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Preliminary Hazard Analysis and Transport Hazard Analysis

APPENDIX 9

Preliminary Hazard Analysis

Document: J20210-004 Sherpa Consulting Pty Ltd (ABN 40 110 961 898) Revision: 1 Phone: 61 2 9412 4555 Revision Date: 13 October 2009 Fax: 61 2 9412 4556 Document ID: J20210-004 PHA Rev 1 Reissued for EA Web: www.sherpaconsulting.com

PROPOSED ANE FACILITY

KURRI KURRI TECHNOLOGY CENTRE

PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

ORICA AUSTRALIA

PREPARED FOR: Richard Sheehan

Orica Australia

DOCUMENT NO: J20210-004

REVISION: 1

DATE: 13 October 2009

Document: J20210-004 Revision: 1 Revision Date: 13 October 2009 Document ID: J20210-004 PHA Rev 1 Reissued for EA

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DOCUMENT REVISION RECORD

REV DATE DESCRIPTION PREPARED CHECKED APPROVED METHOD OF ISSUE

A 3 August 2009 Draft for client comment J Polich P Johnson J Polich PDF

B 20 August 2009 Revised Draft for client comment

J Polich P Johnson J Polich PDF

0 16 September 2009 Final Issue for inclusion in EA


1 13 October 2009 Final for inclusion in EA. Reissued with minor text updates.


RELIANCE NOTICE

This report is issued pursuant to an Agreement between SHERPA CONSULTING PTY LTD (‘Sherpa Consulting’) and Orica Australia which agreement sets forth the entire rights, obligations and liabilities of those parties with respect to the content and use of the report.

Reliance by any other party on the contents of the report shall be at its own risk. Sherpa Consulting makes no warranty or representation, expressed or implied, to any other party with respect to the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of the information contained in this report and assumes no liabilities with respect to any other party‟s use of or damages resulting from such use of any information, conclusions or recommendations disclosed in this report.

Title:

Proposed ANE Facility

Kurri Kurri Technology Centre

Preliminary Hazard Analysis

QA Verified: D Pastuszak

Date: 13 October 2009


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CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS ...................................................................................................................................... 6

1 SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................................ 7

2 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 12

2.1 Background .............................................................................................................................. 12

2.2 Objective .................................................................................................................................. 12

2.3 Scope ....................................................................................................................................... 12

2.4 Methodology ............................................................................................................................ 13

2.5 Risk Criteria ............................................................................................................................. 14

2.6 Limitations ................................................................................................................................ 16

2.7 Links to Other Studies ............................................................................................................. 16

3 SITE DESCRIPTION ....................................................................................................................... 17

3.1 Site Overview ........................................................................................................................... 17

3.2 ANE Project Overview ............................................................................................................. 17

3.3 Location and Surrounding Land Use ....................................................................................... 17

3.4 Site Security ............................................................................................................................. 18

3.5 Site Layout ............................................................................................................................... 18

3.6 Australian Standard Separation Distances .............................................................................. 18

3.7 ANE Plant Process Overview .................................................................................................. 24

3.8 ANE Manufacture, Storage and Loadout ................................................................................ 25

3.9 Technology Centre Existing Facilities...................................................................................... 26

4 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION ............................................................................................................ 28

4.1 Hazardous Materials for Proposed ANE Plant ........................................................................ 28

4.2 Hazardous Materials at Existing Technical Centre Facilities .................................................. 30

4.3 External Events........................................................................................................................ 30

4.4 Bushfires .................................................................................................................................. 31

4.5 Potential Hazardous Incident Scenarios ................................................................................. 35

4.6 Scenarios for Quantitative Assessment .................................................................................. 35

4.7 Rule Sets for Incident Inclusion ............................................................................................... 35

5 QRA BASIS ..................................................................................................................................... 44

6 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS .......................................................................................................... 46

6.1 Overview .................................................................................................................................. 46


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6.2 Effect Levels of Interest ........................................................................................................... 46

6.3 Explosion Consequence Assessment Assumptions ............................................................... 48

6.4 Explosion Scenario Consequence Results ............................................................................. 51

6.5 Onsite Escalation ..................................................................................................................... 56

6.6 Toxic Effects Consequence Assessment ................................................................................ 65

7 FREQUENCY ANALYSIS AND RISK RESULTS ............................................................................ 68

7.1 Individual Fatality Risk ............................................................................................................. 68

8 RISK ASSESSMENT ....................................................................................................................... 70

8.1 Individual Fatality Risk ............................................................................................................. 70

8.2 Explosion Injury Risk ............................................................................................................... 70

8.3 Escalation Risk (Offsite Property) ............................................................................................ 71

8.4 Toxic Injury / Irritation Risk ...................................................................................................... 71

8.5 Risk to Biophysical Environment ............................................................................................. 73

9 CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................................................................. 76

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

APPENDIX 2. HIRAC INFORMATION

APPENDIX 3. EXPLOSION OVERPRESSURES CONSEQUENCE MODELLING METHODOLOGY

APPENDIX 4. QRA SCENARIOS

APPENDIX 5. SUMMARY OF ASSUMPTIONS

APPENDIX 6. REFERENCES


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TABLES

Table 1.1: Compliance with Individual Fatality Risk Criteria ...................................................................9

Table 2.1: NSW Individual Risk Criteria, New Plants ........................................................................... 14

Table 2.2: NSW Escalation Risk Criteria, New Plants ......................................................................... 15

Table 2.3: NSW Risk Criteria, Existing Plants ...................................................................................... 15

Table 3.1: Utility Chemicals .................................................................................................................. 26

Table 3.2: Existing Facilities Inventory Summary ................................................................................. 27

Table 4.1: NO2 Toxicity ......................................................................................................................... 30

Table 4.2: External Events ................................................................................................................... 30

Table 4.3: Proposed ANE Production Facility Hazardous Material Properties .................................... 33

Table 4.4: Rule Set for Scenarios Considered in QRA ........................................................................ 36

Table 4.5: Hazardous Scenarios Considered in PHA, Proposed ANE production facility ................... 37

Table 4.6: Hazardous Scenarios Considered in QRA, Existing Technical Center Facilities ................ 43

Table 5.1: QRA Basis, Proposed ANE PLant ....................................................................................... 44

Table 5.2: QRA Basis, Existing Kurri Facilities ..................................................................................... 45

Table 6.1: Fatality / Overpressure Correlation ..................................................................................... 46

Table 6.2: Impact Levels For Toxic Effects .......................................................................................... 48

Table 6.3: ANS and AN Explosion Efficency ........................................................................................ 49

Table 6.4: TNT Equivalence ................................................................................................................. 50

Table 6.5: Separation Distances Between Inventories ........................................................................ 51

Table 6.6: Consequence Analysis Results – Overpressures Proposed ANE PLant ............................ 61

Table 6.7: Consequence Analysis Results – AS2187.1 Separation Distances Proposed ANE Plant . 62

Table 6.8: Consequence Analysis Results – Overpressures for Existing TEchncial Centre Inventories63

Table 6.9: Consequence Analysis Results – AS2187.1 Separation Distances Existing Kurri Facilities64

Table 6.10: Consequence Analysis Results – NO2 Dispersion ............................................................. 67

Table 7.1: Orica Frequency Scale ........................................................................................................ 69

Table 8.1: Compliance with Individual Fatality Risk Criteria ................................................................ 70

Table 8.2: Compliance with Injury Risk Criteria .................................................................................... 71

Table 8.3: Compliance with Escalation Risk Criteria ............................................................................ 71

Table 8.4: Compliance with Toxic Injury / Irritation Risk Criteria .......................................................... 72

FIGURES

Figure 3.1: Site Location .................................................................................................................. 21

Figure 3.2: Kurri KURRI TEcHNCIAL Centre Site Layout ............................................................... 22

Figure 3.3: Proposed ANE Plant Layout .......................................................................................... 23

Figure 6.1: Proposed ANE Plant Worst Case Explosion – Aggregate Inventory ............................ 53

Figure 6.2: Proposed ANE Production Facility - ANE (maximum storage) Explosion ..................... 54

Figure 6.3: Proposed ANE Plant – ANS Storage Tank (largest inventory) Explosion ..................... 55

Figure 6.4: Research Magazine and Quarry Services Explosion (Maximum NEQ) ........................ 57

Figure 6.5: Research Laboratory Explosion (Maximum NEQ) ........................................................ 58

Figure 6.6: Mixing Laboratory Explosion (Maximum NEQ) ............................................................. 59

Figure 6.7: Test Cell Explosion (Maximum NEQ) ............................................................................ 60


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ABBREVIATIONS

AEGL Acute Emergency Guideline Level

AEMSC Australian Explosive Manufacturers Safety Committee

AN Ammonium Nitrate

ANE Ammonium Nitrate Emulsion

ANS Ammonium Nitrate Solution

APZ Asset Protection Zone

AS Australian Standard

BOS (Orica) Basis of Safety

CoP Code of Practice

DG Dangerous Goods

DGRs (NSW DoP) Director General‟s Requirements

DoP (NSW) Department of Planning

EA Environmental Assessment

ERPG Emergency Response Planning Guideline

FRMP Fire Risk Management Plan

HAZOP Hazard and Operability study

HIPAP Hazard Industry Planning Advisory Paper

HIRAC Hazard Identification Risk Assessment and Control

KI Kooragang Island

MAE Major Accident Event

ML Mixing Laboratory

MMU Mobile Manufacturing Unit

MSDS Material Safety Datasheet

NEQ Net Explosive Quantity

NO Nitric Oxide

NO2 Nitrogen dioxide

NOx Oxides of nitrogen (includes NO, NO2 and others)

OXS Oxidiser Solution

PHA Preliminary Hazard Analysis

PW Protected Works

QRA Quantitative Risk Assessment

QS Quarry Services depot

RFS NSW Rural Fire Service

RL Research Laboratory

RM Research Magazine

SHE Safety Heath and Environment

TNT Trinitrotoluene

UK HSE United Kingdom Health and Safety Executive

UN United Nations


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1 SUMMARY

Background

Orica Australia proposes to build a new Ammonium Nitrate Emulsion (ANE) Production

Facility at their existing Technology Centre site at Richmond Vale, NSW to meet the

projected regional ANE demand to 2020 and beyond. The Technology Centre site

currently undertakes research and commercial production of various Class 1

explosives and Class 5 ammonium nitrate emulsions (ANE‟s). The site is several

kilometres from populated areas and the current explosives facilities are well

separated from each other and site boundaries, as the site complies with the quantity

distance rules in AS2187.1-1998 Explosives – Storage, Transport and Use Part 1:

Storage.

The proposed ANE Production Facilities comprise the ANE Production Facility or

Plant, and associated infrastructure such as offices and access roads. The proposed

ANE Production Facility will manufacture Class 5.1 ANE‟s classified as UN number

3375. Materials meeting this classification are precursor materials which behave as

Dangerous Goods of Class 5 – Oxidisers, rather than as Class 1 – Explosives. These

materials undergo final processing at the point of use (e.g. at a mine site) and only

become explosives at that stage.

The NSW Department of Planning (DoP) Director General‟s Requirements (DGRs) for

the project require that a Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) be prepared in

accordance with the DoP Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Papers No 6 Hazard

Analysis Guidelines (HIPAP 6), and No 4 Risk Criteria for Land Use Safety Planning

(HIPAP 4).

Orica retained Sherpa Consulting Pty Ltd (Sherpa) to prepare the PHA and associated

report for inclusion in the project Environmental Assessment (EA).

Purpose and Scope

The overall objective of the PHA was to develop a comprehensive understanding of

the hazards and risks associated with the facility and the adequacy of the safeguards.

The PHA covered the proposed ANE Production Facilities and also potential

interactions with the existing facilities on the Technology Centre site.

Major Findings

Hazardous Incidents

The potentially significant hazardous incidents identified were:

ANE Production Facility - explosions involving raw materials, i.e. ammonium

nitrate solutions (ANS) or ammonium nitrate, or emulsion products (ANE) due

to contamination or external heating.


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ANE Production Facility – ANS decomposition and toxic decomposition product

(NOx) formation.

Existing Technology Centre facilities – explosion in existing Class 1 high

explosives, ANE or AN facilities. Note there are no significant toxicity impacts

associated with explosion of high explosives.

External factors were considered in the hazard identification. Bushfire was the only

identified external event of potential concern.

Methodology

The assessment followed the methodology given in HIPAP 6 and also the DoP

guideline Multi-Level Risk Assessment. For this study, sufficient quantitative analysis

was undertaken to identify the events with the potential to have an offsite impact on

people or property, including potential escalation effects from or to the existing site

facilities.

The ANE Production Facility assessment was prepared using maximum storage

inventories for individual scenarios, including an assessment of an aggregated Net

Explosive Quantity (NEQ) to cover an escalation scenario involving all susceptible

inventories in the ANE Production Facility. This is a conservative approach to the

assessment, but is considered to be appropriate for a QRA conducted at the project

planning stage. Assessment of the existing facilities was also conservatively based on

the maximum aggregate NEQ for each area.

Analysis of the consequences of these incidents on people or property was

undertaken using a TNT equivalent model for explosion effects, and standard

air dispersion packages for toxic impacts (TNO Riskcurves, BP Cirrus and US

EPA ALOHA).

Evaluation of likelihood of the hazardous incidents occurring was based on the

order of magnitude frequency assessments from the qualitative frequency

rankings applied in Orica‟s hazard study workshops. Likelihood was assessed

only for those incidents where the consequence analysis showed offsite

impacts were possible.

Risk levels were compared with risk criteria given in HIPAP 4.

This is a level 2 risk assessment as defined in the Multi-Level Risk Assessment

guidelines. A level 2 approach was selected as the consequence assessment

indicated only a small number of scenarios with the potential to have offsite impacts.

Risk Results:

This study has found that there are no neighbouring hazardous inventories,

infrastructure or populations that may be affected by an explosion event. Due to the

large separation distances between the various hazardous inventories and the site

boundaries, very few events were identified with potential to cause injury or fatality


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outside the site boundary. For those few events, the population potentially affected is

very low as the area within a one kilometre distance from the site boundary is largely

unpopulated. In summary:

No explosion events were identified associated with the ANE Production

Facilities or existing Technology Centre facilities with the potential to affect

offsite residential or industrial populations, or occupied buildings.

No explosion events were identified with the ANE Production facilities or

existing Technology Centre facilities with potential to damage offsite property or

infrastructure.

No explosion events were identified which would result in escalation incidents

between the proposed ANE Production Facilities and existing facilities at the

Technology Centre.

Dispersion modelling of toxic decomposition products (modelled as NO2) from a

worst case decomposition occurring in the largest ANE Production Facility

inventory demonstrated that there would be no offsite fatality effects. Injurious

concentrations would not be exceeded in any residential areas. Irritation effects

were possible in populated areas at a very low frequency (below the irritation

risk criterion).

Hence the quantitative risk criteria are complied with as summarised in Table 1.1.

TABLE 1.1: COMPLIANCE WITH INDIVIDUAL FATALITY RISK CRITERIA

Land Uses Max Risk (per year)

Comments Complies with HIPAP 4 Criteria?

Proposed ANE Prod Facility

Existing Tech Centre Facilities

Cumulative

Individual Fatality Risk

Sensitive uses 0.5 x 10-6

No fatality impacts in this land use

Y Y Y

Residential areas 1 x 10-6


Y Y Y

Commercial developments, retail centres, offices, entertainment centres

5 x 10-6


Y Y Y

Sporting complexes and active open space

10 x 10-6


Y Y Y

Remain within boundary of an industrial site

50 x 10-6

Event frequency does not exceed risk criterion.

Y Y Y

Injury Risk (Explosion) Risk

Fire / Explosion Injury risk - incident explosion overpressure at residential areas should not exceed 7 kPa at frequencies of more than 50 chances in a million per year

50 x 10-6

No injury impacts in this land use

Y Y Y


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Land Uses Max Risk (per year)

Comments Complies with HIPAP 4 Criteria?

Escalation (Explosion) Risk

Overpressure at neighbouring potentially hazardous installations or the nearest public building should not exceed a risk of 50 per million per year for the 14 kPa overpressure contour.

50 x 10-6

No damage impacts in this land use

Y Y Y

Toxic Injury / Irritation Risk

Toxic Injury - Toxic concentrations in residential areas should not exceed a level which would be seriously injurious to sensitive members of the community following a relatively short period of exposure at a maximum frequency of 10 in a million per year

10 x 10-6

Injurious concentrations not experienced in residential areas

Y Y

Y

Toxic Irritation - Toxic concentrations in residential areas should not cause irritation to eyes, or throat, coughing or other acute physiological responses in sensitive members of the community over a maximum frequency of 50 in a million per year

50 x 10-6


Y Y

Y

Safeguards:

The ANE project has advanced to the detail design stage. Risk assessment activities

have occurred throughout the design process; including completion of a HAZOP

(which was used to prepare the PHA). In addition, quantitative consequence explosion

overpressure results have been utilised early in the design process to identify required

separation distances between inventories and site boundaries, determining the

production facility location and layout.

Key safeguards include:

Minimisation of inventories to minimise offsite consequences of potential

explosion events.

Separation distances from site boundaries and existing facilities.

Separation distances between any combustible material storages and Class

5.1 inventories.

Engineering controls such as automated control of ANE manufacture batch

process and high reliability low flow trips for emulsion pumps.

Asset protection zones to protect against bushfire impingement.


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Recommendations

As risk reduction has been integrated into the design process, no recommendations in

relation to additional engineering or layout safeguards are made as part of the PHA.

It is recommended that the existing site Fire Risk Management Plan be updated to

cover the proposed ANE Production Facilities. This should specifically address

extension of the existing site bushfire hazard reduction practices to cover the ANE

Production Facility area.


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2 INTRODUCTION

2.1 Background

Orica Australia Pty Ltd (Orica) currently operates an Ammonium Nitrate Emulsion

(ANE) Production Facility at their Liddell site. Liddell is the ANE manufacturing centre

for the South East Region, including the Hunter Valley, NSW and southern Australia.

To meet the projected regional demand for ANE to 2020 and beyond, the ANE

manufacturing capacity requires expansion. Orica proposes to meet this additional

demand by closing and decommissioning the current ANE manufacturing facility at

Liddell, and constructing a new ANE manufacturing facility at their existing Technology

Centre site at Richmond Vale.

The NSW Department of Planning (DoP) Director General‟s Requirements (DGRs)

issued for the proposed ANE Production Facility as part of the Environmental

Assessment (EA) require that a Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) be prepared in

accordance with the DoP Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Papers No 6 Hazard

Analysis Guidelines (HIPAP 6) (Ref 1), and No 4 Risk Criteria for Land Use Safety

Planning (HIPAP 4) (Ref 2).

Orica retained Sherpa Consulting Pty Ltd (Sherpa) to assist in completing the risk

assessment activities associated with the ANE Project, including preparation of the

PHA.

2.2 Objective

The objectives of the PHA were to:

Develop a comprehensive understanding of the hazards, risks, and the

adequacy of the safeguards associated with the proposed ANE facility.

Establish the offsite risk levels from the proposed ANE facility, and also

determine the cumulative offsite risk from all operations on the site, and

compare these with the risk criteria given in HIPAP 4.

Prepare a report in accordance with HIPAP 6 for inclusion in the project

Environmental Assessment (EA) that satisfies the requirements of the NSW

DoP.

2.3 Scope

The study covers:

the proposed ANE Plant and associated facilities (ANE Production Facilities)

the existing Technology Centre facilities at site, which will be unchanged by the

project.


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2.4 Methodology

The assessment generally follows the methodology given in the NSW Department of

Planning (DoP) guideline Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper (HIPAP) No. 6

Guidelines for Hazard Analysis (HIPAP 6) (Ref 1), and is also consistent with the DoP

guideline Multi-Level Risk Assessment (Ref 3).

The main steps are:

Identification of hazards and description of potential incident scenarios. Hazard

identification and development of hazardous incident scenarios was conducted

using the Orica HIRAC (Hazard Identification Risk Assessment and Control)

process in a workshop attended by relevant site and engineering design

personnel. This included review of incidents known to have occurred at Orica‟s

sites and other similar facilities in the industry. Based on the HIRAC process,

scenarios with potential off-site impact were identified for further analysis. Refer

to Section 4 of this report for further details.

Analysis of the consequences of these incidents on people, property and the

biophysical environment. Consequences for explosion scenarios were

assessed using the TNT equivalence method. Toxic emission consequences

were assessed using information from the UK HSE to estimate quantities of

toxic gases formed in a fire leading to decomposition of AN solutions, and a

Gaussian dispersion model in the BP Cirrus software to estimate toxic gas

effect distances (Refer to Section 6.3 of this report).

Evaluation of likelihood of the hazardous incidents occurring and the adequacy

of the safeguards provided. Likelihood was assessed using order of magnitude

estimates from the literature, supplemented by some information from the Orica

Ammonium Nitrate Draft Code of Practice (v8) available in Orica‟s SHE Risk

Register (Ref 4). Likelihood was assessed only for those incidents where the

consequence analysis showed offsite impacts were possible. (Refer to Section

7 of this report).

The resulting risk levels were obtained by combining the frequency and

consequence for each event of interest, which are then summed for all potential

recognised incidents. A separate summation is carried out for each

consequence of interest, e.g. injury, individual fatality etc.

Comparison of risk levels with appropriate risk criteria as detailed in HIPAP 4.

Safeguard Assessment: Using the information from the previous steps,

potential risk reduction measures were identified for further assessment as part

of the project process. (It is noted that these recommendations generally

related to inventory reduction and have already been included in the design

covered by this PHA hence are not repeated as recommendations – refer to

Section 2.7).


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As suggested in the Multi-Level Risk Assessment guidelines, the frequency,

consequence and risk analysis can be carried out either qualitatively or quantitatively,

or using a combination of techniques. For this study, sufficient quantitative analysis is

undertaken to identify the events with the potential to have an offsite impact on people

or property and also whether the project will comply with the risk criteria published in

HIPAP 4. This approach is known as a Level 2 risk assessment. A level 2 assessment

appropriate as the initial consequence modelling results were used to site the ANE

Production Facilities (i.e. contain effects within the site boundary), hence minimise the

number of incidents that could have offsite effects.

