premises in the practical arguments of preservice teachers

15
Teachmg a, Teacher Educarron. Vol. 4. No. 3, pp 21s229. IY88 Printed m Great Britain 0742-051x/XX $3.11l+0.0(1 0 19% Pergamon Press plc PREMISES IN THE PRACTICAL ARGUMENTS OF PRESERVICE TEACHERS GRETA MORINE-DERSHIMER Syracuse University, U.S.A. Abstract -This paper uses the concept (from Aristotle via Fenstermacher) of the practical argu- ment to analyze stimulated recall data for eight secondary student teachers. Differences in the types of premises stated are reported, according to sex, subject matter major, and complexity of thought exhibited. Three case studies illustrate value conflicts revealed in the student teachers’ practical arguments, and examine the resolution of those value conflicts in the actions that con- clude the practical arguments. Implications of the findings for teacher education and for research on teaching are discussed. The study reported here was undertaken in response to several criticisms of research on teaching and teacher cognitions. Fenster- macher (1986) has questioned the application of research on teaching in teacher education, and specified that “when it is argued that research has benefit for practice, the criterion of benefit should be the improvement of practical argu- ments in the minds of teachers and other prac- titioners” (p. 44). Shulman (1986) has criticized research on teacher cognition on several grounds, noting that the teaching activities in- vestigated are “severely attenuated” (p. 24) and the analysis of data is lacking in “complexity and subtlety” (p. 25). Elsewhere, the present author has criticized research on teacher thinking (Morine-Dershimer, 1987b), noting that while the program of research developed in the belief that teachers’ behavior was guided by their thoughts, studies of interactive thinking have rarely investigated the direct links between their decisions and their behavior. These criticisms led to testing the potential value of the concept of the practical argument for purposes of analysis of teachers’ interactive decisions (Morine-Dershimer, 1987b). The concept of the practical argument, as explicated by Fenstermacher (1986), derived from an in- terpretation of the work of Aristotle suggested by Green (1976). The practical argument was seen in contrast to the logical argument, in that it ended in an action,* rather than a logical con- clusion. A series of premises contributed to the decision to act, and these premises were of three types: situational premises described the con- text in which the action occurred, as perceived by the actor; empirical premises were state- ments of principle denoting the consequences that might be expected to follow the action; and value premises indicated the desirable condi- tions that the actor associated with these conse- quences. These types of premises might be stated explicitly by a teacher discussing an ac- tion taken in an interactive lesson, or they might ^ A rewed verston ot a paper prepared tor presentatton at the American Educational Research Association meetings, Washington, DC. April 1987. * Fenstermacher has later recanted. and amended his definition to say that a practical argument can end in an intention to act (Fenstermacher. 1987). Green has not changed his position, and I still find it most appropriate to think of practical argu- ments as ending in an action, since I am examining them in relation to teachers’ interactive thinking. and can observe the actions directly in the videotaped lessons used to stimulate teachers’ recall of their interactive decisions. 215

Upload: greta

Post on 04-Jan-2017

212 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

Teachmg a, Teacher Educarron. Vol. 4. No. 3, pp 21s229. IY88

Printed m Great Britain

0742-051x/XX $3.11l+0.0(1

0 19% Pergamon Press plc

PREMISES IN THE PRACTICAL ARGUMENTS OF PRESERVICE TEACHERS

GRETA MORINE-DERSHIMER

Syracuse University, U.S.A.

Abstract -This paper uses the concept (from Aristotle via Fenstermacher) of the practical argu- ment to analyze stimulated recall data for eight secondary student teachers. Differences in the types of premises stated are reported, according to sex, subject matter major, and complexity of thought exhibited. Three case studies illustrate value conflicts revealed in the student teachers’ practical arguments, and examine the resolution of those value conflicts in the actions that con- clude the practical arguments. Implications of the findings for teacher education and for research on teaching are discussed.

The study reported here was undertaken in response to several criticisms of research on teaching and teacher cognitions. Fenster- macher (1986) has questioned the application of research on teaching in teacher education, and specified that “when it is argued that research has benefit for practice, the criterion of benefit should be the improvement of practical argu- ments in the minds of teachers and other prac- titioners” (p. 44). Shulman (1986) has criticized research on teacher cognition on several grounds, noting that the teaching activities in- vestigated are “severely attenuated” (p. 24) and the analysis of data is lacking in “complexity and subtlety” (p. 25). Elsewhere, the present author has criticized research on teacher thinking (Morine-Dershimer, 1987b), noting that while the program of research developed in the belief that teachers’ behavior was guided by their thoughts, studies of interactive thinking have rarely investigated the direct links between their decisions and their behavior.

These criticisms led to testing the potential value of the concept of the practical argument for purposes of analysis of teachers’ interactive decisions (Morine-Dershimer, 1987b). The concept of the practical argument, as explicated by Fenstermacher (1986), derived from an in- terpretation of the work of Aristotle suggested by Green (1976). The practical argument was seen in contrast to the logical argument, in that it ended in an action,* rather than a logical con- clusion. A series of premises contributed to the decision to act, and these premises were of three types: situational premises described the con- text in which the action occurred, as perceived by the actor; empirical premises were state- ments of principle denoting the consequences that might be expected to follow the action; and value premises indicated the desirable condi- tions that the actor associated with these conse- quences. These types of premises might be stated explicitly by a teacher discussing an ac- tion taken in an interactive lesson, or they might

^ A rewed verston ot a paper prepared tor presentatton at the American Educational Research Association meetings, Washington, DC. April 1987.

* Fenstermacher has later recanted. and amended his definition to say that a practical argument can end in an intention to act (Fenstermacher. 1987). Green has not changed his position, and I still find it most appropriate to think of practical argu- ments as ending in an action, since I am examining them in relation to teachers’ interactive thinking. and can observe the actions directly in the videotaped lessons used to stimulate teachers’ recall of their interactive decisions.

215

216 GRETA MORINE-DERSHIMER

be implicit in the teacher’s description of the event.

In order to test the possible applications of this concept, a reanalysis was conducted of stimulated recall data for one experienced teacher, and, in some detail, her practical argu- ments were explored in relation to one type of action (calling on pupils to participate in discus- sion). The results of this exercise demonstrated that a focus on this teacher’s practical argu- ments added some “complexity and subtlety” to the analysis of data; revealed some direct links between the teacher’s explicit (and i-mplicit) reasoning and her behavior; and indicated some possible ways in which research on teaching might contribute to the improvement of her practical arguments. Furthermore, the results suggested that the three major premises in the practical argument (situational premise, empirical premise, and value premise) included variations which might be considered as sub- categories of some importance in relation to possible procedures for improvement of the teacher’s practical arguments.

