preparing the record for appeal and tips for appellate ......preparing the record for appeal and...
TRANSCRIPT
Winter 2011 Kelly A. Benedict & Jo H. Stegall III, editors Section Newsletter
1. Thinkabouttheappealprocesswhenyouarecreatingtherecord.Keeptherecordclean.Statetheissuesclearlyatthebeginningofthehearingsothatthereisnodoubtthatallissueshavebeenraisedattheappropriatetime.Attheappellatelevel,reframeyourissuestofocusontheALJ’serror.
2. Donotinterrupteachotherorthewitnesses.Whentwoattorneysaretalkingovereachotheroranattorneyandawitnessaretalkingatthesametime,notonlydoestheALJbecomefrustrated,butthecourtreportermaynotcapturetheexactconversationeither.Whenyou(oryourassociate)readthetranscripttowritethebrief,itwillbeajumbledmess.Mostsignificantly,whentheappellatecourtslookatthetranscript,theywillbefrustratedwiththeinabilitytoreadacompleteandintactquestionandanswer.Withoutthefacetofaceinteractionthatoccursatthehearinglevel,thesignificanceoftheevidencepresentedmaybelostinthefrustrationofreadingamessyandconfusingtranscript.So,avoidthisproblemthroughwitnesspreparation.Explaintothewitnessthatbothyourquestionandhisanswerareimportantandthatthejudgeneedstoheareverythingclearly.Explainthattheriskofspeakingprematurelyisthathewillnotunderstandoranswerthequestionyouintended.Finally,despiteyourunendingdesiretospeak,holdyourtongueandwaituntilyourwitnesscompleteshisanswerbeforecontinuing.Keepyourquestionssimple.Donotusewordsthatyourwitnessmaynotknow.Askonlyonequestionatatime.
3. PresentyourcaseinanorderlyfashionatthehearingsothattheALJandappellatecourtsunderstandyourposition.Keepinmindthatwhileyouhavebeenlivingwiththeclaimandknowthesequenceofeventsalltoowell,theALJandappellatecourtsdonotevenknowwhattype
ofworktheEmployeeperformed.Itiseasiertounderstandanovelifyoustartatthebeginningandworktotheend.Thesameistruewithaclaim.Presentthesequenceofeventsinalogicalfashion,tellingtheEmployee’sstoryfromthebeginning.
4. Anticipateevidentiaryobjectionsandbepreparedwithalegalbasisforyourpositionastotheadmissibilityofevidence.BringcopiesofsupportingcaselawfortheALJtoreview.Offertobrieftheissueandaskthatarulingontheadmissibilitybedeferred.Ifyouoffertobrieftheissue,besuretodoso.Makeanofferofproofifanevidentiaryrulingdoesnotgoyourway.Thisistheonlywaytheappellatecourtswillbeabletoconsidertheadmissibility(andthesubstanceifadmissible)oftheevidence.Ensurethatallappropriatewitnesses(includingthosenecessarytotheintroductionofdocumentaryevidence)attendthehearingandthatyouwillbeabletoclosetherecord(otherthanbriefs)attheendofthehearing.Writeoutyourquestionsorimportantpointstocover.Itistooeasytogetcaughtupinanevidentiaryissueandtoforgettoproveacrucialelementwithoutareferencesheet.
5. IfyouwanttheALJtotakejudicialnoticeofaBoardform,besurethatallapplicableinformationontheformisreadintotherecordbyeitheryouorthejudge.Remember,theformwillnottravelaspartoftherecord.
6. Donotleadyourownwitnesses.TheALJandappellatecourtsarenotissuingrulingsbasedonthetestimonyoftheattorneys.Thetestimonyislesspersuasiveifitcomesfromyouratherthanfromthewitness.
