CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

PRE-BAR GUIDE

IN CRIMINAL LAW 1

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PROF. PEDRO T. DABU, JR.

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I. Fundamental Principles

a. Definition of Penal Law

Penal laws or statutes are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violation; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment. (Subido vs. Sandiganbayan, 266 SCRA 379, January 20, 1997)

I. Classes of crimes: difference between mala in se and mala prohibita

1.1. Mala in se crimes are wrong per se even without a law punishing the act or acts. Criminal intent is required in this kind of crimes. Such being the case, good faith is a defense.

1.2. Mala prohibita- the act is illegal because of the law prohibiting it. Mere violation of the law consummates the crime. Criminal intent is not required, hence, good faith is not a defense.

II. Cases:

Garcia vs. CA, 484 SCRA 617, March 14, 2006

Senatorial Candidate Nene Pimentel, who lost in the 1995 election, charged the Election Registrar of Alaminos, Pangasinan with violation of Section 27(b) of RA 6646 for allegedly reducing his votes and increasing the votes of other senatorial candidates. The election offense reads: (b) Any member of the board of election inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers, increases, or decreases the votes received by a candidate in any election or any member of the board who refuses, after proper verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered votes. It was the position of the accused that this offense is mala in se, while the prosecution contended it is mala prohibita. Held: Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se. For otherwise, even errors and mistakes committed due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable. Given the volume of votes to be counted and canvassed within a limited amount of time, errors and miscalculations are bound to happen. And it could not be the intent of the law to punish unintentional election canvass errors. However, intentionally increasing or decreasing the number of votes received by a candidate is inherently immoral, since it is done with malice and intent to injure another. (Note: accused was nonetheless convicted since her act was found to be intentional.

2.2. Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, 369 SCRA 394, Nov. 19, 2001

The crime of plunder is malum in se. When Congress declared plunder as a heinous crime in 1993, it resolved that the crime of plunder be considered male in se and it does not matter that such act is punished in a special law especially since the predicate crimes of plunder are mainly mala in se. Accordingly, mens rea is an element of the crime. This can be seen from the fact that the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent.

2.3. Gonzales vs. HSBC, 537 SCRA 255, October 19, 2007The offense punished under PD No. 115 is in the nature of malumprohibitum.A mere failure to deliver the proceeds of the sale or the goods if notsold,is estafaunder Art. 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code without need of proving intent to defraud.

2.4. Sps. Veroy vs. Layague, , 210 SCRA 97, June 18, l992Sps. Veroy had already been living in Quezon City for sometime when the firearms were found in their house in Davao. They left their house in the custody of a friend. True, that even constructive possession is punishable. True also that there is no need of criminal intent in mala prohibita. But there must be knowledge that the firearms existed. Without the knowledge of voluntariness there is no crime.

2.5. Loney vs. People, 482 SCRA 194

Marcopper stored its mine waste in a pit. At the base, there is a tunnel leading to the river but a concrete plug was placed at the end of the tunnel. But despite this, mine waste went out of the pit and in merely a few days, the pit discharged millions of tons of mine waste into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. The President and other officials of Marcopper were charged with violation of Art. 365, RPC and violation of Section 108 of RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. The accused moved to quash on the ground of double jeopardy.

Ruling: Suffice it to say that a mala in se felony cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes. What makes the former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes are the special penal laws enacting them.

b. SCOPE OF APPLICATION OR CHARACTERISTICS OF PENAL LAW

1. Territoriality- penal laws cannot be applied outside of Philippine Territory. In practice, this principle is invoked when a Filipino commits a crime outside of Philippine territory. Example, a Filipino married for the second time in the United States. He cannot be charged with bigamy.

But there are exceptions to this rule, which can be found in Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

2. Generality-Article 14 of the New Civil Code provides that penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in Philippine territory. As applied, this may involve a foreigner committing a crime in the Philippines. He cannot put up the defense that our penal laws donot apply to him

Exceptions-

1. Immunity of heads of states

2. Immunity of members of diplomatic corp (Ambassadors, Ministers, Ministers

Residents and Charge d affairs)

N.B. Consuls, including consul general, are not included.

3. Visiting Forces Agreement

Under the Visiting Forces Agreement, criminal jurisdiction over certain crimes is waived in favor of the United States. These are:

1. US military authorities shall have the right to exercise within the Philippines all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the military law of the United States over US personnel in the Philippines.

2. US authorities exercises exclusive jurisdiction over US personnel with regard to offenses, including offenses relating to the security of the US, punishable under the law of the US but not under the laws of the Philippines. i.e. treason; sabotage or violation of any law relating to national defense

3. US military authorities shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over US personnel subject to the military law of the US in relation to:

(a) offenses solely against the property or security of the US or offenses solely against the property or person of US personnel

(b) offenses arising out of any act or omission done in the performance of official duty.

3. Prospectivity- as a rule, penal laws apply prospectively, or those acts committed after their effectivity. This is because no ex post facto law shall be enacted. However, in case the penal law is favorable to the accused, it may be given retroactive effect. (Article 21, RPC)

C. Constitutional limitations on the power of Congress to enact penal laws in the Bill of Rights

i. equal protection

The equality guaranteed by the Constitution is legal equality or equality of all persons before the law. It simply means that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.

But legislations may provide reasonable classification. Requirements of valid classification are:

1. Classification must rest on substantial distinctions

2. must be germane to the purpose of the law

3. must not be limited to existing conditions only

4. must apply equally to all members of the same class

ii. due process

Void for Vagueness Doctrine.

1. Estrada vs. Desierto, 369 SCRA 394, November 19, 2001.

Violative of Due process?

This doctrine requires that criminal statute state explicitly and definitely what acts are prohibited, so as to provide fair warning and preclude arbitrary enforcement. A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, it is repugnant to the constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.But a statute is not void merely because general terms are used therein. There is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment.

Words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptations and signification, unless the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.Moreover, a facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence and if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws againsts socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes.

2. Romualdez vs. COMELEC, 553 SCRA 370, April 30, 2008

In case the law provides for the punishment of (j) Violation of any of the provisions of this Act is not vague. Section 45[41] of Republic Act No. 8189 makes a recital of election offenses under the same Act. Section 45(j) is, without doubt, crystal in its specification that a violation of any of the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189 is an election offense. The language of Section 45(j) is precise. The challenged provision renders itself to no other interpretation. A reading of the challenged provision involves no guesswork. We do not see herein an uncertainty that makes the same vague.

Overbreadth Doctrine

If a statute is so broadly written that it deters free expression, then it can be struck down on its face because of its chilling effect, even if it also prohibits acts that may legitimately be forbidden. The overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing on their faces statutes in free speech cases.

iii. non imposition of cruel and unusual punishment or excessive fines

1. RA 9346-An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines.

2. Agbanlog vs. People, et al, 222 SCRA 530, May 24, l993,This is a case for malversation of public funds. The amount involved was P21,000.00. Accused questions as oppressive and unconstitutional the penalty of 11 years and 1 day to 16 years, 5 months and 11 days imprisonment imposed upon him. He argues that considering the value of the peso in 1932 when the Revised Penal Code was enacted and the value of the peso today, the penalty for malversation of P21,000.00 should only be an imprisonment of 1 to 2 years.

Ruling: The Court can intervene and strike down the penalty as cruel, degrading or inhuman only when it has become so flagrantly oppressive and so wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral senses. Considering that malversation of public funds by a public officer is a betrayal of the public trust, the penalty imposed upon the petitioner is not so disproportionate to the crime committed as to shock the moral sense.

