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Contemporary South Asia

ISSN: 0958-4935 (Print) 1469-364X (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ccsa20

SAARC and subregional co‐operation: Domesticpolitics and foreign policies in South Asia

Md Nuruzzaman

To cite this article: Md Nuruzzaman (1999) SAARC and subregional co‐operation: Domesticpolitics and foreign policies in South Asia, Contemporary South Asia, 8:3, 311-322, DOI:10.1080/09584939908719871

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09584939908719871

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Contemporary South Asia (1999) 8(3), 311-322

SAARC and subregionalco-operation: domestic politics andforeign policies in South Asia

MD NURUZZAMAN

ABSTRACT In 1997, intense debate engulfed Bangladesh domestic politics over the questionof subregional co-operation with India, Bhutan and Nepal within the South Asian Associationfor Regional Co-operation (SAARC). Whilst the political opposition depicted the proposedsubregional co-operation scheme as an Indian ploy to undermine the national sovereignty andindependence of Bangladesh, the ruling Awami League viewed it as essential for nationaleconomic development. This paper examines the scheme's rationale, maps out the nature ofits political opposition, analyses India's position, and highlights Pakistani and Sri Lankanconcerns as to the nature of subregional co-operation in South Asia. It concludes thatminimum value consensus between the political parties on fundamental national issues in allSAARC countries, particularly in Bangladesh, and better political understandings between thegovernments of the region are the prerequisites to make the scheme for subregionalco-operation a success.

In 1997, domestic politics in Bangladesh witnessed a fierce debate over the issueof subregional co-operation within the South Asian Association for RegionalCo-operation (SAARC) framework. The debate started after Bangladesh andNepal had proposed at the 17th meeting of the SAARC Council of Ministers(New Delhi, 19-20 December 1996) that subregional co-operation be initiatedamong Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and the northeastern states of India onmutually agreed areas. The proposal immediately led to an unprecedentedpolarization of political forces in Bangladesh. The political opposition,specifically the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), the largest opposition in theJatiya Sangsad (National Assembly), expressed vehement opposition to theproposed subregional grouping. BNP politicians and pro-BNP intellectualspainted the new venture as a grave threat to the national sovereignty andindependence of Bangladesh.1 The grouping was actually designed, they con-tended, to materialize India's interest and superpower aspirations in South Asia.2

Correspondence: Md Nuruzzaman, Department of Political Science, University of Alberta, Canada.

0958-4935/99/030311-12 © 1999 Taylor & Francis Ltd

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The Awami League, the ruling party in Dhaka, on the contrary argued thatsubregional co-operation was essential for the country's economic progress. Thedebate was very intense in nature and the civil society, as a whole, becamesharply divided over the proposed subregional co-operation scheme.

Against the backdrop of high political controversy over sub-regional cooper-ation, this paper seeks to address what factors led the Awami League govern-ment, in consonance with its Nepalese counterpart, to propose a sub-regionalgrouping within SAARC and why the political opposition in Bangladeshopposed the new grouping. It also will attempt to analyse the position of Indiavis-a-vis the proposed sub-regional scheme. Finally, it will try to highlight thefuture possibilities of a sub-regional cooperative in South Asia.

Why subregional co-operation?

The need for increased economic co-operation among geographically contiguouscountries has been a dominant feature of the global political economy ever sincethe emergence of the European Economic Community (EEC) in the late 1940sand the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the 1960s. Therationale for such co-operation has been strengthened further in the 1990s by theemergence of regional trading blocs like the European Union (EU) and the NorthAmerican Free Trade Area (NAFTA).

