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Politics, Ideology, and Discourse

T A van Dijk, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona,

Spain

2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction

Few areas in the social sciences are as closely related asthose of the study of politics, ideology, and discourse.Politics is one of the social domains whose practices arevirtually exclusively discursive; political cognition is bydefinition ideologically based; and political ideologiesare largely reproduced by discourse. In this article weexamine these relationships more closely.

Ideology

The concept of ideology is often used in the mediaand the social sciences, but it is notoriously vague. Itseveryday usage is largely negative, and typically refersto the rigid, misguided, or partisan ideas of others: wehave the truth, and they have ideologies. This nega-tive meaning goes back to Marx-Engels, for whomideologies were a form of false consciousness; thus,the working class may have misguided ideas about theconditions of its existence as a result of their indoctri-nation by those who control the means of production.Throughout a large part of the 20th century, and bothin politics and in the social sciences, the notion of

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ideology continued to carry its negative connotation,and was often used in opposition to objectiveknowledge (for histories of the notion of ideology,see, e.g., Billig, 1982; Eagleton, 1991; Larrain, 1979;for a useful collection of classical studies on ideology,see Zizek, 1994).

Originally, ideology did not have this negativemeaning. More than 200 years ago, the French phi-losopher Destutt de Tracy introduced the term in orderto denote a new discipline that would study ideas:ideologie. Also, in contemporary political science, thenotion is used in a more neutral, descriptive sense, e.g.,to refer to political belief systems (Freeden, 1996).

One of the many dimensions highlighted in theclassical approaches to ideology was their dominantnature, in the sense that ideologies play a role in thelegitimization of power abuse by dominant groups.One of the most efficient forms of ideological domi-nance is when also the dominated groups accept

dominant ideologies as natural or commonsense.Gramsci called such forms of ideological dominancehegemony (Gramsci, 1971). Bourdieu does not usethe notion of ideology very much (mainly becausehe thinks it is too vague and has often been abusedto discredit others who do not agree with us; seeBourdieu and Eagleton, 1994), but rather speaks ofsymbolic power or symbolic violence. It should bestressed, however, that although related, his uses ofthese terms are different from the (various) uses of thenotion of ideology. His main interest lies in the socialconditions of discursive and symbolic power, such as

the authority and legitimacy of those who producediscourse.

To cut a long historical survey short, a specificconcept of ideology will be used in this article, namelyto describe specific, fundamental beliefs of groups ofpeople. Our working definition of ideologies is there-fore as follows: an ideology is the foundation of thesocial representations shared by a social group.Depending on ones perspective, group membershipor ethics, these group ideas may be valued positively,negatively, or not be valued at all. That is, we do notexclusively identify ideologies with dominant groups(see also the discussion in Abercrombie et al., 1980).In addition, dominated groups may have ideologies,namely ideologies of resistance and opposition. Ideol-ogies more generally are associated with socialgroups, classes, castes, or communities, which thusrepresent their fundamental interests. The theoryaccounting for such ideological beliefs is complexand multidisciplinary, and may be summarized asfollows (for details and many further references, seeVan Dijk, 1998):

. Ideologies have both social and cognitive proper-ties which need to be accounted for in an integratedtheory.

. Cognitively, ideologies are a special kind of socialbelief systems, stored in long-term memory (see ).

. Socially as well as cognitively, these ideological be-

lief systems are socially shared by the members ofspecific social groups, or ideological communities(see Distributed Cognition and Communication).

. Ideologies, like languages, are essentially social.There are no personal or individual ideologies,only personal or individual uses of ideologies.

. The identity of groups is not only based on theirstructural properties, but also on their ideology.

. Ideological belief systems ideologies form theaxiomatic basis of the more specific beliefs or socialrepresentations of a group, such as their groupknowledge and group opinions (attitudes).

. Unlike in most traditional approaches to ideology,

ideologies are not necessarily negative. They havesimilar structures and functions whether sharedby dominant or dominated groups, bad groupsor good groups. Thus, we may have negative aswell as positive ideologies (utopias), depending onthe perspective, values, or group membership of theone who evaluates them.

. Not all socially shared beliefs of a group are ideo-logical. Thus, ideologically different or opposedgroups in the same society need to have beliefs incommon in order to be able to communicate inthe first place. This common ground consists of

socioculturally shared knowledge, which by defini-tion is preideological within that society (althoughit may later or elsewhere be described as ideologicalknowledge).

. Thus, the traditionally problematic relationshipbetween knowledge and ideology is resolved asfollows: general, sociocultural knowledge, sharedby an epistemic community, forms the commonground for all social representations of all (ideolog-ical) groups in that community. However, eachgroup may develop specific group knowledge(e.g., professional, religious, or political knowl-edge) based on the ideology of the group. Thisknowledge is called knowledge within the groupbecause it is generally shared, certified, and presup-posed to be true. For other groups, such knowledgemay of course be called mere belief, superstition, orreligion. In other words, beliefs that are taken forgranted, commonsense, undisputed, etc. within acommunity, and shared by different ideologicalgroups, is by definition non-ideological withinthat community.

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. Ideologies embody the general principles that con-trol the overall coherence of the social representa-tions shared by the members of a group. Forinstance, a racist ideology may control more specificattitudes about immigration or affirmative action.

