AN INTRODUCTION

TO THE

POLITICAL UPHEAVAL AT MEDINA

ON THE DEATH OF

MUHAMMAD, THE PROPHET OF ISLAM

By

Muhammad Sultan Mirza, M.A., L.L.B.,District & Session Judge, (Retd.)

Published, by

A GROUP OF MUSLIM BROTHERS

P. 0. Box No.11365-1545,

Tehran - (IRAN).

IN THE NAME OF ALLAH,THE MOST COMPASSIONATE,

THE MERCIFUL.

Praise belongs to Allah, the Lord of all beings;the Most Compassionate, the Merciful;

the Master of the Day of Judgment;Thee only we serve, and to Thee alone we pray

for succour;Guide us in the straight path;

the path of those whom Thou hast blessed,who are immune from Thy wrath

and have never gone astray.

O'Allah! send your blessings to the head of

your messengers and the last ofyour prophets, Muhammad

and his pure and cleansed progeny.Also send your blessings to all your

prophets and envoys.

Dear Reader,

The book you mow have in hand is oneof the many Islamic publications distributedby this Group throughout the world in differentlanguages with the aim of conveying the messageof Islam to the people of the world.

You

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A GROUP OF MUSLIM BROTHERS.

CONTENTS

LIST OF TRANSLITERATIONS ... ... ... ... ...

Page

3

INTRODUCTION ... ... ... ... .................. 5

A. DIRECT EVIDENCE ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 15

B. CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ... ... ... ... 30

NOTES ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 51

In the Name of Allah, The Beneficent,

The Merciful

INTRODUCTION

There was a great upheaval, a veritablerevolution at Medina on the death of the Pro-phet. Muhammad had not left the communityin any doubt as to the person who was to suc-ceed him in the spiritual and temporal headshipof Islam. He had often, notably at GhadirKhumm on the occasion of his return journey

5

from the last hajj, declared in unequivocableterms that `Ali would succeed him, and on thisoccasion, he formally announced his appoint-ment as his successor. But there was a partyamong his companions who were determinedto seize power and place their own man on thethrone. How they achieved their object is fullydescribed in this book: "The Political Upheavalat Medina on the Death of Muhammad, theProphet of Islam." by Aqa Muhammad SultanMirza, District and Sessions Judge, (Retd.). TheBook is concerned chiefly with analysing andcriticising the theory on the basis of which theso-called election was arranged at Saqifah. Thistheory is the dogmatic assertion, supported nei-ther by facts nor by logic, that the Prophet ofIslam did not designate anyone as his successor.From this they wanted the people to concludethat their meeting at Saqifah to select a successorof the Prophet was not only quite justified but

6

was also absolutely necessary. All the rewardsand allurements that a ruling fiction can offerand all the threats and punishments that are inits power were employed to weave this ideainto the warp and woof of the very existence ofthe Islamic Nation. To give it greater securityand immunity from criticism, it has been takeninto the fold of religion. But after all, the factremains that this is purely a question of history.and must be treated as such. It is the first con-cern of the historians of Islam to describe theconstitution of the Islamic State founded byMuhammad; and how the head of a State is tobe appointed, is the chief question relating tothe constitution of that State. It has been provedin this treatise that the arrangement by whichthe head of the State was appointed at Saqifahwas neither open election nor honest selection.An appeal is made to impartial historians, un-hindered by considerations of religion and un-

7

mindful of noisy propaganda, to examine thisassertion and theory critically in the light ofproved facts and dictates of sound reason,and give their own finding, regardless of all con-siderations, political, religious or social. That his"loving" companions left the dead body of theProphet to take part in the meeting at Saqifah,that his relatives including `Ali remained by hisside, overwhelmed by the great calamity thathad befallen the whole nation, that he diedbefore noon on Monday and was not buried tilllate at night on Wednesday according to some

1

and till late at night on Tuesday according toa minority including Mawlawi Shibli,

2 that his

funeral was not taken through the town to asecluded place in the graveyard and that on thisoccasion also as on other similar disputed occa-sions Abu Bakr came out with an alleged sayingof the Prophet which no one else had heard andwhich has no rationalistic basis that Prophets

8

9

are buried at the very place where they die,

3

and that, therefore, he was buried in the hujrah(room) of Abu Bakr's daughter, `A'ishah, areclear indications that all was not well, and thatthere was something wrong somewhere. Thisbook discloses what that something was andwhere it was wrong.

