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The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative

PerspectiveAuthor(s): Eva BellinSource: Comparative Politics, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Jan., 2004), pp. 139-157Published by: Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New York Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4150140

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The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East

Exceptionalismn Comparativeerspective

Eva Bellin

Why have the Middle East and North Africa remained so singularly resistant to

democratization? While the number of electoral democracies has nearly doubled

since 1972, the number n this regionhas registeredan absolutedecline.1Today,onlytwo out of twenty-one countriesqualify as electoral democracies,down from three

observedin 1972.2Stagnation s also evidentin the guaranteeof political rightsand

civil liberties. While the number of countriesdesignatedfree by Freedom House has

doubledin the Americas and in the Asia-Pacific region, increasedtenfold in Africa,andrisen exponentiallyin Centraland East Europeover the past thirty years, there

has been no overall improvement n the Middle East and NorthAfrica.3Aggregatescores in 2002 differ little from 1972. Fifteen countriesare designatednot free, five

partlyfree, andonly one free (see Table1). While a few countries,notablyMorocco,

Jordan, Bahrain, andYemen, have registerednoteworthy progress towardpoliticalliberalization n the past decade, overall the vast majorityof countries has failed to

catch the wave of democratization that has swept nearly every other part of the

world.

Explanations suggest a litanyof regional failures.First,civil society is weak and

thus is an ineffective championof democracy.Labor unions are empty shells; busi-

nessmen's associations lack credibleautonomy;nongovernmentalorganizations ack

indigenous grounding. The weakness of associational life undermines the develop-ment of countervailingpowerin society that can force the state to be accountableto

popularpreferences.It also contracts the opportunitiesfor citizens to participate n

collective deliberation, stunting the development of a civic culture, that essential

underpinningof vibrantdemocracy.4Second, the commanding heights of the economy remain largely in state hands.

Despite nearlytwo decadesof experimentationwith structuraladjustment, he publicsector continuesto accountfor a majorshareof employmentandGNP generationin

most countries.5 This legacy of statist ideologies and rent-fueled opportunitiesunderminesthe capacity to build autonomous, countervailingpower to the state in

society.Third,people are poor; literacyrates are low; and inequality is significant. It is

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ComparativePolitics January2004

Table 1 FreedomHouse Rankingsfor Middle EasternandNorth AfricanCountries,1972 and2002

Country PoliticalRights/Civil ibertie Freedom ating(Compositecore)

1972/3 2001/2 12221 2002/3

Algeria 6 5.5 Not Free Not FreeEgypt 6 6 NotFree NotFreeIran 5.5 6 NotFree NotFreeIraq 7 7 NotFree NotFreeLibya 6.5 7 Not Free Not FreeOman 6.5 5.5 Not Free

NotFreePalestineNat'l Author. * 5.5 * Not FreeQatar 5.5 6 NotFree NotFreeSaudiArabia 6 7 Not Free NotFreeSudan 6 7 NotFree NotFreeSyria 7 7 Not Free NotFreeTunisia 5.5 5.5 NotFree NotFreeUnitedArabEmirates 6 5.5 NotFree NotFreeYemen South) 7 6 (N&S) Not Free Not Free

Lebanon 2 5.5 Free NotFree

Bahrain 5.5 5.5 PartlyFree Partly reeJordan 6 5 Not Free Partly reeKuwait 4 4.5 PartlyFree Partly reeMorocco 4.5 5 PartlyFree Partly reeTurkey 3.5 4.5 PartlyFree Partly reeYemen(North) 4.4 ** Partly Free **

Israel 2.5 2 Free Free

Anaverageatingf 1-2.5re

generallyonsideredFree",

-5.5"'Tartlyree",

nd5.5-7"NotFrce."ForFreedomHouse'smethodologyeewww. reedomhouse.org

*The PNA was created n 1993-94**Northand South Yemen unitedin 1990

140



Eva Bellin

not unusualfor a fifth of the populationin a given countryto fall below the poverty

line; 32 percentof adults areilliterate;andthe regionranksin the bottomhalf of the

United Nations' humandevelopmentindex despite the enormouswealth of severalcountries.6These conditionscompromiseboth elite and mass commitmentto democ-

ratic reform.The masses do not prioritize t, andthe elite has reason to be frightened

by it. The championsof democracyarefew andfarbetween.

Fourth,countries in the region are geographicallyremote from the epicenter of

democratization.Few,exceptTurkey,borderdirectlyon successfulmodels of democ-

ratic rule.The demonstration ffect thathas provenso important n fueling democra-

tizationin otherregionsis dilutedin the MiddleEastandNorthAfrica.7

Fifth, culture, specifically Islam, distinguishes the region. Surely culture must

explain some of the region'sexceptionalism,especially since Islam is presumedto

be inhospitable o democracy.8In short,the Middle East andNorthAfrica lack the prerequisitesof democratiza-

tion. The lack of a strongcivil society, a market-driven conomy, adequateincome

and literacy levels, democratic neighbors, and democratic culture explains the

region'sfailureto democratize.

None of these explanations s satisfying.The Middle East andNorthAfrica are in

no way unique in theirpoor endowmentwith the prerequisitesof democracy.Other

regions similarlydeprivedhave nonetheless managed to make the transition.Civil

society is notoriouslyweak in sub-SaharanAfrica, yet twenty-threeout of forty-twocountries carried out some measure of democratic transition between 1988 and

1994.9The commandingheights of the economy were entirelyunder state controlin

easternEurope priorto the fall of the Berlin wall, yet the vast majorityof countries

in this region successfully carriedthrougha transitionduringthe 1990s.10Povertyandinequality,not to mentiongeographicremotenessfromthe democraticepicenter,have characterized ndia,Mauritius,andBotswana,yet these countrieshave success-

fully embraced democracy.1"And other world cultures, notably Catholicism and

Confucianism,have at differenttimes been accused of incompatibilitywith democ-

racy,yet these cultural endowmentshave not preventedcountriesin LatinAmerica,southernEurope,andEastAsia fromdemocratizing.12

Prerequisites:A Useful Approach?

Cross-regionaland cross-temporalcomparison indicates that democratization s so

complex an outcome that no single variablewill ever proveto be universallyneces-

sary or sufficientfor it.13Any notion of a single prerequisiteof democracyshould be

jettisoned.But must the notion of prerequisitesbe abandonedaltogether? t mightbe

temptingto hold on to the idea. Cumulativefailure to realizemany of the conditions

that have historicallybeen associated with successful democratization s bound to

141




hinder democratic ransition oday.In the MiddleEast andNorthAfrica the failureto

realize so many of these conditions simultaneouslymay explain the region'sresis-

tance to transition.

