PP vs Azzaraga DECISION SERENO, J.:: In the present Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Mandatory Injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner questions the legality of Chapter V, Section 9 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC or the Guidelines on the Selection and Appointment of Executive Judges and Defining Their Powers, Prerogatives and Duties issued by this Court on 27 January 2004, in relation to Section 90 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The antecedent facts are as follows: On 7 February 2009, petitioner filed two (2) Informations[1] before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City against private respondent John Rey Prevendido for Violation of Article II, Sections 5 and 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The cases were raffled to Branch 36, a designated special court pursuant to R.A. 9165, presided by Judge Victor E. Gelvezon. Soon after, however, Judge Gelvezon disclosed that Coreen Gemarino, the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) operative who conducted the entrapment operation against private respondent, had close family ties with him. Thus, in order to preserve the integrity of the court, Judge Gelvezon issued an Order[2] dated 17 February 2009 inhibiting himself from trying the case. The cases were then reassigned to the other special court, Branch 25, presided by Judge Evelyn E. Salao. On 24 February 2009, Judge Salao also issued an Order[3] whereby she inhibited herself for the reason that Coreen Gemarino was a cousin; thus, the cases were endorsed to the Office of the Executive Judge for reassignment. Citing Chap. V, Sec. 9 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, Executive Judge Antonio M. Natino ordered the Clerk of Court to forward the entire records of the cases to Branch 37 presided over by public respondent, the pairing judge of Branch 36, which was the special court that originally handled the cases.[4] On 16 March 2009, however, as soon as public respondent proceeded with the cases, Prosecutor Kenneth John Amamanglon filed a Motion to Transfer Case to a Branch of Competent Jurisdiction.[5] He questioned the jurisdiction of public respondent to hear the cases, citing Sec. 90 of R.A. 9165. Prosecutor Amamanglon also claimed that, as the prosecutor assigned to Branch 37, he was not among the prosecutors who had been designated to handle cases exclusively involving violations of R.A. 9165. On the same day, respondent judge denied the motion on three grounds, to wit: 1. This motion ought not to have been filed in this court for lack of legal basis; 2. This court is not without jurisdiction to hear the instant case; 3. The matter about the appearance of Trial Prosecutor Kenneth John Amamanglon should have been addressed to the Department concerned.[6] Respondent judge thus set the hearing on the Motion for Admission to Bail[7] filed on 10 February 2008. He directed the city prosecutor to assign an assistant city prosecutor to handle the case effective 20 March 2009. Prosecutor Amamanglon, however, moved for a reconsideration[8] of respondent judge s Order, contending that the trial court needed a special designation from this Court in order to have jurisdiction over the cases. Thus, Prosecutor Amamanglon concluded, absent the special designation, respondent court should remand the cases to the Office of the Executive Judge for reraffling to another court specially designated pursuant to R.A. 9165. To support its contention, petitioner further cited this Court s 11 October 2005 Resolution in A.M. No. 05-9-03-SC, which clarified whether drug courts should be included in the regular raffle. Respondent judge denied the Motion for Reconsideration in its Order dated 20 March 2009.[9] He held that A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC should be deemed to have modified the designation of special courts for drug cases. He declared that, under the circumstances enumerated in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, Branch 37 itself became a special court. He further ruled that A.M. No. 05-9-03-SC was inapplicable. On 23 March 2009, the city prosecutor endorsed the assailed Orders of respondent judge to the Office of the Solicitor General for the appropriate review and filing of the necessary action.[10] Thus, on 24 March 2009, petitioner filed the present petition before this Court. On 27 March 2009, while the Petition for Prohibition was pending, respondent judge issued an Order[11] inhibiting himself from hearing the case after private respondent alleged that the former was biased for the prosecution. The cases were thereafter transferred to Branch 35, also a regular court, presided by Judge Fe Gallon-Gayanilo. Absent a temporary restraining order from this Court, the trial court proceeded to hear the cases. The present petition raises two (2) issues, to wit: I. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE DRUG CASES IN CRIMINAL CASE NOS. 09-68815/16 DESPITE HIS ASSIGNMENT TO A REGULAR COURT II. WHETHER OR NOT A.M. NO. 03-8-02-SC IS IN CONFORMITY WITH SECTION 90 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, MANDATING THE DESIGNATION OF SPECIAL COURTS TO EXCLUSIVELY TRY AND HEAR DRUG CASES[12] At the outset, it is an established policy that parties must observe the hierarchy of courts before they can seek relief directly from this Court. The rationale for this rule is twofold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the limited time of this Court; and (b) it would inevitably result in a delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances, had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a trier of facts.[13] It is only for special and compelling reasons that this Court shall exercise its primary jurisdiction over the extraordinary remedy of writ of prohibition. However, in the case at bar, since it is only the Supreme Court itself that can clarify the assailed guidelines, petitioner is exempted from this rule. The petition, however, must fail. The crux of the matter in the present case is whether or not this Court violated Sec. 90 of R.A. 9165 when it issued A.M. 03-8-02SC, particularly Chap. V, Sec. 9, which prescribes the manner in which the executive judge reassigns cases in instances of inhibition or disqualification of judges sitting in special courts. Petitioner insists that should respondent judge (now Judge Fe Gallon-Gayanilo of Branch 35) continue hearing and trying the case, it would result in the circumvention of the legislative conferment of jurisdiction to a court to exclusively try and hear drug offenses only. [14]

Contrary to the assertion of petitioner, this Court did not commit any violation of R.A. 9165 when it issued the assailed guidelines. Rather, it merely obeyed Article VIII, Sec. 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution, which mandates that the rules promulgated by this Court should provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, in conformity with the right of all persons to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.[15] As this Court stated in San Ildefonso Lines v. Court of Appeals,[16] there must be a renewed adherence to the time-honored dictum that procedural rules are designed not to defeat, but to safeguard, the ends of substantial justice. Petitioner grounds its assertion on Sec. 90 of R.A. 9165, which states: Jurisdiction. The Supreme Court shall designate special courts from among the existing Regional Trial Courts in each judicial region to exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of this Act. The number of courts designated in each judicial region shall be based on the population and the number of cases pending in their respective jurisdiction. ... ... ... Trial of the case under this Section shall be finished by the court not later than sixty (60) days from the date of the filing of the information. Decision on said cases shall be rendered within a period of fifteen (15) days from the date of submission of the case for resolution. Petitioner interprets the above provision to mean that a court must be specifically designated by the Supreme Court as a special court. But what is Chap. V, Sec. 9 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC if not an express designation of a special court? Chap. V, Sec. 9 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC provides: Raffle and re-assignment of cases in special courts where judge is disqualified or voluntarily inhibits himself/herself from hearing case. (a) Where a judge in a court designated to try and decide ... ... ... (3) cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, or ...is disqualified or voluntarily inhibits himself/herself from hearing a case, the following guidelines shall be observed: (ii) Where there are more than two special courts of the same nature in the station, the Executive Judge shall immediately assign the case by raffle to the other or another special court of the same nature. In case the Presiding Judge of the other special court is also disqualified or inhibits himself/herself, the case shall be forwarded to the pairing judge of the special court which originally handled the said case. If the pairing judge is also disqualified or inhibits himself/herself, the case shall be raffled to the other regular courts. At the next raffle, an additional case shall be assigned to the disqualified or inhibiting judge/s to replace the case so removed from his/her/their court... (Emphasis supplied.) Under R.A. 9165, Congress empowered this Court with the full discretion to designate special courts to hear, try and decide drug cases. It was precisely in the exercise of this discretionary power that the powers of the executive judge were included in Chap. V, Sec. 9 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC vis--vis Sec. 5(5) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, in cases of inhibition or disqualification, the executive judge is mandated to assign the drug case to a regular court in the following order: first, to the pairing judge of the special court where the case was originally assigned; and, second, if the pairing judge is likewise disqualified or has inhibited himself, then to another regular court through a raffle. Under these exceptional circumstances, this Court designated the regular court, ipso facto, as a special court but only for that case. Being a designated special court, it is likewise bound to follow the relevant rules in trying and deciding the drug case pursuant to R.A. 9165. Petitioner also contends that the legislative intent of R.A. 9165 is to make use of the expertise of trial judges in complicated and technical rules of the special drug law. Thus, petitioner suggests that in instances in which all the judges of special courts have inhibited themselves or are otherwise disqualified, the venue for the affected drug cases should be transferred to the nearest station that has designated special courts. Petitioner s suggestion is ill-advised. To subscribe to this suggestion is to defeat the purpose of the law. Undoubtedly, petitioner s unwarranted suggestion would entail the use of precious resources, time and effort to transfer the cases to another station. On the other hand, the assailed guidelines provide for a much more practical and expedient manner of hearing and deciding the cases. To reiterate, over and above utilizing the expertise of trial judges, the rationale behind Sec. 90 of R.A. 9165 and Chap. V, Sec. 9 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC is to effect an efficient administration of justice and speedy disposition of cases, as well as to breathe life into the policy enunciated in Sec. 2 of R.A. 9165, to wit: Declaration of policy. It is the policy of the State to safeguard the integrity of its territory and the well-being of its citizenry particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs on their physical and mental well-being, and to defend the same against acts or omissions detrimental to their development and preservation. In view of the foregoing, the State needs to enhance further the efficacy of the law against dangerous drugs, it being one of today's more serious social ills. Toward this end, the government shall pursue an intensive and unrelenting campaign against the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs and other similar substances through an integrated system of planning, implementation and enforcement of anti-drug abuse policies, programs, and projects. The government shall however aim to achieve a balance in the national drug control program so that people with legitimate medical needs are not prevented from being treated with adequate amounts of appropriate medications, which include the use of dangerous drugs. It is further declared the policy of the State to provide effective mechanisms or measures to re-integrate into society individuals who have fallen victims to drug abuse or dangerous drug dependence through sustainable programs of treatment and rehabilitation. (Emphasis supplied.)