It must be patent to every student ofHistory that some of those historical facts thecorrectness of which had for centuries beenconsidered as finally established were eventuallydiscovered to be incorrect, but that it was onlywhen the causes that had given rise to them hadceased to exist, and the passions and prejudicesthat had nursed them had subsided. He oftenfinds crystals of historical truth lying concealedin the layers of falsehood accumulated throughcenturies of religious fanaticism, personal pre-judices or state policies of rulers who had gained

10

the throne after a struggle, open or secret, butnot based on right and justice. Their first neces-sity is to gain control of History and Propaganda,and stiffle any the slightest voice that is or maybe raised in favour or sympathy of their defeatedrivals. A criticism of their policy, nay, even oftheir daily movements and actions is taken to bean offence against State to be atoned for withnothing less than life. This has been the govern-ing principle of politicians from the age ofHannibal to the days of Hitler, and this in spiteof that much-talked-of boon called ModernCivilisation which is held to be the last wordon all that is best and wisest in Man. That greathistorian of Muslim Spain, Dr. J. A. Conde, haslaid down a maxim of universal applicationwhich may serve as a guide to all who want towrite impartial history, and have an ambition tooccupy the position of an impartial judge of thePast. He says:

"A sort of fatality attaching itself to humanaffairs would seem to command that in therelation of historical events those of the highestimportance should descend to posterity throughthe justly suspected channels of narrations writ-ten by the conquering parties. The mutation ofempires, the most momentous revolutions andthe overthrow of the most renowned dynastiesseem all to be liable to this disadvantage; it wasby the Romans that the history of their ownaggrandisement was written; the narration oftheir rivalry and sanguinary wars with theCarthaginians has come down to us from them-selves; or if Greek writers have also treated thesubject, these men were the tributaries anddependants of Rome, nor did they spare theflatteries best calculated to conciliate her favour.Scipio thus appears to us the most admirable ofheroes, but is not that in part because the historyof his life is the work of his admirers and flat-

1 1

12

terers? 1t is true that the noble and illustriousHannibal cannot look otherwise than great andglorious even in the narratives of his mortalenemies, but if the implacable hatred andaggressive policy of Rome had not commandedthe destruction of all the Punic annals, therenowned African general would doubtless ap-pear to us under an aspect differing much fromthat presented by the ruthless barbarian, des-cribed by Livy and accepted by his readers asthe portrait of Hannibal., ,4

What a striking resemblance with the earlyhistory of the khilafah (caliphate) and its heroes,which was the result of a struggle between twoparties, one of which won the throne by a veryclever coup d'etat. Under the circumstances, it isapparent, as Conde goes on to remark that "asound and just discrimination forbids us tocontent ourselves with the testimony of one

13

side only, this requires that we compare the rela-tions of both parties with careful impartiality,and commands us to cite them with no otherpurpose than that of discovering the truth."

5

It is really very strange that the Europeanwriters on Islamic History have entirely lost sightof this wholesome axiom based on mere common sense, and have accepted, with credulityalmost criminal, the version of the events of thattroublous period as published by the party thathad won the throne and displaced the rightfulheirs by means of a very skilfully plannedcoup d'etat giving rise to a fierce and longdrawn struggle between the two parties and theirrepresentatives, in which one party had almostalways the upper hand. And this in spite oftheir knowing, or having enough material attheir disposal to know the following facts:

14

The appointment of a successor to theProphet at Saqifah Bani Sa'idah was not anopen, sincere and peaceful affair. It was a veryskillfully arranged scheme to capture the throneafter the death of the Prophet. That it was nei-ther open and sincere nor peaceful is apparentfrom both (a) direct and (b) circumstantialevidence.

A. DIRECT EVIDENCE

i) As soon as the Islamic movement enteredits first stage of expansion, meeting and defeat-ing the rival forces in the open field, it becameclear to all thinking persons that an IslamicState was in the making. This idea grew instrength with time, and took possession of themind of ambitious spirits;

l5

1 6

ii) The utterances of the Prophet and hisconduct combined with the outstanding person-ality of `Ali and his services in the cause ofIslam particularly his feats in the field of battlehad not left any doubt that he had been markedout by the Prophet as his successor in thespiritual and temporal office.

There was another party which, as `Umaribn al-Khattab rightly said

6 was bitterly opposed

to this combination of nubuwwah (prophecy)and khilafah in one family, as they were averseto the rise, over other tribes, of one family,which looked to them un-precendented andintolerable. This combined with the ambitiousrivalry and jealousy of some and the personalhatred against `Ali of others whose. relatives hehad killed in the battles of Islam and who didnot like his extreme zeal in the cause of Islamgave rise to a very noisy and powerful party

17

against the house of the Prophet as representedby `Ali. There was a third party of rich andinfluential people who expected, as their birthright, a preferential treatment at the hands ofthe Caliph, and who rightly surmised that `Aliwas not the proper person in this respect, as hewould never sacrifice his principles of justice andequity for their sake, in fact, for any one's sake.Naturally enough, this party wanted a pliantruler who should pander to their wishes, andtreat them as privileged people superior to thecommon run of men. All these factors joinedtogether to give birth to a very powerful factionagainst `Ali; they had their own designs on thethrone. Though open opposition to the Prophetwas impossible during his life, yet they were notentirely inactive even then. They tried secretlyto secure adherents to their cause by takingadvantage of every event that took place. Theypointed to the conduct and the utterances of the