Assuming arguendo that inflation has in effect made more severe the penalty for malversing P21,000.00, the remedy cannot come from this Court but from Congress.

iv. bill of attainder

- is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial. Test: inflicts punishment without judicial trial

1. People vs. Ferrer. 48 SCRA 382 (1972)

RA 1700 Or The Anti Subversion Law. This law declared the CPP as an outlawed organization. Those who remained members of the CPP or affiliates shall be punished. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the law because the guilt of the accused must still be proven in court. Justice Castro said:

i. The law does not specify the CPP for the purpose of punishment. The term communist party is used for definitional purposes

ii. The law does not specify the members of the CPP for the purpose of punishment.

v. ex post facto law

i. which makes an action done before the passing of the law which and was innocent when done criminal and punishes such action.

ii. Which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed, or

iii. Which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed.

iv. Which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the accused.

d. ARE THERE COMMON LAW CRIMES IN OUR JURISDICTION?

None, nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege

e. APPLICABILITY OF THE RPC TO SPECIAL PENAL LAWS (Art. 10)

Go Tan vs. Sps. Perfecto and Juanita Tan, September 30, 2008

Q. Can the parents-in-law be sued for violation of RA 9262 in conspiracy with their son?A. Yes, True that the law provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, yet it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC.

Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application of the RPC, thus:

SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal Code and other applicable laws, shall have suppletory application. (Emphasis supplied)

If the RPC is given suppletory application to offenses penalized by special laws even if said special penal laws do not provide for it, with more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of Section 47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to said law.

OTHER INSTANCES WHERE THE RPC WAS APPLIED TO SPL:

1. Provision on subsidiary penalty under Article 39 of the RPC was applied to cases of violations of Act No. 3992, otherwise known as the "Revised Motor Vehicle Law," (People v. Moreno, 60 Phil 712, 1934)

2. The rules on the service of sentences provided in Article 70 of the RPC was applied in favor of the accused who was found guilty of multiple violations of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," considering the lack of similar rules under the special law. (People v. Li Wai Cheung, 214 SCRA 504 (October 13, 1992

2.1. But the provisions of Articles 13, 64, 71 and 76 of the RPC could not be given suppletory effect to drug offenses (Gallardo vs. Judge Tabamo, 232 SCRA 960, June 2, 1994)

3. Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the RPC to define the words "principal," "accomplices" and "accessories" under R.A. No. 8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," because said words were not defined therein, although the special law referred to the same terms in enumerating the persons liable for the crime of illegal recruitment. (People v. Chowdury, 325 SCRA 572, Feb. 15, 2000)

4. The provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39 of the RPC was applied to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22, otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law," noting the absence of an express provision on subsidiary imprisonment in said special law. (Yu v. People 438 SCRA 431, September 20, 2004)

5. The principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC was applied to B.P. Blg. 22 in the absence of a contrary provision therein. (Ladonga v. People 451 SCRA 673, February 17, 2005)

6. The penalty for violation of PD 533 should follow the classification and duration of penalties prescribed in the RPC since PD 533 merely modified the penalties for qualified theft of large cattle under Article 310 of the RPC (People vs. Martinada, February 13, 1991; Pil-ey s. People, July 9, 2007)

II. FELONIES

A. CLASSIFICATION OF FELONIES

Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies. Felonies are committed by means of deceit (dolo) and by means of culpa (fault). Thus, felonies are either:

1. Intentional or

2. Culpable

1. Intentional Felonies (Dolo) - the act is performed with deliberate intent or malice to do an injury.

a. mens rea- (guilty mind)

mens rea has been defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent, and essential for criminal liability. Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a crime, (Valenzuela vs. People G.R. No. 160188, June 21, 2007)

There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, punishment is the sequence of wickedness, without which it can not be. It is therefore a principle in our legal system, as probably it is of every other, that the essence of an offense is the wrongful intent without which it cannot exist. Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea- the act itself does not make a man guilty unless his intention were so. Actus me invito factus non est meus actus- an act done by me against my will is not my act. (U.S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488, March 19, l910)

Villareal vs. People, 664 SCRA 519, February 1, 2012:It is not enough to do what the law prohibits. In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that the act be committed by means of dolo or malice.

Dolo is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom, intelligence and intent.

Freedom refers to act done with deliberation and with power to choose between two things

Intelligence concerns the ability to determine the morality of human acts as well as the capacity to determine between the licit and an illicit act.

Intent refers to the purpose of the mind and the resolve with which a person proceeds.

On the other hand, the term felonious means malicious.

Taken together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony must refer to malicious intent.

Homicide

Therefore the presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is a vital ingredient in establishing the commission of the intentional felony of homicide. Being mala in se, the felony of homicide requires the existence of malice or dolo.

Intent to kill or animus intericendi should not be inferred unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent

Now even if there is no intent to kill but if there is malicious intent to injure (animus iniuriandi) and as a result of the physical injuries inflicted death ensued, then the offenders may still be liable for homicide pursuant to Article 4 (1)

But mere infliction of physical injuries does not make a person automatically liable for an intentional felony.

Calimutan vs. People, 492 SCRA 44, February 9, 2006

Throwing a stone and hitting the victim at the left side of his back at a chance encounter; the incident was a brief scuffle which lasted only for a few minutes: accused hardly had the time to ponder upon the most appropriate course of action to take, he was deemed not to have intent to kill, but it was reckless for him to do so, thus is liable for reckless imprudence resulting to death and not the intentional felony of homicide.People vs. Carmen, March 26, 2001

Carmen and the other members of her group are not liable for murder. They had no criminal intent to kill the boy. They performed the ritual not to kill the boy but to cure him of illness. Besides, the ritual performed over the victim was consented to by the victims parents.With the permission of the victims parents, accused Carmen, together with the other accused, proceeded to subject the boy to a treatment calculated to drive the bad spirit from the boys body.Their liability arises from their reckless imprudence because they ought to know that their actions would not bring about the cure.They are, therefore, guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and not of murder. The elements of reckless imprudence are apparent in the acts done by the accused which, because of their lack of medical skill in treating the victim of his alleged ailment, resulted in the latters death.As already stated, accused, none of whom is a medical practitioner, belong to a religious group, known as the Missionaries of Our Lady of Fatima, which is engaged in faith healing. Bagajo vs. People, November 20, 1978As a matter of law, Bagajo did not incur any criminal liability for her act of whipping her pupil, Wilma, with the bamboo-stick-pointer. She did not do what she had done with criminal intent. That she meant to punish Wilma and somehow make her feel such punishment may be true, but the means she actually used was moderate and that she was not motivated by ill-will, hatred or any malevolent intent. The teacher intended merely to discipline the pupil. And it cannot be said, that Wilma did not deserve to be discipline. In other words, it was farthest from the thought of the teacher to commit any criminal offense.Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.

b. motive is not intent

Motive is the moving power which impels one to action for a definite result; whereas intent is the purpose to use a particular means to effect such results. Motive is not an essential element of a felony while intent is an essential element of dolo.

In some instances, however, motive and intent may be considered one and the same. The accused is the brother in law of the victim. He and his wife lived in the house of his parents in law together with the victim. Prior to the fateful night when Arlenes body was discovered, accused was seen peeping through the bathroom while Arlene was taking a bath and through the bedroom while Arlene was inside the room. Intent to kill was duly established by the witnesses when they testified relative to the peeping incident. Such peeping incident manifested accused evil motive. Motive and intent may be considered one and the same, in some instances as in the present case.( Salvador vs. People, 559 SCRA 461, 473, July 23, 2008)

c. good faith negates criminal intent

1. One who fills up his daily time record in the belief that, on the basis of the time so indicated therein, she is merely making an honest claim for the pay corresponding to the time so indicated, no intent to commit the crime of falsification of public document can be ascribed to her. There was no deliberate intent to falsify because she had rendered public service in those times that she said she was present in her office. (Beradio vs. CA 103 SCRA 567, March 30, l981)

2. A widow who signed the name of her late husband in the checks delivered to her by no less than the School Supervisor long after her husbands death and that she used the proceeds of the checks to pay for the expenses of her husbands last illness and burial and on the belief that she was entitled to the money as an advance payment of her husbands vacation and sick leave credits cannot be said to have acted with criminal intent.( Luage vs.. CA, 112 SCRA 97, Feb. 22, l982)

3. Even if the order is illegal if it is patently legal and the subordinate is not aware of its illegality, the subordinate is not liable, for then there would only be a mistake of fact committed in good faith. (Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332, Feb. 17, l997)

4. The rule is that any mistake on a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith. (Lecaros vs. Sandiganbayan, 305 SCRA March 25, 1999)

5. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. (Manuel vs. People, 476 SCRA 461)

d. mistake of fact is absence of criminal intent- A misapprehension of fact on the part of the person causing injury to another. Such person is not criminally liable as he acted without criminal intent.