As a matter of fact, this Court also issued similar guidelines with regard to environmental cases,[17] election cases involving elective municipal officials,[18] and cases that involve killings of political activists and members of media.[19] Foremost in its mind is the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Petitioner further points out that this Court issued A.M. No. 05-9-03-SC to define the phrase to exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of this Act to mean ...[c]ourts designated as special courts for drug cases shall try and hear drug-related cases only, i.e., cases involving violations of RA 9165, to the exclusion of other courts. Hence, petitioner submits, drug cases should not be assigned to regular courts according to the procedure provided in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC; in other words, the two issuances contradict each other. Again, this Court disagrees. Petitioner underestimates the rule-making power of this Court. Nothing in A.M. No. 05-9-03-SC or in A.M. No. 03-8-03-SC suggests that they contradict each other. In fact, both were issued with a common rationale, that is, to expeditiously resolve criminal cases involving violations of R.A. 9165, especially in the light of the strict time frame provided in Sec. 90 of R.A. 9165. Both provide for the guidelines regarding the assignment of drug cases to special courts. Thus, A.M. No. 05-9-03-SC provides for the exemption of special courts from the regular raffle under normal circumstances, while A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC provide for the assignment of drug cases to special courts except under special circumstances that would warrant reassignment to a regular court. Moreover, the exemption of special courts from the regular raffle was not established as an ironclad rule. A.M. No. 05-9-03-SC does in fact allow special courts to acquire jurisdiction over cases that are not drug cases. In the interest of justice, executive judges may recommend to the Supreme Court the inclusion of drug courts in the regular raffle, and this Court has the discretion to approve the recommendation, as the Resolution states: WHEREFORE, Executive Judges and presiding judges of special courts for drug cases shall hereby observe the following guidelines: 4. If, in the opinion of Executive Judges, the caseload of certain drug courts allows their inclusion in the regular raffle without adversely affecting their ability to expeditiously resolve the drug cases assigned to them and their inclusion in the regular raffle becomes necessary to decongest the caseload of other branches, the concerned Executive Judges shall recommend to this Court the inclusion of drug courts in their jurisdiction in the regular raffle. The concerned drug courts shall remain exempt from the regular raffle until the recommendation is approved. (Emphasis supplied.) In conclusion, the two sets of guidelines are examples of this Court s foresight and prudence in the exercise of its rule-making power. These guidelines were issued to prevent or address possible scenarios that might hinder the proper administration of justice. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Prohibition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

For review in these consolidated petitions is the November 23, 2004 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No. [3] [2] 78218, as well as the Resolutions dated February 4, 2005 and September 13, 2005, denying the motions for its reconsideration. Liberty Commercial Center, Inc. (LICOMCEN) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating shopping malls. In March 1997, the City Government of Legaspi leased its lot in the Central District of Legaspi to LICOMCEN. The Lease Contract was based on the Build-Operate-Transfer Scheme under which LICOMCEN will finance, develop and construct the LCC City Mall (CITIMALL). LICOMCEN engaged E.S. De Castro and Associates (ESCA) as its engineering consultant for the project. On September 1, 1997, LICOMCEN and Foundation Specialist, Inc. (FSI) signed a Construction Agreement for the bored pile [4] foundation of CITIMALL. Forming part of the agreement were the Bid Documents and the General Conditions of Contract (GCC)[5] prepared by ESCA. A salient provision of the GCC is the authority granted the engineering consultant to suspend the work, wholly or partly. LICOMCEN was also given the right to suspend the work or terminate the contract. Among other caveats, GC-05 provided that questions arising out or in connection with the contract or its breach should be litigated in the courts of Legaspi, except where otherwise stated, or when such question is submitted for settlement through arbitration. GC-61 also provided that disputes arising out of the execution of the work should first be submitted to LICOMCEN for resolution, whose decision shall be final and binding, if not contested within thirty (30) days from receipt. Otherwise, the dispute shall be submitted to the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) for arbitration. Upon receipt of the notice to proceed, FSI commenced work and undertook to complete it within ninety (90) days, all in accordance with the approved drawing, plans, and specifications. In the course of the construction, LICOMCEN revised the design for the CITIMALL involving changes in the bored piles and substantial reduction in number and length of the piles. ESCA, thus, informed FSI of the major revision on December 16, [6] 1997 and ordered the non-delivery of the steel bars, pending approval of the new design. FSI, however, responded that the steel bars had already been loaded and shipped out of Manila. ESCA then suggested the delivery of 50% of the steel bars to the jobsite and the return of the other 50% to Manila, where storage and security were better.[7] On January 15, 1998, LICOMCEN sent another letter to FSI ordering all the construction activities suspended, because Albay Accredited Constructions Association (AACA) had contested the award of the Contract of Lease to LICOMCEN and filed criminal complaints with the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against LICOMCEN and the City Government of Legaspi. Thus, pending a clear resolution of the case, LICOMCEN decided to suspend all construction activities. It also requested FSI not to unload the steel bars.[8]

