ON THE NATURE OF PRAMA!;lA: A DIALOGUE BETWEEN JAYANTABHATTA AND THE

V AIBHASIKAS AND YO.dACARINS

V.N. 1IIA

0.0 INTRODUCTION

Vatsyayana, the author of the Nyayasiitrabha~ya opined under Nyaya­siitra ( = NS) 1.1.1 that the true nature of a thing is decided on the basis of the four components of the act of knowing, namely, the knower, the knowable, the process of knowing and the resultant knowledge ( catasr~u evam vidhasu arthatattvam parisamapyate). In my opinion, these are the four components of philosophizing. Ancient Indian philosophers had to pay, naturally therefore, a lot of attention to the discussion on the process of knowing (prama~w).

The structural depth of ancient Indian analytical thinking was acquired through a dialogue in which the participants were the orthodox philosophers and logicians like the Naiyayikas on the one side and the Buddhist philosophers and logicians on the other. The result is the illustrious tradition of analytic philosophy and logic called Pracina Nyaya. Had the Buddhist logicians not participated in this dialogue, Pracina Nyaya which includes Bauddha Nyaya, would not have acquired such depth. Although this has been accepted beyond doubt and some scholars have been engaged in highlighting this fact, still a lot remains to be done. What is required is a very close study and analysis of the texts of these traditions with an aim to identify the issues which prompted the dialogue so that we have a clear picture of the development of philosophical thinking in ancient India during the period called golden period of Indian philosophy.

In this paper an attempt is made to present the central issues which led the dialogue on the nature of pramal}a. The text taken for the purpose is a portion of the Nyayamaiijari of Jayantabhatta.

Jayantabhatta is a logician of the 9th century A.D. from Kashmir. Although his Nyayamaiijari is called a vrtti on the Nyayasiitra of Gautama, still it is not a usual commentary on each and every siitra of Gautama. What he has done is that he has selected some siitras only in accordance with the issues in his mind and has presented encyclopaedic discussions on them. Thus, the Nyayamaiijari does not present the view of only one system but it takes into account all the existing view of his time on those particular issues and presents his

Nagoya Studies in Indian Culture and Buddhism: Sarphha~ii 17, 1996 ©Department oflndian Philosophy, University of Nagoya

V.N . .TI!A

own views in conclusion. Thus, it has not remained a text on Nyaya, but has become an encyclopaedia of Indian philosophy.

Here, in this paper, I am going to present Jayanta's definition of pramiil}a along with the two views of the two schools of Buddhist philosophy and logic namely, the Vaibha~ikas and Y ogacarins, as presented by Jayanta. The text is being presented here with my own English Translation and Notes.

But before we present the text, let us identify the issues involved behind the notion of pramii~Ja ..

0.1 The Issues

The main issues behind the concept of pramiil}a are the following: (a) Whether a pramiil}a is the producer of prama (a true cognition) or

not. (b) Whether a producer (karal}a) is different from its result (phala) or

not. (c) The basis of distinguishing the knowledge of x from the knowledge

of y. (d) Whether jfiapa is sakiira or not.

The settlement of issues (a) is necessary in order to distinguish a true cognition from a false cognition. The answer to the issue (b) is essential for knowing the process of a true cognition and a false cognition.

We behave with the world around us. For a consistent behaviour it is necessary to acquire discrete knowledge of each object of our behaviour. How to distinguish each cognition? This is what is required to be settled in (c). The solution to this problem is provided by the answers to (d).

In this dialogue, the Buddhists have taken the stand that the nature of pramii{la is jfiiina or bodha knowledge or cognition. This has provoked Jayanta to raise the issue whether a kara{la has to be different from phala. If a jfiana is the result of a process, the process (pramiil}a) has to be different from the result. The Buddhist maintain this by introducing the idea of various aspects of one and the same jfiiina. The participating Buddhists here are the Vaibha~ikas and the Y ogiicarins. The Y ogacarins are the vijfiiina-vadins (Idealists) who think that no knowledge can arise without a form and the form is in the knowledge itself and not outside and hence a knowledge is always sakara. Not only that, it is because the knowledge is sakiira one can distinguish one knowledge from the other and one can say that this is the knowledge of x and not of y. If knowledge is taken as niriik.iira as the Naiyayika..;; (Realists) take, such a distinction cannot be made.

Thus, it can be seen that ultimately the dialogues aims at settling the most important issue whether the world of our behaviour is real or not.

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NATURE OF PRAMiifY"A

J ayanta, first of all, presents his novel idea of a prama~1a. According to him, a cognition of factors and no factor in isolation can claim to be the most effective means of a valid cognition. It is, therefore, the assemblage or collection of factors of knowledge (samagri) which is fit to be called a prama~1a. To him prrama~a is basically a kara~a and since it produces prama, the prama is phala and a kara~a and prama~a have to be different and since prama is knowledge, its producer (kar~a) must be different from it.

In this context Jayanta brings views of other systems of Indian philosophy like, Mimarhsa, Sarhkya and Buddhism.

Since the Vijfliinavadin s are the idealists, they have to maintain that the nature of a prama~a and, that of the prama are jfliina itself, although different aspects of knowledge.

We have, therefore, to look at the entire dialogue with these issues in mind. Let us have now a close look at the texts.

1.0 JAYANTA'S TEXT, ENGLISH TRA~SLATION AND NOTES

The English translation is of the Nyayamaiijari (Almika 1), Mysore edition, 1969, pp. 31-42. The page numbers and the line numbers put in the brackets in each text refer to those of this edition.

1.1 Jayanta's Theory of pram~a

Text 1 (p. 31, 1-3): prama~asamanyalak~a~avibhagasiitra1p tv avasara­praptatvad idanim eva vivriyate --

pratyak~anumanopamanasabda!J pram a~ ani //1.1.3/ I Translation 1: Since it is order, the siitra which deals with the general

definition of prama~1a and its division is being explained now. Perception, Inference, Analogy and Words are the pram~as i.e. the means of valid knowledge.

Note 1: In the Nyayasiitra (NS) of Gautama there are certain siitras which present the list of items. The listing or mentioning the items is called uddesa (namna padarthasa1pkirtanam uddesa!J). And the siitras which do such listing are called udde.<~a-siitra. There are some other siitras which are called lak~~a-siitras since they contain definitions of the items given in the uddesa-siitras. These definitions are of two kinds: (1) general definition (samanya-lak~~a) and (2) particular defmition ( vise~a-lak~~a).

There has to be a sequence between a uddesa-siitra and lak~~a­siitras. An uddesa-siitra precedes a lak~~a-siitra. Similarly, there has to be a sequence between a samanya-lak~~a-siitra and vise~a-lak~~a­siitra. The vL<ie:"a-lak~~a-siitra must follow a samiinya-lak~~a-siitra.

3

V.N . .Tlli\

In other words, the general definition must precede a particular definition.

There are, similarly, some siitras which are called vibhaga-siitras containing division of a particular item.

Thus, for instance, the item pramiil}a 'means of valid cognition' is mentioned in the udde,.;a-siitra (NS 1.1.1) and the division of this items is presented in NS 1.1.3.

Similarly, there is another category of siitras in the NS, which is called parik~a-siitra 'an examining rule'. A parik~a-siitra examines whether a definition presented by a lak~aiJa-siitra is actually applicable to an item or thing defined or not.

In the preceding section Jayantabhaga has already explained the meaning of NS 1.1.1 and he has said that he is going to concentrate on the lak~al}a-siitras. The first item of the NS 1.1.1 is pramiiiJa. So he wants to discuss the general definition of prama~1a and its subdivisions such as pratyak~a. anumana, upamana, and sabda and their particular definitions. Therefore, he thinks that the discussions on the general definition of prami'iiJa and its divisions is quite in order. In other words, this is the proper occasion to discuss the general definition of pramiiiJa which forms the first item in the uddesa-siitra (NS 1.1.1 ).