A person is not criminally liable if by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide if the actor had known the true state of facts at the time when he committed the act. Mistake of fact cancels the presumption of intent and works an acquittal. Under such circumstances, there is no criminal liability provided that the alleged ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence. There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, punishment is the sequence of wickedness, without which it can not be. It is therefore a principle in our legal system, as probably it is of every other, that the essence of an offense is the wrongful intent without which it cannot exist. this doctrine is confirmed by the legal maxims: actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, (the act itself does not make a man guilty unless his intention were so) actus me invito factus non est meus actus (an act done by me against my will is not my act). U.S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil 488

Mistake of fact not applicable if there is negligence

1. Yapyuco vs. Sandiganbayan, 624 SCRA 470, June 25, 2012

Facts: Villanueva, Flores, Calma, De Vera, Panlican and Licup were on board a tamarraw jeep and they were traversing the road after coming from a barrio fiesta when suddenly they met a burst of gunfire and instantly, Villanueva and Licup were both wounded and bleeding profusely. Licup died thereafter. Villanueva survived. Members of San Fernando PNP including barangay officials and CHDF members were at the situs of the shooting because of their information that armed NPA were spotted at the said place; that when they saw the tamarraw jeepney, a barangay official said that the suspects were on board that jeepney; the PNP members flagged them down but they did not stop and so the policemen fired at them. Accused policemen puts mistake of fact as a defense. Decide.

Ruling:

Mistake of fact is a misapprehension of a fact which, if true, would have justified the act or omission which is the subject of the prosecution. Mistake of fact is a defense to a charge of crime where it negates the intent component of the crime. But as held in People v. Oanis and Baxinela v. People, the justification of an act, which is otherwise criminal on the basis of a mistake of fact, must preclude negligence or bad faith on the part of the accused. Here, there was negligence on the part of the police officers because they shot at the victims without following the rules of engagement. The rules of engagement do not require the police officer to immediately fire his weapon if the person to be accosted does not heed his call. Pursuit without danger should be his next move, and not vengeance for personal feelings or a damaged pride.

2. Baxinela vs. People, 485 SCRA 331 (March 24, 2006)

3. People vs. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257.

2. Culpable felonies (culpa) See Calimutan vs. People, 482 SCRA 44 (2006) and People vs. Carmen discussed above

III. CRIMINAL LIABILITY: A. CRIMINAL OFFENDERS

1. A person committing a felony is liable for the resulting injury although not intended. (No. 1, Article 4)a. Proximate cause

People vs. Ilagan, 191 SCRA 643, November 26, 1990

i. Effect of supervening event ,

a. Urbano vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 1, January 7, 1988b. Accelerating death ruleGarcia vs. People, 597 SCRA 392, August 28, 2009

Ingrained in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that: x x x where death results as a direct consequence of the use of illegal violence, the mere fact that the diseased or weakened condition of the injured person contributed to his death, does not relieve the illegal aggressor of criminal responsibility.

Although the assaulted party was previously affected by some internal malady, if, because of a blow given with the hand or the foot, his death was hastened, beyond peradventure he is responsible therefor who produced the cause for such acceleration as the result of a voluntary and unlawfully inflicted injury. (Emphasis supplied.)

c. Instilling fear rule- If a man creates in another persons mind, an immediate sense of danger, which causes such person to try to escape, and in so doing, the latter injures himself, the man who creates such state of mind is responsible for the resulting injuries. [People vs. Toling, 62 SCRA 17,33, (1975)Peo vs. Page, 77 SCRA 348, (l977); People vs. Castromero, 280 SCRA 421, (1997)]2. Impossible Crime [Art. 4 (2) ]

i. Jacinto vs. People, 592 SCRA 426, July 13, 2009

The taking of a check without the consent of the owner with intent to gain but which the check bounced when deposited is an impossible crime, not theft of personal property because the check has no value.

ii. Intod vs. Court of Appeals, et al 215 SCRA 52, The killing of a person who was not at the room at the time of shooting, but was believed to there is an impossible crime.

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. It would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime. The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.

Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. One example is the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty. B. Degree of participation1. PRINCIPAL

1. By Direct Participation

a. CONSPIRACY

This topic discusses the second category.

Kinds of Multiple Conspiracies (Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, 377 SCRA 556, Feb. 26, 2002)

1. Wheel or circle conspiracy in which there is a single person or group (the hub) dealing individually with two or more other persons or groups (the spokes)

2. Chain conspiracy, which involves the distribution of narcotics or other contraband, in which there is successive communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer and then retailer and consumer.

3. Enterprise Conspiracy-it is unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprises affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt. Racketeering activity includes great variety of serious criminal conduct such as murder, kidnappining, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion and drug dealing and for there to be a pattern there must be at least two such acts within a 10 year span. The RICO has its own conspiracy provision.

Kinds of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code:

1. Express Conspiracy

2. Implied Conspiracy

Doctrine of implied conspiracy

. 1. People vs. Gueverra, November 13, 1989)

1.1. While Joselito and Teofilo were walking, they were waylaid by Stalin and Eduardo. Stalin went immediately behind Joselito, and embraced him with both hands.; the firm embrace locked the whole body and both arms of Joselito. Facing the hapless Joselito, Eduardo got his knife from his pocket, opened it, and thrust the weapon at the right side of Joselito's body and he fell to the ground. Joselito died. Held: There can be no question that the Stalins act in holding the victim from behind immediately before the latter was stabbed by Eduardo constitutes a positive and an overt act towards the realization of a common criminal intent, although the intent may be classified as instantaneous. The act was impulsively done on the spur of the moment. It sprang from the turn of events, thereby uniting with the criminal design of the slayer immediately before the commission of the offense. That is termed as implied conspiracy

1. 2. Subayco, et al vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., August 22, 1996

Several circumstances intersect to show a community of purpose among the accused, that is, to fire at the demonstrators. This common purpose was pursued by the accused who used firepower against the rallyists. As proved, the plan to disperse the demonstrators did not include the use of guns, yet, accused did. At the first crack of gunfire coming from CHDF Alfredo Quinatagcan (a.k.a. Pidong Bagis), accused commenced firing at the demonstrators, as if on signal. They fired indiscriminately toward the demonstrators who were then already lying prone on the ground. There was no imminent danger to their safety. Not just one or a few shots were fired but several. The firing lasted a few minutes and cost the lives and limbs of the demonstrators. The collective acts of the accused clearly show the existence of a common design toward the accomplishment of a united purpose.

Exceptions to the doctrine of implied conspiracy:

1. Mere signature rule

i. Macadangdang vs. Sandiganbayan, 170 SCRA 308 , February 14, 1989

Simply because a person in a chain of processing officers happens to sign or initial a voucher as it is going the rounds, it does not necessarily follow that he becomes part of a conspiracy in an illegal scheme. The guilt beyond reasonable doubt of each supposed conspirator must be established. It is all too easy to be swept into a long prison term simply because the guilt of some conspirators is overwhelming and somehow it attaches to all who happen to be charged in one indictment.

Every person who signs or initials documents in the course of their transit through standard operating procedures does not automatically become a conspirator in a crime which transpired at a stage where he had no participation. His knowledge of the conspiracy and his active and knowing participation therein must be proved by positive evidence.

