PRAGMATISM, THEN PRAGMATISM, THEN AND NOWAND NOW

Susan Haack Susan Haack

-- an interview with Sun -- an interview with Sun YongYong

SY:SY: Let me begin by asking you to Let me begin by asking you to clarify the history of pragmatism. clarify the history of pragmatism. Thomas English Hill tells us that Thomas English Hill tells us that

Peirce declined the honor of being the Peirce declined the honor of being the founder of pragmatism; that he did founder of pragmatism; that he did not, like James, apply the PM to the not, like James, apply the PM to the concept of truth; & that many of his concept of truth; & that many of his major contributions are irrelevant to, major contributions are irrelevant to, even incompatible with pragmatism. even incompatible with pragmatism.

but your book, but your book, Meaning and ActionMeaning and Action

suggests a very different picture – can you explain your view,

please?

SH:SH: the classical pragmatist the classical pragmatist tradition tradition

was a late C19th movement in was a late C19th movement in American philosophyAmerican philosophy

growing out of discussions between growing out of discussions between Peirce and James at the Metaphysical Peirce and James at the Metaphysical Club in Cambridge, MA, in the early Club in Cambridge, MA, in the early 1870s1870s

… a young C. S. Peirce

… & a young William James

both Peirce and Jamesboth Peirce and James

stressed that pragmatism was less a stressed that pragmatism was less a body of doctrine than a methodbody of doctrine than a method

-- the method expressed in the -- the method expressed in the Pragmatic Maxim of meaningPragmatic Maxim of meaning

this core ideathis core idea

was first expressed in CSP’s ”How to was first expressed in CSP’s ”How to Make Our Ideas Clear” (1878)Make Our Ideas Clear” (1878)

but the but the wordword “pragmatism” (in its “pragmatism” (in its philosophical sense) didn’t appear in philosophical sense) didn’t appear in print until James used it, in 1898print until James used it, in 1898

-- acknowledging that the idea was -- acknowledging that the idea was CSP’sCSP’s

why didn’t Peirce use the word?why didn’t Peirce use the word?

at the time he wrote, its meaning in at the time he wrote, its meaning in ordinary language was “officious ordinary language was “officious meddlesomeness” meddlesomeness”

which was SO off-putting that (Peirce which was SO off-putting that (Peirce later wrote) he didn’t dare use it in later wrote) he didn’t dare use it in print!print!

so Hill’s account needs correctionso Hill’s account needs correction

so far from “declining the honor,” in so far from “declining the honor,” in 1903 Peirce took his bows as the 1903 Peirce took his bows as the founder of pragmatismfounder of pragmatism

& even when, in 1906, he introduced & even when, in 1906, he introduced the word “pragmaticism” for his the word “pragmaticism” for his version, he says it is NOT to dissociate version, he says it is NOT to dissociate himself from James, Dewey -- or even himself from James, Dewey -- or even SchillerSchiller

moreovermoreover

both Peirce and James saw the PM as both Peirce and James saw the PM as the core idea of pragmatismthe core idea of pragmatism

to be used both to be used both negativelynegatively -- to -- to dissolve meaningless metaphysical dissolve meaningless metaphysical disputesdisputes

& & positively --positively -- to explain hard concepts to explain hard concepts

&&

both apply the PM to the concept of both apply the PM to the concept of truthtruth

James in James in PragmatismPragmatism (1907) and (1907) and The The Meaning of TruthMeaning of Truth (1909) (1909)

but Peirce much earlier, in “How to but Peirce much earlier, in “How to Make our Ideas Clear”Make our Ideas Clear”

moreovermoreover

Hill compounds his mistakes by Hill compounds his mistakes by identifying “pragmatism” with a bunch identifying “pragmatism” with a bunch of doctrines held by James, Dewey, or of doctrines held by James, Dewey, or C. I. LewisC. I. Lewis

& then saying that Peirce’s views were & then saying that Peirce’s views were “anti-pragmatist” where they diverged “anti-pragmatist” where they diverged from thesefrom these

it would be much better to sayit would be much better to say

that Peirce gradually developed a that Peirce gradually developed a more realist, and James a more more realist, and James a more nominalist, version of pragmatismnominalist, version of pragmatism