However, he Middle EastandNorth Africaare not uniquein this cumulative ail-

ure. The inabilityto fulfill these conditions is the reasonwhy democracy s on such

shakygroundin so many partsof the world,why analystsmust resortto "democracywith adjectives" another erm for imperfectdemocracy)when categorizingso many

productsof the thirdwave in Africa,Asia, and Latin America.14Cumulative ailureto achieve the prerequisitesof democracy clearly undermines the consolidationof

democracy.But alone it can not explainthe failure to carryout democratic ransition

because many countries burdenedwith failure have nonethelessmade thatleap suc-

cessfully. The transitionto democracyaccomplishedby sub-SaharanAfrican states

that typically rank as poorly as if not worse than many Middle Eastern and NorthAfrican states on standard ocioeconomic indicators,proximityto successful democ-

racy,andthe vigor of civil society makes this point clear. The puzzle posed by the

Middle East andNorth Africa is not why democracyhas failed to consolidatein this

region (failure would be expected) but ratherwhy the vast majority of MiddleEastern and North African states have failed to initiatetransitionat all. Hereinlies

the exceptionalismof the region.To explainit, it is necessaryto look beyondfailure

to achieve the prerequisitesof democracy, since failure is not exceptional to the

region.

Insights from Studies of Revolution

Why has democratic transitionlargely eluded Middle Easternand North African

countries?It is not as thoughthe region has been deprivedof all democratic mpuls-es. It has indeed experiencedthe fledgling emergenceof civil society (humanrights

groups,professionalassociations,self-help groups), only to see most of themeither

repressedor corporatizedby the state.15Statistregimeshave increasingly iberalized

their economies (often underpressure from internationalforces), but autonomous

political initiativeby their new private sectors is typically punished.16Progressiveinterpretationsof Islam that endorse democraticnorms and ideals have been parsed

by Islamic theorists,only to be buriedby hostile state elites.17In each case a coer-

cive state deeply opposed to democraticreformhas quashedinitiativesfavorable o

democracy.To understand he rarityof democratic transition n the region, it is necessaryto

return to a classic work on revolution writtenby Theda Skocpol more thantwenty

years ago. The puzzling thing about revolution, Skocpol pointed out, is that,

althoughthe intuitiveprerequisite or revolution-mass disaffectionfrom the regime

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Eva Bellin

in power--is a relativelycommonphenomenon n humanexperience,successful rev-olution is a relativelyrareevent. What explains this divergencebetween cause andoutcome? The

answer, Skocpol argued,lies in the

strengthof the state

and, mostimportant, he state'scapacityto maintaina monopoly on the means of coercion. Ifthe state'scoercive apparatus emainscoherentandeffective, it can face downpopu-lar disaffection and survivesignificant illegitimacy,"value incoherence,"and even a

pervasivesense of relativedeprivationamongits subjects.18In short,the strength,coherence,and effectiveness of the state'scoercive appara-

tus distinguish among cases of successful revolution, revolutionary failure, andnonoccurrence.19 he same mightbe said of democratictransition.Democratictran-sition can be carried out successfully only when the state's coercive apparatusacksthe will or capacity to crush it. Where that coercive apparatusremains intact and

opposedto politicalreform,democratic ransitionwill not occur.Thus,the solution to the puzzle of Middle Easternand North Africanexceptional-

ism lies less in absent prerequisitesof democratizationand more in present condi-tions that foster robustauthoritarianism,pecifically a robust coercive apparatus nthese states.20The will and capacity of the state's coercive apparatusto suppressdemocratic initiative have extinguishedthe possibility of transition.Herein lies the

region'strueexceptionalism.Some conceptualclarifications are in order.First,will and capacityare two inde-

pendentqualitiesthat do not covary and ought not be collapsed into one. A regime

mayhave the

capacityto

repressdemocratic forces but not the

will,as in South

Korea under Roh Tae Woo in 1987. Or the reversemay be true, as in Benin underKerekouin 1989. Second, this argumentadmittedlyveers toward conflation of thecoercive apparatus and the authoritarianregime it undergirds. The distinctionbetween the two is often difficult to draw,even in regimes (for example, Egypt,Syria,andAlgeria) where the official head of state is a civilian, because the head ofstate is often closely allied with the coercive apparatusand highly dependent oncoercion to survive. The mutualcontrols exercisedby the securityapparatusand thecivilian leaderendow each with a measureof veto powerover the otherand make itdifficultto determinewho exercisessuperioragency in the dyad.

Classic indicatorsused to gaugerelativepower(controloverappointments, oliticalsuccession,budgets, andpolicy) often do not yield a clear-cutpicture.21Patrimonial

linkagesbetweenthe regimeandcoerciveapparatusurther nmeshthe two. InAlgeria,for example,conflationof theregimeand the coerciveapparatuss so pronouncedhatone analyst,paraphrasingMirabeau'sdescriptionof Prussia,declared hat"everystatehas an armybut in Algeriathe armyhas a state."22 he problemof conflationbetweenauthoritarian ivilian regimes and the militaryis in no way peculiarto this region.23Nevertheless, he prevalenceof patrimonialogic in many regimesmakesthis problemparticularlyervasive n the MiddleEast andNorthAfrica.

143




Thus, authoritarianismhas proven exceptionally robust in the Middle East and

North Africa because the coercive apparatusn many states has been exceptionallyable and

willingto crush reform initiatives from below.

Comparative analysisis

helpful in explaining why.The experienceof otherregionsrevealswhat is exception-al about the MiddleEast and North Africa.

Robustness of the CoerciveApparatus

What shapes the robustness of a regime's coercive apparatus? Underwhat condi-

tions will it lose its capacity and will to hold on to power and permit society to

experimentwith democratization?Comparativeanalysis of cases of such renuncia-

tion suggestsat least fourvariables hatare crucial to this outcome.First,the robustness of the coercive apparatuss directlylinked to maintenanceof

fiscal health. The securityestablishment s most likely to give up when its financial

foundation is seriously compromised. When the military can no longer pay thesalaries of its recruitsandthe securityforces can not guaranteesuppliesof arms and

ammunition,the coercive apparatusdisintegratesfrom within. Forexample, in sub-

SaharanAfrica democratictransitionwas less the workof strongsocieties andmore

the consequenceof weak states.24Prolongedfiscal crisis "hollowedout"the coercive

apparatusof many African countries. Soldiers went unpaid,andmateriel deteriorat-ed. Democratic transition was possible because decompositionof the militaryand

securityestablishmentsopened up the political space in which demandsfor democ-

racycould be pressed.25Accordingto Brattonand van de Walle,the strengthand dis-

position of the militarywere among the most significant determinantsof the fate oftransitionon theAfricancontinent.26

Second, the robustness of the coercive apparatus s also shaped by successful

maintenance of internationalsupportnetworks. The security establishment s most

likely to lose its will and capacityto hold on to powerwhen it loses crucial interna-

tional support.Coercive regimes especially face this problemif they have been the

recipientsof massive foreign support(and few authoritarianegimes of the twentieth

centuryescapedthe benevolenceof one great poweror anotherduringthe cold war).Withdrawalof internationalbacking triggersboth an existential and financial crisis

for the regimethatoften devastatesboth its will and capacityto carryon. This sce-narioprovedkey in easternEurope,where the Soviet Union's withdrawalof supportfor the Brezhnev doctrine spelled the end of the coercive backbone of eastern

European regimes and their will to hold on.27It also proved important in Latin

America,where the United States'abruptshift away from supportingauthoritarian-ism after the cold war dealt manyregimes an importantexistential blow.28Finally, t

was importantn sub-SaharanAfrica where,as the cold warwaned, foreign patrons,

144



Eva Bellin

both eastern and western, withdrew massive supplies of military aid and wherewestern donors ncreasinglymade foreignaid conditional on democraticreform.29

Third,he robustnessof the coercive

apparatus,or of its will to

repressreformini-

tiatives, is inverselyrelatedto its level of institutionalization.The more institutional-ized the security establishment is, the more willing it will be to disengage from

powerandallow political reform to proceed.The less institutionalized t is, the lessamenable t will be to reform.