18

Prophet which appeared to them as giving unduepreference to `Ali, they criticised the conduct ofthe Prophet when he confided his secrets to `Aliat an exclusive meeting with him,

7 their mur-

murings amounted almost to open revolt whenthe Prophet passed a general order requiring allthe companions whose houses opened into themosque, except `Ali to close their doors. Thesewere thus shut out of the mosque, and theexception was galling to them.8 The members ofthis clique took a great advantage of this eventto spread disaffection among the companionsand to secure adherents to their cause. Theywent to the extent of expressly disobeying thecommands of the Prophet which seemed tothem as creating opportunities for the smoothsuccession of `Ali.

9 They did not hesitate to plan

the death of the Prophet. They could not conceal their chagrin, and bitterly criticised his lastspeech at Ghadir Khumm holding up `Ali to the

1 9

sight of a huge gathering as his successor. TheProphet himself was aware of the existence ofthis very powerful faction among his compan-ions. The Qur'anic verse hints at the existenceof a party to whom the succession of `Ali wasdistasteful, and for that reason they wereprepared to go to the extent of causing harmto the Prophet.

iii) The attempts of this party to foil theefforts of the Prophet that were intended toprovide means for the peaceful succession of`Ali. Clear instances of these attempts arerecorded in History. During his last illness, theProphet thought that `Ali might succeed peace-fully if these ambitious members and leadersof this party were out of Medina at the time ofhis death. He, therefore, ordered all his compan-ions except `Ali and Banu Hashim to go out andjoin the army under Usamah ibn Zayd that was

20

to invade the Roman territory to avenge thedefeat and death of Zayd, father of Usamah.It appears that this punitive expedition had beenpostponed for this occasion intentionally. Theleaders of the opposite party were shrewdenough to realise the significance of this expedi-tion at this juncture, and refused to go. TheProphet continued urging the need of immediatemarch, but they kept evading the orders. Theydid not move out, and the Prophet died.10

Another instance of this criminal and un-abashed disobedience of the express orders ofthe Prophet came during the same illness whenthe Prophet expressed his wish to write a willappointing `Ali as his successor. The leaders ofthis opposition party prohibited the people fromsupplying the writing material to the Prophet,saying that the Prophet was delirious and talkingnon-sense.11 It is significant that Abu Bakr

2 1

wrote his last will when he was so ill that hefainted during the dictation, so much so that`Uthman who was scribing the will wrote thename of `Umar ibn Khattab in the will whileAbu bakr was unconscious, fearing lest he mightnot regain conscious and die without completingthe will.12

This shows the extent to which themembers of this party were prepared to go.They would not hesitate even to forge a will andfoist it upon the nation. On that occasion thecharge of ravings of a diseased brain was notlevelled. On the other hand, `Umar ibn al-Khat-tab himself took out the document and forcedthe people to declare allegiance to what was writ-ten in it, with out announcing the contents. 13

iv) At the meeting of the Sagifah where theCaliph was to be "elected,"' Ali and his relatives,in fact Banu Hashim were not invited not eveninformed of it. 14

22

v) The possibility of a necessity arising touse force at the meeting at the Saqifah was notlost sight of by the actors of the Coup, and hadbeen amply provided for. They had an armedforce in Banu Sulaym ready for the occasion;and when the altercations reached a criticalstage, they did intervene. `Umar ibn al-Khattabsays that he was not sure of his success until thearmed force of Banu Sulaym had arrived on thescene. 15

vi) The ansar (Helpers) were not averse to'Ali's succeeding the Prophet; but the deeds andintrigues of the Opposition party of the muhaji-run (Immigrants) had convinced them that theywould never accept `Ali and would get their ownman placed on the throne. The ansar, could not,of course, tolerate this. They were, therefore,forced to set up their own man, Sa'd ibn` Ubadah as a candidate for the caliphate. They

23

were not the first to move in the matter; longbefore they collected at the Saqifah, Abu Bakrhad asked the people to come and elect a caliphfrom among themselves. This election speechwas given just after the death of the Prophetwhen the speaker returned from his house atas-Sunh and saw his associate biding time bydeclaring, sword in hand, that he would killanyone who would say that the Prophet haddied. It is said that `Umar's extreme love forthe Prophet caused him this loss of his senses.But this ebullition of exuberant love subsidedat the sight of his comrade Abu Bakr, and thenboth of them went to the Saqifah as if, to usethe words of Shibli, nothing had happened. 16

