practice note - improving domestic accountability in aid effectiveness

8/7/2019 Practice Note - Improving Domestic Accountability in Aid Effectiveness

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ContentsContents ......................................................................................................................................2

PRACTICE NOTE ..................................................................................................................... 3

How to Gain Access to the Aid Effectiveness Architecture and ................................................3

Improve Domestic Accountability ............................................................................................. 3

1.1 Audience: ......................................................................................................................... 3

1.2 Introduction: ..................................................................................................................... 3

1.3 Accountability and its Role in Governance of Donor Resources: ....................................5

1.4 Methodology and Goal: ....................................................................................................8

1.5 Common Perceptions/Misperceptions: ............................................................................ 9

1.6 Advocacy Principles First Steps for Civil Society: ........................................................12

1.7 A note on Donor Communication: .................................................................................12

1.8 Advocacy Goal: ..............................................................................................................14

1.9 Who are the actors? Who makes the decisions? .............................................................16

1.9.1 How to identify supporters? ........................................................................................21

1.9.2 Identifying early Allies: .............................................................................................. 22

1.9.3 Why Some Might Oppose Domestic Accountability: .................................................23

1.9.4 Speak to the Junior Staff First/Recognise the Value of Local Staff: ...........................24

1.10 How to get domestic accountability on the Agenda – The Programme Cycle: ...........25

1.10.1 How to Improve Influence through the Project Cycle: .............................................26

1.10.2 Monitoring and Evaluation, Project and Programme Design: ..................................28

1.10.3 Job Boards: ................................................................................................................29

1.11 Funding Cycles – The Importance of Always Having a Proposal on Hand: ...............29

1.13 First Steps .....................................................................................................................33



PRACTICE NOTEHow to Gain Access to the Aid Effectiveness Architecture and

Improve Domestic Accountability

Ensuring MEANINGFUL participation by [civil societyorganisations] (CSOs) at all levels:CSOs are demanding to have MEANINGFUL engagement andparticipation in the whole process of implementation, monitoringand evaluation of the aid effectiveness agenda. By MEANINGFULwe mean: clear mechanisms of participation at all levels, withenough resources to ensure broad representation of diverse CSOs(including the commonly excluded groups, such as women,peasant, migrant, refugee and indigenous, among others). Clearparameters and accountability on how recommendations andproposals presented by CSOs will be seriously considered in theprocess should be decided in conjunction with CSOs.

CSO International Steering Committee for Ghana, Policy Paper on Aid Effectiveness, July 2007

1.1 Audience:

This is intended as a starting point for African civil society actors toimprove their access to donor decision making to improve domesticaccountability and donor support for domestic accountability. While someadvocates have advanced beyond what is proposed below, this note

responds to the lack of advocacy tools specifically targeting the new aidarchitecture; this is only a starting point and should not be considered acomprehensive guide. Furthermore, the approach is based on what arewidely used advocacy and lobbying tools; as such this practice note is notintended as a radical departure from existing methodologies.

1.2 Introduction:

The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness resulted in the establishment of largely independent and unregulated aid decision making and consensusbuilding structures. While this decision making structure differs fromcountry to country, there are clear commonalities appearing. In Kenya thestructure is called the Aid Effectiveness Group (AEG), in Zambia it is calledthe Cooperating Partners Group (CPG), in Ethiopia it is called the Donors’Assistance Group (DAG) and in Somalia it is called the Somalia DonorGroup (SDG). These groups tend to meet monthly and at the national levellargely with donor in-country heads of agencies (Country Directors/Headsof Cooperation). These groups are mirrored at the sector level wheredonors establish “technical working groups” in sectors from education andhealth to democratic governance. These groups often meet without



government participation and very rarely with regular participation fromcivil society 2.

Technical (sector) working groups support joint donor decision making onfunding, dialogue with government and in developing common political

positions on the state of social and economic development at the countrylevel. At the first level these groups are important for accountabilitybecause they have enormous influence on how donors allocate theirfunds. In Kenya, for example, 2008 official development assistance rose toover a billion dollars a year3 and in 2010 Kenya’s Minister of Finance4

projected that just over a quarter of Kenya’s revenue would come fromdonor resources5. In other countries like Ethiopia and Somalia the aidarchitecture groups govern public expenditure that is significantly largerthan the government’s; in conflict and post-conflict situationsaccountability to citizens is further undermined because donors tend tomake even fewer decisions in consultation with government andrepresentatives of local civil society.

At a second and possibly more important level, these donor groups areimportant for domestic accountability because they are spaces in whichdonors come to consensus on what they advocate or negotiate with thegovernment. In many countries, there is little enough space for civilsociety to raise issues of critical concern with government. Whenaccountability actors have no say in what donors communicate togovernment, a significant mechanism for accountability is lost. Worse, solong as civil society is not represented in these forums, donors are able to

raise issues of critical concern by invoking the mechanism of “speaking onbehalf” of local civil society. Being able to invoke the moral imperativeand to do so unhindered is a very useful tool for donors when negotiatingwith governments. In other words, when civil society is not present it ispossible for donors to mask their own interests as being in the interests of civil society to better encourage governments into agreeing policies jointlyin the interest of government and donors. With Western donors feelingthreatened by the rise of emerging powers like China, Brazil and India,donors are increasingly under pressure to improve their economic ties andpolitical alliances with African governments. One way donors can improvetheir relationships with governments is by better directing their resources

at government priorities. Deciding on how to spend these vast resourcesis increasingly institutionalised behind closed doors with only governmentand donors present. It would be naïve to presume that any of the actors inthese closed door discussions is necessarily acting in the interest of Africa’s disenfranchised and/or African civil society6.