2. Arias vs. Sandiganbayan, 180 SCRA 309, December 19, 1989

Ruling:

There is no conspiracy by negligence. All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies or enter into negotiations

3. Pareno, vs. Sandiganbayan, 256 SCRA 242, April 17, 1996; Larin vs. Sandiganbayan, April 17, 1996

Ruling:

There is no proof of actual agreement between the petitioners to commit the crimes charged. The acts of petitioners and that of Evangelista may be considered concerted only because they performed interrelated functions. Larin from the Excise Tax Office received the letter of Tanduay and referred the matter to Pareo, as head of the Alcohol Tax Division considering that the issue was a tax on liquor. A certification from the RAD was requested and indorsed back to Larin who made a favorable recommendation to the Deputy Commissioner. There is no showing that petitioners have acted irregularly, or performed acts outside of their official functions. The testimony of Jeanet Aurelio that she saw Larin's secretary at their office, following up the memorandum she was typing has no probative value at all. It must be founded on facts, not on mere inferences, conjectures and presumptions. There is actually no proof that conspiracy exists between the parties.

It is rather apparent that under the Sandiganbayan's decision, a department secretary, bureau chief, commission chairman, agency head, department head or chief of office would be equally culpable for every crime arising from any transactions or held guilty of conspiracy simply because he was the last of a long line of officials or employees who acted upon or affixed his signature to a transaction. We cannot allow this because guilt must be premised on a more knowing personal, and deliberate participation of each individual who is charged with others as part of a conspiracy. There must be more convincing proof which in this case is wanting.

b. mere presence or companionship rule1. Rosario Astudillo vs. People, November 29, 2006

Mere companionship does not establish conspiracy. 2. People vs. Roland Cruz, Nov. l4, l990The phrase andiyan na has no conclusive conspiratorial meaning.

2. Principals by inducementInducement may take the form of either by a command (precepto) or for a consideration (pacto),

People vs. Dumancas, et. al ,320 SCRA 584, December 13, 1999

Dumancas was swindled in a fake gold bar transactions losing P300T to Danilo and his cohort. Domingo and his companions abducted Danilo and his cohorts. They brought the victims to the office of Dumancas. Dumancas investigated the two on the whereabouts of the money and the two answered that it was already spent. It was then that Dumancas ordered Doming to take care of the two. The following day Doming and a companion shot the victims to death.

Ruling:

In order that a person may be convicted as principal by inducement, the following must be present:

(1) the inducement be made with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime; and

(2) such inducement be the determining cause of the commission by the material executor ( U.S. vs. Indanan, 24 Phil. 203 [1913] ). To constitute inducement, there must exist on the part of the inducer the most positive resolution and the most persistent effort to secure the commission of the crime, together with the presentation to the person induced of the strongest kind of temptation to commit the crime.

By the foregoing standards, the remark of Dumancas to take care of the two does not constitute the command required by law to justify a finding that she is guilty as a principal by inducement. As we held in U.S. vs. Indanan, supra, a chance word spoken without reflection, a wrong appreciation of a situation, an ironical phrase, a thoughtless act may give birth to a thought of, or even a resolution to crime in the mind of one for some independent reason predisposed thereto without the one who spoke the word or performed the act having any expectation that his suggestion would be followed or any real intention that it produce the result. In such case, while the expression was imprudent and the results of it grave in the extreme, he (the one who spoke the word or performed the act ) would not be guilty of the crime committed.

3. Principals by indispensable cooperationPeople vs. Dina Dulay, 681 SCRA 638, September 24, 2012

Facts: Dina asked AAA to accompany her at a wake at GI San Dionisio, Paraaque City. Before going to the said wake, they went to Bulungan Fish Port along the coastal road to ask for some fish. Afterwards, AAA and Dina proceeded to the Kubuhan located at the back of the Bulungan Fish Port. When they reached the Kubuhan, Dina suddenly pulled AAA inside a room where "Speed" was waiting. AAA saw "Speed" give money to Dina and heard "Speed" tell Dina to look for a younger girl. Thereafter, "Speed" wielded a knife and tied AAA's hands to the papag and raped her. AAA asked for Dinas help when she saw the latter peeping into the room while she was being raped, but Dina did not do so.

Issue: Whether or not Dina is guilty as co-principal by indispensable cooperation in the crime of rape.

Ruling:

(1) To be a principal by indispensable cooperation, one must participate in the criminal resolution, a conspiracy or unity in criminal purpose and cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act without which it would not have been accomplished. Here, the acts committed by Dina are not indispensable in the commission of the crime of rape. The events from the time Dina convinced AAA to go with her until Dina received money from the man who allegedly raped AAA, are not indispensable in the crime of rape. Anyone could have accompanied AAA and offered the latter's services in exchange for money and AAA could still have been raped. Even AAA could have offered her own services in exchange for monetary consideration and still end up being raped. Thus, this disproves the indispensable aspect of Dina in the crime of rape.

II. ACCOMPLICES

People vs. De Vera , 312 SCRA 640, August 18, 1999When is a lookout deemed an accomplice and when a conspirator? What is the distinction between the two?

Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they know and agree with the criminal design.

Conspirators, however, know the criminal intention because they themselves have decided upon such course of action. Accomplices come to know about it after the principals have reached the decision, and only then do they agree to cooperate in its execution.

Conspirators decide that a crime should be committed; accomplices merely concur in it. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment.

Conspirators are the authors of a crime; accomplices are merely their instruments who perform acts not essential to the perpetration of the offense.

2. Abejuela vs. People, 200 SCRA 806, August 19, 1991

Abejuela lent his passbook to a bank teller, his friend. His friend deposited the checks of his father to Abejuelas passbook, then Abejuela withdrew what was deposited and gave the same to his friend. His friend assured him that was alright and nothing wrong. The deposits turned out to be simulated. Is Abejeula an accomplice.Answer. Knowledge of the criminal intent of the principal (Glicerio Balo, Jr.) is essential in order that Abejuela can be convicted as an accomplice in the crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial document. To be convicted as an accomplice, there must be cooperation in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. However, the cooperation which the law punishes is the assistance rendered knowingly or intentionally, which assistance cannot be said to exist without the prior cognizance of the offense intended to be committed. Here, Abejuela was not aware of the crime intended to be committed.ACCESSORIES

People vs. Vino 178 SCRA 626, October 19, 1989I. The first issue that arises is that inasmuch as the petitioner was charged in the information as a principal for the crime of murder, can he thereafter be convicted as an accessory? The answer is in the affirmative.

The variance is in the participation or complicity of the petitioner. While the petitioner was being held responsible as a principal in the information, the evidence adduced, however, showed that his participation is merely that of an accessory. The greater responsibility necessarily includes the lesser. An accused can be validly convicted as an accomplice or accessory under an information charging him as a principal.

II. The next issue that must be resolved is whether or not the trial of an accessory can proceed without awaiting the result of the separate charge against the principal. The answer is also in the affirmative. The corresponding responsibilities of the principal, accomplice and accessory are distinct from each other. As long as the commission of the offense can be duly established in evidence, the determination of the liability of the accomplice or accessory can proceed independently of that of the principal. So much so that even if the principal is acquitted, the accessory may be convicted especially so if the acquittal is predicated on reasonable doubt.

III. The third question is this-considering that the alleged principal in this case was acquitted can the conviction of the petitioner as an accessory be maintained?

In United States vs. Villaluz and Palermo, a case involving the crime of theft, this Court ruled that notwithstanding the acquittal of the principal due to the exempting circumstance of minority or insanity (Article 12, Revised Penal Code), the accessory may nevertheless be convicted if the crime was in fact established.

Corollary to this is United States vs. Mendoza, where this Court held in an arson case that the acquittal of the principal must likewise result in the acquittal of the accessory where it was shown that no crime was committed inasmuch as the fire was the result of an accident. Hence, there was no basis for the conviction of the accessory.

A similar situation may be cited. The accessory was seen driving a bicycle with an unidentified person as passenger holding a carbine fleeing from the scene of the crime immediately after the commission of the crime of murder. The commission of the crime and the participation of the principal or assailant, although not identified, was established. In such case, the Court holds that the accessory can be prosecuted and held liable independently of the assailant.