While the results of this case study were promising, they certainly did not respond to Shulman’s criticism about attenuation of teach- ing activities investigated, since only one type of teacher action was considered (albeit an action designated as important by studies of classroom management, studies of teacher expectations, and sociolinguistic studies of classroom com- munication alike). Nor could the results of a single case study demonstrate that the analysis technique was generally applicable for use with stimulated recall data. The procedure needed to be tested with a larger body of data. For this rea- son the present study was conducted.

This present study also involved reanalysis of data from an earlier study (Morine-Dershimer & Oliver, 1988), which had investigated com- plexity of thought in secondary student teachers, using stimulated recall interviews and concept maps. This earlier study developed and tested two quantifiable measures of complexity of thought,? building on research characterizing the cognitive abilities of effective, experienced

teachers (e.g., Leinhardt & Greeno, 1986). These teachers focus on salient information and organize that information into categories rather than dealing with many discrete details. This or- ganized structure of information enables them to be attentive to a variety of important aspects of the lesson. The measures of complexity of thought in preservice teachers were designed to reveal such organized structures of information in their thinking about interactive lessons, and in their thinking about teacher planning. The clear presence of such structures was taken to be evidence of complexity of thought. The study showed that complexi’y of thought about the in- teractive teaching was related to complexity of thought about teacher planning. Differences were identified in the thinking of science and mathematics majors as compared with English and social studies majors. Science and mathematics majors displayed patterns of thought associated with logical reasoning more frequently than English and social studies majors.

The concept of the practical argument as orig- inally proposed by Aristotle involved a clear distinction between the practical argument and the logical argument. The findings of this earlier study provided an interesting opportunity to consider whether the use of practical arguments by prospective teachers might be related to their tendency to use logical reasoning, or to the gen- eral complexity of their thinking about teach- ing. Based on findings from these two earlier studies, then, the following questions were posed for investigation in this study:

(1) What types or subcategories of premises are contained in the practical arguments of secondary preservice teachers? Are there ten- dencies toward group differences (by subject specialization, complexity of thought, or gen- der) in the types of premises used?

(2) Are the premises in these arguments related to concepts associated with research on effective teaching?

(3) What do these practical arguments reveal about the relationships between the beliefs and actions of these prospective teachers?

t Readers wishing more specific information about these measures should read the earlier study, where they are defined and explicated in some detail (Morine-Dershimer & Oliver, 1988).

Premises in the Practical Arguments of Teachers 217

Procedures

Subjects

The subjects in this study were eight student teachers in the secondary teacher education program at Syracuse University, who com- pleted their student teaching in the fall of 1985. Two students from each of four subject majors were selected from the group of 12 1986 graduates who participated in the original study. The students were selected to provide as much diversity as possible within each subject area, in terms of gender and complexity of thought (as identified in the earlier study). The distribution of subjects is shown in Table 1. The subjects included three males and five females, as well as four students identified as more com- plex in thought about teaching and four iden- tified as less complex.

Table 1

dent was videotaped teaching one lesson to one of the classes to which he/she was assigned. In an attempt to keep the instructional setting as natural as possible, researchers gave no specific directions to the student teachers about the lessons to be taught. The particular class to be videotaped, the instructional procedures to be followed, and the lesson topic to be discussed were all determined by the student teacher (with, of course, the agreement of the cooperat- ing teacher). Classes ran for approximately 50 minutes in all the schools, and the full lesson was taped in each case. Videotaping and inter- views were done by the author or a trained doc- toral student who, had worked as a teaching as- sistant in the Strategies course.

Shortly after the lesson ended, the videotape in its entirety was played back to the student teacher, and a stimulated recall interview was

Distribution of Subjects by Subject Area, Complexiry of Thought, and Gender

Comolexitv of thoupht English Social studies Mathematics Science

More complex Less complex

F F M.F M M.F F

Data Collection

All subjects had been participants in a course on Strategies of Teaching taught by the author just prior to their entry into student teaching. In connection with peer teaching sessions in this course, they had been videotaped and had engaged in unstructured stimulated recall inter- views. Thus, all subjects were familiar with the general procedures of stimulated recall, and had viewed themselves on videotape prior to student teaching.

The students were assigned to middle schools and high schools in nearby suburban or urban public school districts. Toward the end of their 7-week student teaching experience, each stu-

conducted. Students were asked to stop the vid- eotape at any point where they were aware of having made a decision or of noticing something particular about pupils during the actual les- son.* Each time the videotape was stopped, the interviewer (who had also videotaped the les- son) asked: “What were you thinking at that point in the lesson?” Students’ initial comments were sometimes followed by probing questions if no decisions or observations were actually reported (“So what did you decide to do?” or “Was there anything in particular you were no- ticing at that point?“). Aside from these probes, the interviewer refrained from comment, in order not to influence the statements or think- ing of the student teacher.

* The reader is reminded that the study reported here involved a reanalysis of data from an earlier study. The initial study was designed to examine complexity of thought related to interactive teaching, so decision.pojnts and processing of informa- tion about pupils were areas of particular interest. Since student teachers in the initial sttfdy%d frequently discuss actions that they had taken in these lessons, their stimulated recall protocols provided a useful opportunity to investigate their use of practical arguments without the added time and expense of videotaping a new set of lessons and conducting a new series of interviews.

218 GRETA MORINE-DERSHIMER

All interviews were recorded on audiotape, including the audio portion of the full playback of the videotape, so that the lesson event trig- ering each student teacher comment was re- corded on the audiotape, as well as the com- ment and any probing questions from the inter- viewer. Transcripts of the interview portions of the audiotapes were made for purposes of cod- ing student teacher comments. The audiotape was later played back in conjuction with the vid- eotape to identify points at which the videotape had been stopped. Notes were taken on the observable verbal and/or nonverbal behavior occurring just prior to the stopping of the videotape. These notes were used to identify the student teacher action associated with each decision or observation that was reported.