The Asian response to trading blocs has not resulted in any concrete achieve-ments, yet efforts to gear up the tempo of cooperation are there. Co-operation ona subregional basis, or forming what is popularly known as a 'growth triangle',is the latest Asian response to emerging trends in the world economy. Growthtriangles are all about the intensification of economic co-operation on a limitedgeographical scale to attract foreign investments and thus boost export pro-motion. They are based on localized economic zones where geographicallycontiguous countries with different economic sizes, socio-cultural patterns andpolitical systems seek to integrate parts of their territories for mutual gains. A setof complex key factors—the most prominent being foreign direct investment,complementarities in production systems, export-oriented development strategiesand differences in factor costs—facilitates the emergence of growth triangles.3

East and Southeast Asian countries, which have recently achieved unpre-cedented rates of economic growth, were the first Asian states to experimentwith such co-operative designs. Two of the most successful growth triangles arethe Southern China growth triangle (Hong Kong, Taiwan and contiguous coastaleconomic zones in South China), and the Johor (Malaysia)-Singapore-Riau(Indonesia) growth triangle. The clear logic of comparative advantage, a dy-namic relationship between the central governments and regional authorities, andsuccessful policy co-ordination between the concerned governments in theregion have led to the astonishing success of these two growth triangles.4

Some of the more recently created growth triangles include the LowerMekong subregion (Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam), Tumen River

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subregion (China, North Korea, Mongolia and Russia), and the Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand (IMT) growth triangle.

The growth dynamism in East and Southeast Asia based on effective subre-gional co-operation provides the necessary impetus for such co-operation inother parts of the world. In its fifteenth session held in May 1995, the SAARCCouncil of Ministers recommended that effective measures were required for afast-track approach to SAARC, including subregional co-operation with well-defined objectives. The objectives for subregional co-operation in South Asia, asset out by the Concept Paper on Subregional Co-operation prepared by theBangladesh delegation5 are defined as the exploitation of complementarities inresource endowment and comparative advantages through cross-border trade andinvestment flows in a contiguous zone of geographic unity. The utilization ofnatural resources, including the harnessing of the immense water resources,development of hydropower and energy, promotion of trade and investment,expansion of telecommunication network, improvement of infrastructure ofsustained economic development, and development of tourism industry havebeen identified as possible areas of subregional co-operation.

The fast-track approach to SAARC through subregional co-operation involvesthree basic components: development of the private sector, development ofregional communication infrastructure, and equity in development co-operation.6

The private sector undeniably occupies a dominant position in South Asia's tradeand investment. The importance of the private sector, in line with generalpost-Cold War trends, is becoming a fact of economic life in each of the SAARCcountries. Although governments in the region are liberalizing their respectiveeconomies, cross-border interactions and the operation of the private sector arestill not very encouraging. The domestic economic liberalization programmes ofthe SAARC countries are not being matched by a regionally formulatedcross-border liberalization programme. Private sector actors need to be moti-vated to co-operate and integrate through time-bound, business-friendly actionplans. The identification of techno-economically sound projects for joint ven-tures can open up real avenues for the successful integration between the privatesectors of the participating countries. The process may better get off the groundwith subregional efforts that may lead the regional tempo at a later stage.

Closely related to the expansion and integration of the private sector is thedevelopment of regional communication infrastructure, the second-most import-ant component of the fast-track approach. Quick expansion of trade andinvestment requires quick expansion of transport infrastructure, including cross-border linkages in road and rail communications, and navigation lines. Infra-structure development also includes telecommunications, large-scale landdevelopment, water and power supply, and extensive air links between thegrowth areas and the rest of the country to facilitate backward and forwardlinkages. Efforts towards regional integration otherwise can be neither significantnor sustainable.

Prior to the partition of British India in 1947, the different parts of northeastSouth Asia were more or less linked up through 5000 miles of inland waterways

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and a few kilometers of railways. The inland waterways provided extensivetransportation network for the movement of goods and peoples. From Calcuttavia the Brahmaputra River, there were regular steamer services up to Assamthrough Bangladesh.7 The West Bengal province of India and East Bengal (nowBangladesh) were also integrated by road and rail communications. The twowars between India and Pakistan over Kashmir in 1948 and 1965, however, ledto a major disruption of the communication networks in northeast South Asia asthe Pakistan government forbade rail communication and imposed restrictions oninland waterways' transportation between East Pakistan and contiguous parts ofIndia. However, efforts are now underway to restore road communicationbetween Bangladesh and India, and commercial bus services started operatingbetween Dhaka and Calcutta from 9 July following an agreement signed by thetwo countries on 17 June 1999.8