2 Zambia, Kenya and Ethiopia have not ensured domestic accountability in their aid architectures; the

Commonwealth Secretariat (2010) case studies on Malawi and Cameroon Domestic and Mutual Accountability

for Aid evidence the same pattern.3 www.oecd.org Development Statistics4

Business Daily, June 10, 2010, Front Page; Kenya’s New Budget , Kenya: Nairobi5 Ibid. Uhuru Kenyatta (Kenya’s Minister of Finance) expects USD 1.8 billion in donor resources in the budget

year 2010-2011.

http://www.oecd.org/






1.3 Accountability and its Role in Governance of Donor Resources:

“If there is no accountability, government is just payingfor activities the beneficiaries disown.”

Kenya Ministry of Trade Official, 2010

Mario Claasen and Carmen Alpin-Lardies7 define accountability as “therequirement of those in power to explain and take responsibility for theirchoices and actions”. The applicability of this concept of accountability,however, becomes more nuanced in real world situations and particularlyin Africa. Here, Claasen and Alpin-Lardies extend the concept of accountability to call for a continual feedback process where by those whohave power constantly recognize their responsibility to report back, solicitviews and ensure accountability to citizens. For accountability to be morethan a mechanistic approach to justifying decision making, it should beextended to peer pressure mechanisms; hence accountability extendsbeyond, say, “Members of Parliament (MPs) [having] a mandate to haveoversight…over the executive [to] also over each other.” Opening publicdecision making to the scrutiny of peers, citizens and civil societyimproves decision making by decreasing space for interference andcorruption as well as diminishing the risk of government policy beingperceived as captured by vested elites. Containment of this risk is both inthe interest of government and donors because when government isperceived as acting in the interests of vested elites, government authorityis publicly contested and donors struggle to justify their support for the

government in question.

The means by which citizens and civil society hold decision makersaccountable are familiar tools to stakeholders in the development sectorrunning the gamut from using elections to taking legal action, advocatingthrough the press, using lobbying and sympathetic institutions to maintainpressure and using alternative solutions to demonstrate problems withcurrent government policies. In the context of this note, however,accountability is about recognising that the donor and governmentofficials deciding how development resources are spent are not electedand as such need to be accountable in the local or domestic environment.

To hold these decision makers accountable, this paper aims to improveaccess to donor-government decision making structures (the aidarchitecture) to better voice the interests of civil society. This will allow

6 See Domestic and Mutual Accountability for Aid – Building Stronger Synergies (2010) London, United

Kingdom: Commonwealth Secretariat that concludes that the spaces created to enable domestic accountability

are in fact excluding non-donor and non-government stakeholders (art. 24) with the risk that implementing aid

effectiveness commitments (art. 17) may “create incentives for [governments] to prioritise donor targets over

legitimate domestic priorities, and can even encourage the government to subvert the evaluation mechanism.”

Also see: http://www.hrw.org/en/node/93604/section/1 for Human Rights Watch’s take on the role donors play

in undermining domestic accountability in Ethiopia, (October 2010) Development Without Freedom, New York:

Human Rights Watch.7 Claasen and Alpin-Lardies (2010) Social Accountability in Africa, Pretoria: Idasa, Associated Network for

Social Accountability- Africa

http://www.hrw.org/en/node/93604/section/1





better monitoring and transparency, diminishing the incentive for officialsto divert development resources away from the beneficiaries.



The first step to demanding accountability in how development resourcesare spent is to recognize that domestic accountability is the onlyreasonable justification officials can use to explain their funding decisions.By this it is important to unpack the existing discourse. Officials of donoragencies do not own their development resources. These resources are

granted to African beneficiaries by donor country electorates. Theresources, then, belong first and foremost to the citizens of thebeneficiary country because they have in a sense already been given.

The primary justification donor officials use to rationalise their decisions isto say that they are acting in the interests of the beneficiaries by doingwhat government wants (as government fairly represents citizens’interests). This justifies donor funding for activities that supportgovernment priorities. The way donors justify funding activities notendorsed by government is to argue that the government is not acting inthe interests of its citizens. To convincingly make this argument donorofficials resort to arguing they know better than the government aboutwhat Africans need or that the government is not acting in the interests of its citizens. These dual mechanisms of questioning integrity and capacity of government officials, enables donors to invoke the necessary authorityto divert funds to their own priorities. To acknowledge that they may notknow best what Africans need would mean to acknowledge they arespending resources earmarked for Africans on other priorities. Invokingthe authority of knowing better what Africans’ need is useful and possibleonly because their decision-making is poorly contested and behind closeddoors. Because donors are not accountable to African civil society,

because these officials are not elected by African beneficiaries andbecause they are able to choose who they consult with; they haveunregulated space to speak and decide “on behalf of their beneficiaries”.

“The problem [in this country] is that we do not have ourown NGO…usually we have an NGO which we can use towrite reports, hire consultants, convince the communitieswhat needs to be done.”

UNDP Deputy Resident Representative/Country Director,2007

This does not mean donors are not accountable at all. As Claasen andAlpin-Lardies point out donors have some accountability mechanisms builtinto their rules and procedures. These mechanisms, however, are largelyabout fiscal accountability8, that is ensuring transparent procurement andcombating corruption. Domestic accountability is about making sure thatdonor resources are spent on what citizens need and done so in such away that they do not reinforce vested political interests. Donors dorecognise these challenges and have provided some support for“independent institutions to promote accountability and good governancein state institutions. These include commissions on human rights or

8 Projects that are not corrupt but do not respond to beneficiary needs are even less in the interests of

beneficiaries than projects responding to beneficiary needs that suffer from some corruption.



gender, ombudsmen and anti-corruption commissions. Most of theseinstitutions play a monitoring role and are meant to be independent fromstate institutions. However, in the African context, these types of institutions face their own challenges, at times deliberately created by thestate to undermine the role of what would be independent bodies. These

challenges include under-resourcing (both human and financialresources), ambiguously defined roles, and most commonly, not havingthe necessary ‘teeth’ to reprimand officials for misconduct. In all of thesegovernance initiatives related to state institutions playing an oversightrole there have been few attempts to bridge the “supply-side” and the“demand-side” of governance.”

This note is about gaining access to donor decision making at the countylevel (the “aid architecture”) so as to improve domestic accountability anddonor support for African accountability organisations.

