CHAPTER 1

Reserve Bank of India

1.1 INTRODUCTION ABOUT RBI

The Reserve Bank of India was established on April 1st, 1935 in accordance with the provisions

of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934. This marked the culmination of prolonged efforts,

spanning more than a century, to setup a central bank in the country.

1.2 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BANK

The efforts to setup a central bank in India started way back in January 1773, when Warren

Hastings the then governor of Bengal recommended the establishment of a ‘General Bank in

Bengal and Bahar’. The Bank was setup in April 1773, but it proved to be only a short lived

experiment. The amalgamation of the three presidency banks was finally effected in 1921, and

the Imperial Bank of India was established. Though primarily a commercial bank, the Imperial

Bank undertook certain central banking functions also in particular, the function of bankers to

the government and to some extent the banker’s bank. However the regulation of note issue and

the management of foreign exchange became the direct responsibility of the Central

Government. In 1926, the Royal Commission on Indian currency and finance (Popularly known

as the Hilton Young Commission), recommended that the dichotomy of the functions and

division of the responsibility for control of currency and credit should be ended. The commission

therefore suggested the establishment of a central bank, to be called the ‘Reserve Bank of India’,

by charter, independently of the Imperial Bank, whose separate continuance was considered

necessary for enlargement of banking facilities throughout the country.

i

The Gold Standard and the Reserve Bank of India Bill to give effect to the commission’s

recommendation, introduced in the Indian Legislative Assembly in January 1927, did not make

much headway and was dropped on account of sharp differences of the Bank’s ownership and

constitution and composition of its Board of Directors. The issue emerged again in 1930-31 in

the context of the debate on constitutional reforms for the country. The white paper on the Indian

Constitutional Reforms published in 19333, underscored in its proposals the transfer of the

responsibility at the centre from British to Indian hands, and the need for establishment of

Reserve Bank of India free from political influence. Meanwhile, the Indian Central Banking

Enquiry Committee (1931) had also strongly recommended the establishment of Reserve Bank

of India at the earliest. These events lead to a fresh Bill being introduced in the Indian

Legislative Assembly on December 22nd, 1933 and by the Council of State on February 16, 1934.

It received the Governor General’s assent on March 5th 1934. Certain Sections of the Reserve

Bank of India Act were brought into force on January 1st, 1935 and rest of the sections on April

1, 1935. After the completion of preliminaries, the Bank commenced operations on April 1,

1935.

1.3 CORE FUNCTIONS OF THE BANK

The basic function of the bank, according to the preamble of the reserve bank of India act is to ‘

regulate the issue of bank notes and the keeping of reserves with a view to securing monetary

stability in India and generally to operate the currency and credit of the country to its advantage.’

This function imposes on the bank the responsibility of:

Operating monetary policy for ensuring price stability and ensuring adequate financial

resources for development purposes

Promotion of an efficient financial system and

Meeting the currency requirement of the public

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In the process of discharging these responsibilities the bank, over the years, has acquired a wide

range of promotional and developmental roles. The functions of the bank also warrant a

complementary impact on the government’s efforts to accelerate and sustain growth of the

economy through planned development process and to realize its socio-economic goals.

The demands and events during the first 15 years of the bank’s existence were marked by the

consolidation of its traditional central banking functions, namely, those of note issue and banker

to the government, apart from attending to the problem of war and post-war finance, repatriation

of sterling debt, setting up of a system of exchange control and tackling the banking an monetary

problems which arose from the partition of the country.

The bank functions as the note issue authority, banker’s bank, banker to the government and

regulator of the financial system. The bank has the sole right to issue currency notes and also acts

as the banker to commercial banks, holding custody of their cash reserve and granting them

discretionary financial accommodation. For the performance of its duties as the regulator of

credit, the bank possesses not only the usual instruments of general credit control such as bank

rate, open market operations and the power to vary the reserve requirements of banks, but also

extensive powers of selective and direct credit regulation.

Another important function of the bank relates to the conduct of the banking and financial

operations of the government and tendering advice to it on economic matters in general and on

financial problems in particular. The bank advises the government on public debt management

and operationalizes the government borrowing programmes.

The bank has an important role to play in the maintenance of the stability of the external value of

the rupee for the purpose of realizing the viability of external sector and ensuring monetary

stability. The bank also acts as the agent of the government in -respect of India’s membership of

the international monetary fund. It exercises control over payment and receipts arising from

international financial transactions under current and capital accounts and regulates the flow of

foreign exchange for sub serving the objective of control of current account deficit.

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CHAPTER 2

BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS

2.1 ABOUT BIS

The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) is an international organization which fosters

international monetary and financial cooperation and serves as a bank for central banks.

The BIS fulfils this mandate by acting as:

A forum to promote discussion and policy analysis among central banks and within the

international financial community

A centre for economic and monetary research

A prime counterparty for central banks in their financial transactions

Agent or trustee in connection with international financial operations

The head office is in Basel, Switzerland and there are two representative offices: in the Hong

Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China and in Mexico City.

Established on 17 May 1930, the BIS are the world's oldest international financial organization.

As its customers are central banks and international organizations, the BIS does not accept

deposits from, or provide financial services to, private individuals or corporate entities. The BIS

strongly advises caution against fraudulent schemes.

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2.2 BIS MISSION STATEMENT

“Excellence in service to central banks and financial authorities”

The BIS

Aims at promoting monetary and financial stability

Acts as a forum for discussion and cooperation among central banks and the financial

community

Acts as a bank to central banks and international organizations

BIS staff emphasise

Excellence in performance

Highest ethical standards

Professional discretion

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CHAPTER 3

ROLE OF BOARD FOR FINANCIAL SUPERVISION (BFS)

The board for financial supervison was setup 1994 as a committee of the Central Board of Directors of the Reserve Bank of India. The prime objective of BFS is to undertake consolidated supervision of the financial sector comprising commercial banks, financial institutions and non-

banking finance companies. The Board meets once in every month. It considers inspection reports and other supervisory issues placed before it by the supervisory departments. BFS through the Audit Sub-Committee also aims at upgrading the quality of the statutory audit and internal audit functions in banks and financial institutions. The audit sub-committee includes Deputy Governor as the chairman and two Directors of the Central Board as members.The BFS oversees the functioning of Department of Banking Supervision (DBS), Department of Non-Banking Supervision (DNBS) and Financial Institutions Division (FID) and gives directions on the regulatory and supervisory issues.

FUNCTIONS

Some of the initiatives taken by BFS include:

1. Restructuring of the system of bank inspections2. Introduction of off-site surveillance,3. Strengthening of the role of statutory auditors and4. Strengthening of the internal defences of supervised institutions.

The Audit Sub-committee of BFS has reviewed the current system of concurrent audit, norms of empanelment and appointment of statutory auditors, the quality and coverage of statutory audit reports, and the important issue of greater transparency and disclosure in the published accounts of supervised institutions.

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DEPARTMENT OF BANKING SUPERVISION (DBS) “The Fortress against Distress”

3.1 FUNCTIONS AND WORKING OF DBS

3.1.1 Organization of the Supervision Function

Prior to the year 1993, the supervision and regulation of commercial banks was handled by the

Department of Banking Operations & Development (DBOD). In December 1993 the Department

of Supervision was carved out of the DBOD with the objective of segregating the supervisory

role from the regulatory functions of RBI.

The Department of Banking Supervision at present exercises the supervisory role relating to

commercial banks in the following forms:

a) Preparation of independent inspection programmes for different financial institutions.

b) Undertaking scheduled and special on-site inspections, off-site surveillance while ensuring

follow-up and compliance of the regulations framed by the Reserve Bank of India.

c) Determination of the criteria for appointment of statutory and special auditors and also the

assessment of audit performance and disclosure standards.

d) Dealing with frauds in the financial sector.

e) Exercising supervisory intervention in the implementation of regulations which includes –

recommendation for removal of managerial and other persons, suspension of business,

amalgamation, merger/winding up, issuance of directives and imposition of penalties.

3.1.2 Supervisory Process of DBS

The major way of supervision of the financial sector in India or for that matter anywhere in the

world is through inspections. The process of inspection focuses mainly on those aspects which

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are crucial to the financial soundness of the banks, for the past decade or so there has been a shift

towards risk management which started with the “Basel Committee on Banking Regulation and

Supervisory practices”. Areas related to internal control, credit management, overseas branch

operations, profitability, compliance with prudential regulations, developmental aspects, proper

valuation of asset/ liability portfolio investment portfolio, and the bank’s role in social lending

are covered in the course of this inspection. The department undertakes annual inspection of

commercial banks at the end of which a supervisory letter is sent to the bank based on the

findings of the inspection and a monitor able action plan is given to the bank for the rectification

of those deficiencies.

3.1.3 Onsite Inspections—Banks

The Department of banking supervision uses a model called CAMELS (Capital adequacy, Asset

quality, Management, Earnings appraisal, Liquidity and Systems & controls) which is an

accepted model worldwide for the onsite inspection of Banks. This method avoids those aspects

which do not have a direct bearing on either the internal management of the bank or the

evaluation of the bank as a whole. The method was first introduced in India in the year 1998 and

has been reviewed by 2001. The department also carries out customer audits to evaluate the

quality of customer service at the branches of commercial banks. Some of the public sector

banks have also been placed under special monitoring, with a Senior Officer in the jurisdictional

Regional Office of the Bank entrusted with the special monitoring efforts. The Deputy

Governor / Executive Director in-charge of banking supervision call the CEOs of those banks,

wherein serious deficiencies have been reported in the inspection reports, for a discussion on the

specific steps the bank’s top management would need to take to improve its financial strength

and operational soundness.