The third most important component for subregional co-operation emerges outof the necessity to ensure equity in developmental co-operation between SAARCmember states. SAARC policy-makers are planning to move from a South AsianPreferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) to a South Asian Free Trade Area(SAFTA) by 2005. But it is vital to recognize that all SAARC states are not onthe same level of development. India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka are comparativelywell-advanced, while Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal are lagging behind in termsof development indices. For example, according to the World DevelopmentReport 1997, the per capita GNP of Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan are US $240,200 and 420, respectively, while those of India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka are US$340, 460 and 700, respectively. The limited production capacities of the leastdeveloped countries also may fail to adequately compete and thus derive anybenefits from operating in the trade regime to be set by SAFTA in 2005. Thus,it is essential that the least developed countries and areas of SAARC co-operatemore effectively to ensure growth with equity under SAFTA.9

The political debate in Bangladesh

The strong rationale for subregional co-operation notwithstanding, domesticpolitics in Bangladesh became highly polarized over proposals for the formationof any such new grouping involving Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and northeastern India. The ruling Awami League viewed subregional co-operation asessential for the economic development of Bangladesh. In her public speechesPrime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wazed stressed the need for the political will anddetermination to create an opportunity for economic development in order tofacilitate trade and economic contacts between the contiguous parts ofBangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and northeast India. She categorically stated hersupport for subregional co-operation as permissible under Article VII of theSAARC Charter, and pointed out that such co-operation was also in practice indifferent parts of the world.10 Awami League law-makers geared up similarefforts to justify the formation of the proposed sub-grouping. Opening up ageneral debate on 'transit and subregional co-operation' in the Jatiya Sangsad on

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15 May 1997, Foreign Minister Abdus Samad Azad stated that 'subregionalco-operation among four nations within the SAARC will complement andsupplement the existing regional co-operation as well'.11

The official position on subregional co-operation was seriously contested bythe opposition in the Jatiya Sangsad. BNP chief and leader of the oppositionBegum Khaleda Zia, categorically termed the move to form the sub-grouping asa design to make the SAARC ineffective and 'establish Indian expansionism'.There was a conspiracy, in her words, 'to destroy the spirit of SAARC'.12

Speaking in a similar tone, BNP law-maker Moshiur Rahman told the JatiyaSangsad that 'India cannot be trusted, they are an aggressive force and they wantto form a greater India (with the countries of this region)'. Another BNPlaw-maker, K.M. Obaidur Rahaman, argued that, while 'we want a goodworking relationship with India ... we can't accept such an agreement as canmake the country into a province of another country'.13

The opposition of the BNP to the subregional grouping centres round threeparticular points.14 Firstly, the proposed grouping undermines the spirit, import-ance, interests and functions of SAARC. As SAARC is the very embodiment ofco-operation of all the countries of South Asia, the formation of a sub-groupingis likely to diminish its effectiveness and make it a loose regional forum.Secondly, once the grouping is formalized, the BNP argues, India would demand'corridor' facilities through Bangladesh in order to help crush armed insurgencyin her northeastern states, endangering Bangladesh's sovereignty and indepen-dence. And, in view of Sino-Indian hostilities, India would use Bangladeshterritory for military purposes whenever any war situation between India andChina arose. Thirdly, the proposed grouping would be superfluous paperwork.The key to regional development is the simulation of growth in the smallernations, not initiatives and additional paperwork at a superstructure-level by amultilateral bureaucracy.