1.4 Methodology and Goal:

The goal of this note is to elaborate how accountability actors and Africancivil society in general can better influence donor decision making anddirect greater resources to accountability. The goal is also to explore howcivil society can ensure donor officials are more accountable for how theymanage resources granted to beneficiaries.

Much of the methodology used will be familiar to activists as it is based onwidely accepted lobbying and advocacy tools. This note aims to broaden

the use of these tools by introducing how they can be applied specificallyto the national aid effectiveness architecture. Here it is important torecognise that this note is targeted at national level decision making; inthe context of aid effectiveness increasing shares of aid are programmedat the national level. This note aims to improve access and accountabilityof national decision making and is complementary to internationaladvocacy and community or local level accountability.



1.5 Common Perceptions/Misperceptions:

While it is difficult to generalise across countries, confidential interviewsand data collected imply a number of common (mis)perceptions abouthow government and donors perceive accountability actors. Key amongst

these misperceptions is the notion that African government officialsalways want to exclude civil society and that African civil society believesit is consulted with and supported by international donors. The(mis)perceptions listed below give a more nuanced view of how actorsmay view the need for domestic accountability:

• Government officials typically want greater participation of civil societyin donor-government decision making structures and see strong civilsociety as an important counter-weight to internationaldonor/international NGO interests. Despite perceptions to the contrarymany NGOs see government as being more open to civil society thandonors: “Government has created more space for NGOs than donorshave.” (Kenyan NGO leader).

• Donors are in principle advocating for greater involvement from civilsociety. However, donors tend to refer to international NGOs as goodexamples of local civil society and are often unaware of how theypreference the voice of international NGOs over local civil society andAfrican umbrella NGO organisations.

• There is a need for institutional capacity strengthening of umbrellaNGO organizations in many African countries. This is essential both tocoordinate and agree a common representative structure (that canadvocate for the sector as a whole) and to build the necessary

institutional knowledge to participate in and influence decision makingin national donor-government forums. Strong national NGO networksact in the interests of African NGOs and domestic accountability actorsas well as playing a role in monitoring and participating in the moretechnocratic aspects of government policy and decision making.

• Line ministries typically have insufficient human resources tocoordinate/lead and monitor the use of donor funding at the sectorlevel.

• Government and donors alike are generally aware of anduncomfortable with the probability that accountability organizationstend to have their independence undermined by the conditions underwhich they receive grants from donors9. This is one reason some arguethat it has become an accepted norm to consider NGO criticism of government as being more in the interests of the NGO’s donor thanorganisation’s constituency.

• Government and African NGOs have a common concern that fundsintended for Africa are routed through international NGOs with littletransparency or accountability to communities on the ground. At thevery least, it is important to recognise a common interest in ensuringthat funding intended for Africa and channelled through internationalNGOs (and other organisations) should be accompanied by a clear

9 For example, the lack of core long term funding creates an enormous disincentive to demand accountability

from decision makers that could impact their funding.



transfer of skills and resources to African NGOs. On the resources side,when international organisations and NGOs are recipients of donorresources they should be required to live up to their commitments tobuilding African capacity by directing the majority of their grantresources through local (African) partners.

• Poor government and local capacity to monitor and hold donorsaccountable for funding decisions has led to excessive duplication andoften dangerous influences on local power structures. African umbrellaorganizations need to be capacitated to engage responsible ministriesand to have the authority to minimise duplication and the likelihood of negative impacts on community structures.

• African civil society needs to be capacitated to better articulate itsinterests. There is significant resentment that international NGOs andorganisations speak on behalf of and receive a better audience thanlocal representatives (particularly amongst donors and the

international community)• Donors should be careful not to merge African civil society with

governments. Accountability organisations have a significant burden inensuring transparency and combatting corruption in management of public resources and will continue to find it difficult to ask foraccountability if they are expected to partner with the very decisionmakers they are expected to hold accountable.

• Basket funds in which donors pool their resources in one project areincreasingly popular tools for donors in Africa. Basket funds typicallyhave poor representation from civil society in their management anddecision making; these decision making structures also need to be

more accountable to domestic actors.• Strong civil society representation is in the interests of both donors and

government as it is an essential precondition to strengthening theirpartnership. Strong endorsement from civil society and demonstrableproof of accountability is useful because it allows donors to fend off (often unwanted) interference from their headquarters. At the sametime strong domestic accountability is a precondition to budget supportand other flexible funding mechanisms that give government morecontrol over how donor resources are spent.

In 2000, donors established an independent civic education grantmaking facility. This was considered successful and was wellreviewed because decisions were made by representatives of Kenyan civil society in the interest of Kenyan civil society. Thefacility was closed in 2003 after the election of a new government.Some argue that this facility was established because donors werecritical of the previous government. However, after 2003, donorsdid not want to be associated with critical civil society and henceclosed this important source of support.

A similar pattern of donor support occurred in South Africa withdonors financing domestic accountability through independent

grant makers like the Transitional National Development Trust,Interfund and the churches. Once apartheid ended, however,



donors were quick to withdraw support for independent grantmaking and/or to support these grant making structures beingabsorbed into government (e.g. the Transitional NationalDevelopment Trust is now the National Development Agency).



1.6 Advocacy Principles First Steps for Civil Society:

• Accept responsibility for the need to represent civil society as a whole;recognise that you are particularly well positioned to speak on behalf of civil society even if the representative arrangements are not ideal,

• Recognise that you have the power to influence agenda setting and theright to have your priorities considered,

• Be prepared as an advocate; have a few clear requests donors canrespond to. The sector needs: greater and better quality funding foraccountability (independent grant making); better access to decisionmaking (i.e. designated seats in basket funds, budget supportmeetings, working groups, etc.); institutional strengthening to themandated national NGO umbrella body and for this body to lobby andbetter coordinate the wider sector; and, greater accountability of donors and international implementing partners to (through localNGOs) to local communities,

• Be positive (avoid adversarial relationships). Emphasise that greateraccess to decision makers and capacity is essential for buildingaccountability – that sustainable development needs to be about localNGOs taking the lead and authoritatively speaking on behalf of beneficiaries10.