Data Analysis

For purposes of the reanalysis of data, new transcripts were printed, so that coding of com- ments from the original study would not influ- ence the interpretations in this study. Almost a full year intervened between the two analyses, so that transcripts were approached with a fairly fresh perspective. Videotapes were reviewed so that lessons could be readily recalled.

Each student teacher comment was examined to determine whether it could be construed to represent a practical argument. Following Fenstermacher (1986)) a practical argument was seen as culminating in an action,t and con- taining at least one instance of each of three types of premises: a situational premise that served to define the situation as perceived by the student teacher; an empirical premise that explicitly or implicitly stated an if-then relation- ship that applied in that situation; and a value premise that explicitly or implicitly stated a de- sired condition associated with that situation. In instances where all three types of premises could be identified within a comment about a single event, and the statements in the premises were all connected with an identifiable action of the student teacher observable at that point on

the videotape, the student teacher’s comment was considered to represent a practical argu- ment. In instances where one or more of these three types of premises were missing, the stu- dent teacher’s comment was not considered to constitute a practical argument. There was no expectation that all of the interactive thought of any teacher (experienced or inexperienced) would be constructed in terms of practical arguments. The proportion of lesson events that were discussed as practical arguments was determined for each student teacher, and an overall mean proportion was calculated.

Premises in the practical arguments were coded according to a set of sub-categories developed as a result of analyses in the earlier case study. Situational premises were coded as referring to: Immediate Observation (pupil behavior or performance); Context (plan, routine, task, or prior lesson); or Pupil Charac- teristic (generalized behavior or performance). Empirical premises were coded as indicating Certainty (definite relationship); Possibility (possible relationship); or an Implicit (clearly implied, but not explicitly stated) relationship. Value premises were coded as explicit or implicit, and as focusing on Management, Instruction, or Socioemotional aspects of the lesson. In addition, the particular desired con- dition was noted (e.g., pupil participation, attention, pupil comprehension, motivation). Actions were coded as directed toward the class as a whole or toward individual pupils within the class. In addition the particular type of action taken was noted (e.g., ask a probing question, call on a particular pupil, issue a desist, explain a point). Table 2 presents examples of coded arguments excerpted from transcripts of the two student teachers who were science majors, to il- lustrate use of these categories. Student teacher comments are presented in the order in which they occurred in relation to a given event. They have been edited to eliminate redundancies.

After coding, the proportional frequency of use of each type of sub-category (number of arguments in which the sub-category occurred divided by number of practical arguments

t An action could be verbal or nonverbal. It could be simple (e.g., calling on a particular pupil to participate) or complex (e.g., demonstrating a computational process to pupils by working a problem on an overhead projector while explaining each step aloud). In some instances. a “non-action” was considered to be an action, as when a student teacher decided to ignore a pupil whose hand was raised. rather than to call upon her.

Premises in the Practical Arguments of Teachers 219

Table 2

Examples of Coded Arguments (Excerpted from Two Science Lessons)

Situation: Context, routine

Empirical: Certainty

(Implicit value): Management, attention

ACTION: Class

That’s something I have to use with the classes now, pass back the tests at the end of class

because if 1 pass them back in the beginning they’re so involved with the test all during the class, and when 1 tell them to put the test away, they still have the test out in front of them and they are going through it.

“You’ll get your test back at the end of class.”

Situation: Context, routine Situation: Pupil Characteristic, behavior

Empirical: Certainty (Implicit value): Instruction, test performance Value: Instruction, task orientation

Empirical: Implicit

ACTION: Class

I do this just about every time we do a worksheet. Because a lot of times the students don’t do the problems until the day

before the exam. If they don’t actually do the problem themselves, then they really do poor on the exams. By now they should be able to take the initiative to do the work on

their own. But this is just kind of a little insurance that they do some problems

before the exam. “Okay. Take a few minutes to do problem 3 .”

Situation: Context, plan

Situation: Context, routine (Implicit value): Management, pace Empirical: Certainty

Empirical: Possibility

Now this is purposely a rhetorical question. 1 just threw it out to put a little more into the introductory part of the lesson.

1 always go over really quickly the highlights from yesterday or two or three days ago. It helps me, puts a mindset in my own mind to say well this is what they

know and build on top of that for myself. And plus for the students’ sake, it reminds them of what we’ve done

and (Implicit value): Instruction, pupil comprehension hopefully to relate what we did yesterday to what we do today. ACTION: Class “Conservation of energy problems all start exactly the same way . .

The first thing you have to know is that energy is conserved. And what does that mean?”

Ellen s arguments

Situation: Immediate observation, behavior

Empirical: Certainty (Implicit value): Socioemotional, motivation ACTION: Class

I thought this was a good time to tell them the test grades because 1 had their attention and they were all quiet.

Also they did really well and so I thought it would be an inspiration for them to continue to work at it. “All right, before we start this, let me just tell you I corrected the

tests over the weekend _”

Value: Instruction, pupilcomprehension

Situation: Pupil characteristic, performance

Situation: Immediate observation, performance Empirical: Implicit ACTION: Individual

1 want to make sure they know the difference between ingest and digest and egest,

especially Miranda, the girl who asked. She’ll very easily complicate ideas. . .

and here she said that tentacles digest. That’s totally different from ingest, so I have to explain it. “Well, actually, they don’t digest, they ingest .”

Situation: Immediate observation, behavior Empirical: Certainty (Implicit value): Management, attenuation Value: Socioemotional, avoid anxiety Situation: Context, task ACTION: Individual

I picked Toby because she was just sitting around with a blank stare. She’ll just sit there and just fade away unless I pick her out. 1 don’t like to scare her with tough questions, but this one I thought she could handle. “Why did we go from the paramecium to the hydra? Toby.”

220 GRETA MORINE-DERSHIMER

stated) was determined for each student teacher. An overall mean proportional fre- quency was calculated for each sub-category. In addition, mean proportional frequencies were calculated for each sub-group of student teachers (more or less complex in thought about teaching, male or female, and English/social studies major or science/mathematics major. No statistical tests were made because of the small numbers involved in each sub-group, but where group means differed by 0.20 or more, patterns were noted as indicative of group ten- dencies.