Institutionalization f the coercive apparatus hould not be confused with profes-sionalization in Huntington's sense. Institutionalization does not refer to the

depoliticizationof the security establishmentand its subordination o civilian con-

trol.30Rather, institutionalization nvokes the constellationof qualities thatWeberused to distinguishbureaucracies rom patrimoniallydrivenorganizations.An insti-

tutionalizedcoercive apparatuss one thatis rule-governed,predictable,and merito-cratic.It has establishedpathsof careeradvancementandrecruitment;promotionisbased on performance,not politics; there is a clear delineationbetween the publicandprivatethat forbidspredatorybehaviorvis-a-vis society; and discipline is main-tained throughthe inculcationof a service ethic and strictenforcementof a merit-

based hierarchy.In contrast, in a coercive apparatus organized along patrimoniallines staffing decisions are ruled by cronyism;the distinction between public and

privatemission is blurred, eadingto widespreadcorruptionand abuse of power;and

discipline is maintainedthroughthe exploitationof primordialcleavage, often rely-ing on balancedrivalrybetween differentethnic/sectariangroups.

Patrimonialismconfers a number of distinctadvantageson authoritarianegimesthat can contributeto their longevity.31They include demobilizing the oppositionand building a loyal base throughselective favoritism and discretionarypatronage.Patrimonialismcan also make authoritarianegimes particularlyresistantto democ-ratic reform.32 n the coerciveapparatus,patrimonialorganizationwill be less recep-tive to political opening. By contrast,institutionalizationwill have more tolerancefor reform.First,where the coercive apparatuss institutionalized, he securityelitehas a sense of corporate dentity separatefrom the state. It has a distinct mission,

identity, and career path. Officers can imagine separation from the state. Theybelieve they will live to see anotherday,even if they relinquish power. They do not

perceivethatthey will be "ruinedby reform."33 o the contrary, hey are more likelyto be ruinedby holding on to office too long because the inevitablepolitical failuresare bound to triggeranddevelop political divisions within the elite. These divisions,in turn,may threatenthe institutional ntegrityof the security apparatus.One of themain factorsthat drove the militaryelite to transferpowerto civilians in Brazil and

Argentinawas its concernto save the institutional ntegrityof the militaryestablish-ments.34Similarincentives are presentwheneverthe coercive apparatus s stronglyinstitutionalized. Second, where the coercive apparatusis institutionalized ratherthanpatrimonial, t is distinguishedby a commitment to some broadernational mis-

145




sion that serves the public good, such as national defense and economic develop-ment, rather han to personalaggrandizementand enrichmentalone. Wherethe elitehas

successfullydeliveredon this

mission,it

againhas

goodreason to be

persuadedthatit will not be ruinedby reform. To the contrary,where it has successfullydeliv-ered on public goals like national defense and economic development,it might beconfidentof its abilityto ride democratic ransition uccessfullyand maintaina holdon power,this time by popularelection. Both Pinochet in Chile andRohTae-Woo nSouth Koreareasoned this way. While Pinochet was overly optimistic (he failed towin the plebiscite that would have elected him Chile'spresidentin 1988), Roh TaeWoo's political confidence was well-placed. The South Korean general rode his

recordof achievementto win the highest office of the land.35Again, the institution-alized characterof the securityapparatusosteredtolerance of democraticreform.

Finally,the coercive apparatus' apacityandwill to hold on to poweris shapedbythe degree to which it faces a high level of popularmobilization.Violently repress-ing thousands of people, even if it is within the physical capacity of the securityforces, is costly. It mayjeopardizethe institutional ntegrityof the security appara-tus, internationalsupport,and domestic legitimacy.Clearly,the high costs of mas-sive repressionwill not deteran elite thatbelieves it will be ruinedby reform.36The

slaughterof thousandsat Hamaby Assad'sregimein Syriaand the massacre of hun-

dreds at TiananmenSquareby the Communistregime in Chinaare only two salient

examples of the humantragedywreakedby coercive elites bent on repressionandundeterredby the very high costs associatedwith it.37However,wherethe elite does

not perceivereformto be so devastating, he highercost of repressionposedby highlevels of popularmobilizationmay serve as a tippingmechanism,pitchingthe eliteonto the side of reform. In Korea mass demonstrationson behalf of democratic

reform,mannedby a broad,cross-class coalitionwith sizablemiddleclass participa-tion, persuadedRoh TaeWooto forgo brutalrepressionof the democracymovementand instead opt for reform.38Similarly,in LatinAmerica the presence of an orga-nized labor movement and an active civil society, both mobilized on the side of

democratization,made coerciveregimes in ArgentinaandPerureconsiderrepressionwhen otheroptionsseemedpossible and safe.39

Twoobjections might be raised to this fourth variable.First,it introducesan ele-

ment of circularity o the argument, ince the level of popularmobilization n societyis, to some degree, shapedby the coercive capacityand will of the state. Forexam-

ple, in Egypt the state'scoercivecapacityandwill has led to harshrepressionof civil

society; consequently,many popularforces have been reluctant o mobilize political-ly. The reluctance has lowered the cost of repressionfor the state and refortified tswill to use coercion. However,there is no simple correlationbetweena state'scoer-cive capacityandwill andits demobilizationof society. Some coercive states nurturethe developmentof civil society through corporatistmeasures. Othersrepress ncon-

sistently,demobilizing some groups (for example, leftist unions) but not others(for

146



Eva Bellin

example,the church).Toleratedpockets of mobilizationcan come back to challengethe state. The elite is forcedto ask if the cost of repressionis worth the benefit. For

example, in SouthKorea n 1987 the mobilizationof tolerated

groupssuch as church

and studentmovementscreatedsignificantpressureto reform. Consequently,popu-lar mobilization must be measuredon its own, independentof the state's coercive

capacityandwill.A second objection to popularmobilization as a variableis that it reintroduces

some of the logic of the social prerequisitesapproachrejected earlier.The level of

popularmobilization is clearly shaped by such variables as literacy,urbanization,and socioeconomic inequality. However, one variable can not be reduced to the

other.Popularmobilizationis also shaped by ideological factors (like Communism

or Islamism), leadership variables (like charismatic leadership), and sudden

momentsof crisis thatspura spontaneouspopularresponse.Measurementof socioe-conomic variableswill not account for such spurtsof mobilization;popularmobi-

lizationmust be measuredon its own.40

Conditions in the Middle East and North Africa

No single variable, whether poor fiscal health, declining international support,

stronginstitutionalization,or high levels of popularmobilization, is either a neces-

sary or sufficient condition of retreat from power by the coercive apparatus.But

these fourvariableshavebeen importantcross-regionally n cases of retreat.How dothe countriesof the Middle East and North Africa rate on them?Theirperformance

suggestsreasonswhy authoritarianegimes areexceptionallyrobustthere.