It seems that after this temporary politic loss,the senses returned with a vengeance. Shibli isforced to admit that this seeming loss was notdue to any softer feelings, but that it was apolitical move to~arrest the news of the Prophet's

24

death from spreading.17 All this is a clear proofof the fact that this opposition party of themuhajirun and not the ansar were the first tomove in the matter and start opposition against`Ali. The ansar stood up, not to oppose `Ali butto present a front against this party. The factthat after the people had been tricked or coercedinto paying homage to the candidate of thisparty the ansar accepted the fait accompli anddid not rise in revolt against the establishedauthority who used all means in his power toguard against this eventuality has more explana-tions than one and is quite irrelevant in thepresent discussion.

vii) This opposition party laid their plansvery carefully and moved very cautiously. Theyforesaw possible lines of friction, and proceededto smooth their way all round. They had theirspies among the ansar, and had also tried to sow

25

dissentions among them. The speeches and thedefections that took place in the meeting at theSaqifah clearly indicate that this policy ofcreating divisions among the enemy succeededvery well.

viii) After the so-called election at theSaqifah, there was a bitter controversy, nay,open hostility, between the ansar and the muha-jirun over the question of outsing `Ali from thecaliphate, and `Ali took the part of the ansar.

ix) The so-called election was defective inmany material points; it was not representative,no intimation of it had been given to the nationnot even to the persons about whom every bodyknew that their leader had the best right to thekhilafah and had been selected for it by theProphet.

26

x) The election was, therefore, neitherunanimous nor complete; Banu Hashim, BanuUmayyad, Banu Zuhrah, Zubayr, Sa'd ibn AbiWaqqas, `Abd ar-Rahman ibn Awf, `Utbah ibnAbi Lahab, Khalid ibn Saeed ibn al-'As, al-Migdad ibn `Amr, Salman al-Farsi, 'Ammar ibnYasir, al-Buraa ibn `Azib, Ubayy ibn Ka'b, Sa` dibn `Ubadah and his party all declined to dohomage to Abu Bakr. These persons occupiedhigh positions in the nation.

xi) The first care, therefore of the opposi-tion which was now the Government Party wasto win these persons over by threats or entice-ments and both were used in abundance. `Umaribn al-Khattab went with sword and fire towardsthe house of `Ali, and threatened to burn thehouse over them if they did not come out andpay homage to the Caliph. It was reminded tohim that Fatimah, the daughter of the Prophet

27

was also in that house. He replied, "Let her be,I do not mind."19

He also went to the mosquewhere those reluctant people had collected, andbeat them into submission.

20 ` Ali went to the

Caliph, but did not do the homage, thoughothers had been terrified into submission.

xii) The allurements offered by the Govern-ment were not less effective. The Caliph sentvaluable gifts to win over the people to his side;most of them accepted them, but we hear of awidow who disdainfully refused to sell herconscience to them. 21

xiii) The arguments that were made at tlicSaqifah at the time of the so-called "election*were concerned solely with the question whetherthe Caliph should be selected out of the muha-jirun or out of the ansar; they mentioned neitherthe good of the State as the criterion or aim of

28

the election nor the abilities of any candidate.The wishes of the Prophet were not even hintedat. All this shows beyond all doubt that theparty interest and not the good of the State wasthe object on which they had set their heart.

xiv) During his Caliphate, `Umar ibn al-Kha-

ttab heard the unpleasant news of a man sayingthat when `Umar would die, they would win theCaliphate for `Ali by the same contrivance bywhich Abu Bakr had been placed on thethrone. This was too unpleasant to be entertain-ed even in thought; this set him thinking,and he came to the conclusion that thoughthe hit had secured the boundary for him, yetthat it was neither lawful nor reasonable andhad set a dangerous example. He, therefore,ascended the pulpit, and gave a long harangueenlarging on the defects of this coup. Hesummed up his lecture with the order that if

anyone resorted to that sort of contrivancein favour of anyone, both that man and hiscandidate should be slain outright.

22 No better

commentary on the nature and utility of so-called election proceedings can be imagined.The author himself condemns his own work.

29

B. CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

i) The effort of `Umar ibn al-Khattab tocheck the news of the Prophet's death fromspreading, as he was not just then ready, hisassociate Abu Bakr being at as-Sunk, is verymaterial in this enquiry. As soon as the latterarrived, he at once started to put his plans intoaction. His imagination conjured up before hiseyes a rally of 'Ali's friends before he himselfwas ready.