Anti Fencing Law, PD 1612

Pamintuan vs. People, July 11, l994

Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law), is "the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft."

The elements of the crime of fencing are:

1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;

2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the said crime;

3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and

4. There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.

One is deemed to know a particular fact if he has the cognizance, consciousness or awareness thereof, or is aware of the existence of something, or has the acquaintance with facts, or if he has something within the mind's grasp with certitude and clarity. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence unless he actually believes that it does not exist.

On the other hand, the words "should know" denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists Tan vs. People

313 SCRA 220, August 26, 1999

Rosita Lim never reported the theft or even loss to the police. She admitted that after Manuelito Mendez, her former employee, confessed to the unlawful taking of the items, she forgave him, and did not prosecute him. Theft is a public crime. It can be prosecuted de oficio, or even without a private complainant, but it cannot be without a victim. As complainant Rosita Lim reported no loss to the public authorities, we cannot hold for certain that there was committed a crime of theft. Thus, the first element of the crime of fencing is absent, that is, a crime of robbery or theft has been committed.Dunlao Sr. Vs. CA, August 22, 1996

Corpus Delicti, meaning

People vs. Lorenzo 240 SCRA 624

It is the body (material substance) upon which a crime has been committed e.g. the corpse of a murdered person or the charred remains of a house burned down. In a derivative sense, it means the substantial fact that a crime was committed. It is made up of two elements: (a) that a certain result has been proved, for example a man has died or a building has been burned down and (b) that some person is criminally responsible for the act.

People vs. Marcelino, October 1, 1999

The corpus is the body or material substance upon which a delicti has been committed. Its two elements are: that a certain result has been proved, and that some person is criminally responsible for the act

Producing the body of the victim, as well as proving its disposal, is not necessary for a murder or homicide conviction. It is enough to show that a person was killed without legal justification. In certain situations, this may even be presumed or established by circumstantial evidence.

PD 1829, Decree Penalizing Obstruction of Apprehension and prosecution of Criminal Offenders

1. Punishable acts

2. Compare with Article 20, RPC (accessories exempt from criminal liability)

IV. Stages of Execution1. Attempted stage:1. People vs. Lamahang, 61 Phil. 793,705-708

The attempt to commit an offense which the law punishes is that which has a logical relation to a particular, concrete offense. The attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, inasmuch as its nature in relation to its objective is ambiguous, is not a juridical fact. It is necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to its complete termination following its natural course, without desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. Xxx There is nothing in the record from which such purpose of the accused (to rob) may reasonably be inferred.

2. Baleros vs. People, 483 SCRA 10 (Feb. 22 2006)

Held: It would be too strained to construe petitioner's act of pressing a chemical-soaked cloth in the mouth of Malou which would induce her to sleep as an overt act that will logically and necessarily ripen into rape. As it were, petitioner did not commence at all the performance of any act indicative of an intent or attempt to rape Malou. It cannot be overemphasized that petitioner was fully clothed and that there was no attempt on his part to undress Malou, let alone touch her private part. For what reason petitioner wanted the complainant unconscious, if that was really his immediate intention, is anybodys guess.

3. Rule in homicide casesPeople vs. Trinidad, 169 SCRA 51Trinidad fired two shots, one of which hit Tan on his right thigh.Trinidad can only be convicted of attempted murder. The wound on his thigh was not fatal and the doctrinal rule is that where the wound inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only Attempted Murder, the accused not having performed all the acts of execution that would have brought about death (People vs. Phones, L-32754-5, July 21, 1978, 84 SCRA 167; People vs. Garcia, L-40106, March 13, 1980, 96 SCRA 497).

People vs. Tiu, December 1, l992

Otillo, was awakened by a noise outside of his house. With a flashlight, he saw that it was a carabao that was causing the noise. He and his son tried to tie the carabao. Suddenly, shots were fired from the direction of the road. Otillo was hit on the right ankle joint and fell down. He then crawled towards the back of the house near the kitchen. Held: The shooting of Otillo, also attended by treachery, was only attempted murder because, although the intent to kill him was clearly established, he was shot only in the ankle. The doctrinal rule is that where the wound inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his death , the accused not having performed all the acts of execution that would have brought it about, the crime is only attempted murder.Rule in estafa:

If only deceit and intent to cause damage were proved but not actual damage, only attempted estafa is committed.

1. Lateo vs. People, 651 SCRA 262, June 8, 2011

At first, Lateo and Elca proposed to Lucero that she financed the titling of the 122 hectares of land located in Muntinlupa allegedly owned by Elca. Lucero released P4.7M. But the project turned out to be hoax. When Lucero confronted Lateo, et al and demanded from them the return of the money, Lateo and Elca instead offered a five (5) hectare property identified as Lot 10140 of Plan Sgs 04213-000441 located at Bacoor,Caviteallegedly owned by Elca. Elca, however, demanded an additionalP2 million for the transfer of title. Lucero initially gave them P200,000.00. When Lucero verified with the Land Management Bureau (LMB), she discovered that Elca only had a pending application for the sales patent over a four (4) hectare area of the subject land.Lucero charged Lateo and Elca withestafarelative to the foiled Bacoor lot transaction where complainant parted P200,000.00.Issue: What is the crime committed by Lateo et al?

Ruling:

Accused representation that Elca owned 14 hectares in Bacoor, Cavite, and was offering a 5-hectare portion of it, in substitution of the Muntinlupa property, and demanding an additionalP2,000,000.00 from Lucero, constituted fraud and deceit.

Accused commenced the commission of the crime ofestafabut they failed to perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime, not by reason of their own spontaneous desistance but because of their apprehension by the authorities before they could obtain the amount.

Since only the intent to cause damage and not the damage itself had been shown, they are merely liable for attemptedestafa.

2. Koh Tieck Heng vs. People 192 SCRA 533, where the Supreme Court held [that] although one of the essential elements of Estafa is damage or prejudice to the offended party, in the absence of proof thereof, the offender would x x x be guilty of attempted estafa.Appellant commenced the commission of the crime of estafa but he failed to perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime not by reason of [their] spontaneous desistance but because of his apprehension of the authorities before they could obtain the amount.Since only the intent to cause damage and not the damage itself has been shown respondent court correctly convicted appellant of attempted estafa.)

2. Frustrated

Requisites:

1. Offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony

2. but felony was not produced by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.

Rule in TheftNo frustrated theft; only attempted and consummated Valenzuela vs. People, 525 SCRA 306, June 21, 2007On the face of the definition of theft under Article 308, there is only one operative act of execution by the actor involved in theft the taking of personal property of another.Theft is already produced upon the tak[ing of] personal property of another without the latters consent.

Theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property due to its taking by one with intent to gain. Viewed from that perspective, it is immaterial that the offender is able or unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since the deprivation from the owner alone has already ensued from such acts of execution. This conclusion is reflected in Chief Justice Aquinos commentaries, as earlier cited, that [i]n theft or robbery the crime is consummated after the accused had material possession of the thing with intent to appropriate the same, although his act of making use of the thing was frustrated.

Indeed, we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.Rule in rapeno frustrated rape, only attempted and consummatedPeople vs. Orita- April 3, l990

We have set the uniform rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ (People v. Tayaba, 62 Phil. 559 People v. Rabadan et al., 53 Phil. 694; United States v. Garcia: 9 Phil. 434) because not all acts of execution was performed. The offender merely commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. Taking into account the nature, elements and manner of execution of the crime of rape and jurisprudence on the matter, it is hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage in rape can ever be committed.

People vs. Alcoreza, G.R. Nos. 135452-53, October 5, 2001

There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ and not merely stroked the external surface thereof for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape. As the labias are required to be "touched" by the penis, which are by their natural situs or location beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, to touch with the penis is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface, hence the conclusion that touching the labia majora or minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape."Rule in arson If a person had poured gasoline under the house of another and was about to strike a match to set the house on fire but was apprehended, he was guilty only of attempted arson. If there was blaze, but no part of the house is burned, the crime of arson is frustrated.