• Emphasise the value local civil society offers government and donorofficials. Remember that civil society endorsement of donor orgovernment decision making is powerful and politically very valuable.

Remember change is about compromise and may be slow to come.

1.7 A note on Donor Communication:

Donors often complain that their influence is undermined because theyare unable to deliver harmonised and clear messages to government. Thisis a joint failing of the donor architecture and the fact that headquarterstypically influence the message transmitted by donor officials at thecountry level. At the same time these differing and often contradictorymessages are often aggravated by the fact that because many donorofficials are permanent civil servants it can be difficult for a countrydirector or head of cooperation to discipline his or her own staff. The

result is that sector specialists (e.g. in governance or health) will oftencommunicate very different messages than that of the head of agency. This is a point of much frustration for senior donor officials who are oftenmeasured on the success they have in communicating (dialogue) withgovernment. Here domestic accountability organisations offer donors avaluable service; by clearly communicating what the priorities should be,senior donor officials have the authority to challenge their staff and otherdonors to speak “on message”.

10 Here international NGOs should be reminded that their role is not to replace African organizations but to

support and partner with them.



When donors raise issues that are neither a priority for government norfor domestic accountability actors, then donors are in a weak position to justify the importance of their concerns. Few donors want to fall into thetrap of having to explain that their concerns are in their own interestsbecause this exposes them to criticism that they are interfering in

domestic politics.



1.8 Advocacy Goal:

The first challenge for domestic accountability actors is in setting a cleargoal. In this regard, it is important to use this space to advance theprimary interests of domestic accountability actors. Here it is important

not to fall into the trap of propagating politically correct slogans overtargeting how to address the fundamental challenges facing domesticaccountability actors in Africa. More important than anything else indemanding accountability from donors is to ensure regular independentfunding and access to domestic accountability actors. Without this, it isunlikely that any other goals will be addressed. To do this, accountabilityactors need to build the national institutional capacity to represent theirinterests as a sector; here the national NGO council is essential as it is oneof the few bodies that can legitimately speak on behalf of the sector as awhole rather than a particular institution or political group. What isdetailed below is an illustrative example that should be tweaked to local

needs.

Goal: Strengthen Local Civil Society to Improve Accountability andBetter Influence Agendas

(Let African Civil Society speak on behalf of and best represent the interest of Africans)

What do we want? National umbrella body represent civil society indonor-government decision making forums,Reallocate funds and personnel to improve domestic

accountability.Who will make thispossible?

Donors, Government and The National NGO UmbrellaOrganisation

How do we want tobe Represented inthe AidArchitecture?

Civil society representatives identified, resources and capacitated to represent local civil society in all(sector) technical working groups, on all basket funds,in budget support meetings and on an ad hoc basis inthe EU Fast-track Division of Labour Process

What key goals willmake this possibleand improveaccountability inthe sector?

Attract funding for institutional support programme tothe national NGO umbrella body to establish a sector consultation and representation mechanism by whichto identify wider sector needs and to give an incentivefor better coordination,Institutional support for the national NGO umbrellabody to understand, monitor and lobby donor decisionmaking structures,Establishing a donor supported independent grant making facility to strengthen advocacy groups incountry,

Agreeing a joint donor-government-NGO statement that argues for at least 50% of funding that goes tointernational organisations and NGOs should be sub-contracted or granted through local organisations (this

should be incorporated into the all Joint/NationalDevelopment Strategies as a performance indicator).



Deadline: 2013 is an essential year because it is when many donors begin their new (often 5 or 6 years)

programming cycle. Accordingly, if this opportunity ismissed the next optimal time to change donor

priorities will only be around 2018.



1.9 Who are the actors? Who makes the decisions?

Setting a goal is only a foundational step. The most important condition tosuccess is being clear about to whom one is communicating and whatspecific behaviour change is desired. Here it is important to start working

on a ‘power map’ by which one identifies which individuals set the agendaand exert the most influence on decision making at the national level.

Do not presume that the donor with the most funding or seniority of officials necessarily means greater influence. Language, for a start, has anenormous influence: in English speaking countries native English speakershave an advantage. Ireland, for example, often has influencedisproportionate to its size in group discussions and drafting jointdocuments. Heads of large organisations are often too busy andoverburdened to formulate policies and strategies. The EU, UK and USAID, for example, often vest significant strategy and decision making

power in their governance officers (who are often comparatively junior).Recognise also that project managers and chiefs of party may notnecessarily have access to the aid architecture. Depending on howrepresentation is shared at the country level, GTZ project managers, forexample, may have no access and instead be represented by the Head of German cooperation (DED).

Here it is important to start by clearly identifying the target audience(example below). This exercise should be regularly updated and thefindings verified on the basis of key informant interviews, reviewing

meeting minutes and participating in forums. Even if one cannot getaccess to the decision making structure itself it is usually possible toapproach a like-minded donor and ask them to confidentially assist inmapping out who they see as most influential in setting the agenda andshaping joint decision-making.



Audience

Decision Makers and Agenda Setters: Head of External ResourcesDepartment/Donor Coordination Unit, Ministry of Finance/Planning11, Chairsof national donor coordination structure (e.g. in Kenya the AEG; in Zambiathe CPG; in Ethiopia the DAG), the lead donor(s) for the EU Fast TrackInitiative on Division of Labour and UNDP (including in its role as a residentcoordinator of the UN system) as well as the World Bank country director.

Potential Allies: Like-minded Donors (particularly the Scandinavian donors,Ireland and Canada), Spain (as a donor of emerging importance), theEuropean Commission (in its role as setting common agendas) and UK Aid

(for its reputation as an influential donor in governance and accountabilityprogramming).

International advocacy NGOs like Human Rights Watch, Freedom House andother good governance groups and facilities.

11 In some cases this relationship is managed by the ministry of foreign affairs.



Example:

Who to Speak To aboutWhat?