Text 2 (p. 31,5-6): atredarp tavad viciiryate -- kirp prama~1arp nama? kim asya svariipam? kil]J va lak~a~Jam iti? tatalJ siitraJ]J yojayi~yate. Translation 2: Here, let us discuss the following questions: What is a

means of valid knowledge? What is its nature? What is its definition? And then will follow explanation of the siitra.

Note 2: The NS 1.1.3 is vibhagasiitra which divides prami'iiJa into four. But there is no siitra which provides the general definition of pramiiiJa, which was expected. What is necessary is one should first of all know the general definition of an item and then one can follow its division. Without providing a general definition of a prami'iiJa the NS 1.1.3 straight way provides the division of it as pratyak;<;a, anumana, upamana and sabda.

In order to know the general notion of pramiiiJa, Jayanta formulates three questions. These three questions aim at knowing the general definition of pramiiiJa, which should reflect upon two aspects: (1) the nature of pramiiiJa and (2) distinguishing features of pramiiiJa which characterize and distinguish it from what is not pramiiiJa. The word Jak~al}a has two aspects: (a) suriipa i.e. form and (b) vyavartakatva 'distinguishing aspect'. Therefore, a pramiiiJalak~aiJa should throw light on these two aspects.

Text 3 (p. 31,8-11 ): tad ucyate -- avyabhicii.riiJim asandigdham arthopa­labdhirp vidadhati bodhabodhasvabhava samagri pramavam. bodhii­bodhasvabhiivii samagri hi tasya svariipam. avyabhicariidivise~al}ii­rthopalabdhisadhanatvarp lak~aiJam.

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NATURE OF PRAMii.J':lA

Translation 3: The questions raised above can be answered as follows : A pram iii} a is an assemblage of factors which are of the nature of both knowledge and non-knowledge which produce infallible or non-illusive and undoubtful knowledge of things. An assemblage which is of the nature of knowledge and non-knowledge, is the nature of pramiil}a. Being the means of infallible and undoubtful knowledge of things is its definition-(part).

Note 3: The nature of pramiil}a is such that it consists of knowledge and non-knowledge. In other words, since the collection or assemblage of factors is pramiil}a, some of its factors are of the nature of a cognition or knowledge and some others of the nature of non­knowledge. Let us look at the epistemology of a perceptual cognition. As Vatsyayana, the Bha~yakara of the NS, puts it under NS 1.1.4: atma manasa sarp-yujyate, mana!J indriyel}a, indriyam arthena, tata!J pratyak~am.

When the soul (the cognizer) comes in contact with the mind ( the internal sense-organ), and when the mind comes in contact with the external sense-organ (eyes etc.) and when the external sense-organ comes in contact with the object, there arises a perceptual cognition.

In this process of perceiving (say, a pot), before the resultant cognition namely, 'This is a pot' arises, the perceiver must have the knowledge of the qualifier namely 'the potness' before the resultant knowledge. Because without the knowledge of the qualifier the knowledge of the qualified cannot arise. Thus, this knowledge of the qualifier is also a factor for producing the resultant perception. This factor is of the nature of knowledge. Whereas the soul, mind, sense­organ and pot and their contact, all are of the nature of non­knowledge. This is why, Jayanta says that a pramiil}a is a collection of factors some of which may be of the nature of knowledge and some others may be of the nature of non-knowledge.

Cakradhara, the author of the commentary called Nyayamafljari­granthibhariga (Edited by Nagin J. Shah, L.D. Institute, Ahmedabad, 1972) comments on the word bodhabodhasvabhava (of the definition of pramal}a) as follows:

bodhabodheti. vise~al}a-jiianader bodhasvabhasya tatra anupravesat bodhabodhasvabhavety uktam (page 6), since the knowledge of qualifier is of the factors in the collection of factors and since it is of the nature of knowledge, the definition reads as 'the collection of factors which consists of knowledge and non-knowledge'.

This is the form of pramiil}a and the distinguishing feature of pramiil}a is this that it produces a true cognition. That which produces a false cognition is, therefore, not pramiil}a, but a pramiil}iibhasa. This is the implication of adjectives 'non-illusive' and 'undoubtful' of the knowledge. Thus, pramiil}a is the means of a valid cognition.

5

V.N.JHA

Text 4 (p. 31, 13-17): nanu ca pramiyate yen a, tat pramlil}.am iti kara~Ja­sadhano 'yarp pramlil}.asabdalJ. karaiJarp ca sadhakatamam. tamab­arthas catisaya!J. sa capek~ika!J. sadhakantarasarpbhave hi tadape­k~aya'tisayayogat kificit sadhakatamam ucyate. samagrayas caikatvat tadatiriktasadhakantaranupalambhat kim apek~am asya atisaya1p briima!J. Translation 4: Well, the word pramiil}a is derived as 'that by which

something is known.' Thus it has an instrumental derivative structure underlying. The instrumental case is, again, defined as sadhakatama (i.e., that which is the most required in producing the result) and the suffix tama means 'most', 'excellence.' This 'excellence' is, again, relative. If there are other cases (karakas) in addition to this then alone it can be taken as 'the most helpful' since in that case it can have 'excellence' in comparison to those other cases. But as 'assemblage' is singular in number and- as no other productive factor i.e. additional karaka is found, in comparison to what its excellence is to be established?

Note 4: The word prama~1a is derived by adding the suffix -ana (lyut) to the root pra-"ma 'to measure, to know' in the sense of an instrument. Thus, the underlying derivative structure of the word pramiiiJa is pramiyate anena 'by which one knows'. Thus, the sense there is instrumental. And the notion of instrumentality is provided by Pfu)ini by defining the instrumental case which runs as sadhakatamam karal}am 'the instrument is that which is the most effective means'. Here the superlative suffix -tamaP is meaningful only when there are more than two entities. But if an assemblage or collection of factors or karakas is considered to be an instrument, then since the collection is only one, how can the meaning of the superlative suffix be applicable there? So, in comparison to what the collection will be called the most excellent factor or karaka and hence the instrument and hence pramiil}a?

The concept of pramiil}a as proposed here does not fit into either the common sense view or into the technical notion of an instrumental case ofPfu)ini. This is the idea behind the opponent's view.

Text 5 (p. 32,1-4): api ca kasmin vi~aye samagryii!J pramiiiJatvam? pramiyamfi.IJO hi karmabhijto Vi~ayafJ samagrayantarbhiltatvat sama­gryeveti kar~1atam eva yayat. niralambanas cediinirp sarvapramitayo bhaveyu!J, alambanakarakasya cak~uradivat pramlil}.iinta!Jpatitvat. Translation 5: Moreover, with respect to what object 'assemblage is to

be taken as a means? That which is to be known itself becomes 'assemblage' because it is also included in the 'assemblage.' Thus, object becomes an instrument. In that case every knowledge will be turned objectless, because the object is included in the pramiil}a itself like eye etc.

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NATURE OF PRAMA~A

Note 5: After having raised the objection that since nothing is left out of a collection in comparison of which one may call the collection 'most excellent means', the opponent is now showing one by one how the accusative case (karmakaraka) is also included in the body of the karal}akaraka. Here, iila1pbana means a karmakaraka. In this way nothing is left to be known. As Varadad'irya puts it in his commentary on the Nyayamanjari called Nyayasaurabha (edited by K.S. Varada­charya, Oriental Research Institute, Mysore, 1969): niralambana iti -karmakarakasyapi samagrigo~thinivi~tatvena samagryiilJ. karaiJatve ka~mal}o 'pi karal}atva-praptya katham jnanam karal}a-vi~ayakam syat iti jnanam niralambanarh prasajyeta ityarthal). i.e. if the accusative case also is included in the collection of karakas, and if the collection (samagri) is treated as an instrument, the accusative case also becomes an instrumental case, how can there be a cognition in which an instrumental case is an objective case? And since it is not possible, a cognition will have no content and as result a cognition will become con tentless or objectless.

The term alambana is a Buddhist term.