. Ideologically based social representations (such as

feminist attitudes about abortion or glass ceilingson the job), are general and abstract. In orderto relate to concrete social practices and dis-courses about specific events, they need to be-come contextualized and specified in mentalmodels. These (ideologically biased) mental mod-els, stored in episodic memory, are the mentalconstructs that control discourse, interaction,and other social practices. And conversely, it isthrough mental models that discourses are ableto influence social representations and ideologiesand reproduce these.

. Ideologies represent one of the dimensions of the

social identity or self-image of groups.. Unlike less fundamental social representations and

much more than variable personal models, ideolo-gies are relatively stable. One does not become orcease to be a feminist, socialist, or pacifist over-night. Many ideologies are acquired over manyyears and remain active for a lifetime of groupmembers.

. Ideologies are structured by a social schema con-sisting of a number of categories that cognitivelyrepresent the major social dimensions of groups,such as their distinguishing properties, membership

criteria, typical actions, goals, norms and values,reference groups, and basic resources or interests.

. Both cognitively as well as socially, ideologies de-velop especially as socially shared resources forintragroup cohesion and cooperation, as well asfor efficient means for intergroup relations.

. Many but not all ideologies are relevant insituations of competition, conflict, domination,and resistance between groups, that is, as part ofa social struggle. This also explains why many ofthe mental structures of ideologies and ideologicalpractices are polarized on the basis of an ingroupoutgroup differentiation, typically between Us andThem, as ideological discourses also show.

. Because individual people may be members of sev-eral groups, they may participate in various ideol-ogies. Thus, someone may be a nationalist,socialist, feminist journalist, and thus share in theideologies of these different kinds of social andprofessional ideologies. Obviously, when activated(used) at the same time, in discourse or other socialpractices, this may sometimes lead to conflicts.

. The social practices, and hence discourses, of groupmembers may be (indirectly) controlled by group

ideologies, but are usually mediated by more spe-cific social representations at the group level and byconcrete, personal mental models at the individuallevel.

. Conversely, ideologies are personally acquired andsocially reproduced by the social practices, and

especially the discourses, of a group.. Groups may organize the discursive acquisition

and reproduction of ideologies, for instancethrough special forms of education, indoctrination,job training, or catechesis, and by specialized groupmembers (ideologues, priests, teachers, etc.) and inspecial institutions.

. Not all group members have nor need to have the same level of ideological knowledge or exper-tise, nor need their ideological knowledge alwaysbe very explicit. Using an ideology is like beingable to use a language without being able to formu-late the grammar of that language. Many men are

sexist and their sexist ideology may control muchof their discourse and other social practices, butthey need not always have explicit access to thecontents of their ideologies.

. However, since many social ideologies develop aspart of group relations, conflict, or domination andresistance, and hence involve ideological debatethat is often published in the mass media, manygroup members know at least the main ideologicaltenets of their group and of other groups. Indeed,when their interests are threatened they often knowhow and why to protect these.

These are some of the main properties of ideologiesas formulated in a multidisciplinary, sociocognitivetheory. Thus, ideologies are the axiomatic basis ofthe social representations of a group and throughspecific social attitudes and then through personalmental models control the individual discoursesand other social practices of group members. In thisway, they also are the necessary resource of ingroupcooperation, coordination and cohesion, as well asfor the management of intergroup relations, competi-tion, conflict, or struggle. It is only within such atheory that we are able to account for ideologicaldiscourse and other social practices, namely as beingderived from ideologically based social representa-tions, and as instantiations of social relations betweengroups.

More than traditional approaches, this multidisci-plinary approach not only emphasizes the social andpolitical nature of ideologies, but also their sociocog-nitive nature. It should be emphasized though thatthis does not mean that especially or only this cogni-tive dimension is important. Unlike traditional socialor socioeconomic approaches, the theory emphasizes

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that trivially ideologies have to do with ideas ofsome kind, and hence also need a cognitive accountbesides a social theory of groups and group relations,power, and interests. The point is that these differentapproaches need and can be integrated in one multi-disciplinary theory. Hence, this approach does imply

that a theory of ideology without an explicit cognitivecomponent is incomplete: dealing with ideologieswithout talking about the nature and functions ofsocially shared ideas is theoretically unsatisfactory.

We see that ideological social practices are by defi-nition based on ideologies defined as shared mentalrepresentations of some kind, in a way that might becompared with the way language use is based on ashared grammar or discourse and conversation rules.It is in this sense that ideologies as socially sharedcognitive resources are fundamental for social prac-tices, interaction and intra- and intergroup relations.Conversely, the general social functions of ideological

practices must hence be represented as part of theirunderlying ideologies. This is one of the many reasonswhy cognitive and social approaches to ideology needto be integrated.

The theory proposed here accounts for both therelatively stable as well as the flexible, dynamic,changing, contextualized, and subjective aspects ofideology. The first dimension is explained in termsof relatively stable, socially shared mental representa-tions of groups. The second dimension is accountedfor by ideologically based, specific, subjective mentalmodels of group members that control discourse

and other social practices in each situation. Unlikeother approaches, for instance in discursive psy-chology and other constructionist approaches (Billig,1988, 1991; Potter, 1996), this theory does not attri-bute the flexible, subjective or contextually variableaspects of ideological practices to the nature of ideol-ogy itself, but to its uses by individual members.Again, the comparison with relatively stable andslowly changing grammars of natural languages,and their variable, contextualized, personal uses, sug-gests itself. For the same reason, ideologies are notreduced to their observable uses, discourses, or othersocial practices, but defined as members sociallyshared underlying representations or resources thatgovern such practices. Nor do we reduce ideologies todiscourses, because obviously they also control othersocial practices, such as forms of discrimination orviolence. In sum, the theory presented here is not onlymultidisciplinary, but also nonreductionist.