For each lesson a detailed qualitative analysis was made of relationships between value pre- mises and actions. Value premises were focused on because Fenstermacher (1986) notes that in- troduction of a new value premise made the teacher in his example more amenable to con- sidering relevant research evidence, and this evidence then had the potential for altering her empirical premises. In the qualitative analysis, particular attention was paid to arguments where value conflicts were indicated, to deter- mine how the associated situational and empiri- cal premises contributed to the final action. A few brief case studies were identified to

Table 3

exemplify student teachers’ approaches to re- solution of these value conflicts.

Findings

General Patterns and Group Tendencies

The general patterns of proportional fre- quency of use of practical arguments, as well as use of the various types of premises are reported in Table 3, together with group tendencies in cases where sub-group means contrasted sharp- ly. Practical arguments were used relatively fre- quently by these student teachers. The number of events discussed in these eight lessons ranged from 6 to 32, with a mean of 19.8. The number of practical arguments offered ranged from 6 to 16, with a mean of 11.9. The proportional fre- quency of use of practical arguments ranged from 0.406 to 1.000, with a mean of 0.667. In most instances when comments were not framed as practical arguments, student teachers were merely describing the sitution as they ob- served it. In a few instances they were reporting prior events called to mind by something they were observing at the moment. In just two or

Types of Premises in Practical Arguments of Secondary Studenr Teachers (Proportional Frequencies)*

Type of premise Overall R Group tendencies

Proportion arguments to events discussed 0.667

Situational oremises Immediaie observation Context Pupilcharacteristics

Empirical premises Certainty

Possibility Implicit

Value premises Management Instruction Socioemotional

Actions

0.604 0.586 0.297

Lesscomplex(0.710) > Morecomplex(0.498)

More complex (0.431) > Lesscomplex (0.163) Science/Math (0.409) > English/S.S. (0.187)

0.337 Science/Math (0.484) > English/S.S. (0.190) Male (0.478) > Female (0.252)

0.126 0.596

0.501 0.526 0.168

Female (0.677) > Male (0.462)

Male (0.622) > Female (0.428)

Class 0.667 Individuals

English1S.S. (0.818) > Science/Math (0.517) 0.333 Science/Math (0.484) > Eng1ishlS.S. (0.183)

* More than one instance of a given type of sub-category of premise could be stated within each argument, so proportional frequencies within each major category do not total 100. Only one type of action ensued, so these sub-categories do total 100.

Premises in the Practical Arguments of Teachers 221

three instances a decision was discussed, and an action taken, but no empirical premise could be discerned from the comments, so these in- stances were not considered to be practical arguments. There were no sharp differences between any sub-groups of students in their tendency to report on their interactive thinking in terms that could be construed as practical arguments.

These student teachers were most apt to state situational premises in terms of their immediate observations, or to report on the context of the situation (as provided by their plan for the les- son, a routine they were following, or the task in which pupils were engaged). They frequently framed empirical premises implicitly, that is, the if-then relationships that they associated with the situation were not often clearly stated. Value premises that focused on instructional as- pects of the lesson were mentioned only slightly more frequently than those focused on manage- rial aspects. Instructional value premises were less likely to be implicit (the mean percentage of instructional value premises framed implicitly was 0.219) than were managerial value premises (0.463) or socioemotional value premises (0.460). Arguments concluded in actions di- rected towards the whole class twice as often as in actions directed toward individual pupils.

Science and mathematics majors (n = 4) exhi- bited somewhat different patterns from English and social studies majors (n = 4), in that they: stated situational premises in terms of pupil characteristics more regularly; framed empiri- cal premises with more certainty; and presented arguments that concluded in actions directed to- ward individuals more often. (Because of the categorical dichotomy of actions, they also pre- sented arguments concluding in actions directed toward the whole class less often.) Students identified as more complex in their thought about teaching (n = 4) exhibited somewhat dif- ferent patterns from those identified as “less” complex (n = 4), in that they: stated situational premises in terms of immediate observations less regularly; and stated situational premises in terms of pupil characteristics more regularly. (Proportional frequencies of these two types of situational premises were not necessarily in- terdependent, since a given argument could in- clude both types.) Males (n = 3) exhibited

somewhat different patterns from females (n = 5), in that they: framed empirical premises with more certainty; offered implicit empirical pre- mises less regularly; and focused value premises on managerial aspects of the lesson more regu- larly.

Value Premises and Actions in Relation to Research on Effective Teaching

The most prevalent specific type of value pre- mise included in the practical arguments of these secondary education student teachers focused on pupil comprehension. In six of the lessons, these premises dealt mainly with learn- ing, understanding, and applying concepts or processes being discussed in the immediate les- son, and relating these concepts or processes to information that had been covered in prior les- sons. One of the other two lessons was a mathematics lesson, where no new material was presented and the value premises related to pupil comprehension focused on evaluating re- tention of prior learning through a homework review and a quiz. In the final lesson, an English major focused on value premises associated with pupil understanding of a future assign- ment, involving writing a research paper com- plete with quotations, footnotes, and bibliog- raphy. The overall mean proportion of argu- ments containing value premises focused on pupil comprehension was 0.412.

Actions associated with these value premises included teacher explanation (35%), asking questions of the class (15%), and reacting to pupil responses to teacher questions (25%). These reactions were primarily providing cor- rective feedback and asking probing questions to elicit further information. In one third of the instances involving teacher explanation, the student teacher indicated awareness of the im- portance of teacher clarity. These types of teacher behavior have been shown to be related to pupil achievement gains in studies of effec- tive teaching, so association of these actions with value premises about pupil comprehension suggests that these student teachers were build- ing at least some of their practical arguments on what Fenstermacher calls “objectively reason- able” beliefs (Fenstermacher, 1978, p. 169).

The other most prevalent type of value pre- mise included in the practical arguments of

222 GRETA MORINE-DERSHIMER

these student teachers focused on active en- gagement of pupils in the lesson. The overall mean proportion of arguments including these premises was 0.312. Five of the students (in- cluding all four science/mathematics majors) stated these premises in terms of pupil attention and on-task behavior. The actions associated with these premises included calling on off-task pupils, and circulating to check pupil work dur- ing seatwork activities. Three of the student teachers (including both social studies majors) stated these value premises in terms of pupil participation. Actions associated with these premises included giving specific directions about the task involved, circulating during small group discussion activities, and using wait time after asking a question, in order to increase the number of volunteers.

Research on effective teaching has de- monstrated that active engagement of pupils in lessons is associated with pupil achievement gains, and the actions reported here are for the most part teaching behaviors that have been shown to be correlated with effective classroom management. Thus, association of these actions with these value premises in the practical argu- ments of these student teachers also indicates the presence of some “objectively reasonable” beliefs.