Text 6 (p. 32,5): kas ca samagraya prameyarp pramimite? pramata 'pi tasyam eva linal}. Translation 6: Who will cognize the object through assemblage? Even

the knower is included in that (assemblage). Note 6: Here it is shown that if the concept of pramiil}a is the collection of all karakas, then even the knower is included in the pramiiiJa and in that case who remains to know? Text 5 said that there would be no kmma-karakas and this text says that likewise there will be no kartr­karaka (agent) also, since everything is included in the assemblage itself. As Varadacarya puts it: Tatha ca pramatul} api karal}atvam eva, na kartrtvam iti bhaval} 'thus, a knower too will become an instrument, he will no longer remain as an agent'.

Text 7 (p. 32,6-7): evan ca yad ucyate 'pramatii pramiil}aip prame­yaip pramitir iti catasr~u vidhasu tattva1p parisamapyate' iti, tad vya­hanyate. Translation 7: Thus, the statement (of Vatsyayana) that "the real

nature of things is concluded on the basis of the four components such as the knower, the instrument of knowing, the object (which is to be cognized) and the cognition" is hereby contradicted.

Note 7: This text has a direct reference to the Bh~ya of Vatsyayana. Although it is not a quotation verbatim, still in essence it is a quotation.

The Bh~ya actually read as follows: Arthavati ca pramiil}e pramata prameyam pramitir ity arthavanti

bhavanti. kasmat? anyatamapaye arthasya anupapattel}. tatra yasya ipsajihasaprayuktasya pravrttil} sa pramata. sa yena artham pramil}oti tat pramiil}am. yo 'rthal} pramiyatie tat prameyam. yad arthavijnanam

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V.N . .TI·IA

sa pramitil}. catasnw evarh vidhasu arthatattvam parisamapyati. kim punal} tattvam? satal} ca sad-bhaval} asats ca asadbhaval}. sad iti grhyamiil}am yathabhiitam aviparitam tattvam bhavanti. asacca asad iti b'!hyamaiJam yathabhiitam aviparitarh tattvam bhavanti (Gariganatha Jha Edn., Chowkhamba Series, 1925, pp.8-11 ).

That is, once the pramiiiJa gets associated with the object, the other elements like, the knower, the knowable, and the knowledge also get associated with the object. How? Because in the absence of the most prominent the object cannot be explained. There, one who acts being prompted by the desire to get something or by the desire to get rid of something is called the knower; by what he measures or knows is the instrument of knowing; that which is known is called object of knowledge and the resultant cognition of the knowable is called the knowledge. In this way, the real nature of a thing is decided on the basis of there four components. What is the real nature of a thing? Being positive of what is positive and being negative of what is negative. When a positive is known as positive not otherwise (i.e. not a" negative) it is called real and when a negative is known as negative not otherwise (i.e. not as positive) it is called real.

This text provides a frame-work to know something and also decide whether what is known is real or not.

The Granthibhariga interprets the text of J ayanta as follows: catasr~u vidhasu iti - tattvam parisamapyate arthal} parisamapto bhavanti, nadhikapek:.,ii upayujyate, i.e. tattvam parisamapyate means '(the knowing the real nature of) a thing is completed and nothing additional is required'.

In the act of knowing these are the only four components and the act of knowing is complete once the reality of a positive and negative entities is known or arrived at. As a matter of fact, these may be considered as the four components of philosophizing.

Thus, if all the components are reduced to only one i.e. to pramiil}a, it will go against the above frame-work suggested by Vatsyayana. This is the tone of text 7.

Text 8 (p. 32,7-10): na ca loko 'pi samagrayal} kar81Jabhavam anu­manyate tasyiilp kar81Javibhaktim aprayufijanal}. na hy eva1p vaktaro bhavanti laukikal}, samagraya pasyama iti; kin tu dipena pasyamal} cak~u~a nirik~amaha ity acak~ate. Translation 8: Nor do the people approve the instrumentality of

'assemblage,' without the instrumental case-ending added to it. Nor do we meet ordinary people saying we see with 'assemblage,' on the contrary they say 'we see with a lamp,' 'we see with eyes.'

Note 8: After having shown that if samagri is treated as pramiiiJa, all kiiraka s will become kar81Jakiiraka and not only that there will be no knowledge and thereby the reality can also not be decided, the

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NATURE OF PR.t\Mil!yA

opponent shows in the present text that even the language of common people do not support this view of J ayanta. Had samagri been prama~Ja, the word samagri would have been treated as kara~1akaraka and people would have used it in instrumental form like samagrya. But no one uses it like this. On the other hand, they use instrumental case­ending after a word denoting single factor and not the collection of factors. Thus, the common men's notion also does not support Jayanta.

Text 9 (p. 32,10-11 ): tasman na samagri kara~am, akara~atvac ca na prama~am iti nedarp sadhu pram~asvariipam. Translation 9: Therefore, 'assemblage' is not the instrument and since

it is not the instrument it cannot be the means of a valid knowledge and thus it is not the actual nature of the means of valid knowledge.

Note 9: This is the conclusion of the piirvapaktja. The notion of prama~a involved the notion of instrument and the notion of an instrument cannot be a collection of factors, but only one factor out of many, which may be the most effective means. Therefore, since Jayanta's notion of kar~a is not acceptable, his notion of pramiilJa is also not acceptable. His notion is also against all authorities like Pal)ini, Vatsyayana and common usage. This is what the opponent concluded.

Text 10 (pp. 32,13-33,3): atrocyate -- yata eva sadhakatamarp kara­~arp, kara~asadhanas ca prama~asabdalJ, tata eva samagrayaiJ pra­ma~atvarp yuktam; tadvyatireke~a karakantare kvacid api tamab­arthasarpspan~anupapattelJ. anekakarakasannidhane kiiryarp ghatama­narp anyataravyapagame ca vighatamiinarp kasmai atisayarp pra­yacchet? na ciitisayaiJ kiiryajanmani kasyacid avadharyate, sarvetjiirp tatra vyapriyama~atvat. Translation 10: We meet the above objections as follows: Because of

the very fact that an instrumental case is defined as 'the most helpful case in producing the result' and because of the fact that the word pram~ a is of instrumental derivation, it is but proper to take 'assemblage' alone as the means of valid knowledge. In no other case excepting that(= assemblage) there is any possibility of fitting in of the meaning of the suffix tamap. Moreover, when this is the situation that if all the cases are present the result occurs, but the result does not occur even if only one of them is removed to which excellence' can be given? The 'excellence' cannot be given to one when all are equally engaged in producing the result.

Note 10: Here Jayanta begins replying the objections raised in the piirva-paktja. Text 10 is a reply to the text 4. Jayanta says that his notion of kar~a is in conforming with that of Pfu)ini. He suggests the interpretation of the rule sadhakatamam kar~am in the light of his notion of kar~a as samagri. He wants to show that 'that' after which a

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V.N.JHA

result follows and in the absence of 'that' the result does not follow is a karal}akaraka. And it is everybody's experience that a result follows only when all the factors required for that result are present and such a result does not follow even if one of those factors is absent. Therefore, the collection of factors alone can be the karaT} a to produce that result. No one factor can be singled out to attribute 'excellence' which is the meaning of the superlative suffix -tama(p ). Therefore, Pal).ini rule sadhakatamam karal}anm will make sense only if the meaning of the superlative suffix -tama(s) is attributed to the collection of kiiraka sand not to any single karaka. Thus, Jayanta's notion is not against the notion of Piil).ini.

V aradadirya also rightly says: Pratyekam kiirakiil}i kara.f}ii.f}i, tat­smudiiyas ca kara.f}am iti tu siiram, i.e. each kiiraka is merely a factor and the collection of all factors is indeed the kara.f}akiiraka. This is the gist of the argument (of Jayanta).

Text 11 (p. 33,4): sannipattyajanakatvamatisaya iti cet? Translation 11: One may hold the view that being the product (or a

result) being very close to it (i.e., directly without any inter­vention) is what is called atisaya 'excellence'.