The major assumptions made to prepare the risk assessment are discussed in the

subsequent sections of this report and also summarised in APPENDIX 5.

2.5 Risk Criteria

Individual risk represents the probability of a specified level of harm (usually fatality or

injury) occurring to a theoretical individual located permanently at a particular location,

assuming no mitigating action such as escape can be taken, hence it is considered to

cover vulnerable individuals such as the very young, sick or elderly.

NSW DoP quantitative individual risk criteria for new plants are given in HIPAP 4 and

are summarised in Table 2.1. These criteria are expressed in terms of individual fatality

risk or likelihood of exposure to threshold values of heat radiation, explosion

overpressure or toxicity.

Escalation criteria (i.e. likelihood of property damage to neighbouring facilities due to

exceeding specified overpressure or heat radiation levels) are also provided in HIPAP

4 and shown in Table 2.2.

TABLE 2.1: NSW INDIVIDUAL RISK CRITERIA, NEW PLANTS

Risks for Different Land Uses (New Plants) Maximum Risk (per year)

Individual Fatality Risk

Sensitive uses (hospitals, schools, childcare , old age) 0.5 x 10-6


Commercial developments, retail centres, offices, entertainment centres 5 x 10-6

Sporting complexes and active open space 10 x 10-6

Remain within boundary of an industrial site 50 x 10-6

Injury / Irritation - Fire / Explosion

Fire / Explosion Injury risk – incident heat flux radiation at residential areas should not exceed 4.7 kW/m

2 at frequencies of more than 50

chances in a million per year or incident explosion overpressure at residential areas should not exceed 7 kPa at frequencies of more than 50 chances in a million per year

50 x 10-6


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Risks for Different Land Uses (New Plants) Maximum Risk (per year)

Injury / Irritation - Toxic Impacts


10 x 10-6


50 x 10-6

TABLE 2.2: NSW ESCALATION RISK CRITERIA, NEW PLANTS

Description Risk Criteria (per year)

Escalation

Incident heat flux radiation at neighbouring potentially hazardous installations or land zoned to accommodate such use should not exceed a risk of 50 per million per year for the 23 kW/m

2 heat flux contour.

50 x 10-6


50 x 10-6

Additionally HIPAP 4 states that the criteria apply to new industry and surrounding land

use proposals, and in theory should apply to existing situations, however it recognises

that this may not be possible in practice. Individual fatality risk criteria for existing

plants are also available in HIPAP 4 and are given in Table 2.3.

TABLE 2.3: NSW RISK CRITERIA, EXISTING PLANTS

Description Risk from Existing Facility (per year)

note 1

Ongoing risk reduction and safety reviews of existing facility, no additional hazardous industry

≥ 10 x 10-6

No intensification of residential development ≥ 1 x 10-6

Notes:

1. Risk level within residential area


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2.6 Limitations

The study focuses on the offsite effects of potential accident scenarios. HIPAPs 4 and

6 do not require quantification of, or provide criteria for, onsite risks to personnel /

employees, hence employee risk is not covered in this PHA.

The PHA does not assess any potential impacts from long-term or continuous

emissions, or occupational, health and safety issues that may arise from routine plant

operations. These are addressed via other mechanisms such as the Environmental

Assessment process and occupational health and safety management systems.

2.7 Links to Other Studies


have occurred throughout the design process; including completion of a HAZOP in

accordance with Orica‟s internal project requirements. Related studies used to prepare

the PHA are listed below

A Hazard Identification, Risk Assessment and Control (HIRAC) study for the

ANE Project, was undertaken. The HIRAC is a study undertaken in a workshop

attended by relevant operations and design personnel. It included discussion of

incidents known to have occurred at Orica sites and other similar facilities in the

industry. Hazardous incidents and safeguards are identified and discussed, and

a qualitative risk ranking applied using the Orica corporate risk matrix. The

consolidated HIRAC is contained in the Orica SH&E Risk Register. The HIRAC

was used to develop the incident scenarios included in the PHA.

A Preliminary QRA to cover the proposed ANE Production Facilities located at

the Orica Technical Centre site. The results were used to assist in the selection

of inventory limits, location and layout of the ANE Production Facilities. (Ref:5).

The QRA results have been updated to reflect the current design and included

in the PHA.

A HAZOP study. The HAZOP is contained in the Orica SH&E Risk Register.

The HAZOP was reviewed as part of the PHA.

At the planning approval stage for the Technology Centre site, a hazard analysis for

the existing facilities was submitted to the NSW Department of Planning (1992, Ref 6).

The 1992 hazard study is no longer directly applicable as a number of the facilities

originally proposed for the site have not been installed. The 1992 report is superseded

by the information contained in this PHA report.


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3 SITE DESCRIPTION

3.1 Site Overview

The existing Technical Centre site is home to Orica‟s Mining Services Technical

Centre and undertakes research and development activities with some commercial

manufacturing. The existing facilities include:

Mixing Laboratory (ML)

Research Laboratory (including pilot scale manufacturing plant) (RL)

Research Magazine (RM)

Quarry Services Depot (QS)

Test Cell

There is also an existing office complex housing around 150 people.

The existing facilities will not be altered by the proposed ANE Production Facilities.

The number of people located permanently at the site would not increase significantly.

3.2 ANE Project Overview

The project will provide an ANE manufacturing facility together with associated

infrastructure at the Orica Technical Centre site. The new ANE manufacturing facility

will initially produce about 135,000 tonnes per annum (tpa) of ANE at the

commencement of operations in 2011. ANE production is forecast to increase to a

maximum production rate of 250,000tpa over 10 to 15 years depending on customer

demand. The new ANE Production Facilities will be built using Orica Mining Services‟

global standard technology.

3.3 Location and Surrounding Land Use

The Orica Technology Centre site is located at George Booth Drive, Richmond Vale

NSW. The Technology Centre is located on Lot 2, DP 809377 and is approximately

292 hectares in area. The land is wholly owned by Orica. The surrounding area

encompasses a variety of land use activities including agriculture, bushland, rural

residential area, rural industrial activities and transport corridors.

There are aboveground power lines in an electrical easement running northwest to

south east across the front of the Orica site. An underground gas pipeline is proposed

to run within the electricity easement.

The land to the south, west and east of the site is predominantly bushland (Crown

land). An electrical easement runs east-west through this land around 500m south of

the Orica site. There are fire trails throughout the area surrounding the Orica site and it

is possible that occasional recreational activities such as bushwalking or 4WD

activities occur in this area.


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The nearest industrial population or industrial infrastructure is Tasman Underground

Mine which is located approximately 2.5 kilometres to the south-east of the Technology

Centre on George Booth Drive. The Sydney-Newcastle Freeway is around 4.5km to

the south east.

The nearest residential area (rural residential rather than suburban) is to the north. The

nearest residence is a single house located 250 m north west of the northern site

boundary, i.e. around 1.8 km from the proposed ANE Plant location. Various farms

(chicken farm, flower farm) are also located in this area. The nearest residential areas

are Seahampton, which is around 6 km to the southeast of the site, and Kurri Kurri,

which is around 7 km to the northwest.

The lots to the west of the Orica site have also been subdivided to large blocks (rural

residential) though are not yet occupied.

The site location is shown in Figure 3.1 with the approximate site boundary also

shown.

3.4 Site Security

As the site already handles security sensitive materials such as AN and Class 1

explosives, a site security plan is in place in accordance with the relevant regulations.

This includes personnel security checks, security fencing, and access control, alarms

and security monitoring. These arrangements are unchanged by the proposed ANE

Plant.

The ANE Plant will also be provided with its own security fence.

3.5 Site Layout

The overall site layout is shown in Figure 3.2 (including the location of existing facilities

and the proposed ANE Plant). The proposed ANE Plant will be located in the south

part of the site, around 250m from the nearest site boundary. Figure 3.3 shows the

proposed ANE Plant layout.

3.6 Australian Standard Separation Distances

Explosives facilities are generally sited and designed in accordance with AS2187.1-

1998 Explosives – Storage, Transport and Use Part 1: Storage, and ANEs in

accordance with a Code of Practice (Ref 7) which has been developed by the

Australian Explosives Manufacturers Safety Committee (AEMSC), Code of Good

Practice Precursors For Explosives Edition 1 – 1999. Separation distance

requirements are explained in the following sections.

The quantity distance rules in AS2187.1 have been based on UK standards which

were in turn based on the observed effects of damage occurring in accidental

explosions that have occurred throughout the world up until the mid 20th century. It is

generally accepted by the explosives industry and regulators that compliance with


Page 19

AS2187.1 and the AEMSC Code will ensure that there will be minimal offsite

consequences or escalation effects from explosion events, i.e. the risk is negligible.

3.6.1 Class 1 Explosives

AS2187.1 contains quantity distance rules which specify separation distances to

various activities or occupied areas based on the net explosive quantity (NEQ) at the

magazine or works. The separation distances are based on consequence (i.e.

overpressure level or impulse) developed by explosions of NEQs. The distances are

set to:

Prevent propagation between explosives storages and associated

works.

Reduce risk to acceptable level for people associated with the site.

Minimise risk at protected works (PW) and vulnerable facilities. (Vulnerable

facilities are generally large populations who would be difficult to evacuate).

Protected works are defined as follows:

(a) Class A: Public street, road or thoroughfare, railway, navigable waterway, dock,

wharf, pier or jetty, market place, public recreation and sports ground or other open

place where the public are accustomed to assemble, open place of work in another

occupancy, river-wall, seawall, reservoir, above ground water main, radio or television

transmitter or main electrical substation, a private road which is a principal means of

access to a church, chapel, college, school, hospital or factory. (Known as PWA

distance).

(b) Class B: A dwelling house, public building church, chapel, college, school, hospital,

theatre, cinema or other building or structure where the public are accustomed to

assemble; a shop, factory, warehouse, store or building in which any person is

employed in any trade or business; a depot for the keeping of flammable or dangerous

goods; major dam. (Known as PWB distance)

Separation distances to „vulnerable facilities‟ (including but not restricted to schools,

hospitals, major places of transport, significant public infrastructure) are also defined.

Vulnerable facilities require the largest separation distances, with PWB the next largest

distance and PWA the smallest distance. There are no vulnerable facilities within

5 kms of the Technical Centre site. The nearest PWB is a single dwelling located 1.8

km north west of the proposed ANE facility.

The existing Technical Centre site layout complies with the separation distances

required by AS2187.1. It is arranged so that the PWB distances are generally within

the site boundary.


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3.6.2 Precursors

Since they are not explosives UN3375 ANEs are outside the scope of AS2187.

However a code of good practice (the AEMSC Precursor Code) covering explosives

precursors has been accepted by the majority of Australian jurisdictions, including

NSW. Under the AEMSC Code, storages of ANE either adopt the same quantity

distances as explosives as per AS2187.1, or must be able to be evacuated in the

event of an emergency which could potentially lead to an explosion.

3.6.3 Oxidisers

Minimum separation distances for Class 5 materials such as ANS are given in AS4326

(2008) “The storage and handling of oxidising agents”. These are much smaller (of the

order of several metres) than the AS2187.1 distances adopted by the AEMSC Code.

The AS4326 distances generally are to provide separation between incompatible

materials, as well as personnel and site boundaries. For Class 5 ANEs the AS4326

distances would be the minimum requirement if there were no populations or other

explosives, AN or ANE inventories in the vicinity. Any installation meeting the AEMSC

Code will also comply with AS4326 separation distances.

3.6.4 Proposed ANE Plant

The proposed ANE Plant will be located such that all separation distances that would

apply to an equivalent amount of explosives under AS2187.1 Table 3.2.3.2 will be met

(i.e. the design adopts the guidance in the AEMSC Code). In this proposal there is no

reliance on evacuation for any off site populations.

The PHA compares the predicted consequences for identified events with the required

distances as noted in subsequent sections of this report. This is to confirm that the

AS2187.1 distances are adequate to minimise risk associated with the proposed ANE

plant.


Page 21

FIGURE 3.1: SITE LOCATION

Note: Figure reproduced from EA


Page 22

FIGURE 3.2: KURRI KURRI TECHNCIAL CENTRE SITE LAYOUT

Note: Figure reproduced from EA


Page 23

FIGURE 3.3: PROPOSED ANE PLANT LAYOUT

ANE (4 tanks)

ANS and oxidising solutions

Dry oxidiser store

Combustibles


Page 24

3.7 ANE Plant Process Overview

The proposed ANE Plant will make explosives precursors. All of the precursors to be

manufactured at the proposed ANE Plant will fall under the UN3375 classification for

Ammonium Nitrate Emulsions (collectively referred to as ANEs), i.e. will behave as

Dangerous Goods of Class 5 – Oxidisers, rather than Class 1 – Explosives. These

materials undergo final processing at the point of use and only become explosives at

that stage.

ANE is made up of a fuel blend and an oxidiser solution (predominantly ammonium

nitrate, AN). At the point of use (a mine site, not at the ANE Plant), the ANE is

processed into an explosive by sensitising it, usually by the introduction of gas

bubbles, microballoons or polystyrene. The gas bubbles may be generated by mixing

ANE with various “gasser” and /or “companion” solutions.

Companion and gasser solutions (which are weak solutions of Ammonium Nitrate or

Sodium Nitrite and water) will also be made up in the new ANE plant area. These

solutions are not Dangerous Goods and will be kept separated from ANE to avoid any

potential contamination issues.

The emulsion products and companion/gasser solutions will be loaded onto tankers in

the ANE Plant. These tankers supply various Depot Plants situated close to customer

sites. The Depot Plants supply Mobile Manufacturing Units (MMUs), which deliver

products to customers.

The ANE Plant is logically divided into the following sections:

Raw materials, comprising:

Ammonium Nitrate Solution (ANS) and other oxidiser solution raw materials

unloading and storage (as summarised in Section 3.7.1).

Fuel Blend Raw Material unloading and storage (as summarised in Section

3.7.1).

Oxidiser Solution (OXS) Batch Preparation (recipe based + development

mode).

Emulsion Manufacture (recipe based + development mode)

Emulsion Storage and Loading

Companion Solution Manufacture

Gasser solution Manufacture

Services, including power, process water, instrument air and hot water system.

Information for each of these sections has been summarised from the process

description (Ref 8).


Page 25

3.7.1 Raw Materials

Ammonium Nitrate Solution (ANS) is delivered to site by road tanker from Orica‟s

Kooragang Island site and stored in bunded areas. ANS is stored in hot water jacketed

tanks to ensure the AN remains in solution.

A range of fuels / oils can be used at the new ANE Plant including diesel and canola to

create different blends of emulsion. These are all C1 or C2 combustibles, no

flammable materials will be used. They are delivered by tanker and stored in a

dedicated bunded area well separated from the ANE Plant and oxidiser storage area

(at least 30m away) to minimise the possibility of a fire in the fuels/oils storage areas

affecting the ANE Plant.

Smaller quantities of other materials (e.g. thiourea, other oxidisers, acetic acid and

caustic soda) are also stored and used in the ANE process to adjust pH etc.

A list of all raw materials to be used in the ANE Plant is given in APPENDIX 1.

3.7.2 Oxidiser Solution Preparation

Oxidiser Solution (OXS) batches are prepared by adding the required liquid ingredients

into batch tanks as defined by the product recipe. Solid material (urea) is added via

forklift and screw feeder to one batch tank if required.

Three batch tanks will be provided. The OXS tanks will be stainless steel, hot water

heated, agitated and insulated.

3.7.3 Dry Oxidiser Store

A small dry oxidiser store of 25 tonne total capacity will also be provided for

ammonium nitrate (AN), calcium nitrate and/or urea. AN is a Dangerous Good Class

5.1 (total quantity 9.6 tonnes). Calcium nitrate and urea are not classed as Dangerous

Goods.

3.8 ANE Manufacture, Storage and Loadout

ANE will be made by blending OXS and fuel in a process mixer known as an Elk.

Emulsion manufacture will be started, monitored, and shut down from the control room.

The process is a recipe based batch process which will have fully automated sequence

control. Routine observation and sampling for quality control will be carried out.

Four overhead ANE product surge tanks will be provided, each pair of tanks providing

nominally 40 tonne capacity to supply B-double tankers. As different vehicles vary in

tank size, the maximum operating capacity of ANE will be limited to about 100 tonnes

(out of a maximum design capacity of 120 tonnes). These tanks will generally be

empty and will only be filled with a tanker load when an empty tanker is expected.

Tankers (including B-doubles) and ISO containers will be filled either from the

overhead ANE surge tanks or directly from the manufacturing process. ANE loadout

will be observed and controlled by the tanker driver. The driver will stop the transfer of


Page 26

ANE from the overhead tank to the tanker when correct tanker weight is obtained. The

tanker is provided with a high level switch to stop overfilling. The risks from an ANE

spill are low as ANE will fudge almost as soon as it hits the ground, i.e. does not run

freely like most liquid spills.

Mobile Manufacturing Units (MMUs) will not be directly loaded in the ANE Plant.

3.8.1 Companion and Gasser Solutions

The plant will also manufacture gasser solutions and companion solution and transfer

these to ANE tankers for distribution. Gasser solutions are dilute mixtures of sodium

nitrite and water and companion solution is a dilute AN solution.

These solutions are handled in dilute form (high water content) and have only localised

hazards. They are not specifically considered in the risk assessment.

3.8.2 Services

Various utility and service chemicals will also be provided as shown in Table 3.1. Due

to their non-hazardous properties and small quantities stored, these materials present

relatively minor / localised risks and are not considered further in the risk assessment.

TABLE 3.1: UTILITY CHEMICALS

Material Delivery Storage Comments

Various Class 8 water treatment chemicals.

Small containers by truck

~ 100L In service storage area

Process water Road tanker 120m3 May be recycled

Potable water Road tanker 30m3

Fire water Road tanker to be finalised.

3.8.3 Offspec ANE Product

Where possible, off spec product will be diverted to a lower specification product or

mixed with on spec product. If the off spec material cannot be reused it will be sent to

authorised contractors for disposal.

3.9 Technology Centre Existing Facilities

The existing Technology Centre site undertakes various research and manufacturing

activities in four main areas on the site. Table 3.2 summarises these, including the

maximum inventories and types of explosive for each area to arrive at a Net Explosive

Quantity (NEQ) for each area.

The information shown in Table 3.2 reflects the most recent update of the site

Dangerous Good notification (August 2008). The quantity figures shown include all

process and storage inventories. The combined Quarry Services / Research Magazine

area has the largest NEQ (around 50 tonnes).


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TABLE 3.2: EXISTING FACILITIES INVENTORY SUMMARY

Area Activities

(Includes process

inventory and storage)

(kg) (kg)

Research Magazine (RM) Storage - magazines Mag 5 4000 1 4000

and Mag 5A 3300 1 3300

Quarry Service Depot (QS) Mag 5B 2700 1 2700

Mag 9 + dets 220 1 220

TOTAL Magazines 10220

Storage - QS depot EP1 40000 0.68 27200

AN1 40000 0.32 12800

TOTAL QS Depot 40000

TOTAL RM and QS 50220

Research Laboratory (RL) Research activities

(processing)

RL1 process 2000 0.91 1820

Depot 4 (ANE) 5000 0.68 3400

Depot 2 (Nitrates - AN) 20000 0.32 6400

RL1 TOTAL 11620

Mixing Laboratory (ML) Research and

commercial activities

Mag 10 20 1 20

ML process 40 1 40

ML Exist Building aggregated 60

Depot 1 - AN 500 0.32 160

Depot 1 - ANE 500 0.68 340

ML New Building total aggregated 560

Test Cell Research activities

(processing)Test Cell 50 1 50

Explosives / precursors

used

Inventory TNT Equiv.

Factor

TNT

Equiv.


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4 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

4.1 Hazardous Materials for Proposed ANE Plant

The hazardous materials associated with the proposed ANE Plant considered in this

risk assessment are listed below. Table 4.3 summarises their main hazards from the

Orica Material Safety Data Sheets and Basis of Safety (BOS) documents.

Ammonium nitrate solution (ANS) / Oxidiser solution (OXS)

Ammonium Nitrate Emulsion (ANE)

Ammonium Nitrate (AN)

Combustibles

Sodium Nitrite

4.1.1 AN and Oxidiser solutions

ANS is a class 5.1 oxidiser. The main hazard associated with handling AN solution

materials (i.e. ANS, OXS) is decomposition due to excessive heating and/or

contamination, and eventually explosion if the decomposition gases are sufficiently

confined (e.g. in an inadequately vented storage tank, pump, process vessel etc).

Additionally, most of the gaseous decomposition products are toxic. These gases can

include ammonia (NH3), nitrous oxide (N2O), nitric oxide (NO), nitrogen dioxide (NO2),

and nitric acid vapour (HNO3). NO2 is the most toxic of these.

In general, assuming they are uncontaminated, ANS and OXS are highly insensitive to

friction and impact and essentially insensitive to sparks (i.e. low explosion risk).

4.1.2 Ammonium Nitrate Emulsions

ANEs are class 5.1. Most emulsions do not contain any self explosive ingredients but

once ANE has been produced, the main hazard is decomposition due to excessive

heating and/or contamination which can cause accelerating decomposition to the point

where explosion or detonation can occur especially if the decomposition gases are

sufficiently confined (e.g. in an inadequately vented storage tank, pump, process

vessel etc).

Sensitivity to accidental decomposition/detonation is increased by the presence of

energetic sensitising materials or chemical contaminants (e.g. excess sodium nitrite).

ANEs are insensitive to friction and impact and also insensitive to sparks.

4.1.3 Ammonium Nitrate

Although it is not combustible, Ammonium Nitrate (AN) is a Class 5 oxidiser, and will

support combustion of other materials as it produces oxygen as one of its

decomposition products. If the decomposition gases are confined (e.g. in a storage

tank, process vessel etc) AN may explode. Most of the gaseous decomposition


Page 29

products are toxic (various NOx compounds, N2O etc), with nitrogen dioxide (NO2) the

most toxic of these.

Solid AN may explode under confinement and high temperature, but is not readily

detonated. High temperature, confinement and contamination are the main factors

which affect the likelihood and severity of an AN explosion. AN explosions can be

caused by a fire involving AN if there is sufficient confinement and/or contamination, or

by contamination without a fire if the decomposition rate is sufficiently high (with

sufficient confinement).