If any part of the house, no matter how small, is burned, the crime of arson is consummated.

(Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book I 2006 Edition, page 111)

3. Consummated

1. People vs. Salvilla, April 26, l990

From the moment the offender gained possession of the thing, even if the culprit had no opportunity to dispose of the same, the unlawful taking is complete. The crime is consummated when the offender acquires possession of the property, even for a short time, and it is not necessary that the property be taken into the hands of the robber, or that he should have actually carried the property away, out of the physical presence of the lawful possessor, or that he should have made his escape with it.

2. See Valenzuela case as discussed in the topic on frustrated theft

V. Conspiracy and proposal (Article 8)

Conspiracy is either a crime or a way of committing a crime. It is a crime when there is a law punishing it. Otherwise, it is only a way of committing a crime, and if it is present, there is collective, rather than individual, criminal responsibility among the actors.

To be a crime there must be a law punishing conspiracy. At present, there are only a few conspiracies punished by the Revised Penal Code. These are (1) Conspiracy to Commit Treason (Article 115); Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion (Art. 136); Conspiracy to Commit Coup d etat (Art. 136); conspiracy to commit sedition (Art. 142). On the other, the Human Security Act of 2007, RA 9372 punishes conspiracy to commit terrorism (Sec. 4); PD 1612 punishes conspiracy to commit arson (Section 7)

On proposal, these are the crimes punished: (1) Proposal to commit treason (Art. 115) ; (2) proposal to commit rebellion (Art. 136); and (3) proposal to commit coup d etat (Art 136)

Conspiracy as a way of committing a crime was discussed in the topic: Degree of Participation under No. IIIVI. Multiple Offenders

(1) Recidivism- A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code.

Absolute pardon does not affect recidivism. ( People vs. Lacao, September 4, l991) Basis- greater perversity of the offender

(2) Reitaracion (or habituality) the offender has been previously punished for an offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty.Basis- greater perversity of the offender.

The offender must have served, partially or totally, the penalty imposed upon him. The controlling factor is the penalty for the previous crime.

Reiteracion is distinguished from recidivism- In recidivism the previous offense and crime for which he is on trial must fall under the same title of the Code, irrespective of penalty, while in reiteracion the controlling factor is the penalty for the previous crime. In recidivism, it is enough that the offender has been previously convicted by final judgment, while in reitaracion, it is required that the offender must have served the penalty for the previous offense.3. Habitual Delinquency (art. 62, par. 5)

1. Within a period of 10 years from the date of his release or last conviction, he is found guilty of any of RETFI2 a third time or oftener.

2. RETFI2 means robbery, estafa, theft, falsification, serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries.

3. One conviction should take place within 10 years from the last conviction or release (People vs. Lacsamana, 70 Phil. 517)

4. Offender should undergo service of the penalty for the first offense

5. Purpose of the law, to render more effective social defense and the reformation of the offender (People vs. Abuyen 52 Phil. 722)

6. Distinguish habitual deliquency from recidivism

4. Quasi Recidivism (Art. 160)- Any person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence or while serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony.VII. Complex Crimes vs. Special Complex Crimes

A complex crime exists when a single act results in two or more grave or less grave offenses (compound crime or delito compuesto) or when an offense is a necessary means of committing the other (complex proper or delito complejo)Special complex crimes, the terminology not being found in law, are different in nature since they arise from different acts and neither of which is a necessary means to commit the other. But they are similar to complex crimes because a single penalty is imposed by the Code. Examples are robbery with homicide ; robbery with rape; robbery with serious physical injuries (Art. 294); kidnapping and serious illegal detention with murder (Art. 267); arson resulting in homicide (Art. 320 as amended by RA 7659); attempted or frustrated robbery with homicide (Article 297);

Plurality of crimes may be (i). formal (ideal) or (ii). material (real)

Formal plurality involves the same criminal intent producing two or more crimes but with only one criminal liability. Material plurality refers to different criminal intents producing in two or more crimes and for each of which the accused incurs criminal liability (Regalado, Criminal Law)

When a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is charged, it is axiomatic that the prosecution must allege in the information and prove during the trial all the elements of all the offenses constituting the complex crime.

However, the failure of the prosecution to prove one of the component crimes and the acquittal arising therefrom will not necessarily lead to a declaration of innocence for the other crimes. Settled is the rule that when a complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to establish one of the component offenses, the defendant can be convicted of the others, so long as they are proved. (Monteverde vs. People, August 12, 20012)Examples of compound crime (delito compuesto)

1. When Cpl. Inocencio heard a commotion from a card game downstairs, he went down and saw Lacao with a knife. He held the latters hand. When he released the hand, Lacao suddenly stabbed Cpl. Inocencio which caused his death. Held: Lacao committed the crime of murder with direct assault. One single act resulted into two grave or less grave offenses, to wit: murder and direct assault of an agent of a person in authority. (People vs. Lacao, September 4, l991)

2. From the store, Maghanoy proceeded to the national road where he met his other victims, Reynante Sabalino, David Baguio and Benito Pacanot who were on their way home. Then Maghanoy, without warning, he opened fire upon them felling all three. By sheer luck, Sabelino was hit only in the left thigh, Baguio and Pacanot died. Held: The accused should have been prosecuted for the complex crime of double murder and frustrated murder. The deaths of Baguio and Pacanot and the wounding of Sabelino were the result of one single act of the accused. (People vs. Maghanoy, December 15, l989)

3. Desalisa stabbed to death his wife who was then pregnant. Held: The accused-appellant has committed the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion. The abortion was caused by the same violence that caused the death of the victim. It is unintentional because accused-appellant must have merely intended to kill the victim but not necessarily to cause an abortion. (People vs. Desalisa, January 4, 1994)

6. People vs. Gaffud 566 SCRA 76, September 19, 2008; the Supreme Court En Banc:

The single act of accused-burning the house of Manuel Salvador, with the main objective of killing the latter and his daughter, Analyn, resulting in their deaths resulted in the complex crime of double murder.

1. People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil 307 (1950). The single act of throwing a grenade at President Roxas resulting in the death of another person and injuring four others produced the complex crime of murder with multiple attempted murders.

2. People vs. Carpo,356 SCRA 248 (April 24, 2001). The single act of hurling a grenade into the bedroom of the victims causing the death of three persons and injuries to one person constituted the complex crime of multiple murder and attempted murder.

3. People vs. Comadre, 431 SCRA 366 (June 8, 2004). The single act of detonating a hand grenade may quantitatively constitute a cluster of several separate and distinct offenses, yet these component criminal offenses should be considered only as a single crime in law because the offender was impelled by a single criminal impulse, which shows his lesser criminal perversity.

Examples of complex crime proper (delito complejo)

1. People vs. Salvilla, April 26, l990

Robbery with serious illegal detention. The term necessary means does not connote indispensable means for if it did then the offense as a necessary means to commit another would be an indispensable element of the latter and would be an ingridient thereof. The phrase necessary means merely signifies that one crime is committed to facilitate and insure the commission of the other. In this case, the crime of serious illegal detention was such a necessary means as it was selected by appellant and his co accused to facilitate and carry out more effectively their evil design to stage a robbery. The detention of the four persons facilitated the commission of the robbery.

2. People vs. Hon. Villallon, et al, December 21, 1990

The accused committed the crime of estafa thru falsification of public document. The falsification of a public document may be a means of committing estafa because before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been consumated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of public, official or commercial document. The damage to another is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the document, hence the falsification of the public, official or commercial document is only a necessary means to commit estafa.

3. Domingo vs. People, October 12, 2009

Domingo committed the complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Document. First, encashment slips are commercial documents. It is falsification not only because the signature of Remedios was counterfeited but also because Domingo made it appear that Remedios participated in an act or proceeding when in fact she did not.