The proponents of subregional co-operation, including Awami League law-makers, dismiss the position of BNP on subregionalism. One newspaper colum-nist accused the BNP of confrontational politics:

for misplaced nationalism, confrontation is of essence; otherwise a populist premise forsuch nationalism cannot be established. If through the subregional grouping, trade andinvestment are promoted, particularly with the seven states of northeast India then thefuture of such nationalist politics is indeed very bleak.13

The proponents of subregionalism also contend that the argument that a subre-gional grouping runs counter to SAARC's spirit miserably fails to accept currenttrends in regional and subregional integration efforts for collective economicprogress.16 The formation of a subregional arrangement within given regionalset-ups, as in ASEAN or in East Asia, are primarily meant to buttress theproduction capacities of the participating states by employing foreign invest-ments and technologies. The founding fathers of SAARC had similar visions asArticle VII of the SAARC charter states: 'The Standing Committee may set upAction Committees comprising Member States concerned with implementation

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of projects involving more than two but not all Member States'. The slowprogress of SAARC in the first decade of its existence—mainly due to Indo-Pakrivalry—makes it imperative to try new efforts at closer co-operation underArticle VII.

The second argument of the opponents to subregional groupings, as itsproponents view it, makes no sense: military attempts to crush insurgency haveproven to be complete failures. Even if India attempts a military solution in itsnortheast, it can do so alone as its modern military transport planes can ferrymilitary equipment and armed personnel at a faster speed than land-basedmethods through corridor facilities. Moreover, corridor facilities throughBangladesh are not essential since India has been successfully containing theinsurgency problem in her northeast right from 1947.17 Additionally, the fear ofa war between China and India can be dismissed because in the post-Cold Warworld, Sine—Indian economic and political interests are converging. Both coun-tries are primarily interested in maintaining a peaceful environment to ensureunhindered economic growth which will allow them to exercise a greater degreeof autonomy in international politics. The present trend of positive developmentsbetween China and India rather indicates that they are in a process of buildingup an Asian balance against the unilateral domination of the United States inAsian affairs. Although India's nuclear explosions in May 1998, avowedly formilitary purposes, and its defence minister's identification of China as thenumber one potential threat to India, slowed the Beijing-New Delhi rapproche-ment process, tensions seem to have subsided since both countries are emphasiz-ing economic values more than military ones. Besides, strategic calculationssuggest that a future war between China and India armed with nuclear weaponsis most unlikely since both parties can lose much and gain nothing out of it. Theslow but progressive trend in Sino-Indian relations suggests that the oldparameters of military hostility, although unlikely to disappear totally, aregradually being replaced by the imperatives of political peace and diplomaticco-operation.

In response to the last argument of the opposition, the proponents ofsubregional co-operation argue that the stimulation of growth is not automatic.It is pushed ahead through massive investment for production and the develop-ment of infrastructure to facilitate further dynamism in the production sector.18

The opportunities for investment in the proposed subregion of Bangladesh,Bhutan, Nepal and northeastern India are enormous once the proposed groupingtakes off. Take the example of hydro-energy production: the subregional group-ing has an undeveloped hydro-energy potential of around 40,000 MW. Theaggregate peak demand in 1992 in the subregion was around 10,400 MW whichis expected to rise to 19,470 MW in 2000, and 32,300 in 2010.19 There neednever be an energy crisis in the subregion should there be co-operation in theenergy sectors. Similar opportunities exist in other sectors like cement, software,ceramics, gas-based fertilizer and power generation.20

The proponents, in a bid to make their case for subregionalism stronger,further highlight the historical linkages, geographic proximity and ecological

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unity of the subregion.21 Bangladesh and northeast India are partners in ahistorical civilization, they form part of the same ecological sub-system, andshare the great rivers of Ganges, Brahmaputra amd Meghna. The cultural patternand practices of the Indian states—particularly West Bengal and Assam—bor-dering Bangladesh are very similar. This is unsurprising as in colonial Indiathese areas were organized in a single administrative unit. Only in 1947 werethey politically separated on a permanent basis. Still, the cultural, historical andcolonial affinity remains as a useful factor that can be exploited to forgeintensive co-operation on a localized basis.