If none of these factors are present, solid AN requires a high energy shock wave (e.g.

from high explosive) to detonate. When molten it may decompose violently due to

pressure or shock.

4.1.4 Combustibles

C1 and C2 combustibles will be used at the ANE Plant. There will be no Class 3

(flammable) materials and all combustibles will be stored in bunded areas complying

with AS1940 Storage and Handling of Flammable and Combustible Liquids separated

from the ANE and ANS storage tanks by at least 30m.

Combustibles are difficult to ignite in the absence of a direct flame. Pool fires are

possible if a strong ignition source is present and a spill occurs, however the impact

area is local to the pool fire and will not extend offsite (given the distances of at least

several hundred metres from the combustible storage areas and site access road to

the site boundary).

Therefore the study considers combustible fires as a possible source of external heat

to the AN, ANE and ANS inventories only.

4.1.5 Sodium Nitrite

Similarly to AN, sodium nitrite is a strong oxidiser and will support combustion of other

materials. Heat, shock, or contact with other materials may cause fire or explosive

decomposition. It is incompatible with AN. It is also extremely toxic if ingested,

however it has no wider toxicity impacts except to the immediately affected individual.

For the assessment, sodium nitrite is treated as having the same hazards as AN.

4.1.6 Toxic Combustion / Decomposition Products

As noted above, nitrogen dioxide (NO2) is the most toxic of the decomposition products

formed in an AN / ANS / ANE decomposition reaction. NO2 is a respiratory irritant,

however its main danger lies in the delay before its full effects upon the lungs are

shown by feelings of weakness and coldness, headache, nausea, dizziness,

abdominal pain and cyanosis. In severe cases, convulsions and death by asphyxia

may follow exposure.

Effects on people are summarised in Table 4.1, reproduced from the Acute Emergency

Guideline Level (AEGL) documentation for NO2 (Ref 9).


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TABLE 4.1: NO2 TOXICITY

Table 2: Effects of acute exposure to high NO2 concentrations (from Ref 9)

NO2 Concentration (ppm) Effect

0.4 approximate odour threshold

15-25 respiratory and nasal irritation

25-75 reversible pneumonia and bronchiolitis

150-300+ fatal bronchiolitis and bronchopneumonia

4.2 Hazardous Materials at Existing Technical Centre Facilities

The existing facilities handle various high explosives of DG Class 1.1, Class 1.4 and

Class 1.5, as well as AN and ANE. The main hazard associated with Class 1 high

explosives is explosion with consequent overpressure and shrapnel / missile impacts.

There are no significant toxicity hazards associated with the explosives stored at the

site.

4.3 External Events

As part of the hazard identification process, the potential for external events to affect

the proposed ANE Plant was considered as summarised in Table 4.2. Given the site is

surrounded by heavily vegetated Crown Land, bushfires were the only external event

identified as a potential concern and are discussed in more detail in Section 4.4.

TABLE 4.2: EXTERNAL EVENTS

Issue Discussion Summary

External Flooding Site is not considered a flood prone area.

Earthquakes According to GSHAP this area is classified as a low to moderate earthquake hazard.

Land slip/ subsidence

Mining in the area (nearest mine about 2km away). Civil design has not indentified any potential subsidence issues.

Cyclones Not a high wind risk area. Facility structures designed in accordance with relevant codes.

Lightning Systems complying with relevant Australian Standards to be installed to manage the risks associated with lightning.

Plane crash Not in flight path. Risk not considered significant.

Vehicle crash Not exposed to outside traffic. Site speed limits and plant protection for structures installed to prevent vehicle impact on critical plant. Considered as an external fire source only.

Sabotage/ vandalism

Secure site as required by AN security sensitive regulations.

Utilities failure Loss of power results in “fail safe” condition. ANE plant operation not possible. No other significant utilities on the ANE plant site.

Bushfire Credible risk due to surrounding environment. Safeguards discussed in further detail in Section 4.4.


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4.4 Bushfires

4.4.1 Existing facilities

A comprehensive bushfire hazard reduction programme is in place for the existing

facilities at the Technology Centre site. This includes:

Cleared areas around all facilities, with further low fuel asset protection zones

(APZ) in accordance with the relevant NSW Rural Fire Service (RFS) Planning

for Bushfire Protection (PBP) 2006 guidelines.

Provision of leafguards and appropriate windows (non-openable) for all

buildings.

Provision of fire trails within and surrounding the site.

Regular programme of inspections by the RFS.

Yearly controlled hazard reduction and backburning operations undertaken by

the RFS (timing and location as advised by RFS).

Manual hazard reduction (i.e. clearing of vegetation within designated APZ).

Regular maintenance is also carried out as follows:

Low fuel zones up to 60m from facilities including lawns, planted garden strips,

roads and pathways.

Fire trails checked regularly by trained site personnel with frequency increasing

during fire season.

Water levels checked daily, minimum of 200,000 litres retained for fire fighting.

Fire pumps, fire hoses and equipment checked monthly by site personnel.

Bushfires would normally approach the Kurri site from the west (as has historically

been the case). Fires can approach from the east but this is rare due to the terrain of

the site. The last serious bushfires experienced at the site were in 1996. These

approached the Kurri site on a 44oC day with westerly winds assisting the fire. The

fires were extinguished as they reached cleared areas such as roads, and lawns,

which form part of the site‟s fuel reduced zones but kept burning to the west of the site.

Bushfire brigades and on-site crew remained onsite and no damage to facilities

occurred.

However it must be recognised that, if involved in a fire, the rate of decomposition and

confinement conditions, hence time to explosion is extremely unpredictable with all

explosives and ammonium nitrate compounds1 (including ANE, ANS, AN). Therefore

1 Historical incidents (globally) have shown that AN compounds engulfed in flames often decompose

without explosion, but the fire response policy treats these as if they were explosives.


Page 32

Orica have a policy of shutting down all operations and evacuation of all non-essential

personnel if an AN manufacturing, research or bulk storage site is threatened by fire.

The existing site Fire Risk Management Plan (FRMP) and Emergency Response Plan

(ERP) covers bushfire in this context. It would be extremely rare that a bushfire could

approach with no warning. There are several pre-planned safe egress routes available

depending on the location of the fire.

In the first instance a small crew of site personnel and security guards may remain on

site to carry out certain functions providing they are safe and competent to do so.

4.4.2 Proposed ANE Production Facility

The approach to bushfire protection for the ANE Production Facility will be similar to

the approach for existing facilities and will be covered in the Emergency Response

Plan (ERP) and Fire Risk Management Plan (FRMP which is an Orica internal

requirement). The existing site FRMP and ERP will be updated to cover the ANE

Production Facility.

As required by the DGRs, a bushfire assessment (Ref 10) for the ANE Production

Facility has been undertaken in accordance with the NSW Rural Fire Service (RFS)

Planning for Bushfire Protection (PBP) 2006 guidelines. The proposed location of the

ANE Production Facility complies with the asset protection zones (APZ‟s) (i.e.

separation distances) required based on the slope, fire danger index (FDI) rating and

the structure of surrounding vegetation. The required APZ around the ANE Production

Facility is shown in Figure 3.2. The APZ is 20m on the northern, southern and eastern

sides of the proposed facility, and 25m from the western edge of the proposed facility.

As the ANE Plant is surrounded by a perimeter road plus an area cleared of vegetation

(the APZ), sustained direct impingement by a bushfire on an ANE or ANS inventory is

unlikely.

A 10,000L rainwater tank (non-combustible materials of construction) dedicated to

bushfire fighting purposes, fitted with suitable connections for the RFS tankers to refill,

will be provided adjacent to the front perimeter gate of the ANE Production Facility.


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TABLE 4.3: PROPOSED ANE PRODUCTION FACILITY HAZARDOUS MATERIAL PROPERTIES

Material Description State DG Class UN no Hazards Refs: Orica MSDS, BOS documents

Ammonium Nitrate Solution (ANS)

Ammonium Nitrate solution approx 80-90% AN, balance water

Solution normally at 90 – 100 oC

Liquid 5.1 PGII 2426 The main hazard associated with strong (>80 wt%) ANS is decomposition due to excessive heating or contamination and eventually explosion if decomposition gases are confined. Contaminants that increase the risk of decomposition include acids, chlorides, organics, alkali metals, nitrites. Most of the gaseous products of ANS decomposition are toxic (NOx gases).

ANS does not burn, but as an oxidising agent, will support fire, even in the absence of an external source of oxygen. ANS is insensitive to friction and impact and also insensitive to sparks.

Oxidiser Solution (OXS)

Ammonium Nitrate solution 70% AN with balance pH adjustment materials such as caustic, acetic acid, ammonia and water.

Liquid 5.1 PGII 2426 As per ANS

Ammonium Nitrate Emulsion (ANE)

A mixture of around 70% AN, 15% water and balance combustible liquids. All bulk emulsions at the proposed ANE Production Facility at Kurri will fall within the UN definition of Ammonium Nitrate Emulsion (ANE), intermediate for blasting explosives, UN number 3375.

Liquid 5.1 PGII 3375 None of the ANE to be manufactured at the proposed site will contain any self-explosive ingredients but once the ANE has been produced, excessive heating can cause accelerating decomposition to the point where thermal explosion or detonation can occur. Sensitivity to accidental decomposition/detonation is increased by the presence of energetic sensitising materials or chemical contaminants (e.g. excess sodium nitrite). ANE‟s are insensitive to friction and impact and also insensitive to sparks


Page 34

Material Description State DG Class UN no Hazards Refs: Orica MSDS, BOS documents

Ammonium Nitrate (AN)

Technical grade AN. > 98% AN, other materials < 2%

Solid (prill)

5.1 PGIII 1942 Ammonium Nitrate (AN) is a strong oxidising agent that will sustain combustion as it produces oxygen as one of its decomposition products. May explode under confinement and high temperature, but not readily detonated. When molten may decompose violently due to shock or pressure. Contaminants that increase the risk of decomposition / explosion include combustibles, hypochlorite, organics, alkali metals, nitrites. Most of the gaseous products of AN decomposition are toxic (various NOx gases).

Combustible liquids

Various – diesel, paraffin, canola etc

Liquid C1 or C2 various Combustible, i.e. will ignite if sustained strong ignition source is present.


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4.5 Potential Hazardous Incident Scenarios

The potential hazardous incidents associated with the ANE Production Facility were

identified by:

Review and consolidation of hazardous scenarios identified in the Orica Hazard

Study 2 for the ANE Production Facility Project, the HIRAC for the existing Liddell

ANE Production Facility, HIRACs for generic ANE Plants and HIRACs for other

similar Orica plants

A two day workshop to review the consolidated HIRACs for the ANE Production

Facility Project, which was attended by relevant Orica personnel.

The resultant HIRAC minutes for the ANE Upgrade Project are available in the SHE

Risk Register. Detailed scenarios have not been provided in the PHA due to potential

security concerns. However a brief description of the HIRAC process and a list of

HIRAC scenarios are included in APPENDIX 2. It should be noted that some scenarios

were considered to have local rather than off-site consequences. These were not

carried forward for quantitative analysis in this study.

4.5.1 Proposed ANE Plant

The significant hazardous incidents identified were consolidated into discrete scenarios

to allow a quantitative model to be developed. The hazardous incidents (referred to as

major accident events or MAEs) included in the PHA are listed in Table 4.5 for

proposed ANE Production Facility.

The MAEs are all very similar in terms of the physical scenario, but have been set up

separately in the quantitative models as they are applicable to different production

facility areas and inventories.

4.5.2 Existing Technical Centre Facilities

An upper limit scenario for each existing area at the site was defined. This scenario is

the explosion of the maximum NEQ in each operational area as summarised in Table

4.6. The inventories used to define the potential explosion scenarios are given in Table

3.2.

4.6 Scenarios for Quantitative Assessment

APPENDIX 4 tabulates the input to the quantitative model for each scenario. The

assumptions made to develop the consequence and frequency for the QRA scenarios

are discussed in Sections 5 and 7 of this report.

4.7 Rule Sets for Incident Inclusion

A rule set for inclusion in the risk assessment was developed based on the properties

of the materials and the results of the HIRAC study. The rule set:


Page 36

Identifies the causes which can result in an explosion in Class 1, ANS, ANE or

AN materials.

Distinguishes between a scenario which develops over time (i.e. a “with

warning” explosion where evacuation is possible), and a “no warning explosion”

(where evacuation would not be possible).

Identifies which materials are susceptible to knock-on (i.e. sympathetic

initiation) from an explosion event.

Essentially:

External fire or contamination could cause explosion in Class1 explosives, AN,

ANE or ANE inventories.

Class 1 explosives, AN and ANE are susceptible to sympathetic detonation,

ANS is not.

This is summarised in Table 4.4. This is a generic rule set, hence covers some items

not applicable to the proposed ANE Production Facility. AN will be handled in bags

only (i.e. AN Stacked), there is no bulk AN.

TABLE 4.4: RULE SET FOR SCENARIOS CONSIDERED IN QRA

Rev Date Prepared By Checked By

A 10-Nov-08 J Polich

(Sherpa)

Ian Dennison

(Orica)

Project: Proposed ANE Plant Kurri Kurri, QRA

Objective: Rule set for determining which explosion scenarios to include in consequence modelling / QRA

Applicability: Explosives / AN/ ANE / ANS Storage and Handling.

Not manufacturing / processing of any Explosives on the ANE plant.

KEY:

Yes Credible (even if very low likelihood)

No Not possible

n/a not applicable - physical configuration not relevant

Without warning explosion (evacuation not possible)

Warning (evacuation possible)

Material (Note 1) Cause of explosion Escalation potential - from another source event

Fire engulfment Contamination Other (undefined

miscellaneous)

Explosion (blast)(Note 3)

Projectile(Note 3)

Propagation from

pump explosion

(connected)

Class 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

ANE Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes (Note 2)

ANS Yes Yes No No No No

AN bulk Yes Yes No Yes Yes n/a

AN stacked Yes Yes No Yes Yes n/a

Notes:

1. Material is on spec and uncontaminated (except for "contamination" cause)

2. Except for case where diaphragm pump is used. Knock on from diaphragm pump not possible.

3. Distances required to avoid risk of knock on are specified in AS2187 for AN. The same distances apply to ANE as per AEMSC code.

Ref: Scenario Rule Sets Excel 2003 ID Rev 2.xls


Page 37

TABLE 4.5: HAZARDOUS SCENARIOS CONSIDERED IN PHA, PROPOSED ANE PRODUCTION FACILITY

ID Major Accident Event (MAE) Description

Causes Controls and Safeguards Incorporated in PHA?

External Events

All Bushfire threatens ANS / ANE / AN inventory. Decomposition, toxic fume emission and eventual explosion

1. Bushfire in surrounding environment.

Asset protection zones (APZ) maintained around all facilities as per RFS guidelines

Firewater tank for RFS use

Evacuation of non-essential personnel

Firefighting to protect inventory (spot fire extinguishment etc)

Y

Raw Materials Storage and Handling

ANS-01 External fire causes decomposition in ANS storage. Toxic fume emission and eventual explosion.

1. Electrical fire 2. Vehicle fire 3. Human failure

followed by failure to control fire.

Minimal fuel / combustible material in the area – sustained fire extremely unlikely

Vehicles separated by kerbing and bollards from storage areas - Vehicle fire impingement extremely unlikely

Y

ANS-02 Contamination causes decomposition in ANS storage. Toxic fume emission and eventual explosion.

1. Human error followed by failure to control decomp reaction.

Density measurement of incoming product, Option to adjust pH.

Temperature monitoring and high temp alarms in storage tanks

Tanks are well vented (increases available time for evacuation)

Y

ANS-03 Heating or contamination causes decomposition in ANS unloading pump. Pump explosion.

1. Dry running or dead heading 2. Friction or impact 3. Contamination or compositional change

Initial explosion would not have off-site impact, given the limited inventory in the pump.

Propagation to ANS bulk storage not credible (where there is no contamination and concentration is below 92%).

N


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ANS-04 Fire on board ANS delivery tanker causes decomposition of ANS. Toxic fume emission and eventual explosion.

1. Tyre fire 2. Engine fire followed by failure to control decomposition reaction

Vehicle maintenance

Tyre fire more likely en-route (not parked)

Fire extinguishers on tanker

Driver trained in emergency procedures

Y

DSL-01 External fire impinges on fuels storage area. Failure of fuel storage tank and progression to significant fire.

1. Electrical fire 2. Vehicle fire 3. Fuel transfer pump fire. 4. Human failure 5. Chemical decomposition

No offsite effects from pool fire heat radiation as site boundaries several hundred metres away. Separation distance (around 30m) means escalation to ANE / ANS storage very unlikely. Pool fire consequences not covered in QRA, however fire considered as a cause of explosion in ANE / ANS storage as per ANS-01, OXS-01, ANE-01

N

DSL-02 Combustible delivery tanker fire while on site

1. Electrical fire 2. Vehicle fire

No offsite effects from pool fire heat radiation as site boundaries several hundred metres away from delivery road and tanker delivery location. Separation distance (around 30m) means escalation to ANE / ANS storage very unlikely.

N

OXS-01 External fire causes decomposition in OXS batch tank. Toxic fume emission and eventual explosion.

1. Electrical fire followed by failure to control fire.


Y

OXS-02 Contamination causes decomposition in OXS batch tank. Toxic fume emission and eventual explosion.

1. Impurities 2. Incorrect batch sequence or quantities followed by failure to control decomposition reaction.

Raw material QA

Operating procedures

Y


Page 39



OXS-03 Heating or contamination causes decomposition in oxidiser solution pump. Pump explosion.


Pumps trip in the event of low flow or elevated temperatures.

Initial explosion would not have off-site impact, given the limited inventory in the pump. However, missiles from the explosion may knock-on to the ANE tank. Propagation to ANS bulk storage not credible (where there is no contamination and concentration is below 92%).

Y


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Causes Controls and Safeguards Incorporated in PHA ?

ANE Manufacture

ELK-01 External fire causes decomposition in ELK. Toxic fume emission and eventual explosion.

1. Electrical fire 2. Vehicle fire 3. Human failure followed by failure to control fire.


Y

ELK-02 Heating or contamination causes decomposition in ANE transfer pump. Pump explosion.


Pumps trip in the event of low flow or elevated temperatures.

Initial explosion would not have off-site impact, given the limited inventory in the pump. However, missiles from the explosion may knock-on to the ELK. Propagation to main ANE inventory may also occur. This is one cause of explosion of ANE inventory, not covered as a separate scenario.

N

ANE-01 External fire causes decomposition in ANE storage. Toxic fume emission and eventual explosion.

1. Electrical fire 2. Vehicle fire 3. Human failure 4. Chemical decomposition followed by failure to control fire.


An explosion can only be produced if there is some degree of confinement – for example, storage in a sealed container. Tanks are well vented (increases available time for evacuation)

Y


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Causes Controls and Safeguards Incorporated in PHA ?

ANE-02 Heating or contamination causes decomposition in NAPCO gear pump. Pump explosion.

1. Dry running or dead heading 2. Contamination or compositional change

Initial explosion would not have off-site impact, given the limited inventory in the pump. Note: Trials have shown that propagation to main ANE inventory not credible for gear pumps due to the relatively low energy input and high heat dissipation from the pump casing.

N


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AN Store

AN-01 Fire in Dry Oxidiser store results in explosion in store

1. Electrical faults 2. Vehicle fire 3. External fire

Minimal fuel/combustible kept in the store.

Y

AN-02 Contaminated AN results in decomposition and store explosion

1. Fuel spill 2. Contaminated product delivered

Product quality tested at point of manufacture. Fuel minimised in area?

Y

Escalation Scenarios

Esc-01 Explosion in ANE Plant area results in sympathetic detonation of ANE Plant aggregated inventory

All causes except ANS storage explosion

Propagation to ANS not possible, rupture of ANS storage tanks may occur, however this will result in a spill, not a net increase in NEQ as ANS is not susceptible to shock detonation

Y

Esc-02 Explosion in ANS storage area results in sympathetic detonation of ANE Plant aggregated inventory including ANS initiating storage inventory.

ANS storage Y

Esc-03 Explosion results in hot shrapnel, initiating a bushfire

All causes Refer to Biophysical Risk, Section 8.5.1 Y


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TABLE 4.6: HAZARDOUS SCENARIOS CONSIDERED IN QRA, EXISTING TECHNICAL CENTER FACILITIES



RM/QS-01

Explosion in Research Magazine or Quarry Services Depot which propagates to involve entire inventory in this plant location

All causes Located and designed in accordance with AS 2187 series.

Y

ML-01 Explosion in Mixing Lab which propagates to involve entire inventory in this plant location

All causes Located and designed in accordance with AS 2187 series

Y

RL-01 Explosion in Research Laboratory which propagates to involve entire inventory in this plant location


Y

TC-01 Explosion in Test Cell which involves entire inventory in this plant location


Y


Page 44

5 QRA BASIS

To carry out the QRA, a number of assumptions were made with respect to the

quantities of material stored. For this study, the proposed ANE Plant is assessed as

per the inventory basis given in Table 5.1. The maximum storage inventories have

been adopted as the basis for the plant, with a worst case scenario represented by an

aggregate NEQ including all relevant inventories in the proposed ANE Plant. This is a

conservative approach to the assessment, but is considered to be appropriate for a

QRA conducted for land use planning purposes. The assumptions used to estimate the

NEQ shown in the last column of the table are explained in Section 6.3.

TABLE 5.1: QRA BASIS, PROPOSED ANE PLANT

Plant Area as used in QRA scenarios

Proposed ANE Plant Comments

Inventory (t) Proportion of Time (%)

NEQ (note 1)

(t)

ANS Storage Tank

330 100 30.2 Maximum inventory of largest ANS Tank (250kL is approximately equivalent to 330t at 88.5 wt% concentration). 100% full is conservative

(note 2)

ANS Tanker 26 Single

38 B-Double

n/a 4.8 Loads expected to be delivered in single Tankers or B-Doubles.

OXS Batch Tank

80 100 6.4 Maximum inventory of largest Batch Tank

ELK unit 2 100 1.4 Estimate. 100% usage is conservative.

ANE Storage Tank

120 100 81.6 4 adjacent tanks, each 30t (note 3).

100% full is conservative as tanks are operated as surge capacity and total quantity will be limited to 100t procedurally.