3.1.4 Off-Site Monitoring and Surveillance Systems (OSMOS)--Banks

As in the case of Offsite monitoring and Surveillance, a proper monitoring system was put in

place in the year 1996 by the Reserve Bank of India. The first tranche of OSMOS returns require

quarterly reporting on assets, liabilities and off balance-sheet exposures, CRAR, operating results

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for the quarter, asset quality and large credit exposures in respect of domestic operations by all

banks in India. Data on connected and related lending and profile of ownership, control and

management are also obtained in respect of Indian banks. Bank profiles containing bank-wide

database on all important aspects of bank functioning including global operations were obtained

for the years commencing from 1994 and are being updated annually on an on-going basis. The

database provides information on managerial and staff productivity areas besides furnishing

important ratios on certain financial growth and supervisory aspects of the bank’s functioning.

Analysis of financial and managerial aspects under the reporting system is done on quarterly

basis in a computerized environment in respect of banks and reviews are placed before BFS for

its perusal and further directions. The second tranche of returns covering liquidity and interest

rate risk exposures were introduced in June 1999. To accommodate the increased data and

analysis required by the second tranche of returns, a project to upgrade the OSMOS database has

been completed and the new processing system has been put in place for the Returns

commencing from the quarter ended September 2000. Trend analysis reports based on certain

important macro level growth/performance indicators are placed before BFS at periodical

intervals. Some of the important reports generated by the Department include half-yearly review

of the performance of banks, half-yearly key banking statistics, analysis of impaired credits,

analysis of large credits, analysis of call money borrowings, analysis of non SLR investments,

etc. The Bank also provides details of peer group performance under various parameters of

growth and operations for the banks of a comparative business size to motivate them to do self

assessment and strive for excellence. The Indian banks conducting overseas operations report the

assets and liabilities, problem credits, maturity mismatches, large exposures, currency position

on quarterly basis and country exposure, operating results etc. on an annual basis. The reporting

system has been reviewed and rationalized in 1999 in consultation with the banks and the revised

system put in place in June 2000. The revised off-site returns focus on information relating to

quality and performance of overseas investment and credit portfolio, implementation of risk

management processes, earning trends, and viability of the branches.

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3.1.5 All India Development Financial Institutions

Quarterly returns have been designed based on data on the liabilities and assets as well as data on

sources and deployment of funds.

3.1.6 Non-Banking Financial Companies

Off-site surveillance of NBFCs involves scrutiny of various statutory returns (quarterly/half

yearly/annual), balance sheets, profit and loss account, auditors’ reports, etc. A format for

conducting the off-site surveillance of the companies with asset size of Rs.100 crore and above

has also been devised.

3.2 FUTURE AGENDA OF DBS

3.2.1 Consultative Process: One of the major changes brought about in the supervisory

functioning is to introduce a consultative process with banks preceding the introduction of major

measures. The guidelines on Asset-Liability Management (ALM) and on comprehensive Risk

Management Systems have been finalized in 1999 on the basis of feedback received from banks

and the banks advised to implement the guidelines. The supervisory focus in the coming years

will be to monitor the progress of implementation of these systems and to ensure their full

coverage. Consultative process has also been followed while introducing the guidelines for

investment in non-SLR securities and review of reporting system covering overseas branches of

Indian banks.

3.2.2 Risk-Based Supervision: A risk based supervisory regime as a means of more efficient

allocation of supervisory resources have been under consideration. The risk based supervision

project, which was initially guided by international consultants with the assistance of Department

for International Development (UK), would lead to prioritization of selection and determining of

x

frequency and length of supervisory cycle, targeted appraisals, and allocation of supervisory

resources in accordance with the risk perception of the supervised institutions. The Risk Based

Approach will also facilitate the implementation of the supervisory review pillar of the proposed

New Capital Accord, which requires that national supervisors set capital ratios for banks based

on their risk profile.

3.2.3 Prompt Corrective Action: To guard against regulatory forbearance and to ensure that

regulatory intervention is consistent across institutions and is in keeping with the extent of the

problem, a framework for Prompt Corrective Action has been developed. The PCA framework,

which will link regulatory action to quantitative measures of performance, compliance and

solvency such as CRAR, NPA levels and profitability, has been circulated for discussion and

suggestions to a wider audience of banks and interested public, and would now be considered by

the BFS before being implemented.

3.2.4 Consolidated Supervision: An approach of consolidated supervision that, while leaving

the responsibility of supervision of bank subsidiaries to their respective regulators, will allow

bank supervisors to obtain a consolidated view of the operations of bank groups has been

approved. This will also require greater coordination between the different supervisors in the

financial sector. Quarterly reporting by parent banks on key areas of functioning of subsidiaries

has been introduced from the quarter ending September 2000. The banks are now being required

to annex the financial statements of their subsidiaries along with their annual accounts. A

Working Group has been set up to look into the introduction of consolidated accounting and it

would submit its report by May 2001. Thus, the components of this diversified approach are

being gradually put in place.

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3.2.5 Skills Up Gradation: The skill-set required by supervisors has changed radically over the

past few years. With the introduction of technology and new products and the move towards

risk-based supervision, the demands on supervision have also increased. Thus, meeting the

training needs of supervisors in this changing environment will be a priority area and will be

monitored continuously.

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CHAPTER 4

Capital Standards

4.1 THE EVOLUTION OF CAPITAL STANDARDS

It is interesting to note that till the 1980s, the risk-weighted approach to capital adequacy was not

in vogue but the bank’s capital was measured through the traditional gearing ratios. During the

1980s, the increasing competition amongst the international banks and rapid growth in their

assets had led to concerns about their deteriorating capital levels. This concern was aggravated

by the debt crisis in some of the emerging markets. While the national authorities and regulators

in many countries began exhorting their banks to improve their capital ratios, it was realized that

varying approaches to capital measurement across countries made international comparisons

difficult and there was a need to evolve an internationally consistent approach to capital

measurement. Moreover, the market developments by the mid-1980s, coupled with the

regulatory pressures for improving the capital ratios for the on-balance sheet activities of the

banks, had also witnessed a phenomenal growth in the banks’ off-balance sheet business –

which, at that time, was not subject to regulatory capital charge. In this background, the efforts

were intensified in 1986 to evolve a common and risk-weighted approach to capital measurement

rather than the traditional gearing measure. During 1987, the “Basle Committee on Banking

Regulations and Supervisory Practices”, as it was then named, arrived at a consensus on 8% as

the minimum capital adequacy ratio. After a period of consultation with the banks around the

world, this framework was formally adopted in 1988 and was widely endorsed by the

supervisory community, world-wide. This standard came to be commonly known as the Basel

Accord or Basel I Framework. It was the first ever attempt at harmonizing the banks’ capital

standards across the countries, for securing greater international competitive equality and to

obviate regulatory capital as a source of competitive inequality.

The Accord, in its original form, addressed only the credit risks in the banks’ operations. It was

only in 1996 that an amendment was made to cover the market risks also. The Accord had

xiii

adopted a risk-sensitive approach for making the banks’ capital more responsive to the riskiness

of their operations. This meant that a bank with a higher risk profile would have to maintain a

higher quantum of regulatory capital while also ensuring the minimum capital ratio. The

framework also stipulated, for the first time, a regulatory capital charge for the off-balance sheet

business of the banks so as to capture their risk exposures more comprehensively. Pursuant to the

recommendations of the Committee on the Financial System (the first Narsimham Committee,

1991), this framework was implemented in India in 1992 in a phased manner.

4.2 DRAWBACKS OF BASEL I AND THE ROAD TO BASEL II

With the passage of time, it was realized that the Basel I framework had several limitations. The

limitations related mainly to the underlying approach as also a less-than-comprehensive scope of

the Accord in capturing the entire risk universe of the banking entities.

First, the Accord had a broad-brush approach under which the entire exposures of banks were

categorized into three broad risk buckets viz., sovereign, banks and corporate, with each category

attracting a risk weight of zero, 20 and 100 per cent, respectively. Such a risk weighting scheme

did not provide for sufficient calibration of the counterparty risk since, for instance, a corporate

with “AAA” rating and one with “C” rating would attract identical risk weight of 100 per cent

and require the same regulatory capital charge, despite significant difference in their credit

standing. This, in turn, engendered a rather perverse incentive for the banks to acquire higher-

risk customers in pursuit of higher returns, without necessitating a higher capital charge. Such

bank behavior could potentially heighten the risk profile of the banking systems as a whole. The

design of the Accord was, therefore, viewed as distorting the incentive structure in the banking

markets and dissuading better risk management.

Second, the Accord addressed only the credit risk and market risk in the banks’ operations,

ignoring several other types of risks inherent in any banking activity. For instance, the

operational risk, that is, the risk of human error or failure of systems leading to financial loss,

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was not at all addressed – as were the liquidity risk, credit concentration risk, interest rate risk in

the banking book, etc.

Third, since 1988, the emergence of innovative financial products had transformed the contours

of the banking industry and its business model the world over. The credit-risk transfer products,

such as securitization and credit derivatives, enabled removal of on-balance sheet exposures

from the books of the banks when they perceived that the regulatory capital requirement for such

exposures was too high and hiving off such exposures would be a better strategy. The Basel I

framework did not accommodate such innovations and was, thus, outpaced by the market

developments.