Value premises about pupil comprehension and pupil engagement in instructional activities can be framed in very general or very specific ways. Shulman (1986) has emphasized the importance of content knowledge in teacher thinking about instruction, and Doyle (1986) has emphasized the importance of classroom tasks in relation to pupil engagement. Seven of these eight student teachers made specific refer- ences to content knowledge in their practical arguments (e.g., citing a specific spelling rule being taught, or noting particular terms and definitions needed for understanding of the topic being discussed). The overall mean prop- ortional frequency of arguments containing these types of specific content knowledge refer- ences was 0.272. Seven of the eight student teachers (not the same 7) made specific refer- ences to the task in which pupils were engaged (e.g., noting task difficulty level, or indicating thought processes required to complete the task). The overall mean proportional frequency of arguments containing specific task references

was 0.212. Thus, these student teachers showed some awareness of the importance of curriculum aspects of instruction in stating their practical arguments.

Resolving Value Conflicts: Beliefs and Actions

Despite the rather positive features of these practical arguments, as revealed by the descrip- tive quantitative analyses, the experienced teacher educator will not be surprised to learn that these eight lessons included a number of in- stances where the instructional and managerial procedures employed would be judged less than effective by most observers conversant with re- search on effective teaching. A more qualitative analysis of the comments of these secondary student teachers reveals more about the nature of relationships between arguments within a given lesson or lesson segment. Of particular in- terest were a series of value conflicts expressed by students. Some details of the reasoning exhi- bited in the process of resolving these conflicts are presented in the several brief case studies which follow.

Task interference: the case of Colleen. Colleen (real names are not used here) was a social studies major who began her lesson on mercan- tilism during the colonial period of American history with a seatwork assignment that was re- quired by the cooperating teacher. Students were writing definitions or explanations of voc- abulary terms. As Colleen explained it:

She wants words put in this file, because at the end of the year that is what she is going to base this final on. So I have to do that . . But when I do that I like to talk about it so that they are not just rote -not just writing it down . . . So I’m thinking, I should be talking just to keep them in the thing, because I can lose some of them if I don’t talk, because they’ll start and just don’t know what to write A lot of times they’ll get annoyed at me. They’ll say, “I’m writing,” when I talk to the class.

Colleen has defined this situation in terms of context (a routine activity that she is required to carry out) and pupil characteristics (typical be- havior in this task setting). Her value premises indicate that she wants to do more than just complete the activity, she wants pupils to under- stand what they are writing. The pupil com- ments she quotes suggest that their goals do

Premises in the Practical Arguments of Teachers 223

on simple

them to talk in response to her question, at the same time that she has asked them to write their responses to the seatwork assignment.

With the next question Colleen tries another technique. She invites a choral response.

I was trying to get the whole class there to answer. I said, “You can answer.” And everyone looked at me

But what I was doing there was trying to relate this review that I had to get in today with the lesson that I have for today . I wanted to make them un-

de&and that even though they were self-governing they still were English colonies.

In this argument Colleen suggests that her real purpose in trying to get everyone to re- spond is not that she values pupil participation so much, but that she values pupil comprehen- sion, and that their answer may provide evidence of comprehension. Her implicit em- pirical premise suggests that establishing some relationship between the review activity and the new material to be covered in the remainder of the lesson might contribute to pupil comprehen- sion of the new material.

On the surface Colleen’s actions are not at all reasonable. She assigns one task to pupils, then sets up a competing task, ostensibly to help them accomplish the first task, and proceeds to use a variety of research-based techniques to engage them in the competing task, exhibiting consternation when they persist in focusing on the original task. The concept of the practical argument, however, specifies that these actions are in fact reasonable from the student teacher’s perspective, and that by analyzing the argu- ments in relation to the actions. we can come to some understanding of the beliefs that make the actions reasonable.

When the several arguments presented here are considered together, it would appear that Colleen’s basic belief has to do with the lack of value she ascribes to the seatwork task she has been required to assign. This belief is never explicitly stated, but it is implicit in several of her comments (so I have to do that; I like to talk about it so that they are not just writing it down; this review that I had to get in today). At another point she admits, “I have only done this about three times since I’ve been here.” Her actions, then, are designed to add some instruc- tional value to what she perceives as an essen- tially valueless activity. If pupils will talk about the terms in addition to writing about them, they may learn something. If the terms can be related to the topic for the day, they may also learn something. Thus, while she acknowledges that the discussion interferes with the writing, and that it annoys the pupils for this reason, she persists in her efforts to engender discussion. Colleen’s problem is that the pupils do not share her basic belief. They presumably know that the real rewards of the system will come from com-

224 GRETA MORINE-DERSHIMER

pletion of the written assignment. After all, the final examination will be based on the words in- cluded in these routine seatwork assignments.

Topic control: the case of Barbara. Barbara was a mathematics major whose lesson involved a homework review, presentation of new work on division of positive and negative numbers, and guided practice on solving word problems dealing with subtraction of negative numbers. Barbara’s practical arguments included several instances of value premises focused on sticking to the topic. In three instances these stated val- ues conflicted with value premises about pupils’ socioemotional states. In all cases Barbara re- solved the conflict by attempting to deal with the socioemotional issue. In the first instance, Barbara is working a division problem (new material) with the class. She asks them to solve a problem exemplifying the rule that like signs in the problem will result in a positive number for the solution. She asks the class, “What about negative 6 divided by negative 3?” A boy inter- rupts with, “Why can’t I get back my quiz?” A girl responds to the question correctly, saying, “Positive 2.” Barbara’s comments are all focused on the boy’s remark.

They just kept interrupting the lesson with things that had nothing to do with it. “Where is this ditto? Where is my homework? Can I get my last quiz?”

They are all getting excited because five-week reports are due. So they keep asking in the middle of the lecture and it has nothing to do with anything. I wasn’t going to stop. Sometimes-and that’s prob- ably why it occurs - because sometimes I do stop. And I feel bad if they don’t have what they want. But I should just keep going. They have time to see me after class.