On January 17, 1998, the steel bars for the CITIMALL arrived at the Legaspi port, and despite LICOMCEN s previous request, these [9] were unloaded and delivered to the jobsite and some to Tuanzon compound, FSI s batching site. Then, on January 19, 1998, LICOMCEN reiterated its decision to suspend construction, and ordered demobilization of the materials and equipment for the [10] Finally, on February 17, 1998, LICOMCEN indefinitely suspended the project, due to the pending cases in the project. [11] Ombudsman. FSI demanded payment for its work accomplishments, material costs, and standby off equipment, as well as other expenses [12] amounting to P22,667,026.97, but LICOMCEN took no heed. On October 12, 1998, the Ombudsman dismissed the cases filed against the City Government and LICOMCEN. The dismissal was affirmed by this Court[13]and attained finality on September 20, 2000.[14] This notwithstanding, LICOMCEN did not lift the suspension of the construction that it previously ordered. It then hired Designtech Consultants and Management System (Designtech) as its new project consultant, which, in turn, invited contractors, including FSI, to bid for the bored piling works for [15] CITIMALL. FSI reiterated its demand for payment from LICOMCEN, but the latter failed and refused to pay, prompting FSI to file a petition for arbitration with the CIAC, docketed as CIAC Case No. 37-2002. LICOMCEN denied the claim of FSI, arguing that it lacks factual and legal basis. It also assailed the jurisdiction of the CIAC to take cognizance of the suit, claiming that jurisdiction over the controversy was vested in the regular courts, and that arbitration under the GC-61 of the GCC may only be resorted to if the dispute concerns the execution of works, not if it concerns breach of contract. During the preliminary conference, the parties agreed to submit the controversy to the Arbitral Tribunal and signed the Terms of Reference (TOR).[16] But onFebruary 4, 2003, LICOMCEN, through a collaborating counsel, filed an Ex Abundati Ad Cautela Omnibus Motion.[17] It reiterated the claim that the arbitration clause in the contract does not cover claims for payment of unrealized profits and damages, and FSI did not comply with the condition precedent for the filing of the suit, thus, the CIAC cannot take cognizance of the suit. LICOMCEN further averred that FSI has no cause of action against it because the claim for material costs has no factual basis and because the contract is clear that FSI cannot claim damages beyond the actual work accomplishments, but only reasonable expenses for the suspension or termination of the contract. LICOMCEN also alleged that the expenses incurred by FSI, if there be any, cannot be considered reasonable, because there was no showing that the materials were ordered and actually delivered to the job site. Finally, it prayed for the suspension of the proceedings, pending the resolution of its omnibus motion. On February 20, 2003, the CIAC issued an Order[18] denying LICOMCEN s omnibus motion on the ground that it runs counter to the stipulations in the TOR. Trial, thereafter, ensued. FSI and LICOMCEN presented witnesses in support of their respective claims. [19] After due proceedings, the CIAC rendered a Decision in favor of FSI, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of Claimant FOUNDATION SPECIALIST, INC. and against Respondent LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED, ordering the latter to pay to the former the following amounts: 1. P14,643,638. 51 representing material costs at site; 2. P2,957,989.94 representing payment for equipment and labor standby costs; 3. P5,120,000.00 representing unrealized profit; and 4. P1,264,404.12 representing the unpaid balance of FSI's billing. FURTHER, the said Respondent is ordered to solely and exclusively bear the entire cost of arbitration proceedings in the total amount of P474,407.95 as indicated in the TOR, and to reimburse the herein Claimant of any amount thereof which it had advanced and paid pursuant to TOR. All the above-awarded amounts shall bear interest of 6% per annum from the date of the formal demand on February 3, 1998 (Par. 10, Admitted Facts, TOR) until the date this Decision/Award becomes final and executory and 12% per annum from the date this Decision/Award becomes final and executory until fully paid. SO ORDERED.[20]

LICOMCEN elevated the CIAC Decision to the CA. It faulted the CIAC for taking cognizance of the case, arguing that it has no jurisdiction over the suit. It also assailed the award and the ruling that the contract had been terminated, allegedly for lack of factual and legal basis. On November 23, 2004, the CA rendered the assailed Decision, modifying the CIAC Decision, viz.: WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the assailed Decision is hereby MODIFIED to the extent that paragraph 1 of the dispositive portion is amended and accordingly, petitioner is ordered to pay only the amount of P5,694,939.865 representing the material costs at site; and paragraphs 2 and 3 on equipment and labor standby costs and unrealized profit of the same dispositive portion are deleted. The rest is AFFIRMED in all respects. No cost. SO ORDERED.[21] Both LICOMCEN and FSI filed motions for partial reconsideration, but these were denied by the CA in its Resolutions [23] [22] dated February 4, 2005 and September 13, 2005. LICOMCEN and FSI reacted with the instant petitions. Considering that the cases involve the same parties, issues and assailed decision, this Court ordered the consolidation of G.R. No. 167022 and G.R. No. 169678 in its Resolution dated November 20, 2006. LICOMCEN raised the following issues: 1.WHETHER OR NOT THE PROJECT WAS MERELY SUSPENDED AND NOT TERMINATED.

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIBUNAL HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE DISPUTE. 3.WHETHER OR NOT FSI IS ENTITLED TO CLAIM ANY AMOUNT OF DAMAGES. 4.WHETHER OR NOT LICOMCEN IS THE PARTY AT FAULT.[24] FSI, on the other hand, interposes the following: 1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT AWARDING TO PETITIONER THE FULL AMOUNT OF MATERIAL COSTS AT THE SITE. 2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER'S CLAIM FOR EQUIPMENT AND LABOR STANDBY COSTS. 3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER'S CLAIM FOR UNREALIZED PROFIT. 4. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RENDERING A MERE MINUTE RESOLUTION IN RESOLVING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION.[25] First, we resolve the issue of the CIAC s jurisdiction. LICOMCEN insists that the CIAC had no jurisdiction over the suit. Citing GC-05 and GC-61 of the GCC, it posits that jurisdiction over the dispute rests with the regular courts of Legaspi City. The argument is misplaced. The power and authority of a court to hear, try, and decide a case is defined as jurisdiction. Elementary is the distinction between jurisdiction over the subject matter and jurisdiction over the person. The former is conferred by the Constitution or by law, while the latter is acquired by virtue of the party's voluntary submission to the authority of the court through the exercise of its coercive process.[26] Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1008, or the Construction Industry Arbitration Law, provides: SECTION 4. Jurisdiction. The CIAC shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from, or connected with, contracts entered into by parties involved in construction in the Philippines, whether the dispute arises before or after the completion of the contract, or after the abandonment or breach thereof. These disputes may involve government or private contracts. For the Board to acquire jurisdiction, the parties to a dispute must agree to submit the same to voluntary arbitration. The jurisdiction of the CIAC may include but is not limited to violation of specifications for materials and workmanship; violation of the terms of agreement; interpretation and/or application of contractual provisions; amount of damages and penalties; commencement time and delays; maintenance and defects; payment default of employer or contractor and changes in contract cost. Excluded from the coverage of this law are disputes arising from employer-employee relationships which shall continue to be covered by the Labor Code of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied) Corollarily, Section 1, Article III of the Rules of Procedure Governing Construction Arbitration provides that recourse to the CIAC may be availed of whenever a contract contains a clause for the submission of a future controversy to arbitration, thus: SECTION 1. Submission to CIAC Jurisdiction. An arbitration clause in a construction contract or a submission to arbitration of a construction dispute shall be deemed an agreement to submit an existing or future controversy to CIAC jurisdiction, notwithstanding the reference to a different arbitration institution or arbitral body in such contract or submission. When a contract contains a clause for the submission of a future controversy to arbitration, it is not necessary for the parties to enter into a submission agreement before the claimant may invoke the jurisdiction of CIAC. Clearly then, the CIAC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from or connected with construction contracts entered into by parties that have agreed to submit their dispute to voluntary arbitration.[27] The GCC signed by LICOMCEN and FSI had the following arbitral clause: GC-61 DISPUTES AND ARBITRATION Should any dispute of any kind arise between the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED and the Contractor or the Engineer and the Contractor in connection with, or arising out of the execution of the Works, such dispute shall first be referred to and settled by the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED who shall within a period of thirty (30) days after being formally requested by either party to resolve the dispute, issue a written decision to the Engineer and Contractor. Such decision shall be final and binding upon the parties and the Contractor shall proceed with the execution of the Works with due diligence notwithstanding any Contractor s objection to the decision of the Engineer. If within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED s decision on the dispute, either party does not officially give notice to contest such decision through arbitration, the said decision shall remain final and binding. However, should any party within thirty (30) days from receipt of the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED s decision contest said decision, the dispute shall be submitted for arbitration under the Construction Industry Arbitration Law, Executive Order 1008. The arbitrators appointed under said rules and regulations shall have full power to open up, revise and review any decision, opinion, direction, certificate or valuation of the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED. Neither party shall be limited to the evidence or arguments put before the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED for the purpose of obtaining his said decision. No decision given by the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED shall disqualify him from being called as a witness and giving evidence in the arbitration. It is understood that the obligations of the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED, the Engineer and the Contractor shall not be altered by reason of the arbitration being conducted during the progress of the Works.[28] LICOMCEN theorizes that this arbitration clause cannot vest jurisdiction in the CIAC, because it covers only disputes arising out of or in connection with the execution of works, whether permanent or temporary. It argues that since the claim of FSI was not connected to or did not arise out of the execution of the works as contemplated in GC-61, but is based on alleged breach of contract, under GC-05[29] of the GCC, the dispute can only be taken cognizance of by the regular courts. Furthermore, FSI failed