In this background, a need was felt to create a more comprehensive and risk-sensitive capital

adequacy framework to address the infirmities in the Basel-I Accord. The Basel Committee on

Banking Supervision (BCBS), therefore, after a world-wide consultative process and several

impact assessment studies, evolved a new capital regulation framework, called “International

Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework”, which was

released in June 2004. The revised framework has come to be commonly known as “Basel II”

framework and seeks to foster better risk management practices in the banking industry.

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CHAPTER 5

BASEL II

According to Ms. Susan Schmidt Bies, former governor of the Federal Reserve System of USA,

“The major objectives of Basel II include creating a better linkage between the minimum

regulatory capital and risk, enhancing market discipline, supporting a level playing field in an

increasingly integrated global financial system, establishing and maintaining a minimum capital

cushion sufficient to foster financial stability in periods of adversity and uncertainty, and

grounding risk measurement and management in actual data and formal quantitative techniques.

Critical to Basel II is the effort to improve risk measurement and management, especially at our

largest, most complex organizations.”

It would be reasonable to infer that the main focus of the new framework (Basel II) is on

providing the right incentives to the banks to adopt data-based, quantitative risk management

systems to be able to adopt the advanced risk-sensitive approaches of the revised framework,

which, in turn, would contribute to systemic and financial stability.

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Three Pillars

Structure

Minimum Capital

Requirements

Market

Discipline

Supervisory

Review process

Credit Risk

Market Risk

Operational Risk

Supervisory Review

Capital Adequacy assessment for all

risks

Enhanced Disclosures

Classifications under 3 Pillars

Figure: 5.1

5.1 SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF BASEL II

The revised capital adequacy norms is applicable uniformly to all Commercial Banks (except

Local Area Banks and Regional Rural Banks), both at the solo level (global position) as well as

at the consolidated level.

A Consolidated bank is defined as a group of entities where a licensed bank is the controlling

entity. A consolidated bank will include all group entities under its control, except the exempted

entities. A consolidated bank may exclude group companies which are engaged in insurance

business and businesses not pertaining to financial services. A consolidated bank has to maintain

a minimum Capital to Risk-weighted Assets Ratio (CRAR) as applicable to a bank on an

ongoing basis.

5.2 BASEL II: IMPLEMENTATION

One of the unique aspects of the Basel II accord is its comprehensive approach to risk

management in the banking entities categorized as the 3 pillars namely:

Pillar I – The minimum capital ratio

Pillar II – The supervisory review process and

Pillar III – The market discipline

Keeping in view Reserve Bank’s goal to have consistency and harmony with international

standards, it has been decided that all commercial banks in India (excluding Local Area Banks

and Regional Rural Banks) shall adopt Standardized Approach (SA) for credit risk and Basic

Indicator Approach (BIA) for operational risk. Banks shall continue to apply the Standardized

Duration Approach (SDA) for computing capital requirement for market risks.

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5.2.1 What Is Parallel Run?

With a view to ensuring smooth transition to the Revised Framework and with a view to

providing opportunity to banks to streamline their systems and strategies, banks were advised to

have a parallel run of the revised Framework. The Boards of the banks were supposed to review

the results of the parallel run on a quarterly basis. The broad elements which were needed to be

covered during the parallel run are as under:

i) Banks are supposed to apply the prudential guidelines on capital adequacy – both current

guidelines and the guidelines as per the New Revised Framework – on an on-going basis and

compute their Capital to Risk Weighted Assets Ratio (CRAR) under both the guidelines.

ii) An analysis of the bank's CRAR under both the guidelines should be reported to the board at

quarterly intervals.

iii) A copy of the quarterly reports to the Board supposed to be submitted to the Reserve Bank,

one each to Department of Banking Supervision, Central Office and Department of Banking

Operations and Development, Central Office. While reporting the above analysis to the board,

banks are also supposed to furnish a comprehensive assessment of their compliance with the

other requirements relevant under the Revised Framework, which includes the following, at the

minimum:

a) Board approved policy on utilization of the credit risk mitigation techniques, and

collateral management

b) Board approved policy on disclosures

c) Board approved policy on Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP)

along with the capital requirement as per ICAAP

d) Adequacy of bank's MIS to meet the requirements under the New Capital Adequacy

Framework, the initiatives taken for bridging gaps, if any, and the progress made in this

regard

xviii

e) Impact of the various elements / portfolios on the bank's CRAR under the revised

framework

f) Mechanism in place for validating the CRAR position computed as per the New

Capital Adequacy Framework and the assessments / findings/ recommendations of these

validation exercises

g) Action taken with respect to any advice / guidance / direction given by the Board in

the past on the above aspects.

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CHAPTER 6

PILLAR I – MINIMUM CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS (MCR)

The Pillar 1 provides a menu of alternative approaches, from simple to advanced ones, for

determining the regulatory capital towards credit risk, market risk and operational risk, to cater to

the wide diversity in the banking system across the world.

xx

Basel 1/

Basic Approach

Standardized

Approach

Foundation

IRB approach

Advanced

IRB approach

One size fits all

No capital incentives for

better credit risk management

Risk based

Incentive to manage risk

Simple Sophisticated

Low level of detail High level of detail

Little sensitivity to risk Highly sensitivity to risk

Methods of calculation of Pillar I MCR

Figure: 6.1

There are 2 approaches to calculate the credit risk of the banks:

6.1 THE STANDARDIZED APPROACH

The Standardized Approach follows the pattern of Basel 1 by assigning standard risk-weights to

different classes of assets to adjust their values. However it does this in a far more sophisticated

and risk-sensitive way than Basel I. It makes the important innovation of allowing risk-weights

for loans and other credit exposures to be based on the external rating of the counterparty or loan

facility. It sets up a regime for supervisors to recognize external credit rating agencies for this

purpose. The Reserve Bank has for this purpose identified the external credit rating agencies that

meet the eligibility criteria specified under the revised Framework. Banks may rely upon the

ratings assigned by the external credit rating agencies chosen by the Reserve Bank for assigning

risk weights for capital adequacy purposes.

6.1.1 Claims against Corporations

Assets that represent claims against corporations (including insurance companies) are assigned a

risk weight according to credit rating assigned to the corporation or the asset. The credit rating

must be assigned by an external recognized rating agency that satisfies certain criteria described

in the Accord.

Credit Assesment AAA to AA- A+ to A- BBB+ to BBB- BB+ to B- Below B- UnratedRisk Weights 0% 20% 50% 100% 150% 100%

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External Ratings model

Table: 6.1

The above is just an example of Ratings followed by Standard and Poor’s (an external rating

agency) for claims against commercial borrowings.

6.1.2 Retail Exposures (Loans to Individuals and Small Businesses)

Loans to individuals and small businesses, including credit card loans, installment loans, student

loans, and loans to small business entities are risk weighted at 75 percent, if the bank supervisor

finds that the bank’s retail portfolio is diverse (for example, no single asset exceeds .2 percent of

the entire retail portfolio. Under Basel I retail and small business loans are placed under the

100% risk weight basket.

6.1.3 Residential Real Estate

Prudently written residential mortgage loans are risk weighted at 35 percent. Under Basel I

residential mortgage loans are placed in the 50 percent basket.

6.1.4 Commercial Real Estate Loans

In general, loans secured by commercial real estate are assigned to the 100 percent risk basket.

However, the Accord permits regulators the discretion to assign mortgages on office and multi-

purpose commercial properties, as well as multi-family residential properties, in the 50 percent

basket subject to certain prudential limits. Basel I – commercial real estate assigned to the 100

percent basket

6.1.5 Claims against Sovereign Governments and Central Banks

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Assets that represent claims against Governments or Central Banks are risk weighted according

to the risk rating assigned to that Government by recognized Export Credit Agencies. The

correlation between credit rating and risk weight is as follows: Basel I assigns claims against

OECD member countries to the 0% basket.

6.1.6 Claims on Banks and Securities Firms

Countries are given two options, but must apply the same option to all banks within their

country. The first option risk weights claims on banks and securities firms at one risk weight

category below the country’s risk weight. The second option is to risk weight banks and

securities firms based on an external credit assessment score, and with lower risk weights for

short term obligations (original maturity is of 3 months or less). Basel I assign a 20 percent

basket to claims on banks and securities firms organized in OECD member countries.

6.2 THE FOUNDATION INTERNAL RATINGS BASED APPROACH

Subject to certain minimum conditions and disclosure requirements, banks that have received

supervisory approval to use the IRB approach may rely on their own internal estimates of risk

components in determining the capital requirement for a given exposure. The risk components

include measures of the probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD), the exposure at

default (EAD), and effective maturity (M). In some cases, banks may be required to use a

supervisory value as opposed to an internal estimate for one or more of the risk components.

6.2.1 Probability of Default (PD)

The probability of default is the likelihood that a loan will not be repaid and will fall into default.

PD is calculated for each client who has a loan (for wholesale banking) or for a portfolio of

clients with similar attributes (for retail banking). The credit history of the counterparty /

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portfolio and nature of the investment are taken into account to calculate the PD. There are many

alternatives for estimating the probability of default. Default probabilities may be estimated from

a historical data base of actual defaults using modern techniques like logistic regression. Default

probabilities may also be estimated from the observable prices of credit default swaps, bonds,

and options on common stock. The simplest approach, taken by many banks, is to use external

ratings agencies such as Egan Jones, Fitch, Moody's Investors Service, or Standard and Poors for

estimating PDs from historical default experience.

6.2.2 Loss Given Default (LGD)

LGD is the fraction of Exposure at Default (EAD) that will not be recovered following default.