Note 11: The Granthibhailga paraphrases the text as follows: anya­kiirakavyiipariivyavadhiyamiinavyiipiiratvam sannipatyajanakatvam (p. 7) 'being the producer (of a result) being very close to it' means 'being the function which is not being intervened by the function of any other karaka'.

But unless the causal complex acquires the nature of being invariably related to the production of the result how can it be called a producer. This nature is obtained only through the collection of factors and not by any one particular factor. This is what Cakradhara says: phalotpada-vinabhiivisvabhavo yavan na bhavati tavat katham avasyataya karya-janako bhavet ? tadriipam ca samagrito nanyasya iti.

Text 12 (p. 33,4-6): na -- arad upakarakii.f}am api karakatviinapayat. jfiane ca janye kim asannipatyajanakam? sarve~am indriyamano 'rthii­diniim itaretarasaipsarge sati jfiiinani~pattep. Translation 12: No. He is mistaken; because those which help the

bringing out of the result remaining indirectly connected with the object do remain cases (karaka). Moreover, in generating knowl­edge, being away from the result which can be a productive factor without being connected (i.e. not being closely connected) because knowledge is produced at the mutual contact of all, the sense-organ, the mind, the object etc.

Note 12: It is not the case that every factor directly produces a result. Some may be directly doing so, some other many be indirectly doing so. In the case of, for example, the perception of a jar, the soul is at a distance in comparison to the sense-object contact, still soul is a

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NATURE OP PRAMAJYA

necessary factor and hence a karaka. The main point, therefore, is this that when all the necessary factors assemble together the result comes into existence and hence the assemblage is the only thing that can be called pramiil}a.

Text 13 (p. 33,7): atha sahasaiva kiiryajananam atisayaiJ; Translation 13: Now, if producing the result all at once is taken as 'the

excellence.' Note 13: This refers to the factor at the final stage of a process after which all at once the result emerges. That final factor may be said to possess 'excellence'. For example, suppose, the person is there in the room, he has good eyes, the book is also there, but the room is dark and so after one puts the light one can see the book. In this case, the putting on the light is the final stage of the result of seeing and hence the light may be said to have the 'excellence' and in this situation one may say,dipenapasyami 'I see with the light'.

Text 14 (p. 33,7-13): so 'pi kasyaflcid avasthaya1p kara~asyeva kar­ma~o 'pi .~akyate vaktu1p -- yatha aviralajaladharadharaprabandha­vaddhiindhakaranivahe bahulani.~ithe sahasaiva sphurata vidyullata­Jokena kaminijflanam adadhanena taj janmani satisayatvam avapyate, evam itarakarakakadambasannidhane saty api simantinim antare~a taddarsana1p na sa1ppadyate, agatamatrayam eva tasya1p bhavatiti tad api karmakarakam atisayayogitvat kara~a1p syat. Translation 14: The same can be attributed like Instrumental to

objective case also. Thus, the sudden flash of the lightning in the night of amavasya having huge darkness due to the layers of series of dense clouds produces the knowledge of a beautiful woman (i.e. makes her visible) and thereby gets 'the excellence' in producing such a knowledge; but to see her is not possible if the woman is not there even though all other karakas are present there. If she comes then alone seeing (her) is possible. In this way the object(= the woman) will become the instrumental since it possesses 'the excellence.'

Note 14: So all the factors or karakas are equally important. An accusative case also is as important as what is normally known as an instrumental case.

Text 15 (p. 34, 1-4): tasmat phalotpadavinabhavisvabhavatvam avasya­taya karyajanakatvam atisyalJ. sa ca siimagrayantargatasya na kasyacid ekasya karakasya kathayitu1p paryate. samagryas tu so 'tisaya/;1 su­vacalJ. sannihita cet samagri saippannam eva phalam iti saivatisyavati. Translation 15: Therefore, excellence is that which invariably produces

the result and which is of the nature of that without which the result cannot be produced. One of the kiirakas constituting. the assemblage cannot be said to have that excellence. But this

11

V.N.JHA

excellence can be easily attributed to 'the assemblage.' In other words, if the assemblage is present the result is as good as accomplished. Therefore, that (assemblage) alone has the excel­lence.

Note 15: Therefore, excellence has to be seen in terms of production of the result. And a result is never produced by a single kiiraka. Therefore, the producer of the result is always a collection of factors and hence the collection alone can have the excellence, and not any single karaka in isolation.

Text 16 (p. 34,6-7): nanu mukhyayop pramatrprameyayor api tadavinabhavitvam atisayo 'sty eva. Translation 16: Well, the main factors like the knower and knowable

too have the excellence of being that without which the result (pramitJ) cannot be produced.

Note 16: Therefore, the agent and the object will become the instru­ment if atisaya is defined as phalotpadavinabhavisvabhavatvam. This is the implication of the objection.

Text 17 (p. 34,7): pramitisambandham antarel}a tayos tathatvabhavat. Translation 17: But without the association with the resultant

knowledge they (the agent and the object) cannot be called important or prominent.

Note 17: So, first knowledge should arise and then the role of agent and object may be decided, not before that.

Text 18 (p. 34,7-8): pramil}otiti pramata bhavati, pramiyata iti ca prameyam Translation 18: (But the derivative meaning of) the word pramata is

one who knows and what is known is called prameya. Note 18: So, before the knowledge arises he is called the knower and the object is called knowable. Thus they are prominent and hence an instrument only.

Text 19 (p. 34,8-13): satyam etat kintu siikalyaprasadalabdhapramiti­sambandhanibandhanap pramiit!Prameyayor mukhyasvariipalabhap. siikalyapacaye pramityabhavat gaul}e pramatprameye sa1ppadyete. evaii ca sakalyam antarel}a yadi pramitir avakalpeta bhaved vyabhi­carap:, na tv asau tatha drsyate iti pramityavyabhicarat siikalyam eva satisayam iti tamabarthayogat tad eva kar81Jam. Translation 19 (Reply): What you say is true. But the knower and the

knowable get prominence when they are related to pramiti got through assemblage, and if the assemblage is not there, there is no pramiti and therefore, the knower and the knowable become secondary. Thus, without assemblage if pramiti were there, your objection would have held water, but such is not the case.

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NATURE OF PRAMA~A

Therefore, since the assemblage is invariably related with the pramiti, it alone has excellence and so assemblage alone can be karana since it alone has excellence.

Note 19: Here, there is no over-application of the definition of atisaya .. The prominence or subordinateness of a factor should be decide by

observing whether the factor is actually involved in producing the knowledge or not. The Granthibhanga puts it as follows: tat-kalam pramam akwvannapi yogyataya yc$ pramata iti bhaJyyate sa gau{la-{1, yastu tat-kalam evaprama-janmani vyapriyate sa mukhya-{1. evam prameyam api.

Text 20 (p. 35,2-4): yat tu kim apek~mp samagrayfil} kar8{1atvam iti tat antargatakiira-kapek~am iti briima-{1. kiirakfilJfilp dhannc$ samagri na svariipahanaya te~arp kalpate; sakalyadasayam api tatsvariipa­pratyabhijflanat. Translation 20: To the objection that with reference to what 'assem­

blage' is an instrument, our answer would be: with reference to all karaka cases included in the assemblage. Assemblage is a property of cases. It never destroys their ( = of the cases) casehood because even at the time of assemblage we recognize their nature (of being a karaka).

Note 20: This is the answer to text 4. A collection is a property of the collected and at the same time it does not replace the collected.

Text 21 (p. 35,6-8): nanu samagrebhya-{1 samagri bhinna cet katharp prthannopalabhyate? abhede tu sarvakiirakfi{li kara{libhiitany eveti kartrkannavyavahiirocchedaprasarigc$ Translation 21: Well, if this assemblage is different from all the cases

how is it that it is not congnized separately? And if it is identical with the cases, there is then the contingency of putting an end to the usage of nominative, accusative etc. because, in that case, all the cases would become Instrumental case only.