7. Donotmakeassumptions.Donotassumethatsomethingthatseemslikeitshouldbecommonknowledgedoesnothavetobeprovedatahearing.ThinkabouteverythingtheALJ/appellate
Preparing the Record for Appeal and Tips for Appellate Practice at the BoardBy Judge Melodie Belcher & Delece Brooks
Workers’ Compensation Law Section
courtsmustknowforyoutowinandconsiderhowtoproveit.
8. Hirecompetentinterpreters.Makesurethattheyareexperiencedinthelanguagethatneedstobetranslatedandthattheyhavecourtroomexperience.Ifyoudonottrusttheinterpretertheopposingpartyisproviding,bringyourowninterpreterandposeobjectionsifnecessary.Instructwitnessestospeakinonelanguageonly
andtowaituntiltheinterpreterfinishesinterpretingbeforeansweringthequestion.Again,constantinterruptionsmakeforasloppyrecord.
9. Organizeyourexhibitsandmarkeachpagewithboththeexhibitnumberandthepagenumber.Donotduplicateexhibits.Donottenderirrelevantmedicaldocumentationsuchashospitalinstructions.Donottenderillegiblerecords.Ifyoucannotreadthem,chancesaretheALJcannotreadthemeither.Tenpagesofextremelyrelevantmedicalevidencearemuchmorepersuasivethanonehundredpagesofnurses’notes,cardiacgraphs,EMGgraphsandtreatmentnotesforunrelatedillnesses.Ifyouhaveastackofmedicalthatissolargethatyoudonotwanttobebotheredgoingthroughittoweedouttheirrelevantstuff,itisagoodbetthattheALJandappellatecourtsarenotgoingtowanttogothroughiteither,andtheymayendupmissingsomethingyoubelieveisimportant.Includeacoversheetdelineatingtheoutstandingmedicalbills.
10.Whenappealingtothehighercourts,theappealingpartypaysforthetransmittaloftherecordanditmustbedonewithin30days.Thecostis$10.00forthefirst10pagesand.50foreverypagethereafter.PursuanttoBoardRule105(f),youmayrequestawaiver.Upongoodcauseshown,theBoardmaywaivethecopyingandtransmittalcosts.Onlythetrialrecordissent–nottheentireBoardfile.Thiswouldincludethetranscript,exhibits,briefs,WC-14,ALJawardandAppellatedecision.Therecordissentinpaperviacertifiedmail.Theappealingpartymustrequestthatitbesenttothecountywheretheinjuryoccurredandifoutofstate,itisgenerallysenttoFultonCounty.
11.WhenappealingtotheAppellateDivision,bespecificwithyourenumerationsoferror.StateexactlyhowyouthinktheALJwasincorrectinhisorheraward.
12.BriefstotheAppellateDivisionshouldnotrehashthesameinformationthatisintheALJbrief.Ifyoudonothaveanynewarguments,justindicatetotheAppellateDivisionthatyouarerelyingontheALJbrief.ItiscertainlyacceptableandoftenpersuasiveforthebriefstobeshortandtofocusonaspecificissuethatyoucontendtheALJgotwrong.
13.EffectiveJuly1,2010,apartyscheduledfororalargumentisrequiredtonotifytheAppellateDivisionnolaterthan48(business)hoursbeforethescheduledappearanceifthepartydoesnotintendtoappear.TheAppellateDivisionallowsonlyoneresetanditmustbeforahighercourtconflictoraverygoodreason(deathinthefamily,seriousillness).Youmustfaxarequesttothe
Winter 2011 3
AppellateDivision48businesshourspriortothehearing.Keepinmindthatoralargumentisnotarightandiftheresetisnotgranted,theAppellateDivisionmaydecidethecaseontheargumentofthepartywhoappearsandthebriefs.
14.BriefsattheAppellateDivisionaredue20daysfromthedaytheappealisfiledandarelimitedto20pagesunlessotherwiseapprovedbytheBoard.BoardRule103(b)(4).Theappelleehas20daystorespond.Ifyouneedanextension,itmustberequestedinwritingevenifallpartiesagree.Ifanextensionisgranted,itwilllikelybeforoneweekonly.