Whenever a person carries out on a public, official, or commercial document any of the acts enumerated in Art. 171 of the RPC as a necessary means to perpetrate another crime, such as estafa or malversation, a complex crime is formed by the two crimes.

The falsification of a public, official, or commercial document may be a means of committing estafa, because before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of public, official, or commercial document. In other words, the crime of falsification has already existed. Actually utilizing that falsified public, official, or commercial document to defraud another is estafa. But the damage is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the document. Therefore, the falsification of the public, official, or commercial document is only a necessary means to commit estafa.

4. People vs. Dawandawan, April 6, l990

Accused boxed Maria at her mid section causing her to lose consciousness. Accused then sexually molested her . After sexually molesting her, accused slashed Marias neck. He slapped her and boxed her in several parts of her body and stabbed her on the left side of her breast and she again lost her consciousness. She did not die however. Held: Accused has committed the two separate crimes of rape and frustrated homicide. The physical injuries which could have caused victims death were not the result of the rape committed; neither was the slashing a necessary means for committing the rape. Independently of the slashing of the victims neck and the stabbing, the accused was able to consumate the rape. The physical injuries were inflicted after the rape and were not a necessary means to commit the same.

Delito Continuado(CONTINUED/CONTINOUS CRIME not continuing crime)

People vs. De Leon, June 26, 2009 (Justice Peralta)

Six people armed with a shotgun and .38 caliber, alighted from their car. Marlon poked a gun at Eduardo and took his wallet containing P50.00. Four of Marlons companions went to the cashier and took the money worth P3,000 and shot the security guard and took his revolver. Held: The accused intended only to rob one place. That they did; and in the process, also took away by force the money and valuables of the employees working in said gasoline station. Clearly inferred from these circumstances are the series of acts which were borne from one criminal resolution. A continued offense is a continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force, however long a time it may occupy.

Defensor Santiago vs. Garchitorena, 228 SCRA 214, Dec. 2, 1993)

For delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts performed during a period of time, unity of penal provision violated and unity of criminal intent or purpose which means that two or more violations of the same penal provisions are united in one and same intent or resolution leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim. In appearance, a delito continuado consists of several crimes but in reality there is only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator.

On May 1, 1991, then BID Commissioner, Miriam Defensor Santiago was charged with 32 counts for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 by allegedly favoring unqualified aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program. The 32 Informations stated the same date when the alleged offenses were committed. Held: The 32 amended informations charged what is known as delito continuado or continued crime or continous crime.

2. Other examples of delito continuado

1. The theft of 13 cows belonging to two different owners committed by the accused at the same place and at the same period of time. (People vs. Tumlos, 67 Phil 320, l939)

2. The theft of six roosters belonging to two different owners from the same coop and at the same period of time (People vs. Jaranillo, 55 SCRA 563, l974.

3. The theft of two roosters in the same place and on the same occasion (People vs. de Leon, 49 Phil. 437, l926)

4. The illegal charging of fees for services rendered by a lawyer everytime he collects veterans benefits on behalf of a client, who agreed that the attorneys fees shall be paid out of the said benefits [People vs. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 (l964)]. The collections of the legal fees were compelled by the same motive, that of collecting fees for services rendered, and all acts of collection were made under the same criminal impulse. [People vs. Lawas, 97 Phi. 975 (1955)]

3. Cases where crimes were not considered delito continuado

1. Two estafa cases, one of which was committed during the period from January 19 to December 1955 and the other from January 1956 to July 1956 (People vs. Dichupa, 113 Phil 306, l961). The said acts were comitted on different occassions.

2. Several malversations committed in May, June and July, l936, and falsifications to conceal the said offenses committed in August and October, l936. The malversations and falsifications were not the result of only purpose or of only one resolution to embezzle and falsify. (People vs. Cid, 66 Phil 354, 1938)

3. Two estafa cases, one committed in December, l963 involving failure of the collector to turn over the installments for a radio and the other in June l964 invloving the pocketing of the installments for a sewing machine (People vs. Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77 (1976]

4. 75 estafa cases committed by the conversion by the agent of collections from customers of the employer made on different dates. (Gamboa vs. Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA 308, l975]

FOREKNOWLEDGE PRINCIPLEThe offender had advanced knowledge or could have foreseen that same event will continuously happen.

Paera vs. People. 649 SCRA 384, May 30, 2011

The theory of fusing his criminal liability to one count of Grave Threat can be sustain only if he had foreknowledge of A, B and Cs presence near the water tank in the morning of 8 April 1999. But not having known in advance of A, B and Cs presence near the water tank at the time in question, Paera could not have formed any intent to threatened any of them until shortly before he inadvertently came across each of them.

VII. Circumstances which Affect Criminal Liability

A. JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES

1. Defense of ones person.

Stand ground when in the right- the law does not require a person to retreat when his assailant is rapidly advancing upon him with a deadly weapon. Reason: He runs the risk of being attacked in the back by the aggressor.

It is axiomatic that the mere thrusting of ones hand into his pocket as if for the purpose of drawing a weapon is not unlawful aggression. Even the cocking of a rifle without aiming the firearm at any particular target is not sufficient to conclude that ones life was in imminent danger. Hence, a threat, even if made with a weapon, or the belief that a person was about to be attacked, is not sufficient. It is necessary that the intent be ostensibly revealed by an act of aggression or by some external acts showing the commencement of actual and material unlawful aggression. (People vs. Rubiso, 399 SCRA 267, March 18, 2003; see also People vs. Daquipil, 240 SCRA 708)

The victim told the accused: So you are brave now you had the guts to fight against me; go home, get your firearm because I will go home to get a gun. If you wont go home and get a gun, I will go to your place and kill you including your parents. Held: Such utterances cant be regarded as unlawful aggression. Such statements could not reasonably inspire well grounded and reasonable belief that accused was in imminent danger of death or bodily harm. Unlawful aggression refers to an attack that has actually broken out or materialized or clearly imminent; it cannot consist in oral threats or a merely threatening stance or posture (People vs. Tacan, 182 SCRA 601)

The victim addressed offensive language to the accused such as vulva of your mother, youre talking as if you have no debts, not like me I have no debts. Held: The victim had not acted with unlawful aggression that might have provoked the accuseds deadly wrath. Infurious words of threats do not amount unlawful aggression. (People vs. Agapinay, June 27, l990)

The claim of appellant that the act of the victim in reaching for a clutch bag and slapping his fellow security guard constitute unlawful aggression is devoid of merit. The aggression must be real or at least imminent and not merely imaginary. A belief that a person is about to be attacked is not sufficient. Even an intimidating or threatening attitude is by no means enough. A mere push or shove not followed by other acts placing in real peril the life or personal safety of the accused is not unlawful aggression. (People vs. Bautista, 254 SCRA 621, March 12, 1996)

There can be no defense where there is no aggression. Alconga had no right to pursue, no right to kill or injure Barion for the reason that "a fleeing man is not dangerous to the one from whom he flees. (People vs. Alconga, 78 Phil 366, April 30, 1947)

It is settled that the moment the first aggressor runs away, unlawful aggression on his parts ceases to exist, and when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any right to kill or wound the former aggressor, otherwise, retaliation and not self-defense is committed. Retaliation is not the same as self-defense. (Razon vs. People, 525 SCRA 284, June 21, 2007 (Austria-Martinez, J)

Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression means rational equivalence not material commensurability. In rational equivalence, what should be considered are the factors of emergency, the danger to the life of a person and instinct more than reason impels the defense (People vs. Gutual, 254 SCRA 37, February 22, 1986)2. Defense of Property

The assault on ones property amounts to unlawful aggression as contemplated by law. But the reasonableness of the resistance is doubtful. When the accused fired his shotgun from his window, killing his two victims, his resistance was disproportionate to the attack. (People vs. Narvaez, 121 SCRA 403, April 20, 1983)

3. Defense of HonorThe placing of hand by a man on the womans upper thigh is unlawful aggression (People vs. Jaurigue 76 Phil 174)

4. Defense of RelativesOlbinar vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 115, January 21, l991

In case the wife saw her husband on the ground, with blood on his person, and two men were boxing and kicking him, she is not required to investigate the nature of her husbands injuries, determine if he was in danger of death, analyze the situation and ascertain what would be the most reasonable mode by which she could stop her husbands mauling, but has to act and act quickly in defense of her husband. The wife had acted in justifiable defense of her husband. People vs. Luis Toring, et al, October 26, l990

When A was about to dance a girl, the victim stopped him, pointed his shotgun at him, took a bullet from his jacket, showed it to A and even asked if A would like it. B, first cousin of A, took his knife and stabbed the victim. Before this, a brother of the victim shot, not only B but also a brother of B. Held: B is entitled to an incomplete defense of relative only. No doubt, there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. There was no provocation also on the part of B, the accused. But B cannot be given the full credence of the justifying circumstance because he was not inspired by pure compassion or beneficence or the lawful desire to avenge the immediate wrong inflicted upon his cousin. Rather, he was motivated by revenge, resentment or evil motive because of a running feud between the victim and accused brothers. Indeed vendetta appears to have driven both camps to commit unlawful acts against each other.