to comply with the condition precedent for arbitration. Thus, according to LICOMCEN, the CIAC erred in assuming jurisdiction over the case. Contrary to what LICOMCEN wants to portray, the CIAC validly acquired jurisdiction over the dispute. Firstly, LICOMCEN [30] submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the CIAC when its president Antonio S. Tan signed the TOR during the preliminary conference. The TOR states: V. MODE OF ARBITRATION The parties agree that their differences be settled by an Arbitral Tribunal who were appointed in accordance with the provision of Article V, Section 2 of the CIAC Rules of Procedure Governing Construction Arbitration, as follows SALVADOR C. CEGUERA Chairma FELISBERTO G.L. REYES Member SALVADOR P. CASTRO, JR. Member The case shall be decided in accordance with the Contract of the parties and the Construction Industry Arbitration Law (Executive Order No. 1008) and on the basis of evidence submitted, applicable laws, and industry practices where applicable under the law.[31] Secondly, we agree with the CA that the suit arose from the execution of works defined in the contract. As it aptly ratiocinated: [T]he dispute between [FSI] and [LICOMCEN] arose out of or in connection with the execution of works. [LICOMCEN] has gone quite far in interpreting disputes arising out of or in connection with the execution of work as separate and distinct from disputes arising out of or in connection with the contract citing the various provisions of the Construction Agreement and Bid Documents to preclude CIAC from taking cognizance of the case. To the mind of this Court, such differentiation is immaterial. Article 1374 of the Civil Code on the interpretation of contracts ordains that the various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly. Essentially, while we agree that [FSI s] money claims against [LICOMCEN] arose out of or in connection with the contract, the same necessarily arose from the work it accomplished or sought to accomplish pursuant thereto. Thus, said monetary claims can be categorized as a dispute arising out of or in connection with the execution of work.[32] Thirdly, FSI complied with the condition precedent provided in GC-61. Record shows that FSI referred the claim to ESCA on February 3, 1998, and then to LICOMCEN on March 3, 1998,[33] but it was disallowed on March 24, 1998.[34] Then, on April 15, 1998, FSI rejected the evaluation of the billings made by ESCA and LICOMCEN and further informed the latter of its intention to [35] FSI exerted efforts to have the claim settled amicably, but no settlement was arrived at. Hence, turn over the project. on March 14, 2001, FSI through counsel made a final demand to pay.[36] LICOMCEN, however, adamantly refused to pay, prompting FSI to file suit with the CIAC. Clearly, FSI substantially complied with the condition precedent laid down in GC61. Finally, the arbitral clause in the agreement, considering that the requisites for its application are present, is a commitment by the parties to submit to arbitration the disputes covered therein. Because that clause is binding, they are expected to abide by [37] it in good faith. Just as meaningful, the issue of jurisdiction was rendered moot by LICOMCEN's active participation in the proceedings before the CIAC. It is true that LICOMCEN initially assailed the jurisdiction of the CIAC. But when the CIAC asserted its jurisdiction in its February 20, 2003 Order,[38] LICOMCEN did not seek relief from the CIAC ruling. Instead, LICOMCEN took part in the discussion on the merits of the case, even going to the extent of seeking affirmative relief. The active involvement of a party in the proceedings is tantamount to an invocation of, or at least an acquiescence to, the court's jurisdiction. Such participation indicates a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case, and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or body's [39] jurisdiction. The Court will not countenance the effort of any party to subvert or defeat the objective of voluntary arbitration [40] for its own private motives. After submitting itself to arbitration proceedings and actively participating therein, LICOMCEN is estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the CIAC, merely because the latter rendered an adverse decision. Having resolved the issue of jurisdiction, we proceed to the merits of the case. LICOMCEN faults the CIAC and the CA for ruling that the contract had been terminated, insisting that it was merely indefinitely suspended. To bolster its position, LICOMCEN cited GC-41 of the GCC which reads: GC-41 LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED S RIGHT TO SUSPEND WORK OR TERMINATE THE CONTRACT xxxx 2. For Convenience of LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED If any time before completion of work under the Contract it shall be found by the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED that reasons beyond the control of the parties render it impossible or against the interest of LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED to complete the work, the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED at any time, by written notice to the Contractor, may discontinue the work and terminate the Contract in whole or in part. Upon issuance of such notice of termination, the Contractor shall discontinue the work in such manner, sequence and at such time as the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED/Engineer may direct, continuing and doing after said notice only such work and only until such time or times as the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED/Engineer may direct. x x x[41] (Emphasis supplied)

Unfortunately for LICOMCEN, this provision does not support but enervates its theory of indefinite suspension. The cited provision may be invoked only in cases of termination of contract, as clearly inferred from the phrase discontinue the work and terminate the contract. And in statutory construction implies conjunction, joinder or union.[42] Thus, by invoking GC41, LICOMCEN, in effect, admitted that the contract had already been terminated. The termination of the contract was made obvious and unmistakable when LICOMCEN s new project consultant rebidded the contract for the bored piling works for the CITIMALL.[43] The claim that the rebidding was conducted for purposes of getting [44] cost estimates for a possible new design taxes our credulity. It impresses us as nothing more than a lame attempt of LICOMCEN to avoid liability under the contract. As the CIAC had taken pains to demonstrate: Suspension of work is ordinarily understood to mean a temporary work stoppage or a cessation of work for the time being. It may be assumed that, at least initially, LCC had a valid reason to suspend the Works on December 16, 1997 pursuant to GC-38 above-quoted. The evidence show, however, that it has not ordered a resumption of work up to the present despite the lapse of more than four years, and despite the dismissal of the case filed with the Office of the Ombudsman which it gave as reason for the suspension in the first place. As such, LCC s suspension of the Works had already lost its essential characteristic of being merely temporary or only for the time being. To still consider it a suspension at this point is to do violence to reason and logic. Perhaps because of this LCC came up with the assertion that what we have is an indefinite suspension. There is no such term in the Construction Agreement or the Contract Documents. In fact, it is unknown in the construction industry. Construction work may either be suspended or terminated, but never indefinitely suspended. Since it is not sanctioned by practice and not mentioned in the herein Construction Agreement and the Contract Documents, indefinite suspension is irregular and invalid. Due to the apparent incongruity of an indefinite suspension, LCC changed the term to continued suspension in its Memorandum. Unfortunately for it, the factual situation remains unchanged. The Works stay suspended for an indefinite period of time.[45] Accordingly, the CA did not err in affirming the CIAC ruling that the contract had already been terminated. Neither can LICOMCEN find refuge in the principle of laches to steer clear of liability. It is not just the lapse of time or delay that constitutes laches. The essence of laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, through due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, thus giving rise to a presumption that the party entitled to [46] assert it had either abandoned or declined to assert it. Indeed, FSI filed its petition for arbitration only on October 8, 2002, or after the lapse of more than four years since the project was indefinitely suspended. But we agree with the CIAC and the CA that such delay can hardly be considered unreasonable to give rise to the conclusion that FSI already abandoned its claim. On the contrary, the delay was due to the fact that FSI exerted efforts to have the claim settled extra-judicially which LICOMCEN rebuffed. Besides, except for LICOMCEN s allegation that the filing of the suit is already barred by laches, no proof was offered to show that the filing of the suit was iniquitous or unfair to LICOMCEN. We reiterate that, unless reasons of inequitable proportions are adduced, a delay within the prescriptive period is sanctioned by law and is not to be considered delay that would bar relief.[47] In the instant case, FSI filed its claim well within the [48] ten-year prescriptive period provided for in Article 1144 of the Civil Code. Therefore, laches cannot be invoked to bar FSI from instituting this suit. The doctrine of laches is based upon grounds of public policy which require, for the peace of society, discouraging stale claims. It is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted. There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches; each case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances. The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and since it is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be worked to defeat justice or to perpetrate fraud and injustice. [49] We now come to the monetary awards granted to FSI. LICOMCEN avers that the award lacked factual and legal basis. FSI, on the other hand, posits otherwise, and cries foul on the modification made by the CA. It asserts that the CA erred in disregarding the pieces of evidence that it submitted in support of the claim despite the lack of objection and opposition from LICOMCEN. It insists entitlement to the full amount of material costs at site, for equipment and labor standard costs, as well as unrealized profits. In this connection, we must emphasize the distinction between admissibility of evidence and its probative value. Just because a piece of evidence is not objected to does not ipso facto mean that it conclusively proves the fact in dispute. The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value. Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of whether the admitted evidence proves an issue. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the [50] guidelines provided by the rules of evidence. We have carefully gone over the records and are satisfied that the findings of the CA are well supported by evidence. As mentioned above, the contract between LICOMCEN and FSI had already been terminated and, in such case, the GCC expressly provides that: GC-42 PAYMENT FOR TERMINATED CONTRACT If the Contract is terminated as aforesaid, the Contractor will be paid for all items of work executed, and satisfactorily completed and accepted by the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED up to the date of termination, at the rates and prices provided for in the contract and in addition:

1. The cost of partially accomplished items of additional or extra work agreed upon by the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED and the Contractor. 2. The cost of materials or goods reasonably ordered for the Permanent or Temporary Works which have been delivered to the Contractor but not yet used and which delivery has been certified by the Engineer. 3. The reasonable cost of demobilization For any payment due the Contractor under the above conditions, the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED, however, shall deduct any outstanding balance due from the Contractor for advances in respect to mobilization and materials, and any other sum the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED is entitled to be credited.[51] We agree with the Court of Appeals that the liability of LICOMCEN for the cost of materials on site is only P5,694,939.85. The said award represents the materials reasonably ordered for the project and which were delivered to the job site. FSI cannot demand full payment of the steel bars under Purchase Order No. 6035.[52] As shown by the records, the steel bars were loaded at [54] [53] But as early as December 16, 1997, M/V Alberto only on January 12, 1998 and reached Legaspi City on January 16, 1998. LICOMCEN already informed FSI of the major revision of the design and ordered the non-delivery to the jobsite of the 50% of the steel bars. Inexplicably, FSI continued the delivery. Worse, it unloaded all the steel bars and delivered them to the jobsite and [55] some to the Tuanzon batching plant onJanuary 17, 1998, despite LICOMCEN s order not to do so. FSI cannot now claim payment of the cost of all these materials. LICOMCEN, however, cannot deny liability for 50% of the steel bars because, as mentioned, it ordered their delivery to the jobsite. The steel bars had in fact been delivered to the jobsite and inventoried by Cesar Cortez of ESCA,[56] contrary to LICOMCEN s claim. The payment of these materials is, therefore, in order, pursuant to GC-41: The Contractor shall receive compensation for reasonable expenses incurred in good faith for the performance of the Contract and for reasonable expenses associated with the termination of the Contract. x x x.[57] We also uphold the denial of FSI s claim for equipment and labor standard costs, as no convincing evidence was presented to prove it. The list of rented equipment[58] and the list of workers[59] offered by FSI and which were admitted by CIAC, are far from being clear and convincing proof that FSI actually incurred the expenses stated therein. As aptly said by the CA, FSI should have presented convincing pieces of documentary evidence, such as the lease contract or the receipts of payment issued by the owners of the rented equipment, to establish the claim. As to its claimed labor expenses, the list of employees does not categorically prove that these listed employees were actually employed at the construction site during the suspension. Hence, even assuming that LICOMCEN failed to submit evidence to rebut these lists, they do not ipso facto translate into duly proven facts. FSI still had the burden of proving its cause of action, because it is the one asserting entitlement to an affirmative relief.[60] On this score, FSI failed. The CA, therefore, committed no reversible error in denying the claim. FSI s claim for unrealized profit has to be rejected too. GC-41 specifically provided that: x x x The Contractor shall have no claim for anticipated profits on the work thus terminated, nor any other claim, except for work actually performed at the time of complete discontinuance, including any variations authorized by the LICOMCEN, INCORPORATED/Engineer to be done under the section dealing with variation, after the date of said order, and for any claims for variations accruing up to the date of said notice of termination.[61] (Emphasis supplied) The provision was agreed upon by the parties freely, and significantly, FSI did not question this. It is not for the Court to change the stipulations in the contract when they are not illegal. Article 1306 of the Civil Code provides that the contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.[62] Besides, no convincing proof was offered to prove the claim. In light of the foregoing, the CA, therefore, correctly denied the claim for unrealized profit. Similarly, we agree with the CIAC and the CA that LICOMCEN should bear the cost of arbitration as it adamantly refused to pay FSI s just and valid claim, prompting the latter to institute a petition for arbitration. In sum, we find no reason to disturb the decision of the CA. It cannot be faulted for denying FSI s motion for reconsideration [63] through a mere Minute Resolution, for as we held in Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco: The filing of a motion for reconsideration, authorized by Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, does not impose on the Court the obligation to deal individually and specifically with the grounds relied upon therefor, in much the same way that the Court does in its judgment or final order as regards the issues raised and submitted for decision. This would be a useless formality or ritual invariably involving merely a reiteration of the reasons already set forth in the judgment or final order for rejecting the arguments advanced by the movant; and it would be a needless act, too, with respect to issues raised for the first time, these being, x x x deemed waived because not asserted at the first opportunity. It suffices for the Court to deal generally and summarily with the motion for reconsideration, and merely state a legal ground for its denial (Sec. 14, Art. VIII, Constitution); i.e., the motion contains merely a reiteration or rehash of arguments already submitted to and pronounced without merit by the Court in its judgment, or the basic issues have already been passed upon, or the motion discloses no substantial argument or cogent reason to warrant reconsideration or modification of the judgment or final order; or the arguments in the motion are too unsubstantial to require consideration, etc. WHEREFORE, the herein petitions for review are DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 139561. June 10, 2003] SPOUSES FEDERICO ATUEL and SARAH ATUEL and SPOUSES GEORGE GALDIANO and ELIADA GALDIANO, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES BERNABE VALDEZ and CONCHITA VALDEZ, respondents. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case Before us is a petition for review on certiorari[1] seeking to reverse the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals dated 20 May 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 48682 as well as the Resolution dated 14 July 1999 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. The Court of Appeals in its assailed decision affirmed the Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board[3] ( DARAB ) which reversed the Decision[4] of the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office ( MARO ) in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. The MARO of Bukidnon ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform ( DAR ), Agusan del Sur, to segregate 2,000 square meters from the land of the Spouses Bernabe and Conchita Valdez. The MARO of Bukidnon also awarded the same segregated land to the Spouses Federico and Sarah Atuel and the Spouses George and Eliada Galdiano. The Facts The present controversy springs from a battle of possession over a portion of a property in Poblacion (formerly Sibagat Nuevo), Sibagat, Agusan del Sur. Atty. Manuel D. Cab ( Cab ) is the registered owner of two parcels of land in Poblacion, Sibagat, Agusan del Sur with an area of 125,804 square meters ( Cab Property ). The Cab Property is covered by OCT No. P-5638 issued pursuant to Free Patent No. 1318. The Cab Property is traversed by the Butuan to Davao Road and adjacent to the municipal building of Sibagat. From the Cab Property, Cab donated the lot occupied by the municipal building.[5] In 1964, Cab appointed Federico Atuel ( Atuel ) as administrator of the Cab Property. Sometime in 1977, Bernabe Valdez ( Valdez ) arrived in Sibagat from Baogo Bontoc, Southern Leyte. Valdez is the nephew of [6] Atuel, who recommended to Cab to lease a portion of the Cab Property to Valdez. On 9 October 1978, Cab and Valdez entered into a Lease of Improved Agricultural Land under which Valdez leased a 1.25-hectare portion of the Cab Property for P300.00 per year for two years. In 1982, Cab allowed the Spouses Federico and Sarah Atuel ( Spouses Atuel ) and the Spouses George and Eliada Galdiano ( Spouses Galdiano ) to occupy a 2,000-square meter portion of the Cab Property. The Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano constructed their respective houses on this 2,000-square meter lot ( Subject Lot ). On 27 September 1985, the Sangguniang Bayan of Sibagat, Agusan del Sur, approved the town plan of the Municipality of Sibagat which classified the Cab Property as residential, subject to the approval of the Ministry of Human Settlements Regulatory Commission. On 25 June 1988, Cab informed Valdez that their lease contract had already expired, and demanded that Valdez stop cultivating the 1.25-hectare portion of the Cab Property and vacate the same. On 2 October 1988, responding to Cab s letter, the MARO of Sibagat, Agusan del Sur informed Cab that Valdez was properly identified as a tenant, and thus deemed to be the owner of the land he cultivated. The MARO added that on 14 September 1988, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, Emancipation Patent No. A-159969 was issued to Valdez for a 2.3231-hectare portion ( PD 27 Land ) of the Cab Property. The PD 27 Land included the 2,000-square meter Subject Lot occupied by the houses of the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano. On 11 May 1989, Cab filed with the DAR in Manila a petition for cancellation of Valdez s emancipation patent. Cab claimed that his property is not planted to rice and corn and that Valdez is a civil law lessee, not a tenant.[7] Consequently, the DAR ordered the Regional Director of Cagayan de Oro City to conduct an investigation regarding the petition.[8] On 17 September 1989, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board ( HLURB ) approved the Town Plan and Zoning Ordinance of fifty-eight municipalities, including that of Sibagat. The HLURB classified the Cab Property as 90 percent residential, and the remaining portion as institutional and park or open space. [9] On 27 September 1991, the Spouses Bernabe and Conchita Valdez ( Spouses Valdez ) filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession with Damages with the DARAB in Malaybalay, Bukidnon against the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano. In their complaint, the Spouses Valdez alleged that the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano stealthily and through fraud entered and occupied a portion of the above-described property with an area of 2,000 sq. m. more or less. The Spouses Valdez claimed that the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano, despite repeated demands, refused to restore possession of the said portion of land to the Spouses Valdez. The Spouses Valdez prayed that the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano be ordered to vacate and restore to the Spouses Valdez possession of the Subject Lot. The Spouses Valdez also prayed for payment of litigation expenses, as well as unearned income from the Subject Lot and moral damages. In their answer, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano asserted that the Spouses Valdez had no cause of action against them because Cab is the owner of the Subject Lot while Atuel is the administrator of the Cab Property. The Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano claimed that upon Cab s instruction and consent, they had been occupying the Cab Property since 1964, long before the Spouses Valdez leased a portion of the Cab Property in 1978. The Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano also pointed out that the Spouses Valdez never set foot on the Subject Lot nor cultivated the same, thus, there is no dispossession to speak of. Moreover, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano alleged that the emancipation patent issued to Valdez is null and void. The Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano maintained that the entire Cab Property, which is covered by the Free Patent issued to Cab, has already been classified as residential, hence, no longer covered by PD No. 27.[10]