Dry Oxidiser Stores

20 100 6.4 Rarely used ingredients for OXS. AN less than 9.6t, calcium nitrate 8t. Separate store for 8t sodium nitrite A total of 20t AN is assumed for the risk assessment to cover all dry oxidiser materials.

ANE Plant aggregate

470 n/a 118 1 x largest ANS tank (330t), ANE inventory, 4 x 30t plus Dry Oxidiser store max inventory of 20t AN (equivalent)

Notes: 1. Refer to Section 6.3 for assumptions used to calculate NEQ.

2. ANS is not susceptible to sympathetic detonation (where there is no contamination and concentration is below 92%) hence the single largest inventory rather than the aggregate inventory is considered (refer to Section 4.7).

3. ANE is susceptible to sympathetic detonation hence the aggregate inventory is considered (refer to Section 4.7).


Page 45

Assessment of the existing plant is also conservatively based on the maximum NEQ

for each area. The NEQs are summarised in Table 5.2. Also see Table 3.2 for further

details as to how the NEQs were calculated.

TABLE 5.2: QRA BASIS, EXISTING KURRI FACILITIES

Existing Area NEQ (t) (note 1)

Proportion of Time (%)

Comments

Research Magazine (RM) and Quarry Services Depot (QS)

50.2 100 Combined inventory due to proximity of RM and QS. Conservative to assume all inventories are 100% full

Research Laboratory (RL) 11.6 100 Conservative to assume all inventories are 100% full

Mixing Laboratory (ML) 0.56 100 Conservative to assume all inventories are 100% full

Test Cell 0.05 100 Conservative to assume all inventories are 100% full

Notes: 1. Refer to Table 3.2 for assumptions used to calculate NEQ.


Page 46

6 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS

6.1 Overview

For this study, consequence analysis involves qualitative and/ or quantitative review of

the identified hazardous scenarios to estimate the potential to cause injury/fatality. The

events of interest in the study are explosions and toxic emissions due to

decomposition of AN or AN solutions, ANE or Class 1 explosives that may result in

injury or fatality. Explosions may be caused by a thermal event (e.g. external fire) or

contamination.

6.2 Effect Levels of Interest

6.2.1 Overpressure

Overpressure levels are equated to different impacts (i.e. injury or probabilities of

fatality) as summarised in Table 6.1. These criteria are based on the levels given in

HIPAP 4.

TABLE 6.1: FATALITY / OVERPRESSURE CORRELATION

Overpressure (kPa)

HIPAP 4 description Probability of Fatality assumed in QRA

Inside Building Outside

7 Damage to internal partitions and joinery but can be repaired. Probability of injury is 10%. No fatality.

- -

14 Houses uninhabitable and badly cracked.

1% 0.1%

21 Reinforced structures distort. Storage tanks fail. 20% chance of fatality for a person in a building.

20% 1%

35 House uninhabitable. Wagons and plant items overturned. Threshold of eardrum damage. 50% chance of fatality for a person in buildings and 15% chance of fatality for a person in open.

50% 15%

70 Threshold of lung damage. 100% chance of fatality for a person in a building or in the open. Complete demolition of houses.

100% 100%

6.2.2 Toxicity Effects

The toxic decomposition products of AN (as NO2) have the potential to cause acute

toxic effects. The values used to assess toxicity impacts are summarised in Table 6.2.


Page 47

Fatality

Probability of fatality is usually estimated using probit equations of the form

Pr = A + b ln(cnt)

Pr Probit value

A, b Constants specific to each material.

c concentration (ppm)

t time exposed to concentration (min)

erf error function (mathematical)

These can then be converted to a probability of fatality using the error function

transform:

Probability = 0.5(1 + erf(2

5Pr))

Injury / Irritation

HIPAP 4 injury and irritation risk criteria for toxic gas exposure were given in Table 2.1.

The PHA makes the following interpretations:

Serious Injury: occurs due to toxic exposure to the lower of the Acute Exposure

Guideline Level 2 (AEGL-2) and Emergency Response Planning Guideline Level 2

(ERPG-2) concentrations. AEGL-2 is the airborne concentration of a substance above

which it is predicted that the general population, including susceptible individuals, could

experience irreversible or other serious, long-lasting adverse health effects or an

impaired ability to escape. ERPG-2 is defined as the maximum airborne concentration

below which nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without

experiencing or developing irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms that

could impair an individual's ability to take protective action.

Irritation: occurs due to toxic exposure to the lower of the AEGL-1 and ERPG-1

concentrations. AEGL-1 is the airborne concentration of a substance above which it is

predicted that the general population, including susceptible individuals, could

experience notable discomfort, irritation, or certain asymptomatic, non-sensory effects.

However, the effects are not disabling and are transient and reversible upon cessation

of exposure. ERPG-1 is defined as the maximum airborne concentration below which

nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing more than

mild, transient adverse health effects or without perceiving a clearly defined

objectionable odour.


Page 48

TABLE 6.2: IMPACT LEVELS FOR TOXIC EFFECTS

Material Concentration

1% Fatality at 30mins exposure

Serious Injury (AEGL-2 Ref. 9 or

ERPG-2 Ref. 11)

Irritation (AEGL-1 Ref 9 or

ERPG-1 Ref 11)

Probit (Ref 12 (ppm

n min)

ppm ppm Ppm

Nitrogen dioxide (NO2) -16.19+ ln(c3.7

t) 65 12 0.5

6.2.3 Escalation

Two types of escalation are considered, consequence results for both levels of interest

have been generated as follows:

Third party property damage. As per the criteria in HIPAP 4 shown in Table 2.2,

NSW DoP suggest 14kPa as a criterion for assessing property damage

potential due to explosion overpressure.

Detonation of another explosives or ANE inventory. In this case the escalation

event of concern onsite would be explosion in one area generating high energy

projectiles or an impulse that then initiates an explosion in other areas with

larger effects than the initial explosion. The AS2187.1 (1998) Table 3.2.3.2

separation distances (and associated formulas) are used as the threshold

where shock or projectiles from an event in the ANE Plant could cause a

detonation in another onsite explosives or ANE facility or vice versa, i.e.

whether the existing facilities could impact the proposed ANE Plant and vice

versa.

6.3 Explosion Consequence Assessment Assumptions

The TNT equivalent model is used to estimate explosion overpressure effects. This

method involves:

1. Equating the explosive or oxidiser of interest into an equivalent mass of TNT.

This is known as the Net Explosive Quantity (NEQ).

2. Estimating the distance to the overpressure levels of interest using a scaling

law known as the TNT overpressure vs. scaled distance relationship.

6.3.1 TNT Equivalent Mass for AN or ANS

To equate AN or ANS to an equivalent mass of TNT, three factors are considered as

follows:

NEQ = x α e MassAN


Page 49

Proportion of material present that is sensitised to explosion (x):

This is set at 100% for this study for AN. High temperature, confinement and

contaminants sensitise Ammonium Nitrate to explosion however are not

expected to extend uniformly to the entire AN inventory (particularly for a bulk

store). Therefore setting this factor to 100% for AN and ANS is considered a

conservative assumption.

(Note that this factor is not relevant for ANE or Class 1 explosives as an

explosion will always propagate through the whole inventory, i.e. always 100%

involvement).

Efficiency (α): The proportion of the sensitised material that actually detonates

in the explosion. Orica‟s AN Draft Code of Practice (CoP) (Ref 4) has been

based on a review of published effects of AN and ANS explosion events that

have occurred. The values suggested in the CoP for AN or ANS have been

adopted for this study and are summarised in Table 6.3.

TNT equivalence (e): Essentially a ratio of the blast energy produced by the

explosive of interest to the blast energy produced by the same quantity of TNT.

Refer to Section 6.3.2 for details for ANS and AN and Section 6.3.3 for ANE.

TABLE 6.3: ANS AND AN EXPLOSION EFFICENCY

Materials Explosion initiator Efficiency (α) Comments

Strong (>80%) ANS

Unconfined decomposition

0.3 A storage tank well vented /

frangible roof etc, reactor etc

that allows decomposition

products to freely vent

Confined decomposition

0.6 Road tanker, storage with small

vents, PSV

AN Fire 0.16 AN Draft Code of Practice

Contamination 0.5 AN Draft Code of Practice

High energy projectile

1 AN Draft Code of Practice

6.3.2 TNT Equivalence for AN and ANS (e)

The literature has a range of values for AN (solid) equivalence, ranging from around

0.32 to 0.57. Orica‟s draft AN Code of Practice (CoP) has been based on a review of

published data and the equivalence values suggested in the CoP have been adopted

for this study as shown in Table 6.4. (This is the value used for “e” in the equation in

Section 6.3.1).


Page 50

6.3.3 TNT Equivalence for ANE

Estimates for TNT equivalence of ANEs range from 0.10 to 0.70. For the types of

ANEs to be produced at the new ANE Production Facility, a value of 0.68 has been

selected as shown in Table 6.4.

This is derived from Orica's proprietary "Ideal Detonation" modelling software IdeX.

The IDeX software derives TNT equivalence from the isentropic expansion energy for

the chosen explosive relative to the same energy for TNT. This software is well-

validated as it is in routine use as the basis on which Orica conducts blast modelling

and blast design on a commercial basis.

TABLE 6.4: TNT EQUIVALENCE

Material Equivalence

(e) Comments

ANS 0.353 Specified in Orica Draft AN Code of practice

AN 0.32 Specified in Orica Draft AN Code of practice

ANE 0.68 Orica's Ideal Detonation code IDeX

6.3.4 TNT Equivalence for Class 1 Explosives

TNT equivalence for Class 1 explosives is generally 1. However there are some

materials in the existing facilities with a lower TNT equivalence. This has already been

accounted for in the NEQ calculations as shown in Table 3.2.

6.3.5 Scaled Overpressure

Overpressure versus scaled distance relationships are presented as equations or

graphs. In this case the Kingery and Bulmash correlation is used to estimate the

scaled distance (Z) from the overpressure of interest (Ref 13). The Kingery and

Bulmash correlation is as follows:

P = exp(A + B.Xo + C.Xo2 + D.Xo

3 + E.Xo4)

Xo = ln(Zo)

Zo = d / NEQ0.333

Where:

Zo scaled distance (m/kg0.333)

d distance at particular overpressure level (m)

P overpressure (kPa)

NEQ Net Explosive Quantity (kg)


Page 51

Refer to APPENDIX 3 for the Kingery and Bulmash coefficients (A,B,C,D,E), the

overpressure (P) levels of interest, and solutions to the equation, as these coefficients

vary depending on Zo.

6.4 Explosion Scenario Consequence Results

Consequence modelling results for all potential explosion scenarios included in the risk

assessment are detailed in APPENDIX 3 for both the proposed ANE Production

Facility and existing facilities. The results include estimated distances to the

overpressure levels of interest (as per the rule sets in Table 6.1) and identification of

the events which cause overpressures sufficient to cause injury or fatality offsite.

The separation distances between the existing explosive inventories and the proposed

ANE Production Facility, have been estimated from the site layout (see Figure 3.2 and

Figure 3.3) and are summarised in Table 6.5.

As noted in Section 3.3, the nearest residence is around 1.8km from the proposed

ANE Production Facility location, the nearest industrial population and infrastructure is

around 2.5km away and the nearest major road (F3 freeway) is around 4.5km away

from the site boundary.

TABLE 6.5: SEPARATION DISTANCES BETWEEN INVENTORIES

6.4.1 Proposed ANE Production Facility

Overpressure results for the proposed ANE Plant are summarised in Table 6.6. The

required separation distances to other inventories based on AS2187.1 Table 3.2.3.2

are shown in Table 6.7.

The following conclusions can be made:

Distances to the 21 kPa level (capable of causing fatality to individuals located

outside – i.e. not in a building) remain within the site boundary which is a

minimum of 260m away for all scenarios except for an escalated event

resulting in sympathetic detonation of the maximum aggregated NEQ in the

ANE Production Facility. The escalated event 21kPa consequence distance

Separation Distance (m) Receptor

Source Proposed ANE Plant

(ANS areas)

Proposed ANE Plant

(Dry Oxidiser store)

Nearest Site

Boundary

Direction of Nearest

Site Boundary

Proposed ANE Plant (ANS

areas)

- 30 260 South

Proposed ANE Plant (Dry

Oxidiser store)

30 - 280 South

Research Magazine (RM) and

Quarry Service Depot (QS)

355 325 635 East

Research Laboratory (RL) 555 525 715 North east

Mixing Laboratory (ML) 850 820 480 North

Test Cell 215 185 450 South


Page 52

extends around 100m beyond the southern boundary into the unpopulated and

undeveloped Crown Land. It is contained within the site boundary in all other

directions.

Distances to the 14kPa level (capable of causing fatality to individuals located

inside a building) range from approximately 100 – 340m for individual inventory

explosions, and up to around 520m for an escalated event involving the

aggregated ANE Production Facility inventory (extending around 250m beyond

the site boundary to the south, and contained within the boundary in all other

directions). However the overpressure effects do not extend to any buildings or

populations (industrial or residential) as the land to the South of the site is

undeveloped Crown land with no buildings for at least 2km. The nearest

residence (to the north) is more than 1800m away from the proposed ANE

Production Facility, the rural subdivision (potential occupied buildings) to the

west is at least 1000m from the proposed ANE Production Facility area.

An overpressure of 14kPa is also capable of causing property damage,

however this overpressure level does not extend to any offsite infrastructure

(industrial, busy roads etc). The electrical easement to the south of the site,

and the power lines and (not yet installed) underground gas lines running

through the Technical Centre site, are also more than 700m away from the

proposed ANE Production Facility area. The maximum overpressure at the

easement area in a worst case event is around 7-8kPa, hence infrastructure

will not be significantly affected by an explosion in the proposed ANE

Production Facility.

Distances to an overpressure of 7 kPa (capable of causing injury) for a number

of scenarios including explosion in largest inventory ANS tank, an ANS tanker,

OXS batch tank or ANE tank, or the escalated event involving the aggregate

ANE Production Facility inventory extend offsite up to 600m beyond the

southern boundary (contained within site boundary in all other directions)

however do not extend to any offsite populations (industrial, busy roads or

residential).

Figure 6.1 to Figure 6.3 show the results for some representative scenarios, including

the worst case scenarios (i.e. aggregate inventory of proposed ANE Production Facility

including all the ANE and the largest ANS inventory in Figure 6.1, and, in Figure 6.2

the aggregate inventory of proposed ANE Production Facility including the only the

ANE inventory).


Page 53

FIGURE 6.1: PROPOSED ANE PLANT WORST CASE EXPLOSION – AGGREGATE INVENTORY


Page 54

FIGURE 6.2: PROPOSED ANE PRODUCTION FACILITY - ANE (MAXIMUM STORAGE)

EXPLOSION


Page 55

FIGURE 6.3: PROPOSED ANE PLANT – ANS STORAGE TANK (LARGEST INVENTORY)

EXPLOSION

6.4.2 Existing Facilities

Overpressure results for the maximum explosives inventories in the existing facilities

are summarised in Table 6.8, with AS2187.1 separation distances given in Table 6.9.

The results are shown graphically in Figure 6.4 to Figure 6.7.


Page 56

The following conclusions can be made:

No events with potential offsite fatality effects to outdoor populations (21 kPa

overpressure) were identified.

No events with potential offsite damage potential or fatality effects to

populations inside buildings (14kPa overpressure) were identified.

One event with potential offsite injury impact was identified (Research

Magazine/ Quarry Store Depot 7 kPa overpressure contour extends around

20m across the southern boundary in Crown Land). However the impact does

not extend to any offsite populations (industrial, busy roads or residential).

Escalation to the proposed ANE Production Facility / AN storage area is

extremely unlikely given the separation distances comply with AS2187.1.

These results confirm that compliance with the AS2187.1 quantity distance rules

minimises offsite risks associated with explosion events.

6.5 Onsite Escalation

Based on the separation distance rules in AS2187.1 it can be concluded from the

consequence results presented in Table 6.9, that there is no risk of escalation from the

existing facilities to the proposed ANE Production Facilities.

The worst case event defined for the proposed ANE Production Facilities (i.e.

sympathetic detonation of all inventories due to a decomposition in the largest ANS

tank as shown in Figure 6.1) may result in a knock-on to the Test Cell area as shown

in Table 6.7. The Test Cell does not have a permanent inventory and even if in use,

the maximum Test Cell NEQ is 50kg (compared to an NEQ of more than 120,000kg for

the worst case ANE Production Facility event). Hence including this additional

inventory would have minimal impact on the worst case predicted consequence

distances and not alter the conclusions of the consequence and risk assessment.

This is also a “with warning” event as defined in Table 4.4 hence the Test Cell area

would be evacuated if it were being used at the time an ANS decomposition occurred

(protecting onsite personnel).

It can therefore be concluded that the worst case event in the ANE Production

Facilities does not have the potential to cause an escalated event with additive

consequences between the existing and proposed facilities, i.e. the proposed ANE

Plant is sufficiently separated from the existing facilities with any significant explosive

inventories to ensure that there is minimal risk of escalation between the proposed and

existing facilities. This conclusion remains true for all initiating causes (including

bushfire).


Page 57

FIGURE 6.4: RESEARCH MAGAZINE AND QUARRY SERVICES EXPLOSION (MAXIMUM NEQ)


Page 58

FIGURE 6.5: RESEARCH LABORATORY EXPLOSION (MAXIMUM NEQ)


Page 59

FIGURE 6.6: MIXING LABORATORY EXPLOSION (MAXIMUM NEQ)


Page 60

FIGURE 6.7: TEST CELL EXPLOSION (MAXIMUM NEQ)


Page 61

TABLE 6.6: CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS RESULTS – OVERPRESSURES PROPOSED ANE PLANT

QRA Scenario Consequence Model Parameters Distance to Overpressure (kPa)

(m)

Distance to

nearest

boundary (m)

Potential

Offsite fatality

effect (i.e.

>21kPa at

boundary)

Potential Offsite

fatality effect

(i.e. >14kPa at

boundary)

Potential

Offsite injury

effect (i.e.

>7kPa at

boundary)

Discuss in

QRA?

Area MAE Ref MAE Description Material Max storage

quantity (te)

proportion

AN

Theoretical

Mass Avail

for Explosion

(te)

Equivalence Efficiency NEQ

(kg)

70 35 21 14 7 2

ANS Storage ANS-01

ANS-02

ANS-03

Explosion in ANS storage tank due to contamination or

external fire

ANS 330 0.885 292.05 0.353 0.3 30928 121 178 247 329 564 1415 260 N Y Y Y

ANS Storage ANS-04 Explosion in ANS tanker ANS 26 0.885 23.01 0.353 0.6 4874 65 96 133 178 305 764 260 N N Y Y

OXS Batch Tank OXS-01

OXS-02

OXS-03

Explosion in OXS batch tank due to contamination or

external fire

ANS 80 0.83 66.4 0.353 0.3 7032 74 109 151 201 344 863 260 N N Y Y

ELK Area ELK-01

ELK-02

Explosion in ELK ANE 2 1 2 0.68 1 1360 43 63 87 116 199 499 260 N N N N

ANE Storage ANE-01

ANE-02

Explosion in single ANE storage tank due to contamination

or external fire

ANE 30 1 30 0.68 1 20400 105 155 215 287 491 1231 260 N Y Y Y

ANE Storage ANE-01

ANE-02

Explosion in all (4) ANE storage tanks due to

contamination or external fire

ANE 120 1 120 0.68 1 81600 167 246 341 455 780 1955 260 Y Y Y Y

AN Storage AN-01 Explosion in Dry Oxidiser store due to contamination AN 20 1 20 0.32 0.5 3200 57 84 116 155 265 664 280 N N N N

AN Storage AN-02 Explosion in Dry Oxidiser store due to fire AN 20 1 20 0.32 0.16 1024 39 57 79 106 181 454 280 N N N N

AN Storage AN-03 Explosion in Dry Oxidiser store due to missile / high

energy shock wave

AN 20 1 20 0.32 1 6400 72 105 146 195 334 837 280 N N Y Y

AN Storage

(offspec)

Explosion in Dry Oxidiser store due to contamination AN (off

spec)

0 1 0 0.32 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 280 N N N N

ANE Plant all

inventory

ESC-01 ANE plant - ANS storage tank explosion and sympathetic

detonation, aggregate inventory including largest ANS (1 x

350 te ANS, 4 x 30te ANE and 20 te AN)

ANS+ANE+A

N

470 as per

individual

scenarios

as per

individual

scenarios

as per

individual

scenarios

as per

individual

scenarios

118928 190 279 387 516 884 2216 280 Y Y Y Y

ANE Plant all

inventory

ESC-02 ANE plant - knock on (any causes except ANS explosion)

and sympathetic detonation, aggregate inventory (4 x

30te ANE and 20 te AN)

ANE + AN 140 as per

individual

scenarios

as per

individual

scenarios

as per

individual

scenarios

as per

individual

scenarios

88000 171 252 350 467 800 2005 280 Y Y Y Y


Page 62

TABLE 6.7: CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS RESULTS – AS2187.1 SEPARATION DISTANCES PROPOSED ANE PLANT

QRA Scenario Consequence Model Parameters Separation distances as per AS2187.1 1998 Table 3.2.3.2

(m)

Escalation


quantity (te)

proportion

AN

Theoretical

Mass Avail

for Explosion

(te)


(kg)

Explosives

(unmounded)

D = 4.8 NEQ1/3

Explosives

(mounded)

D = 2. 4NEQ1/3

Process

building

D = 8 NEQ1/3

AN

(unmounded)

D = 1.8 NEQ1/3

Class A PW

Note 1

Class B PW

(unmounded)

Note 2

Class B PW

(mounded)

Note 2

Distance to

Nearest Existing

Explosives

Inventory (Test

Cell)

Potential onsite

escalation effect

(AS2187)

ANS Storage ANS-01

ANS-02

ANS-03


external fire

ANS 330 0.885 292.05 0.353 0.3 30928 151 75 251 57 465 697 697 215 N

ANS Storage ANS-04 Explosion in ANS tanker ANS 26 0.885 23.01 0.353 0.6 4874 81 41 136 31 251 376 376 215 N


OXS-02

OXS-03


external fire

ANS 80 0.83 66.4 0.353 0.3 7032 92 46 153 34 284 425 425 215 N

ELK Area ELK-01

ELK-02

Explosion in ELK ANE 2 1 2 0.68 1 1360 53 27 89 20 123 180 184 215 N

ANE Storage ANE-01

ANE-02


or external fire

ANE 30 1 30 0.68 1 20400 131 66 219 49 404 607 607 215 N

ANE Storage ANE-01

ANE-02



ANE 120 1 120 0.68 1 81600 208 104 347 78 642 963 963 215 N

AN Storage AN-01 Explosion in Dry Oxidiser store due to contamination AN 20 1 20 0.32 0.5 3200 71 35 118 27 204 311 311 185 N

AN Storage AN-02 Explosion in Dry Oxidiser store due to fire AN 20 1 20 0.32 0.16 1024 48 24 81 18 102 180 152 185 N


energy shock wave

AN 20 1 20 0.32 1 6400 89 45 149 33 275 412 412 185 N

AN Storage

(offspec)


spec)

0 1 0 0.32 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a N

ANE Plant all

inventory




ANS+ANE+A

N

470 as per

individual

scenarios

as per

individual

scenarios

as per

individual

scenarios

as per

individual

scenarios

118928 236 118 393 89 728 1092 1092 215 Y

ANE Plant all

inventory




ANE + AN 140 as per

individual

scenarios

as per

individual

scenarios

as per

individual

scenarios

as per

individual

scenarios

88000 214 107 356 80 658 987 987 215 N


Page 63

TABLE 6.8: CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS RESULTS – OVERPRESSURES FOR EXISTING TECHNCIAL CENTRE INVENTORIES


(m)

Distance to

nearest

boundary

(m)

Potential

Offsite

fatality

effect (i.e.