Finally, ideologies are accounted for in sociocogni-tive rather than in emotional terms, because they areby definition socially shared, and in our definition of

emotions, only individual persons and not groups canhave, bodily based, emotions. When we sometimesspeak of ideologies of hate, as is the case for racist orsexist ideologies, we are not speaking of emotions butof shared negative evaluations (opinions). Emotionsare temporal, contextual, and personal, physiologi-

cally based, and cognitively interpreted events. Thusone can have and share a more or less permanentnegative opinion about immigrants, but one cannot,in the strict sense of the term be permanently angryabout immigrants, nor literally share an emotion withothers. Thus, since ideologies are socially shared, theyby definition cannot be emotional. However, theiruses or applications by individual group members inconcrete situations may of course trigger and beexpressed as emotions. Also for this reason, it is es-sential to analytically distinguish between ideologiesand their actual uses or manifestations in discourse,interaction, and other social practices.

Ideology and Politics

The general theory of ideology summarized aboveneeds to be specified for the huge social field of poli-tics, that is, for politicians, political cognition, politicalprocesses, political practices, and political discourseas characterizing political groups, such as politicalparties, members of parliaments, or social movements.As soon as ideologies not only have general socialfunctions but more specifically (also) politicalfunctions in the field of politics, we will call them poli-tical ideologies. Thus, socialism is more obviously a

political ideology than the professional ideology ofdentists, as long as we interpret political here asdescribing processes in the field of politics, and notas part of the fields of health care, education, or jus-tice, among others. Thus, one way of classifyingideologies as well as discourses is by the socialfield in which they function. That is, we have political,educational, legal, religious, and health care ideologies,among others.

It is beyond the scope of this brief article to defineand theorize in detail about what characterizes thefield of politics (see, e.g., Goodin and Klingemann,

1996). However, apart from being defined by its pro-totypical participants (politicians), this field maybriefly and somewhat traditionally be defined by:

. its overall systems (democracy, dictatorship, etc.);

. special social macro actions, such as government,legislation, elections, or decision making;

. and their micro practices, interactions, or dis-courses such as parliamentary debates, canvassing,or demonstrations;



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. its special social relations, such as those of institu-tional power;

. its special norms and values (e.g., freedom, equali-ty, etc.);

. its political cognitions, such as political ideologies.

If there is one social field that is ideological, it is

that of politics. This is not surprising because itis eminently here that different and opposed groups,power, struggles, and interests are at stake. In order tobe able to compete, political groups need to be ideo-logically conscious and organized. Few ideologicalgroups besides political parties have programs thatformulate their ideologies explicitly, and that com-pete for new members or supporters on that basis.Few ideologies are as explicitly defended and con-tested as political ideologies, as we know from thehistory of socialism, communism, liberalism, and soon. In other words, the political process is essentially

an ideological process, and political cognition oftensimply identified with ideology (see Freeden, 1996;Ball and Dagger, 1999; Eatwell, 1999; Leach, 2002;Seliger, 1976).

The social organization of the field of politics, andhence of politicians and political groups, is largelybased on ideological differences, alliances, and simi-larities. The overall organization of social beliefsas a struggle between the left and the right is theresult of the underlying polarization of politicalideologies that has permeated society as a whole.Elections, parliaments, political campaigns, propa-ganda, demonstrations, and many other phenomena

of the political field are thus profoundly ideological.Debates in parliament pitch opposed political ideolo-gies as a basis for political policies, measures, deci-sions, or actions. Ones political identity, stances,and allegiances are not so much defined in terms ofstructural group membership, such as membershipof a political party, but rather in terms of ones ideol-ogy. Most socialists or neoliberals do not have amembership card. The same is true for other socialideologies that have profound political implications,such as feminism, pacifism, ecologism, or racism.

Although primarily defined in sociocognitive

terms, political ideologies permeate the whole politi-cal field, for example in overall systems such asdemocracies (based on democratic ideologies), over-all acts and processes (such as government, coalitionbuilding, or elections), everyday political practices(such as parliamentary debates or demonstrations),group relations (such as domination and resistance,government, or opposition), fundamental norms andvalues (such as equality and independence that areconstitutive categories of ideologies), as well as more

specific political attitudes (for instance on legislationconcerning abortion or divorce) that are controlledby ideologies.

Political Discourse and Ideology

If the political field is thoroughly ideological, then soare its political practices, and hence its discourses(among the many books on political discourse, see,e.g., Chilton, 1995, 2004; Chilton and Scha ffner,2002; Wilson, 1990; Wodak and Menz, 1990; seealso the other contributions to this section). Indeed,political ideologies not only are involved in the pro-duction or understanding of political discourses andother political practices, but are also (re)produced bythem. In a sense, discourses make ideologies observ-able in the sense that it is only in discourse that theymay be explicitly expressed and formulated. Otherpolitical practices only implicitly show or experience

ideologies, for instance in practices of discriminationon the basis of sexist, racist, or political ideologies. Itis in discourse that we need to explicitly explain thatsuch discrimination occurs because she is a woman,because he is black, or because they are socialists.