The opposition's political stance against subregional groupings appears to bedriven largely by India's past foreign policy behaviour in South Asia in general,and its odd relations with Dhaka in particular.22 Customarily, India, with regardsto its short-term or long-term interests, has pursued a hard line and uncompro-mising policy in projecting its influence and power vis-a-vis its smaller neigh-bours. This policy objective got robust expression in what ultimately came to belabeled as the 'India Doctrine'—the South Asian version of the Monroe Doctrinein North America. The essence of the doctrine revolves round the recognitionand acceptance of India's paramount position in South Asia's economic, politicaland security systems, both from major external powers and from other states inthe region.23 The doctrine transmitted sufficient alarming signals to all theregion's capitals, including Dhaka which, in particular, had tried after 1975 tochalk out a foreign policy course independent of India. India's overt and covertinterventions in Nepal in 1950-1951 and again in 1961-1962, as well as in SriLanka in 1987 created widespread concern throughout the region. In addition,the evolving patterns of Dhaka-New Delhi relations, particularly after 1975,were characterized by a host of complex issues, the Ganges water-sharingdispute being the most notorious. There was a feeling among the Bangladeshisthat India was bent upon using the water issue to corner Bangladesh in regionaland international affairs. Apart from any political gains to be made out ofanti-India feelings in Bangladesh the opposition political parties that now opposethe subregional co-operative scheme with India are undoubtedly mindful of thelatter's past actions.

India's stance on subregional co-operation

How does India perceive the formation of the proposed sub-grouping inSAARC? This question begs special attention since India was originally antithet-ical to the idea of a forum for subregional co-operation in South Asia. In fact,the Indian position may better be understood if one looks back to India's originalresponse to the formation of SAARC.

To begin with, India was not favourable to the idea of a regional co-operativeventure in South Asia and her original response to the Bangladesh WorkingPaper proposing the formation of SAARC was, at best, lukewarm. The strategicdivergences of the region led India to view the Bangladesh move for regionalcooperation with skepticism. The coincidence of the move with the Soviet

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intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 further sharpened its skepticism.The ruling elite in New Delhi considered that it would trap India into apro-Western strategic consensus and accordingly force it to endorse the renewaland approval of Pakistan-US military ties.24

In the regional context, India suspected the Bangladesh move as having itsroots in Nepal's failed efforts to have itself acknowledged as a 'Zone of Peace',a concept India firmly rejects. In addition, India, being mindful of the pastexperiences of regional pacts in Asia and its determination to prevent itself fromgetting involved in political and security alliances that invite external powers'involvement in South Asian affairs, decided to adopt a cautious approachtowards the Bangladesh proposal fearing that the initiative might be a USmove.25

Initial fears and reservations notwithstanding, New Delhi publicly agreed tothe Bangladesh move for regional co-operation and ultimately joined SAARC,officially launched in Dhaka in 1985. The prospect of political isolation, in caseSAARC minus India could be floated, influenced India's ruling elite to opt forthe regional organization at last. India's concurrence with SAARC also mayhave been influenced by the consideration that, in her absence from the regionalforum, SAARC affairs might be influenced by external powers which would beat variance with its foreign policy objectives of preventing external powers'involvement in South Asian affairs.26

In contrast to its initial apathy to joining SAARC, India was enthusiastic tomove forward with the idea of a subregional scheme within the organization'sstructure. It is true that Bangladesh Foreign Minister Abdus Samad Azadformally floated the concept in the December 1996 meeting of the SAARCCouncil of Ministers in New Delhi, but Indian Foreign Minister Inder KumarGujral's press interview wherein he first spoke about Bangladesh, India, Bhutanand Nepal forming 'a dynamic area of growth'27 preceded Azad's move. Gujral,who later became Prime Minister of India, reaffirmed the same idea of subre-gional co-operation in the region in a lecture delivered at London's RoyalInstitute of International Affairs (RIIA) in September 1996.28 At the same time,there also was a press report that while India initially was reluctant; nonethelessformer Prime Minister H.D. Deve Gowda backed the initiative when he visitedBangladesh in January 1997.29

Gujral did not elaborate what he meant by the 'dynamic area of growth'. Butone may extrapolate that he meant the huge growth potentials of the subregionwhich is endowed with great reserves of human and natural resources, particu-larly gas, oil, coal and water. These resources, given the political will andappropriate policy coordination, communication infrastructure development, andpromotion of trade and cultural linkages, could push the pace of growthsignificantly in the subregion. The exploitation of mutual economic complemen-tarities on the basis of comparative advantage may open up better avenues togive real life to the dynamic area of growth.