15.IfyouwouldliketheAppellateDivisiontoholdtherulingonanappeal,becauseyouaretryingtosettletheclaim,theywilldosofor30daysonly.Thentheywillruleontheappeal.
16.Whenmakingyouroralargument,focusonthestrongestpoints.Bepreparedtoanswerquestionsfromthejudges.Youmaymakeanoralmotionforassessedattorney’sfees,butyoumustprovideevidenceofyourtimeandexpertise.
17.Ifyouareappealinganinterlocutoryissue,remembertoproperlyrequesttheALJtocertifyhisorherorderforappeal.Otherwise,yourappealwillbedismissedforlackofjurisdiction.BoardRule103(d).
18.Ifyouareappealingaclaiminvolvingmultipleaccidentdates,bespecificastowhatdatesofaccidentyouareinfactappealing.
19. IfyouwouldliketofileaMotionforReconsiderationofanALJaward,fileyourappealatthesametime.The20dayclockrunssimultaneouslyonboth.YoucanalwaysdismissyourappealiftheALJgrantstherequestedchange.Also,ifyoufileMotionsforReconsiderationdonotuseaWC-102(d).ThereisnotaformforaMotionforReconsideration,butthereisadoctypeinICMS.ThisappliesattheALJlevelandattheAppellateDivision.BesuretocalltheALJortheAppellateDivisionifyoufileaMotionforReconsiderationtomakethemawareofit,andtheAppellateDivisionwouldlikeacourtesycopyfaxedtothemaswell.FileMotionsforReconsiderationassoonaspossibletoallowtheALJsortheAppellateDivisiontimetoruleonthem.
20.Finally,thereisnowsecurityattheAppellateDivisioncourtroom.Planaheadandarriveearly.Youwon’twanttobelate!
4 Workers’ Compensation Law Section
I thasbeenalmosttenyearssincetheCentersforMedicareandMedicaidServices(CMS)releaseditsseminalpolicymemoranduminJuly,2001,
(knownasthe“PatelMemo”)1formallyintroducingtheMedicareSet-Aside(MSA)inrelationtoworkers’compensation(WC)settlements.TheWC-MSAistheagency’srecommendedcompliancemechanismtoprotectMedicare’s“futureinterests”undertheMedicareSecondaryPayerStatute(MSP).2
Onmanylevels,theWC-MSAhasrevolutionizedclaimspracticesandopenednewfrontsofpotentialexposure.Inadditiontoaddingachallenginglayerofcomplexitytoclaimshandling,theWC-MSAhassignificantlyincreasedcasevaluesandhascomplicated(and,insomeinstances,evenprevented)claimsettlement.
WhiletheindustryhascertainlymadestridesinbecomingbetterfamiliarizedwithCMS’everchangingpoliciesandprocedures,therestillremainsagooddealofconfusion,misunderstandingandmisapplicationofCMS’WC-MSAreviewthresholds.Likewise,howtohandle“non-threshold”cases(thosecasesthatdonotmeetCMS’WC-MSAreviewthresholds)continuestopresentformidablechallengesforpractitionersandtheclaimsindustryingeneral.
ThisarticledissectsCMS’WC-MSAreviewthresholds,highlightspotentialpitfallsregardingcertaindefinitionalcomponentsofthereviewthresholds(e.g.thepopular$24,999.99settlement),andaddressesthetroublingareaofMSPcomplianceinnon-thresholdcases.3
Part ICMS’ WC-MSA Review Thresholds: Understanding the Criteria & Avoiding the Pitfalls
A. Commutation v. Compromise Settlements
42C.F.R.§411.46istheregulationoftencitedbyCMSastheprimarybasisfortheWC-MSA.Subsection(a)ofthisregulationstatesasfollows:
Lump-sumcommutationoffuturebenefits.Ifalump-sumcompensationawardstipulatesthattheamountpaidisintendedtocompensatetheindividualforallfuturemedicalexpensesrequiredbecauseofthework-relatedinjuryordisease,Medicarepaymentsforsuchservicesareexcluded
untilmedicalexpensesrelatedtotheinjuryordiseaseequaltheamountofthelumpsumpayment.