Thus, it is largely through discourse that politicalideologies are acquired, expressed, learned, propa-gated, and contested. The rest of this article willdiscuss these relationships between political discourseand political ideologies. Interestingly, despite the vastliterature on ideology (thousands of books in Englishalone), there are virtually no monographs that

explore the details of the relations between discourseand ideology, although many books in critical lin-guistics and critical discourse analysis deal withat least some aspects of this relationship (see, e.g.,Fairclough, 1989, 1995; Fowler et al., 1979; Fowler,1991; Hodge and Kress, 1993; Pecheux, 1982; VanDijk, 1998; Wodak, 1989; Wodak et al., 1987;Wodak and Menz, 1990; Wodak and Meyer, 2001).

Political Situations and Contexts

The relations between discourse and political ideolo-gies are usually studied in terms of the structures of

political discourse, such as the use of biased lexicalitems, syntactic structures such as actives and pas-sives, pronouns such as us and them, metaphors ortopoi, arguments, implications, and many other prop-erties of discourse (see the references given at the endof the preceding section).

It should be emphasized, however, that discourseshould be conceptualized also in terms of its contextstructures (Duranti and Goodwin, 1992). It is notsufficient to observe, for instance, that political



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discourse often features the well-known political pro-noun we. It is crucial to relate such use to such cat-egories as who is speaking, when, where and with/towhom, that is, to specific aspects of the politicalsituation.

Since such political situations do not simply cause

political actors to speak in such a way, we again needa cognitive interface between such a situation andtalk or text, that is, a mental model of the politicalsituation (van Dijk, 1999, 2001, 2003). Such mentalmodels define how participants experience, interpret,and represent the for-them-relevant aspects of thepolitical situation. These specific mental modelsare called contexts. In other words, contexts aresubjective participant definitions of communicativesituations. They control all aspects of discourseproduction and comprehension.

Political discourse, thus, is not only defined in termsof political discourse structures but also in terms of

political contexts. Thus, acting as an MP, prime min-ister, party leader, or demonstrator will typically beperceived by speakers or recipients as a political rele-vant context category in political discourse, whereasbeing a dentist or a doorkeeper much less so. Similar-ly, political contexts may be defined by special set-tings, featuring locations such as parliamentarybuildings or events such as debates or meetings, asoften controlled by precise timing, as is the case inparliamentary debates. Moreover, political discoursesand their structures will only be able to have thepolitical functions they have when they are enact-

ing political acts or processes, such as governing,legislating, or making opposition, and with very spe-cific political aims in mind, such as defending ordefeating a bill or getting elected. And finally, politi-cal actors obviously do not participate mindlessly inpolitical situations, but have political knowledge,share political norms and values, as well as politicalideologies. Indeed, it is through this form of contex-tualization that we are able to link the ideologies ofthe participants to their discourses (Gumperz, 1982).Text or talk show ideologies discursively, but it ispeople, politicians, or protesters, who have ideologies not only in this social practice or discourse, buttypically also in others.

These then are some of the types of categories thatmake up our political context models, that is, politi-cal categories that we use to define political situationsof text and talk. In the same way as discourses maybe ideological when based on ideologies, the struc-tures and practices of political contexts may alsohave such an ideological basis. Obviously, beingan MP presupposes a parliamentary system andhence a democratic ideology, whereas being a dictatorpresupposes another ideology.

Obviously, these categories are culturally variable:members of parliament, prime ministers, or partysecretaries are not exactly universal political partici-pant categories. Other cultures may have their ownspecific political event types, political actions, parti-cipants, locations, time management, and of course

their own political knowledge, attitudes, ideologies,norms, and values.A detailed explanation of the cognitive processes

involved in the way context models control politicaldiscourse is beyond the scope of this article. Suffice itto say that the information in the various categoriesof the (pragmatic) context model for instance whoare participating in the communicative situation first of all controls the speech acts and other acts ofthe current situation. Thus, the current utterance maybe defined as a political promise or as a threat,depending on the power or relationships of the parti-cipants, their political position (government or oppo-

sition, my party or your party), as well as theintentions to help or harm the recipient. Secondly,pragmatic context models control the selection ofinformation in the (semantic) mental model that(inter)subjectively defines what participants talkabout, such as the war in Iraq. Thus, an MP orminister addressing his or her peers in parliamentwill express and presuppose very different knowledgethan does a politician giving a speech or an interview.Thirdly, context models control all levels of style ofpolitical discourse, such as lexical choice, pronouns,syntactic structure, and other grammatical choices

that depend on how situations are defined. Thus,lexical and syntactic style in a parliamentary debatewill be much more formal than an informal politicalmeeting of party members or a propaganda leaflet.Finally, context models control the overall format orschema of political discourse, such as the formal turn-taking organization, openings and closings of a de-bate in parliament, the conversational structure of apolitical interview, the overall organization of a partyprogram, or the layout of a political advertisement ina magazine or on a billboard. For instance, only theSpeaker, as specific participant category in the BritishHouse of Commons, may open and close parlia-mentary sessions and debates, distribute turns, anddecide when interruptions or questions will beallowed, among many other things. Thus the rulesand structures of parliamentary interaction andtheir participants are closely related to the discur-sive structures of the debate being engaged in bythe MPs.

Relevant for our discussion in this case is that itis especially the political ideology of the participantsthat not only controls much of what they saythemselves, but also how they will understand other



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speakers. Thus, a call to limit immigration by anextremist right wing party member will typically beheard and commented upon as racist, whereas similarproposals by left wing MPs of our own party willobviously seldom be interpreted as such.

Political Discourse and Political Ideology

If political ideologies are relevant properties of politi-cal situations, namely as being shared by participants,then how are they expressed and reproduced by thestructures of text and talk?