ProjectFinancing

JointProgrammeDecisions

GovernmentImplementationDecisions

NationalPolicy /CountryStrategy

Minister – Line MinistryPermanent Secretary – LineMinistryHead of Unit/Section – LineMinistryMinister – Ministry of Finance/PlanningDirector of ExternalRelationsDepartment/DonorCoordination Unit – Ministryof Finance/PlanningHead of Donor Desk –Ministry of Finance Planning

Remember - most governments haveappointed a responsibledesk officer for managingrelations with individualdonors at a national level.Ambassador – DonorHead of Cooperation –

DonorHead of Section/DeskOfficer – DonorProject Manager/Chief of PartyLead Donor in the EU Fast

Track Initiative on Divisionof LabourUNDP ResidentRepresentative/CountryDirectorUNDP Deputy CountryDirector – ProgrammesUNDP ProjectManager/Project OfficerNote: This table can vary dramatically depending on the size of donor mission,the size of overall ODA and its proportion in the national budget. The above-tableshould be used as an illustrative example only.

It is important to differentiate how we work with those that support betterdomestic accountability, those against it and those that are undecided.Because it is not politically correct to reject requests for improveddomestic accountability, it is particularly challenging to identifyopponents. More problematically, opponents in the development sector



are more likely to talk as if they support better accountability whileundermining domestic accountability behind closed doors. It is rare thatopponents will come out and voice their distaste for improved domesticaccountability. Opponents will more likely use their influence to keep thesubject of improved accountability off the agenda, deploy delay tactics or

resort to undermining the authority or integrity of civil society bycriticising national NGO umbrella structures as being divided or tilted tospecific political interests and/or implying that African NGOs are just‘briefcase organisations’. It can often be a losing battle trying to convincethose opposed to change their approach. Instead, the best way toovercome opposition is often by working with supporters to strengthenand vocalise their support and by convincing undecided actors toparticipate in the conversation. It is critical to create momentum and aperception that a core group of donors is committed to betteraccountability. If a core and committed group advocates for betterdomestic accountability, it is unlikely that opponents will resist bothbecause nobody wants to be seen as rejecting domestic accountabilityand because senior donor officials tend to be hesitant at criticising eachother.

There are three clear groups of beneficiaries: the first is the nationalumbrella NGO body. Supporting the national umbrella NGO organisation toact on behalf of civil society raises the profile of the national umbrellaorganisation as well as demonstrating to its members that they are doingtheir job and protecting the interests of national NGOs.

The second group of beneficiaries are domestic accountabilityorganisations. With this group it is important to have a clear messagereminding them that the goal is for them to have greater access andinfluence as well as to improve the enabling conditions for domesticaccountability.

The third group of beneficiaries is likely the most important because itcomprises the bulk of the remaining civil society and NGO community. This group is fractured and requires support. It needs issues to rallyaround. Here a central and important theme that often resonatesmeaningfully is the concern that African NGOs are often excluded, their

opinions disregarded and that they receive a small portion of the fundingin their respective sectors. In this regard, then, it can be very useful toadopt clear targets such as:

• Requesting donors to ensure that at least 50% of funds they grant tointernational NGOs and organisations are sub-contracted to Africanorganisations,

• Incorporating and measuring what proportion of developmentresources go to African organisations,

• Incorporating project steering (governance) committees in all projectsand ensuring that African accountability actors are represented on

these committees,• Better including African voices in deciding which grants are made.



1.9.1 How to identify supporters?

Identifying supporters is very difficult because officials in donororganisations are effectively contracted to diplomatic or Foreign Servicebranches of government. As such, it is important to be cognisant that the

message they communicate is often filtered through their officialinstitutional position and thus it is safe to presume they arecommunicating a strategic position rather than what they may see as thetruth. Furthermore, it would be safe to presume that the donors andofficials in strategic positions in the aid architecture are at least partly toblame for the fact that domestic accountability is not higher on theagenda.

When approached by critical civil society or accountability actors, donorofficials frequently find themselves on the defensive making supportersdoubly hard to identify. Many experienced donor officials will be cautious

to express their honest opinions for fear of being quoted out of context.Furthermore, civil society tends to approach donors either to solicitfunding or to criticise them. Hence donor officials often feel justified inguarding how and what they say to civil society.

One approach that has had some success in ascertaining donors’ positionsis to couch dialogue in a narrative they are comfortable with. A donorofficial that has relocated from a first world capital to Africa to dodevelopment work is likely to have created a narrative justifying why heor she is well positioned to do his or her job. This narrative will emphasise

the themes that internationally recruited donor officials:A. Have some skills and knowledge that African’s do not have,B. Are better positioned to know what is the right or more ethical

approach than their government counterparts (this enables them toevaluate whether to support the government or not),

C. Are justified in demanding accountability because they are tasked with“protecting their tax payers” funds.

While many officials privately acknowledge the weakness in this narrative,it is important not to underestimate the power this sub-text has in justifying important decision making.

Accountability actors are more likely to identify potential supporters byplaying into this narrative. Approaching a donor in the spirit of doingresearch and wanting information from “key experts” is a good way tostart a conversation. At the same time, it can be useful to invoke commonconcerns such as in raising the concern that donor funds granted togovernment are not necessarily managed in the interests of the widerpopulation. Another option is to point out that one purpose of domesticaccountability is to ensure better financial transparency. Treating officialsin this way allows one to ask in a more open manner the questions thatwill help identify which donors are influential in setting the agenda:

• Which donors are the most influential in setting policy?

• To which donors is the government most willing to listen to?



• In the donor community which donors feel that their voice is not heardin joint meetings (i.e. in the aid architecture)?

• What are the most important development priorities and what will bethe future development priorities (i.e. where the future funding willgo)?

1.9.2 Identifying early Allies:

Special attention should be placed on approaching disenchanted donors. These donors might feel marginalised from a perceived consensus in thewider donor community because they have a more critical approach tocorruption and human rights (e.g. the Scandinavian donors). Languageand culture are also important means of exclusion. In English speakingcountries for example, non-native speakers will likely have somefrustration that Anglo-Saxons dominate group discussions thusundermining others’ inputs. Under-staffed donors also tend to feel side-lined because they have too many responsibilities tothoroughly/effectively lead in joint meetings.

