postcolonial insanity by abbas zaidi

Journal of Postcolonial Cultures and Societies

ISSN No. 1948-1845 (Print); 1948-1853 (Electronic)

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‘Postcolonial insanity,’ Abbas Zaidi

JPCS Vol 2 No 4, December 2011

Postcolonial insanity

Abbas Zaidi

The enemies of Islam must be hunted down and killed like snakes even when they were offering

prayers. General Faiz Ali Chishti 1

I remember my days as a political prisoner in Karachi Central Jail in 1981. A prison warden,

bringing me my food, said she was frightened. She had heard that a Shia family had moved into

the lane of the house where she lived. “You know Shias eat children,” she said. “I lock my child

up all day so that Shias can‟t kidnap, kill, and eat my child.” She has heard it from the imam at

her local mosque. Benazir Bhutto2

1. Introduction

On 4 January 2011, Salman Taseer, a liberal human rights campaigner and the governor of

Punjab, Pakistan‟s largest and most powerful province, was killed by Mumtaz Qadri, his

bodyguard, for insulting Prophet Muhammad. Taseer‟s „crime‟ was that he had stood up for

Aasia Bibi, a poor Christian woman, sentenced to death for insulting Prophet Muhammad.

Taseer‟s murder fused the educated, the less educated, and the illiterate into an Islamist-

nationalist unity. Within hours of Taseer‟s murder, the educated created a Facebook account for

Mumtaz Qadri where they justified his crime in the name of Islam (the account was soon

scrapped by Facebook managers). Lawyers all over the country threatened to kill any lawyer

who would dare to prosecute Qadri, and no judge was willing to try him. Soon Taseer‟s son was

kidnapped, and it is widely believed that he will be used as a bargaining chip for the release of

Qadri. Recently, an anti-terrorism court sentenced Qadri to death for openly and proudly

admitting killing Taseer. The judge said he had no option but to sentence him to death because

he admitted killing Taseer of his own will. After sentencing Qadri, the judge disappeared

because the mullahs and the lawyers had threatened to kill him and his family. Later he left

Pakistan with his family. 3

1 Cited by Noman (1990: 122). General Faiz Ali Chishti was one of the architects of Islamization during General Zia

ul Haq‟s martial law (1977-88).

2 Bhutto (2008: 54).

3 See Asian Human Rights Commission‟s brief report: “Government sends a judge abroad to appease extremist

religious groups”. Available at: http://www.humanrights.asia/news/ahrc-news/AHRC-STM-160-2011

http://www.humanrights.asia/news/ahrc-news/AHRC-STM-160-2011



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This paper claims that Pakistan as a postcolonial society has been suffering from a syndrome in

which the love of the Prophet has gone to an extent which can be termed postcolonial insanity. It

begins by defining three terms: insanity, postcolonial, and then postcolonial insanity. These

definitions are sketchy and recapitulatory, and do not add significantly to the great corpus of

postcolonial writings. However, it is relevant to the discussion which follows. After the

definitions have been understood in perspective, the paper chronicles the history of postcolonial

insanity in Pakistan. Various examples and sources are cited to corroborate claims and

observations made. The paper concludes with a suggestion for further research; the suggestion is

based on a claim that postcolonial insanity is not exclusive to Pakistan.

2. Postcolonial insanity

Before defining postcolonial insanity, I would like to say a word about postcolonial and insanity,

respectively.

2.1. Insanity

I have preferred insanity to its synonyms such as craziness, dementia, derangement, and lunacy

even though it has been “abandoned” by both psychologists and psychiatrists (Hayakawa, 1971:

461). This is so because insanity implies absence of legal responsibility on the part of a person

called/diagnosed as insane (Dobson and Pusch, 1994).

Insanity refers to a state of mind; any definition of insanity, however, figurative or metaphorical,

will have to take into account the mental aspect of a person or situation in question. I would like

to quote two important definitions of insanity:

(i) “A medico-legal. . . term, covering forms of mental disorder which involves legal

responsibility and incompetence.” (Drever, 1952: 139)

(ii) To be insane is to be in “a state of mind that precludes normal perception and behavior, and

ordinary social interaction.” (The New Shorter Oxford Dictionary, 1993: 1377)

(iii) Nairne calls insanity a legal, and not a psychological, concept; it is “the inability to

understand that certain actions are wrong” (Nairne, 2010: 454).



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(iv) Siegel argues that insanity “should be defined as a lack of substantial capacity to control

one‟s behavior. Substantial capacity is defined as the mental capacity needed to understand the

wrongfulness of an act” (Siegel, 2010: 99).

It may be observed here that insanity as a medico-legal term is more in the nature of alibi than

accusation, i.e., it is used in defense of the person accused of “mens rea” (Marvit, 1994: 645). I

will try to show that those I claim to be postcolonially insane have legal, and even moral,

exemption, even justification.

2.2. Postcolonial

There are many problems with the notion of the postcolonial/postcoloniality, and thus no blanket

definition of it can be given (Weaver, 2004; Ramutsindela, 2005; Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin,

2006). Postcolonial discourse/situation is strongly linked to colonial discourse/situation. The

postcolonial cannot be understood without the colonial (Hall, 1996; Ashcroft, Griffiths, and

Tiffin, 2007). This is why, references have to be made to colonialism to understand

postcolonialism4. But this is not as straightforward as it appears. For instance, Hooks links a

typical postcolonial situation, decolonization, to breaking with “white supremacist thinking that

suggests we are inferior, inadequate, and marked by victimization” as a strategy of resistance

(Hooks, 1992: 17). This is a wrong argument because it evokes two questions whose answers

Hooks does not give: First, does the end of colonialism result in supremacist thinking? Second,

can such an end be brought about in the first place? Decolonization in many „independent‟

countries resulted in the masses being looked down upon as inferior by the new (local) ruling

elites; it is the ruling elites who have been responsible for the crises of various types (Eyoh,

1999; Thomson, 2010).

In the similar vein, with respect to postcolonialism, colonization has been linked to

“thingification” (Cesaire 1972:177). But decolonization, i.e., postcoloniality, does not result n

„dethingification‟. If “thingification” means a status akin to that of objects of ordinary or little

worth, the orang asli5 of postcolonial Malaysia, for example, have seen no improvement in their

lives. They remain the same display items of backwardness they were during British rule

(Doolittle, 2005; Gomes, 2007). Religious and ethnic minorities in Pakistan (Ali and Rehman,

2001; Pande, 2005) and Bangladesh (Uddin, 2006) have seen no improvement in their lives

4 Iroegbu makes a similar plea to understand the healing of insanity amongst the Igbo of Nigeria. See Iroegbu, 2010.

5 It means the indigenous peoples or races.



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either, and postcolonial African countries host the same groups of people in ghettos as in colonial

times (Chiavetta, 2005).