A first question we need to deal with is whether allproperties of political discourse are influenced byunderlying ideologies. The response to that questionis: obviously not, because only those properties ofdiscourse can be influenced by ideologies that canbe contextually variable in the first place. Thus,choice of more or less polite pronouns is contextually

variable, whereas much of syntactic structure, suchas the position of articles in front of nouns inEnglish, is not. People of different ideologies do nothave different grammars, although they use suchgrammars sometimes a bit differently. Socioculturalknowledge, including language, defines communitiesand not ideological groups. In that respect, the left orthe right, socialists or neoliberals, racists or antira-cists, will not speak or write very differently. Thissuggests that ideological differences should rather besought in what people say, rather than in how theysay it. Political ideas may be persuasively defended

by the right or the left, so ideologically differenceswill hardly be defined only in terms of rhetoric. Thus,although there are probably political uses of dis-course forms such as the use of pronouns as ingroupand outgroup markers, or rhetorical means of persua-sion, it is likely that most ideological variation will befound at the levels of meaning.

In order to avoid a rather arbitrary discovery pro-cedure of the potentially huge amount of ideologi-cally variable structures of text and talk, it is moreuseful to proceed in a more systematic and theory-driven way. Thus, we have seen that ideologies oftenhave a polarized structure, reflecting competing orconflicting group membership and categorization iningroups and outgroups. These underlying structuresalso appear in more specific political attitudes forinstance racist attitudes about immigration andultimately in the biased personal mental models ofgroup members. These mental models control thecontents of discourse, and if they are polarized, itis likely that discourse will thus also show varioustypes of polarization. Thus, much research hasshown that ideological discourse often features the

following overall strategies of what might be calledthe ideological square:

. Emphasize Our good things

. Emphasize Their bad things

. De-emphasize Our bad things

. De-emphasize Their good things.

These overall strategies may be applied to all levelsof action, meaning, and form of text and talk. Thus,political speeches, interviews, programs, or propa-ganda typically focus on the preferred topics of ourgroup or party, on what we have done well, andassociate political opponents with negative topics,such as war, violence, drugs, lack of freedom, and soon. Thus, many politicians and media associate immi-grants or minorities with problems or delinquency.For decades, communism was associated with aggres-sion, lack of freedom, and rigid ideology. Similarly, ifcommunism is good or better than us in the area of

social services, health care, or education, anticommu-nist discourse will typically ignore or downplay suchgood things of its opponent.

What is true for meanings or topics also holds forform or structure: we may enhance meanings in manyways by intonation or stress, visual or graphicalmeans, word order, headlining, topicalization, repeti-tion, and so on. The opposite will occur when wewant to downplay our bad things. Very bad thingsof our arch enemies such as a terrorist attack willthus appear on the front page, in a big article withbig negative headlines, or in an emergency debate in

parliament, and so on.In other words, there are systematic means to ex-

amine discourse at various levels when looking forways ideologies are (not) expressed or enacted in suchdiscourse: Whenever a meaning is associated withgood things, it will tend to be associated with theingroup of the speaker, and all structural propertiesof the discourse may be brought to bear to emphasizesuch meanings. And the opposite will be the case forOthers, Opponents, or Enemies.

Besides the general, combined strategy of positiveself-presentation and negative other-presentation,ideological discourse structures may appear as expres-sions of other underlying ideology structures, and notonly as an expression of the polarized relationshipbetween (opposed) ideological groups. Thus, if iden-tity, characteristic actions, aims, norms, values, grouprelations, and resources are fundamental ideologicalcategories, we may expect that references to the con-tents of such categories will be prominent in the dis-courses of ideological group members. Thus, if peopletalk as group members, in terms ofwe, and positive-ly evaluate their own actions, norms and values, and



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defend the resources or other interests of their group,then such talk will also usually be ideological. Again,such will typically be true for the meaning or contextof discourse, but the ways such meanings areexpressed and especially persuasively conveyedmay of course also involve many formal aspects of

grammar, discourse and conversation.These are the general strategies of ideological dis-course production and also a handy discovery orrecognition procedure for ideological analysis ofpolitical discourse. The more detailed and subtleideological discourse structures will be examined ina concrete example.

Examples

By way of examples, I will use some fragments from adebate in the British House of Commons on asylumseekers, held on March 5, 1997. Mrs Gorman, rep-

resentative of Billericay for the Conservative Party,then still in power, had taken the initiative for thisdebate, which she opened with a critique of the al-leged costs of asylum seekers, costs she claimed werebeing paid by poor old English ratepayers. Amongthose who opposed her was Jeremy Corbyn, of theLabour Party.

In order to enhance the usefulness of our analysis,we shall assign an analytical category to each exam-ple, and order the categories alphabetically. After thecategory name I shall add the domain of discourseanalysis to which the category belongs (e.g., meaning,

argumentation, etc.). The main point of the analysis isto show how various ideologies, especially those ofracism and antiracism, are expressed in various kindsof structures. There are in principle hundreds of suchcategories, so we make a small selection (for details,see a more detailed ideological analysis in Van Dijk,2000; no further references are given to the manyhundreds of studies that deal with the respective ana-lytical categories mentioned above; see Van Dijk,1997, for a general introduction to many of thesenotions; for further analysis of parliamentary debateson immigration, see Wodak and Van Dijk, 2000).