& that what the classical pragmatists & that what the classical pragmatists had in common was a congeries of had in common was a congeries of philosophical philosophical attitudesattitudes::

distaste for dogmatism & for false distaste for dogmatism & for false dichotomiesdichotomies

a naturalistic disinclination to a naturalistic disinclination to philosophize purely philosophize purely a prioria priori

looking to social aspects of language looking to social aspects of language and inquiry, & to the future rather and inquiry, & to the future rather than the pastthan the past

taking evolution seriouslytaking evolution seriously

the realist pragmaticist

the nominalist pragmatist

attitudes shared not only by Peirce and James, but also

by …

Dewey Mead

& Oliver Wendell

Holmes, Jr., the great

pragmatist legal theorist

Papini’s “hotel” metaphor is Papini’s “hotel” metaphor is helpful helpful

-- within pragmatism,

people worked on different topics, from

different angles – but all

came in through the same lobby

SY: Pragmatism says that truth is essentially verification, and describes the true as “the expedient in our way of thinking.” But surely the fact that a belief is expedient is not sufficient for

its being true; and doesn’t James’s account of truth (as Hill suggests) lead

to subjectivism and even solipsism?

SH:SH: there are differences between there are differences between

Peirce’s account of truth as the Final Peirce’s account of truth as the Final Opinion that would be agreed were Opinion that would be agreed were inquiry to continue indefinitelyinquiry to continue indefinitely

James’s more nominalist account of James’s more nominalist account of truth as verifiability, andtruth as verifiability, and

Dewey’s emphasis on the “tried and Dewey’s emphasis on the “tried and true”true”

but all three agree this farbut all three agree this far

it is not false, exactly, to say that truth it is not false, exactly, to say that truth is correspondence to the factsis correspondence to the facts

but this gives us no real insight, i.e., no but this gives us no real insight, i.e., no pragmatic insight, into what difference pragmatic insight, into what difference it makes whether a belief is trueit makes whether a belief is true

-- a lack each tries, in his way, to fill -- a lack each tries, in his way, to fill

Peirce: 3 grades of clarityPeirce: 3 grades of clarity

ability to use a termability to use a term

ability to give a verbal (“nominal”) ability to give a verbal (“nominal”) definitiondefinition

grasp of the experiential grasp of the experiential consequences of the concept’s consequences of the concept’s applying – hence his df. of truthapplying – hence his df. of truth

of course, this isn’t unproblematicof course, this isn’t unproblematic

problem of Buried Secretsproblem of Buried Secrets

to which P’s reply isn’t fully satisfying – he to which P’s reply isn’t fully satisfying – he can’t say ALL questions would eventually can’t say ALL questions would eventually get settled, so has to say that those that get settled, so has to say that those that wouldn’t, lack pragmatic meaningwouldn’t, lack pragmatic meaning

so “pragmatic meaning” isn’t meaning (?) so “pragmatic meaning” isn’t meaning (?)

but obviously but obviously

Peirce’s account of truth is in no way Peirce’s account of truth is in no way subjectivist or solipsisticsubjectivist or solipsistic

he can, and does, say that “Truth is he can, and does, say that “Truth is SO, whether you or I or anyone SO, whether you or I or anyone believes it is so or not”believes it is so or not”

Hill’s problem probably arisesHill’s problem probably arises

from a common misinterpretation of from a common misinterpretation of James’s account of truthJames’s account of truth

James identified “Abstract Truth” James identified “Abstract Truth” with verifiwith verifiabilityability, but, but

““concrete truths” with propositions concrete truths” with propositions that are verifthat are verifiedied, which he says , which he says “become” true, are “made” true“become” true, are “made” true

true, James writes thattrue, James writes that

““the true is only the expedient in the the true is only the expedient in the way of our thinkingway of our thinking””

BUT he adds … BUT he adds …

““expedient in the long run and on the expedient in the long run and on the whole, of course … . Experience has whole, of course … . Experience has ways of ways of boiling overboiling over, and making us , and making us correct our present formulas”correct our present formulas”

… which reveals that he is NOT

simply identifying truth with expediency,

and that his account is NOT

subjectivist

Dewey Dewey

BOTH tells us that Peirce’s is “the BOTH tells us that Peirce’s is “the best definition of truth”best definition of truth”