Edwards Said has claimed that colonialism is manifested through the "configurations of power"

(Said, 1994: 133). He further claims,

a whole series of „interests‟ which. . . creates but also maintains. . . a certain will or

intention to understand, in some cases to control, manipulate, and even incorporate, what

is a manifestly different (or alternative and novel) world (Said, 1994: 138).

Both Wa Thiong‟o (1986) and Said (1994) have said that colonialism is supported by

government institutions. In Wa Thiong‟o‟s words, colonialism is a situation where “the night of

the sword and the bullet was followed by the morning of the chalk and blackboard” (Wa

Thiong‟o, 1986: 9). But, as will be shown later in this paper, postcolonial/independent rulers in

question have proved worse than their colonial predecessors. Through legislation and textbooks,

they have done away with the chalk and board, and used swords and guns regardless of time or

place.

Theorists have defined postcolonialism in locational and temporal terms too. But if this is the

case, Australia, Canada, and the United States should be referred to as postcolonial sates, and

Claude McKay‟s Banjo and Chinua Achebe‟s Things Fall Apart should not be counted as

postcolonial works because they were written when Jamaica and Nigeria were still colonies.

There is an important issue which needs to be addressed: postcolonial acts committed in non-

postcolonial countries. For example, how would we assess a crime committed in Canada by a

father (who migrated from Pakistan) who beheads his daughter (who also migrated from

Pakistan) for not wearing the Islamic scarf to school? What about a brother of Asian extraction

(born and lived all his life in England) who kills his sister (also born and lived all her life in

England) for immodesty? What about a Canadian Sikh mother who hires killers from India in

order to punish her daughter who has married a fellow Canadian Sikh and escaped to India?

It may be pointed out that in all the above situations, the colonial aspect is the common factor, be

it former English colonies (Australia, Canada, the Unite States), or England, the former colonial

master, itself. But what about the Italian-based young woman of Pakistani origin whose father

cut her into pieces for going out with an Afghani Muslim?

These are difficult issues to deal with. But it seems possible to argue that postcolonial problems

should be understood neither locationally nor temporally, but thematically because issues like the

status of women, minorities, ethnicities, segregation, and persecution are themes which are not



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circumscribed by time or place. This implies another point: the postcolonial is where the

postcolonial agent happens to be.

Who is a postcolonial agent? I would like to define a postcolonial agent as one who is affected by

the impact of colonialism and its subsequent stage known as postcoloniality regardless of

whether or not such a person actually has had a colonial encounter or experience. A

postcolonial subject can be/is found anywhere in the world.

I would like to claim that the above definition, however broad, is appropriate. The majority of

people living in postcolonial countries such as India and Pakistan were born long after Partition,

but they are affected by the legacy of colonialism. A person who has had no colonial experience,

e.g., from Japan or Thailand, but has got engaged in writing about the problems of colonialism

in, say, India can be counted as a postcolonial person too. Thus, “post” in “postcolonial,”

“postcoloniality,” or “postcolonialism,” should be understood as having a bracketed deep

structure (e.g., (post)colonial); every discussion of the postcolonial should be informed by this

deep structure.

2.3. Postcolonial insanity

Given Cesaire‟s designation of the colonialist project based upon a “pseudo-humanism” (1972:

174) and “hideous butcheries” (1972: 176), I would like to define postcolonial insanity as A

humanist legal-moral obsession with a sacred idea or person whose perceived violation,

however miniscule, results in extreme corporeal, material, and symbolic butcheries; in

illocutionary terms6, it has (i) expressive force because it is emotive and as such arouses

people‟s emotions7, and (ii) commissive force because it forces people to a course of action

8.

The rest of the paper will discuss a case study with reference to the above definition.

6 For a discussion of the theory of illocutions, see Levinson, 1983.

7 It may be regarded as madness in reason.

8 From the point of view of speech act theory, it can be regarded as having the following forces too: Directive which

gets the addressee to do something, and declarative, which “effects changes in the institutional state of affairs and

which tend[s] to rely on elaborate extra-linguistic institutions,” (Levinson, 1983: 240).



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3. Postcolonial insanity: A case study

This paper is about postcolonial insanity in Pakistan as a result of people‟s obsession with the

honor and sanctity of Prophet Muhammad. As indicated in the beginning of this paper, the

monomaniac fixation on love and respect for the Prophet has turned his name into a taboo.

3.1. The Thesis:

Prophet Muhammad‟s sanctity is so important that any person insulting it must be killed.

Criterion for the thesis: The sanctity of the Prophet is based upon the belief that (i) he was the

last divinely appointed prophet in the world, (ii) after him there will be no one who can claim to

be a prophet, (iii) his name cannot be taken without also uttering or writing an appositive such as

“Peace be Upon Him”, and (iv) any reference, however indirect, which suggests that he is not

being given due reverence is a gross instance of blasphemy.

3.2. The thesis and the state

3.2.1. Legality of the thesis: Pakistan‟s penal code stipulates that anyone insulting the Prophet

will be sentenced to death. Pakistan‟s constitution stipulates that to qualify for any government

office of import, one must declare that one believes in the finality of the Prophet.

3.2.2. Legal-political implications of the thesis: Pakistan‟s official name is “The Islamic

Republic of Pakistan.” Despite protests from non-Muslims, Pakistan‟s electoral system is based

on what is called “Separate Electorate”. Muslims participate in general elections, but non-

Muslim are allowed to run against only reserved seats set aside for what is know as “minorities”.

3.2.3. Denominational implications of the thesis: In Pakistan, Muslims and non-Muslims are not

distinguished based upon religion, however. This may seem strange, but the constitution is very

clear on it: Those who do not believe in the finality of Prophet Muhammad are non-Muslim.

Ahmadis (or the Al-Ahmadiyya) form a minority sect of Islam. They have a different view on

prophethood compared to the majority of Muslims. According to the majority of Muslims,

Prophet Muhammad was the last prophet of Allah. But according to Ahmadis, although he was

the greatest of all prophets, he was not the last. They believe that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835-

1908) was the Promised Messiah and Mahdi who, according to the Islamic faith, would appear

towards the end of the world (Chaudhry, 1983; Friedmann, 2003). Ahmadis also believe that he

was a prophet who carried out his divine task under the subordination of Prophet Muhammad

(Rafiq, 1978; Shafaat, 2003).