What are India's real interests behind the newly floated idea of subregionalco-operation? The officially proclaimed objectives of subregional co-operation,

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as spelt out by Bangladesh's Concept Paper on Subregional Co-operation inSouth Asia and Nepal's Approach Paper for Subregional co-operation inSAARC,30 seen to have been held in good faith by the common people of thesubregion. But the Indian press, particularly the West Bengal press, carriedstories depicting interests that created public confusion in Dhaka. The AnandaBazar Patrika (Calcutta) identified access to the northeast through Bangladeshterritory and the ending of alleged Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI)operations backing militant and secessionist organizations in India's northeasternprovinces based in Bangladesh as two factors that were instrumental in thesigning of the Indo-Bangladesh Water Treaty of 1996.31 This view lent credenceto the apprehensions of the political opposition in Bangladesh that India had newregional designs hiding behind the disguise of the proposed subregional co-oper-ation framework.

Various academics and researchers in New Delhi also feel discomfort with theidea of subregional co-operation, and brush the idea aside as something detri-mental to India's interests. For example, Professor Kanti Bajpai, based atJawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, categorically opined that what subre-gional grouping was intended to do could be done bilaterally. He was of theview that the floating of the new sub-structure in SAARC would alienate SriLanka and Pakistan.32 Dr Partha S. Ghosh, a prominent researcher with theIndian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR) thinks that subregionalco-operation minus Pakistan and Sri Lanka is an unfeasible idea, and that the'marginalization of Pakistan would lead to further dilution of SAARC image'.33

India's enthusiasm for subregional co-operation, as the above convents sug-gest, is without due respect to several pragmatic considerations linked toIndo-Pakistani and Indo-Sri Lankan relations. The alienation of Pakistan and SriLanka from the proposed subregional grouping may force them to repeat effortsto forge closer ties with West Asia and Southeast Asia, respectively,34 whichIndia wants to avoid. Particularly, according to some Indian views, Pakistan'sdrift away from South Asia and the forging of closer linkages with Islamiccountries in the Gulf and West Asia may lead it to a more militant path ofIslamic fundamentalism. In the long run, such a move would create unnecessaryforeign policy complications for India. Secondly, in recent times, trade interac-tions between India and Pakistan have increased considerably, paving the wayfor closer economic contacts and also possible integration. Indian academia thinkit unwise to antagonize the Pakistani business community which is puttingtremendous pressure on the government to facilitate trade with India.

Prospects of subregionalism in SAARC

Any new co-operative design, regional or subregional, to be successful must passtwo tests; it should be acceptable to the people of the participating states, and itshould engender a positive and strong regional political response. The proposedsubregional grouping in SAARC apparently has failed to score points on both

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counts. Opposition to it first started at home in Bangladesh, and the responsefrom Pakistan and Sri Lanka to the grouping has not been encouraging either.

The story of political opposition in Bangladesh to the idea of subregionalco-operation is already extensively highlighted and needs not be reproducedhere. The situation took a further downward swing due to negative perceptionsof the concept by Pakistan and Sri Lanka, two other influential members ofSAARC. Pakistan felt unhappy with the proposal and pointed out that it couldundermine SAARC. One Foreign Ministry official in Islamabad warned that 'themove will isolate its [SAARC's] three other important members—Sri Lanka,Pakistan and the Maldives and the over-all interest of SAARC will be dam-aged'.35 Sri Lanka expressed a similar reaction and decided to support thePakistan position. Just before the concluding session of the SAARC summit inMale held in May 1997, Sri Lanka President Chandrika Kumaratunga went onrecord to state that the establishment of a subregional grouping within SAARCcould adversely affect the regional forum. 'We believe that the subregionalgrouping', added a senior Sri Lankan Foreign Ministry official, 'could be ahurdle to SAARC because the member nations of subregional group may givetop priority to implementation of the programmes of that group, thus pushingSAARC programmes to the back seat'.36