Furthermore,subsection(b)(2)ofthisregulationprovidesthatifasettlement“appears to represent an attempt to shift to Medicare the responsibility for payment of medical expenses for the treatment of a work related condition, the settlement will not be recognized.”
UnderCMS’WC-MSAframework,theinitialscreeningtestindeterminingwhethertheagencydeemsaMSAappropriaterequiresanassessmentofthetypeofsettlementatissue.Inthisrespect,CMSclassifiesWCsettlementsascommutationorcompromisesettlements.4
CMSprovidesalengthyoverviewofcommutation vs. compromisecasesinitsJuly23,2001andApril23,2003policymemorandawhichtheauthorsuggeststhereadercarefullyreviewintheirentirety.Understandingtheagency’sapproachinthisrespectisimportantasitdictateswhetherornotconsiderationofaWC-MSAisnecessary.
PerCMS,aMSAisappropriateonlyinrelationtosettlementsthatpossessacommutation aspect.5Ingeneral,CMSviewsacommutation settlementasonethatcompensatesworkersforfuturemedicalexpensesrelatedtotheworkinjury;whileacompromise settlementisviewedasasettlementthatcompensatesonlycurrentorpastmedicalexpenses.6Asettlementcouldpossessbothacommutationandcompromiseaspect.7
CMSindicatesthatadmissionofliabilityisnotthesoledeterminingfactorofwhetherornotasettlementisconsideredacommutationorcompromise.8Alongtheselines,CMSstatesthatasettlementwhichdoesnotprovideforfuturemedicalscouldstillpossessacommutationaspectifthefactsindicateaneedforfuturemedicalcareinrelationtotheWCinjury.9
Onceitisdeterminedthataparticularsettlementisacommutation,containsacommutationcomponent,orcouldpossiblybeviewedbyCMSaspossessingacommutationaspect,thefocusshiftstodeterminingwhetherornotthecasemeetsCMS’WC-MSAreviewthresholds.
B. CMS’ Current WC-MSA Review Thresholds
CMShasestablishedtwospecific“reviewthresholds”forWCcases.IfaWCsettlementmeetseitheroneofthebelowthresholds,CMSdeemssubmissionofaWC-MSAproposalforitsreviewandapprovalappropriate.10
CMS’currentWC-MSAreviewthresholdsareasfollows:
Understanding CMS’ WC-MSA Review Thresholds & Addressing “Non-Threshold” Cases By Mark Popolizio, Esquire, NuQuest/Bridge Pointe
Winter 2011 5
Threshold #1à Medicare Beneficiaries
TheclaimantisaMedicarebeneficiaryatthetimeofsettlementandthetotalsettlementamountisgreaterthan$25,000;or
Threshold #2 à Non-Medicare Beneficiaries
TheclaimantisnotaMedicarebeneficiaryatthetimeofthesettlement,buthasareasonableexpectationofMedicareenrollmentwithin30monthsofthesettlementdateandthetotalsettlementamountisgreaterthan$250,000.11
Inordertodeterminepotentialapplicabilityofthereviewthresholds,itisimperativetounderstandhowCMSdefines(a)total settlement amountand(b)reasonable expectation of Medicare enrollment.
CMS’ Definition of Total Settlement Amount
Theconceptoftotal settlement amountrelatestohowCMScalculatesthemonetarycomponentofitsreviewthresholds.