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Thus it was on account of this definition of a Muslim that the Ahmadi community was

apostatized by the parliament on 21 September, 1974 through an amendment in the constitution

(Rehman, 2000; Valentine, 2008). The amendment is known as “Second Amendment to the

1973 Constitution”. Its text is presented below:

Constitution (Second Amendment) Act, 1974

ACT XLIX OF 1974

September 21, 1974

An Act to amend the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Whereas it is expedient further to amend the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of

Pakistan for the purposes hereinafter appearing;

It is hereby enacted as follows:-

1- Short title and commencement.

(1) This Act may be called the CONSTITUTION (SECOND AMENDMENT) ACT,

1974

(2) It shall come into force at once.

2- Amendment of Article 106 of the Constitution.

In the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, hereinafter referred to as the

Constitution in Article 106, in clause (3) after the words “communities” the words and

brackets “and persons of Quadiani group or the Lahori group (who call themselves

„Ahmadis‟)” shall be inserted.

3- Amendment of Article 260 of the Constitution.

In the Constitution, in Article 260, after clause (2) the following new clause shall be

added, namely—

(3) A person who does not believe in the absolute and unqualified finality of The

Prophethood of Muhammad (Peace be upon him), the last of the Prophets or claims to be

a Prophet, in any sense of the word or of any description whatsoever, after Muhammad



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(Peace be upon him), or recognizes such a claimant as a Prophet or religious reformer, is

not a Muslim for the purposes of the Constitution or law.

3.2.4. Assumption of a government office and the centrality to the thesis: The constitution of

Pakistan makes it compulsory that anyone taking oath for a government office must express

his/her belief in the finality of Prophet Muhammad. For example, Article 42 of the constitution

prescribes the following reference to the Prophet for those who would take oath for president,

prime minister, ministers, speaker of the house/senate, governors, members of parliament and

state assemblies, and other high offices:

(In the name of Allah, the most Beneficent, the most Merciful.)

I,__________________________, do solemnly swear that I am a Muslim and believe in

the Unity and Oneness of Almighty Allah, the Books of Allah, the Holy Quran being the

last of them, the Prophethood of Muhammad (peace be upon him) as the last of the

Prophets and that there can be no Prophet after him, the Day of Judgment. . . .

3.2.5. Iron hand of the law to safeguard the thesis: Section 295-C of Pakistan Penal Code9

prescribes death penalty or life imprisonment10

for anyone who insults the Prophet. This is

known as the Blasphemy Law. Here is the text of the Section:

Section 295-C, PPC. Use of derogatory remark etc., in respect of the Holy Prophet:

“Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation or by any

imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the

Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) shall be punished with death, or

imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.”

Ahmadis (derisively called Qadianis in Pakistani press, textbooks, private and public media, and

by the people at large), Christians, Hindus, and Sikhs are a direct target of this law. General Zia

ul Haq who promulgated this law through an ordinance in 1986, made the following remark with

reference to Section 295-C: “We shall persevere, Insh‟a Allah, in our efforts to root out the

cancer of Qadianism” (Gualtieri 1989: 36).

9 The entire text of the Penal Code is available online at:

http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/1860/actXLVof1860.html

10 No one has ever been awarded life imprisonment. Courts have deemed blasphemers as worthy of death.

http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/1860/actXLVof1860.html



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There is the Federal Shariat Court which ensures that no amendment is made in the Blasphemy

Law. It has rejected all appeals against the Law. The Supreme and High Courts have jealously

guarded the Blasphemy Law. No one blamed for insulting the Prophet has been given relief. In

fact, the judges have even urged the people to kill the blasphemers instead of bringing them to

courts:

The Lahore High Court has shown bias in favor of the law rather than correcting the

abuses that happen because of it. The present High Court has stayed the president from

granting pardon to the latest victim, but a retired judge of the High Court Justice (retd)

Nazir Akhtar has given a statement in favor of the dreaded law to confirm the bias of the

conservative judiciary in Pakistan. As a sitting judge of the Lahore High Court, he used

to tell people at social gatherings that they should kill the blasphemer instead of invoking

the law against him. (Daily Times, 2010)

3.2.6. The thesis beyond review: The Blasphemy Law cannot be even commented upon unless

one is praising it. In 2009, the governor of Punjabi Salman Taseer suggested that the Law be

reviewed. All he said was that the Law be amended so as to protect people from being wrongly

punished for blasphemy. Overnight, Taseer was the evil incarnate for insulting the Prophet.

Hundreds of death fatwas were pronounced on him in mosques, public gatherings, and the

media. Inspired by the fatwas, Qadri put 29 bullets into his body. His assassination led to

widespread celebration all over the country. The celebrants included people of every level in

terms of economic status, education, and ethnicity.

3.2.7. Gate-keeping through the thesis: In order to obtain an official document such as a passport

and the national identity card, one has to make the following declaration on the form before

submitting it11

:

a. I am a Muslim and believe in the absolute and unqualified finality of the Prophethood

of Muhammad (peace be upon him) the last of the prophets.

b. I do not recognize any person who claims to he prophet in any sense of the word or of

any description whatsoever after Muhammad (peace be upon him) or recognize such a

claimant as prophet or a religious reformer as a Muslim.

11 Non-Muslims are not debarred from obtaining such documents. But their documents show that they are non-

Muslim, which means discrimination in getting jobs.



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The gate-keeping is so powerful and effective that a person with a document saying that he/she

is, say, an Ahmadi, cannot find a job, or be sacked if one already has a job.

3.3. Thesis and the non-state vigilantism

It will take thousands of pages to document vigilante actions taken against the alleged, perceived,

or declared blasphemes. I will only briefly mention instances of vigilantism to make my point.

People in general, religious parties, vigilante groups, student bodies, and good Samaritans have

made sure that any direct or indirect insult or a semblance of insult to the Prophet is wiped out of

existence. However, it would be impossible to draw a line of demarcation between the

official/government vigilantism and that of non-government sectors. The case of the grave of Dr

Abdus Salam (1926-1996) can be referred to in this respect. The only Pakistani to have won the

Nobel Prize, he belonged to the Ahmadi sect and was buried in Jhang, his hometown in central

Punjab. On his gravestone was written: “First Muslim Nobel Laureate”. But within a week of his

burial, a mob gathered at his grave led by members of the parliament and state assemblies with a

heavy presence of local police. The word “Muslim” was painted black resulting in “First Nobel

Laureate”. 12

12 A very insightful article on this act of insanity is available online. See Arqam (2011).



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The media, political parties, religious scholars, and general public have openly called for the

destruction of those who have one way or another insulted the Prophet. They have called upon

people kill Ahmadis for not believing that the Prophet was the last prophet of Allah. There are

countless acts of violence against them, but one of the latest should suffice. On 28 May 2010,

two of Ahmadi places of worship were attacked13

by two groups of the Taliban. At least 96

worshippers were killed and dozens wounded14

. The following day, Islamic scholars and political

leaders blamed Ahmadis for being foreign agents.15

It should be clear by now that it is the Ahmadis who have been victims of alleged blasphemy.