30

3 1

ii) The speech of Abu Bakr on his arrivalwas altogether a party speech, and not abemoaning oration. He chastised the peoplefor mourning over the loss of their Prophetand Benefactor; and invited them to select asuccessor.

iii) When they all were collected round thedead body of the Prophet, one of the spiesappointed for the purpose came, and concealinghimself behind a wall called `Umar ibn al-Khat-tab alone to himself, and informed him thatthe meeting at the Saqifah to nominate a Caliphhad started.23

iv) `Umar kept the news a secret from allexcept Abu Bakr whom he took with himselfand both started towards Saqifah. On the way,Abu `Ubaydah ibn Jarrah met them as if byappointment. Of all the muhajirun, these three

32

persons alone were present at the Saqifahmeeting.

24 On the way, two more spies met

and gave them the news of the Sagifah.

25

v) The next important factor is the placeof the meeting. Saqifah was an out-of-the-wayplace where dacoits, ruffians and women mongers used to assemble and contrive means for theexecution of their nefarious projects. 26 It wasat a distance from the mosque of the Prophetand his house. See how the plan is being keptsecret from 'Ali and his relatives. The wholeidea was to inflict it upon him as a fait accompli.

vi) The time chosen for action was inkeeping with this plan. They knew the loftynature of 'Ali and his high ideals. They wereperfectly sure that 'Ali would not leave thedead body of the Prophet to join in the racefor worldly, sordid gains.

33

vii) Had it been a frank, open and honestelection or selection, they would have waitedtill the obsequies were over, and then wouldhave invited the whole nation to a commonmeeting place, preferably the mosque wheresuch political meetings had taken place before,and were taken after this incident. There was noimmediate need. They ought to have suggestedto the ansar the advisibility of attending firstto the funeral of the Prophet.

viii) The most important point to note inthis connection is that they anticipated theeventuality of using force, and made arrange-ments for it.

ix) The coup was over, in the heat andhaste of the moment, the people had donehomage to Abu Bakr; now they found time torepent at leisure when the right and the wrong

34

of the matter began to dawn upon them; theybegan to blame each other for acting hastily andfalling a prey to the machinations of a party.This was to be provided against, and it was done.Hastily and en masse, they were sent out onforeign expeditions which developed into Persianand Roman wars. It was in consonance. withArab nature; Arabs were passionately fond ofwomen, loot and fighting, and this happy strokeof statesmanship provided them with all theywanted. There was a bit of pass-time nearerhome as well. Some of the tribes did notacknowledge Abu Bakr to be the rightful Caliph;they therefore, refused to pay him zakat whichwas in the nature of a tax. This was a dangerousbeginning which might develop into a poisonousgrowth. But a mere denial of zakat cannot be agood cause for killing a Muslim. It was, there-fore, given out that they were renegades fromIslam. It was not an organised rebellion, and

3 5

those people were speedily over-come. But thearmies were not allowed to come to Medina.While they were on the way, they were orderedto invade Persia and Rome, though these count-ries had given no cause for this action. SuchImperialistic wars are not permitted in Islam.But to avoid internal trouble, they had to beundertaken. This is a contrivance which has beenvery often adopted by statesmen in similarcircumstances.

In the face of this overwhelming evidence,it would be sheer folly to deny the followingfacts which are fully established:-

1. The succession to the Prophet wasa disputed one;

2. There were distinctly two parties to thisdispute. One party put forth `Ali as the rightful

36

claimant to the succession by virtue of hisability, kinship with the Prophet and his desig-nation by the Prophet as his heir and successor;the other party headed by certain leaders hadan eye on the throne.

3. Various causes which have been detailedin the book contributed to the success of thislatter party. They captured the Caliphate bymeans of the coup which has been mentionedabove. Henceforth, naturally enough, their mainconcern was to keep down the rival party byany means, fair or foul. For this purpose, thefirst thing that they did was to divide theMuslim nation into two factions, (i) Compa-nions, and (ii) Ahlu'1-bayt, that is, the descen-dants of the Prophet. The Government partyidentified itself with the Companions, and triedto win over all the companions by this move.They won them over to their side by represent-

37

ing to them that if the ruling power was onceacquired by `Ali it would remain in the familyof the Prophet, and they would never be ableto get it, but that if it were confined to themalone, everyone of them might hope to get itin his turn. During the proceedings at Saqifahthe question of ability and fitness was not allow-ed to come in. In short, the children of theProphet were from the very beginning con-sidered as a rival party and throughout theperiod of the Caliphate were treated as such. Thecoup at Saqifah marks the beginning of thatseries of calumnies, cruelties, insults, indignities,inhuman brutalities, injustices, ill-treatments,whole-sale massacres, un-justifiable and jealoussurveillance, false accusations as excuses forkillings, and long periods of incarcerations towhich these innocent children of the Prophetwere subjected throughout the history of theCaliphate; their only sin was that they were

38

born in his house.

Having ascertained that there were twoparties, one of which won the throne and theother was considered as a dangerous rival, weproceed to find who wrote the history and howit was written.