On 4 March 1993, the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator, after hearing the case, issued a decision which disposed of as follows: WHEREFORE, premises above considered, the DAR Agusan del Sur is hereby ordered to segregate the TWO THOUSAND (2,000) SQ. METERS, more or less, from the land of the complainants, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1261 covered by Emancipation Patent No. A-159969, and award the same to the respondents; and hereby ordered this case dismissed. [11] SO ORDERED. Dissatisfied with the decision, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano appealed to the DARAB Central Office. The DARAB Central Office reversed the decision of the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator, thus: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED. Judgment is hereby rendered as follows: (1) Enjoining the respondents-appellants from committing acts of intrusion and maintain the possessory rights of the complainants over the EP (Emancipation Patent) covered land; and (2) Ordering the MARO (Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer) or PARO (Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer) concerned to assist the parties in determining the amount to be reimbursed in favor of the respondents for whatever improvements made on the 2,000 square meter portion to be paid by the complainants. [12] SO ORDERED. [13] Aggrieved by the decision, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On 20 May 1999, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the DARAB Central Office and dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied. On 14 January 1998, while the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, the Spouses Valdez sold 5,000 square meters out of the PD 27 Land to the Municipality of Sibagat.[14] Hence, the instant petition. The Ruling of the Court of Appeals In affirming the decision of the DARAB, the Court of Appeals ruled that the DARAB has primary and exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of emancipation patents. The Court of Appeals held that the DARAB s decision should be respected because it enjoys the presumption of regularity. [15] The Court of Appeals also ruled that the DARAB correctly relied on Pagtalunan v. Tamayo where this Court held that upon issuance of an emancipation patent, a holder acquires a vested right of absolute ownership in the land. [16] The Court of Appeals further held that the doctrine laid down in Teodoro v. Macaraeg is applicable. In Teodoro, this Court ruled that a landowner has full liberty to enter into a civil lease contract covering his property. However, once a landowner enters into a contract of lease whereby his land is to be devoted to agricultural production and said landholding is susceptible of personal cultivation by the lessee, solely or with the help of labor coming from his immediate farm household, then such contract is of the very essence of a leasehold agreement. Otherwise, the Court added, it would be easy to subvert, under the guise of the liberty to contract, the intendment of the law of protecting the underprivileged and ordinarily credulous farmer from the unscrupulous schemes and pernicious practices of the landed gentry. [17] The Issue [18] After a review of the issues raised, the question boils down to whether the Spouses Valdez are entitled to seek redress from the DARAB in recovering possession of the 2,000-square meter Subject Lot from the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano. The Court s Ruling We grant the petition based not on the arguments of the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano but on an entirely different ground. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals because of the DARAB s lack of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the present controversy. The DARAB has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Spouses Valdez s complaint for recovery of possession of the Subject Lot. Though the parties do not challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB, the Court may motu proprio consider the issue of [19] jurisdiction. The Court has discretion to determine whether the DARAB validly acquired jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by law. It may not be conferred on the court by consent or waiver of the parties where [20] the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. In their complaint for recovery of possession, the Spouses Valdez alleged, among others, that they are farmers and beneficiaries of an emancipation patent. The Spouses Valdez also alleged that the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano stealthily and [21] fraudulently occupied the 2,000-square meter Subject Lot. The Spouses Valdez claimed that despite repeated demands, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano refused to vacate and restore possession of the Subject Lot to the Spouses Valdez.[22] The Spouses Valdez prayed that the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano be ordered to vacate and restore possession of the Subject Lot to the Spouses Valdez. The Spouses Valdez did not allege the existence of tenancy relations, if any, between them and the Spouses Atuel and the [23] Spouses Galdiano. In Morta, Sr. v. Occidental, this Court ruled: It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it, are the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined upon the allegations made in the complaint. In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint, which are contained in the decision of the MARO,[24] indicate that the nature and subject matter of the instant case is for recovery of possession or accion publiciana. The issue to be resolved is who between the Spouses Valdez on one hand, and the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano on the other, have a better right to possession of the 2,000-square meter Subject Lot forming part of the PD 27 Land. The Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano [25] likewise raise the issue of ownership by insisting that Cab is the real and lawful owner of the Subject Lot. In Cruz v. Torres, this Court had occasion to discuss the nature of an action to recover possession or accion publiciana, thus:

xxx This is an action for recovery of the right to posses and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding in a regional trial court to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of the title. Accion publiciana or plenaria de posesion is also used to refer to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the [26] unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. In such case, the regional trial court has jurisdiction. xxx [27] For the DARAB to acquire jurisdiction over the case, there must exist a tenancy relations between the parties. This Court held in Morta,[28] that in order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it is essential to establish all its indispensable elements, to wit: xxx 1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. [29] xxx (Emphasis supplied) Emphasizing the DARAB s jurisdiction, this Court held in Hon. Antonio M. Nuesa, et al. v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al.,[30] that: xxx the DAR is vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian reform program. The DARAB has primary, original and appellate jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under R.A. 6657, E.O. Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, R.A. 3844 as amended by R.A. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. (Emphasis supplied) Under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the CARP Law, an agrarian dispute is defined as follows: (d) xxx any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers' associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee. In the instant case, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano are not and do not claim to be the owners of the 2,000-square meter Subject Lot where their houses are constructed. They also do not claim ownership to any other portion of the PD 27 Land. They and the Spouses Valdez have no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian relationswhatsoever that will bring this [32] controversy within Section 3(d) of RA No. 6657.[31] The instant case is similar to Chico v. CA, where this Court ruled that the DARAB had no jurisdiction over a case which did not involve any tenurial or agrarian relations between the parties. Since the DARAB has no jurisdiction over the present controversy, it should not have taken cognizance of the Spouses Valdez s complaint for recovery of possession. Jurisdiction over an accion publiciana is vested in a court of general jurisdiction.[33]Specifically, the regional trial court exercises exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve x x x possession of real [34] However, if the assessed value of the real property involved does not exceed P50,000.00 in Metro Manila, property. and P20,000.00 outside of Metro Manila, the municipal trial court exercises jurisdiction over actions to recover possession of real [35] property. Moreover, the municipal trial court exercises jurisdiction over all cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer. The Court of Appeals correctly stated that the DARAB has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of registered emancipation patents. However, the Spouses Valdez s complaint for recovery of possession does not involve or seek the cancellation of any emancipation patent. It was the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano who attacked the validity of the emancipation patent as part of their affirmative defenses in their answer to the complaint. The rule is well settled that thejurisdiction of the court (or agency in this case) cannot be made to depend on the defenses made by the defendant in his answer or motion to dismiss. If such were the rule, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant.[36] [37] Jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties. The active participation of the parties in the proceedings before the DARAB does not vest jurisdiction on the DARAB, as jurisdiction is conferred only by law. The courts or the parties cannot disregard the rule of non-waiver of jurisdiction. Likewise, estoppel does [38] not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a cause of action. The failure of the parties to challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB does not prevent this Court from addressing the issue, as the DARAB s lack of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the complaint. Issues of jurisdiction are not subject to the whims of the parties.[39] In a long line of decisions, this Court has consistently held that an order or decision rendered by a tribunal or agency without jurisdiction is a total nullity.[40] Accordingly, we rule that the decision of the DARAB in the instant case is null and void. Consequently, the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the DARAB is likewise invalid. This Court finds no compelling reason to rule on the other issues raised by the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20 May 1999 and the Resolution dated 14 July 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 48682 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The MARO s Decision dated 4 March 1993, and the DARAB s Decision dated 17 June 1998, are declared NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction. No costs. SO ORDERED. FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 145838. July 20, 2001]

NICASIO I. ALCANTARA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS, SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES ANTONIO CERILLES, THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, ROLANDO PAGLANGAN, ET AL., respondents. HEIRS OF DATU ABDUL S. PENDATUN, REP. BY DATU NASSER B. PENDATUN, AL HAJ., HEIRS OF SABAL MULA, and GAWAN CLAN, REP. BY TRIBAL CHIEFTAIN LORETO GAWAN, intervenors. DECISION KAPUNAN, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 22, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 53159[1] and its Resolution dated October 16, 2000 denying petitioner s motion for reconsideration. The facts of the case are as follows: Sometime in 1993, petitioner Nicasio Alcantara was granted Forest Land Grazing Lease Agreement No. 542 (FLGLA No. 542) by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Under said FLGLA, Alcantara was allowed to lease Nine Hundred Twenty-Three (923) hectares of public forest land at Sitio Lanton, Barrio Apopong, General Santos City for grazing purposes for a period of twenty-five (25) years to expire on 31 December 2018. As early as 1990, however, private respondent Rolando Paglangan together with Esmael Sabel and Lasid Acop filed a lettercomplaint with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) seeking the cancellation of FLGLA No. 542 and the reversion of the entire 923 hectares to the B laan and Maguindanaoan tribes. The case was docketed as COSLAP Case No. 98052. Petitioner filed his Answer questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP over the case, since the dispute involved a claim for recovery of ancestral land. Petitioner claimed that the case should have been filed with the DENR since it is the latter which has jurisdiction to administer and dispose of public lands, including grazing lands. Notwithstanding petitioner s objection to the COSLAP s exercise of jurisdiction over the case, said body continued the hearings thereon. Petitioner alleged that COSLAP did not conduct formal hearings on the case, and that he was not notified nor given the [2] opportunity to be present and participate in the field interviews and ocular inspections conducted by COSLAP. On August 3, 1998, the COSLAP issued a Decision ordering the cancellation of FLGLA No. 542. Petitioner appealed the same to the Court of Appeals by petition for review on certiorari. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition in its Decision dated June 22, 2000, and also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated October 16, 2000.[3] Hence, the present petition. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that he had earlier recognized the jurisdiction of the COSLAP over the case. He stated further that the appellate court should have considered that the COSLAP does not possess the historical, genealogical and anthropological expertise to act on ancestral land claims, and that it is the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), under the Indigenous People s Rights Act of 1997[4] which has jurisdiction over such claims. Petitioner thus submits that the COSLAP s decision ordering the cancellation of FLGLA No. 542 and declaring the area being claimed by private [5] respondent as ancestral land is void for having been issued by a body which does not have jurisdiction over said matters. In his Comment, private respondent Rolando Paglangan argued that the petition should be dismissed since the petition for [6] certiorari filed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals was filed out of time. He also contended that the COSLAP has the power to entertain cases involving indigenous cultural communities when the DENR or the NCIP fails or refuses to act on a complaint or grievance brought before them.[7] He alleged that the dispute between petitioner and the B laan tribe antedated the creation of [8] the NCIP, hence, filing of the petition for cancellation of the FLGLA with the COSLAP. On April 6, 2001, a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File Complaint-in-Intervention was filed with this Court by the Heirs of Datu Abdul S. Pendatun, represented by Datu Nasser B. Pendatun, Al Haj; the Heirs of Sabal Mula, represented by Hadji Latip K. Mula; and the Gawan Clan, represented by their Tribal Chieftain Loreto Gawan. Subsequently, on May 24, 2001, they filed an Amended Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File Amended Complaint-inIntervention. In their Amended Complaint-in-Intervention, they allege that the parcels of land in dispute form part of their ancestral lands, and that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under claim of ownership of the same. They stated further that private respondent Rolando Paglangan acts only as agent of the Mula clan, and not of the [9] other intervenors. The Court finds no reason to disturb the ruling of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible error in the assailed decision. The Court agrees with the appellate court that petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP since he participated actively in the proceedings before said body by filing an Answer, a Motion for Reconsideration of the COSLAP s decision and a Supplement to Respondent s Motion for Reconsideration. The Court also notes the appellate court s observation that petitioner began to question the jurisdiction of the COSLAP only when he realized that his period to appeal the COSLAP s decision had already lapsed.[10] It has been repeatedly held by this Court that the active participation of a respondent in the case pending against him before a court or a quasi-judicial body is tantamount to a recognition of that court s or body s recognition and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the court s or body s jurisdiction.[11] Moreover, Executive Order No. 561 creating the COSLAP, the law then prevailing when private respondents filed their complaint for cancellation of FLGLA No. 542, provides in Section 3, paragraph 2(a) thereof that said Commission may assume jurisdiction over land disputes involving occupants of the land in question and pasture lease agreement holders: Sec. 3. Powers and Functions. -- The Commission shall have the following powers and functions: xxx