Note 21: If the collection is a property of the cases as held in text No.20, then one should know whether it is a different from the cases or identical with them. If different, then why should it not be cognized differently? And if identical then all cases tum to be Instrumental cases only, which is an absurdity. This is the purpose of the objection.

Text 22 (pp. 35,8-36,7): maivam samagrasannidhfinfikhyadhannasya pratyak~am upalambhat. prthag avasthite~u hi sthalijalajvalana­t8{1guladi~u na samagratapratyayc$; samudite~u tu bhavatity ata-{1 tantupatalaparighatitapa!fidyavayavivat kiirakakalapani~padyadravya­ntarabhave 'pi samudayatmika samagri vidyata eveti samudayy­apek~aya karaJJata.tp pratipadyate. tasman na paricodaniyam idarp. kasmin kanna{li siimagri kara{lam iti. samudiiyi{liirp siimagryava-

13

V.N.JHA

sthiiyiim api svariipiinapiiyiit samudiiyivise~e karmaiJi siimagrf karaiJam. ata eva pramiter na niriilambanatvam. Translation 22: What you have said is not true because the property

such as closeness of all the participating cases (i.e. the assem­blage) is directly cognized. If the cooking pot, water, fuel, rice etc. are kept in different places hardly one can have the knowl­edge of assemblage, but one can certainly have that when they (i.e. pot, water, etc.) are assembled together. Therefore, although the assemblage does not produce any other result than the result produced by the group of cases as the threads produce a cloth, still there is certainly the assemblage which is of the nature of collection or group, or totality. Hence it ( = assemblage) has the instrumentality in comparison to the cases. Therefore, there is no point in asking with reference to what (prameya) assemblage is the instrument. Since the cases involved do not lose their forms even at the time of assemblage, the assemblage is the instrument with reference to a particular object which is one amongst the cases. Therefore, the pramiti (valid knowledge) is not without an object.

Note 22: The property of being together is siimagrf which is experienced by all when the cases come together. Thus, siimagri is not a ficticious thing. Nor is it identical with the cases. Therefore, all the usages of all cases will continue.

Text 23 (p. 35,8-9): etena pramiitriidil) prthg upadarsita iti vidhii­catu~tayam api samiihitam. Translation 23: In this way, the knower etc. are shown separately.

Thus, all the four aspects are hereby maintained. Note 23: Thus, the basic frame-work of philosophizing is not disturbed.

Text 24 (p. 35,10-12): yat tv abhyadhiiyi siimagrayiilJ. karaiJavibhakti­nirdeso na drsyata iti tatrocyate- siimagri hi saqlhatil). sa hi smphanya­miinavyatirekeiJa na vyavahiirapadavim avatarati tena siimagryii pa . .;yamiti na vyapadesal). Translation 24: To the objection that none uses instrumental case­

ending with siimagri (assemblage),the following is the answer: The word ri siimagri means collection or assemblage. That (assem-blage) never becomes the object of usage without those cases which are being assembled. Therefore, no such usage such as siimagryii pasyiimi (I see with the assemblage) is found.

Note 24: This is an answer to text 8.

Text 25 (p. 36,2-3): yas tu dipendiyiil}iilp tp:iyiinirdesal), sa phalopaja­naniiviniibhiivisvabhiivatviikhyasiimagrisariipasamiiropaiJanibandhanal). anyatriipi ca tadriipasamiiropeiJa sthiilyii pacatiti vyapadeso drsyate

14

NATURE OP PRAMAJ':lil.

eva. tasmad antargatakarakapek~aya JabdhakaraiJabhava samagri pra­manam. Translation 25: But that we find instrumental case-ending added to

dipa (lamp), sense-organ (eye etc.) is due to the imposition of the nature of the assemblage namely the nature of being invariably productive of the result. Similarly, in other cases (i.e. in the case of Locative) by the imposition of its nature to the assemblage) we get the usage sthalya pacati (he cooks by the pot). Therefore, in comparison to the participating cases the assemblage becomes the Instrument and it is the means of valid knowledge.

Note 25: The usage of language is prompted by the intention of a speaker. It is as per that intention a particular role is assigned to an entity. Thus, the role of instrument is assigned to sthali which is in reality a locative case.

Here this has happened due to the superimposition of the notion of instrumentality on a locative. This is a universal phenomenon in language.

After this Jayantabhaga discusses some other view according to which a kiiraka other than nominative and accusative which produce the knowledge of a thin, which is neither doubtful nor erroneous is called kara~Ja-karaka. But we are not going to discuss it here. Because our aim is to present the Nyaya-Buddhist-controversy on the nature of a pramaiJa. Therefore, I present the following texts which present two stand-points of the Buddhist logicians and which have been taken for examination by J ayanta.

1.2 Buddhist Views and Their Refutation

Text 26 (pp. 38,13-39,6): ye tu bodhasyaiva pramaiJatvam acak~ate­na silk~madarsinas te. bodha~ khalu pramfiiJasya phalam, na siik~at­pramaiJam. karaiJarthabhidhiino hi pramlli}asabda~, pramiyate aneneti pramaiJam. pramiyata iti ko 'rth~? prama janyata iti. pramaiJad ava­gacchama iti vadanto laukika~ karaiJasyaiva pramaiJyam anumanyate. yas tu prama pramlli}am iti pramlli}asabd~, sa pramaiJaphale dra~~ tavya~. tatha ca sa~psayaviparyayatmakaip apramaiJaphalam api jfia­narp atmamano 'numiine tad vise~aiJiirthaparicchede va visi~')faprama­jananat pramlli}atiirp pratipadyate. avyabhiciiradivise~eiJopapannam api jfiiinam aphalajanakaip apramlli}am eva. kevalapramasvabhava1p pra­mlli}ad vibhinna1p phalam iti pratyak~alak~aiJe vak~yam~. Translation 26: Those who take knowledge itself as the means of valid

knowledge do not have a critical mind or outlook. Knowledge, in fact, is the result of the means of valid knowledge and not the means itself. The word pramlli}a means instrument since it is derived as pramiyate anena iti 'by which something is known'. Pramiyate, again, means 'knowledge is produced'. Moreover,

15

V.N.JHA

people do use such sentences as pramfiiJad avagacchamal} 'we know by the means of valid knowledge'. Thus, they too accept instrument only as pramfiiJa. When, however, the word prama (knowledge) is paraphrased as pramfiiJa, it (i.e. the word pramaiJa) means 'the result of pramfi¥a (i.e. the means of valid knowledge)'. Moreover, even the knowledge which is the result of defective means and even which is the nature of doubt or misapprehension does become the means of valid knowledge with reference to inferring the soul and mind or with reference to determining the qualification of the soul because it produces the knowledge of the qualified object. On the other hand, if a knowledge, which is, although an invariable (i.e. undoubtful) knowledge, does not produce any result, it never becomes the means (of valid knowledge). That the result is different from the means and that it can be of the nature of a valid knowledge also, will be explained when we will discuss the definition of perception.

Note 26: The main issue is this that a valid cognition is produced by a means of valid cognition. In this process, the process or pramfi¥a has to be different from the result (phala) namely, the valid cognition. This is the view of Jayanta. The Buddhists, however, argue that the result itself is pramfiiJa.

Cakradhara puts it as follows: yada karaiJasadhanena pramiiiJa­.<~abdena Joke vyavaharal), evarh sati phalasya pramariipasya aprama­I}yam sidhyati. phala-pramfiiJa-pak~e punal} sarhsayajiianasya pra­maiJa-lak:~aiJa-virahat yat kvacit siddham prama~1yam sarhsayito 'yam arthal}. ityadau vise~al}atvena tad hiyate. phalantara-janakatvena ca yad aprfimfiiJyam akarakasya phalasya tadapi na parigrhitam bhavati iti tatparyam.

In other words, we can distinguish a true or a false cognition, if the instrument is treated as different from the result. For the Buddhists' view cf. Pramfi¥asamuccaya (1.8) and the V.rtti thereon, Nyayapravesa 7 (Baroda edn.) p. 7; Nyayabindu 1.18.21.