AND yet, like James, tends to stress AND yet, like James, tends to stress particular truths over truth-as-such, particular truths over truth-as-such, & verificat& verificationion over potential over potential verifiverifiabilityability

in 1911 lecturesin 1911 lectures

he presents his pragmatist conception he presents his pragmatist conception of truth as intermediate between of truth as intermediate between “realist” [correspondence] and “realist” [correspondence] and “idealist” [coherence] accounts“idealist” [coherence] accounts

& writes of a mutual “co-& writes of a mutual “co-respondence” of proposition and respondence” of proposition and reality – not subjectivist, but, reality – not subjectivist, but, arguably, less than fully realist (?)arguably, less than fully realist (?)

SY: Dewey was the pragmatist with the greatest influence in the outside world. Basic to everything he writes about knowledge is that we should think of knowing in the context of

inquiry – a kind of contextualism. But his ontological position seems to deny

the full objectivity and independence of the world. How should we think of

Dewey’s epistemology as relating to his ontological views?

SH:SH: Dewey’s Dewey’s Quest for CertaintyQuest for Certainty

gives a historical diagnosis of the gives a historical diagnosis of the traditional desire for certainty, from traditional desire for certainty, from Plato through Descartes to his own Plato through Descartes to his own dayday

suggests that this “Spectator suggests that this “Spectator Theory” is at odds with the true Theory” is at odds with the true character of modern scientific inquiry character of modern scientific inquiry

he writes that he writes that

“[S]pecial theories of knowledge differ enormously from each other.

Their quarrels fill the air. The din thus created makes us deaf to the way they all say one thing in common. They all hold that the operation of inquiry excludes any element of

practical activity.”

he seems to meanhe seems to mean

in part, that we learn about the world by in part, that we learn about the world by active observation and experimentation, active observation and experimentation, not just passive experiencenot just passive experience

but also, in part, that by knowing the but also, in part, that by knowing the world we change itworld we change it

& & perhapsperhaps, that we change it , that we change it substantivelysubstantively

if so if so

my reaction would be like Peirce’smy reaction would be like Peirce’s

““There are certain mummified There are certain mummified pendants who have never waked to pendants who have never waked to the fact that the act of knowing an the fact that the act of knowing an object changes it. They are curious object changes it. They are curious specimens of humanity, and … I am specimens of humanity, and … I am

one of them.”one of them.”

but I wouldn’t put this in terms of the but I wouldn’t put this in terms of the objectivity of the “material world”objectivity of the “material world”

because, besides real physical because, besides real physical (Peirce, “external”) things, (Peirce, “external”) things, phenomena, and eventsphenomena, and events

there are also mental (Peirce, there are also mental (Peirce, “internal”) things, phenomena, and “internal”) things, phenomena, and events that are real events that are real

SY: How do you see Quine as fitting into the evolving history of American

pragmatism? Could you comment specifically on Quine’s work in logic,

and his views about truth, ontological commitment, and analyticity?

SH:SH: sometimes it is thought that sometimes it is thought that

Quine is the key link between

classical pragmatism & contemporary pragmatism

I disagreeI disagree

when Quine describes himself as when Quine describes himself as espousing “a more thorough-going espousing “a more thorough-going pragmatism” pragmatism”

his contrast is with Carnap’s view of his contrast is with Carnap’s view of “external” ontological questions“external” ontological questions

&&

the commitment to pragmatism, in our the commitment to pragmatism, in our sense, is doubtful sense, is doubtful

Q seems to have the ordinary-language Q seems to have the ordinary-language (& Carnap’s) meaning of “pragmatic” in (& Carnap’s) meaning of “pragmatic” in mindmind

& don’t forget that “The Pragmatists’ & don’t forget that “The Pragmatists’ Place … ” became “Five Milestones …”Place … ” became “Five Milestones …”

in logicin logic

Quine reviewed vols 2, 3, & 4 of Quine reviewed vols 2, 3, & 4 of Peirce’s Peirce’s Collected PapersCollected Papers when they when they appearedappeared

but, as his reviews reveal, he didn’t but, as his reviews reveal, he didn’t really appreciate the significance of really appreciate the significance of Peirce’s logical innovationsPeirce’s logical innovations