>14kPa at

boundary)

Potential

Offsite

injury effect

(i.e. >7kPa

at

boundary)

Discuss in

QRA?


(te)

NEQ

(kg)

70 35 21 14 7

Research Magazine

(RM) and Quarry

Service Depot (QS)

RM/QS-01 Explosion in Research

Magazine or Quarry

Services Depot which

propagates to involve

entire inventory in this

plant location

Explosive n/a 50220 142 209 290 387 663 635 N Y Y

Research

Laboratory (RL)

ML-01 Explosion in Mixing Lab

which propagates to

involve entire inventory

in this plant location

Explosive n/a 11620 87 129 178 238 407 715 N N N

Mixing Laboratory

(ML)

RL-01 Explosion in Research

Laboratory which



plant location

Explosive n/a 560 32 47 65 86 148 480 N N N

Test Cell TC-01 Explosion in Test Cell

which involves entire

inventory in this plant

location

Explosive n/a 50 14 21 29 39 66 450 N N N


Page 64

TABLE 6.9: CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS RESULTS – AS2187.1 SEPARATION DISTANCES EXISTING KURRI FACILITIES

QRA Scenario Consequence Model

Parameters

Separation distances as per AS2187.1 1998 Table 3.2.3.2

(m)

Escalation

Area MAE Ref MAE Description Material NEQ

(kg)

Explosives

(unmounded)

D = 4.8 NEQ1/3

Explosives

(mounded)

D = 2.

4NEQ1/3

Process

building

D = 8 NEQ1/3

AN

(unmounded)

D = 1.8 NEQ1/3

Distance to

Proposed

ANE Plant /

AN Store

Potential onsite

escalation effect (i.e.

less than AS2187

process building sep

distance to ANE Plant /

AN Store inventory)

Research Magazine

(RM) and Quarry

Service Depot (QS)


Magazine or Quarry




plant location

Explosive 50220 177 89 295 66 325 N

Research

Laboratory (RL)


which propagates to

involve entire inventory

in this plant location

Explosive 11620 109 54 181 41 525 N

Mixing Laboratory

(ML)


Laboratory which



plant location

Explosive 560 40 20 66 15 820 N




location

Explosive 50 18 9 29 7 185 N


Page 65

6.6 Toxic Effects Consequence Assessment

The impact of toxic releases was assessed using the following methodology:

1. Estimating the amount of toxic material released

2. Estimating the distances to the toxic levels of interest (as defined in Section

6.2.2) using dispersion models.

Dispersion modelling assumed:

Ambient temperature: 25oC

Typical stability / windspeeds: D5m/s and F2m/s

Surface roughness: 0.1m

6.6.1 NOx Source Term Estimation

The amount of NO2 likely to be released from a fire involving AN solution materials

(ANS, OXS, ANE) was estimated by extrapolating the experimental results from

measurements of toxic emission from fires involving solid AN conducted by the UK

HSE (Ref 14). Although the results are for solid AN in a fire, there does not appear to

be a similar model for ANS in the public domain. The UK HSE work has been used as

the results are likely to be broadly conservative, given that the event could only occur if

a sustained fire occurred as water would have to be driven off the ANS before

decomposition to liberate NO2 can occur.

Two AN fire scenarios were considered by the UK HSE:

Scenario A: A large fire in combustible goods co-stored with AN. In this case, the

decomposition of the AN is driven by thermal radiation from the fire. The highest

emission of NO2 recorded in the experiments for this scenario was 3 g/s (for a 1m2

molten pool of AN). It was also noted that in radiant fires large enough and hot

enough to initiate significant decomposition of co-stored AN, the decomposition

products will become entrained into the fire combustion products. These will be hot

and will generally lead to the decomposition of the NO2, with the result that NO will

be the dominant emission.

Scenario B: A self-sustaining combustion reaction between AN and timber palleting

on which it is stored. The experimental work indicated that 10 g/s of NO2 was

produced for a wooden pallet consumed in a fire. A correlation between the NO2

emission rate and the number of wooden pallets involved in the fire is provided in

the paper.

Scenario A was considered to be more representative of the fire scenarios modelled in

this QRA, i.e. there is no direct fire impingement and decomposition is the result of

radiant heat from external fires. The NO2 emission rate for this QRA was estimated

from the UK HSE results by assuming that the NO2 emission rate is related to source


Page 66

area, i.e. the NO2 flux is constant. Based on a surface area of 50 m2 for the largest

ANS/ANE tank, the NO2 emission rate modelled in this study is 151 g/s.

Again this is thought to be very conservative as radiant heat impact from an external

fire will be uneven i.e. from one side only, and a constant mass emission rate from the

whole liquid surface is very unlikely.

6.6.2 Dispersion Modelling Results

Dispersion of NO2 was modelled using the BP Cirrus passive release dispersion

model. Although NO2 is denser than air at ambient conditions, NO2 emissions in this

study are likely to be buoyant due to the radiant heat effects from the fire. NO2

temperature was assumed to be 150oC (as it decomposes to NO at 160oC).

Consequence modelling results for the toxic scenarios considered in the QRA are

summarised in Table 6.10.

The results show:

Toxic releases do not result in concentrations off site capable of causing fatality

Injurious levels (ERPG2 or AEGL2) are not exceeded in residential areas

Irritating levels of toxic decomposition gases (evolved during extended

exposure of a large ANS / ANE tank to heat radiation) may be experienced

several kilometres from the site and may extend to residential areas. However

it should be noted that the AEGL1 endpoint of 0.5ppm is very low and large

dispersion distances (> 10km) are estimated for F2 conditions. Dispersion

models such as those used in this study cannot accurately model behaviour

over more than a few kilometres as they do not take into account changing

terrain (slope, obstacles, channelling etc) or changes in meteorological

conditions, hence tend to over-predict effect distances.


Page 67

TABLE 6.10: CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS RESULTS – NO2 DISPERSION

Scenario Distance to Following Ground Level Concentrations – F2 (m)

Distance to Following Ground Level Concentrations – D5 (m)

1% fatality Probit

AEGL-2 12ppm

AEGL-1 0.5ppm

1% fatality Probit

AEGL-2 12ppm

AEGL-1 0.5ppm

Toxic NOx emission from ANS decomposition in storage tank (0.151 kg/s)

Not found 1400 > 10,000 (Note 1)

Not found 100 2600

NOTES: 1. Dispersion distances over 10km are highly unreliable as atmospheric conditions and terrain would not remain constant.


Page 68

7 FREQUENCY ANALYSIS AND RISK RESULTS

The frequency of an event is defined as the number of occurrences of the event over a

specified time period; with the period in risk analysis generally taken as one year.

Ideally statistical data would be used to estimate the likelihood of the identified

hazardous events occurring. However for rare events there is often insufficient data to

estimate a statistically valid frequency hence “best estimates” based on industry

knowledge can be made as described below.

The main focus of this QRA is to compare the offsite risk levels from the proposed

ANE Production Facilty with the criteria given in HIPAP4. Therefore estimation of

frequency is only carried out for the small number of events identified in the

consequence analysis in Section 5 where an offsite impact was identified.

7.1 Individual Fatality Risk

As per Section 5, only one event (in the proposed or existing facilities), an escalated

event involving the aggregated inventory in the proposed ANE Plant, was identified

with a potential offsite fatality impact (i.e. overpressure exceeding 21kPa in outdoor

areas). However this impact did not extend to any residential, sensitive, recreational or

commercial areas.

In addition, the nearest (potentially) occupied building to the proposed ANE Production

Facility is in subdivided area to the west of the Orica site more than 1100 m away, with

the nearest (actually) occupied building to the north west 1800 m away from the

proposed ANE Production Facility.

No events (in the proposed or existing facilities) were identified with a potential offsite

fatality impact (i.e. overpressure exceeding 14kPa) in any offsite buildings.

It can therefore be concluded that (regardless of the event frequencies) the offsite

fatality risk in the land uses where risk criteria are defined is minimal and fatality risk

contours have not been prepared.

7.1.1 Boundary Risk

The boundary risk criterion is 50 x 10-6 per year. This criterion is primarily aimed at

minimising risk to neighbouring hazardous industries (of which there are none adjacent

to the Technical Centre site). There is only one event with a fatality effect (i.e. 21kPa

overpressure) at the site boundary, an escalated event involving the aggregated

inventory in the proposed ANE Production Facility.

7.1.2 Escalated Event Frequency

To provide a comparison with the criterion a frequency estimate needs to be made for

this event. The HIRAC process included ranking of each event using the Orica

frequency scale (shown in Table 7.1), and also identified any known events similar to

the hazardous incident scenario under discussion.


Page 69

Orica has stored and manufactured ANEs for over 30 years (as have other

companies). Orica currently has several thousand ANE tanks at around 500 sites

globally (and estimates a similar number operated by other companies). Across this

large number of sites there are no known occurrences of an escalated event of this

nature for sites with similar levels of control.

The two potential causes of explosion in any individual inventory (hence source of a

sympathetic detonation) are contamination and sustained heat source. External fires

are extremely unlikely as the combustible materials are located in a separate bund at

least 30m away from the ANE Production Facility area. ANS delivery and ANE

collection vehicles are also in a separate sealed area and separated from the tanks by

a least a few metres. Similarly to the existing facilities, bushfire risks will be controlled

primarily through maintenance of an APZ around the facility.

Contamination of incoming ANS is highly unlikely since it is controlled via strict

manufacturing and quality assurance procedures at Orica‟s Kooragang Island site, and

any serious contamination would become evident during the journey as it would cause

emission of visible NOx fumes.

Taking into account the safeguards included (as per the HIRACs and as summarised

in Table 4.5), all large or sustained decomposition events were rated as “very unlikely”,

corresponding to a frequency of around 1x10-5 per annum per event, with a

subsequent explosion at least a factor of 10 lower or “extremely unlikely”.

Therefore in the absence of any sound historical frequency data, a frequency of 1x10-6

per year is judged to be applicable to an escalated explosion event. Note that a fault

tree approach is also possible however would also only arrive at an order of magnitude

judgement at best. It is therefore concluded that the frequency of the escalated event

is well below the boundary risk criterion of 50x10-6 per year.

TABLE 7.1: ORICA FREQUENCY SCALE

Likelihood Qualitative Description Range (per annum)

Almost Certain Will occur at least once a year > 1

Very Likely Very likely to occur at least once during a 10 year period of operation of the facility/business

10-1

to 1

Likely (possible)

Has occurred at least once during the operating life of the facility/business

10-2

to 10-1

Unlikely Known to have happened within the industry: periodically in small industries and more often in large industries

10-4

to 10-2

Very Unlikely Has occurred somewhere in the world in all related industries

10-6

to 10-4

Extremely Unlikely

Could theoretically occur but not aware of any instances

< 10-6

(around 10-7

)


Page 70

8 RISK ASSESSMENT

8.1 Individual Fatality Risk

Due to the large separation distances to populated areas and the large buffer zones

between operational areas and the site boundary, very few (worst case) events have

potential offsite impact. In addition, given the safeguards in place, event frequencies

for worst case events are low hence the individual fatality risk criteria are complied

with.

Table 8.1 gives a summary of compliance with the HIPAP4 individual fatality risk

criteria.

TABLE 8.1: COMPLIANCE WITH INDIVIDUAL FATALITY RISK CRITERIA

Land Uses Max Risk Comments Complies with HIPAP 4 Criteria?

(per year) Proposed ANE Plant

Existing Kurri Facilities

Cumulative

Sensitive uses 0.5 x 10-6


Y Y Y



Y Y Y

Commercial developments, retail centres, offices, entertainment centres

5 x 10-6


Y Y Y

Sporting complexes and active open space

10 x 10-6


Y Y Y

Remain within boundary of an industrial site

50 x 10-6


Y Y Y

8.2 Explosion Injury Risk

Overpressure injury criteria are defined only for residential areas. As noted in the

results in Section 5 there were no events identified where injurious overpressures

would be experienced in residential areas.

Hence (regardless of frequency) the overpressure injury risk criterion (10x10-6 per year

in residential areas) is satisfied as summarised in Table 8.2.


Page 71

TABLE 8.2: COMPLIANCE WITH INJURY RISK CRITERIA




Cumulative

Fire / Explosion Injury risk –incident explosion overpressure at residential areas should not exceed 7 kPa at frequencies of more than 50 chances in a million per year

50 x 10-6

No injury impacts in residential land use

Y Y Y

8.3 Escalation Risk (Offsite Property)

Escalation criteria are defined for public buildings or neighbouring hazardous industry,

(rather than general or onsite infrastructure). As noted in the results in Section 5, there

were no events identified where overpressures capable of causing property damage

would be experienced in neighbouring installations (which are many kilometres away).

Hence the overpressure damage risk criterion (50x10-6 per year) is automatically

satisfied (regardless of frequency) as summarised in Table 8.3.

TABLE 8.3: COMPLIANCE WITH ESCALATION RISK CRITERIA




Cumulative


50 x 10-6

No damage impacts outside the site boundary

Y Y Y

8.4 Toxic Injury / Irritation Risk

Toxic injury and irritation criteria are defined only for residential areas. Potential toxicity

effects were assessed only for the proposed ANE Production Facility as there are no

significant toxicity effects associated with Class 1 explosives and existing inventories

of AN and ANE are relatively small in comparison to the proposed ANE Production

Facility.

Assessment results compared against the risk criteria are summarised in Table 8.4

with further discussion in Sections 8.4.1 and 8.4.2.


Page 72

TABLE 8.4: COMPLIANCE WITH TOXIC INJURY / IRRITATION RISK CRITERIA




Cumulative


10 x 10-6

Injurious concentrations not experienced in residential areas

Y n/a Y


50 x 10-6


Y n/a Y

8.4.1 Injury Risk

As noted in the results in Section 6.6, there were no events identified where injurious

toxicity impacts due to NOx formed during ANS decomposition events would be

experienced in residential areas (which are many kilometres away). Hence the toxic

injury risk criterion (10x10-6 per year in residential areas) is automatically satisfied.

8.4.2 Irritation Risk

As noted in the results in Section 6.6, emission of toxic decomposition products from a

large ANS/ ANE storage tank due to an external fire or contamination may result in

irritation due to toxic decomposition products being experienced in residential areas

under some wind weather conditions (F2).

To allow a comparison to the risk criteria, an estimate of frequency of decomposition

(not explosion) in ANS storage is required. There are very few reported events of this

nature involving ANS and ANE. The HIRAC process included ranking of each event

using the Orica frequency scale (shown in Table 7.1), and also identified any known

events similar to the hazardous incident scenario under discussion.

As discussed in Section 7.1.1, the two potential causes of decomposition are

contamination and sustained heat source, both of which are very unlikely due to the

safeguards in place.


Page 73

Taking into account the safeguards included (as per the HIRAC‟s and as summarised

in Table 4.5), all large or sustained decomposition events were rated as “very unlikely”,

corresponding to a frequency of around 1 x 10-5 per annum per event. Therefore in the

absence of any sound historical frequency data, a frequency of 1 x10-5 per year is

judged to be applicable to ANS / ANE decomposition events with a potential offsite

impact.

The total ANS decomposition event frequency was estimated at 50 x10-6 per year (This

is based on all 5 ANS scenarios with a decomposition frequency of 1x10-5 per year

each).

Adjusting for wind direction (a factor of 8 – 12 in any particular direction), and

probability of occurrence of F2 stability conditions (typically 20% of time or less), the

likelihood of offsite irritation effects is around 1x10-6 per year. It should also be

reiterated that the consequence model was conservatively developed and would be an

overestimate of effect distances from most decomposition events.

Hence the irritation risk criterion (50x10-6 per year in residential areas) is also satisfied.

8.5 Risk to Biophysical Environment

The main concern relating to environmental risk from accident events is generally with

effects on whole systems or populations. HIPAP 4 provides the following qualitative

guidance for assessment of environmental risk due to accident events:

Industrial developments should not be sited in proximity to sensitive natural

environmental areas where the effects (consequences) of the more likely

accidental emission may threaten the long-term viability of the ecosystem or

any species within it.


environmental areas where the likelihood (probability) of impacts that may

threaten the long-term viability of the ecosystem or any species within it is not

substantially lower than the background level of threat to the ecosystem.

Whereas any adverse effect on the environment is obviously undesirable, there were

no accidental emissions identified for the ANE Production Facilities or existing

Technology Centre facilities with the potential to damage an ecosystem, or to result in

any environmental effect other than a localised impact.

Overpressures associated with a worst case explosion event may damage some

vegetation and fauna in the vicinity, however are unlikely to affect the long-term

viability of the ecosystem or any species within it. However as identified in Table 4.5 it

is possible that an explosion could result in a bushfire with resulting adverse effects on

the environment. This is discussed in Section 8.5.1.


Page 74

For completeness, potential risks to the biophysical environment due to loss of

containment events, and control measures in place to prevent or reduce any impacts

are also briefly summarised in the following sections.

8.5.1 Explosion events resulting in bushfire

It is possible that hot shrapnel or fragments generated in an explosion could act as an

ignition source, initiating a bushfire. Any bushfire could result in significant impacts to

the biophysical environment (flora and fauna). As the ANE Production Facility will be

surrounded by an APZ, the fuel load will be low and fire development should be slow,

however the scenario cannot be entirely discounted as the ultimate effects would be

heavily dependent on the environmental conditions at the time.

As noted in Section 4.4, a serious bushfire was last experienced close to the site

around 1996. Even with active vegetation management, bushfires are always a

potential threat in the summer season, with the main causes of Australian bushfires

being lightning and human initiation (either malicious or accidental, Refs 15, 16). Given

past history, the background likelihood of a serious bushfire in the area would appear

to be of the order of 1 in 10 to 20 years (i.e. approximately 1x 10-1 per year).

The likelihood of an escalated explosion event in the ANE Production Facility is

estimated at around 1x10-6 per year (as per Section 7.1). The likelihood that an

explosion would also initiate a bushfire is not 100%. It can therefore be inferred that

the frequency of an explosion in the ANE Production Facility initiating a bushfire is less

than 1x10-6 per year.

Based on the history of bushfires in the area, it is concluded that the likelihood of an

explosion in the ANE plant that then initiates a bushfire is substantially lower (at least

several orders of magnitude lower) than the background risk of a bushfire (and any

associated impact on the environment) occurring, and that the location of the proposed

development is therefore consistent with the biophysical risk criterion that:


environmental areas where the likelihood (probability) of impacts that may

threaten the long-term viability of the ecosystem or any species within it is not

substantially lower than the background level of threat to the ecosystem.

8.5.2 Escape of Liquid Materials

Chemicals Stored in Bunded Areas:

Chemicals stored include various oxidisers and corrosives (ANS, acetic acid, caustic

soda etc as per APPENDIX 1). These chemical are water soluble and would affect pH

if released into groundwater or surface waters. ANS contains significant amounts of

nitrogen so would add to nutrient loads if released into a waterway.

All chemicals are stored within concrete bunded areas which are designed to hold up

to 110% of the capacity of the largest tank and 25% of the capacity of all the tanks


Page 75

where there are multiple tanks in a bund. All tanker deliveries occur over sealed areas

with kerbing and a drainage design preventing any runoff to the environment if a spill

occurs.

Various combustible fuels (hydrocarbon or vegetable oils) are also stored. These are

stored in self-bunded tanks and the unloading area has a drainage design to prevent

any runoff to the environment if a spill occurs.

Drainage systems for the combustible materials delivery areas and ANS delivery areas

are separate to ensure cross contamination cannot occur in drains.

Spill kits are provided to areas identified via risk assessment, enabling recovery of

small quantities of spilt materials. A spill of any of these chemicals would have very

localised impacts. The likelihood of any spill reaching the environment is also very low

due to the onsite containment devices and sealed surfaces.

Drainage systems and site grades:

The plant, associated roadway and chemical storage areas are all sealed, and where

appropriate, bunded. Water collected in process areas and chemical storage areas is

recycled within the plant.

The site grades have been designed to minimise stormwater flowing onto the site from

up gradient. Rainwater collected from sealed road surfaces will be treated to remove

sediment and hydrocarbons. The treated rainwater will be harvested for reuse within

the process where possible. Surplus rainwater will be discharged to the environment.

8.5.3 Escape of Gaseous Materials

There are no highly volatile materials handled at the ANE Plant.

Acetic acid may generate odours during transfer however this would have very

localised impact.

The only gaseous emission would be the NOx emitted if an AN decomposition occurs.

NOx compounds can contribute to air pollution/smog. However the likelihood of a

decomposition event is very low due to the controls in place, and the total quantities of

NOx emitted in such a decomposition event would be very small in comparison to total

NOx from other sources such as power stations in the Hunter area.