First,with regardto fiscal health, although many states in the Middle East and

NorthAfrica have economic difficulties of one sort or another,few, save perhapsthe

Sudan,face economic collapse of sub-Saharanproportions.41Most, moreover,enjoysufficientrevenueto sustainexceedinglyrobustexpenditureon theirsecurityappara-tuses. In fact, these expendituresare among the highest in the world. The region'sstates areworldleadersin the proportionof GNP spenton security.On average,they

spent6.7 percentof their GNP on defense expenditures n the year 2000, comparedto a global average of 3.8 percent, 2.2 percent in NATO countries,2.8 percent in

non-NATOEuropeancountries,3.3 percentin East Asia andAustralasia,4 percentin

sub-SaharanAfrica, and 1.6 percent in the Carribean and in Central and Latin

America.42They are also among the biggest spendersin terms of arms purchased.

Seven--Saudi Arabia, Iran,Egypt, Israel, the United Arab Emirates,Kuwait, and

Algeria-alone accountedfor 40 percentof all global arms sales in the year 2000.43

Finally, the percentage of population engaged in various branches of the security

apparatuss high by worldstandards.The average countrycounts 16.2 men perthou-

sand underarms, comparedto 6.31 in France,3.92 in Brazil, and .33 in Ghana. In

147




Iraq, for example, the number is 20.94; in Syria, 26; in Bahrain, 33.8; in Saudi

Arabia,9.86; andin Egypt, 10.87. 44

How do these countries sustain such elaborate coerciveapparatuses?

Here iswhere access to rent comes intoplay.This access has long distinguished heregion.45Many, though not all, of these states are major recipients of rentier income. Theirrent derives from differentendowments-petroleum resources, gas resources,geo-strategicutility,and controlof critical transit facilities. From the morethan$30 bil-lion that the Saudi state earns each year in oil revenue to the $2 billion thatEgyptreceives annually from the United States in foreign aid, many Middle Eastern andNorth Africanstates are richly suppliedwith rentalincome.46 t gives themaccess tosubstantialdiscretionaryresources so that,even if the countryis overallin poor eco-nomic health,the state is still able to hew to conventionaleconomic wisdom andpay

itself first, thatis, give first priority o paying the militaryandsecurityforces.Thus,while governmentspendingon educationand welfaremay remainflat and economiccrisis may cut into infrastructuralnvestment,expenditureon the security apparatusremains very high.47In Egypt, for example, economic crisis forced the regime to

sign an IMF accord that requireda reductionin the subsidy of basic goods by 14

percent.This reduction did not preventthe regime fromincreasingthe militarybud-

get by 22 percentthat same year.48Similarly, in Algeria, althoughcivil war has rav-

aged the country'seconomy,the army s always paid.Themilitary apparatus emainsintact thanks to Algeria's reliable dole of oil and gas rents. In short, exceptionalaccess to rents has nurtureda robust coercive apparatus n many states across the

region.Withregard o international upport, he region is exceptionalfor theuniqueposi-

tion it enjoys in the internationalarena. As in other regions, authoritarian tates inthe Middle East and North Africa profited from the cold war, reaping patronagefrom eastern and western great powers(sometimes simultaneously) n return or the

promiseof reliable alliance in the fight for or againstCommunism.But in contrast ootherregionsthe authoritariantatesin the Middle East and North Africa did not seetheir sources of internationalpatronage evaporatewith the end of the cold war orwith America'ssubsequentreanimationwith democracy,because western interest nthe regionhas been drivenby multiple securityconcernsthat survivedthe cold war.

Twokey concerns area reliableoil supply,a strategicallycrucial resource o increas-

ingly dependent OECD countries, and the Islamist threat, which has provedevermore alarmingas Islamist radicals turned their furytowardAmericantargets n theU.S. andabroad.49

Both of these concerns have provideda compelling rationale to westernpolicy-makers to persist in providing patronageto many authoritarian tates in the region.As Roosevelt said about Somoza, "they may be sons of bitches but at least they areoursons of bitches."50Authoritarianegimesin SaudiArabia,Egypt,Jordan,Tunisia,and Algeria have received western support,at times in very generous proportions,

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Eva Bellin

because of the belief (perhaps mistaken) among western policymakers that these

regimes would be most likely to deliver on western security concerns by assuring

regularoil and

gas suppliesto the West and

containingthe Islamist threat.In

short,the region is exceptional in that the cold war's end has not signaled great powerretreatfrom patronageof authoritarianism,as in Latin America, Africa, and else-where.51Playing on the West'smultiple securityconcerns has allowed authoritarian

regimes in the region to retaininternational upport.The West'sgenerous provisionof this supporthas bolsteredthe capacityandwill of these regimesto hold on.

With regardto the third variable,patrimonialism,in most Middle Eastern andNorthAfrican countries the coercive apparatus,ike the regimesthemselves, is gov-erned by patrimonial ogic. Although not universal(the military in Turkey,Egypt,andTunisiaare highly institutionalized)many of the regional powerhouses, such as

Iraq, Syria,and SaudiArabia,as well as lesser forces such as Jordanand Morocco,have coercive establishments shot throughwith patrimonialism. Personalismper-vades staffing decisions. In Jordan and Morocco the king regularly appoints hismale relatives to key military posts to guarantee against military rebellion.52InSaudi Arabiaand Syriaentirebranches of the militaryand securityforces are familyaffairs.53Politicalreliability supercedesmerit in promotions.In JordanPalestinianscan not rise abovethe rank of majoror lieutenantcolonel in combat units.54 n SyriaanAir Force commanderwas appointed houghhe was not even a pilot (buthe was atrusted friend of Hafez al-Asad).55Ethnic ties are used to guarantee oyalty. In Iraqthe elite units were overwhelminglySunni. In Syriathey areAlawi.56 Intercorpand

intracorpdiscipline is maintainedby relying on balancedrivalrybetween primordialgroups.The SyrianregimecarefullybalancesAlawi, Sunni,andChristian eadershipto maintaincontrol.The Jordanianand Saudiregimes rely on tribal andbedouinloy-alties to balancepowerbetweendifferentcorps.57The distinctionbetweenpublic and

private s not always scrupulouslyobserved. In Iraqand Syriathe militaryhas servedas a key routeto personalenrichment.It has not been unusual for generals to turntheir units intopersonaleconomic fiefdoms.58

Of course, not all security establishmentsare equally corrupted.The Jordanian

militaryis much more rule-governed han its Syrianor Iraqicounterparts.Moreover,

patrimonialismshould not be confused with professional incompetence; many of

these apparatusesare professionallywell-trainedand equipped to handle the mostmodern military materiel. But patrimonialism spells a strong personal linkagebetween the coercive apparatusand the regime it serves; it makes for the coercive

apparatus'personal identification with the regime and the regime's longevity andthus fostersresistanceto politicalreform.