People vs. Lingatong, January 29, l990

Accused is not entitled to the benefit of a justifying circumstance of defense of a relative. It was the accuseds brother and not the victim who was the unlawful aggressor by his act of clubbing EJ with a kulafu bottle on the right eyebrow.

5. Defense of StrangersPaera vs. People, 649 SCRA 384, May 30, 2011

The defense of stranger rule requires proof of (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it and (3) absence of evil motives such as revenge and resentment.

None of the Darongs committed acts of aggression against third parties rights.6. State of Necessity

People vs. Punzalan, 687 SCRA 687, December 10, 2012

Facts: Punzalan was punched by Bacosa in his right ear. To avoid further altercation, Punzalan left the bar. When he passed by the sentry, somebody threw stones at his van. When he alighted, Bacosa and another man boxed him. He saw four other men approaching him. So, Punzalan went back to his car and drove it in a rushing and zigzagging manner that hit and bumped Duclayna and Andal. Charged with double murder, Punzalan contended that the attack against him by two men whose four companions were also approaching created in his mind a fear of greater evil prompting him to speed up his vehicle to avoid a greater evil or injury.

Issue: Whether or not Punzalan is entitled to the justifying circumstance of state of necessity.

Ruling: Punzalans contention cannot be sustained. Under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, infliction of damage or injury to another so that a greater evil or injury may not befall ones self may be justified only if it is taken as a last resort and with the least prejudice to another. If there is another way to avoid the injury without causing damage or injury to another, then such course should be taken. In this case, the road where the incident happened was wide, some 7 meters in width, and the place was well lighted. With this wide space, Punzalan had other way to avoid hitting the approaching four men. He failed to resort to other practical and less harmful available means of preventing the evil or injury he claimed to be avoiding.

People vs. Retubado, 417 SCRA 393 December 10, 2003Retubado followed the victim up to his house when the latter refused to talk to him; the victim, irritated, went inside his room; when he went out of his room, he had already a gun, although the trigger finger was outside the trigger guard and the muzzle facing downward, Retubado feared for his life and so tried to wrestle possession of the gun; in the process the gun went off and hit the victim who died. Retubado put up defense of state of necessity. Held: Not entitled. It is indispensable that the state of necessity must not be brought about by the intentional provocation of the party invoking the same. Retubado provoked the victim in getting his gun.6.1. Compare with Pure Accident (Article 12 (4)People vs. Nepomuceno, 298 SCRA 450, November 11, 1998

Accused was always being nagged by his wife. Because of this, he thought of ending his life. He took the gun from their childs drawer. Their son however woke up, walked to the space between him and his wife, he raised his arm holding the gun passing over the left leg of his wife but the gun went off, his wife was hit and died. Held: Accident to be exempting, presupposes that the act done is lawful. Here, however, the act of accused of drawing a weapon in the course of a quarrel, the same not being in self defense, is at least constitutes light threats (Art. 285, par. 1,RPC). There is thus no room for the invocation of accident as a ground for exemption. Talampas vs. People, 661 SCRA 197, November 23, 2011

Facts Talampas alighted from his bicycle and fired his revolver at Eduardo, who was hit and took refuge behind Ernesto. Talampas fired his gun again three times, one shot hit Ernesto at the right portion of this back causing him to fall on the ground on his back. Ernesto died instantaneously. Charged with homicide, Talampas puts up the defense of accident because the shot was aimed at Eduardo and not at Ernesto, the victim. Is Talampas entitled to the exempting circumstance of accident? Explain.

Ruling: Talampas could not relieve himself of criminal liability by invoking accident as a defense. Article 12(4) of theRevised Penal Code, contemplates a situation where a person is in fact in the act of doing something legal, exercising due care, diligence and prudence, but in the process produces harm or injury to someone or to something not in the least in the mind of the actor an accidental result flowing out of a legal act.Accident presupposes the lack of intention to commit the wrong done.

Here, Talampas brandished and poked his revolver at Eduardo and fired it, hitting Eduardo, who then hid behind Ernesto.Then Talampas fired his revolver again thrice. One shot hit Ernesto at the right portion of his back and another shot hit Eduardo on the nape. Clearly, Talampas acts were not lawful, being a criminal assault againstbothEduardo and Ernesto.

The fact that the target of Talampas assault was Eduardo, not Ernesto, did not excuse him from criminal liability. The fatal hitting of Ernesto was the natural and direct consequence of Talampas felonious act against Eduardo. Talampas poor aim amounted toaberratio ictus, or mistake in the blow, a circumstance that neither exempted him from criminal responsibility nor mitigated his criminal liability.Lo que es causa dela causa, es causa del mal causado(what is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused).Under Article 4 of theRevised Penal Code,criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

People vs. Latosa, 621 SCRA 586, June 23, 2010

Facts: Felixberto and Susan, husband and wife, were at their house on that fateful day. When Felixberto was awaken, he asked his wife Susan to get his service pistol from the cabinet adjacent to their bed. As she was handing the pistol to him, it suddenly fired, hitting Felixberto at his left temple. Susan claimed that it was an accidental shooting. Decide.

Rule: Susan is liable for parricide. To avail of the exempting circumstance of accident, the offender must be performing a lawful act with due care. The pointing of the gun towards her husband cannot be considered as performing a lawful act with due care. Susan held the gun in one hand and extended it towards her husband who was still lying in bed. Prudence dictates that when handing over a gun, the muzzle should not be pointed to a person. Susan should have known this. Here the muzzle of the gun was pointed at her husband. Besides, a gun does not fire unless there was pressure on the trigger.

7. Performance of a duty

1. Cabanlig vs. Sandiganbayan, 464 SCRA 324 , July 28, 2005

A warning shot is not absolutely mandated at all times.The duty to issue a warning is not absolutely mandated at all times and at all cost, to the detriment of the life of law enforcers. The directive to issue a warning contemplates a situation where several options are still available to the law enforcers. In exceptional circumstances such as this case, where the threat to the life of a law enforcer is already imminent, and there is no other option but to use force to subdue the offender, the law enforcers failure to issue a warning is excusable. 2. Paera vs. People, 649 SCRA 384, May 30, 2011

On justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or exercise of office under the 5th paragraph of Article 11 of the RPC lies upon proof that the offense committed was the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of office. Arguably, Paera acted in the performance of his duty to ensure delivery of basic services when he barred the Darongs access to the communal water tank.

Nevertheless, Paera exceeded the bounds of his office when he successively chased the Darongs with a bladed weapon, threatening harm on their persons, for violating his order. Paera ought to know that no amount of concern for the delivery of services justifies use by local elective officials of violence or threats of violence.

3. Yapyuco vs. Sandiganbayan, 624 SCRA 470, June 25, 2012

Facts: Villanueva, Flores, Calma, De Vera, Panlican and Licup were on board a tamarraw jeep and they were traversin