Loss Given Default is facility-specific because such losses are generally understood to be

influenced by key transaction characteristics such as the presence of collateral and the degree of

subordination. LGD is calculated in different ways, but the most popular is 'Gross' LGD, where

total losses are divided by EAD. Another method is to divide Losses by the unsecured portion of

a credit line (where security covers a portion of EAD - Exposure at Default). This is known as

'Blanco' LGD. If collateral value is zero in the last case then Blanco LGD is equivalent to Gross

LGD.

6.2.3 Exposure at Default (EAD)

EAD can be seen as an estimation of the extent to which a bank may be exposed to a counter-

party in the event of that counterparty’s default. It is a measure of potential exposure (in

currency) as calculated by a Basel Credit Risk Model for the period of 1 year or until maturity

whichever is sooner. Based on Basel Guidelines, Exposure at Default (EAD) for loan

commitments measures the amount of the facility that is likely to be drawn if a default occurs.

All these loss estimates should seek to fully capture the risks of an underlying exposure. Under

Foundation IRB approach EAD is calculated taking account of the underlying asset, forward

valuation, facility type and commitment details. This value does not take account of guarantees,

collateral or security (i.e. ignores Credit Risk Mitigation Techniques with the exception of on-

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balance sheet netting where the effect of netting is included in Exposure At Default). For on-

balance sheet transactions, EAD is identical to the nominal amount of exposure. On-balance

sheet netting of loans and deposits of a bank to a corporate counterparty is permitted to reduce

the estimate of EAD under certain conditions. For off-balance sheet items, there are two broad

types which the IRB approach needs to address: transactions with uncertain future drawdown,

such as commitments and revolving credits, and OTC foreign exchange, interest rate and equity

derivative contracts.

6.3 ADVANCED INTERNAL RATING BASED APPROACH

Approaches to operational risk are continuing to evolve rapidly, but are not likely in the near

term to attain the precision with which market and credit risk can be quantified. This situation

has posed obvious challenges to the incorporation of a measure of operational risk within pillar

one of the New Accord. Nevertheless, the Committee believes that such inclusion is essential to

ensure that there are strong incentives for banks to continue to develop approaches to operational

risk measurement and to ensure that banks are holding sufficient capital buffers for this risk. It is

clear that a failure to establish a minimum capital requirement for operational risk within the

New Accord would reduce these incentives and result in a reduction of industry resources

devoted to operational risk.

The Committee is prepared to provide banks with an unprecedented amount of flexibility to

develop an approach to calculate operational risk capital that they believe is consistent with their

mix of activities and underlying risks. In the AMA, banks may use their own method for

assessing their exposure to operational risk, so long as it is sufficiently comprehensive and

systematic. The extent of detailed standards and criteria for use of the AMA are limited in order

to accommodate the rapid evolution in operational risk management practices that the Committee

expects to see over the coming years.

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The Committee intends to review progress in regard to operational risk approaches on an

ongoing basis. It has been strongly encouraged by the advances made at those banks that have

been developing operational risk frameworks consistent with the spirit of the AMA.

Management at these banking organizations has concluded that it is possible to develop a flexible

and comprehensive approach to operational risk measurement within their firms.

Internationally active banks and banks with significant operational risk exposure (for example,

specialized processing banks) are expected to adopt over time the more risk sensitive AMA.

Basel II contains two simpler approaches to operational risk: the basic indicator and the

standardized approach, which are targeted to banks with less significant operational risk

exposures. In general terms, the basic indicator and standardized approaches require banks to

hold capital for operational risk equal to a fixed percentage of a specified risk measure.

In the basic indicator approach, the measure is a bank's average annual gross income over the

previous three years. This average, multiplied by a factor of 0.15 set by the Committee, produces

the capital requirement. As a point of entry for the capital calculation, there are no specific

criteria for use of the basic indicator approach. Nevertheless banks using this approach are

encouraged to comply with the Committee's guidance on sound practices for the management

and supervision of operational risk, which was released in February 2003.

In the standardized approach, gross income again serves as a proxy for the scale of a bank's

business operations and thus the likely scale of the related operational risk exposure for a given

business line. However, rather than calculate capital at the firm level as under the basic indicator

approach, banks must calculate a capital requirement for each business line. This is determined

by multiplying gross income by specific supervisory factors determined by the Committee. The

total operational risk capital requirement for a banking organization is the summation of the

regulatory capital requirements across all of its business lines. As a condition for use of the

standardized approach, it is important for banks to have adequate operational risk systems that

comply with the minimum criteria outlined in CP3.

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Banks using the basic indicator or standardized approaches to operational risk are not permitted

to recognize the risk mitigating impact of insurance. However banks using the AMA are

permitted to do so subject to certain conditions

6.4 MARKET RISK UNDER PILLAR I

With regulators becoming more focused on advancing the risk management practices of banks,

they also used the opportunity of revising the original capital adequacy accord and consider other

types of banking risk as needing capital backing. One such risk category has been market risk, a

form of price risk from adverse fluctuations in the market value of a securities portfolio, which

may potentially arise in the wake of various negative scenarios weighing on financial markets.

Inclusion of that risk category was prompted not least by structural changes causing banks to

carry much larger amounts of securities on their balance sheets. Key here is the worldwide

convergence towards a financial structure centered on multi-functional universal banks

combining traditional commercial banking (i.e. taking deposits, making loans) with market-

making investment banking (i.e. acting as brokers, dealers, and underwriters of securities). That

convergence, which has undone decades of separation between those two different types of

banking in such crucial economies as the United States, Japan, and Britain, has been fuelled as

much by financial innovation, most importantly securitization and derivatives, as by regulatory

changes.

Market risk is defined as the risk of losses in on and off-balance-sheet positions arising from

movements in market prices. The risks subject to this requirement are:

• The risks pertaining to interest rate related instruments and equities in the trading book;

• Foreign exchange risk and commodities risk throughout the bank.

6.4.1 Market Risk – The Standardized Measurement Method

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Interest Rate Risk

The minimum capital requirement is expressed in terms of two separately calculated charges, one

applying to the “specific risk” of each security, whether it is a short or a long position, and the

other to the interest rate risk in the portfolio (termed “general market risk”) where long and short

positions in different securities or instruments can be offset. With banks increasingly vested in

the securities markets, they have gone beyond market-making investment banking and have

engaged themselves in either setting up or managing institutional investors with large holdings of

securities, notably mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies. Today’s banks face

not only credit risk (i.e. loan defaults), but also market risk which reflects the possibility of

losses arising from declines in the prices of securities (e.g. stocks, bonds, derivatives) held in its

portfolio.

Specific risk

The capital charge for specific risk is designed to protect against an adverse movement in the

price of an individual security owing to factors related to the individual issuer. In measuring the

risk, offsetting will be restricted to matched positions in the identical issue (including positions

in derivatives). Even if the issuer is the same, no offsetting will be permitted between different

issues since differences in coupon rates, liquidity, call features, etc. mean that prices may diverge

in the short run. Specific risk capital charges for issuer risk “710”. The new capital charges for

“government” and “other” categories will be as follows.

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6.4.2 Market Risk— The Maturity Method

In the maturity method, long or short positions in debt securities and other sources of interest rate

exposures including derivative instruments are slotted into a maturity ladder comprising thirteen

time-bands (or fifteen time-bands in case of low coupon instruments). Fixed rate instruments

should be allocated according to the residual term to maturity and floating-rate instruments

according to the residual term to the next re-pricing date. Opposite positions of the same amount

in the same issues (but not different issues by the same issuer), whether actual or notional, can be

omitted from the interest rate maturity framework, as well as closely matched swaps, forwards,

futures and FRAs which meet the conditions below:

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Table: 6.2

Maturity method: Time-Bands and Weights

Modified Duration:

Modified duration is a measure of the weighted average term to maturity of a security. It is a

useful concept in measuring the price-sensitivity of a security to interest rate movements. The

higher the duration, the higher the price sensitivity of a security to interest rate movement.

6.5 Operational Risk

Three approaches have been finalized for assessing the operational risk capital charge:

1. Basic Standard approach

2. Standardized Approach

3. Advanced Measurement Approachxxx

Table: 6.3

6.5.1. Basic Indicator Approach (BIA)

The Basic Indicator Approach (BIA) is the simplest of all the approaches. Under this approach,

gross income is viewed as a proxy for the scale of operational risk exposure of the bank. Gross

income is defined by the Basel Committee as the net interest income plus net noninterest income.

The operational risk capital charge under the BIA guidelines is calculated as fixed percentage of

average over previous three years of positive annual gross income.

The total capital charge can be calculated as

KBIA = [ ∑(GI1…n × α)]/n

Where

GI = annual gross income,

n = the number of the previous three years for which the GI is positive

α = the fixed percentage of the positive GI

Currently α as set by the committee stands at 15% and is supposed to reflect the industry-wide

level of minimum required regulatory capital (MRC).

Gross annual Income = Net Profit (+) Provisions and contingencies (+) Operating expenses

(Schedule 16) (-) items as defined by the definition as in Basel 2 draft.

The main advantages of the BIA are:

It is easy to implement.

It does not require time or resources to develop other sophisticated models.

It is useful at the primary stage implementation of the Basel II.

This model is particularly applicable for the small and the medium banks.

The chief drawbacks of BIA are:

No account is given to the specifics of the bank’s operational risk exposure and control,

business activities structure, credit rating and other indicators.

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xxxii

It often results in the overestimation of the true amount of the capital required to

capitalize the operational risk.

It is not applicable at the large and internationally active banks.