CMSdefinesthetermtotal settlement amountasfollows:
Totalsettlementamountincludes,butisnotlimitedto,wages,attorneyfees,allfuturemedicalexpenses(includingprescriptiondrugs)andrepaymentofanyMedicareconditionalpayments.Payouttotalsforallannuitiestofundtheaboveexpensesshouldbeusedratherthancostorpresentvaluesofanyannuities.AlsonotethatanypreviouslysettledportionoftheWCclaimmustbeincludedincomputingthetotalsettlement.12
CMS’definitionoftotal settlement amountshouldbecarefullyexaminedtomakesurethatallrelevantfactorsarebeingconsidered.
Forexample,closeattentionshouldbepaidtohowtheagencycalculatesthetotal settlement amountwhenannuitiesareused.Inthiscontext,CMSstatesthatthetotalpayouttotheclaimantshouldbeusedinthecalculation--notthecostorpresentdayvalueoftheannuity.13
Furthermore,“any previously settled portion of the WC claim” isincludedincalculatingthetotal settlement amount.Unfortunately,theagencyhasnotprovidedanyfurtherguidanceastoexactlywhatmaybeconsideredtofallwithinthisconcept.Assuch,thiscouldverylikelycreateuncertaintyinparticularsituationsinlightofthewidearrayofpaymentarrangementsandoptionscommonlyusedinWCpractice.
Notwithstanding,thisfactorwouldatleastseemtohavespecificapplicationinthosejurisdictionswhereitiscommonpracticetosettleoutindemnity(leavingmedicalsopen)atonepoint,followedbyasettlementoffuturemedicalsatsomesubsequentpointintime.PerCMS’definition,theamountofthepriorindemnitysettlementwouldseeminglyneedtobeaddedtotheamountofthe
subsequentmedicalsettlementamounttodetermineifsaidsumexceedstheapplicablemonetarythresholds.
Anotherareaofcautionconcernsthe“repayment of any Medicare conditional payments”aspectofthetotal settlement amountdefinition.14Thiscallsintoparticularfocusthepopular$24,999.99settlement(orasettlementforsomeotheramountthatiscloseto,butdoesnotexceed,CMS’$25,000monetarythreshold)inrelationtosettlementsinvolvingMedicarebeneficiaries(Threshold#1).ThisapproachisoftenutilizedinanattempttokeeptheclaimbelowCMS’WC-MSAreviewthresholds.
However,despitetheparties’intentions,itispossiblethatthecasecouldendupmeetingCMS’WC-MSAreviewthresholdswhenconditionalpaymentsaretakenintoaccount.Unfortunately,CMShasnotprovidedmuchbywayofinterpretationalguidanceonexactlyhowconditionalpaymentsshouldactuallybefactoredfortotal settlement amountcalculationpurposes,and,thus,hasleftkeyquestionsunansweredregardingthepracticalapplicationofthisdefinitionalcomponent.
Forexample,CMS’useoftheword“repayment”isinterestinginthattakenliterallythiscouldbeinterpretedtomeanthattheincludableconditionalpaymentamountisthe“final”conditionalpaymentamountthatisultimatelydeterminedtobereimbursabletoCMS.However,underCMS’currentpolicy,thepartiesgenerallycannotobtain
6 Workers’ Compensation Law Section
CMS’“final”conditionalpaymentamountuntilaftertheclaimissettledandtheexecutedsettlementagreementissenttotheagency’scontractor.15
Thiswouldraisethequestionofhowdeterminingtheactualamountofconditionalpaymentstoberepaidcouldbeascertainedwithoutthepartiesfirstsettlingthecase.Thiswouldseeminglycreateanimpracticaland,perhaps,unworkablescenarioonmanylevels,andwouldlikelyinjectadditionaldelayandcomplicationtotheprocess.
AbsentclarificationfromCMS,practitionersarelefttowrestlewithhowbesttoaddressthe“repayment of any Medicare conditional payments” componentofCMS’definitionfromapracticalstandpoint.