This can be further understood from another law in Pakistan:

Section 298-C PPC. Person of Qadiani group, etc., calling himself a Muslim or

preaching or propagating his faith: Any person of the Qadiani group or the Lahori

group (who call themselves „Ahmadis‟ or by any other name) who, directly, or indirectly,

poses himself as a Muslim, or calls, or refers to, his faith as Islam, or preaches or

propagates his faith, or invites others to accept his faith, by words, either spoken or

written, or by visible representations, or in any manner whatsoever outrages the religious

feelings of Muslims shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term

which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.

The Ahmadis are the main target of the Blasphemy Law, but there other communities, including

Muslims, who have been at the receiving end. Even religious Muslims have fallen victims to it:

MULTAN, Jan 11: A court has jailed a prayer leader and his 20-year-old son for life on

blasphemy charges in the rural heartland of the country, court officials said on Tuesday.

The case follows the assassination of Punjab governor Salman Taseer by his bodyguard

last week, after he called for reform of the blasphemy law under which a Christian

woman was sentenced to death.

13 As per Pakistan‟s penal code, Ahmadi places of worship are not supposed to be called mosques. Before 1986, they

were called mosques, but a legislation stipulated that anyone calling them mosques will be jailed for 3 threes (See,

Bielefeldt, 1995; Ebrahim, 2011).

14 See, “Pakistan: Massacre of minority Ahmadis,” prepared by the Human Rughts Watch. Avaiblae at:

http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/06/01/pakistan-massacre-minority-ahmadis. Accessed on 13 December 2011.

15 Two good resources on Ahmadi persecution in the name of blasphemy are Asian Human Rights Comission

(http://www.humanrights.asia/search?SearchableText=pakistan) and The Persecution.Org

(http://www.thepersecution.org/index.html).

http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/06/01/pakistan-massacre-minority-ahmadis

http://www.humanrights.asia/search?SearchableText=pakistan

http://www.thepersecution.org/index.html



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Mohammad Shafi, 45, and his son Mohammad Aslam, 20, were arrested in April last year

for removing a poster outside their grocery shop promoting a religious event in a nearby

village. The poster allegedly carried Quranic verses.

Judge Mohammad Ayub, heading an anti-terrorism court in Muzaffargarh, handed down

a life sentence to the pair on Monday, his assistant Faisal Karim said by telephone.

According to the prosecution, the organisers of the event marking the birth anniversary of

Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) said the pair had “pulled the poster down, tore it and

trampled it under their feet,” Mr Karim said.

“The judge sentenced them to life imprisonment on charges of blasphemy and ordered

them to pay a fine of Rs200,000 each,” he said. (Dawn, 2011)

Muslims have been lynched too:

BAHAWALPUR, June 15: A mosque Imam was killed while a religious leader sustained

critical injuries in violence caused reportedly by sectarian tension between two Sunni

sects in Choonawala Mandi near Hasilpur, about 90km from here, on Thursday.

According to reports reaching here, the trouble started when Hafiz Qamar Javed, prayer

leader at local Masjid Ahl-e-Hadith, burnt some trash near his mosque. The fire attracted

neighbours, including people from the rival sect, who propagated that Javed was burning

pages from Quran. Within no time a huge mob turned up at the scene and attacked Javed.

When Ahl-e-Hadith‟s local leader Master Muhammad Sadiq came to his rescue, he was

also beaten up severely. The assailants left the scene when the two fell unconscious.

Following an appeal, Choonawala traders‟ president, shopkeepers pulled down their

shutters to protest the „blasphemous act‟. Meanwhile, it was learnt that a case under the

Blasphemy Act had been registered against deceased Hafiz Qamar Javed and injured

Muhammad Sadiq while no case was registered against the assailants. (Gill, 2006)

A faintest hint or suspicion can cause trouble:

HARIPUR:

For some bigots, putting up a portrait of a man vaguely associated with the founder of the

Ahmadi sect is enough to deserve being „punished‟ with exile from the district and a ban

on your business.

That, at least, has been the experience of Sheikh Arif, a hakeem (practitioner of

traditional medicine) in Haripur. A gathering of so-called „religious‟ leaders took place in



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Haripur on Monday, where they „decided‟ to „expel‟ Arif from the district and „banned‟

his business.

Arif‟s supposed „crime‟ was to have a picture on his shop‟s signboard of Hakeem

Muhammad Hussain, allegedly an associate of the founder of the Ahmadi sect, Mirza

Ghulam Ahmad Qadiyani. It was not immediately clear why the so-called religious

leaders found the portrait quite so offensive. Where they felt they got the authority to

„ban‟ a business and „exile‟ a person also remains unclear.

The meeting was attended by representatives of all factions of the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-

Islam, the Aalmi Majlis Tahafuz Khatm-e-Nabuwat, the Shaban Khatm-e-Nabuwat, the

Ahle Sunnat Waljamaat, and Wafaq ul Madaras. Attendees warned the district

administration of agitation if the government failed to ban Arif‟s entry into the district.

Without offering any evidence, the gathering accused the hakeem of preaching the beliefs

of the Ahmadi sect, which they claimed was unconstitutional. They seem misinformed on

that front: Article 20 of the constitution states “every citizen shall have the right to

profess, practise and propagate his religion.”

Arif himself, meanwhile, appears to have disappeared. His shop was closed when this

correspondent visited, though the „offensive‟ portrait had been removed. (Sadaqat, 2011)

A mobile phone-maker also fell under suspicion. A prayer leader suspected that the “Q” in Q-

Mobile referred to “Qadianis” (i.e., Ahmadis). The Q-Mobile company immediately put in

expensive advertisements on front pages of national dailies. Even in English newspapers, the

advertisement was given in Urdu so that everyone could read and understand that “Q” had

nothing to do with “Qadianis”. The advertisement begins with a hadith16

in Arabic with Urdu

translation. It says: “To give false evidence is a great sin.” On one side of the advertisement is

placed a Q-Mobile set which shows an image of the tomb of the Prophet Muhammad in order to

show which side the Q-Mobile company stood17

:

16 A hadith is a saying of Prophet Muhammad.

17 http://express.com.pk/epaper/PoPupwindow.aspx?newsID=1101409089&Issue=NP_LHE&Date=20111225. It

can safely be said that had the mobile company not launched the advertisement campaign, loss of life and property

would have been immense.

http://express.com.pk/epaper/PoPupwindow.aspx?newsID=1101409089&Issue=NP_LHE&Date=20111225



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3.4. Defeat of the thesis: The dictum “In my beginning is my end” can be considered a perfect

descriptive of the thesis this paper has dealt with so far. In 1953, just six years into the

establishment of Pakistan, the entire province of Punjab was engulfed in sectarian fire. Religious

parties launched a bloody movement to apostatize the Ahmadis who, they alleged, did not

believe in the finality of the Prophet (Bahadur, 2009; Aziz, 2008). The extent of violence was so

widespread that the civilian government had to declare martial law. It was for the first time that

martial law was imposed in Pakistan. That had had extremely unfortunate consequences for the

country because it gave the army a taste of civilian blood and in four years‟ time, the army

generals sacked the civilian set-up and imposed martial law which continues to this day in one

way or another (Haqqani, 2005; Cohen, 2006).