Barbara’s argument seems to justify her in- tention not to stop. She has defined the situa- tion in terms of immediate observation of pupil behavior (repeated interruptions) as well as context (report cards are due). Her implicit value premise (pupil comments should have something to do with the topic under discus- sion) is repeated in two comments (it has no- thing to do with anything). Her empirical pre- mise notes the possibility that if she stops (as she sometimes does) they may continue their inter- ruptive behavior. Furthermore, if she keeps going, pupils can see her after class, so they won’t be hurt by her behavior. Note, however,

that while Barbara’s value premises about stay- ing on the topic are implicit, her socioemotional value premise is explicit (I feel bad if they don’t have what they want). Despite the tenor of her argument, Barbara reacts not to the girl’s cor- rect answer, but to the boy’s interruption. “I’ll look for it if you want,” she says. “Do you want to hold on, and not interrupt the lesson?”

In the second instance the class is still working division problems. In reaction to a correct answer, Barbara says, “You got it. Good. It’s the same rules that apply.” Again a student interrupts, “Can we do something else?” Barbara’s comment about this situation is:

They wanted me to go on to something else. They are bored with it. They said, “Can we start our homework?” But I had plans for other things. The word problems were supposed to be done. And I still want to do some more examples because I think we really didn’t have enough of the division. But there were so many who were bored, I figured they would get enough practice on their homework.

In this argument Barbara defines the situa- tion in terms of immediate observed behavior (repeating a pupil’s specific comment), and an interpretation of that behavior (they are bored), noting as well a context (her plan to do word problems). Her explicit value premise in- dicates that she wants to continue with the topic (do some more examples), but her implicit socioemotional value premise (there shouldn’t be so many bored pupils) takes precedence here. Her implicit empirical premise serves to justify a shift in topic (if they get enough prac- tice on their homework, they will learn it). But Barbara does not give in to pupils completely. Instead of allowing them to start their homework, she says, “You want something else? Easy enough. How about we try to use it in some practical application.” She continues with a whole class activity, working word problems on subtraction with negative numbers.

The third instance occurs during the work on word problems. Barbara is explaining an im- portant difference in subtraction rules with negative numbers. She says, “We can’t just do that anymore. We can’t just subtract the smaller from the larger number.” Then she calls on a boy who has his hand raised. “Bill.” Bill’s ques- tion is on the prior topic. “Do we have to reduce in division?” Barbara’s comment about this situation is:

Premises in the Practical Arguments of Teachers 225

I wasn’t sure what I was going to say to him. “Why are you talking about that right now?” But 1 know that he has a real problem reducing, so he’s probably sitting there worrying about that - “Do we have to reduce in division?” This may not have concerned me, but it may have been important to him. He wasn’t following along, but he must have been wor- ried.

Again Barbara defines the situation in terms of immediate observed behavior (Bill’s ques- tion), but she adds a pupil characteristic (he has a real problem with reducing), and interprets his behavior as an indication that he is worried Her implicit premises refer both the portance of on the (why are talking about right now) the socioemo-

state of pupil (it have been portant to he must been worried).

implicit empirical has to with the consequences that worry he’s worried isn’t following On the of this argument, responds to query, reverting to the of division,

providing evidence support her ier statement “sometimes I stop,” and

probably insuring pupils will to interrupt lessons with com-

Barbara’s practical arguments to indi- that her about the socioemotional

states pupils have over her about the benefits of to the

In two her implicit empirical mises help resolve the between these

values in of responding to topic shifts, in her argument the empirical premises action that give priority the topic discussion. Even here, reinforces the interruption, although she issue a reprimand (“Do

want to on, and interrupt the son?“). This argument is particularly structive regarding reasonableness of bara’s action, she is clear about she ought do (I going to stop; some- times -

I do I should

Using routines: the case of Ben. Ben was a science major teaching a physics lesson instruct- ing pupils in processes for solving problems dealing with kinetic and potential energy. In this lesson Ben demonstrates the problem-solv- ing process to the whole class, working through several problems. He then assigns a seatwork problem for independent practice, and reviews this problem with the whole class after pupils have completed it independently. The lesson concludes with more problems worked in the whole class setting.

Ben’s practical arguments reveal a value conflict that pits lesson pace against pupil com- prehension. He consistently refers to a routine he has established as a way of resolving this con- flict. In the first instance, Ben is working through a problem with the whole class. He goes into great detail about the process of stat- ing the equation that will represent the word problem. Then he says, “Okay, divide through and you end up with H (height) equals 40 met- ers.” His comment about this event is:

I didn’t go and solve that problem after I had it set up algebraically. I did that with them for a while, but I was getting a lot of questions about the algebra. By now, if they are in physics, they should be able to do basic algebra. A few of them have trouble with the algebra, which is unfortunate because it is hard enough for them to get the physics without having to understand the math too. So 1 started the last few weeks not doing the algebra in class, and if they were having trouble with it, they could see me individu- ally. Most of the students don’t need that algebra help, so it’s kind of boring and wasting the time for the rest of the students to see me go through the algebra again.

226 GRETA MORINE-DERSHIMER

In this argument Ben has defined the situa- tion in terms of context (this is a two-part task, involving setting the problem up algebraically, and solving it algebraically), and in terms of pupil characteristics (a few of them have trouble with algebraic solutions, but most do not). His implicit value premises include wanting pupils to “get the physics,” and to avoid “wasting the time” of the majority of the class. His implicit empirical premise notes that “getting” the physics is harder if pupils cannot do the algebra. His action resolves the conflict. He does not waste class time with the computation-, but he does provide a means by which pupils who need it can get help with algebraic computations, so that they will be better able to learn the physics. Best of all, he has done this by establishing a routine, so that he does not have to consider what to do anew with every physics problem he works on with the class. Apparently the routine works successfully, for in a later comment Ben notes that “a lot of students come in after school for help.” He goes further to recount the example of one student who was failing in the beginning of the year, but began coming after school for help with mathematics, and “ended up this quarter with an 85 average.”

Having established this routine, Ben draws on it for other types of situations as well. In a later incident he responds to a pupil question by saying, “You can calculate vertical displace- ment using this method - if you don’t believe me, we’ll do it after class.” Ben’s comment about this event is:

I think that I have an idea about what’s in his mind and where his confusion stems from, so I said come to me after class and I’ll show it to him a little more in depth, and kind of prove it to him. But I couldn’t prove it to him in the class time of a minute or so. It would take a few more minutes to do it, and I’m al- ready a little behind in this class.