Text 27 (p. 39,7): atha vyatiriktaphalajanakam api bodhariipam eva pramfi¥am ucyate Translation 27: Even if it is accepted that a means must produce a

result which should be different from the means, still pramfi¥a remains 'of the nature of knowledge' only.

Notes 27: Let the nature of pramfi¥a remain of the nature of knowl­edge still one can show the difference by pointing at different aspects of knowledge. Thus, the aspect of revealing the iikara of jiifina may be called phala and the act of revealing that iikfira by the same knowledge may be called pramfi¥a. Thus, it is said under the Tattvasarlgraha (karika 1344): jiifinasya adhigatiriipatvat sadhyatva-

16

NATURE OF PRAM A~ A

pratitir iti phala-tvam upa-caqate. tasyaiva ca vi~ayiikara-parigraha­kanna~;a vyapare1_1a ca saha pratitir iti pramiil}atvam upacaryate.

Text 28 (p. 39,8-9): tad ayuktam- sakalajagadviditabodhetarasvabha­vasabdalingadipendriyadiparihiiraprasailgat. Translation 28: This is incorrect. If this nature (i.e. the nature of

knowledge alone) of prama1_1a is accepted, there would arise a contingency of rejecting the (Instrumentality of) words, probans, lamp, sense-organs etc. which are of the nature of non-knowledge and which are known as Instruments by the whole world.

Note 28: This text presents contradiction of the Buddhist concept of prama~Ja with that of common people.

Text 29 (pp.39,9-40,2): tasmat samagryanupravi~tobodhaf:l vise~a1_1a­jiianam iva kvacit pratyak~e, lingajiianam iva lingipramitau, siiriipya­darsanam ivopamane, sabdasrava1_1am iva tadarthajiiane pramiil}atiiip pratipadyate. ata eva bodhabodhasvabhavasamagri prama1_1am ity uktam. Translation 29: Therefore, a knowledge when included in the assem­

blage does become a prama1_1a as the knowledge of adjunct in the case of the perception of some possessed of that adjunct, as the knowledge of probans in the case of inferring the probandum, as the observing (knowledge) of similarity in the case of analogy, as the hearing (knowledge) of words in the case of knowing the meaning of those words. That is why, we have said that pramiil}a is the assemblage which consists of knowledge and non­knowledge.

Note 29: In all the four processes of knowing some factors involved are of the nature of knowledge and some others of the nature of non­knowledge. For instance, in the process of perception of pot the nirvikalpaka-jiiiina preceding the savikalpaka-jiiiina of pot is a factor which is of the nature of knowledge.

Similarly, the process of inferring starts from the knowledge of probans (hetu) and so this factor is of the nature of knowledge.

Likewise, the analogical cognition of the relationship between the word gavaya and the animal gavaya results from the knowledge of similarity and so the factor may be of the nature of knowledge.

Similarly, in the process of verbal understanding the starting point is the perception of a linguistic expression and it is no doubt of the nature of knowledge.

But all the factors involved in the process of knowing are not knowledge. Hence the nature of prama1_1a cannot be of the nature of knowledge only. This is the view of Jayantabhatta.

Text 30 (p. 40,4-1 0): anye tulyasamagrayadhinayof:l jiiiiniirthayof:l gra­hyagahakabhavaip vadantaf:l bodha1p pramiiiJam abhyupagaman

17

V.N.JHA

k$aiJabhangi$u padarthe$u sahakaryupadanakaraiJlipek$ak~aiJantara­santatijananena ca lokayatram udvahatsu jflanajanmani jflanam upadiinakaraiJam, arlhalJ sahakarikaraiJam; arthajanmani ca arthalJ upadanakfiraiJarp, jflanarp ca sahakarikaraiJam iti - jflanarp ca jnana­rthajanyam, arthas ca arthajnanajanyo bhavatity evam ekasiimagraya­dhinataya tam artham avyabhicarato jnanasya tatra pramliiJyam iti. Translation 30: Some others, again, accept that knowledge and object

which depend upon the same assemblage, (means) are mutually related as grlihya (which is to be known, the object) and grahaka (which is the means of knowledge) and therefore, knowledge itself is the means (of valid knowledge). (They further elaborate this as follows).

Objects are momentary. They help the activities of this world by producing a chain of momentary (objects and knowledge) depending on material cause as well as the auxiliary cause. When knowledge is produced, knowledge is the material cause and the object is the auxiliary cause; when object is produced (in the next moment) object is the material cause, knowledge is the auxiliary one. Knowledge is produced by both knowledge as well as object. Similarly, object is produced by both object as well as knowledge. Therefore, knowledge alone is pramiiiJa there because it is always with the object since it depends on the same assemblage (i.e. means such as knowledge and object).

Note 30: According to Cakradhara, this view refers to the Vaibha~ika school of Buddhist philosophy. According to the Vaibha~ikas a knowledge is without any form (niriikara). As Cakradhara puts it: ajanako 'pi arthalJ sahabhavi-jnanena grhyate iti niriikara-jiiana­vadiniim vaibhfi$ikapam dan~anam (p.8) i.e. 'Although an object is not the direct producer of its knowledge, it is cognized by the knowledge which arises along with it - this is the view of the Vaibha~ika­philosophy which holds that knowledge is without a form'.

Now the question arises, if a knowledge has no form and if it is also not caused by its object, then how to decide that this is the knowledge of x and not of y? In order to account for this difficulty, they hold that both, the knowledge and its object depend on both of the previous moment. Since x has taken part in the production of its knowledge of the subsequent moment, one can say this is the knowledge of x . In the words of Cakradhara, eka-samagry-utpannatvena tasyaiva tad grliha­kam nanyasya (p.8).

Similarly, since y has not played any part with regard to the production of the knowledge in the subsequent moment, this knowl­edge cannot be the knowledge of y. As the Granthibhanga puts it: yatha etad-graha~1e tulya-samagry-adhinatvam tasya niyamakam asti, tatha anya-grahape na kincit asti (p.8).

Cakradhara defines the term upadana-kiiraiJa as follows: piirvabhavi svasantanagatasadrsak~aiJalJ upadanakliraiJam (p.8) i.e. 'the moment-

18

NATURE OF PRAMA_r;,rA

entity which precedes the effect and which is a moment-entity similar to the moment-entity of its series is a material cause'.

In support of this definition he quotes Abhidharrnakosa 2.52ab. Then he defines sahak.ii.ri-kliraiJa as tad-anyalJ. sahakiiri-kliraiJam 'Other than the upiidiina-kiiraiJa is an auxiliary cause'. In support of this he further quotes Abhidharrnakosa 2.50. [P. Pradan's edition reads svato 'nye ... in the place of tato 'nye ... ]

Cakradhara also reads another definition of upiidanakiiraiJa of the same school which runs as under: yad-utpattau yat-santiina-nivrttilJ tat tasya upiidiinakiiraiJam i.e. 'if after the production of y the series of x has terminated, then x is the material cause of y. '

But this definition does not work in the present cases because here what is explained is the next member of the same series i.e. the series of knowledge and the series of objects. Thus, the second definition of material cause refers to the case where the effect belongs to the series of another class. Therefore, Cakradhara comments: tad visadrsotpiidii­bhipriiyam, and gives an example to illustrate the point: tathii hi -ghatotpatau m[t-pii;uja-santana-niv[ttilJ, anutpanne hi ghate mrt-pi{lga­k:~a{lii eva santiinena utpadyante, ghate tu utpanne ghata-k~anii iti.

In this context one may also compare the Pramii{lavarttika of Dharmak1rti. JiUinasr1mitra points out: ekasiimagrijanyatve tu jagii­nubhavayolJ pratiniyatam vedyatvam vedakatvam ca syiit. tatprati­bandhiit ca niitiprasarlgalJ (p.421) 'i.e. if both are produced by both, then they will be always i.e. at every moment 'a revealer and revealed'. Since difference is introduced in the material and auxiliary

· causes, such a contingency will not arise'.