Some Categories of IdeologicalDiscourse Analysis

ACTOR DESCRIPTION (MEANING). The wayactors are described in discourses also depends onour ideologies. Typically we tend to describe ingroupmembers in a neutral or positive way and out-group members in a negative way. Similarly, we willmitigate negative descriptions of members of ourown group, and emphasize the attributed negativecharacteristics of Others. Here is how Mrs Gormandescribes a Romanian asylum seeker:

(1) In one case, a man from Romania, who came overhere on a coach tour for a football match ( . . .) decidedthat he did not want to go back, declared himself anasylum seeker and is still here 4 years later. He has neverdone a stroke of work in his life (Gorman).

AUTHORITY (ARGUMENTATION). Many spea-

kers in an argument, also in parliament, have recourseto the fallacy of mentioning authorities to support theircase, usually organizations or people who are above thefray of party politics, or who are generally recognizedexperts or moral leaders. International organizations(such as the United Nations or Amnesty International),scholars, the media, the church or the courts often havethat role. People of different ideologies typically citedifferent authorities. Thus, Mr Corbyn ironically asksMrs Gorman whether she has not read the reports ofAmnesty or Helsinki Watch.

BURDEN (TOPOS). Argumentation against immi-

gration is often based on various standard arguments,or topoi, which represent premises that are takenfor granted, as self-evident and as sufficient reasonsto accept the conclusion. One of the topoi of anti-immigration discourse is that asylum seekers are afinancial burden for us:

(2) It is wrong that ratepayers in the London area shouldbear an undue proportion of the burden of expenditurethat those people are causing (Gorman).

CATEGORIZATION (MEANING). As we alsoknow from social psychology, people tend to categorizepeople, and so do speakers in parliament, especially

when Others (immigrants, refugees, etc.) are involved.Most typical in this debate is the (sub)categorization ofasylum seekers into genuine political refugees, andbogus asylum seekers, a categorization formulated inthe following ways:

(3) There are, of course, asylum seekers and asylumseekers (Gorman).

(4) . . . those people, many of whom could reasonably becalled economic migrants and some of whom are justbenefit seekers on holiday, to remain in Britain (Gorman).

COMPARISON (MEANING, ARGUMENTA-

TION). Different from rhetorical similes, compari-sons as intended here typically occur in talk aboutrefugees or minorities, namely when speakers com-pare ingroups and outgroups. In racist talk, out-groups are compared negatively, and ingroupspositively. In antiracist talk, we may negatively com-pare our country or government with loathsome un-democratic regimes. In the following example,Mr Corbyn uses an argumentative comparison withthe Second World War to emphasize the plight ofasylum seekers:



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(5) Many soldiers who were tortured during the SecondWorld War found it difficult to talk about their experi-ences for years. That is no different from the position ofpeople who have been tortured in Iran, Iraq, WestAfrica, or anywhere else. (Corbyn).

CONSENSUS (POLITICAL STRATEGY). To claim

or insist on cross-party or national consensus is awell-known political strategy in situations where thecountry is threatened, for instance by outside attack.Immigration is often seen as such a threat. Thus,Mrs Gorman insists that the current immigrationlaw is the fruit of consensus, and hence should not betampered with:

(6) The Government, with cross-party backing, decidedto do something about the matter (Gorman, C).

COUNTERFACTUALS (MEANING, ARGUMEN-TATION). (see also Counterfactuals.) What wouldhappen, if. . . the typical expression of a counterfactu-

al, is often used in this debate by the Labour oppositionin order to suggest that the conservatives try to imaginewhat it would be like to be in the situation of asylumseekers, an persuasive argumentative move that is alsois related to the move of asking for empathy:

(7) I suggest that he start to think more seriously abouthuman rights issues. Suppose he had to flee this countrybecause an oppressive regime had taken over. Wherewould he go? Presumably he would not want help fromanyone else, because he does not believe that help shouldbe given to anyone else (Corbyn).

(8) If that happened in another country under a regime of

which we disapproved, the British Government wouldsay that it was a terrible indictment on the human rightsrecord of that regime that prisoners were forced to un-dertake a hunger strike to draw attention to their situa-tion (Corbyn).

DISCLAIMERS (MEANING). A well-known com-bination of the ideologically based strategy of positiveself-presentation and negative other-presentationare the many types of disclaimers. Note that disclai-mers in these debates are not usually an expressionof attitudinal ambiguity, in which both positive andnegative aspects of immigration are mentioned, or

in which humanitarian values are endorsed on theone hand, but the burden of refugees is beyond ourmeans. Rather, disclaimers briefly save face by men-tioning Our positive characteristics, but then focusrather exclusively on Their negative attributes.Hence our qualification of the positive part ofthe disclaimer as Apparent, as in Apparent Denials,Concessions, Empathy, etc.:

(9) [Apparent Empathy] I understand that many peoplewant to come to Britain to work, but there is a procedure

whereby people can legitimately become part of ourcommunity (Gorman).

(10) [Apparent Denial] I did not say that every easternEuropeans application for asylum in this country wasbogus. However. . . (Gorman).