Ironically, disenchanted donors are likely to be easier allies to win becausewhen accountability actors align themselves with these donors they raisethe donor’s profile in the national aid architecture. Furthermore, byproviding critical and often hard to come by information about what civilsociety wants, accountability actors can complement and be of benefit tothe (formerly disenchanted) donors. By giving these donors privilegedinformation they are able to speak with greater authority in joint forums

about what ‘the people’ want.

Other important allies to approach early on are donors that typically havestrong governance programming teams and budgets but do not lead ongovernance issues in the aid architecture. Because the leads or chairs of technical working groups are rotated, the lead of the governancetechnical working group may be held by a donor that has few human orfinancial resources. When the stronger donor is not leading the group, thiscan create some frustration based on the belief that they are notappropriately valued. Accountability actors can capitalize on thismarginalisation to build alliances and advocating changes in the way that

the donor architecture is structured. Here it is important to recognise theprimary goal is to gain access to these decision making structures; whathappens afterwards is another question but at least will be in consultationwith domestic accountability actors. Accordingly, it can be strategic toinitially advocate for the participation of African domestic accountabilityactors in a Machiavellian manner.



1.9.3 Why Some Might Oppose Domestic Accountability:

In any case, dictators have received a remarkably constant

share - around a third - of international aid expenditures since1972. The proportion of aid received by democracies has

remained stuck at about one fifth (the rest are in a purgatorycalled “Partly Free” by Freedom House). As for US foreign aid,despite all the brave pronouncements such as the ones I’vequoted, more than half the aid budget still went to dictatorsduring the most recent five years for which figures areavailable (2004–2008).

Bill Easterly, Foreign Aid for Scoundrels,New York: New York Times (November 25, 2010)

While one will be hard pressed to find formal opposition to improvingdomestic accountability, the fact that accountability actors do not alreadysit in many working groups nor at the heads of agency meetings meansthere is undoubtedly some reluctance to civil society being present.Reluctance may arise from the risk of political repercussions and fear of being quoted out of context by civil society. Another factor is thatdecisions taken in working groups are not always transparent and mayinvolve decisions to fund preferred organisations on the basis of no-bidcontracting.

Resistance to greater domestic accountability is likely to be always

present in one shape or form simply because increased scrutiny (of donoractivity/decision-making) is rarely welcomed. Nonetheless, much work canbe done in diminishing the risk of opposition by identifying whatorganisations and/or individuals oppose and are not comfortable withgreater domestic accountability and why. Here it is important to ask:• What is to be lost in improving domestic accountability (recognise that

some organisations will see this as a threat to their funding and otherswill see this as a threat to making preferred political deals that shouldbe not be made in a transparent environment)?

• Who incurs professional or reputational risk by improving domesticaccountability (remember many in the development sector succeed by

convincing their peers that they speak on behalf of and have the voiceof civil society – often when they do not)?

• Who controls the current aid architecture (make no mistake, greaterpublic scrutiny is a threat to this control whether those who control itpurport to want this control or not)?

• Who sees donor decision making as exempt from domesticaccountability scrutiny (many donors are still housed in very traditionalforeign affairs type structures – they see development as philanthropyand will see greater accountability as a threat to how they makedecisions)?



In opening discussion on how to improve accountability, it is important tobe cognisant of some commonly cited reasons for the poor access givento domestic accountability actors. At one level, the aid architecture andworking groups are, in many countries, relatively new phenomena. Oftendecision makers have simply not had the time to think about the

importance of decisions taken in these groups and the importance of ensuring accountability. Another possibility is that while many participantsare aware of the importance of giving access to accountability actors,they may view the working group structures as fragile and not wellenough structured to engage in more transparent decision making.Another common justification is that while donors see the potential benefitof greater accountability they do not perceive any requirement orobligation to open their decision making to better public scrutiny (largelybecause donors have their own accountability mechanisms).

While the above-mentioned arguments are worth considering it is asimportant to emphasise to donors that without the endorsement of domestic accountability actors, their decision making invites furtherscrutiny, which can often be overly politicised. The 2010 Human RightsWatch12 report on distortions of aid in Ethiopia, for example, clearlyaccuses donors of making funding decisions with the primary intent of improving their working relationship with the Government of Ethiopia. Thefact that Ethiopia’s donors cannot point to any meaningful dialogue and/orendorsement from domestic accountability actors has left themparticularly vulnerable to the accusation that their decision making ismore in the interests of Ethiopia’s political elite than in responding to the

needs of the poor.

1.9.4 Speak to the Junior Staff First/Recognise the Value of Local Staff:

While most donor institutions take decisions from the top it is important torecognise these decisions are rarely taken without consultation with lesssenior staff. Typically speaking, potentially contentious issues such as arequest to change the aid architecture to better allow for domesticaccountability will happen at heads of agency level. In such a case, headsof agency will turn to their governance/political officers to prepare briefingnotes. Accordingly, it is essential to ensure that the junior officers are well

briefed before raising the issue with senior staff.

Junior political and/or governance officers often occupy a difficult space inthe aid architecture. While they are officially responsible forpolitical/governance issues they are rarely afforded access to high levelpolitical meetings because these meetings are typically attended at theambassadorial or head of agency level. This dynamic often leaves juniorofficers looking for a field in which to develop their expertise and remainrelevant within their respective organisational hierarchy. Many of theseofficers resort to specialising in human rights, corruption and/or civil

12 Human Rights Watch (October 2010), Development Without Freedom, USA: New York,

www.hrw.org/en/africa/ethiopia



society issues in the hope of developing specialised knowledge that willearn them space at the table. However, being housed in an embassy andoften being an expatriate staff member inherently means that they aredisadvantaged in gaining access to civil society actors and being able todifferentiate what information is most relevant. In fact, many of these

officers rely mainly on reports from international NGOs such as HumanRights Watch, Amnesty International or Freedom House to inform theirdecisions. By making oneself available to the more junior officers,accountability actors can benefit junior officers with the authority to speakin meetings about what is “really happening on the ground”, including, of course, priority issues raised by the accountability actor. A good strategicmove, then, is to garner good working relationships with juniorpolitical/governance officers so that they can raise issues of domesticaccountability internally before accountability approach heads of agencyfor funding or to improve access.