Underpatrimonialconditions,political reformrepresentsthe prospectof ruin forthe elite of the coercive apparatus.Political opening and popular accountabilitywould deprivethe Alawi officer in Syria of his special perquisites, if not his life.

Regime change would jeopardize the predominanceof favored tribal elites in the

149




JordanianandSaudimilitary.Furthermore,ew of these officers could expectto ride

electoralpolitics to power,Roh TaeWoo-style,because of the failureof these patri-

moniallydriven

apparatuseso deliver on national

goalsas

successfullyas did Roh

Tae Woo. To the contrary, hese officers have every incentive to close ranks behind

the old authoritarianystem, shoring it up even when naturalcalamity providesan

opportunity or opening. Forexample, in Syriathe ruling dictator'sold age, illness,and deathmight have created an opportunity or political opening if the leadersof

the coercive apparatushad not closed ranksbehind the old systemandpersuadedhe

dictator's on that the country'sbest interests ay in continuingthe regime.The prevalence of patrimonialism is by no means exceptional to this region.

Similarlogic governs regimesin Africa, Asia, andbeyond.But the low level of insti-

tutionalization in the region's coercive apparatusesconstitutes one more factor

explainingthe robustwill of so manyto thwartpoliticalreform.As for the fourth variable,popular mobilization on behalf of political reform

remains weak. Nowhere in the region do mammoth,cross-class coalitions mobilize

on the streets to push for reform,as in South Korea.Consequently, n most Middle

Eastern and NorthAfricancountries the costs of repressionarerelativelylow.Even

where mobilization has been higher, as when Islamists mobilized impressivenum-

bers for political reform in Syria in the 1980s and Algeria in the 1990s, the state

lessened the costs of repression,that is, the potentialloss of domestic legitimacyor

international upport, by playingon the special threatposed by Islamist forces. The

mobilization was cast as athreat o orderandsecurity

forbothdomestic and interna-

tional constituencies. This approachsucceeded. The Algerianstate was able to count

on continued French patronage for many years by emphasizing the dangerof the

Islamist menace. Even Asad's brutal massacreat Hamawon him some popularsup-

port on the grounds:"Betterone month of Hamathan fourteenyears of civil waras

in Lebanon."59

The low level of popularmobilization for political reform is not limited to the

region, and to some extent it is a consequenceof some of the absentprerequisitesof

democracylike povertyand low levels of literacy.However, hereare additional ac-

tors that reduce popularenthusiasm for democratic reform in the Middle East and

North Africa. First, experimentsin political liberalizationare historicallyidentifiedwith colonial dominationrather han self-determination in contrast o India).Earlier

half-heartedattemptscarriedout underBritishand Frenchmandateswere more win-

dow-dressing for foreign domination than substantive experiments in self-rule.

Second,there is no prolongedprior experiencewith democracythatmight havecre-

ated the institutionalfoundations for popularmobilization,such as mass-basedpar-ties and laborunions (in contrast o many Latin Americancountries).Third,a coun-

terparadigmoffers an ideologicallyrich and inspiringalternative o liberaldemocra-

cy (in contrastto easternEurope after the fall of Communism).AlthoughIslamist

150



Eva Bellin

ideologies need not be posed as an alternativeto liberal democraticworld-views,

they often develop in this way out of political expedience. Fourth,the presence of

this nondemocraticIslamistthreatdemobilizes much of the traditionalconstituencyfor democraticactivism, the secularand educatedelements of the middle class. No

matterwhat the explanationis, low levels of popularmobilization for democratic

reformarea reality in the region.They lowerthe costs of repressionfor the coercive

apparatusand increase the likelihood that the security establishmentwill resort to

forceto thwartreforminitiatives.

Of course, there is one dramaticexample in the region where popularmobiliza-

tion for political reform succeeded in bringingon regime change: Iran. Millions of

Iraniansparticipatedn mass proteststo bringdownthe shah,andpopularmobiliza-

tionplayed

akey

role in the revolution'ssuccess, not least for the profound mpactit

exercised on the military.Although the military retained the physical capacity to

repressthe protestors, ts will was sappedby the potentiallyenormouscost of repres-

sion, not least to the institutional ntegrityof the militaryitself. Facedwith masses of

civilians bearing flowers and chanting religious slogans, many soldiers refused to

shoot;desertionsmounted;andoutrightmutiniesagainstthe upperranksmultiplied.

Fearingfor the institutional ntegrityof the armedforces, the chief of staff declared

the military'sneutrality oward he revolutionandsealed the fate of the old regime.60In short,high levels of popularmobilizationin Iranraisedthe cost of repressionsuf-

ficiently to undermine he coerciveapparatus'swill to repress.61

A fifth variable,the existence of a crediblethreat,has been suggested to explainthe robustness of the coercive apparatusn many Middle Easternand NorthAfrican

countries. Given the centrality of the Arab-Israeli conflict to the politics of the

region, some analystslink the robustnessof the region'sauthoritarianismo the exis-

tential threatposed by Israel to its Arab neighborsand to the subsequentconstruc-

tion of large militariesby many Arab states. No doubt the prevalenceof interstate

conflict in the region (including but not limited to the Arab-Israeli conflict) has

played an importantrole in reinforcingauthoritarianismn the region.62But analystswho championthis explanationmust accountfor the fact thatthe robustnessof coer-

cive apparatusesn Arab states correlatesneithergeographicallynortemporallywiththe threatposed by Israel. Geographically,he arc of authoritarianismn the regionfar exceeds the fly-zone of the Israeli air force; that is, countriesfar removed from

the epicenter of the conflict (for example, Saudi Arabia, Morocco) still share the

region's propensity for robust coercive apparatuses.Temporally,reduction in the

existentialthreatposed by Israel has not led to commensuratedecline in the size of

the coercive apparatus.For example, the cold peace between Egypt and Israel over

the past twenty-five years has not been matched by a comparable reduction in

Egypt's militarybudget.63

151




Conclusion

Theexceptionalism

of the Middle East andNorthAfrica lies not so much in absent

prerequisitesof democracyas in presentconditions that fosterrobust authoritarian-ism and especially a robustandpoliticallytenacious coercive apparatus.Some con-

ditions responsiblefor the robustnessof this authoritarianism re exceptionalto theMiddle East andNorthAfrica;others are not. Access to abundant entdistinguishesthe region and subsidizes much of the cost of these overdevelopedcoerciveappara-tuses. Multiplewesternsecurityconcerns in the regionguaranteecontinuous nterna-tional supportto authoritarian egimes in the Middle East and North Africa even

after the cold war. But the prevalenceof patrimonialism n state structuresand thelow level of popularmobilization are not uniqueto the region.Together, hese fac-

tors reinforcethe coerciveapparatus' apacityandpreventdemocraticreform.For otherregions,the experienceof the Middle EastandNorthAfricadrawsatten-

tionto thepersistent mportance f structuralactors,most importantly,hecharacter fstate nstitutions,n chartinga country's usceptibilityo democratic ransition. hesud-den andpervasive urntowarddemocracy n LatinAmericaduring he 1980splayeda