Page 76

9 CONCLUSIONS

A hazard analysis for the proposed ANE Plant has been completed. The risk

assessment took a conservative approach to quantifying the consequences of the

event scenarios by assuming worst case inventories. This is appropriate for a land use

planning assessment.

The area directly around the site is largely unpopulated and there are no offsite

hazardous inventories, vulnerable infrastructure or populations that may be affected by

an explosion event. The nearest residential property is located approximately 1.8 km

from the proposed new plant. Due to the large separation distances between the

explosives, ANE or ANS inventories and the site boundaries, very few events were

identified with potential to cause injury or fatality outside the site boundary.

The results demonstrate that the existing site facilities and proposed ANE Plant

individually comply with all NSW land use planning risk criteria for new plants as

published in HIPAP 4. There are very few scenarios with any offsite fatality, injury or

irritation effect for either the existing or proposed facilities when measured against the

relevant screening thresholds, hence cumulative risk will also be within the HIPAP 4

criteria.


have occurred throughout the design process; including completion of a HAZOP and

HIRACs (which were used to prepare the PHA). Quantitative consequence explosion

overpressure results were used to identify required separation distances between

inventories and site boundaries, hence determine plant location and layout. Key

safeguards include:

Minimisation of inventories to minimise offsite consequences of potential

explosion events.

Separation distances from site boundaries and existing facilities.

Separation distances between any combustible material storages and Class

5.1 inventories.

Engineering controls such as automated control of ANE manufacture batch

process and high reliability low flow trips for emulsion pumps.

Asset protection zones and associated maintenance to protect against bushfire

impingement.

Therefore no recommendations in relation to additional engineering or layout

safeguards are made as part of the PHA.

However it is recommended that the existing site FRMP and ERP be updated to cover

the ANE Plant.

Document: J20210-004 APPENDIX 1 Revision: 1 Revision Date: 13 October 2009 Document ID: J20210-004 PHA Rev 1 Reissued for EA

APPENDIX 1. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

This Appendix summarises the inventories of materials to be used at the ANE Plant.

As noted in the comments column, due to their properties and / or the small quantities

stored, some of these materials present relatively minor / localised risks and are not

considered further in the PHA.

TABLE A1.1: OXIDISERS (FEEDS TO ANE PLANT)

Material DG Class

Delivery Max quantity (t)

Storage Comments

80% - 88% ANS

5.1 from Kooragang Island (KI) in road tankers

890 2 x 250 kL tanks

2 x 60 kL tanks

1 x 20 kL tank

Nominally 80-90% ANS. 250kL of ANS is approximately 330 tonnes ANS. All tanks have temp maintenance using hot water.

Weak ANS (30% - 55%)

5.1 from Kooragang Island (KI) in road tankers

90 1 x 60kL tank

2 x 10 kL tanks

Ammonium nitrate

5.1 From Kooragang Island by truck

9.6 Covered store, bulk bags

Calcium nitrate

n/a By truck 8 Covered store, bulk bags

Thiourea (solid)

6.1 PGIII

dry thiourea will be supplied in 1000 kg bags.

8 Covered store

Localised hazards. Combustible dust, may decompose (NOx, SOx if heated). Not considered in QRA – hazards similar to other materials and is stored in much smaller quantities. .

10% Thiourea solution

n/a Made from dry thiourea in hot water-heated dissolving tank, to make 10% thiourea solution.

Not yet defined

Batch tank Localised hazards. Not considered in QRA.

Urea n/a In 1000 kg bags 10 Covered store, bulk bags

Localised hazards. Not considered in QRA.

75% Acetic Acid

8 PGII by 20 te tanker 30 Localised hazards. Odours if spilled . Not considered in QRA. It has a flash point of 67°C and so is a combustible liquid. Orica has selected a concentration of 75% as concentrations of acetic acid over 80% are Class III flammable liquids.


Material DG Class

Delivery Max quantity (t)

Storage Comments

50% Caustic Soda

8 PGII by 20 te tanker 30 Localised hazards. Not considered in QRA.

Sodium Nitrite 5.1 In 25 kg bags 8 Covered Store Dedicated store area.

Weak sodium nitrite solution

n/a 2 x 10 kL tanks Localised OHS hazards. Not considered in QRA.

TABLE A1.2: FUELS (FEEDS TO ANE PLANT)

Material DG Class Delivery Storage Comments

Diesel C1 Tanker 100,000 L bunded storage tank

Canola C2 Tanker 100,000 L bunded storage tank

Paraffin C2 Tanker 80,000 L bunded storage tank

E26-66 C2 Tanker 60,000 L bunded storage tank

SFBHP90 C2 Tanker 80,000 L bunded storage tank

Fuel Dye C1 Truck 300 L in total concentrate diluted with paraffin

Development fuel blends

C1 Truck 1 x 3000 L tank Mixed on site

Fuel IBCs C1, C2 Truck Up to 4,000 L total in 4 off 1,000 L IBCs

Waste oil, small batch trial fuel ingredients, stored in Fuel Blend bund.

TABLE A1.3: TANK INVENTORIES FOR QRA

Tank Name Concentration Capacity

ANS Storage Tank 1 (33-4301) 88.5 % AN 330 tonne (239 m3) - 88.5 % AN

ANS Storage Tank 2 (33-4302) 88.5 % AN 330 tonne (239 m3) - 88.5 % AN

Weak ANS Storage Tank (33-4303) 35 % AN 75 tonne (66 m3) - as 35% AN

OXS Batch Tank 1 (33-4218) 83 % AN (maximum) 26 tonne (19 m3) as 83% AN

OXS Batch Tank 2 (33-4201) 83 % AN (maximum) 80 tonne (58.8 m3) as 83% AN

OXS Batch Tank 3 (33-4202) 83 % AN (maximum) 80 tonne (58.8 m3) as 83% AN

ANE Surge Tank 1 (33-4540) Emulsion 30 tonne (23 m3) - as emulsion





APPENDIX 2. HIRAC INFORMATION

HIRAC Overview

HIRACs have been carried out independently of the PHA as part of Orica‟s normal risk

assessment activities.

The HIRAC methodology is broadly based on AS/NZS 4360 Risk Management. A team of

experienced site engineering, operations and maintenance personnel is convened to carry

out the HIRAC on a particular scenario, such as “Explosion in the ANS Tank”.

A HIRAC comprises the following steps for each scenario:

Hazardous event identification

Identification of potential causes

Establishment of potential consequences (safety, health, environment and

business) and the severity of those consequences both onsite and offsite

Identification of existing controls (both hardware and procedural) and review of their

probable effectiveness

Estimation of likelihood of initiating events based on plant knowledge and

experience, historical incident reviews and generic frequency data

Estimation of the reliability of the existing controls in preventing and/or mitigating the

hazardous event

Using the above data, estimation of the final likelihood of each of the various

consequences identified earlier (in some cases this requires fault tree or similar

analysis)

Comparison of the likelihood and severity (risk) of each of the consequences

against Orica‟s standard risk matrix

Determination as to whether additional controls are required to reduce risks further

or whether the existing risks are acceptable

Recommendation for additional controls if required and if so, a timeline for their

implementation.

The estimate of the final likelihood of the major consequence event (i.e. explosion with

offsite effects) is the value used in the PHA.

HIRAC Scenarios

A list of the HIRAC scenarios extracted from the SHE Risk Register is given on the

following pages. For security reasons complete details of the scenarios have not been

provided.


HIRAC SCENARIOS (as extracted from Orica’s Lotus Notes Explosives Risk Register 15/9/09)

P01 EXTERNAL FIRE / EXPLOSION Inclusion in PHA?

1. Potential for external fires (from various mechanisms) to result in burning embers entering the fuel compound with

ignition of combustible materials and vapours and progression to a significant fire with radiant heat.

Fuel fire source of

heat to ANE / ANS

inventories only.

No offsite effects from

fire radiant heat

2. Exposure to ANE from radiant heat from an external fire from other external processes to the ANE storage causes

thermal decomposition of the Ammonium Nitrate generating toxic fumes. A section of fixed pipe work with enclosed

emulsion heated under confinement could cause an explosion possibly escalating to adjacent equipment.

Yes – see Table 4.5

3. Exposure to AN from radiant heat from an external fire from other external processes to the AN storage causes

thermal decomposition of the Ammonium Nitrate generating toxic fumes.


P01.1 EXTERNAL FIRE

4. Potential for external fires from human failing leading to introduction of ignition sources to the fuel compound with

ignition of combustible materials and vapours and progression to a significant fire with radiant heat.

Fuel fire source of

heat to ANE / ANS

inventories only.


fire radiant heat

5. Potential for external vehicle fire to result in burning embers entering the fuel compound with ignition of combustible

materials and vapours and progression to a significant fire with radiant heat.

6. Potential for external fires from chemical decomposition due to mixing of incompatible materials in waste bins etc.

leads to burning embers entering the fuel compound with ignition of combustible materials and vapours and

progression to a significant fire with radiant heat.

7. Potential for external fires from electrical source to result in ignition of combustible materials and vapours and

progression to significant fire with radiant heat.

8. Major leak of fuel oil into the fuel compound which ignites



9. External fire engulfs ANE storage due to human failure. Leading to exposure of ANE to radiant heat causing thermal

decomposition of the Ammonium Nitrate and generation of toxic fumes with potential propagation to detonation

(under confinement).

Fuel fire source of

heat to ANE / ANS

inventories only.


fire radiant heat

10. External vehicle fire leads to exposure of ANE to radiant heat causing thermal decomposition of the Ammonium

Nitrate leading to generation of toxic fumes and potential propagation to detonation (under confinement).

11. External fire caused by chemical decomposition of incompatible materials leads to exposure of ANE to radiant heat

causing thermal decomposition of the Ammonium Nitrate leading to generation of toxic fume and potential

propagation to detonation. Section of fixed pipe work with enclosed emulsion heated under confinement could cause

explosion possibly escalating to adjacent equipment.

12. External fire engulfs ANE storage or transfer equipment due to electrical fault. Leading to exposure of ANE to radiant

heat causing thermal decomposition of the Ammonium Nitrate and generation of toxic fumes with potential

propagation to detonation (under confinement) possibly resulting in significant damage to plant , with potential for

people in the localised area to be seriously injured.

13. Collapse or catastrophic failure of ANE Surge Bin resulting in loss of containment of emulsion phase ammonium

nitrate which ignites causing injury \ fatality to personnel and a pool fire.

No. Local impact only

14. External fire engulfs AN storage due to human failure. Leading to exposure of AN to radiant heat causing thermal

decomposition of the Ammonium Nitrate and generation of toxic fumes with potential propagation to detonation

(under confinement).


15. External vehicle fire leads to exposure of AN to radiant heat causing thermal decomposition of the Ammonium Nitrate

leading to generation of toxic fume and potential propagation to detonation (under confinement).

16. External fire caused by chemical decomposition of incompatible materials leads to exposure of AN to radiant heat

causing thermal decomposition of the Ammonium Nitrate leading to generation of toxic fume and potential

propagation to detonation.

17. External fire engulfs AN storage due to electrical fault. Leading to exposure of AN to radiant heat causing thermal

decomposition of the Ammonium Nitrate and generation of toxic fume with potential propagation to detonation (under

confinement).



18. Exposure to AN from radiant heat from an external fire due to natural causes to the AN storage causes thermal

decomposition of the Ammonium Nitrate generating toxic fume.


19. External fire engulfs Sodium Nitrite being handled within gasser manufacture building leading to thermal

decomposition of Sodium Nitrite with release of noxious gases.

No – smaller case

than ANS decomp –

see Section 0

20. Vehicle fire or accident causes external heating of gasser storage resulting in ignition of combustible material with

consequential fire and combustion products from thermal decomposition of gasser solution.

No – smaller case

than ANS decomp –

see Section 0

21. External fire engulfs Sodium Nitrite being unloaded or stored causing heating leading to thermal decomposition of

Sodium Nitrite with release of noxious gases.

No – smaller case

than ANS decomp –

see Section 0

22. Chemical contamination of spilled gasser residue causes thermal decomposition and external fire in proximity of

gasser storage. Exposure to heat from a fire leading to generation of noxious fumes and potential violent rupture of

container.

No –local impact only

23. Radiant heat from an external fire heats the acetic acid tank and the contents reach the flashpoint (67 C for 75 %

solution)

No

P02 INTERNAL FIRE / EXPLOSION

24. Fire inside workshop caused by poor control of hot work or electrical fault. Combustible or flammable materials

present.

No – OHS

25. Fuel fed into Hot Water Generator combustion chamber creating fuel rich atmosphere which later ignites violently. No –local impact only

26. Fire in fuel unloading or transfer pumps with progression to significant fire with radiant heat. No – local heat

radiation only

27. Chemical unloading errors leading to the mixing of caustic and acetic acid. Heat of reaction, no

hazardous products

28. Thiourea dust explosion No –local impact only



29. Internal fire/ heating caused by chemical decomposition of incompatible materials leads to exposure of AN to radiant

heat causing thermal decomposition of the Ammonium Nitrate leading to generation of toxic fume and potential

propagation to detonation.


30. No flow in hot water recirculation pump. No – operational

upset, ANS blockages

31. Loss of feed water to HWG. Tubes overheated and melt causing fire. No –local impact only

P04 EXPLOSIVE DECOMPOSITION / DETONATION Inclusion in PHA?

32. Incompatible chemicals contaminate the emulsion which starts to decompose in the surge bin with the potential to

raise the temperature and detonate.

No – smaller inventory

33. Incompatible chemical (or contaminated water – domestic or process) added to concentrated ANS (ANS Storage or

OXS) or overheating of solution resulting in explosive decomposition / detonation


34. Dead heading or dry running ammonium nitrate solution pumps leading to overheating of ammonium nitrate and

internal explosion in the pump and\or pipe work.


35. Dead heading or dry running emulsion phase coarse and\or fine hopper mono pumps leading to overheating of

ammonium nitrate emulsion phase and internal explosion in the pump and\or pipe work


36. Thermal heating by dry running or dead heading the ANE Unloading pump (NAPCO gear pump). Heating of

emulsion under confinement can lead to thermal decomposition.


37. Dry running of plant sump pumps resulting in potential fire or explosion. No

38. Local or spot heating caused by friction or impact in Progressive Cavity transfer pump leading to decomposition of the

enclosed material .Heating of emulsion under confinement can lead to thermal decomposition. Pump casing may fail

due to pressure build-up.


39. Compositional change could lead to sensitisation or heating of pump contents. This could be caused by air

entrainment leading to sensitisation by density reduction, compression ignition or dry running of pump caused by

trying to pump crystalline product/ more viscous product.


40. Tanker unloading ANS explodes due to cook-off from external fire Yes – see Table 4.5


P04 EXPLOSIVE DECOMPOSITION / DETONATION Inclusion in PHA?

41. AN contamination inside heating coils decomposes when heated in Hot Water Generator causing damage to

equipment.

No – asset damage

P05 TOXIC / HARMFUL EXPOSURE

Accidental Operator exposure (splash) to harmful process chemicals (e.g. ANS, Caustic, Acetic Acid, Gasser, Fuel

Dye Concentrate, hydrocarbons)

No - OHS

Accidental ingestion of Gasser solution (poison) No - OHS

Accidental Operator exposure (inhalation) of Thiourea and Sodium Nitrite dusts (poisons) No - OHS

42. Decomposition of ANS leading to emissions of NOx (low pH) or Ammonia (high pH) from ANS and OXS Batch Tanks. Yes – see Table 4.5

43. Addition of Thiourea to Oxidiser Solution (at low pH) can form Hydrogen Sulphide (H2S). The H2S can then react to

form NOx provided nitric acid is present. H2S has a low STEL limit.

No – small quantities – local impact only

P06 PHYSICAL OVER OR UNDER PRESSURE

44. Failure of air receiver or connecting components due to overpressure causes injury. No - OHS

45. Contamination of Gasser with Comsol (or vice versa) by incorrect loading of truck tanks could lead to a reaction and

over pressure of truck tank.

No – asset damage

P07.1 VIOLENT RELEASE OF ENERGY

Catastrophic failure of a storage tank while operator in bund. No - OHS

Failure of air hose connection on air driven diaphragm pump used for emptying bunds causes "whipping" of air lines. No - OHS


P07.2 EXPOSURE TO DAMAGING ENERGY

46. Failure of transfer hose/line under pressure leads to operator being sprayed with process liquids (eg. Caustic, acetic

acid, diesel, emulsion, AN solution) causing injury

No - OHS

47. Vehicle impact to process storage and handling equipment (in particular Emulsion Surge Tanks) No – asset damage

48. Vehicle impact to pedestrian No - OHS

49. Operator injured by fall from height during operation of fuel storage, emulsion tanker loading No - OHS

50. Contact with moving parts can cause operator injury. No - OHS

51. Contact with hot surfaces can cause operator injury No - OHS

52. Operator injured by residual pressure in compressor air receiver and lines No - OHS

53. Operator injured by bag/ IBC falling from height. No - OHS

1. Operator electrocuted by electrical fault. No - OHS

P08 ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION

54. Loss of containment of process chemicals either during tanker unloading or during transfer to the process. Storage

tanks are bunded therefore any loss of containment is restricted to unloading hose and transfer lines.

No – local impact. Minor environmental

55. Loss of containment of emulsion from Surge Tank or associated process lines, valves and other fittings. Loss of

containment from tanker, or associated lines, valves and fittings during loading.

No – local impact. Minor environmental

56. Loss of containment of solid raw materials during unloading, storage and addition to the process No – local impact. Minor environmental

57. Gaseous emissions from Hot Water Generator Stack No – local impact. Minor environmental

58. Gaseous emissions from Thiourea and Sodium Nitrite dust extraction systems No – local impact. Minor environmental


P09 WASTE PRODUCTS AND MATERIALS

59. Badly contaminated storm water or bund water captured and recycled into the process. No – operations

60. Disposal of contaminated packaging materials. No – local impact. Minor environmental

61. Fire and fume from mixing of incompatible waste raw material packaging. No – local impact. Minor environmental

62. Disposal of contaminated/offspec emulsion product (if process upset occurs). No – local impact. Minor environmental

63. Disposal of contaminated/offspec oxidiser solution. No – local impact. Minor environmental


APPENDIX 3. EXPLOSION OVERPRESSURES CONSEQUENCE MODELLING METHODOLOGY

Ref: Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board Alexandria, VA2 February 2007

TP no 14 Rev 3 APPROVED METHODS AND ALGORITHMS FOR DOD RISK-BASED EXPLOSIVES SITING

Objective: Use Kingery-Bulmash TNT correlation to estimate effect distances to set overpressure levels for AN explosions

Method: This worksheet solves the K-B equations for a range of overpressure levels to determine the equivalent effective hazard factor (Zo)

The estimated Z is then used to calculate impact distance from the NEQ on worksheets "Explosions".

P psi

d feet

Y pounds

Z ft/lbs1/3

Zo = d/NEQ 0.333

Xo = ln (Zo )

Ref: pg 22, and pg A-3, Table A-3

P = e (A + B.Xo + C.Xo2 + D.Xo

3 + E.Xo4)

Z (ft/lbs1/3) A B C D E

0.5 - 7.25 6.9137 -1.4398 -0.2815 -0.1416 0.0685

7.25 - 60 8.8035 -3.7001 0.2709 0.0733 -0.0127

60 - 500 5.4233 -1.4066 0 0 0

P (kpa) 70 35 21 14 7 2

P (psi) 10.15 5.075 3.045 2.03 1.015 0.29

ln(P) psi 2.317473705 1.6243265 1.1135009 0.7080358 0.0148886 -1.2378744

Use Excel Solver to solve for Xo (ft):

Upper X

1.9810 2.2937 2.8903 2.8903 2.8903 2.8903 2.8903 Don't use - errors in results, outside upper X limit

4.0943 2.2715 2.6585 2.9852 3.2728 3.8112 4.7304

6.2146 2.2080 2.7008 3.0640 3.3522 3.8450 4.7357

Excel solver ln(P) recalc 2.3175 1.7621 1.7621 1.7621 1.7621 1.7621

2.3175 1.6243 1.1135 0.7080 0.0149 -1.2379

2.3175 1.6243 1.1135 0.7080 0.0149 -1.2379

solver check 0.0000 0.1377 0.6486 1.0540 1.7472 3.0000 Don't use - errors in results, outside upper X limit

(aim: diff in ln(P) ~ 0) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

Z (ft/lbs1/3) Z range

0.5 - 7.25 9.911749761 17.998674 17.998674 17.998674 17.998674 17.998674 Don't use - errors in results, outside upper X limit

7.25 - 60 9.69395392 14.274424 19.790032 26.384216 45.2041 113.34265

60 - 500 9.097840801 14.891939 21.412668 28.5667 46.759795 113.93812

Z (m/kg1/3

) Z range

2.882924057 3.941354735 7.1570772 7.1570772 7.1570772 7.1570772 7.1570772 Don't use - errors in results, outside upper X limit

23.85868185 3.854749374 5.6761492 7.8694012 10.491544 17.97517 45.070104 Use this one to calculate d (m) - covers Z range

198.8223487 3.617708153 5.9217006 8.514634 11.359397 18.593784 45.306889

Conversion: 0.397644697

ft/lb^.333 to m/kg^.333


APPENDIX 4. QRA SCENARIOS

Rev Date Description By Checked

A 10/10/2008 Initial Issue for comment J Polich -

B 4/12/2008 Revised draft J Polich P Johnson

C 22/12/2008 Updated quantities, ANE storage, ANE plant escalation

event

J Polich -

D 26/06/2009 Updated ANS concentrations J Polich P Johnson

E 5/08/2009 Updated ANS concentrations back to 0.885 J Polich P Johnson


(m)


(m)

Distance to

nearest

boundary

(m)

Potential

Offsite fatality

effect (i.e.

>21kPa at

boundary)

Potential Offsite

fatality effect

(i.e. >14kPa at

boundary)

Potential

Offsite injury

effect (i.e.

>7kPa at

boundary)

Discuss in

QRA?