At the same time be particularly sensitive to involving local staff in donorinstitutions. First and foremost, local staff members tend to stay withdonors for a longer period than international staff; alienating entrenchedlocal staff can be particularly problematic. More importantly, however,many local staff are better qualified than their international peers butfrequently excluded from management decision making and career paths. This tends to make local staff more sympathetic to domesticaccountability actors and often willing to support greater accountability indonor decision making. Creating allies out of experienced national donorstaff is also valuable in identifying power dynamics, decision makers and

what they want or need to better support domestic accountability.

1.10 How to get domestic accountability on the Agenda – The ProgrammeCycle:

The programming cycle may sound administrative and technical butunderstanding it is essential to influencing decisions and improvingaccountability. Project cycle management is now a generally acceptedmanagement practice that guides most donor decision making. Foraccountability actors, in its simplest form, the project cycle defines whenaccess and influence is more likely and when it will most probably be

disregarded.

Donors are increasingly moving towards medium-term funding cycles thatdefine goals, budgets and focal areas on a four to five year basis. Themedium term strategy for World Bank cycle below is the “countryassistance strategy”. This strategy generally takes between six andtwenty four months to develop but once drafted is a fairly inflexiblestructural condition for how aid is contracted and disbursed in country13. The strategy sets focal areas, elaborates targets and may indicate fundingenvelopes. It is against these conditions that new projects are evaluatedand approved.

13 For the United Nations systems look for the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF);

this document is a joint UN document and important for a number of agencies.



Domestic accountability actors in Africa must begin now to prepare 201314

which may be the first year that Western donors (and particularlyEuropean donors) will formulate joint country strategies. At the very leastthese new strategy papers will agree the priorities for a handful of donorsand may end up setting priorities for of the wider donor community. Joint

country strategy papers will likely cover five year periods thus beingimportant for accountability actors both in how funding is managed andwhere it is directed. Bearing in mind it can take up to two years to preparesuch a document, it is likely that preparations will begin early 2011.

World Bank: Making PRSP Inclusive

1.10.1 How to Improve Influence through the Project Cycle:

The section above details approaches to improving influence with donorstaff. However, when it comes to reviewing past projects, identifying goalsand setting new priorities donors tend to use external actors (e.g.consultants or think-tanks) in a bid to invite an “outside perspective”. These external actors have enormous influence because they tend toproduce the first drafts of key documents that eventually become thefoundation for future programming. It is important here to advocate thatparticipatory processes do not become “rubber stamping” activities thatsimply endorse pre-determined findings.

14 See 2005 EU Joint EU Framework for Multi-Annual programming, 2007 EU Code of Conduct and 2009

Council of Europe Conclusions on an Operational Framework for Division of Labour.



1.10.2 Monitoring and Evaluation, Project and Programme Design:

It is important to recognize that political positions are first elaborated in Terms of Reference when recruiting consultants to monitor existingprojects. The outcomes of these monitoring exercises inform the terms of

reference of consultants to evaluate projects. Project evaluations andrecommendations are then collated into new terms of reference toevaluate the country strategy as a whole. This evaluation and itsrecommendations are then repackaged into new terms of reference todesign the new country strategy paper and future funding priorities.

A similar cycle occurs in designing new projects. The outcomes of concluded evaluations and monitoring reports become the basis for newproject designs. Accordingly, to influence the way funding is made it isessential to influence both the terms of reference and the outcomes of these assignments. This is not out of the reach of local NGOs or NGO

umbrella bodies.

When attempting to get involved in monitoring and evaluation it is of paramount importance to identify which organisation is responsible forcontracting the consultant/monitor. Regardless of the fact that theexercise will almost always be characterized as an independentevaluation, monitors are consciously or unconsciously influenced by whomanages their contracts. This can be advantageous whether thecontracting body supports or opposes the need for greater accountability.In the case of a supportive body, ensuring domestic accountability is

included is often only a question of communicating this wish to thecontracting body. When the contracting body is opposed to domesticaccountability, it is still possible to include domestic accountability in themonitoring or evaluation exercise because the contracting body will besensitive to possible accusations that it interfered in the independence of the exercise – this fact, however, should never be delivered overtly.



1.10.3 Job Boards:

Job boards are essential information gathering sites. When donors arepreparing new programming and/or conducting monitoring and evaluationactivities they will often turn to recruiting consultants for which these

posts are likely to be advertised on the internet job boards. While is notalways the case, rules of public procurement make job boards a goodinformation tool. Additionally, focussing on the consultancy specific jobboards15 will often allow one access to the specific terms of reference.Reviewing these terms of reference gives the accountability actor goodknowledge of trends in the sector. This in turn enables better informedcommunication with donors on their obligations to improve domesticaccountability. The launch of a new project design process is anopportunity to approach the donor and advocate for domesticaccountability to be featured more prominently in the respective terms of reference. This is typically a good way to begin a conversation and tends

to encourage donors to be more cautious about ensuring that civil societyis consulted more effectively on project results and design.

1.11 Funding Cycles – The Importance of Always Having a Proposal on Hand:

“The solution seems to rest in strengthening the civic sectorrather than setting goals for it. Funds should be invested inraising capacities of civic actors so that they are equal,independent partners with more space to communicate withboth clients and members."