key role in discrediting ocioeconomicdeterminismn theoriesof democraticransition,

highlighting instead the centrality of elite choice and voluntarismin establishingdemocracy.64 he dramatic ransition o democracy hatsweptsub-Saharan frica andeasternEurope n the 1990s drew attention o the important ole popularmobilizationcan play in bringingdown authoritarian egimes.65But the stubbornpersistenceof

authoritarianismn theMiddleEast and NorthAfricahighlightsanequallypowerfules-son. Wherepatrimonialnstitutions reweddedto coercivecapacity,authoritarianisms

likelyto endure.In this context,regimeelitespossess boththe will andthecapacity o

suppressdemocratic nitiative.And where internationalupportandfinancing s forth-

comingto the authoritarianegime,rapidregimechangeis unlikely.66It would be temptingto arguethatremovalof the coerciveapparatus,perhapsby

decisive external intervention, could end authoritarianismand open the way to

democracyin such regions.Unfortunately,he analysis presentedhere does not sup-portthis view. The fourvariables dentified aboveexplainthe robustnessof the coer-cive apparatusesn many Middle EasternandNorthAfrican countries andtheir will

to suppressdemocratic nitiative.This analysis says little about the conditions neces-

sary to implant democracyitself. For,while the removal of democracy-suppressingcoercive apparatusess a necessarycondition for democratictransitionand consoli-

dation, it is not sufficient. A host of conditions, including a minimal level of elite

commitment,a minimal level of national solidarity,a minimal level of per capitaGNP,and,perhapsmost importantof all, the creation of impartialand effective stateinstitutionsmust be present.Effective bureaucracies,police, andjudiciariesthat candeliverpredictablerule of law and order areessential for democracyto flourish.To a

largedegree,ordercomes priorto democracy.Democracycannot thrive n chaos.67

152



Eva Bellin

Sadly, countrieswith a history of patrimonialrule are greatly disadvantaged n

this institutionalendowment.Personalisticregimes, by definition, privilege govern-

mentby the ruler'sdiscretion,not rule of law.

Generally,patrimonialregimesdo not

have the effective and impartialbureaucracies,police, and other state institutions

thatare essential for a robustdemocracy.Thus, consolidationof democracyin post-

patrimonialregimesis especially challenging.68In the absence of effective state institutions, removing an oppressive coercive

apparatuswill lead, not to democracy,but ratherto authoritarianism f a different

stripeor, worse, chaos. To anchordemocracyin the region, political reformersmust

focus on building effective, impartialstate institutions,nurturingassociations that

reach across ethnic lines and unite people aroundcommon economic and cultural

interests,and fosteringeconomic growththatwill increaseper capita GNP into the

zone of democraticpossibility.69This challenge is gargantuanbut is little differentfrom the one facing many other countries. In facing this challenge, as in so many

ways, the MiddleEastand NorthAfrica arehardly exceptionalat all.

NOTES

Theauthor ratefullycknowledgeshecritical ommentsf LisaAnderson,MichelePenner ngrist,Mia

Bloom,JasonBrownlee, oseCheibub,LarryDiamond,KennethErickson,GregoryGause,Barbara

Geddes,DanielGingerich,StevenHeydemann,MichaelHudson,SamuelHuntington,AlanJacobs,Pauline ones-Luong,ickieLangohr, llenLust-Okar,elsonKasfir,AugustusRichardNorton,Susan

Pharr,Marsha ripstein osusney, ruceRutherford,aulSalem,Benjamin mith,LilyTsai,LucanWay,CarrieRosefskyWickham,hemembers f theHarvard niversityResearchWorkshopn ComparativePolitics, nd woanonymouseadersnd heresearch ssistance f TheresaHouse.

1. TheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica nclude wenty-one ountries: lgeria,Bahrain,Egypt,Iran,

Iraq, srael,Jordan,Kuwait,Lebanon,Libya,Morocco,Oman, he Palestinian uthority,Qatar,Saudi

Arabia, yria,Sudan,Tunisia, urkey,he UnitedArabEmirates,ndYemen. haveexcludedourcoun-

triesthat are members f theArabLeaguebut aregeographicallyoo remote:Somalia,Mauritania,

Djibouti, nd he Comoros slands.2. IsraelandTurkeyodaymeet he standardsf electoral emocracy,efinedas a regimehatchoos-

es its governmenthroughegular,ree,competitivelections. n 1972Lebanon id as well. Freedom

House,"FreedomntheWorld:002,"www.freedomhouse.org,. 7. Onelectoral ersusiberaldemocra-

cy,seeLarryDiamond,Is heThirdWave

Over?,"ournal

fDemocracy, (July1996),20-37.

3. Ibid.,pp.5-7. FreedomHouse'sdivision f the worldplacesTurkeynEurope nd hePalestinian

Authorityna separate ategory alleddisputederritories.hus,neither ountryappearsn its statistics

for heMiddleEastandNorthAfrica. include oth.4. AugustusRichard orton, d.,CivilSocietyn theMiddleEast(Leiden:E. J.Brill,1995-96).For

a superb verviewof the debateon the sourcesof MiddleEastern uthoritarianism,ee RexBrynen,

BahgatKorany, ndPaulNoble, eds.,PoliticalLiberalizationnd Democratizationn theArabWorld

(Boulder: ynneRienner,995).5. UNDP,ArabHumanDevelopment eport 2002),reportshatgovernmentxpendituress a per-

centage f GDPaverage 0percentn theArabworld,houghhisfigure s likelyan underestimateince

manyoil-rich tates ike SaudiArabia nd heUnitedArabEmirates erenot ncluded.

153




6. For poverty levels and illiteracy rates, see Economic Trends n the MENARegion, 2002 (Cairo:AmericanUniversity in Cairo Press, 2002), pp. 23, 102. The illiteracyrate cited excludes Israel,which

registers 4 percent adult illiteracy. For human development data, see UNCAD, Human Development

Report (2001). Interestingly,according to Adams and Page "the MENA region has the lowest regionalincidence of extreme povertywith less than 2.5% of the population living on or below $1/day." n fact,countries n the regionhave, on average,one of the most equal income distributions n theworld,althougheven its income distribution is significantly unequal. See UNDP, Arab Human Development Report

(2002), p. 90; WorldBank, WorldDevelopmentReport(2002), pp. 230-35.

7. See GiuseppeDiPalma,ToCraftDemocracy (Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1990), pp.1-26.

8. Elie Kedourie,DemocracyandArab Political Culture London:FrankCass, 1994);P.J.Vatikiotis,Islam and the State (New York: Croom Helm, 1987); Martin Karmer, "Islam vs. Democracy,"

Commentary, 5 (January1993), 35-42.

9. Michael Bratton and Nicholas van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa (New York:

Cambridge, 1997), pp. 1-13, 72; Michael Bratton,"Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational

Life in Africa,"WorldPolitics, 41 (1989), 407-30; JeffreyHerbst,"Political Liberalizationn Africa afterTenYears,"ComparativePolitics, 33 (April2001), 357-75.