The anti-Ahmadi movement of 1953 foregrounded the insanity built within the movement. The

federal government of Pakistan appointed a judicial commission to look into the causes of anti-

Ahmadi movement. The commission was headed by Chief Justice Munir. The report the

commission came up with is known as the Munir Report18

. The commission interviewed over

18 The entire report is available online at: http://www.thepersecution.org/dl/report_1953.pdf

http://www.thepersecution.org/dl/report_1953.pdf



15



two hundred Islamic scholars. All of them had declared Ahmadis infidels for not believing in the

finality of the Prophet and had taken active part in the movement. However, not two of them

gave the same definition of Islam. Says the report:

The result of this part of inquiry, however has been anything but satisfactory and if

considerable confusion exists in the minds of our ulama [i.e., religious scholars] on such

a simple matter [as the definition of what constitutes a Muslim], one can easily imagine

what the differences on more complicated matters will be. (p. 215)

The report continues:

Keeping view the several different definitions given by the ulama, need we make any

comment except that no two learned divines are agreed on this fundamental. If we

attempt our own definition as each learned divine has done and that definition differs

from that given by all others, we unanimously go out of the fold of Islam. And if we

adopt the definition given by any one of the Ulama, we remain Muslims according to the

view of that alim [scholar], but kafirs [infidels] according to the definitions of everyone

else. . . . If the constituents of each of the definitions given by the Ulama are given effect

to and subjected to the rule of combination and permutation and the form of charge in the

inquisition‟s sentence on Galileo is adopted mutatis mutandis as a model, the grounds on

which a person maybe indicted for apostasy will be too numerous to count. (pp. 218-219)

There is more to the defeat of the thesis than just the definition of what constitutes the Islamic

faith and what constitutes the lack or absence of it. The question is: If Islam is a religion of peace

and Pakistan is an Islamic society, in what way have the incessant professions of love for the

Prophet made a meaningful contribution to the existence of peace in the Pakistan society? In

what way does the prosecution of the „blasphemers‟ make the Pakistan society a better society

than the rest of the societies in the world? In what way is silencing of societal plurality is better

than the principle of denominational exclusivity?19

Perhaps the most relevant question is: In what way do the Blasphemy Law and its consequent

bloodletting derive inspiration from the life of the Prophet? Every Muslim will say that the noble

life of the Prophet Muhammad was marked by generosity and kindness. He forgave even his

worst enemies. He believed in the principle of peaceful coexistence with his enemies. Thus any

19 Various religious beliefs such as those of Christians, Hindus, and Parsis make Pakistan a religiously plural

society.



16



blood spilled in his name is itself blasphemous. Even to pose this question in Pakistan is an

extremely dangerous, or foolish, thing to do.

There is yet another factor which goes against the thesis. Can democracy be subverted to a

majoritarian tyranny? Can a majority, because it is a majority, relegate a minority to a status

where it is a target of discrimination and violence? What if Muslims living in a non-Muslim

majority country (e.g., India or the United States) are given the same treatment which they have

given to the Ahmadis in Pakistan?

The (anti-Ahmadi) postcolonial insanity has another dimension which must be taken account of:

Naming a drink as “Qadiani” comes from the same mindset which claims that Pakistan‟s atomic

bomb is “Islamic bomb”. Such a mindset divides the world into a Manichean binary in which the

other side is identified as evil and must be destroyed for the good of humanity. If today the

Ahmadis are at great risk, in future the entire humanity will face the same fate as Islamic bombs

will be destined to hit the infidels.

5. Postcolonial insanity: the term revisited

In Section 2.3. above, I have defined the term in humanist legal-moral terms, and one may object

to it: How can this form of insanity be legal, moral, or legal-moral? It may also be argued that in

the name of the sanctity of the Prophet, people can, and do, settle personal scores or grab what

does not belong to them legally.

I would, however, like to insist that postcolonial insanity is a deeply legal-moral issue in

Pakistan. It is true that incidents based on personal agenda (e.g., land grabbing, personal enmity)

have taken place. Such incidents are no more than a byproduct of postcolonial insanity. Insulting

the Prophet is a moral issue because it is understood in religious sense and protecting the sanctity

of the Prophet is no less than protecting the very religion of Islam. The insanity is very much

legal/legalized too because the full force of the state of Pakistan is behind it. It is humanist

because both the religious morality and the law of the land are behind it. The facts that (i) people

proudly and publicly declare that they will kill any insulter to the Prophet, (ii) those who have

killed the insulters come up with no attenuating alibis, (iii) the most pious Islamic scholars say

that to kill an insulter will bring one paradise and Allah‟s ultimate bounties, and (iv) high profile

official and public figures lend support to the killing of the insulters, make it20

perfectly humanist

and legal-moral.

20 i.e., postcolonial insanity



17



Some of the highest political office holders have supported killing of blasphemers:

LAHORE: Punjab Assembly speaker Chaudhry Afzal Sahi Thursday declared that

according to Islam a blasphemer should be killed and if any blasphemer would come in

front of him he would definitely kill him. He said the issue of awarding the title of „Sir‟

to blasphemer Salman Rushdie was a religious issue. Being a Muslim, he said, he was not

ready to compromise on the issue. “I am not a religious scholar, but I want to make it

clear that a blasphemer was liable to kill,” the speaker said. “First, I am a Muslim and

later the Punjab Assembly speaker.” (Daily Times, 2007)

Judges of superior courts have not been left behind:

LHC orders govt not to amend blasphemy law till the final decision of the court on Aasia

Bibi's case.

LAHORE: The Lahore High Court (LHC) has barred the government from amending the

blasphemy law, till the final decision of the court in Asia Bibi‟s case.

The court gave the orders during the hearing of a petition filed to stop the government

from tabling an amendment bill in the blasphemy law 295-C.

Former Information Minister Sherry Rehman has also been made a party to the

petition. Notices have been issued to her and the federal government for the December

23 hearing.

Meanwhile, the court extended the stay order in the Asia Bibi‟s case till December 23. It

declared that the government cannot proceed further on Asia Bibi‟s mercy application till

the set date.