In this argument Ben defines the situation mainly in terms of the context (where they are in relation to his plan). His two implicit value pre- mises have to do with pupil comprehension (to clear up the confusion in this pupil’s mind) and pace (to avoid getting too far behind in this class). His empirical premise notes the possibil- ity that he understands the source of the pupil’s confusion, and can therefore “prove” to him that this is the method for calculating vertical

displacement. He is certain, however, that such proof would take more than a minute or two of class time. His resultant action draws on the same routine as before. The pupil can come in after class for further help. Questioned about this move further, Ben notes:

Some questions that they ask are so involved that it’s not worth the class time for the other people to go into it. So I end up telling them that if you’re really interested, come see me after class. Of course. they come very rarely. Now and then they will -maybe once or twice all year. It’s kind of too bad.

Here Ben reveals his awareness of the differ- ences in results of the two applications of the same routine. Pupils do come in after class for help in algebraic computation. They do not come in to discuss questions that they raise in class, questions that may indicate some confu- sion about the concepts or processes being taught. But Ben does not change his behavior as a result of his awareness. He continues to see the two situations as analogous, possibly because both involve a potential waste of time for the majority of the class. Perhaps the key phrases in this comment are “if you’re really in- terested,” and “it’s kind of too bad.” Certainly Ben’s routine provides his pupils with the opportunity to have their questions answered. If they fail to take advantage of that opportun- ity, they may not be really interested, and that is, indeed, kind of too bad.

Discussion

The findings reported here indicate that analysis of teachers’ interactive thinking through use of the concept of the practical argu- ment has potentially useful applications in future research as well as in teacher education. The findings related to each of the three ques- tions addressed in this study are discussed briefly in this section, and some possible appli- cations are noted.

To begin with, it is important to note that practical arguments were readily identifiable in a fairly large proportion of the comments made by the prospective teachers in this study. It is also interesting to observe that there were no clear sub-group differences in the relative fre- quency of use of practical arguments. This find-

Premises in the Practical Arguments of Teachers 227

ing seems to support the idea that there is a clear distinction between practical arguments and logical arguments. Science/mathematics majors in this study had shown a tendency to exhibit more logical reasoning than English/social studies majors (Morine-Dershimer & Oliver, 1988), but there was no difference between these groups in their tendency to use practical arguments. Further, students who showed more complexity of thought about teaching were no more apt to construct practical arguments than students who showed less complexity. This suggests that the tendency to use practical reasoning is not a function of the practitioner’s cognitive structure. This finding needs to be tested further with larger groups of prospective or experienced teachers, but it fits the concept of the practical argument as explicated by Fenstermacher (1986).

The types of sub-categories of premises noted in the original case study (Morine-Dershimer, 1987b) were clearly present in the practical arguments of these secondary student teachers. The general patterns in use of these sub-cate- gories may reflect the context of the situation in which the data were gathered. For example, these students tended to state situational pre- mises that focused on the lesson context (primarily lesson plans and instructional tasks) and on their immediate observations of pupil behavior. Novice teachers tend to be tied to their lesson plans, and the novices in this study were asked to stop the videotape at points where they were aware of noticing something particular about pupils. These factors may have influenced the types of situational premises stated by these students. To take another example, prospective teachers in this study tended to frame their empirical premises im- plicitly rather than explicitly. This suggests that they had not yet clearly developed a set of prin- ciples to guide their instructional decisions, and this is hardly surprising, given their limited classroom experience. Finally, these students were more apt to state explicit value premises in discussing instructional values than they were in discussing managerial or socioemotional val- ues. This pattern could have been influenced by two contextual factors. First, instructional goals such as pupil comprehension and teacher clarity were goals that had been emphasized in the methods courses taken by these students just

prior to student teaching. Second, the stimu- lated recall interviews were conducted by in- structors in one of those methods courses, so students may have shared a common language with interviewers that enabled them to be more specific in commenting on their instructional values. The general patterns in use of types of sub-categories of premises need to be examined further in studies of both experienced and inex- perienced teachers, to determine the factors that may influence these aspects of practical arguments.

The various sub-groups of students in this study tended to exhibit somewhat different pat- terns in use of sub-categories. Since only eight student teachers participated in this study, any interpretations of the quantitative results must be considered speculative at best. However, while the patterns exhibited here were not tested for statistical significance because of the small numbers of students involved, they are for the most part patterns that are not unreason- able, given what we know from prior research. For example, the tendency for the more com- plex thinkers to state situational premises in terms of pupil characteristics more frequently than the less complex thinkers might be explained by the fact that more complex think- ers tend to process information by use of cate- gories or constructs. Reference to a pupil characteristic is in effect reference to a category that the student teacher is using to process infor- mation about that pupil’s behavior or perform- ance. Similarly, the tendency for science/ mathematics majors to state empirical premises with certainty more frequently than English/ social studies majors might be explained by the fact that these students are more practiced in making if-then statements, because their sub- ject areas emphasize deductive thought. The tendency for females to include implicit empiri- cal premises in their arguments more frequently than males might be explained by reference to stereotypical gender differences, which suggest that females are more hesitant about asserting a particular position. Similarly, stereotypical gen- der differences, suggesting that males exhibit more need to be in control might explain the tendency of males in this study to state value premises focused on management aspects of the lesson more frequently than females. In sum, the tendencies revealed by these findings are

228 GRETA MORINE-DERSHIMER

not totally unexpected tendencies. Further studies with larger numbers of student teachers and experienced teachers should be conducted to explore these patterns in more detail.

The findings of this study also indicate that the premises in the practical arguments of these secondary student teachers are related to con- cepts associated with research on effective teaching. In many instances, the actions as- sociated with these premises were appropriate, given the results of research on effective teach- ing. This is a welcome finding for any resear- chers who take seriously Fenstermacher’s (1986) criterion for judging the benefits of re- search on teaching. It is also a welcome finding for teacher educators who may be trying to in- clude information from research on teaching in their teacher preparation programs. (For a de- scription of how information from research on teaching was included in the Strategies course taken by these student teachers, see Morine- Dershimer, 1987a.)

The case studies presented here suggest that practical arguments which include value con- flicts may provide key leverage points, if we are interested in using research to improve the pre- mises in teachers’ practical arguments. For each of the three case studies presented here, it is possible to identify research that might be use- ful, given what we have learned about the val- ues and beliefs of these student teachers as a result of analyzing their practical arguments.