10. Ivo Banac, ed., EasternEuropein Revolution Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress, 1992).11. Atul Kohli, ed., The Success of India s Democracy(New York:CambridgeUniversityPress,2001);

Brattonandvan de Walle,pp. 69, 246.

12. For example, Sinagpore'sPrime Minister Lee Kuan Yew pronounced"Asian values"contrary o

democracy. See also Lucian Pye, Asian Power and Politics (New York:CambridgeUniversity Press,

1985); Howard J. Wiarda,"Social Change and Political Development in Latin America: Summary,"n

HowardWiarda,ed., Politics and Social ChangeIn LatinAmerica(Amherst:Universityof Massachusetts

Press, 1974); Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave:Democratization in the Late TwentiethCentury

(Norman:University of OklahomaPress, 1991), pp. 72-85; LarryDiamond, ed., Political Cultureand

Democracyin

DevelopingCountries

(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993); Larry Diamond, DevelopingDemocracy:TowardConsolidation(Baltimore:The JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress, 1999), pp. 161-217.

Perhaps the most powerful critique of any deterministic association between religious tradition and

authoritarianism,nd specifically between Islam and authoritarianism,s made by a nonspecialist.Alfred

Stepan, "Religion, Democracy,and the 'TwinTolerations,"'n Alfred Stepan,ed., ArguingComparativePolitics (New York:OxfordUniversityPress, 2001), emphasizes the multivocalityof all greatreligioustraditionsand theirpotentialfor reconciliationwith democratic ideals. He provides empiricalsupport or

the possibility of Islam'sreconciliationwith democracy by pointing to both Muslim majoritycountries

that sustain electoral democracies (Indonesia, Turkey,Bangladesh) and the millions of Muslims who

reside in democraciesin India,Europe,and the U.S. withoutinjuryto theirreligious identity.13. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., Democracy in Developing

Countries(Boulder:LynneRienner,1999).

14. David Collierand Steven Levitsky,"Democracywith Adjectives,"WorldPolitics,49 (April 1997),430-52; Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation

(Baltimore:The JohnsHopkins UniversityPress, 1996);Diamond,DevelopingDemocracy,pp. 1-63.

15. See Norton,ed. Also Iliya Harik,"RethinkingCivil Society,"JournalofDemocracy, 5 (July1994),

43-56; QuintanWiktorowicz,"CivilSociety as Social Control,"ComparativePolitics, 33 (October2000),43-61.

16. Eva Bellin, StalledDemocracy: Capital,Labor,and the Paradoxof State-SponsoredDevelopment

(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,2002), pp. 86-121.

17. MumtazAhmad,"Parliament,Parties,Polls and Islam: Issues in the CurrentDebateon Religionand Politics in Pakistan,"AmericanJournalof slamic Social Sciences, 2 (July 1985), 15-28.

18. ThedaSkocpol,States and Social RevolutionsNewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1979),p. 32.

154



Eva Bellin

19. Ibid.,p. 34.

20. Jill Crystal,"Authoritarianismnd Its Adversariesin the ArabWorld,"WorldPolitics, 46 (January

1994), 262-89.

21. In Egypt, for example, the president retainscontrol over promotionsabove brigadier,has a finalsay over the military'sbudget, and can dismiss popularmilitary leaders (such as Abu Ghazala) if theybecome too popular.The military has independentsources of financing, seems to exercise veto powerover the designationof Mubarak's uccessor,and has saved the regime from fatal attack on at least three

occasions. See Philippe Droz-Vincent,"Le Militaireet le Politiqueen Egypte,"MondeArabe: Maghreb

Machrek,165 ( July-September1999), 16-35; Daniel Sobelman,"GamalMubarak,Presidentof Egypt?,"Middle East Quarterly(Spring2001), 31-40; John Sfakianakisand Robert Springborg,"The President,the Son, andMilitarySuccession in Egypt,"Arab StudiesJournal (Fall 2001), 73-88. In Syriathe balance

of poweris similarlyunclear.The late dictatorHafez el-Assad was able to dismiss powerfulspecial forces

commanderAli Haydarover a differencein policy but also had to court the favor of the militaryto ensure

the succession of his son Bashar to the presidency.See Risa Brooks, Political-MilitaryRelations and the

StabilityofArab Regimes(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress for ISIS, 1998).22. MohammadHarbi,cited in Le Soir de Bruxelles,Jan. 11, 2002. I thankReda Bensmaiafor alerting

me to this source.Droz-Vincent,p. 16, identifies the originalsourceas Mirabeau.

23. For example, Robin Luckham, "The Military, Militarization, and Democratization in Africa,"

AfricanStudiesReview,37 (September1994), esp. 42-50, explores it in Africa.

24. Herbst,p. 372.

25. Luckham,"TheMilitary,Militarization,and Democratization,"pp. 50-59; also, Robin Luckham,"Dilemmas of Military Disengagement and Democratization in Africa,"IDS Bulletin, 26 (1995), esp.52-55.

26. Brattonandvan de Walle,pp. 83, 144-49, 211.

27. Andrew Janos, East CentralEurope in the Modern World Stanford:StanfordUniversity Press,

2000), p. 342; MarkR. Thompson,"To Shoot or Not to Shoot: Posttotalitarianismn China and Eastern

Europe,"ComparativePolitics, 34 (October2001), 63-84.28. The impactof such a shift was evident even priorto the end of the cold war. See RichardSnyder,"Paths out of Sultanistic Regimes," in H. E. Chehabi and Juan J. Linz, eds., Sultanistic Regimes

(Baltimore:The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), p. 73; John Booth, "The Somoza Regime in

Nicaragua,"n ibid., p. 148.

29. Luckham,"Dilemmas of Military Disengagement,"pp. 53-56.

30. PeterFeaver,"Civil-MilitaryRelations,"Annual ReviewofPolitical Science, 2 (1999), 211-41.

31. Jason Brownlee, "AndYet They Persist: Explaining Survival and Transitionin Neo-Patrimonial

Regimes,"Studies in Comparative nternationalDevelopment,37 (Fall 2002). See also BarbaraGeddes,"WhatDo We Know aboutDemocratizationafter20 Years,"AnnualReviewof Political Science, 2 (1999),115-44.

32. Brattonand van de Walle,pp. 82-97; Geddes,pp. 115-44.

33. Nancy Bermeo, "Myths of Moderation: Confrontation and Conflict during DemocraticTransitions,"ComparativePolitics, 29 (April 1997), esp. 315; also, RobertDahl, Polyarchy(New Haven:

YaleUniversityPress, 1971).34. Alfred Stepan,RethinkingMilitaryPolitics (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1988).35. See Linz and Stepan,Problemsof DemocraticTransition nd Consolidation,p. 206.

36. Bermeo,"Mythsof Moderation," . 317.

37. Thomas Friedman,From Beirut to Jerusalem (New York:Farrar,Straus,and Giroux, 1989), pp.

76-105; Thompson,pp. 63-83.