In an earlier hearing, the court had stalled pardon moves for Aasia Bibi, directing

President Asif Ali Zardari and the governor Punjab to abstain from making any move to

pardon blasphemy convict Aasia Bibi till December 6. The court today (Monday)

extended the stay order till December 23. (The Express Tribune, 2010)

And:

http://tribune.com.pk/story/81290/aasia-bibis-family-goes-into-hiding/

http://tribune.com.pk/story/83404/lhc-issues-stay-order-against-aasia-death-sentence/

http://tribune.com.pk/story/80869/no-mercy-petition-no-presidential-pardon/



http://tribune.com.pk/story/81290/aasia-bibis-family-goes-into-hiding/



18



LAHORE: Acting Chief Justice of Lahore High Court Mian Nazeer Akhtar has said that

no one has the authority to pardon the accused of blasphemy. Prophets can forgive in his

life but after his death this right has ceased. He was delivering a lecture on the subject of

Blasphemy Laws in F. C. College on Saturday. He said that 17 persons were punished on

account of blasphemy when Mecca fell to Muslims. Justice Mian Nazeer said that in

Pakistan Blasphemy Laws were not misused. Courts decide on the basis of evidence

considering all the facts. Muslim history tells us that so far blasphemers were punished

on 70 occasions. He explained that this law is for the benefit of accused so that people

don't take the law in their hands and do not punish the accused by themselves. He said

that western countries are unjustifiably beating the drum that Muslims misuse Blasphemy

laws. Other laws also have punishments but foreign powers are only after this particular

law. He said that this law has provided safety to non-Muslims. In Question Answer

session with students Chief Justice told that those who demand to end the Blasphemy

Laws are agents of atheistic powers. (Daily Jang, 2000)

The legal community has also made its sentiments explicit:

LAHORE: The LHCBA‟s [i.e., Lahore High Court Bar Association] general house on

Monday unanimously adopted a resolution asking the federal government not to make

any amendment in section 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code, which provides for death

penalty or life imprisonment for blasphemy. The house resolved that no change should be

made in the blasphemy law and federal government should not bow to international

pressure in this regard. The resolution read that national and international media, eminent

personalities have launched a propaganda campaign to compel the government to amend

the blasphemy law. (Daily Times, 2010)

Even Qadiani/Ahmadi drinks have faced the insane wrath of the legal community:

LAHORE:

The Lahore Bar Association (LBA) has banned Shezan drinks from subordinate court

complexes and vowed tough action against those found buying or selling Qadiani-owned

products on court premises.

The decision was reached on Thursday at the LBA‟s bar room in the LDA plaza

following a motion by Advocate Ghulam Mustafa Chaudhry, president of Khatme

Nabuwat Lawyers Forum (KNLF).

LBA president Chaudhry Zulfiqar Ali told The Express Tribune said that more than 100

lawyers unanimously voted for the ban on Shezan drinks for being the product of

Ahmadis. The house also vowed to ban other products at a later stage.



19



Zulfiqar said that the association had launched a campaign to ensure a complete ban on

Shezan drinks in subordinate court canteens etc. He said that he had constituted a team to

enforce this decision. He added that strict action would be taken against canteen owners

found selling Shezan drinks in subordinate courts.

KNLF President Advocate Choudhary said the LBA president had directed LBA Vice

President Rana Javed Bashir Khan to coordinate enforcement of the ban in sessions

courts, district courts, banking court, special court, Aiwan-i-Adl, in Model Town and

Cantonment courts. (Yasif, 2012)

Salman Taseer‟s assassin was cheered by the masses all over the country:21

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — Lawyers showered the suspected assassin of a liberal

Pakistani governor with rose petals as he entered court. Some 170 miles away, the prime

minister joined thousands to mourn the loss of the politician, who dared to challenge the

demands of Islamic extremists.

The cheers and tears across the country Wednesday underscored Pakistan's journey over

the past several decades from a nation defined by moderate Islam to one increasingly

influenced by fundamentalists willing to use violence to impose their views.

Even so-called moderate Muslim scholars praised 26-year-old Mumtaz Qadri for

allegedly killing Punjab province Gov. Salman Taseer on Tuesday in a hail of gunfire

while he was supposed to be protecting him as a bodyguard. Qadri later told authorities

he acted because of Taseer's vocal opposition to blasphemy laws that order death for

those who insult Islam.

As Qadri was escorted into court in Islamabad, a rowdy crowd patted his back and kissed

his cheek as lawyers at the scene threw flowers. On the way out, some 200 sympathizers

chanted slogans in his favor, and the suspect stood at the back door of an armored police

van and repeatedly yelled "God is great."

The Jamat Ahle Sunnat group said no one should pray or express regret for the killing of

the governor. The group also issued a veiled threat to other opponents of the blasphemy

laws.

21 As always, exceptions were there. But the dissenting voices wrote in English, a language which not even 1 percent

of Pakistani read or write in. English is the most ineffective language when it comes to taking up social issues in

Pakistan.



20



"The supporter is as equally guilty as one who committed blasphemy," the group warned

in a statement, adding politicians, the media and others should learn "a lesson from the

exemplary death."

Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani and other senior ruling party officials joined up to

6,000 mourners under tight security to pay homage to Taseer at a funeral in the eastern

city of Lahore. Other parties, including the main opposition Pakistan Muslim League-N,

which is more aligned with religious groups, had limited presence at the event. (Dogar,

2011)

Liberal politicians have also ensured that their sentiments are heard loud and clear:

LAHORE: The Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid-i-Azam will quit the National Assembly

if it amends the blasphemy laws, said party leader Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi at a Tehrik-i-

Namoos-i-Risalat rally here on Sunday.

“We curse the assembly that would dare to amend the anti-blasphemy laws,” Elahi said.

“Our party would be the first to quit such an assembly.”

The former chief minister added that he and his party colleagues were deeply committed

to the cause. “Our children and our worldly belongings are of no consequence in the

defence of Namoos-i-Risalat,” he said.

Elahi was one of several political leaders from non-religious parties to attend the Tehrik-

i-Namoos-i-Risalat rally. Analysts say that these politicians are trying to gain religious

sympathies and to cash in on anti-government feeling following the assassination of

Governor Salmaan Taseer. (Tanveer 2011)

Thus no one, not from his own ruling party, offered prayer for Taseer:

ISLAMABAD: In what could be described as an eye-opening development, none of the

members of the upper house of parliament on Friday came forward to offer Fateha for

slain Punjab governor Salmaan Taseer.

Not only that, the house members stayed away from leading Fateha, but also prevented a

resolution by Senator Nilofar Bakhtiar to condemn the killing of Salmaan Taseer by his

security guard Mumtaz Qadri.