Perhaps two important considerations led Pakistan and Sri Lanka to view thesubregional grouping with reservations and, ultimately, put up opposition to it.The first was the prospect of economic and, by implication, political isolationfrom mainstream regional interactions if the subregional grouping was launched.By all measures of power—geography, resources, economic progress and tech-nological advances—India remains the central power of South Asia. NewDelhi's closer economic contacts and political interactions with Dhaka, Thimpuand Kathmandu under the garb of subregional co-operation could result inconcentrating major regional politico-economic activities in those capitals thusmaking Colombo and Islamabad less important. Secondly, the forging of a closeridentity between Dhaka, Thimpu, Kathmandu and New Delhi also mighteventually produce a common strategic view, or even a strategic consensusbetween India, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal that might create unavoidableforeign policy complications for Sri Lanka and Pakistan. Colombo and Islama-bad ultimately may have decided to make a strong bid to keep SAARC'sstructure intact by expressing their strong reservations against the concept ofsubregional co-operation.

Although Nepal officially backed the formation of the subregional grouping,non-official reactions in Kathmandu were as adverse as official reactions inIslamabad and Colombo. An influential section of Nepalese politicians andintelligentsia remains unconvinced of the need for subregional developmentinitiatives. Former Nepalese Foreign Minister Ramesh Nath Pandey told theIndia Abroad News Service (IANS) that he did not understand why any kind ofsubregional concept is being forwarded when there is SAARC. Pakistan, SriLanka and Maldives too should have been taken into confidence for thisinitiative'.37 Pandey was joined by the economist, Professor Madhab Khadka of

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Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu, who said: 'At a time when SAARC itselfhas not been showing effect for overall development of one billion pluspeople of the region, I do not think any subregional concept will work'.38

It appears abundantly clear that, despite official backing, the formation ofa subregional structure in SAARC enjoys less unofficial support in Nepaltoo.

Conclusion

Regionalism in South Asia is not a new phenomenon and, unsurprisingly:internal differences over the modalities to promote effective subregional inte-gration under SAARC do exist, particularly in Bangladesh. The political differ-ences between the ruling and the opposition parties point to the lack of a nationalconsensus to chalk out a long-term plan for the overall development ofthe country. For social and political stability, a minimum consensus onfundamental national issues between the ruling and the opposition parties is amust. But a lack of minimum consensus has continuously weakened thegovernment in power, shortened state capacities to mobilize resources fornational development, and thwarted efforts on the part of Dhaka to play aproactive regional and international role. The opposition to subregionalism is acase in point.39

The idea of subregional co-operation also suffered major setbacks due toadverse perceptions of the concept by Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The officialpositions of these two countries indicate that they are very reluctant to endorsethe proposed subregional grouping between Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal andnortheast India since they perceive no gain but potential loss if the subgroup wasto take firm root. Indeed, their efforts to keep the regional forum created bySAARC stand in close conformity with their perceptions of national interest.

The combination of domestic political opposition in Bangladesh and unfavour-able reactions in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and, to a lesser extent, Nepal havefrustrated imperatives for a fast-track approach to SAARC, the South Asianvehicle for regional co-operation. There is a common feeling in the region thatSAARC has succeeded only in making snail-paced progress, despite the high-sounding statements and declarations issued by the leaders of the region at theend of their ritualistic annual summit. Co-operation on a subregional basis, manybelieve, could be an effective mechanism to bail SAARC out of superfluoussuper-structures and paperwork. Such a step, however, remains extremelydependent on building a favourable consensus in domestic Bangladeshi politics,as well as in the region as a whole. Although the concept of subregionalco-operation has not been abandoned officially, political developments in dom-estic and regional contexts do not portend immediate hopes for its fruition.Perhaps more time is required to fight against the political gimmicks that atpresent thwart the move for subregional co-operation which would ultimatelymake SAARC a more effective regional organization.