38. Nora Hamilton and Eun Mee Kim, "Economic and Political Liberalizationin South Korea and

Mexico,"ThirdWorldQuarterly,14 (1993); CarterEckert et al., Korea Old and New (Cambridge,Mass.:

Harvard University Press, 1990); Michael Hsiao and Hagen Koo, "The Middle Classes and

155




Democratization," in Larry Diamond, Marc Plattner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-mao Tien, eds.,

Consolidating the ThirdWaveDemocracies: Themes and Perspectives (Baltimore:The Johns Hopkins

UniversityPress, 1997), pp. 312-34.

39. Ruth Berins Collier and James Mahoney, "AddingCollective Actors to Collective Outcomes,"ComparativePolitics, 29 (April 1997),285-303.

40. Popularmobilization should also not be confused with the variable civil society. It encompassesand exceeds this variable,embracingmore spontaneousand short-livedmovements such as demonstra-

tions and riots andnot limiting itself to the more institutionalized omponentsof associational ife such as

laborunions,businessmen'sassociations,andnongovernmental rganizations.41. Nemat Shafik, ed., Prospectsfor Middle Eastern and NorthAfrican Economies (New York: St.

Martin's,1998);Economic Trends n the MENARegion, 2002; UNDP,Arab HumanDevelopmentReport

(2001).42. InternationalInstitute of Strategic Studies, The MilitaryBalance 2001-2002 (London:Oxford,

2001), p. 304.

43. "The MENA continues to be the world'sleading arms market...inabsolute terms." bid.,pp. 119,

298.44. Compiledfromibid., p. 128.The size of the coercive apparatus lone does not indicate he relative

robustnessof authoritarianism. countrymayboast a very largemilitaryandstill be democratic,as in the

U.S. Similarly,Israel sustains a democraticpolitical systemdespitethe very largesize of its military,mea-

sured in terms of military expenditureas share of GNP or of percentageof populationunderarms. As

long as the coercive apparatuss subjectto civilian control,largesize is compatiblewith democracy.45. Lisa Anderson, "The State in the Middle East and North Africa," ComparativePolitics, 20

(October1987), esp. 9-12; GiacomoLuciani,"Allocationvs. ProductionStates" n GiacomoLuciani,ed.,TheArab State (Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1990), pp. 65-84; HazemBeblawi,"The Rentier

Sate in the Arab World,"in ibid., pp. 85-99; Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf (New York:

Cambridge University Press, 1995); Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, "The Price of Wealth,"International

Organization,43

(Winter 1989), 101-45;Dirk

Vandewalle,Libyasince

Independence(Ithaca:Cornell

UniversityPress, 1998); Michael Ross, "Does Oil HinderDemocracy?,"WorldPolitics, 53 (April2001),325-61.

46. See ClementHenry and RobertSpringborg,Globalization and the Politics of Development n the

Middle East (New York:CambridgeUniversity Press, 2001), esp. pp. 30-44. Although they detect a

decliningtrend in rents earnedby MiddleEasternandNorthAfrican countries n recentyears, his income

is still substantial.Forexample, oil income alone accountedfor more than50 percentof government ev-

enues in about half of these countries n the late 1990s.

47. See ibid.,p. 106. In manycountries25 percent(or more)of governmentexpenditures on the mili-

tary,andin some, includingthe Sudan(55 percent),the UAE (48 percent),and SaudiArabia 37 percent),the proportion s significantlyhigher.

48. Droz-Vincent,p. 17.

49. Preservation of Israel's security might be a third concern, although it seems to be more anAmerican than a fully western preoccupation. See Amy Hawthorne,"Do We WantDemocracy in the

MiddleEast?,"www.afsa.org/fsj/feb01/hawthorne01.html.50. I would like to thankSteve Levitskyfor remindingme of this quotation.51. HenryandSpringborg,p. 32.

52. MehranKamrava,"MilitaryProfessionalizationand Civil-MilitaryRelationsin the MiddleEast,"Political Science Quarterly,115 (2000), 89.

53. Aymanal-Yassini,Religion and State in the Kingdomof Saudi Arabia(Boulder:Westview,1985);

RaymondHinnebusch,AuthoritarianPower and State Formation n Ba 'thistSyria (Boulder:Westview,

1990).54. Alexander Bligh, "The JordanianArmy: Between Domestic and ExternalChallenges," n Barry

156



Eva Bellin

Rubinand ThomasKeaney,eds., ArmedForces in theMiddle East (London:FrankCass, 2002), p. 150.

55. Eyal Zisser,"TheSyrian Army on the Domestic and ExternalFronts," n Rubin and Keaney,eds.,

pp. 118-22.

56. BarryRubin,"TheMilitary n ContemporaryMiddle EasternPolitics,"in RubinandKeaney, eds.,pp. 7-8.

57. RobertSatloff, Troubleson the East Bank (New York:Praeger,1986), pp. 60-62; PeterW.Wilson

andDouglasF Graham,SaudiArabia: TheComingStorm(New York:M. E. Sharpe,1994).58. Zisser,pp. 119-20.

59. Friedman, . 101.

60. Charles Kurzman, "Structural Opportunity and Perceived Opportunity in Social Movement

Theory:The IranianRevolution1979,"AmericanSociological Review,61 (February1996), 165.

61. Of course, high levels of popularmobilization were not the only reasonthe militaryfolded. Also

at work were the weak administrative tructureof the military (which was left headless after the shah's

departure) and the sense among the generals that the U.S. had abandoned the shah. See Said Amir

Arjomand,TheTurbanor the Crown OxfordUniversityPress, 1998), pp. 121-29.

62. Besides providingrhetorical egitimationfor coercive regimes, persistentconflict has rationalizedthe prolonged states of emergency that stifle civil liberties in many Middle Eastern and NorthAfrican

countries. See Gregory Gause, "Regional Influences on Experiments in Political Liberalizationin the

ArabWorld,"n Brynen,Korani,andNoble, eds., pp. 283-306.

63. Droz-Vincent, p. 17.

64. KarenRemmer,MilitaryRule inLatinAmerica(Boston:Unwin Hyman, 1989).65. Brattonand van de Walle;Banac.

66. Brownlee;Snyder.67. No single variable is universallynecessary or sufficient for an outcome as complex as democracy.

But past democratic ransitionssuggest thatthe chances for democracyare favoredwhen per capitaGNP

rises above $5,500, when there is popularconsensus about national solidarity,and when elites are per-suadedthatdemocratic nstitutionsare the least worst

wayto handle conflict. See Eva

Bellin, "IraqPost-Saddam:Prospectsfor Democracy,"HarvardMagazine (July-August,2003). See also Adam Przeworski

and FernandoLimongi, "Modernization:Theory and Facts,"WorldPolitics, 49 (1997), 155-83; Thomas

Carothers,"The End of the TransitionParadigm,"Journal of Democracy, 13 (2002), 5-21; Marina

Ottaway,ThomasCarothers,Amy Hawthorne,and Daniel Brumberg,"DemocraticMirage in the Middle

East,"CarnegieEndowmentfor InternationalPeace Policy Brief, October 2002.

68. H. E. ChehabiandJuanJ.Linz, "ATheoryof Sultanism,"n Chehabi andLinz, eds., p. 48.69. Statistically,between $4,500 and$5,500.

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