In other words, the Senate refused to own Salmaan Taseer who was killed at Kohsar

Market in Islamabad for what his security guard Mumtaz Qadri said Taseer called

blasphemy law a black law. None of the PPP senators including Leader of the House

http://tribune.com.pk/story/102253/no-change-to-blasphemy-law/



21



Nayyar Bokhari or any other ruling party member got the opportunity to support Nilofar

Bakhtiar.

Qadri not only confessed his act, but also gave a statement to the investigators that prior

to the shooting, he hadasked his colleagues that he would surrender after killing the

governor. Jamaat-e-Islami senator Professor Muhammad Ibrahim in full-throat voice

said: “We oppose it”, as Nilofar Bakhtiar on a point of order said she wanted to move a

resolution to condemn Taseer‟s murder and incident of petals showered on Qadri by

lawyers.

On seeing mood of the members, Senate chairman Farooq H Naek did not allow Bakhtiar

to move the resolution. On that Nilofar said the house at least should offer fateha. The

chair asked Abdul Khaliq Pirzada to lead fateha. But it was also astonishing that a senator

who hails from the MQM, which is considered as a liberal party, refused to follow

instructions from the chairman.

In the meantime, JUI-F senators also left the Senate Hall. Leader of Opposition in the

Senate Wasim Sajjad said the senators could offer their individual fateha. The senators

belonging to Jamaat-e-Islami, MQM and Fata did not raise their hands for fateha. It may

be mentioned here that Khateebs of the Governor‟s House mosque and Badshahi Mosque

had also refused to lead Nimaz-e-Jinazah of Salman Taseer in Lahore. (Anis, 2011)

Based on the preceding discussion, a point may be added to the definition of postcolonial

insanity: Postcolonial insanity is enchantment with grand narratives which are held to be

universal in their reach, inviolability, and truthfulness. Thus, this aspect of postcolonialism is

directly opposed to postmodernism which is distinguished for its “incredulity towards

metanarratives” (Lyotard, 1989: XXIV).

6. Conclusion

This paper will appear to be rather sketchy, which is true. My plea is that postcolonial insanity is

a vast subject, and no single paper can do justice to it even if only one case study is being dealt

with. I would like to believe instances on postcolonial insanity can be found in almost every

country.

There are a number of questions this paper will raise. For instance, one may ask: Does

postcolonial insanity not exist in those countries which in the past were not colonized? For

instance, Saudi Arabia is a perfect case for various types of insanity including the one discussed

in this paper. My answer will be something like this: Saudi Arabia was created as a result of the

conspiracies of the colonial powers of the first half of the 20th

century, and since its



22



establishment, it has been playing second fiddle to the greatest colonial-imperial power in the

world: the United States of America. This is why, despite its massive and persistent violations of

human rights, it is seldom criticized in Western, especially, American media.

Postcolonial insanity in the case of Pakistan has thrown a targeted community, the Ahmadis, into

a heart of darkness. But it, the insanity, is as much a matter of the darkness of the heart as

anything else (see section 8 below). In the context of the persecution of the blasphemers in

Pakistan, there is no fear factor or a militant, dominant minority which has reduced the rest of the

country to the status of a moral, silent majority. One can understand the extent of collective-

societal participation in this insanity by just clicking a couple of online resources dedicated to

Mumtaz Qadri to understand the pride Pakistan‟s most educated and most powerful have in a

character like Qadri and the existence of the Blasphemy Law.22

Whether it is a democratic government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1972-77) or Nawaz Shrif (1990-

93 and 1996-99), or dictatorship of General Zia (1977-88) and General Musharraf (1999-2007),

destruction of insulters to the Prophet has been the central article of faith on its part (Larson,

1998).

Another issue which needs to be tackled is: What is the cause of postcolonial insanity in

Pakistan?

This, I confess, is a difficult subject to deal with. I hope someone better informed than me can

deal with it. I would, however, like to make a point. Pakistan even before its actual creation was

an abnormal conceptual-psychological conundrum. This point is supported by Allen (1992) and

Noman (1990). Noman begins his book by referring to this abnormality thus:

It is ironic that Pakistan continues to be plagued by a controversy regarding the precise

role for religion in its politics. The country is haunted by the ideological schizophrenia

permeating the Pakistan movement23

. The demand for the partition of Indian territory into

two-nation state was based upon the notion that Muslims and Hindus constituted two

distinct nations. This communal division implied a theologically determined divergence

in social structure. Muslims could refer to a holistic conception of society outlined in the

22 There are countless web sites and organizations glorifying murder in the name of sanctity of the Prophet. Two of

them are: http://mumtazqadri.net/ and http://www.mumtazqadri.info/.

23 The Pakistan movement here refers to the movement for the creation of Pakistan, which means colonial times.

Thus the problems of postcolonial Pakistan have their roots in colonial times. This is why, I have tried to argue that

there is no cut-off point between colonialism and postcolonialism.

http://mumtazqadri.net/

http://www.mumtazqadri.info/



23



Quran. Economic, political and legal institutions delineate vectors within a

comprehensive ideological matrix. Jinnah‟s rhetoric often conformed to this vision:

“Islam is out guide and complete code of life”. (Noman, 1990: 3; emphasis added)

The problem was that Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, and his comrades were thoroughly secular

in their education, behavior, outlook, and lifestyle. But they had to practice the political of

religious differentiation to make a case of a Muslim homeland. They succeeded in getting a

separate homeland for the Muslims, but they failed to realize that “Muslim” could not be

separated from “Islam”. Thus, the clergy demanded imposition of shariah in the country. On 11

August 1947, three days before the official establishment of Pakistan, Jinnah took up the issue of

shariah in the Legislative Assembly declaring,

You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to

any other place or worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or

caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the State.24

This was, to take Noman‟s word, a schizophrenic statement. It was like being a Muslim without

confessing the religion of Islam. It was a volte-face from what the Pakistan movement had stood

for. The ulema25

were not satisfied; they campaigned for the imposition of shariah in Pakistan.

The most prominent of the ulema, Maududi said,

The case of Pakistan is different from other Muslim countries. . . this is because it has

been achieved exclusively with the object of becoming the homeland of Islam. (Cited by

Noman, 1990: 6)

In less than two years of the Jinnah speech in the Legislative Assembly, the government staged

another ideological-schizophrenic volte-face. On 12 March 1949, the government of Pakistan

proclaimed the Objectives Resolution in parliament by making Islam the basis of Pakistan‟s

polity. The relevant clauses of the Resolution were:

1. Sovereignty belongs to Allah alone but He has delegated it to the State of Pakistan

through its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him as a sacred

trust.