The Government party has come to becalled "Sunnis" in common parlance. We havethe testimony of a great Sunni historian of IndiaShibli, that all the great works on Islamic His-tory known to the world have been written bythe Sunnis.

27

Let us see how it was written and whocontrolled the writing of it. Mu'awiyah, theUmayyad king who was at war with `Alithroughout the period of the latter's Caliphateand who eventually wrested the Caliphate from

39

Imam Hasan, the son of `Ali, was the first toturn his attention to History. He got a historyof the ancients written by `Ubayd whom hecalled from Yemen. Marwan who had beenexiled by the Prophet for his anti-Islamic activi-ties and who had a great influence with `Uthmanwas the implacable foe of `Ali. His son `Abd al-Malik ascended the throne in 65 A.H. He wasthe first Islamic king who ordered the compila-tion of Islamic History, hadith (tradition) and

tafsir (Interpretation of the Qur'an). He askedthe learned people to write works on thesesubjects, az-Zuhri, the first celebrated historianof Islam, wrote his history under the orders of` Abd al-Malik. He also wrote works on hadith;

he is one of the preceptors of al-Bukharf. Hewas attached to the royal court of `Abd al-Malik,and was the tutor of his sons. Of the pupils ofaz-Zuhri, two persons, viz. Musa son of `Ugbahand Muhammad ibn Ishaq obtained great renown

40

as historians. The former was a slave of thehouse of Zubayr. His history, though now notavailable, had for a long time been the mostpopular work on history; its references are foundin many books on this subject. Muhammad ibnIshaq is the most celebrated historian. His bio-graphy of the Prophet is still the accreditedauthority on the subject in the shape that wasgiven to it by Ibn Hisham, and is known as theas-Sirah of Ibn Hisham. az-Zuhri is the first tocompile hadith also.

28 Their works on history

and hadith are the authorities on the basis ofwhich works on these two subjects were writtenafterwards. This evidence proves the followingfacts:-

1. hadith and History were first compiled underthe orders of the Umayyad kings;

2. The first authors were az-Zuhri and his twcpupils, Musa and Muhammad;

4 1

3. These authors were attached to the royalcourt of the Umayyad kings.

The inveterate enmity and un-dying hatredof the house of Umayyad against Banu Hashim,chiefly the Prophet and `Ali, is much too wellknown to need any comment on our part. Thewars of Abu Sufyan and his son Mu'awiyahagainst the Prophet and `Ali respectively, themachinations of Marwan against the Prophetand Islam, his avowed enmity against `Ali, thehorrible massacres at Karbala' perpetrated bythe armies of Yazid in compliance with hisorders are only some of the top items of a longlist of such crimes. Mu'awiyah instituted thecustom of anathematising from the pulpits thememory of `Ali and his descendants whichcontinued for full forty years until discontinuedby `Umar ibn `Abd al-`Aziz who proved himselftoo good to live under Umayyad atmosphere,

42

and was, therefore, poisoned by the descendantsof Umayyad. 29 These were the persons underwhose orders and influence the history of Islamwas written. What justice they would do to `Aliand his rights and title can be left to the bestimagination to picture.

Let us mention the directions under whichthe books of history and hadith were compiled.Mu'awiyah issued three series of orders in thisconnection. They are fully detailed with re-ference in the Book. He ordered that:-

i) The virtues of `Ali and the sayings of theHoly Prophet showing 'Ali's superiority over allothers should be suppressed;

ii) Anyone narrating those virtues andthose sayings should be severely punished, hissubsidies and allowances should be suppressed,

43

he should not be employed in State Service,social relations with him should be cut off, hishouses and properties should be forfeited, andeventually, if he did not desist from thispractice, he should be killed.

iii) On the other hand, all imaginablevirtues should be attributed to Abu Bakr, `Umarand `Uthman; people should be encouraged, bymeans of rewards in money and lands, to coinsayings extolling the virtues of these personagesand ascribe those sayings to the Prophet. Suchpersons should be reported to the Caliph ofDamascus who would fix subsidies for them,admit them to his royal court, and honourthem by other means.

Details and references to authorities aregiven in the Book. History thus shaped andhadith thus moulded have reached us and have

44

been circulated in the whole of the World.And this is the history which European authorsand writers have made the basis and source oftheir works on Islam.