Escalation


quantity

(te)

proportion

AN

Theoretical

Mass Avail

for Explosion

(te)


(kg)

70 35 21 14 7 2 Explosives

(unmounded)

D = 4.8 NEQ1/3

Explosives

(mounded)

D = 2. 4NEQ1/3

Process

building

D = 8 NEQ1/3

AN

(unmounded)

D = 1.8 NEQ1/3

Class A PW

Note 1

Class B PW

(unmounded)

Note 2

Class B PW

(mounded)

Note 2

Vulnerable

facilities

D = 44 NEQ1/3

Distance to

Nearest Existing

Explosives

Inventory (Test

Cell)

Potential onsite

escalation effect

(AS2187)

ANS Storage ANS-01

ANS-02

ANS-03


external fire

ANS 330 0.885 292.05 0.353 0.3 30928 121 178 247 329 564 1415 151 75 251 57 465 697 697 1381 260 N Y Y Y 215 N

ANS Storage ANS-04 Explosion in ANS tanker ANS 26 0.885 23.01 0.353 0.6 4874 65 96 133 178 305 764 81 41 136 31 251 376 376 746 260 N N Y Y 215 N


OXS-02

OXS-03


external fire

ANS 80 0.83 66.4 0.353 0.3 7032 74 109 151 201 344 863 92 46 153 34 284 425 425 843 260 N N Y Y 215 N

ELK Area ELK-01

ELK-02

Explosion in ELK ANE 2 1 2 0.68 1 1360 43 63 87 116 199 499 53 27 89 20 123 180 184 487 260 N N N N 215 N

ANE Storage ANE-01

ANE-02


or external fire

ANE 30 1 30 0.68 1 20400 105 155 215 287 491 1231 131 66 219 49 404 607 607 1202 260 N Y Y Y 215 N

ANE Storage ANE-01

ANE-02



ANE 120 1 120 0.68 1 81600 167 246 341 455 780 1955 208 104 347 78 642 963 963 1908 260 Y Y Y Y 215 N

AN Storage AN-01 Explosion in Dry Oxidiser store due to contamination AN 20 1 20 0.32 0.5 3200 57 84 116 155 265 664 71 35 118 27 204 311 311 648 280 N N N N 185 N

AN Storage AN-02 Explosion in Dry Oxidiser store due to fire AN 20 1 20 0.32 0.16 1024 39 57 79 106 181 454 48 24 81 18 102 180 152 443 280 N N N N 185 N


energy shock wave

AN 20 1 20 0.32 1 6400 72 105 146 195 334 837 89 45 149 33 275 412 412 817 280 N N Y Y 185 N

AN Storage

(offspec)


spec)

0 1 0 0.32 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 280 N N N N n/a N

ANE Plant all

inventory




ANS+ANE+A

N

470 as per

individual

scenarios

as per

individual

scenarios

as per

individual

scenarios

as per

individual

scenarios

118928 190 279 387 516 884 2216 236 118 393 89 728 1092 1092 2164 280 Y Y Y Y 215 Y

ANE Plant all

inventory




ANE + AN 140 as per

individual

scenarios

as per

individual

scenarios

as per

individual

scenarios

as per

individual

scenarios

88000 171 252 350 467 800 2005 214 107 356 80 658 987 987 1957 280 Y Y Y Y 215 N

Notes:

1. PWA

D = NEQ2/3 NEQ <= 2500kg

D = 3.6NEQ1/2 2500 kg < NEQ <= 4500kg

D = 14.8NEQ1/3 NEQ > 4500kg

2. PWB

D = 1.5 NEQ2/3 NEQ <= 2500kg

D = 5.5NEQ1/2 2500 kg < NEQ <= 4500kg

D = 22.2NEQ1/3 NEQ > 4500kg

Minimum of 180m for unmounded magazines

3. "n/a" means the event is not credible or is the result of an escalation and does not further escalate as all inventories already involved (i.e. NEQ is aggregate inventory)

20210 QRA scenarios KURRI Rev E

Explosions proposed ANE plant

Print Date: 20/08/2009

Page 1 of 1

Rev Date Description By Checked

A 10/10/2008 Initial Issue for comment J Polich -

B 4/12/2008 Revised draft J Polich


(m)


(m)

Distance to

nearest

boundary

(m)

Potential

Offsite

fatality

effect (i.e.

>14kPa at

boundary)

Potential

Offsite

injury effect

(i.e. >7kPa

at

boundary)

Discuss in

QRA?

Base Case Comments re frequency Escalation


(te)

% AN Theoretical

Mass Avail

for Explosion

(te)

Equivalence

(ref Orica AN

CoP v8)

Efficiency

(ref Orica AN

CoP v8)

NEQ

(kg)

70 35 21 14 7 2 Explosives

(unmounded)

D = 4.8 NEQ1/3

Explosives

(mounded)

D = 2.

4NEQ1/3

Process

building

D = 8 NEQ1/3

AN

(unmounded)

D = 1.8 NEQ1/3

Class A PW

Note 1

Class B PW

(unmounded)

Note 2

Class B PW

(mounded)

Note 2

Vulnerable

facilities

D = 44

NEQ1/3

Frequency

(per yr)

X Y Distance to

Proposed

ANE Plant /

AN Store

Potential onsite

escalation effect (i.e.

less than AS2187

process building sep

distance to ANE Plant

/ AN Store inventory)

Research Magazine

(RM) and Quarry

Service Depot (QS)


Magazine or Quarry




plant location

Explosive n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 50220 142 209 290 387 663 1663 177 89 295 66 546 819 819 1623 635 N Y Y 1.00E-06 Upper boundary of "extremely

unlikely"

325 N

Research

Laboratory (RL)


which propagates to

involve entire inventory in

this plant location

Explosive n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 11620 87 129 178 238 407 1021 109 54 181 41 335 503 503 997 715 N N N 1.00E-06 Upper boundary of "extremely

unlikely"

525 N

Mixing Laboratory

(ML)


Laboratory which



plant location


unlikely"

820 N




location


unlikely"

185 N

20210 QRA scenarios KURRI Rev D

Explosions Existing Kurri

Print Date: 2/07/2009

Page 1 of 1


APPENDIX 5. SUMMARY OF ASSUMPTIONS

The key assumptions made at each stage of the risk assessment are summarised in the

table below.

Stage Assumption Comments

Hazard ID Hazards from ANE Plant are associated with ANS, ANE or AN. Other chemicals not significant.

Hazards from existing facilities are associated with Class 1 explosives, ANE and AN. Other chemicals are not significant. Pool fires from combustible storage present localised heat radiation risks only.

All other chemicals either oxidizers or corrosives (stored as per relevant codes with bunding etc). Localised risks only.

Consequence Assessment

100% maximum inventory (NEQ) for each storage (proposed ANE plant and existing facilities) is assumed to be involved in any explosion event. Orica Draft AN Code of Practice (version 8) assumptions for TNT equivalence estimates for AN, ANS. ANE assumptions based on Orica's ideal detonation (IDEx) code. Kingery and Bulmash scaled distance correlation for overpressure impact distance estimates. (Ref: US DoD Technical Paper no 14 Rev 3 Feb 2007). HIPAP 4 endpoints for overpressure vs probability of fatality calculation for base case as follows for receptors located indoors and outdoors Probability of fatality: indoors outdoors 70kPa 100% 100% 35kPa. 50% 15% 21kPa 20% 1% 14kPa 1% 0.1%

Refer to main report for inventory basis for proposed ANE plant and existing facilities. Refer to main report for consequence results. Inside risk results are more conservative than outside.

Frequency Assessment

Upper end of Orica qualitative risk matrix frequency band for all ANS / ANE explosion events. (Generally each decomposition event involving a particular ANS / ANE inventory was rated as “very unlikely” and the frequency has been set at 1 x10

-5 per year).

Explosions are set a factor of ten lower (i.e. 1 x 10

-6 per year) This approach does

not account for factors such as delivery frequency, numbers of tanks etc.

NOTE: Publicly available frequency data is very poor. Fault tree approach is an alternative however would be order of magnitude at best


Stage Assumption Comments

Escalation Risk

Escalation risk between the proposed ANE plant and existing facilities has been assessed by comparing the layout with the separation distances required in Table 3.2.3.2 in AS2187.1 - 1998. If the required separation distance is met, escalation is not credible for the purposes of the risk assessment. Worst case escalated event within the ANE plant is aggregated inventory NEQ (i.e. ANE and AN, also ANS only if ANS is initiating inventory).

Knock on events affecting the AN store or ANE storage (i.e. part of ANE plant) or existing Class1 explosives, ANE or AN inventories are assumed to contribute to escalation risk (as AN, ANE and Class1 explosives may detonate if subjected to a high energy shock wave). ANS is not susceptible to impact / shock detonation therefore an external explosion may result in a loss of containment of AN solution due to storage vessel damage, but not a subsequent explosion event.

Risk Calculation

- NOTE: Risk contours not prepared for site due to very low number of scenarios with potential offsite effects.


APPENDIX 6. REFERENCES

1 NSW Department of Planning (Reprinted 1997) Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory

Paper (HIPAP) No. 6 Guidelines for Hazard Analysis

2 NSW Department of Planning (Reprinted 1997) Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory

Paper (HIPAP) No. 4 Risk Criteria for Land Use Planning

3 NSW Department of Planning (1997) Multi-Level Risk Assessment

4 Orica Draft Ammonium Nitrate Code of Practice (v8) available in the SHE Risk Register

5 Sherpa Consulting 20210-001 Rev A June 2007 Liddell Site ANE Upgrade Project

Quantitative Risk Assessment

6 ICI Engineering (16 April 1992) Updated Hazard Analysis ICI Mining Services

Technology Park

7 Australian Explosives Manufacturers Safety Committee (AEMSC), Code of Good

Practice Precursors For Explosives Edition 1 – 1999

8 Orica Liddell ANE Plant Uprate Process Description Doc Ref: KIEG1150-02-26001_A

9 Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGLs) for Nitrogen Dioxide, October 2006.

10 Bushfire Consulting Specialists 090201 Orica Kurri

11 http://www.aiha.org/Committees/documents/erpglevels.pdf ,

http://www.eh.doe.gov/chem_safety/teel.html

12 TNO Purple Book, Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment, CPR 18E, ,

Committee for the Prevention of Disasters, 1st edition 1999

13 Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board Alexandria, VA TP no 14 Rev 3

Approved Methods And Algorithms For DOD Risk-Based Explosives Siting (IMESAFR)

14 Adams, W.D. UK HSE, Hazardous Installation Directorate The Toxic Effects from a Fire

Involving Ammonium Nitrate.

15 Geoscience Australia What Cause Bushfires?

http://www.ga.gov.au/hazards/bushfire/causes.jsp

16 http://www.bushfirecrc.com/research/downloads/Fire%20Bugged%20-%20MW.pdf

Transport Hazard Analysis

Sherpa Consulting Pty Ltd (ABN 40 110 961 898)

Phone: 61 2 9412 4555

Fax: 61 2 9412 4556

Web: www.sherpaconsulting.com

J20210-005 Rev 0 Transport Word 2003

8 October 2009 Page 1

TECHNICAL NOTE

ANE and ANS Transport Hazard Analysis

Input to Environmental Assessment

Prepared for: Richard Sheehan, Orica

Prepared by: Jenny Polich, Sherpa Consulting

Rev Date Description Prepared By Checked By

A 8 Jan 2009 Draft for client comment Jenny Polich -

B 2 Oct 2009 Updated draft for client comment Jenny Polich Phil Johnson

0 8 Oct 2009 Final Issue for inclusion in EA Jenny Polich Phil Johnson

RELIANCE NOTICE

This report is issued pursuant to an Agreement between SHERPA CONSULTING PTY LTD (‘Sherpa Consulting’) and Orica which agreement sets forth the entire rights, obligations and liabilities of those parties with respect to the content and use of the report.

Reliance by any other party on the contents of the report shall be at its own risk. Sherpa Consulting makes no warranty or representation, expressed or implied, to any other party with respect to the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of the information contained in this report and assumes no liabilities with respect to any other party’s use of or damages resulting from such use of any information, conclusions or recommendations disclosed in this report.



1 BACKGROUND

1.1 Project Description

Orica Australia (Orica) proposes to build a new Ammonium Nitrate Emulsion

(ANE) Production Facility at their Kurri Kurri Technical Centre located off George

Booth Drive, Richmond Vale NSW. The new plant will meet the projected

Ammonium Nitrate Emulsion demand in the South East Region to 2020 and

beyond. The plant is expected to manufacture up to 250,000 tonnes per annum of

ANE at maximum production, using Ammonium Nitrate Solution (ANS) from

Orica’s Kooragang Island manufacturing facility as the main feed.

Umwelt Australia Pty Ltd is preparing an Environmental Assessment for the

Project, on behalf of Orica which will be submitted to the approval authority, the

NSW Department of Planning (DoP), under Part 3A of the Environmental Planning

& Assessment Act. Sherpa Consulting Pty Ltd (Sherpa) has been retained to

assist in completing the risk assessment activities associated with the transport of

the product and the raw materials for the project.

1.2 Scope and Objectives

Orica has determined that the Environmental Assessment (EA) should include

some consideration of transport risks associated with project, specifically ANE and

ANS transport to and from the site. Both ANE and ANS are classed as Dangerous

Goods (DG) Class 5.1 oxidiser materials. Transport of these goods is regulated

under the Australian Dangerous Goods Code (ADGC). As ANE contains over 45%

Ammonium Nitrate (AN), it is also classified as Security Sensitive AN (SSAN) and

is also regulated under the NSW Explosives Regulations 2005.

A brief technical note has been prepared summarising the potential transport

incident scenarios involving ANE or ANS, and identifying the safeguards in place.

This technical note will be included as an appendix in the Project EA.

1.3 Limitations

Various other chemicals including DG Class 8 corrosives (such as acetic acid and

caustic soda) and combustible liquids (e.g. diesel, canola) will be used in the

facility, but are not covered by this technical note. It should be noted that large

quantities of these types of materials are routinely transported in most areas of

Australia including the Newcastle region.

Review of any changes in heavy vehicle numbers and implications for the existing

roads is addressed in the Traffic Impact section of the Environmental Assessment.

However it is noted that the traffic impact assessment concludes that the overall

increase in heavy vehicle numbers can be easily accommodated within the

existing road network.



2 TRANSPORT OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

ANS and ANE transport quantities anticipated for the Project are summarised in

Table 2-1. Note that these reflect the final capacity of the facility at maximum

capacity. Initially, ANE plant operations are expected to be at lower capacity,

hence require a smaller number of vehicles.

The roads on the routes to and from the Technology Centre site at Richmond Vale

are well maintained, and are currently used for transport of Dangerous Goods,

including Class 5.1 materials. ANE is currently transported from Orica’s Liddell

site to the Kurri Kurri site in small quantities (averaging one single tanker per week

for the existing Quarry Services business at Kurri Kurri). The route is confirmed B-

double capable by the NSW RTA.

TABLE 2-1: ANS AND ANE HEAVY VEHICLE TRANSPORT SUMMARY

Route Material Load size (tonnes)

No of vehicles per day

Comments

Orica Kooragang Island to Orica Technology Centre site

ANS (88% at 110

oC)

B-Double - 38

ISO/ Single - 23

16 Based on 250,000tpa max capacity and average load size for tankers/ISO’s.

Orica Technology Centre site to various existing Depot sites in Hunter region and South Eastern Australia.

ANE B-Double - 38

ISO/ Single - 23

22 Based on 250,000tpa max capacity and average load size for tankers/ISO’s.

2.1 Routes

ANS:

Currently hot ammonium nitrate solution (88% ANS at 110oC) is transported via

dedicated tankers from Kooragang Island (KI) via Maitland and Singleton to the

Orica Liddell manufacturing site in both single tankers and B-Doubles. The

majority of the route is along the New England Highway.

The latter part of the route will change as shown in Table 2-2 when ANS is

transported to the proposed ANE Production Facility at the Technology Centre.

The tankers will turn off the New England Highway at the John Renshaw Drive

junction, travelling along John Renshaw Dr until the intersection with George

Booth Dr, where they will turn onto George Booth Drive continuing to the site

approximately 5 km to the east at Richmond Vale. The vehicles will enter the



Orica Technical Centre using an existing entrance on George Booth Drive and

travel to the proposed ANE Production Facility using a new internal access road.

TABLE 2-2: ANS ROUTE

ANS Current Route (KI to Liddell) ANS Modified B-Double route (KI to Kurri Kurri Site)

Cormorant Rd Cormorant Rd

Tourle St Tourle St

Industrial Dr Industrial Dr

Maitland Rd Maitland Rd

Pacific Highway Pacific Highway

New England Highway (via Maitland and Singleton)

New England Highway

Pikes Gully Rd John Renshaw Dr

Liddell site. George Booth Dr

Technical Centre site

ANE:

ANE will be manufactured at the Kurri Kurri site and transported via tanker to

various existing Orica Depot Sites in the Hunter Valley and South East Australia

region. From the depot sites Mobile Manufacturing Units (MMUs) operate to

transport the ANE to the mine site where it is sensitised prior to use. The Project

will have no effect on the MMU transport activities from the depot sites.

The ANE route from Technology Centre site to the Depot sites is summarised in

Table 2-3. The likely variation to the route following the planned construction of

the F3 Freeway extension is also detailed.

The ANE tankers are dedicated and do not carry any other materials. Various

tanker configurations which are able to carry either 20, 22 or 38 tonne of ANE are

used. Small quantities (250L each) of gasser solution (dilute sodium nitrite / water

solution) and companion solution (low concentration ANS) may also be carried on

the ANE tankers in separate tanks on the vehicles.



TABLE 2-3: ANE ROUTE

ANE Route (Kurri to Depot sites) ANE Route (Kurri to Depot sites after F3 Freeway extension)

George Booth Dr George Booth Dr

John Renshaw Dr John Renshaw Dr Hunter Expressway on-ramp

Mulbring St, Kurri Kurri Hunter Expressway (F3 Freeway extension)

Tarro St, Kurri Kurri New England Hwy at Branxton

Lang St, Kurri Kurri New England Hwy (Singleton)

Main Rd Depot Sites (South East Region)

Cessnock Rd Or

New England Hwy at Maitland F3 Freeway Northbound or Southbound

New England Hwy (Singleton) Depot Sites (South East Region)

Depot Sites (Hunter area)

Or

As above to John Renshaw Dr

F3 Freeway Northbound or Southbound

2.2 Legislation, Codes and Standards

Transport of Dangerous Goods such as ANE and ANS is regulated under the

ADG7 (Australian Dangerous Goods Code, version 7) managed by WorkCover

NSW and for substances classified as SSAN under the NSW Explosives

Regulations 2005. In summary for ANE and ANS, the regulations require that

A road vehicle transporting dangerous goods should wherever practicable

avoid heavily populated or environmentally sensitive areas, congested

crossings, tunnels, narrow streets, alleys, or sites where there is, or may be, a

concentration of people.

Routes should be pre-planned wherever possible.

Routes should be selected to minimise the risk of personal injury, of harm to

the environment or property during the journey.

A risk assessment in accordance with AS4360 Risk Management be prepared.

(This is undertaken on a route specific basis by the transport company).

Both drivers and vehicles are Dangerous Goods licensed.

Vehicles carrying Dangerous Goods adhere to design standards.

For SSAN materials, the appropriate security clearance for the drivers has

been obtained.



2.3 Internal Orica standards, policies, procedures

Orica have corporate standards applicable to transport generally and ANE

specifically. The Orica Model Procedures (specifically MP-SF-014: Selection and

Management of Transport & Storage Contractors and MP-SF-016: Transport of

Dangerous and Non-Dangerous Goods) require the following general measures

relevant to DG transport be adopted:

Driver training and accreditation

Carrier accreditation

Disciplinary procedures

Carrier maintenance programs

Orica site and customer site procedures

Reporting and investigation of incidents

Internal engineering guidelines specifically applicable to ANE and ANS transport

and design of road tankers include Bulk Distribution Tankers For Emulsion Phase

And Oxidiser Liquors, Orica (23/9/98)

This outlines Orica’s commitments under the legislation listed below to ensure

safe and effective operation of ANE and ANS delivery units, ensuring that they are

constructed to applicable regulatory and engineering design requirements.

Australian Code for the Transport of Dangerous Goods by Road and Rail

(Australian Dangerous Goods Code). Specifically:

- Section 3.4 Marking of Road Vehicles

- Section 3.7 Requirements for Emergency Information Panels

- Section 6.3 Application for approval and notification requirements

- Section 6.5 Road Standards

- Section 6.8 Approval

- Section 6.9 Alternative Design Criteria

- Section 6.10 Maintenance

Australian Design Rules for Motor Vehicles and Trailers (ADR’s).

AS1210 Pressure Vessels.

AS1554.1 Structural Steel Welding - Welding of Steel Structures.

AS1841.5 Portable Fire Extinguishers - Specific Requirements for Dry

Powder Type Extinguishers

AS2809.1 Road Tank Vehicles for Dangerous Goods - General

Requirements.



AS2809.2 Road Tank Vehicles for Dangerous Goods

AS2809.4 Road Tank Vehicles for Dangerous Goods - Tankers for Toxic

and Corrosive Cargoes.

AS4326 The Storage and Handling of Oxidising Agents

As per the guideline ANS and ANE tankers are designed with emergency venting

capacity based on experimentally measured vapour generation in a

decomposition event.



3 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

Both ANS and ANE are classified as Dangerous Goods and an assessment of the

potential hazards associated with the transport of these products has been

undertaken to ensure that appropriate safeguards are in place.

3.1 ANS Properties

Hot ammonium nitrate solution (88% ANS at 110oC) will be transported from

Orica’s Kooragang Island site to the Technology Centre site via tanker as

discussed in Section 2.1.

ANS is a class 5.1 PGII oxidiser, UN number 2426. The main hazard associated

with handling AN solutions is decomposition due to excessive heating and/or

contamination, and eventually explosion if the decomposition gases are

sufficiently confined (e.g. in an inadequately vented storage tank). Contaminants

such as acids, chlorides, organics, alkali metals, and nitrites increase the risk of

decomposition.

Most of the gaseous decomposition products from a decomposition event are

toxic. These gases can include ammonia (NH3), nitrous oxide (N2O), nitric oxide

(NO), nitrogen dioxide (NO2), and nitric acid vapour (HNO3). NO2 is the most toxic

of these.