24 The entire speech is available on the government of Pakistan‟s official web site:

http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/constituent_address_11aug1947.html

25 Religious leaders and scholars.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereignty

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allah

http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/constituent_address_11aug1947.html



24



2. The State shall exercise its powers and authority through the chosen representatives of

the people.

3. The principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, as

enunciated by Islam, shall be fully observed.

4. Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in

accordance with the teachings of Islam as set out in the Quran and Sunnah.26

The Objectives Resolution opened up Pandora‟s Box. Now the question was: Who will represent

or interpret Islam? The ulema claimed that only those who were immersed in Islamic thought

and jurisprudence could lead an Islamic country. But the bigger question was: Whose Islam? It

was this question that hurled Pakistan into a sectarian war which began as a movement to

apostatize the Ahmadis in 1952, and continues to this day.27

7. Further research

In Pakistan, the Ahmadis have been reduced to the status of quarry which can be killed with

impunity. They live in a state of permanent persecution and discrimination. Cases of individual

persecution of the Ahmadis can be researched. Christians too have been falling prey to

persecution in the name of the sanctity of the Prophet.

A great deal of research can be done on the unchecked violent frenzy which swept the Pakistani

nation in the wake of the death fatwa against Salman Rushdie after he published his The Satanic

Verses. Just one example should suffice as an eye opener, and one is referred to the movie

International Guerillas in which Rushdie is killed by flying, laser-releasing copies of the Koran.

In the movie, Rushdie is shown as actively working against the stature of the Prophet. In the last

scene of the movie he laughs hysterically and insults the Koran and Islam before being burnt to

death.28

26 For the complete text of the Objectives Resolution, see: Binder, 1963:142-143.

27 For a good account of controversies and problems caused by the Objectives Resolutions, see: Bennett, 2010, and

Lau, 2010.

28 One can watch the entire movie on You-Tube. The link to the last scene, Rushdie‟s killing, is worth-seeing for its

insanity. There are English subtitles too, so any non-Punjabi can understand it:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zypArCxmF8A&feature=related

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qur%27an

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sunnah

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zypArCxmF8A&feature=related



25



Outside Pakistan, the Shias of Malaysia have been victim of state terrorism. Malaysia claims to

be multi-racial and multi-cultural. All religious beliefs enjoy freedom through state legislation,

and yet there is no freedom given to the Shia who are also Muslim, but differ from Malaysian

Sunnis in minor details. They are not allowed to practice their beliefs. A great deal of work can

be done on the Shia persecution in Malaysia.29

Biography

Abbas Zaidi is a Pakistani writer and journalist based in Brunei Darussalam where he teaches

English at Sultan Saiful Rijal Technical College. He is the author of Two and a half words and

other stories, published by Classic Books, Lahore.

References

Ali, Shaheen Sardar and Rehman, Javaid (2001). Indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities of Pakistan:

Constitutional and legal perspectives. London: Routledge.

Allen, Douglas. (1992). Religion and political conflict in South Asia: India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.

Oxford: Greenwood Publishing Group.

Anis, Muhammad. (2011, January 29). Senate refuses to pray for Taseer. The News.

http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=3636&Cat=13&dt=3%2F8%2F2011. Accessed

30 January 2011.

Arqam, Ali. (2011). Paint it Black!!! Dr Adib Rizvi road:

http://grandtrunkroad.wordpress.com/2011/10/21/paint-it-black-dr-adib-rizvi-road/. Accessed on 13

December 2011.

29 A few useful resources on the persecution of the Shias in Malaysia: (i) http://dailypioneer.com/nation/24985-

malaysia-ex-pm-for-third-party-intervention-in-indo-pak-issue.html (ii)

http://www.breakingnewsweek.com/malaysia-may-charge-200-muslim-shiites-for-deviating-from-islam.html (iii)

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\03\10\story_10-3-2011_pg4_2 (iv) http://www.ahl-ul-

bayt.org/en.php/page,4425A4775.html?PHPSESSID=d3d642e9be544463446bb878167f54e0 (v)

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\03\10\story_10-3-2011_pg4_2 (vi)

http://www.islamicinsights.com/news/international-news/shias-unwelcome-in-multicultural-malaysia.html (vii)

http://www.ahlulbayt-academy.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=193:shias-in-malaysia-to-

appear-before-court-on-20-january&catid=52:campaigns&Itemid=53 (viii)

http://www.shiitenews.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2981:malaysia-breaks-up-shia-

celebrations&catid=64:asia&Itemid=72 (ix) http://www.justiceformalayshia.org/media/media-reports/87-malaysia-

bans-shiites-from-promoting-their-faith (x) http://www.justiceformalayshia.org/

http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=3636&Cat=13&dt=3%2F8%2F2011

http://grandtrunkroad.wordpress.com/2011/10/21/paint-it-black-dr-adib-rizvi-road/

http://dailypioneer.com/nation/24985-malaysia-ex-pm-for-third-party-intervention-in-indo-pak-issue.html

http://dailypioneer.com/nation/24985-malaysia-ex-pm-for-third-party-intervention-in-indo-pak-issue.html

http://www.breakingnewsweek.com/malaysia-may-charge-200-muslim-shiites-for-deviating-from-islam.html

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\03\10\story_10-3-2011_pg4_2

http://www.ahl-ul-bayt.org/en.php/page,4425A4775.html?PHPSESSID=d3d642e9be544463446bb878167f54e0

http://www.ahl-ul-bayt.org/en.php/page,4425A4775.html?PHPSESSID=d3d642e9be544463446bb878167f54e0


http://www.islamicinsights.com/news/international-news/shias-unwelcome-in-multicultural-malaysia.html

http://www.ahlulbayt-academy.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=193:shias-in-malaysia-to-appear-before-court-on-20-january&catid=52:campaigns&Itemid=53

http://www.ahlulbayt-academy.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=193:shias-in-malaysia-to-appear-before-court-on-20-january&catid=52:campaigns&Itemid=53

http://www.shiitenews.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2981:malaysia-breaks-up-shia-celebrations&catid=64:asia&Itemid=72

http://www.shiitenews.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2981:malaysia-breaks-up-shia-celebrations&catid=64:asia&Itemid=72

http://www.justiceformalayshia.org/media/media-reports/87-malaysia-bans-shiites-from-promoting-their-faith

http://www.justiceformalayshia.org/media/media-reports/87-malaysia-bans-shiites-from-promoting-their-faith

http://www.justiceformalayshia.org/



26



Ashcroft, Bill, Griffiths, Gareth, and Tiffin, Helen. (2006). Introduction. In Bill Ashcroft, Gareth

Griffiths, Helen Tiffin (Eds.), The post-colonial studies reader (pp.5-13). London: Taylor & Francis.

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