It must be crystal clear to all by now thatIslamic History has been written by the partywho won the throne on the death of theProphet, and that there was another party whoclaimed that the Prophet had designated `Alias his successor.30

The next question for determination is:whether, apart from the usual political needsand natural temptings which induce a con-querring party to give a particular shape to theevents which they wish the world to know andthe posterity to receive, the party which wonthe throne on the death of the Prophet wasunder any pressing need to mould the events

4 5

and formulate any particular theories to justifythe coup d'etat carried out by them at theSaqifah. The need is obvious; their very existencedepended on it. Cogent evidence culled from thebooks of this party has been furnished by thebook to show that the Prophet had designated`Ali as his successor. As Muslims, they couldnot disobey any order of the Prophet. The onlycourse open to them was to deny that theProphet had designated `Ali or anyone else ashis successor. Once they admitted that theprophet has designated anyone as his successor,

all their doings and proceedings at Saqifah wereto become null and void. If they were to remainon die throne, they had to make the peoplebelieve that the Prophet had not nominated orselected anyone as his successor. It is quitesimple to understand that if they had acceptedthe position. that the Holy Prophet had appoint-ed his own successor; their meeting at Sagifah

46

and the subsequent election or selection of AbuBakr would have lost all validity, and in factthe election would have been a nullity. Theirtrumph-card was the denial of the Holy Pro-phet's mandate of having appointed `Ali as hissuccessor, and it was only on this glaring denialcould they hoodwink the public and cling totheir power. For their existence they must cointhe theory and stick to it that the Prophet didnot designate anyone as his successor. This wasthe soul of their Saqifah Coup. They, therefore,used all the means in their power to givecurrency to this view of theirs, to propagate itby means of propaganda, rewards and threats.In fact, every allurement that royal power couldhold out, every means that the man on thethrone could have in his power were used andemployed to instil this theory into the mindsof the people and keep it alive and going onfrom generation to generation. We have the

47

authority of a great Sunni divine and historian,Shibli, to prove the fact that all histories havebeen written by Sunni authors. In fact, this wasin keeping with the whole trend of their dip-loiacy. No one holding a contrary view couldbe allowed to write a history that would not fitin with the policy of the ruling party. When thiswas the state of things, how could one expectthe contrary view to find a place in the historiesthat were compiled and circulated under thedirect supervision of the Government. Naturallythe foreign countries adopted the view that wasfound in all the books of history written by theMuslims themselves. It requires great courageand erudition in a foreignor to differ with theunanimous view held by almost all the nativehistorians whose books are the only source ofinformation to him. I am sure that for variousreasons which need not be detailed here theforeign writers of Islamic history have not

48

bestowed that attention and care on the ques-tion of the Prophet's succession which itsimportance deserves. It is obvious that nointelligent human being whom nature has pro-vided with faculties of discernment, discrimi-nation and judgment would accept the theorythat the Prophet did not designate his successor,as foreign writers appear to have done. To us theacceptance of this theory on non-appointmentby foreign writers is as much of a problem as themost difficult question in Law or politicscan be. Why should this have happened has beenconsidered at length in the book and cogentreasons have been given as to why this theoryprof ounded by the Government party has founda ready acceptance in Europe in spite of its beingentirely against facts and throughly opposedto reason. In the name of Truth, Justice andDecency an appeal is made to the reader tosurvey the whole situation, weigh and judge

49

the facts and then give his final and consideredjudgment. This is the only thing that is requiredof him who cares to go through this Book.Established opinions and long accepted theoriescreate a sort of prejudice in the mind againsteverything that appears to disturb them. Buttruth stands on a much higher level thanPrejudice. This book has been written pri-marily for European scholars of history, andthe author will consider himself amply re-warded if they read this book from coverto cover even though as hostile critics. It iscertain in the end they will find themselvessupporting the view which they had begunby criticising. The author has taken it uponhimself to give authorities for every contestedpoint and that too from the accredited worksof the opposite party. The value of this Booklies in its three characteristics, viz:-

i) Sound Logic;

ii) Appeal to Reason; and

iii) Correct and apt references to reliable

authorities.

THE END

50

NOTES

1. at-Tabari, at-Tarikh, Cairo, vol.ll, pp.205-207;Ibn Hisham, as-Sirah, Cairo, voLIV, p.343.

2.

Shibli, as-Sirah an-nabawiyyah, vol.11, p.143.3.

ibid, p.144.4,

History of the Arabs in Spain, translated fromthe Spanish of Dr. J. A. Conde by Mrs. JonathanFoster, vol.1, p.l.

5.

History of the Dominion of the Arabs in Spain,vol.1, p.2.

6.

Shibli.

al-Faruq,

, Foot-Note

on

pp.204-205;at-Tabari, at-Tarikh, vol.V, pp.30-32; Ibn al-Athir, Tarikh al-kamil, vol.111, pp.24-25.

7.

Khwand Mir, Habib assiyar, vol.l, Part Three,p.66; `Abd al-Hagq, Ashi"at al-lumu`at f sharpal-mishkat, vol.IV, p.666; `Ubaydallah, Arjah al-matalib, chap.IV, p.695.