Tetyana Danyliv, Director of the GURT Resource Centre forNGO Development in Ukraine; Donor Exchange Network

(DECIM), World Bank: November, 2010

While it should not replace active lobbying, it is an open secret in thedonor community that development is a supply driven industry. As such,donor decision making is constrained by public expenditure cycles. At abasic level this means that when fiscal years come to a close andallocated funds have not been contracted or spent, donors risk losingthese funds to their national coffers. It is an embarrassment to officials inthe field to return development funds and it lays them open to being

criticised for over-budgeting and under-performing. One way successfulorganisations are able to take advantage of this institutional constraint isto start pushing project ideas in the last quarter of the year. As donorstend to be looking for new, quick-to-contract projects as the year comes toan end, the usual standards and due process tend to be relaxed. This timeof the year, then is a good time to float ambitious or new project conceptssuch as how to build domestic accountability into the aid architecture. This being said designing a good project well in advance will putaccountability actors in a strong position; donors tend to be frustratedyear end as many organisations submit poorly conceived and rushed

project proposals to meet the year-end deadline.15 For example, look at: devex.com or developmentaid.org.



It is advisable to have concept notes on hand that could be quick toreceive funding. Of particular importance is recognising that promotingdomestic accountability in the aid architecture requires specialised skillsand institutional resources. It is expensive for civil society to pay for staff to learn how donor decision making works, to participate in all of the

donor and technical working group meetings and discussions and to beable to contribute regularly and meaningfully to discussions and jointdocuments. Donors themselves find this a labour intensive activity so it islikely that they will recognise that participation in the aid architecture isnot something that is easily resourced by civil society. Additionally, donorsshould be approached to fund better consultation as when it comes toestablishing performance indicators and priorities (in budget support, forexample), donors have a patchy record of consulting with and settingsindicators in the interest of beneficiaries.

1.12 Power and Its Use

Recognise the fragile allocation of power: Domestic accountability actorsshould not underestimate the power they have. If African domesticaccountability actors formally oppose donor decisions and are able to justify how they represent the poor, this opens staff to the most damagingcriticisms. A potential career breaker in a donor organisation is to get areputation of making decisions that neither benefits the beneficiarygovernment nor the poor.

This power, however, is only useful as a threat and almost always back-

fires when used. If ever exercised, this power risks forcing donors into acorner where officials’ career potentials are bound to their ability todisenfranchise domestic accountability actors. Accordingly, the first ruleshould be to avoid backing donors into a corner. Accountability actors willbe wise to minimise the risk of embarrassing donor officials, asembarrassment more often leads to marginalization than progress.

Recognise the power of writing in bureaucracies: formal letters becomepaper trails and if not responded to, paint donors in a very poor light (andare often reviewed by internal oversight mechanisms). For this reason, optfor a more benign line of questioning. For example, instead of asking for

domestic accountability actors to be represented in the civil societyworking group, it might be better to ask donors if their policies allow fordomestic accountability actors to partake in decision making. The latterquestion reminds donors that when making decisions without ensuringdomestic accountability, they are acting against their own policies; thisquestion is posed without donors getting the impression they are beingcriticised for not implementing their own policies. Less contentiouscommunication can be more readily followed up with further writtencorrespondence if not responded to.

While most donors are sensitive enough not to dismiss Africanaccountability actors off-hand, be prepared that some will opt to criticise



domestic accountability actors rather than engage with them. Here it isimportant to be prepared. One argument to make is that any criticism of the effectiveness of domestic accountability actors is strongly tied to thetype of funding that donors provide. After all, with most funding in Africacoming from external sources and with an often unwelcoming

environment, the failure of domestic accountability actors toprofessionalise needs to be linked to the type of funding donors provide.Here it is important to ask a few poignant questions: why there is nosystemic funding for legal aid for accountability actors, witness protectionprogrammes, whistle-blower programmes and core-funding toaccountability organisations so they can respond to their constituencybefore their donors. At the same time, it is also important to lobby forbroader accountability norms. Here, it is often useful to respond tocriticism by pointing out that donors are not accountable to domesticlegislatures either – that for donors to simultaneously deny access todomestic accountability actors and to ignore the role of parliamentaryoversight does not demonstrate a willingness for greater transparency.

It is also important to be aware of the fact that some donors havehistorical relationships with certain NGOs that they use to justify decisionmaking. If donors respond that they consult with these NGOs it is strategicto acknowledge this consultation as a good practice while calling forgreater inclusion of domestic accountability actors in these consultationmechanisms; here it is important to point out that no one NGO speaks onbehalf of African civil society.



1.13 First Steps

The new aid architecture has become a recent reality in developingcountries. Working to make this architecture more accountable to

domestic actors is relatively new and with few best-practices on which tobuild. As such the first step needs to be about engaging existing networksso as to collect and build on existing experiences. Here, networks such asthe ANSA network can provide a good peer group and support network formaking progress at the country level.

At the country specific level it is important not to be too optimistic abouthow quickly things will improve. For a start, the space available to discussissues with donors is already limited; accountability actors need to findearly allies to get domestic accountability on the agenda. Here it isimportant to refer to the sections above on identifying like-minded donorsand early beneficiaries (such as with umbrella organisations).

At a minimum it is important to vocalise clear and pragmatic requests thatwill create space for dialogue and eventually a foundation to improvedomestic accountability. Here African accountability actors shouldconsider asking for:

• A target of 50% of donor funding to NGOs to either go to African NGOsor be sub-contracted to African NGOs,

• Donors to commit to strengthening the national NGO umbrella bodywith specific attention to its capacity to represent domestic

accountability actors,• Dedicated medium term core funding for accountability organisations

so as to build an institutional culture and competence predicated onadvocating for beneficiary needs over that of donors or decisionmakers.

Finally, it is important to be aware of existing processes. Many countrieswill redesign their national development strategies in 2011 and 2012;donors should be encouraged to solicit response from accountabilityactors before supporting domestic development strategies. At the sametime, the next aid effectiveness forum in South Korea is due end 2011. Itis likely that consultations and feedback will be solicited from developingcountries; here it is important that African domestic accountability actorsvoice their concern and get the message across that aid effectiveness is apipe dream without strong domestic accountability.

Alexander O’Riordan

January 2011

[email protected]

practice note - improving domestic accountability in aid effectiveness

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