6.5.2 The Standard Approach (TSA)

In the general standardized approach (TSA), banks’ activities are divided into eight business

lines. Within each business lines, gross income (GI) is a broad indicator that serves as a proxy

for the scale of business operations and operational risk exposure. The capital charge for each

business line is calculated by multiplying GI by a factor, denoted by β, assigned to each business

line. β serves as proxy for the industry-wide relationship between the operational risk loss

experience for a given business line and the aggregate level of GI for that business line.

The total capital charge is calculated as the three year average of the maximum of (a) the simple

summation of the regulatory capital charges across each of the business lines and (b) zero.

Table No: Business Line-wise Betas( β)

Business LinesBeta Factors

(in %)

Corporate finance (β1) 18

Trading and sales (β2) 18

Retail banking (β3) 12

Commercial banking (β4) 15

Payment and settlement (β5) 18

Agency services (β6) 15

Asset management (β7) 12

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Table: 6.4

Retail brokerage (β8) 12

The total capital charge (KTSA) can be expressed as:

KTSA = ∑ (GI1-8 × β1-8)

Where

KTSA= the capital charge under the Standardized Approach.

GI1-8= the average annual level of gross income over the past three years, as defined above in the

Basic Indicator Approach, for each of the eight business lines.

Β1-8 = fixed percent age set by the committee, relating to the level of required capital charge to

the level of GI for each of the eight business lines.

6.5.3 Advanced Measurement Approaches (AMA)

The Advanced measurement approach is the most sophisticated approach currently available,

presented by the Basle Committee. Under the Advanced Measurement Approaches, the

calculation of the regulatory capital requirements for operational risk is based on a bank’s

internal risk measurement system. A bank must satisfy several criteria set out by the committee

before they are permitted to use the Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA). However, within

these criteria, banks are not provided with specification on distributional assumptions to generate

the operational risk measure. So, banks are flexible to use any distribution to calculate the

potential loss.

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The Internal Measurement Approach (IMA)

The Internal Measurement Approach provides discretion to individual banks in the use of

internal loss data. In this approach banks estimate the operational risk capital based on the

measurement of the total expected losses. The IMA approach assumes a fixed, direct relationship

between expected loss (the mean of the loss distribution) and the unexpected loss (the tail of the

distribution). The relationship can be linear; this implies that the capital charge is a simple

multiplication of the expected loss with a fixed number. Or non-linear, implying that total capital

charge will be a more complex function of expected losses; the capital charge is determined by

the product of three parameters:

PE: The probability that an operational risk event occurs over some future horizon.

LGE: The average loss given that an event occurs.

EI: An exposure indicator that is intended to capture the scale of the bank’s activities in a

particular business line.

The product EI x PE x LGE is used to calculate the expected loss (EL) for each of the business

line/loss type combination. The EL is then rescaled to account for the unexpected losses (UL)

using a parameter (), different for each business line/ loss type combination. The total one-year

capital charge (KIMA) is calculated as:

The Expected loss (EL) for each business line and event combination will be calculated with the

following formula:

EL=EI∗PE∗LGE

Combining these parameters, the IMA capital charge for each business line and event type

combination would be:

K ij=γ ij∗EI ij∗PEij∗LGEij=γ ij∗ELij

In this formula we expect a linear relationship between expected losses and the tail of the

distribution. The parameter translates the estimates of expected losses, for the business line and

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event type combination into a capital charge. The γ for each business line and event type

combination would be specified by the supervisor.

The drawbacks of this approach are the assumptions of

1. Perfect correlation between the business line/loss type combinations.

2. Linear relationship between the expected and the unexpected losses.

The loss distribution approach

The Loss Distribution Approach (LDA) is an advanced measurement approach that makes use of

the exact operational loss frequency and severity distributions. Under the LDA the bank's

activities are classified into a matrix of business lines/event type combinations. The number of

business lines and the event type would depend on the complexity of the bank. For a general case

of 8 business lime and 7 event type, we have to deal with 56-cell matrix of possible pairs. For

each pair the key task is to work out the loss severity and the loss frequency distribution. Based

on these two distributions, the bank works out the probability distribution function of the

cumulative operational loss.

The major advantages of the LDA are:

It is highly risk sensitive, making direct use of the bank's internal loss data.

No assumptions are made about the relationship between the expected and the

unexpected losses.

The approach is applicable to banks with solid databases.

The LDA capital charge is accurate if the methodology assumed is correct.

However, while taking the simple sum of VaR measures for calculating the capital charge the

LDA approach assumes perfect correlation between the "business line/event type" combinations.

The drawbacks of the LDA approach are:

Loss distributions may be complicated to estimate.

VaR confidence level is not agreed upon, whether 99.9% confidence level should be

lower or higher is an issue.

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The LDA approach requires extensive internal data for at least 5 years.

The approach is historical in nature as it is based on past data.

The scorecard approach

In the scorecard approach, banks initially determine a level of operational risk capital at the

firm’s business line and over time these amounts will be modified according to the Scorecard.

Banks aims to improve the risk control environment that will reduce both the frequency and

severity of future operational risk losses. By identifying a number of risk indicators for particular

risk types within business lines, one can captures the underlying risk profile of the various

business lines. These risk indicators represents indirectly the altitude of the operational risk. A

combination of risk indicator will be combined into a score, to allocate the altitude of the

operational risk. After a certain time, the performance of these indicators will be assessed. Based

on these assessments one can decide which point must still be improved. Also, based on the

scorecard, one can analyze what was effectively the indirect influence of the indicators on

eventual operational risk losses.

Where the Scorecard approach differs from other approaches (Internal Measurement Approach

and Loss Distribution Approach) is that it relies less exclusively on historical loss data in

determining capital amounts. Instead of this, after the size of the regulatory capital is determined,

its overall size and its allocation across business lines will be modified on a qualitative basis.

However, historical operational risk loss data must be used to validate the results of scorecards.

It is a highly qualitative approach, under which banks determine an initial level of operational

risk capital at the business line level. The amounts are then modified on the basis of scorecards.

The approach aims at reducing both the frequency and the severity of the risks. The scorecard

generally depends on a number of indicators within the business line. The scorecards are

completed by the line personnel at regular intervals.

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CHAPTER 7

PILLAR 2: SUPERVISORY REVIEW PROCESS (SRP)

The second pillar of the New Basel Accord is based on a series of guiding principles, all of

which point to the need for banks to assess their capital adequacy positions relative to their

overall risks, and for supervisors to review and take appropriate actions in response to those

assessments. These elements are increasingly seen as necessary for effective management of

banking organizations and for effective banking supervision, respectively.

The inclusion of a supervisory review element in the New Accord, therefore, provides benefits

through its emphasis on the need for strong risk assessment capabilities by banks and supervisors

alike. Further, it is inevitable that a capital adequacy framework, even the more forward looking

New Accord, will lag to some extent behind the changing risk profiles of complex banking

organizations, particularly as they take advantage of newly available business opportunities.

Accordingly, this heightens the importance of, and attention supervisors must pay to pillar two.

One of the updates which the Basel committee is working on is in relation to stress testing. The

Committee believes it is important for banks adopting the IRB approach to credit risk to hold

adequate capital to protect against adverse or uncertain economic conditions. Such banks will be

required to perform a meaningfully conservative stress test of their own design with the aim of

estimating the extent to which their IRB capital requirements could increase during a stress

scenario. Banks and supervisors are to use the results of such tests as a means of ensuring that

banks hold a sufficient capital buffer. To the extent there is a capital shortfall, supervisors may,

for example, require a bank to reduce its risks so that existing capital resources are available to

cover its minimum capital requirements plus the results of a recalculated stress test.

Other refinements focus on banks' review of concentration risks, and on the treatment of residual

risks that arise from the use of collateral, guarantees and credit derivatives. Further to the pillar

one treatment of securitization, a supervisory review component has been developed, which is

xxxviii

intended to provide banks with some insight into supervisory expectations for specific

securitization exposures. Some of the concepts addressed include significant risk transfer and

considerations related to the use of call provisions and early amortization features. Further,

possible supervisory responses are outlined to address instances when it is determined that a

bank has provided implicit (non-contractual) support to a securitization structure.

The objective of the SRP is to ensure that the banks have adequate capital to support all the

material risks in their business and also to encourage the banks to adopt sophisticated risk

management techniques for monitoring and managing their risks. This, in turn, would require a

well-defined internal assessment process within the banks through which they would determine

the additional capital requirement for all material risks, internally, and would also be able to

assure the RBI that adequate capital is actually held towards their all material risk exposures. The

process of assurance could also involve an active dialogue between the bank and the RBI so that,

when warranted, appropriate intervention could be made to reduce the risk exposure of the bank

or augment / restore its capital. Thus, ICAAP is an important component of the Supervisory

Review Process. The important point here is that the Pillar 1 stipulates only the minimum capital

ratio for the banks whereas the Pillar 2 provides for a bank-specific review by the supervisors to

make an assessment whether all material risks are getting duly captured in the ICAAP of the

bank. If the supervisor is not satisfied in this behalf, it might well choose to prescribe a higher

capital ratio, as per its assessment.

7.1 IMPORTANCE OF SUPERVISORY REVIEW

1. The supervisory review process of the Framework is intended not only to ensure that

banks have adequate capital to support all the risks in their business, but also to

encourage banks to develop and use better risk management techniques in monitoring and

managing their risks.

xxxix

2. The supervisory review process recognizes the responsibility of bank management in

developing an internal capital assessment process and setting capital targets that are

commensurate with the bank’s risk profile and control environment. According to the

Framework, bank management continues to bear responsibility for ensuring that the bank

has adequate capital to support its risks beyond the core minimum requirements.