In Colleen’s case, having determined that her basic problem stems from her belief that she is required to engage pupils in an essentially val- ueless activity, we might provide information to show her that her efforts to engage pupils in dis- cussion are not adding any appreciable value to the activity, as well as providing information about alternative activities that might add some instructional value to the task. Kounin’s work on signal systems (Kounin & Gump, 1974) might serve to transform her empirical premise about task interference from a statement of pos- sibility to one of certainty. Information from re- search on cooperative learning (Slavin, 1983) could provide her with an alternative approach to the seatwork activity, one which could add both instructional and socioemotional value.

In Barbara’s case, having noted that she is better able to balance her conflicting values when she views the situation within the context

of her prior plans for the lesson, we might pro- vide information on the importance of routines in teachers’ decision making and classroom management. Such information might convince her to establish routines for returning quizzes and homework, so that pupils would know what to expect, and would not need to interrupt the lesson to relieve their anxieties. Rosenshine and Stevens’ (1986) explication of teaching func- tions might also be useful here, to alert Barbara to the importance of guided practice following presentation of new skills or procedures. If the lesson on division with positive and negative numbers were followed by guided practice, pupils would be active rather than bored, and Bill’s concerns about reducing in division could be dealt with individually, without any interrup- tion of the work of others.

In Ben’s case, the problem is less obvious, even to Ben. As we have noted, Ben interprets pupils’ questions more as an indication of in- terest in a side issue than as an indication of con- fusion or misconceptions about the concepts or processes being taught. Thus, he is saddened, but not concerned when these pupils do not come in after school for further discussion. Given this intepretation or belief, his actions are reasonable. How could research help to make his premises more objectively reasonable? Re- search on pupils’ conceptions and misconcep- tions in science could be useful here. Alerted to the possibility that pupils’ questions signal their confusion, Ben might be encouraged to develop new routines that could help him to determine when a question denotes confusion, and how widespread that confusion is. Armed with this knowledge, his reactions to pupil questions might exhibit a better balance as he continues to be confronted with value conflicts pitting pupil comprehension against lesson pace.

Clearly, the analysis of practical arguments can provide some interesting data regarding the reasonableness of student teachers’ actions. For purposes of instruction of these student teachers, however, the analysis process is too time consuming for daily use to be practicable. By the time these arguments were transcribed and analyzed, and appropriate research iden- tified to assist with improving the premises, the particular issues each student was dealing with would have long since been resolved in other ways, or the actions they were engaging in

Premises in the Practical Arguments of Teachers 229

would be developing into habits. A more gen- eral approach to improvement might be both practical and useful, however. Implicit value and empirical premises could be stated more explicitly, and situations could be defined more frequently in terms of context and pupil charac- teristics relative to the immediate behavior ob- served, thus placing the situation within some larger framework. “Improving” the premises in this generic sense could help student teachers to identify more clearly the situations and the value conflicts they face, and to deal with them more effectively. Stimulated recall interviews used as an instructional device, with the deliber- ate inclusion of more probing questions to elicit more complete descriptions of the situation and more specificity of premises might facilitate this process. Analysis by preservice teachers of case studies similar to the three presented here might also serve to point out characteristic situations and potential value conflicts, and make student teachers more readily aware of the values and beliefs they hold, and the value conflicts they themselves face.

In addition to yielding potential applications for teacher education, this study provides a further indication of the potential value of the concept of the practical argument for research on teacher thinking. As Table 3 of this paper indicates, it is possible to analyze practical argu- ments with a focus on the categories and sub- categories of premises, following the all too typical procedures of research on teacher infor- mation processing, and reducing data to counts of relative frequency. However, the concept of the practical argument requires the researcher to identify the associated action, and to search for the key that makes that action reasonable, and this requirement focuses the researcher’s attention directly on the relationship between thought and action. Thus, studies that investi- gate teachers’ practical arguments will necessar- ily be responsive to the central issue that initially prompted research on teacher thinking. In fact, studies along these lines should be more

responsive to this central issue than much of the research to date has actually been. For this rea- son, if for no other, further studies of this nature are in order.

References

Doyle, W. (1986). Classroom organization and manage- ment. In M. C. Wittrock (Ed.), Handbook of research on teaching (3rd ed., pp. 392-431). New York: Macmillan.

Fenstermacher, G. D. (1978). A philosophical considera- tion of recent research on teacher effectiveness. In L. S. Shulman (Ed.). Review of research in education (pp. 157- 185). Itasca, IL: F. E. Peacock.

Fenstermacher, G. D. (1986). Philopshy of research on teaching: Three aspects. In M. C. Wittrock (Ed.), Hand- book of research on reaching (3rd ed., pp. 3749). New York: Macmillan.

Femstermacher, G. D. (1987). A reply to my critics. Educa- tional Theory, 37 413-421.

Green, T. F. (1976). Teacher competence as practical rationality. Educational Theory, 26,249-2X

Kounin, J., & Gump, P. (1974). Signalsystemsoflessonset- tings and the task related behavior of preschool children. Journal of Educational Psychology, 66,554-562.

Leinhardt, G., & Greeno, J. G. (1986). The cognitive skill of teaching. Journal of Educational Psychology, 78, 75- 95.

Morine-Dershimer, G. (1987a). Informal theory and in- structional practice: Sensemaking makes sense. Theory Into Practice, 26 59-66.

Morine-Dershimer, G. (1987b). Practical examples of the practical argument: A case in point. Educational Theory, 37,395-407.

Morine-Dershimer, G., & Oliver, B. (1988). Examining complexity of thought in secondary student teachers. In C. Clark. J. Lowyck, & R. Halkes (Eds.), Teacherrhink- ing and professional action (in press). Tilburg, The Netherlands: International Study Association on Teacher Thinking (ISATT).

Rosenshine, B., & Stevens, R. S. (1986). Teaching func- tions. In M. C. Wittrock (Ed.), Handbook of research on reaching (3rd ed., pp. 376-391). New York: Macmillan.

Shulman, L. (1986). Paradigms and research programs in the study of teaching: A contemporary perspective. In M. C. Wittrock (Ed.), Handbook of research on teaching (3rd ed., pp. 3-36). New York: Macmillan.

Slavin, R. (1983). Cooperative learning. Research on teach- ing monograph series. New York: Longman.

Received 30 March 1988 Cl