Putnam commented thatPutnam commented that

Quine’s understanding of the history Quine’s understanding of the history of logic would have been much richer of logic would have been much richer had he grasped, e.g., thathad he grasped, e.g., that

while Russell learned quantification while Russell learned quantification theory from Fregetheory from Frege

Whitehead learned it from PeirceWhitehead learned it from Peirce

& later Quine apparently came to & later Quine apparently came to agreeagree

writing in 1985 that Peirce arrived at writing in 1985 that Peirce arrived at quantification theory a few years quantification theory a few years after, and independently of, Fregeafter, and independently of, Frege

& in “Peirce’s logic” (1989) giving & in “Peirce’s logic” (1989) giving CSP more credit for his influence on CSP more credit for his influence on the history of logic the history of logic

he alsohe also

acknowledges Peirce as having acknowledges Peirce as having “anticipated the Scheffer stroke”“anticipated the Scheffer stroke”

(though really he should have said that (though really he should have said that Scheffer rediscovered the Peirce Scheffer rediscovered the Peirce stroke!)stroke!)

& that CSP saw the correspondence & that CSP saw the correspondence truth-functions and electric circuits truth-functions and electric circuits

howeverhowever

there is really nothing in Quine’s there is really nothing in Quine’s logical work that is distinctively logical work that is distinctively pragmatistpragmatist

nor, presumably, would he have nor, presumably, would he have much approved of Peirce’s forays much approved of Peirce’s forays into 3-valued and intensional logicinto 3-valued and intensional logic

on truthon truth

Quine explicitly Quine explicitly rejectsrejects Peirce’s Peirce’s definitiondefinition

indeed, it was his dismissive remarks in indeed, it was his dismissive remarks in chapter 1 of chapter 1 of Word and ObjectWord and Object that led that led me to start reading CSP’s me to start reading CSP’s Collected Collected PapersPapers

moreovermoreover

Quine’s own understanding of truth is Quine’s own understanding of truth is far from clear, and not in any obvious far from clear, and not in any obvious way pragmatistway pragmatist

he seems to endorse Tarski’s theoryhe seems to endorse Tarski’s theory

but then runs this together with but then runs this together with “disquotationalism,” which Tarski “disquotationalism,” which Tarski would have emphatically rejectedwould have emphatically rejected

on ontologyon ontology

we can understand Quine’s views via we can understand Quine’s views via two sloganstwo slogans

1)1) ““to be is to be the value of a variable” to be is to be the value of a variable” – criterion of ontological commitment– criterion of ontological commitment

2)2) ““no entity without identity” -- in no entity without identity” -- in effect, extensionalismeffect, extensionalism

Q’s criterion of ontological Q’s criterion of ontological commitmentcommitment

reflects Q’s insistence that there is reflects Q’s insistence that there is only one sense of “exists”only one sense of “exists”

& means that, if he acknowledged & means that, if he acknowledged properties, propositions, etc., it properties, propositions, etc., it would have to be as would have to be as abstract abstract particularsparticulars

whereas CSPwhereas CSP

distinguishes distinguishes existenceexistence (of particulars) (of particulars) and and realityreality (of generals) (of generals)

& distinguishes his own scholastic & distinguishes his own scholastic realism, which says that there are real realism, which says that there are real generals generals

from “Nominalistic Platonism,” which from “Nominalistic Platonism,” which says that universals existsays that universals exist

&&

moreover, CSP does not share Q’s moreover, CSP does not share Q’s extensionalismextensionalism

(in his later philosophy) he (in his later philosophy) he acknowledges real, unactualized acknowledges real, unactualized possibilities possibilities

& developed modal logic (probably C. I. & developed modal logic (probably C. I. Lewis’s inspiration)Lewis’s inspiration)

on analytic/syntheticon analytic/synthetic

Q’s position has Q’s position has somesome affinity with affinity with pragmatists’ rejection of “untenable pragmatists’ rejection of “untenable dualisms” (& CSP’s critique of Kant’s dualisms” (& CSP’s critique of Kant’s “explicatory” propositions)“explicatory” propositions)

but much but much lessless affinity than Morton affinity than Morton White’s earlier rejection of the a/s White’s earlier rejection of the a/s distinction, which is directly distinction, which is directly influenced by Deweyinfluenced by Dewey

SY: Do you think that Richard Rorty’s “Vulgar Pragmatism” (as you call it) is

a consequence of difficulties within pragmatism itself, that there is some lack in pragmatism that was bound to

lead to radical postmodernist conclusions? Or do you think RR’s conclusions stem from the ways James’s and Dewey’s versions of

pragmatism differ from Peirce’s?