Text 31 (p. 40, 11-12): tad idam anupapannam - aphalajanakasya pra­mii{latviinupapatter ity uktatviit. Translation 31: What you say is uncogent, because (if your view that

knowledge alone is the means is accepted then) there will arise a contingency of taking even that knowledge as pramii{la which does not produce any result. We have already pointed out this before.

Note 31: Jayanta points to his argument in text No.26.

Text 32 (p. 40,12-16): api ca karmaiJi jfiiina1p pramiiiJam i~yate. yathoktam - 'savyiipiiram ivabhiiti vyiiplireiJa svakarmaiJi' iti. sa ciiyam arthak~aiJO jfiiinasamakiilalJ tatalJ piirviibhyiiip jiiiiniirtha­lak~aiJiibhyiim upajanita iti tatkarmatiiip pratipadyatiiip, na punalJ svasamiinakiilaprasiitajiiiinak~aiJakarmatam iti. Translation 32: Moreover, with reference to an object you want to take

(mere) knowledge is the means, as you, yourself, have said in the Pramii{laviirtika that knowledge (which is of the form of reflection of an object) by intermediate course (i.e. by invariably revealing the objects) appears to be as if it has function with

19

V.N.JHA

reference to its own object. Therefore, as this (second) momentary object which is the first knowledge is produced by the immediately preceding momentary knowledge and object, but it (the second arthak~aiJa) be the object of the first momentary knowledge and not (of that which has come into existence simultaneously with it).

Note 32: Jayanta points out that if the Buddhist view is accepted then the vi~aya-vi~ayi-bhava between an object and its knowledge is difficult to be shown. Every thing is momentary so if a thing has to be object of a cognition it requires at least two moments: coming into existence in the first moment and then becoming the object in the second moments. How can it be accepted by the k~aiJabharigavadin ?

The Granthibhanga points out another difficulty. It says that the question by J ayanta is from the PramaiJavarttika in the context of arguing in favour of siikara-jfiiina and hence it may not apply to them. To this Cakradhara thinks that even the niriikara-jfiiinavadin Vaibha~ika will have to accept that there is grahya-grlihaka-bhava relation between an object and its cognition. If they do not accept this position, they will have to give up their own theory niriikara-jfiiina-vada and will have to adopt the yogacara-position of siikarajfiiinavada. In the words of Cakra-dhara, evam ca vaibha~ika-mata idarh dii~aiJarh katharh sangacchate? satyam kintu svasmin vi~aye jfianasya pramaiJyam tair api i:"Yate, ata eva tan-mata-sarhviidina eva slokakarasya upanyasap .k[tap. athavii vaibha~ikair ani~yamaiJam api balad etad angikaryam, anyatha nir-vi~atve jfianasya yogacara­darsanapatti-prasarigat. (p. 9)

Text 33 (p. 40,17-18): nanu ca tulyasamagrayadhinastaya samana­kalataya ca tadavyabhicarasiddhau satya1p kva karmatvam upayujyate? Translation 33: Well, where does the question of its (= of the second

momentary object) abjectness come when it is invariably associated with the knowledge by their being simultaneously produced and by their being produced, by the same causes?

Note 33: Even if grlihya-grabaka-bhava is not there, still the one-is to­one relationship is mainted because both the cognition and its objects are producing each simultaneously?

Text 34 (p. 40,18-19): banta tarhi sahotpannayop samiinasamagrikayop griihyagriihakaniyamap ki1plqta iti vaktavyam? Translation 34: Funny indeed is your view! Then you should tell me

what is the cause of the rule regarding the revealable and the revealer of two things having the same causes for their production and which have come into existence simultaneously?

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NATURE OF PRAM~A

Note 34: If two things x and y are produced by the same causal complex how is it that one of these is called a revealer and the other the revealed?

Text 35 (p. 41,1-2): jiianaip. svaprakasasvabhavam iti griihakam, artho jacjatmeti griihyam - iti cet Translation 35: Knowledge is of the nature of illumination and

therefore, it is griihaka whereas object is of the form of inanimate things and therefore, it is grahya.

Note 35: Thus, svabhava of knowledge and that of knowable are such that there subsists the relationship of grahya-griihaka-bhava.

Text 36 (p. 41,2): ayam api vise~~as tulyakalayol} kutastyal}? Translation 36: Wherefrom do they (knowledge and object) get their

distinctness (i.e. one is praka.~asvabhava and the other is jacja­svabhava) when both have the same causes?

Note 36: What is source of the respective svabhava of things? When the causes remain the same and they occur at one and the same time how to distinguish them?

Text 37 (p. 41,2-3): upadanasahakasrikiiraiJabhedad iti cet, Translation 37: Since there is a difference in the material cause and the

auxiliary cause (they acquire svabhavas). Note 37: See text 30.

Text 38 (p. 41,3-4): na - tasya k~aiJabharigabhange niriikiiri~yamiirJa­tvat. Translation 38: No. That will be refuted in the k~aiJabhnga-bhariga­

section. Note 38: The refutation of the theory of momentariness of things is presented by Jayanta in the seventh Ahnika of the Nyayamaiijari.

Text 39 (p.41,6-ll): ye 'pi niriikiirasya bodhasvariipasya nilapitady­anekavi~ayasadhiirai}atvat, janakatvasya ca cak~uradav api bhavenati­prasarigat, tadakiiratvalqtam eva jiiiinakarmaniyamam avagacchantal} siikiiraip. jiifinaip. prami4J.am iti pratipedire te 'pi vijiianadvaitasi~adha­yi~ayaivam abhidadhiinii.IJ tannirasaprasariga eva nirasi~yante. na hy ekam eva siikiiraip. jiiiinarp griihyarp griihakarp ca bhabitum arhatiti vak~yate. Translation 39: Those (Y ogacaras) who took knowledge of the form of

the object to be the pramf41a (means of valid knowledge) think that the invariable association between knowledge and the object is feasible only when the knowledge (i.e. the pramf41a) has in it a reflection of that (object). Because, if the nature of knowledge is taken as having no particular form then-since it (niriikiirajiiiina) is common to all sorts of knowledge such as that of a blue thing or

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V.N.JHA

of a yellow thing etc. and since productive nature is also there in eyes etc.-there is the contingency of its over-application.

They (Y ogacaras) being desirous of establishing identity with the knowledge speak in the above manner. They too will be refuted when we will be refuting their Vijfliiniidvaita-theory. It will also be shown later that knowledge of form of the object cannot be both griihya (revealed) and griihaka (revealer).

Note 39: This text presents the view of theY ogacara-school. According to this school of thought the knowledge is always siikiira. Since the iikiira is in the knowledge, there is no iikiira (thing of this world) outside. What appears as being outside is mere projection of one's mind.

Text 40 (p. 41, 12-15): arthas tu siikiirajfliinaviidino na samasty eva. sa by anumeyo vii syiit? pratyak$o vii? niinumeya~; sambandhagrahm;ii­bhiiviit.

arthe hi sati siikiirarp niriikiirarp tadatyaye I nityiinumeyaviihyiirthaviidi jfliinarp kva dr~taviin. I /381 I

Translation 40: Moreover, for these Buddhists who are the propagators of knowledge having a particular form of object as the means) the object itself does not probably exist If it is positive it should be either inferred or perceived?

(We say:) it cannot be inferred because there is no invariable concomitance between the object which is outside and the siikiira-knowledge which is inside the mind.

(We ask:) Where did the Buddhists for whom the wordly objects are always inferable and never perceivable) see or realize the knowledge of invariable concomitance such as if there is an object there is the knowledge of the form of that object and if that object is removed the knowledge has no form?

Note 40: If an existence of a thing is to be established it should be by some pramapa. The Buddhists accept only two pramiil}a s: pratyak~a and anumiina. First, J ayanta shows that inference is not capable of establishing the existence of an object of knowledge.