2. Refer and follow-up for immediate action by the agency having appropriate jurisdiction any land problem or dispute referred to the Commission: Provided, That the Commission, may, in the following cases, assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes which are critical and explosive in nature considering, for instance, the large number of the parties involved, the presence or emergence of social tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action: (a) Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement holders or timber concessionaires; (b) Between occupants/squatters and government reservation grantees; (c) Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or applicants; (d) Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of lands of the public domain; and (e) Other similar land problems of grave urgency and magnitude. The Commission shall promulgate such rules of procedure as will insure expeditious resolution and action on the above cases. The resolution, order or decision of the Commission on any of the foregoing cases shall have the force and effect of a regular administrative resolution, order or decision and shall be binding upon the parties therein and upon the agency having jurisdiction over the same. Said resolution, order or decision shall become final and executory within thirty (30) days from its promulgation and shall be appealable by certiorari only to the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.) The Court of Appeals also stated that based on the records, the the land area being claimed by private respondents belongs to the B laan indigenous cultural community since they have been in possession of, and have been occupying and cultivating the [12] same since time immemorial, a fact has not been disputed by petitioner. It was likewise declared by the appellate court that FLGLA No. 542 granted to petitioner violated Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 410[13] which states that all unappropriated agricultural lands forming part of the public domain are declared part of the ancestral lands of the indigenous cultural groups occupying the same, and these lands are further declared alienable and disposable, to be distributed exclusively among the members of the indigenous cultural group concerned. The Court finds no reason to depart from such finding by the appellate court, it being a settled rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court absent any showing that such findings are not supported by [14] the evidence on record. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED. ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE ISSUES SPS GONZAGA V CA (SPS ABAGAT) SCRACALLEJO SR; October 18, 2004 NATURE Petition for the Review of the Decision and resolutionof CA FACTS - October 22, 1991 > Sps Abagat filed complaintagainst Sps Gonzaga for recovery of possession of land in Baclaran, Paraaque issued in their names, asowners. Sps Abagat alleged in their complaint thatthey were the owners of a small hut (barongbarong)constructed on the lot, which was then owned by thegovernment- February 22, 1961 > Abagat filed an application forsales patent over the land- January 26, 1973 > hut was gutted by fire and afterthat, Sps Gregorio built a two-storey house on theproperty without their consent. Sps Abagat filed acomplaint for ejectment against Sps Gregorio butcomplaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdictionbecause in their answer to the complaint, the SpsGregorio claimed ownership over the house- Sps Gregorio sold house to Sps Gonzaga forP100,000 under a deed of conditional sale, in whichSps Gregorio undertook to secure an award of theland by the government in favor of Sps Gonzaga. Inan MOA, Sps Gregorio indicated that if they would not secure such, they would return P90,000 aspayment for the house- January 2, 1986 > Bureau of Lands granted theapplication of Abagat for a sales patent over theproperty. TCT No. 128186 was issued by theRegister of Deeds in his name. Sps Abagatdemanded that Sps Gonzaga vacate the property,but latter refused- September 29, 1992 > Sps Abagat filed a motionfor leave to file a third-party complaint against theSps Gregorio. TC no longer resolved the motion forleave to file a third-party complaint - Trial Court > October 10, 1994, in favor of SpsAbagatCA > December 19, 1997, affirmed the decision of the trial court on. On the plea of Sps Gonzaga thatthe TC should have ordered the Sps Gregorio torefund to them the P90,000.00 the latter hadreceived as payment for the house, CA ruled that aseparate complaint should have been filed againstthe Sps Gregorio, instead of appealing the decision of the TC. ISSUE: WON RTC and CA erred in not ordering Sps Gregorioto refund to them the P90,000 they had paid for thehouse and which the latter promised to do so undertheir Memorandum of Agreement HELD: NO. Ratio: The rule is that a party is entitled only to suchrelief consistent with and limited to that sought bythe pleadings or incidental thereto. A trial courtwould be acting beyond its jurisdiction if it grantsrelief to a party beyond the scope of the pleadings.Moreover, the right of a party to recover depends,not on the prayer, but on the scope of the pleadings,the issues made and the law. Reasoning: - Sps Gonzaga failed to file any pleading against SpsGregorio for the enforcement of the deed of conditional sale, the deed of final and absolute sale,and the Memorandum of Agreement executed bythem. The petitioners filed their motion for leave tofile a third-party complaint against the intervenors,Sps Gregorio, and appended thereto their third-partycomplaint for indemnity for any judgment that maybe rendered by the court against them and in favorof the respondents. However, Sps Gonzaga did notinclude in their prayer that judgment be renderedagainst the third-party defendants to refund theP90,000.00 paid by them to the Sps Gregorio. SpsGonzaga failed to assail the trial court s order of denial in the appellate court. Even after the trialcourt had granted leave to the Sps Gregorio tointervene as parties-defendants and the latter filedtheir Answer-inIntervention, Sps Gonzaga failed tofile a cross-claim against the intervenors for specificperformance for the refund of the P90,000.00 theyhad received from the petitioners under their deed of conditional sale, the deed of final and absolute saleand the memorandum of agreement and pay filingand docket fees therefor. Disposition Petition is DENIED DUE COURSE

THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 147406, July 14, 2008] [1] VENANCIO FIGUEROA Y CERVANTES, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES RESPONDENT. DECISION NACHURA, J.: When is a litigant estopped by laches from assailing the jurisdiction of a tribunal? This is the paramount issue raised in this petition for review of the February 28, 2001 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 22697. Pertinent are the following antecedent facts and proceedings: [3] On July 8, 1994, an information for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide was filed against the petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, Branch 18.[4] The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94.[5] Trial on the merits ensued and on August 19, 1998, the trial court convicted the petitioner as charged.[6]In his appeal before the CA, the petitioner questioned, among others, for the first time, the trial court's jurisdiction.[7] The appellate court, however, in the challenged decision, considered the petitioner to have actively participated in the trial and to have belatedly attacked the jurisdiction of the RTC; thus, he was already estopped by laches from asserting the trial court's lack of jurisdiction. Finding no other ground to reverse the trial court's decision, the CA affirmed the petitioner's conviction but modified the penalty imposed and the damages awarded.[8] Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari raising the following issues for our resolution: a. Does the fact that the petitioner failed to raise the issue of jurisdiction during the trial of this case, which was initiated and filed by the public prosecutor before the wrong court, constitute laches in relation to the doctrine laid down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, notwithstanding the fact that said issue was immediately raised in petitioner's appeal to the Honorable Court of Appeals? Conversely, does the active participation of the petitioner in the trial of his case, which is initiated and filed not by him but by the public prosecutor, amount to estoppel? b. Does the admission of the petitioner that it is difficult toimmediately stop a bus while it is running at 40 kilometers per hour for the purpose of avoiding a person who unexpectedly crossed the road, constitute enough incriminating evidence to warrant his conviction for the crime charged? c. Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in considering the place of accident as falling within Item 4 of Section 35 (b) of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, and subsequently ruling that the speed limit thereto is only 20 kilometers per hour, when no evidence whatsoever to that effect was ever presented by the prosecution during the trial of this case? d. Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in convicting the petitioner for homicide through reckless imprudence (the legally correct designation is "reckless imprudence resulting to homicide") with violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code when the prosecution did not prove this during the trial and, more importantly, the information filed against the petitioner does not contain an allegation to that effect? e. Does the uncontroverted testimony of the defense witness Leonardo Hernal that the victim unexpectedly crossed the road resulting in him getting hit by the bus driven by the petitioner not enough evidence to acquit him of the crime charged?[9] Applied uniformly is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive application thereof.[10] In this case, at the time the criminal information for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide with violation of the Automobile Law (now Land Transportation and Traffic Code) was filed, Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129[11] had already been amended by [12] Republic Act No. 7691. The said provision thus reads: Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases.-Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: x x x x (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof:Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof. As the imposable penalty for the crime charged herein is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods or imprisonment for 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years,[13] jurisdiction to hear and try the same is conferred on the Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs). Clearly, therefore, the RTC of Bulacan does not have jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94. While both the appellate court and the Solicitor General acknowledge this fact, they nevertheless are of the position that the principle of estoppel by laches has already precluded the petitioner from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC--the trial went on for 4 years with the petitioner actively participating therein and without him ever raising the jurisdictional infirmity. The petitioner, for his part, counters that the lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be raised at any time even for the first time on appeal. As undue delay is further absent herein, the principle of laches will not be applicable. To settle once and for all this problem of jurisdiction vis- -vis estoppel by laches, which continuously confounds the bench and the bar, we shall analyze the various Court decisions on the matter. As early as 1901, this Court has declared that unless jurisdiction has been conferred by some legislative act, no court or tribunal [14] [15] can act on a matter submitted to it. We went on to state in U.S. v. De La Santa that: It has been frequently held that a lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter is fatal, and subject to objection at any stage of the proceedings, either in the court below or on appeal (Ency. of Pl. & Pr., vol. 12, p. 189, and large array of cases there cited), and indeed, where the subject-matter is not within the jurisdiction, the court may dismiss the proceeding ex mero motu. (4 Ill., 133; 190 Ind., 79; Chipman vs. Waterbury, 59 Conn., 496.) Jurisdiction over the subject-matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court; it is

given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law and an objection based on the lack of such jurisdiction can not be waived [16] by the parties. x x x Later, in People v. Casiano,[17] the Court explained: 4. The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it hadjurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same "must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel" (5 C.J.S., 861-863). However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position--that the lower court hadjurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not depend upon the will of the parties, has no bearing thereon. Thus, Corpus Juris Secundum says: Where accused has secured a decision that the indictment is void, or has been granted an instruction based on its defective character directing the jury to acquit, he is estopped, when subsequently indicted, to assert that the former indictment was valid. In such case, there may be a new prosecution whether the indictme