3. Supervisors are expected to evaluate how well banks are assessing their capital needs

relative to their risks and to intervene, where appropriate. This interaction is intended to

foster an active dialogue between banks and supervisors such that when deficiencies are

identified, prompt and decisive action can be taken to reduce risk or restore capital.

Accordingly, supervisors may wish to adopt an approach to focus more intensely on those

banks with risk profiles or operational experience that warrants such attention.

4. The Basel committee recognizes the relationship that exists between the amount of

capital held by the bank against its risks and the strength and effectiveness of the bank’s

risk management and internal control processes. However, increased capital should not

be viewed as the only option for addressing increased risks confronting the bank. Other

means for addressing risk, such as strengthening risk management, applying internal

limits, strengthening the level of provisions and reserves, and improving internal controls,

must also be considered. Furthermore, capital should not be regarded as a substitute for

addressing fundamentally inadequate control or risk management processes.

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7.3 PRINCIPLES OF SUPERVISORY REVIEW

The Supervisory review is entirely based on four key principles which complement the guidance

given by the Basel committee.

7.3.1 Principle 1 Banks should have a process for assessing the overall capital adequacy

in relation to their risk profile and a strategy for maintaining their capital levels.

The Banks must be able to demonstrate that chosen internal capital targets are well founded and

that these targets are consistent with their overall risk profile and their current operating

environment. In assessing the capital adequacy the bank managements need to be mindful of the

particular stage of the business cycle in which the bank is operating. Rigorous forward looking

stress testing that identifies possible events or changes in market condition that could adversely

impact the Bank, should be performed. Bank management clearly bears primary responsibility

for ensuring that the bank has adequate capital to support its risks.

The Committee enlists 5 major features that form the characteristics of the rigorous process

system, they are as listed below:

Board and senior management oversight;

A sound risk management process is the foundation for an effective assessment of the adequacy

of a bank’s capital position. Bank management is responsible for understanding the nature and

level of risk being taken by the bank and how this risk relates to adequate capital levels. It is also

responsible for ensuring that the formality and sophistication of the risk management processes

are appropriate in light of the risk profile and business plan.

The bank’s board of directors has responsibility for setting the bank’s tolerance for risks. It

should also ensure that management establishes a framework for assessing the various risks,

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develops a system to relate risk to the bank’s capital level, and establishes a method for

monitoring compliance with internal policies. It is likewise important that the board of directors

adopts and supports strong internal controls and written policies and procedures and ensures that

management effectively communicates these throughout the organization.

Sound capital assessment;

The fundamental elements of sound capital assessment include:

1. Policies and procedures designed to ensure that the bank identifies, measures, and reports

all material risks;

2. A process that relates capital to the level of risk;

3. A process that states capital adequacy goals with respect to risk, taking account of the

bank’s strategic focus and business plan; and

4. A process of internal controls reviews and audits to ensure the integrity of the overall

management process.

Comprehensive assessment of risks;

All material risks faced by the bank should be addressed in the capital assessment process.

Credit risk: Banks are supposed to have methodologies that enable them to assess the credit risk

involved in exposures to individual borrowers or counterparties as well as at the portfolio level.

For more sophisticated banks, the credit review assessment of capital adequacy, at a minimum,

should cover four areas: risk rating systems, portfolio analysis/aggregation,

securitization/complex credit derivatives, and large exposures and risk concentrations.

Market risk: Banks are supposed to maintain methodologies that enable them to assess and

actively manage all material market risks, wherever they arise, at position, desk, business line

and firm-wide level. For more sophisticated banks, their assessment of internal capital adequacy

for market risk, at a minimum, should be based on both VaR modeling and stress testing,

xlii

including an assessment of concentration risk and the assessment of illiquidity under stressful

market scenarios, although all firms’ assessments should include stress testing appropriate to

their trading activity.

Liquidity risk: Liquidity is crucial to the ongoing viability of any banking organization. Banks’

capital positions can have an effect on their ability to obtain liquidity, especially in a crisis. Each

bank must have adequate systems for measuring, monitoring and controlling liquidity risk. Banks

should evaluate the adequacy of capital given their own liquidity profile and the liquidity of the

markets in which they operate.

Other risks: Although the Committee recognizes that ‘other’ risks, such as reputational and

strategic risk, are not easily measurable, it expects industry to further develop techniques for

managing all aspects of these risks.

Monitoring and reporting;

The bank should establish an adequate system for monitoring and reporting risk exposures and

assessing how the bank’s changing risk profile affects the need for capital. The bank’s senior

management or board of directors should, on a regular basis, receive reports on the bank’s risk

profile and capital needs. These reports should allow senior management to:

1. Evaluate the level and trend of material risks and their effect on capital levels;

2. Evaluate the sensitivity and reasonableness of key assumptions used in the capital

assessment measurement system;

3. Determine that the bank holds sufficient capital against the various risks and is in

compliance with established capital adequacy goals; and

4. Assess its future capital requirements based on the bank’s reported risk profile andmake

necessary adjustments to the bank’s strategic plan accordingly.

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Internal control review.

The bank’s internal control structure is essential to the capital assessment process. Effective

control of the capital assessment process includes an independent review and, where appropriate,

the involvement of internal or external audits. The bank’s board of directors has a responsibility

to ensure that management establishes a system for assessing the various risks, develops a

system to relate risk to the bank’s capital level, and establishes a method for monitoring

compliance with internal policies. The board should regularly verify whether its system of

internal controls is adequate to ensure well-ordered and prudent conduct of business.

7.3.2 Principle 2: Supervisors should review and evaluate banks’ internal capital adequacy

assessments and strategies, as well as their ability to monitor and ensure their compliance

with regulatory capital ratios. Supervisors should take appropriate.

The supervisory authorities should regularly review the process by which a bank assesses its

capital adequacy, risk position, resulting capital levels, and quality of capital held. Supervisors

should also evaluate the degree to which a bank has in place a sound internal process to assess

capital adequacy. The emphasis of the review should be on the quality of the bank’s risk

management and controls and should not result in supervisors functioning as bank management.

The periodic review can involve some combination of:

1. On-site examinations or inspections;

2. Off-site review;

3. Discussions with bank management;

4. Review of work done by external auditors (provided it is adequately focused on the

necessary capital issues); and

5. Periodic reporting.

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7.3.3 Principle 3: Supervisors should expect banks to operate above the minimum

regulatory capital ratios and should have the ability to require banks to hold capital in

excess of the minimum.

Banks are supposed to maintain a buffer for a combination of the following:

(a) Pillar 1 minimums are anticipated to be set to achieve a level of bank creditworthiness in

markets that is below the level of creditworthiness sought by many banks for their own reasons.

For example, most international banks appear to prefer to be highly rated by internationally

recognized rating agencies. Thus, banks are likely to choose to operate above Pillar 1 minimums

for competitive reasons.

(b) In the normal course of business, the type and volume of activities will change, as will the

different risk exposures, causing fluctuations in the overall capital ratio.

(c) It may be costly for banks to raise additional capital, especially if this needs to be done

quickly or at a time when market conditions are unfavorable

(d) For banks to fall below minimum regulatory capital requirements is a serious matter. It may

place banks in breach of the relevant law and/or prompt non-discretionary corrective action on

the part of supervisors.

(e) There may be risks, either specific to individual banks, or more generally to an economy at

large, that are not taken into account in Pillar 1.

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7.3.4 Principle 4: Supervisors should seek to intervene at an early stage to prevent capital

from falling below the minimum levels required to support the risk characteristics of a

particular bank and should require rapid remedial action if capital is not maintained or

restored.

Supervisors should consider a range of options if they become concerned that a bank is not

meeting the requirements embodied in the supervisory principles outlined above. These actions

may include intensifying the monitoring of the bank, restricting the payment of dividends,

requiring the bank to prepare and implement a satisfactory capital adequacy restoration plan, and

requiring the bank to raise additional capital immediately. Supervisors should have the discretion

to use the tools best suited to the circumstances of the bank and its operating environment.

The permanent solution to banks’ difficulties is not always increased capital. However, some of

the required measures (such as improving systems and controls) may take a period of time to

implement. Therefore, increased capital might be used as an interim measure while permanent

measures to improve the bank’s position are being put in place. Once these permanent measures

have been put in place and have been seen by supervisors to be effective, the interim increase in

capital requirements can be removed.

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CHAPTER 8

PILLAR 3: MARKET DISCIPLINE

8.1 SCOPE OF APPLICATION

Pillar 3 applies at the top consolidated level of the banking group to which the Framework

applies. Disclosures related to individual banks within the groups would not generally be

required to fulfill the disclosure requirements set out below. An exception to this arises in the

disclosure of Total and Tier 1 Capital Ratios by the top consolidated entity where an analysis of

significant bank subsidiaries within the group is appropriate, in order to recognize the need for

these subsidiaries to comply with the Framework and other applicable limitations on the transfer

of funds or capital within the group.

8.2 THE PURPOSE

The purpose of pillar three is to complement the minimum capital requirements of pillar one and

the supervisory review process addressed in pillar two. The Basel Committee had sought to

encourage market discipline by developing a set of disclosure requirements that allow market

participants to assess key information about a bank's risk profile and level of capitalization. The

Committee believes that public disclosure is particularly important with respect to the New

Accord where reliance on internal methodologies will provide banks with greater discretion in

determining their capital needs. By bringing greater market discipline to bear through enhanced

disclosures, pillar three of the new capital framework can produce significant benefits in helping

banks and supervisors to manage risk and improve stability.