Text 41 (p. 42,1-4): niipi pratyak~o 'rthal} iikiiradvayiinupalambhiit. abhyupagame ciinavasthiiprasangiit. arthiikiiro hi niriikiirajfliinagamyo na bhavatiti jiiiineniikiiravatii grhyate; so 'yam idiinirp jiiiiniikiiro 'pi griihyatviit anyeniikiiravatii grhyate, so 'py anyeneti. Translation 41: Nor, the objects can be perceived according to their

theory because no body realizes two forms at a time (one of the siikiira knowledge which is the means and the other of the object). If it (i.e. realization of two forms of knowledge) is accepted there would arise the contingency of the fallacy known as anavasthii. Thus, since the form of an object cannot be realized by the knowledge (the means) which has no form or reflection of

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NATURE OF PRAMAf:lA

that object) , it (the object) is realized by the knowledge having the fonn or reflected of that object. Now, that fonn of knowledge (of that object) also becomes an object of some other knowledge and as such it is to be realized by some other knowledge having the fonn of reflection of that, earlier knowledge. This knowledge of the earlier knowledge also requires some other knowledge having a particular form for its realization or knowledge, and so on and so forth. Thus, the fault of the anavasthii.

Note 41: Once one accepts the view that an object is to be revealed by only that knowledge which has the form of that object, this fault of anavasthii is unavoidable. So, one can never perceive the object if it is of the fonn of jiiiiniikiira only.

Text42 (p. 42,5-9): atha vii artho niriikiirajiiiinagriihyatiirp nopayiititi svagriihake jiiiiniitmani samarpitiitmii bhavatiti siikiirarp jiiiinam evedarp sampannam iti punar artho 'nya.p kalpaniya.p, so 'pi griihya­tviit svagriihakasya siikiiratvasiddhaye tatraiva Iiyata iti siikiirarp jiiiinam eviivasi~.;;yata iti punar anyo 'rtha iti ittham anavasthii. Translation 42: The anavasthii can be shown in another way also. As an

object cannot be realized by a knowledge having no fonn, it (the object) offers itself to the knowledge which will reveal it and thereby becomes one with knowledge. (In that case there is no object left outside.) Therefore, another object is to be postulated or inferred. That too, being an object, becomes one with the means (knowledge) in order to make it (knowledge) siikiira. Therefore, what remains even at this step is simply a knowledge having a particular fonn. It again requires an object and therefore another object is to be inferred and so on and so forth. Thus the fault of aniivasthii.

Note 42: There is a step-by-step explanation of the fault of anavasthii presented by the Granthibhaiiga(p.lO). Since the artha has to be only one, since without the arthiikiira, the knowledge cannot be the revealer pramiiiJa, the arthiikiira will keep on making the pramiiiJa siikiirii and it will never stop. The result is this that one can never know the object.

Thus, if one holds the Y ogacara-view, one cannot establish the existence of an object of knowledge.

Text 43 (p. 42,9-13): pratikarmavyavasthii tu janakatvanibandhanii bhavi~yati, vastusvabhiivasyiiparyanuyojyatviit. siikiirapak~e 'pi pary­anuyogasiimyamityiidi sarvarp upari~tiit savistaram abhidhiisyate. siik.iirapak~e 'pica na pramiiiJiit vyatiriktarp phalam upadarsitam ity asatpak~a eviiyam. Translation 43: The settlement namely, this is the knowledge of x and

this is the knowledge of y is possible (according to our doctrine) because the object is considered as the producer of the knowledge.

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V.N.JHA

[On this you argued that as object is a jmwka, eyes etc. are also janakas and therefore, they (eyes etc.) should also be revealed by the knowledge.] To this we say it is the nature of the knowledge which reveals only the object and not the karaiJa (i.e. eyes etc.).

We can as well ask you on this point that even in your case of siikiira knowledge how is it that the knowledge gets the form of the object and not of the eyes etc. which are auxiliary means according to you? Therefore, your objection and your own position both are similar. All this will be discussed in detail later.

As in the theory of siikiira-knowledge also a pramii.I}a is not different from the result, it is not a good theory.

Note 43: The Granthibhariga clarifies vastu-svabhiivasya aparyan­yojyatviit as follows: - yadi briiyiit - tulye kiirakatve katham artha­syaiva pratibhiisyatvam na cak$uriider iti? tatra uttaramvastusvabhiivo 'yam iti tathii ca bhavadbhir api paryanuyuktai!J 'tulye janakatve katham arthasyaiva iikiiragriihi jiiiinam na ak;')ii.I}iim' iti vastusvabhiiva­patha ity eva uttaram deyam. (p.lO)

2.0 CONCLUSION

Following conclusions emerge from the understanding of the above dialogue:

(1) It is the basic philosophical frame-works of both, the Indian Realists and the Indian Idealists, which prompt their respective arguments. In Indian Idealism of the type of the Vijiiiinaviida, since a thing can exist only in the form of a cognition, how can they accept non-knowledge as the nature of pramii.I}a ? Similarly, according to the Indian Realism of the type of niriikara-jiiiina-viida of the Naiyayikas, when the thing has a separate existence independent of its cognition what is the necessity to disturb the common-sense view of a process and its result?

(2) While the Indian Realists base these argument on the basis of producer and produced - pramiipa, the producer and pramii, the produced - the Indian Idealists depend on the notion of revealer and revealed, pramii.I}a being 'the revealer' and the pramii, being 'the revealed'. It is this reason that Jayantabhatra's concept of pramii.I}a was criticized by the Jaina logician Prabhacandra Siiri (11th Century A.D.) in his PrameyakamalamiirtaiJda (Edited by Pdt Mahendrakumar Shastri, Nimaya Sagar Press, 1941, pp.7-13).

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NATURE OF PRA.MA~A.

SELEC1ED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Sanskrit Texts

1. Abllidharmako§abhJ~yam of Vasubandhu, Edited by P.Pradhan, K.P.Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna, 1975.

2. Dhmmottarapradipa of Dharmottara, Edited by Pal)9ita Dalsukhbhai Malvania, K.P. Jayaswal Resear·ch Institute, Patna, Revised second edition, 1971.

3. Nyaya-Dar§ana of Gautama, Edited by M.M. Ganganatha Jha, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1925.

4. Nyiiyamaiijari of Jayanta, Par·t I and II, Edited by Pdt. K.S. Var·dadirya, Oriental Research Institute, Mysorc, 1969,1983.

5. Nyiiyamaii}migranthibharlga of Cakradhar·a, Edited by Nagin J. Shal), L.D.Institue of lndology, Ahmedabad, 1972.

6. PramiiQavmttika of Dharmakirti, Edited by Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, Bauddha Bhiirati, Var·anasi, 1968.

7. Pnuncyakamalamiirt~ga of Prabhacandra Siiri, Edted by Pt.Mahendra Kumar Shastri, Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay, 1941.

English Translation

1. Bhattachar·ya, J anaki Vallabha, Nyaya-Maiijmi: The Compendium of Indian Speculative Logic, Vol.I, Motilal Banar·sidass, Delhi, 1978.

2. Chattopadhyay, D.P. and Gangopadhyay M.K., Nyaya-Siilra with Vatsyayana's Commentary, Complete English Translation, Indian Studies, Calcutta,1987.

3. Jha, V.N., NyJyamaiiJmi(Ahnika 1), English Translation, Indian Books Centre, New Delhi, 1995.

t This resear·ch work fmms the part of my project on "The Interaction between Hindu Philosophy and Buddhism in Medieval India", which was supported by the Peace Nakajima Foundation, Tokyo, Japan. I am thankful to the Foundation. I am also thankful to Prof. Junsho Kato who kindly extended an invitation to me to work in the Department of Indian Philosophy, University of Nagoya, Japan during October 1995 to December 1995. I benefited much from the discussions not only with Prof. Kato but also with Prof. Toshihiro Wada and Mr. Ko Endo.

Professor and Director Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit University ofPoona

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