51

52

8. Ahmad Hanbal, al-Musnad, vol.I, pp.175,330;vol.II, p.26; vol.IV, p.369; Naysaburi, al-Mustadrak`ala as-sahihayn, vol.III, pp.117,125,134; IbnKathir ash-Shami, at-Tarikh, vol.VII, p.122; as-Suyuti, ad-burr al-manthur, vol.Vl, p.122; IbnHajar al-`Asgalani, Fath al-bari, Commentary onal-Bukhari, vol.VII, p.59.

9. al-Tabari, at-Tarikh, vol.III, pp.188-190; Husaynal-Diyar Bakri, Tarikh al-khamis, vol.II, p.120;Ibn `Asakir, at-Tarikh, vol.I, pp.117,119,121;Khwand Mir, Habib as-siyar, vol.I, Part Three,p.77; Ibn al-Athir, Tarikh al-kamil, vol.II, pp.120-121.

10. Same as Note no.9; `Abd al-Hagq, Madarij an-nubuwwah, vol.I1, pp.530-531; Shahristani, al-Milal waTnihal; Ibn Abil-Hadid, Commentaryon Nahj al-balaghah, vol.I, p.53; vol.II, p.20.

11. Sahih of al-Bukhari, in seven places, e.g. chap. on

Kitab al-`ilm , chap. on `Kitab al-jihad; Sahih ofMuslim, Cairo, vol.V, pp.75-76; Ahmad Hanbal,al-Musnad, vol.I, pp.355 356; Shahristani, al-Milalwal -nihal, on the margin of K̀itab al-Fisal, by IbnHazm, p.23.

53

12. at-Tabari, at-Tarikh, vol.IV, p.25; Ibn al-Athir,Tarikh al-kamil, vol.I1, p.163; Husayn al-DiyarBakri, Tarikh al-khamis, vol.1I, p.268.

13. at-Tabari, at-Tarikh, vol.IV, p.52; Ibn al-Athir,Tarikh al-kamil, vol.I1, p.163; Ibn Qutaybah,al-Imamah waTsiyasah, vol.I, p.19.

14. al-Muhib at-Tabari, ar-Riyad an-nadirah, vol.1,Part Two, chap.XIII, p.165; at-Tabari, at-Tarikh,vol.I11, p.208; Ibn `Asakir, at-Tarikh, Part "Tah-dhib."Life of Bashir ibn Sa'd, vol.111, p.263.

15. at-Tabari, at-Tarikh, vol.111, pp.209-210.16. Shibli, al-Faruq, Part One, pp.65-66.17. ibid, p.65.18. Khwand Mir, Habib as-siyar, vol.IV, p.2; Ibn

Abil-Hadid, Commentary on Nahj al-balaghah,vol.11, pp.8,10,13,15,18.

19. at-`Tabari, at-Tarikh, vol.1II, p.198; al-Mas'ndi,Muruj adh-dhahab, vol.I11, p.24; Abul-Fida',at-Tarikh (al-Mukhtasar), vol.1, p.156; Ibn `Abdal-Barr, al-Isti ab, Life of `Abdallah ibn Abi Quha-fah, vol.I. p.345.

20. Ibn Qutaybah, al-Imamah wa alsiyasah, vol.I,pp.l1-12.

54

21. Ibn Sad, Tabagat, vol.111, Part One, p.129; IbnAbi1-Hadtd, Commentary on Nahj al-balaghah,vol.1, pp.74,132-133; Ibn Qutaybah, al-Imamahwa Tsiyasah, voLI, p.15.

22. at-Tabari, at-Tarikh, vol.I11, pp.200,210; Ibn al-Athir, Tarikh al-kamil, vol.I1, p.124; al-Bukhari,Bab: Rajm al-hubla idha ahsanat; Ibn Kathir ash-Shami, at-Tarikh, vo1.V, p.245; Ibn Hajar Makki,as-5awa`iq al-muhrigah, Part One, chap.1, p.5.

23. Shibli, al-Faruq, vol.1, p.66; Abu Ya'la,al-Musnad,cited by Shibli.

24. al-Muhib at-Tabari, ar-Riyad an-nadirah, vol.l, PartTwo, chap.XIII, p.165; at-Tabari, at-Tarikh, vol.111, p.208; Jalal ad-Din Abu'1-Faraj ibn Jawzi,on the Life of `Umar, chap.XXVI, pp.32, 35.

25. Same as above.26. The Arabic-Persian Dictionaries: Muntakhab al-

lughat; Ghiyas al-lughat; Chiragh-i hidayat on themargin of Ghiyas al-lughat.

27. Shibli, al-Ma'mun, Part 1, p.61.28. For this account of the eimpilation and writing of

History and Hadith, see Shibli, as-Shah an-naba-wiyyah, vol.1, Part One, pp.13, 15-17.

55

29. Amir `Ali, History of the Saracens, chap.X, pp.126-127.

30. Mas'udi, Muruj adh-dhahab, vol.I, p.28.