EUPHEMISM (RHETORIC; MEANING). (seeTaboo, Euphemism, and Political Correctness.) Thewell-known rhetorical figure of euphemism, a seman-tic move of mitigation, plays an important role intalk about immigrants. Within the broader frame-work of the strategy of positive self-presentation,and especially its correlate, the avoidance of negativeimpression formation, negative opinions about immi-grants are often mitigated, especially in foreign talk.The same is true for the negative acts of the owngroup. Thus, racism or discrimination will typicallybe mitigated as resentment or unequal treatment, re-spectively. Similarly Ms Gorman in this debate usesthe word discourage (to discourage the growingnumber of people from abroad. . .) in order to referto the harsh immigration policies of the government,and thus mitigates the actions of the conservativegovernment she supports. Similarly, the Labour(Corbyn) opposition finds the condemnation ofoppressive regimes by the Government very mutedinstead of using more critical terms. Obviously, suchmitigation of the use of euphemisms may be explainedboth in ideological terms (ingroup protection) as wellas in contextual terms, e.g., as part of politeness con-ditions or other interactional rules that are typical for

parliamentary debates.EVIDENTIALITY (MEANING, ARGUMENTA-

TION). (see also Evidentiality in Grammar.) Claimsor points of view in argument are more plausiblewhen speakers present some evidence or proof fortheir knowledge or opinions. This may happenby references to authority figures or institutions(see Authority above), or by various forms ofevidentiality: How or where did they get the infor-mation. Thus people may have read something inthe paper, heard it from reliable spokespersons, orhave seen something with their own eyes. Especiallyin debates on immigration, in which negative beliefsabout immigrants may be heard as biased, evidentialsare an important move to convey objectivity, reliabil-ity, and hence credibility. In stories that are intendedto provoke empathy, of course such evidence mustbe supplied by the victims themselves. When sourcesare actually being quoted, evidentiality is linked tointertextuality. Here are two examples:

(11) This morning, I was reading a letter from a constit-uent of mine (. . .) (Gorman).



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(12) The people who I met told me, chapter and verse,of how they had been treated by the regime in Iran(Corbyn).

EXAMPLE/ILLUSTRATION (ARGUMENTA-TION). A powerful move in argumentation is to giveconcrete examples, often in the form of a vignette or

short story, illustrating or making more plausible ageneral point defended by the speaker. Concretestories are usually better memorized than abstractarguments, and have more emotional impact, so theyare argumentatively more persuasive. Of course, theright and the left each will have its own stories to tell:

(13) The Daily Mailtoday reports the case of a womanfrom Russia who has managed to stay in Britain for 5years. According to the magistrates court yesterday, shehas cost the British taxpayer 40,000. She was arrested,of course, for stealing (Gorman).

(14) The people who I met told me, chapter and verse, of

how they had been treated by the regime in Iran of howthey had been summarily imprisoned, with no access tothe courts; of how their families had been beaten up andabused while in prison; and of how the regime murderedone mans fiancee in front of him because he would nottalk about the secret activities that he was supposed to beinvolved in (Corbyn).

GENERALIZATION (MEANING, ARGUMEN-TATION). Instead of providing concrete stories,speakers may also make generalizations, in racist dis-course typically used to formulate prejudices aboutgeneralized negative characteristics of immigrants.

Similarly, in a populist strategy, conservative speakersmay generalize the negative feelings against asylumseekers:

(15) Such things go on and they get up the noses of allconstituents (Gorman).

HYPERBOLE (RHETORIC). Hyperbole is a se-mantic rhetorical device for the enhancement ofmeaning. Within the overall strategy of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation, we maythus expect in parliamentary debates about immi-grants that the alleged bad actions or properties ofthe Others are expressed in hyperbolic terms (our bad

actions in mitigated terms), and vice versa. Sometimessuch forms of hyperbole are implied by the use ofspecial metaphors, as we observe in Mrs Gormansuse ofopening the floodgates in order to refer to thearrival of many asylum seekers. And conversely, onthe left, Labour speakers will of course emphasize thebad nature of authoritarian regimes, and likeMr Corbyn, will call them deeply oppressive, andthe conditions of refugees coming from thosecountries appalling.

IMPLICATION (MEANING). For many pragmat-ic (contextual) reasons, speakers do not (need) to sayeverything they know or believe. Indeed, a large partof discourse remains implicit, and such implicit infor-mation may be inferred by recipients from sharedknowledge or attitudes and thus constructed as part

of their mental models of the event or action repre-sented in the discourse. In debates about immigra-tion, implicitness may especially be used as a meansto convey meanings whose explicit expression couldbe interpreted as biased or racist. Thus, whenMs Gorman says that many refugees come fromcountries in Eastern Europe who have recently beenliberated, she is implying that people from suchcountries cannot be genuine asylum seekers becausedemocratic countries do not oppress their citizens (apoint later attacked by the Labour opposition). Andthe same is true when she describes these refugees asable-bodied males, which implies that these need no

help from us.IRONY (RHETORIC). (see Irony.) Accusations

may come across as more effective when they arenot made point blank (which may violate face con-straints), but in apparently lighter forms of irony.There is much irony in the mutual critique andattacks of Conservatives and Labour, of course,and these characterize the proper interactional di-mension of the debate. However, when speakingabout immigrants, irony may also serve to derogateasylum seekers, as is the case for the phrase suddenlydiscover in the following example, implying that

such a sudden discovery can only be bogus, sincethe asylum seekers allegedly knew all along that theycame to the country to stay:

(16) Too many asylum seekers enter the country initiallyas family visitors, tourists, students, and business people,and then suddenly discover that they want to remain asasylum seekers (Shaw).