SH: Neither of the above!

Vulgar Pragmatism Vulgar Pragmatism

is Rorty’s own invention, falsely is Rorty’s own invention, falsely advertised as “pragmatism”advertised as “pragmatism”

perhaps because, as the only home-perhaps because, as the only home-grown American philosophy, its name grown American philosophy, its name has great resonance, & is good PRhas great resonance, & is good PR

for examplefor example

RR’s account of truth as here-&-now RR’s account of truth as here-&-now agreement strips CSP’s account of agreement strips CSP’s account of everything that ties it to the worldeverything that ties it to the world

RR’s response to the flaws of RR’s response to the flaws of spectator theories of knowledge is to spectator theories of knowledge is to abandonabandon epistemology, not, like epistemology, not, like Dewey, to Dewey, to reconstructreconstruct it it

&&

classical pragmatists, unlike classical pragmatists, unlike positivists, wanted positivists, wanted reformedreformed metaphysicsmetaphysics

e.g. agapism, tychism (CSP); the e.g. agapism, tychism (CSP); the pluralistic universe (WJ); experience pluralistic universe (WJ); experience and nature (JD) and nature (JD)

whilewhile

Rorty wants to Rorty wants to abandonabandon metaphysics metaphysics

escheweschew any notion of objective truth any notion of objective truth

& & repudiaterepudiate the idea that there is a the idea that there is a “way the world is”“way the world is”

which reminds me to tell you a

story …

& on philosophy and democracy& on philosophy and democracy

the appearance of agreement with JD is the appearance of agreement with JD is misleadingmisleading

for JD knows that to improve society we for JD knows that to improve society we must know how it is now, & what must know how it is now, & what changes would produce a desired resultchanges would produce a desired result

impossibleimpossible if there is no “way the world if there is no “way the world is” is”

SY: What is your assessment of the prospects for the future of

pragmatism? Is traditional pragmatism nearing extinction? Or

can we rescue pragmatism from its seemingly inevitable demise? What do you see as the future of

pragmatism in the U.S.?

first, the present situationfirst, the present situation

continuing scholarship on the pragmatist continuing scholarship on the pragmatist traditiontradition

working philosophers in the pragmatist working philosophers in the pragmatist tradition – inc. Putnam, Rescher, me! tradition – inc. Putnam, Rescher, me!

& many outside philosophy (e.g., in & many outside philosophy (e.g., in economics) influenced by pragmatismeconomics) influenced by pragmatism

RR’s influence seems to have RR’s influence seems to have declined since his deathdeclined since his death

but neo-analytic philosophy is now but neo-analytic philosophy is now trying to domesticate social trying to domesticate social epistemology, feminist epistemology, epistemology, feminist epistemology, etc., -- and pragmatism etc., -- and pragmatism

Brandom, Blackburn, etc.Brandom, Blackburn, etc.

I am reluctant to make predictionsI am reluctant to make predictions

there are just too many there are just too many unforeseeable contingenciesunforeseeable contingencies

e.g., when I began, there was no e.g., when I began, there was no internet – who could have foreseen internet – who could have foreseen how much influence Brian Leiter’s how much influence Brian Leiter’s website would have on our website would have on our profession? profession?

but what I but what I hopehope

because the pragmatist tradition, in all its because the pragmatist tradition, in all its variety, was so fruitful, and in some ways variety, was so fruitful, and in some ways far ahead of our time as well as its ownfar ahead of our time as well as its own

is that there will continue to be those who is that there will continue to be those who learn from it and develop its insights in learn from it and develop its insights in new and fruitful ways (including marrying new and fruitful ways (including marrying with other traditions)with other traditions)

thank you for your attention!

dakujem za vasu

pozornost!