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Notes and references1. The Daily Star, 13 March 1997; The Bangla Bazar Patrika, 15 February 1997.2. The Bangladesh Observer, 20 March 1997.3. Myo Thant, 'Overview', in: Myo Thant et al. (eds), Growth Triangles in Asia: A New Approach to

Regional Economic Cooperation, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p 1.4. For an extensive analysis of the two growth triangles see Edward K.Y. Chen and Joseph S.L. Lee,

'Southern China growth triangle: an overview'; Sree Kumar, 'Johor-Singapore-Riau growth triangle: amodel of subregional cooperation'; and G. Naidu, Mohor—Singapore-Riau growth triangle: progress andprospects'; in: Myo Thant op cit, pp 49-101, 187-229 and 231-255.

5. 'Concept paper on subregional cooperation in South Asia', Bangladesh, undated, p 1.6. 'Approach paper for subregional cooperation in SAARC, Nepal, undated, pp 1-2.7. ibid., p 78. The Daily Star, 9 July 1999.9. Nepal, op cit, Ref 6, p 6

10. The Daily Star, 9 & 30 January 1997.11. Ibid, 16 May 1997.12. Ibid, 8 January 1997.13. Ibid, 16 May 1997.14. Ibid, 30 January & 10 April, 1997; and Weekly Holiday, 4 & 11 April 1997.15. Editorial, The Daily Star, 8 & 24 April 1997.16. Ibid, 10 June 1997.17. The Daily Janakantha, 10 November 1997.18. Editorial The Daily Star, 10 June 1997.19. Nepal, op. cit., Ref 6, p 5.20. For elaboration, see Anirban Chattopodhyay, 'Some aspects of developmental regionalism', a paper

presented at 'Interactions with Indian Bordering States', Bangladesh Institute of International and strategicstudies (BUSS) Dhaka, 19-20 February 1997.

21. For elaboration, see Monirul Hussain, 'Subregional cooperation between Bangladesh and Indian BorderingStates: an incomplete perspective from Assam Today', a paper presented at ibid.

22. See Leo E. Rose, 'India and its neighbours: regional foreign and security policies', in: Lawrence Ziring(ed), The Subcontinent in World Politics: India, its Neighbours and the Great Powers (New York: Prager,1982), pp 37^tl.

23. See Iftekharuzzaman, "The India doctrine: relevance for Bangladesh', in: M.G. Kabir and Shaukat Hassaneds. Issues and Challenges Facing Bangladesh Foreign Policy (Dhaka: Bangladesh Society of Inter-national Studies, 1989).

24. See S.D. Muni, 'Geo-strategic implications of SAARC, pp 23-24, a paper presented at 'Regional Securityin South Asia', Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu, Nepal, 3-5 November 1985.

25. S.D. Muni, 'SAARC: building regionalism from below', Asian Survey, Vol 25, No 4, April 1985, p 395.26. Md. Nuruzzaman, 'Global change and regional cooperation in South Asia', Regional Studies, Vol 11, No

3, Summer 1993, p 51.27. Quoted in Abul Kalam, 'Environmentalism in South Asia', BUSS Journal, Vol 17, No 4, October 1996,

p535.28. Editorial, The Daily Bhorer Kagoj, 23 June 1997.29. The Asian Age, 6 May 1997.30. Bangladesh, op cit, Ref 5; and Nepal, op cit, Ref 6.31. Ananda Bazar Patrika, 6 November 1996.32. Personal interview with Dr Kanti Bajpa in New Delhi, 6 January 1998.33. Personal interview with Dr Partha S. Ghosh in New Delhi, 7 January 1998.34. Pakistan, under Z.A. Bhutto and in the wake of its 1971 break-up, tried to forge closer ties with Muslim

West Asia. Sri Lanka tried to do the same with Southeast Asian countries in the 1980s.35. The Asian Age, 6 May 1997.36. The Daily Star, 13 May 1997.37. India Abroad News Service.38. The Daily Star, 6 January 1998.39. For an elaboration, see B.K. Jahangir, 'Reformist agenda for Bangladesh', The Journal of Social Studies,

No 75, January 1997. pp 23-32.

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