LEXICALIZATION (STYLE). At the local level ofanalysis, debates on asylum seekers need to expressunderlying concepts and beliefs in specific lexicalitems. Similar meanings may thus be variablyexpressed in different words, depending on the posi-

tion, role, goals, point of view, or opinion of thespeaker, that is, as a function of context features. Inconservative discourse opposing liberal immigrationpolicies, this will typically result in more or lessblatantly negative expressions denoting refugeesand their actions, thus implementing at the levelof lexicalization the overall ideological strategy ofnegative other-presentation. Thus, also in this debate,we may typically find such expressions as economicimmigrants, bogus asylum seekers, or benefit



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scroungers, as we also know them from the tabloidpress in the UK. On the other hand, lexicalization insupport of refugees may focus on the negative presen-tation of totalitarian regimes and their acts, such asoppression, crush, torture, abuse, or injustice.

METAPHOR (MEANING, RHETORIC). (See the

other articles on metaphor). Few semantic-rhetoricalfigures are as persuasive as metaphors, also in debateson immigration. Abstract, complex, unfamiliar, new,or emotional meanings may thus be made more fa-miliar and more concrete. Virtually a standard meta-phor (if not a topos) is the use of flood metaphors torefer to refugees and their arrival, symbolizing theunstoppable threat of immigration, in which wewould all drown. Thus, Ms Gorman warns forchanges in the present law by saying that suchchanges would open the floodgates again. Anothernotorious semantic realm of metaphors is to describepeople in terms of (aggressive, repulsive, etc.) ani-

mals, for instance asylum seekers as parasites, asdoes Mrs Gorman.

NATIONAL SELF-GLORIFICATION (MEAN-ING). Especially in parliamentary speeches on immi-gration, positive self-presentation may routinely beimplemented by various forms of national self-glorification: positive references to or praise for onesown country, its principles, history, and traditions.Racist ideologies may thus be combined with nation-alist ideologies, as we have seen above. This kind ofnationalist rhetoric is not the same in all countries.It is unabashed in the USA, quite common in France

(especially on the right), and not uncommon inGermany. In the Netherlands and the UK, suchself-glorification is less explicit. See, however, thefollowing standard example probably even a topos:

(17) Britain has always honored the Geneva convention,and has given sanctuary to people with a well-foundedfear of persecution in the country from which they arefleeing and whose first safe country landing is in theUnited Kingdom (Wardle).

NEGATIVE OTHER-PRESENTATION (SEMAN-TIC MACROSTRATEGY). As the previous exampleshave shown, the categorization of people into

ingroups and outgroups, and even the division be-tween good and bad outgroups, is not value-free,but imbued with ideologically based applicationsof norms and values. Thus, throughout this debate,Mrs Gorman describes asylum seekers in terms ofbenefit seekers or bogus immigrants. Negative other-presentation is usually complimentary to positiveself-presentation.

NORM EXPRESSION. Anti-racist discourse is ofcourse strongly normative, and decries racism, dis-crimination, prejudice, and anti-immigration policies

in sometimes explicit norm statements about whatwe (in parliament, in the UK, in Europe, etc.) shouldor should not do:

(18) We should have a different attitude towards asylumseekers (Corbyn).

NUMBER GAME (RHETORIC, ARGUMENTA-TION). Much argument is oriented to enhancingcredibility by moves that emphasize objectivity. Num-bers and statistics are the primary means in our cul-ture to persuasively display objectivity, and theyroutinely characterize news reports in the press. Arri-vals of immigrants are usually accompanied by num-bers, also in parliament. The same is true for the costsof immigrants:

(19) It would open the floodgates again, and presumablythe 200 million a year cost that was estimated when thelegislation was introduced (Gorman, C).

POLARIZATION, USTHEM CATEGORIZA-TION (MEANING). Few semantic strategies indebates about Others are as prevalent as the ex-pression of polarized cognitions and the categoricaldivision of people in ingroup (us) and outgroup(them). This suggests that especially talk and textabout immigrants or refugees is also strongly moni-tored by underlying social representations (attitudes,ideologies) of groups, rather than by models ofunique events and individual people (unless theseare used as illustrations to argue a general point).Polarization may also apply to good and bad sub-

categories of outgroups, as is the case for friends andallies on the one hand and enemies on the other. Notethat polarization may be rhetorically enhanced whenexpressed as a clear contrast, that is, by attributingproperties of us and them that are semanticallyeach others opposites. Examples in our debateabound, but we shall only give one typical example:

(20) It is true that, in many cases, they have made carefulprovision for themselves in their old age, have a smalladditional pension as well as their old-age pension andpay all their rent and their bills and ask for nothing fromthe state. They are proud and happy to do so. Such

people should not be exploited by people who areexploiting the system (Gorman, C).

POPULISM (POLITICAL STRATEGY). One ofthe dominant overall strategies of conservative talkon immigration is that of populism. There are severalvariants and component moves of that strategy. Thebasic strategy is to claim (for instance against theLabour opposition) that the people (or everybody)does not support further immigration, which is also awell-known argumentation fallacy. More specificallyin this debate, the populism strategy is combined with



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bad things, and by de-emphasizing Our bad thingsand their good things. Such a general strategy may beimplemented at all levels of discourse. Thus, in exam-ples from a debate on asylum seekers in British par-liament we see that there are many ways ideologiesmay be expressed, for instance in the actor descrip-

tions, fallacies, disclaimers, metaphors, comparisons,euphemisms, hyperboles, and so on.

See also: Context, Communicative; Counterfactuals; Criti-

cal Discourse Analysis; Distributed Cognition and Com-

munication; Evidentiality in Grammar; Irony;

Parliamentary Discourses; Pragmatic Presupposition;

Taboo, Euphemism, and Political Correctness.

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