Assuming ANS is uncontaminated, it is highly insensitive to friction and impact

and essentially insensitive to sparks (i.e. low explosion risk). ANS does not burn,

but as an oxidising agent, will support fire, even in the absence of an external

source of oxygen.

ANS also poses an environmental hazard if it reaches a waterway due to its high

nitrogen content. High concentrations of nitrogen can be toxic to aquatic life and

grazing animals if ingested.

3.2 ANE Properties

ANE is a mixture of around 70% ammonium nitrate (AN), 15% water and the

balance hydrocarbon based materials. All bulk emulsions manufactured at the

proposed ANE plant will fall within the UN definition of Ammonium Nitrate

Emulsion (ANE) Intermediate for Blasting Explosives, Class 5.1 PGII, UN number

3375.

Bulk emulsions produced at the Technology Centre site will not contain any self

explosive ingredients. However once ANE has been produced, the main hazard is

decomposition due to excessive heating and/or contamination which can cause

accelerating decomposition to the point where explosion or detonation can occur.



Sensitivity to accidental decomposition/detonation is increased by the presence of

energetic sensitising materials such as fuel oil or chemical contaminants.

ANE’s are insensitive to friction and impact and also insensitive to sparks.

While ANE’s are liquids, they are extremely viscous, and solidify quickly when

cooled, hence do not pose a significant environmental hazard in the event of a

spill.

3.3 Hazardous Incidents

The event of most concern during transport of ANE or ANS is explosion. Potential

causes of an explosion for either ANS or ANE are:

Decomposition of contaminated load and confinement of gases, resulting in

explosion en-route.

Vehicle fire engulfs load resulting in decomposition, confinement of gases

and explosion. A fire could be initiated by various causes including

electrical or mechanical faults, a tyre fire or a vehicle accident or collision.

Note that impact alone is not a credible cause of ANE or ANS explosion in a

vehicle accident as:

ANS and ANE is insensitive to impact (i.e. does not explode on impact /

shock).

Impact in a vehicle accident is not of sufficiently high energy to cause

explosion of ANE. A high energy explosive charge (such as a detonator) is

required to initiate an explosion.

A review of transport incidents within Orica and within the industry indicates that

vehicle fires and accidents involving ANE and ANS transport vehicles do occur.

However escalation to involve the ANE or ANS load is extremely uncommon and

takes a period of time to escalate to conditions which could potentially result in an

explosion, providing time to isolate the accident area.

There is only one incident in Orica’s records (globally) where escalation to an ANE

load and explosion occurred involving an MMU unit carrying class 1 explosive

ANFO material. The ANS and ANE vehicles from the Kurri site will not be carrying

any class 1 dangerous goods (explosive) materials.



4 CONTROLS AND MITIGATION

Orica has implemented a number of measures to ensure that the risk associated

with the transport of ANS and ANE is minimised, with a summary of these controls

detailed in the sections below. These controls are audited at least annually in

accordance with Orica model procedures.

In addition, in the event of a transport related incident there are procedures in

place to prevent escalation of the event and minimise the risk to the community

and the environment.

These are described in the following sections and also summarised in the Hazard

Identification Word Diagram in APPENDIX A.

4.1 Product Contamination Controls

To prevent risks associated with the contamination of ANS and ANE with other

products the following controls have been implemented.

Quality control processes at Kooragang Island to ensure that the ANS is

suitable for transport from the site;

Quality control processes at the Technology Centre Kurri site to ensure

that the ANE product is suitable for transport;

Dedicated ANS and ANE Tankers for the transport of each product,

ensuring that non compatible materials are not introduced during

transport;

Filling nozzles and loading facilities for the ANS, ANE and other

chemicals are of different configurations and sizing to prevent incorrect

loading; and

Separate, dedicated tanks for the small loads of gasser and companion

solution transported with the ANE.

4.2 Truck Controls

To minimise the potential for escalation of an incident as a result of an accident or

vehicle fire the following controls are incorporated into transport arrangements for

ANE and ANS:

As required by state legislation, all vehicles carrying ANE and ANS are

licensed by the relevant body, which in NSW is the Department of

Environment, Climate Change and Water (DECCW). The licensing

process requires that the tank component of the vehicle be constructed in

accordance with an approved design and that the tank comply with the

requirements of the Australian Code for the Transport of Dangerous

Goods by Road and Rail (ADG Code).



Activities such as maintenance and pre-start checks are undertaken in

accordance with manufacturer requirements and the National Heavy

Vehicle Accreditation Scheme requirements.

4.3 Driver Training, Education, and Licensing

All drivers who carry Dangerous Goods are required to be licensed by state

regulatory agencies, in NSW the Department of Environment, Climate Change

and Water is the responsible agency. To obtain a licence, drivers must complete

an accredited training course, complete a medical and meet the driving history

requirements.

In addition, Orica requires that drivers complete specific training including

information on Orica’s Safety Management Systems, information on the products

being transported and the controls in place to ensure safe transport of the product.

4.4 Route Risk Analysis

Route risk analysis is undertaken by the transport contractor in accordance with

the following documents;

AS/NZS 4360:2004 Risk Management Standard

Australian Code for the Transport of Dangerous Goods by Road and Rail

Issues considered in the transport route risk analysis include the physical

conditions experienced along the route, the impact of changing conditions and

other factors such as speed and fatigue (Table 4-1).

TABLE 4-1: Route Risk Analysis

Physical Conditions Changing Conditions Other Issues

Restricted View – especially at intersections and ‘blind

corners’

Oncoming traffic – known passing areas

Speed – yours and other traffic on the road

Roundabouts – size, location, condition,

alternative route to avoid these

Other heavy vehicle movement

Fatigue Management

Pedestrian Crossings and islands

School and public bus route First time travel on the route

Intersections and concealed roadways

Congestion Emergency Response

Procedure in place

Bridges – esp. if small or one way

Road works – scheduled and unscheduled

Safety Management Plan in place

Roadway shoulders / known pull over areas

Detours – scheduled and unscheduled

Media reports – cultural events, sporting events, protest action, political

activity

Concealed crest, sharp curves, poor camber

Weather – rain, high wind areas

Maintain communication with base

Over / Underpass clearance Known flood areas




Rail crossings Livestock / farm areas

Floodways, culverts, water courses

Bush fires – usually seasonal

Overtaking lanes Transport Vehicle fire

Designated rest areas and Road house locations

Recreational areas and Industrial areas

Locations of Protected Works A & B type areas

The outcome of the transport risk analysis is incorporated into the driver training

for the route being travelled.

An example risk assessment prepared by the transporter (Toll) is contained in

APPENDIX B.

4.5 Emergency Plans

All drivers undergo emergency response training for incidents such as vehicle

accidents or vehicle fires. The training includes:

Mitigation measures in the event of a vehicle fire, such as battery isolation

and extinguishing of fires;

Measures to ensure the safety of the public, including, in the event of a

large fire the implementation of an exclusion zone around the vehicle.

Activation of the Orica Emergency Response Systems to assist in the

management of the incident. The general public are also able to activate

the Orica Emergency Response System, with the contact details for the

co-ordinating group detailed on the vehicle Dangerous Goods placarding.

Each vehicle carries an Emergency Procedure Guide which summarises the

actions to be undertaken in the event of a vehicle fire and also a guide for each

type of product being carried (i.e. ANS or ANE).



5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Given the existing regulatory requirements, Orica’s internal requirements, the

nature of the roads to be used, and the engineering controls in place in relation to

tanker design, no additional recommendations have been identified in relation to

managing the hazards of ANE or ANS during transport to or from the Technology

Centre site.


8 October 2009 ATTACHMENTS

APPENDIX A: HAZARD IDENTIFICATION WORD DIAGRAM

Event Cause/Comments Prevention Controls Possible Consequences Mitigation Controls

1. Contamination occurs during

manufacture of ANE or ANS

Manufacturing process quality control

2. Tanker is contaminated 1. Dedicated tankers

2. Tanker maintenance programme

1. Tyre fire, ignited by binding brakes,

faulty bearings, deflated tyres

1. Vehicle maintenance programme

2. Pre-use vehicle checks

3. Driver competence

2. Electrical / mechanical fault /

driver smoking etc resulting in cabin

or engine fire

1. Vehicle maintenance programme



3. Vehicle accident / collision 1. Vehicle maintenance programme



4. Route risk assessment as per ADG7

conducted by transporter

5. Well signed road, approved B double

route

6. Daylight transport operation as far as

practicable

Decomposition and explosion

en-route.

Potential fatality for driver and

other road users

With warning event.

1. Driver training

2. Emergency response procedures define

evacuation distance

Decomposition of

contaminated load

resulting in explosion en-

route

Vehicle fire engulfs load

resulting in

decomposition,

confinement of gases and

explosion

With warning event

1. Purpose built ANS and ANE tankers designed with

emergency venting capacity based on

experimentally measured vapour generation in a

decomp event (Ref: Orica document BULK

DISTRIBUTION TANKERS FOR EMULSION PHASE AND

OXIDISER LIQUORS 9/98)

2. No combustible / flammables in load area. Diesel

with prime mover only.

3. Driver training

4. Emergency response procedures define

evacuation distance

Fire engulfs load.

Decomposition and explosion.

Potential fatality for driver and

other road users


8 October 2009 ATTACHMENTS

APPENDIX B: EXAMPLE ROUTE RISK ASSESSMENT BY TRANSPORTER

1

Risk Assessment Report

What was assessed:

Transport of Ammonium Nitrate Solution (ANS) from Orica Manufacturing facility Kooragang Island to Orica Technology Centre Ammonium Nitrate Emulsion (ANE) Facility site via road. Product is carried in B-double and single semi trailers.

Area in which assessment was conducted:

Distribution Operations by Toll Resources

Date of assessment:

28/05/09 Date to be reviewed:

28/05/10

Assessment Team Position

Lead Assessor Michael Bonadio Compliance Manager – Supply Chain, OMS

Assessor Paul McGrath SSDS Security and Compliance Manager Toll Resources NSW

Assessor Paul Nicou Compliance Officer

Special notes

Areas Assessed:

1. Egress from OMS facility at Kooragang Island

2. Route via New England Highway, John Renshaw Drive and George Booth Drive to Orica Technology Centre, Richmond Vale.

3. Right hand turn into Echidna Drive, Orica’s Technology Centre entrance

4. Alert security for access

2

Job Safety Environment Risk Assessment

1 PURPOSE

Risk assessment aids in the control of safety associated with the transportation of product by road to customer sites located throughout Australia. The performance of a risk assessment is mandatory in order to protect:

Our customers

Our employees and contracted carriers

Our shareholders

The community

The environment The purpose of this procedure is to document the OMS processes for performing a risk assessment and implementing controls for the road transport of OMS product from manufacturing and storage facilities within Australia.

2 SCOPE

The risk assessment process forms part of our structured approach to managing risk. It includes the identification, analysis and evaluation of risks, and also incorporates the first stage of controls on how to mitigate the risks. Formal risk assessments will be performed for:

Transportation of product within Australian

3 REFERENCES

AS/NZS 4360:2004 Risk management standard

AS/NZS 2187.1 Explosives – Storage, Transport & Use

Australian Code for the Transport of Dangerous Goods by Road & Rail - 7th Edition

3

4 RESPONSIBILITY 41057

Logistics Manager Overall responsibility

Compliance Manager Setting Master assessments

Distribution Officer Performing assessments when delegated to do so

5 ACTION / METHOD

Making assessments A new Risk Assessment form will be created for each transport route.

Communication Risk assessment results will be communicated to the carrier/s involved with the physical transportation of product, the applicable Account Manager associated with the customer and the business management team.

Matrix values In order to assess severity, consequence or risk level, a clear understanding of the accepted meanings is needed. The following tables are provided for guidance:

Risk Assessment Matrix

MP-SG-030B - SH&E RISK MANAGEMENT - APPENDIX C: QUALITATIVE RISK TABLES

RISK APPLICATION:

Job Safety & Environment Risk Analysis (JSERA) applications refer to the following risk matrix and probability of occurrence descriptors.

Job Safety & Environment Risk Analysis: The following simplification of the Orica Risk Matrix is intended to facilitate the application of risk assessment in Job Safety & Environment Risk Analysis (JSERA) applications. It is consistent with MP-SG-033(2).

4

Table 1: SH&E Category Issues for Job Safety & Environment Risk Analysis

Consequence Categories

Notable Event Cat 1

Significant Event Cat 2

Highly Significant

Cat 3.1

Serious Event MHF

Cat 3.2

Extremely Serious MHF

Cat 4.1

Catastrophic Event MHF

Cat 4.2

SAFETY & HEALTH 1 Minor Injury,

First Aid

Single MTI

Single LWC or

Multiple MTI

Permanent Disability;

Multiple LWC

Single Fatality

Multiple Fatalities

ENVIRONMENT

Very minor

pollution

Minor local

pollution

Evident pollution

local concern

Significant local

pollution

Major local

pollution

Extremely severe

pollution

Table 2: Job Safety & Environment Risk Analysis Risk Matrix

Likelihood of Occurrence Notable

Event Cat 1

Significant Event Cat 2

Highly Significant

Cat 3.1

Serious Event MHF

Cat 3.2

Extremely Serious MHF

Cat 4.1

Catastrophic Event MHF Cat 4.2

[A] Almost Certain Level II

Level II

Level I

Level I

Level I

Level I

[B] Very Likely

Level III

Level II

Level II

Level I

Level I

Level I

[C] Possible (Likely)

Level III

Level III

Level II

Level II

Level I

Level I

[D] Unlikely

Level IV

Level IV

Level III

Level III

Level II

Level I

[E] Very Unlikely Level IV

Level IV

Level IV

Level IV

Level III

Level II

[F] Extremely Unlikely Level IV

Level IV

Level IV

Level IV

Level IV

Level III

5

Table 3: Event Likelihood of Occurrence Descriptors for Job Safety & Environment Risk Analysis

For Use in JSERA Example or detailed description

Descriptor Description

A. Almost Certain It is expected to occur in most circumstances

B. Very Likely Has occurred in some circumstances (known to have happened)

C. Possible (Likely) Might have occurred at some time but details not known

D. Unlikely Could occur here at some time but has not as yet happened

E. Very Unlikely Has occurred somewhere (heard of it happening)

F. Extremely Unlikely Could theoretically occur but not aware of any instances

NOTE: Range of descriptors used should reflect the needs of the activity under review.

Almost certain would mean at least once per year i.e. a common event.

Extremely Unlikely would be used where the event is virtually impossible.

Table 4: Risk Level Descriptors for Job Safety & Environment Risk Analysis

For Use in JSERA Interpretation and detailed description of Risk Level

Risk Level 1 Unacceptable risk. Job should not proceed without resolving this risk issue, for example by adding more risk controls or substituting existing controls with more effective ones.

Risk Level II Risk may tolerable where further risk reduction is not practicable. Take action to reduce risk where possible.

Risk Level III Acceptable level of risk where further risk reduction is not practicable. Review risk on subsequent jobs to determine whether further action is appropriate.

Risk Level IV Generally considered to be a trivial risk. Further risk reduction should always be considered but may not be practicable.

6

Table 5: Suggested issues to consider / address in the Risk Assessment


Restricted View – especially at intersections and ‘blind corners’

Oncoming traffic – known passing areas Speed – yours and other traffic on the road

Roundabouts – size, location, condition, alternative route to avoid these

Other heavy vehicle movement Fatigue Management

Cross Walks and Pedestrian islands School and public bus route First time travel on the route

Intersections and concealed roadways Congestion Emergency Response Procedure in place

Bridges – esp. if small or one way Road works – scheduled and unscheduled Safety Management Plan in place

Roadway shoulders / known pull over areas Detours – scheduled and unscheduled Media reports – cultural events, sporting events,

protest action, political activity

Concealed crest, sharp curves, poor camber Weather – rain, high wind areas Maintain communication with base

Over / Underpass clearance Known flood areas

Rail crossings Livestock / farm areas

Floodways, culverts, water courses Bush fires – usually seasonal

Overtaking lanes Transport Vehicle fire

Designated rest areas & Road house locations

Recreational areas & Industrial areas

Locations of Protected Works A & B type areas

7

Table 6: JSERA

Risk Action Plan

Task Steps Hazard & Effect Controls Additional Controls / Comments

1. Egress from Kooragang

Island Left turn out of KI onto Greenleaf Road Vehicle travels along Cormorant Drive, which become Tourle Street and across the Tourle St bridge. Right turn onto Industrial Drive then onto the Maitland Road (Pacific Highway) Follow onto the New England Highway at Hexham

Vehicle not to standard may result in vehicle accident and personal injury Poor vehicle selection / maintenance could result in LOC and / or personal injury Poor roadway conditions may contribute to an accident resulting in personal injury Interaction with other traffic causing property damage or personal injury

Conduct daily Spot Checks at KI weighbridge Vehicles and equipment purpose built for task and approved load restraints used Contracted carrier / sub-contractor management program in place Visibility is good coming out of weighbridge gate, delivers occur during day time hours Driver behaviour, training and experience continually assessed All drivers are DG safety awareness trained Driving to conditions on known heavy vehicle route Movement effected in daylight hours where at all possible Vehicles fitted with GPS tracking system and duress button Scheduled travel times to minimise road user interaction

Contractor Safety Management Plan in place Communication with drivers maintained at all times Drivers stay with their vehicles at all times Carrier audited at regular intervals Well signed road, well maintained road

8

Movement along the Route


2. Route via New England Highway, John Renshaw Drive and George Booth Drive to Echidna Dr at Orica Technology Centre site

Merge left at John Renshaw Dr interchange continuing onto John Renshaw Drive to F3 round about. Cross the round about continuing along John Renshaw Drive toward Kurri Kurri for approximately 9KM. Left turn onto George Booth Drive. (100 meters after the Buchanan Rd intersection on right hand side.) Intersection is moderately sharp and although a turning lane exists long vehicles will require the use of the left lane.

Heavy traffic congestion at F3 round about during various and unpredictable times. F3 round about at the bottom of a moderately steep hill requiring additional breaking effort. Poor road conditions could result in damage to property and personal injury Delays or diversions due to road works possibly through built up or congested areas increased risk of incident or accident in unfamiliar area Interaction with other traffic causing property damage or personal injury Light vehicle passing on left using turning lane. Risk of vehicle rollover if speed is not sufficiently reduced. Vehicle suffers mechanical failure resulting in vehicle being stopped along the roadway Emergency situation resulting in Exposure to Protected Works A or Protected Works B which might pose a threat to the public or public property

Driving to conditions Well signed road, Well maintained road Known heavy vehicle route Movement effected in daylight hours where at all possible Diversion from designated route only permitted under instruction from Police, Emergency services or DG supervisor Communication maintained with other vehicles Vehicles fitted with GPS tracking system and duress button Carrier maintenance regimes New England Highway, John Renshaw Dr and George Booth Dr are well maintained roadways and well known to drivers Emergency Response Plan in place and well understood by the driver

Maintain auditing programs Contracted carrier / sub-contractor management program in place Safety Management Plan in Place Toll has a dedicated VHF channel for communication to the transport vehicles Transport vehicles do not make fuel stops during this route Alternative route must be communicated to DG supervisor and any concern addressed before proceeding Scheduled travel times to minimise road user interaction Emergency information and procedures folder carried in all vehicles

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Movement along the Route (ctd.)


3. Approach Orica Technology Centre entrance on Echidna Dr. approximately 5Km from George Booth Drive.

Right hand turn into Orica Kurri Kurri entrance, approach gate and alert reception/security of your arrival. (Follow directions given by Orica personnel or security personnel at all times.)

Interaction with other traffic causing property damage or personal injury Intersection is soon after slight RH bend and requires turning across oncoming traffic. Poor road conditions could result in damage to property and personal injury Emergency situation resulting in Exposure to Protected Works A or Protected Works B which might pose a threat to the public or public property Vehicle suffers mechanical failure resulting in vehicle being stopped along the roadway Theft – loss of product .

Movement effected in daylight hours where at all possible Scheduled travel times to minimise road user interaction Driving to conditions reduced speed through industrial area, poor road conditions and moderate traffic flow through Racecourse Rd UHF radio’s fitted to all trucks for communication with trucks in close proximity Well signed road, Well maintained road Known heavy vehicle route Emergency Response Plan in place and well understood by the driver Safety Management plan in place Vehicles fitted with GPS tracking system and duress button No need for driver to leave truck unattended during trip, loaded and unloaded in secure areas

Maintain auditing programs Contracted carrier / sub-contractor management program in place Safety Management Plan in Place Dedicated VHF channel for communication to the transport vehicles Carrier audited at regular intervals Vehicle fitted with security seals preventing load tampering or theft.

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Security on the Public Roadway


4. Security Theft – loss of product

Well signed road Good, well maintained road Speed signs provided Carrier maintenance regimes Container approved for use on road and rail by Competent Authority Driving to conditions Known heavy vehicle route Solid product only carried Driver stays with vehicle at all times Vehicles fitted with GPS tracking system and duress button

Emergency Response Plan in place and known to drivers

Maintain auditing programs Contracted carrier sub-contractor management program Driver behaviour training and follow up Vehicles fitted with GPS tracking system and duress button Scheduled travel times to minimise road user interaction Movement effected in daylight hours where at all possible Safety Management plan in place Dedicated VHF channel for communication to the transport vehicles

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REPORT SUMMARY:

The route is a well travelled roadway and is well known to the transport vehicle drivers. The distance allows the vehicle to complete the return journey without the need for a fuel stop. All vehicles are fitted with GPS equipment and a contractor dedicated VHF channel to maintain communication and control over vehicle movement. There are a number of small schools, residential areas, small businesses and small to medium sized industrial operations that must be manoeuvred around during travel to complete the route safely. The condition of the roadway, traffic controls in place and the controls on the vehicles allow for the route to be travelled safely. It is considered that the existing controls are appropriate and adequate to ensure the risks are managed in a safe and professional manner.

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Sign off Record

Record of participants in the original JSERA

Participants:

Name Signature Date Name Signature Date

Record of others who have read the JSERA

Communications Log:

Name Signature Date Name Signature Date

preliminary hazard analysis and transport hazard analysis ane... · 2011-05-20 · 3.8 ane...

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