Over the past year, the Committee has engaged various market participants and supervisors in a

dialogue regarding the extent and type of bank disclosures that would be most useful. The aim

has been to avoid potentially flooding the market with information that would be hard to

xlvii

interpret or to use in understanding a bank's actual risk profile. After taking a hard look at the

disclosures proposed in its second consultative package on the New Accord, the Committee has

since scaled back considerably the requirements, particularly those relating to the IRB

approaches and securitization.

Another important consideration has been the need for the Basel II disclosure framework to align

with national accounting standards. Considerable efforts have been made to ensure that the

disclosure requirements of the New Accord focus on bank capital adequacy and do not conflict

with broader accounting disclosure standards with which banks must comply. This has been

accomplished through a strong and co-operative dialogue with accounting authorities. Going

forward, the Committee will look to strengthen these relationships given that the continuing

work of accounting authorities may have implications for the disclosures required in the New

Accord. With respect to potential future modifications to the capital framework itself, the

Committee intends to also consider the impact of such changes on the amount of information a

bank should be required to disclose.

8.3 INTERACTION WITH ACCOUNTING DISCLOSURES

The management of the bank is supposed to its own discretion in determining the appropriate

medium and location of the disclosure. In situations where the disclosures are made under

accounting requirements or are made to satisfy listing requirements promulgated by securities

regulators, banks may rely on them to fulfill the applicable Pillar 3 expectations. In these

situations, banks should explain material differences between the accounting or other disclosure

and the supervisory basis of disclosure. This explanation does not have to take the form of a line

by line reconciliation.

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8.4 MATERIALITY

A bank should decide which disclosures are relevant for it based on the materiality concept.

Information would be regarded as material if its omission or misstatement could change or

influence the assessment or decision of a user relying on that information for the purpose of

making economic decisions. This definition is consistent with International Accounting

Standards and with the national accounting framework. The Reserve Bank recognizes the need

for a qualitative judgment of whether, in light of the particular circumstances, a user of financial

information would consider the item to be material (user test). The Reserve Bank does not

consider it necessary to set specific thresholds for disclosure as the user test is a useful

benchmark for achieving sufficient disclosure. However, with a view to facilitate smooth

transition to greater disclosures as well as to promote greater comparability among the banks’

Pillar 3 disclosures, the materiality thresholds have been prescribed for certain limited

disclosures. Notwithstanding the above, banks are encouraged to apply the user test to these

specific disclosures and where considered necessary make disclosures below the specified

thresholds also.

8.4 FREQUENCY

The disclosures which have been mentioned under the Pillar 3 are supposed to be made on a

semi-annual basis, subject to the following exceptions. Qualitative disclosures that provide a

general summary of a bank’s risk management objectives and policies, reporting system and

definitions may be published on an annual basis. In recognition of the increased risk sensitivity

of the Framework and the general trend towards more frequent reporting in capital markets, large

internationally active banks and other significant banks (and their significant bank subsidiaries)

must disclose their Tier 1 and total capital adequacy ratios, and their components. Furthermore,

if information on risk exposure or other items is prone to rapid change, then banks should also

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disclose information on a quarterly basis. In all cases, banks should publish material information

as soon as practicable and not later than deadlines set by like requirements in national laws.

8.5 PROPRIETARY AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

Proprietary information encompasses information (for example on products or systems), that if

shared with competitors would render a bank’s investment in these products/systems less

valuable, and hence would undermine its competitive position. Information about customers is

often confidential, in that it is provided under the terms of a legal agreement or counterparty

relationship. This has an impact on what banks should reveal in terms of information about their

customer base, as well as details on their internal arrangements, for instance methodologies used,

parameter estimates, data etc. The Basel Committee believes that the requirements set out below

strike an appropriate balance between the need for meaningful disclosure and the protection of

proprietary and confidential information. In exceptional cases, disclosure of certain items of

information required by Pillar 3 may prejudice seriously the position of the bank by making

public information that is either proprietary or confidential in nature. In such cases, a bank need

not disclose those specific items, but must disclose more general information about the subject

matter of the requirement, together with the fact that, and the reason why, the specific items of

information have not been disclosed. This limited exemption is not intended to conflict with the

disclosure requirements under the accounting standards.

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CHAPTER 9

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY and LIMITATIONS

9.1 WHAT IS EXPERT INTERVIEW?

Expertly guided form of interviewing, with a prepared form and scheme of questions, in order to

obtain an expert view, opinion and information from the professional public or experts with

interactions according to results.

9.2 WHY EXPERT INTERVIEW?

In order to get a firsthand knowledge of the challenges faced by the commercial banks while

implementing Basel II norms, I found, in consultation with my project coordinator at RBI that

“Expert Interview” would be the best way to deal with since the number of banks with head

offices in Tamil Nadu is only 6. The project has been limited to Tamil Nadu only because of the

RBI regional office restriction. Hence, I chose expert interview as my research methodology.

9.3 HOW WAS IT DONE?

The Interviews were guided by an interview protocol prepared by taking inputs from various

published and unpublished sources and also by taking inputs from experts at RBI, after which

interview appointments were fixed with various bank heads relevant to the implementation of

Basel II in their respective banks by my mentor at the Reserve Bank. The bank heads were later

personally met and the interviews taken. The interviews were recorded in a recorder and then the

transcripts used to write the findings. Each interview lasted for around 25-30 min.

9.4 LIMITATIONS

1. The project has been confined to Tamil Nadu; hence the suggestions and conclusion

given are relevant only to the banks with registered head offices in Tamil Nadu.

2. The number of Banks under study is only 6 due to the above said limitation.

3. Some suggestions based on confidentiality data could not be published.

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CHAPTER 10

1FINDINGS FROM THE INTERVIEWS

1. Changes have been and will be there in the quantum of data collected due to the new

Basel II norms. This has had an impact on the manpower requirements and the time

availability for the job, which was one of the common problems faced by the banks

during this phase, though some bankers feel it’s just the aggregating of the data available

in various databases. This data collection though is critical for the banks for the purpose

of ratings.

2. While some bankers say that there have been privacy and security issues faced during the

collection of data for the purpose of rating but they were not clear on how they had

overcome those issues, most others say that they did not have any issues related to

privacy since the customer is obliged to provide data for the processing of the application

with regards to security issue they were not aware of any security issues faced so far. The

bankers say that industry risk data, business risk data are also available with the banks

which help in the rating process, so data privacy is not a major problem they say.

3. With regards to the specific allocation of man power for the purpose of Basel II

implementation all the banks interviewed had designated people for the implementation

of Basel II, in a few organizations it was being handled by the Risk Management

department, in some specific issues were handled by specific departments like market

risk was handled by the funds management department and operational risk handled by

the inspection department. None of the banks had the need to recruit outside experts for

this process since the staff involved in this process was trained mostly at the Staff

College or National Institute for Banking Management (NIBM), therefore covering the

knowledge management aspect. Some of the banks have dedicated intranet websites for

staff desirous of gaining knowledge in these aspects.

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2

4. Most of the banks are of the view that with the advent of Basel II there will be better

capital adequacy since they are based on the risks involved unlike the ones in Basel I,

where a single brush approach was adopted without taking any specific risks into

consideration. But it has also been affecting their business in a way; like for instance the

underarm limits for NPAs has been increased from 100% to 150% so there is an impact

on the amount available for lending.

5. Basel II has not affected the short term lending of the banks, the way it was predicted to

affect, but the bankers say that there will be an impact on the pricing of these short term

lending of the banks. The banks have a firm belief that short term lending is a major

weapon in the bank’s armory for the better utilization of the bank’s short term resources.

Further the banks are of the view that the excess liquidity with the banks can be diverted

through into this route.

6. Most of the banks except for few had their ICAAPs in tune with the regulatory capital

requirements set by the regulatory authorities and IBA. Some of the banks had used

Liquidity risk, Interest risk on banking book (MVE & Earning Perspective), Credit

concentration risk and others to calculate the ICAAP. Those that had actually calculated

ICAAPs had their capitals at well above the regulatory requirements averaging at around

12%.

7. The interviews with different bankers threw up contradicting views regarding the number

of rating agencies available in the country. Some of them were of the view that in India

there is no much demand for rating of corporate bonds and other instrument, their

argument is that very few organizations which go for ratings, get a good rating, so the

purpose of ratings which is actually to increase the value of the instrument is actually not

working. Some also argue that the situation is opposite where the rating agencies are

behind the banks to rate their instruments. The other set of bankers are of the view that

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the number of rating agencies is insufficient when viewed from the perspective of

corporate accounts which need to be rated. 3

8. Most of the bankers were of the view that it’s difficult to classify the expense incurred as

a capital expenditure or revenue expenditure. There was feeling that there needs to be

proper demarcation of the expenses incurred in order to have better comparability

between the banks. Some of the banks were already demarcating some expenses as

capital expenditure or revenue expenditure but this has been varying from bank to bank.

9. The question related to pro-cyclicality seemed to be irrelevant as none of the banks felt

that they have been affected or find any reason that they will be affected in the near

future because of this. They were also of the view that their portfolios are well diversified

to handle any such situation.

10. Except for one of the banks, the others were of the view that the prevalent economic and

market conditions are pointers for consolidation and that the impact of the Basel II norms

needs to be understood by both the banks and its customers. They feel it’s good to wait

for the stabilization period to end rather than to proceed to advanced measurement

approaches in haste. The one exception which I said earlier was eager to proceed to the

advanced approaches as they were confident of handling it.

11. Regarding the comparability of the capital standards post Basel II, banks had varying

views some were of the view to wait and watch what happens next, some were of the

view that it definitely achieves the purpose it was set due the basic theme, i.e. the ideas

propounded by Basel II and because it advocates for the international best practices to be

adopted by banks, others were of the view that there needs to be further study regarding

this.

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CHAPTER 11

SUGGESTIONS AND CONCLUSION

The Suggestions and conclusions mentioned herewith does not confine to the reserve bank in

particular but also the Indian Banking Association.

1. Data which is a major requirement for the implementation of Basel II needs to bettered,

which can be done only with proper financial inclusion policy in place without any loop

holes for example some banks are opening no-frill accounts with improper customer data,

which could later cause problems.

2. Though data privacy and data security issues have not posed a major problem with the

banks in Tamil Nadu, I feel that this could be an issue in the future considering the issues

the developed countries are facing. Especially with the rise of the out sourcing culture in

India too there could be security issues with regards to data security; hence it’s worth the

regulators give a look at this.

3. A special forum within the framework of the Indian Bank’s Association to facilitate the

bankers to discuss live issues faced during the implementation of the Basel II. This would

make the transition easy especially for small banks implementing the norms in India.

4. The opening of more branches of National Institute of Bank Management (NIBM) could

help in driving the reserve banks policies more efficiently and quickly. This I feel could

reduce the time spent by the banks on acquiring knowledge on complex norms like Basel.

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5. With regard to the treatment of Basel II implementation expenses incurred by the banks,

the reserve bank could support the banks with proper demarcation of the expenses other

than those provided by the Indian Companies Act, since it was one of the problems faced

by the commercial banks.

6. The major problem facing the regulators is about the current crisis, it’s not the crisis in

itself that’s the problem but the underlying factor that the countries and banks which

implemented Basel II have faced the most of the heat of the current crisis, so it’s time the

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision revisits the Basel II.

7. The methods and assumptions used to calculate the ICAAP needs to be made clear,

though ICAAP is totally the banks own calculations there needs to be some regulation

with regards to this since there could be possibility that the banks could use future profits

or other probabilities to set against capital requirements.

8. Though Basel II has reduced the amount available with the banks for lending its for the

good of the banking system as a whole so the strict capital standards.

9. The number of rating agencies available in India is low compared to the number of

corporate accounts that need to be rated. But first awareness has to be created about the

uses and advantages of external ratings, among the consumers and with provided demand

at the later stage the regulators could authorize more rating agencies.

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10. The central banks counter cyclical measures are good enough to ward off the pro-

cyclicality issues faced by the developed countries. So I feel pro cyclicality would not be

a major issue with the banks in the near future.

11. I feel that the banks would still face problems in capturing the IT systems losses under

the current framework. There needs to be a proper mechanism set in place to measure

future IT systems loss, and the potential monetary losses it could cause, especially since

the Indian banking sector is in a transformational process, upgrading the data bases in IT

systems.

12. Finally, Basel II is fundamentally about better risk management anchored in sound

corporate governance. The central bank needs to ensure strong corporate governance

practices in the banking industry, the Indian Banking Association needs to conduct

regular workshops on corporate governance for the bank’s board members.

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APPENDIX-1

Interview protocol:Basel II implementation and challenges faced by commercial banks.

Name of the Bank:

Address of the Head-Office:

Name and designation of the person in charge:

Contact’s email ID:

1. Did/Will Basel II cause changes in the way (intensity, depth etc) that you collect and process rating data?

If YES how did it affect your business? How have you overcome it?

Does it impact your business in any way?

If NO, Do you think you will face any problem related to collecting and processing rating data?

2. Have you so far faced any privacy or security issues with regards to collection of additional data for the purpose of Basel II?

If YES, what was the issue in specific? And how did you tackle it?

lviii

If NO, do you think you would face any such situation in the future?

3. Does your bank have designated people to work exclusively as suggested by RBI on implementing the various stages of the Basel II norms? If YES... how many?

If NO... didn’t you find the need to employ personnel exclusively for that?

Or was the current staff sufficient enough?

4. Do you think the high rise in the risk weights would increase the cost of borrowings for your consumers?

Comment

5. How much in Percentage terms is your short term lending? Has Basel II discouraged you from such lending?

If YES do you think it is good for the bank in the long term perspective?

If NO so you would say that STL should be continued what is the major reason behind this view of yours?

6. Has the lack of knowledge of employees posed any problems in implementing BASEL II norms in your bank?

If YES... what were the specifics?

If NO... How did you equip the employees?

Did you get any help for the central bank’s side in this regard?

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7. What, is the current ICAAP of your bank, how different is it from the regulatory capital requirement?

What are the variables you use to calculate this?

8. Do you think there are insufficient numbers of external rating agencies in India?

Would your decision have been different in case you had more options?

9. Do you have any reservations in classifying the expenses incurred in implementing Basel II?

If YES, How do you think the expenses should be treated?

If NO, So you agree that the additional expenses incurred in technology, resources up gradation need not be treated as Investments right?

10. Has pro-cyclicality affected your lending obligations?

If YES, how have you overcome it?

If NO, Do you think you would face such a situation in the future?

11. Given your bank’s current condition and situation, would you pitch in with the Reserve Bank for the introduction of advanced credit measurement models?

If YES, What are the factors that you consider are the forces behind this view?

IF NO, when would you think would be the right time for ...the bank...to move to such methods?

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12. In, your view does Basel II achieve its purpose of international comparability of the bank-capital standards given that there could be 130 different frame works under different jurisdictions?

----Thankyou---

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REFERENCES

Papers by single authors

1. Will the proposed new Basel capital accord have a net negative effect on developing

countries? By, Stephany Griffith-Jones, Economic Commission for Latin America and

the Caribbean (ECLAC)

2. Basel II: Panacea or a Missed opportunity? By Maximilian J. B. Hall, professor of

banking and financial regulation, Department of Economics, Loughbrough University.

Papers by more than one author

1. The Ripple Effect: How Basel II will impact institutions of all sizes. By, Hans

Helbekkmo, Shahram Elghanayan, David Samuels, Rob Jameson

Papers presented at conferences (Speeches)

1. Remarks by former US FED Governor Susan Schmidt Bies (At the Risk USA 2005

Congress, Boston, Massachusetts June 8, 2005)

3. Approach to Basel II (Speech) by Mrs.Shyamala Gopinath.

4. Challenges and implications of Basel II for Asia (Speech) by Dr.Y.V.Reddy

5. Demystifying Basel II (Speech) by Shri V.Leeladhar, Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank of

India

6. Basel II and Credit Risk Management (Speech) Shri V. Leeladhar, Deputy Governor, and

Reserve Bank of India at the program me on Basel II and Credit Risk Management.

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7. The Evolution of Banking Regulation in India – A Retrospect on Some Aspects (Speech)

by Shri V Leeladhar, Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank of India at the Bankers’

Conference (BANCON) 2007

8. Global Financial Crisis: Causes, Consequences and India’s Prospects By Rakesh Mohan,

Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank of India at London Business School on April 23, 2009

9. Regulation and Risk Management: Implementing Basel II (Speech) by Address of Shri V

Leeladhar, Deputy Governor, delivered at the Platinum Jubilee Celebrations of the South

Indian Bank Ltd., Thirussur on July 9, 2005

10. India’s Preparedness for Basel II implementation,(Speech) The Special Address delivered

by Shri V. Leeladhar, Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank of India at the Panel Discussion

during “FICCI-IBA Conference on Global Banking : Paradigm Shift”

Articles from the Internet:

1. Greater international links in banking—challenges for banking regulation, an article

found in www.articlesarchive.com

2. Reports and speeches from the Bank for International Settlements website www.bis.org

3. Basel 2 Implementation FSA Annual Public Meeting www.fsa.gov.uk

4. Presentation by Y K Choi Deputy Chief Executive (Banking) Hong Kong Monetary

Authority http://www.garp.com/documents/Presentations/choi.pdf

5. Certain definitions for glossary have been take from http://www.wikipedia.org

lxiii

EDDINGTON PRATHISH PEERIZ 1/13 King Street

Virapandianpatnam Tutcorin District

Tamilnadu 628 216 Email: prathishpeeriz@gmail.com

(M) +91-99403 57191

Year Degree/Examination Institute/University Percentage/CGPA (out of 9)

2008

PGDM*

LIBA, Chennai

2006 B.Com Andhra Loyola (Vijayawada,A.P) 77.8%

2003 Intermediate Andhra Loyola (Vijayawada,A.P) 79.8%

2001 Xth St.Mathews P.S (Vijayawada,A.P)

64.4%

*Course in progress

Philips shared services. A Philips group Company (Acquired by Infosys as on October 2007)

Financial Officer, Consumer Lifestyle, March 2007 -May 2008

End user knowledge of SAP (FICO), Worked in Accounts payable division of Philips Mexicana.

Responsible for payments to 3rd party vendors of Philips.

Responsible for financial account closing every month.

Successfully semi-automated the processing of Journals (a critical activity during month ends)

Class Topper for three consecutive years in B.Com

Best Outgoing student of the college during B.com

Special award (Silver medal) for overall performance in B.com

Received awards for submitting 4 Kaizens , 2 Best performer awards in Philips.

Languages Known: English, Telugu, Tamil and Hindi __________________________ Eddington Prathish Peeriz

EDUCATION

WORK EXPERIENCE

ACADEMIC PROJECTS / PAPERS PRESENTED

Project work on Customer satisfaction at Indian Overseas Bank Branch, at Loyola Vijayawada.

AWARDS & ACHIEVEMENTS

lxiv