Alongtheselines,addressingthisissuewouldatleastseemtoentailconsideringCMS’claimedconditionalpaymentamountatthetimeofsettlement,orperhapsfromsomeotherlogicalandacceptablemeasuringpointshortofactuallyobtainingCMS’“final”conditionalpaymentamount.Indoingso,itmaybediscoveredthatthisfigurebyitself,whenaddedtotheactualsettlementamounttobepaidtotheclaimant,couldendupyieldingatotal settlement amount greaterthanthe$25,000thresholdamount.
However,thesepracticalapproaches(assumingthatCMSwouldevenpermitsame)raisetheirownquestionsandissues.Forinstance,thefirstquestionthatsurfacesishowwouldtheconceptof“atthetimeofsettlement”bedefined?ThiscouldproveparticularlyproblematicgiventhatunderthecurrentprocessitcouldtakeafewmonthstoobtainaconditionalpaymentfigurefromCMS.Thus,shouldthepartiesbepermittedtousetheinterimconditionalpaymentamountthattheymayhavereceivedfromCMSduringthecourseoftheclaim?Ifso,howrecentshouldthisfigurebe?16
Assuminganacceptablemeasuringpointcouldbeestablished,additionalquestionsarise.Shouldthegrossfigureoftheclaimedconditionalpaymentamountbeused?Dependingonthespecificfacts,usingthegrossfiguremayverywellincreasetheprospectsthatthemonetarythresholdcouldendupbeingpierced.Or,shouldtheincludableamountbelimitedtotheamountthatwouldbe(orcouldbe)actuallyreimbursableundertheregulatoryreimbursementprovisionscontainedin42C.F.R.§411.24and42C.F.R.§411.37?
Limitingtheincludableamountofconditionalpaymentsinthismannercouldpreventaclaimincertaincircumstancesfromexceedingthemonetarythreshold.17
(Caveat: The above approaches are presented for illustrative discussion purposes only. In presenting same, the author is not stating or otherwise suggesting that these approaches represent, or could represent, a proper interpretation of CMS’ policy, or that same would necessarily be accepted by the agency).
Whilelegitimateinterpretationalquestionsremain,itisimportanttorecognizethelargerissues:(1)Thatthe“repayment of conditional payments” componentofthetotal settlement amountdefinitionmustbeconsidered,and(2)Thatindoingso,asettlementthatisseeminglybelow(andintendedtobebelow)the$25,000monetarythresholdcouldactuallyendupgettingtippedoverandintoCMS’WC-MSAreviewthresholds.
CMS’ Definition of Reasonable Expectation of Medicare
Theconceptofreasonable expectation of Medicare enrollmentdealswiththoseclaimantswhoarenotMedicarebeneficiariesatthetimeofsettlement.ThisrelatesdirectlytoCMS’WC-MSAreviewthresholdpertainingtonon-Medicarebeneficiaries(Threshold#2).
CMSdefinesreasonable expectationinitsApril23,2003,memorandumasfollows:
WhendealingwithaWCcase,whatis“areasonableexpectation”ofMedicareenrollmentwithin30months?
Answer:Situationswhereanindividualhasa“reasonableexpectation”ofMedicareenrollmentforanyreasonincludebutarenotlimitedto:
a)TheindividualhasappliedforSocialSecurityDisabilityBenefits;
b)TheindividualhasbeendeniedSocialSecurityDisabilityBenefitsbutanticipatesappealingthatdecision;
c)Theindividualisintheprocessofappealingand/orre-filingforSocialSecurityDisabilityBenefits;
d)Theindividualis62yearsand6monthsold(i.e.,maybeeligibleforMedicarebaseduponhis/heragewithin30months);or
e)TheindividualhasanEndStageRenalDisease(ESRD)conditionbutdoesnotyetqualifyforMedicarebaseduponESRD.
Winter 2011 7
Aswillbenoted,threeofthefactors(a-c)revolvearoundtheclaimant’ssocialsecuritydisability(SSD)status.Todeterminewhether(a-c)couldbeapplicable,directmeasuresneedtobetakentodeterminetheclaimant’sSSDstatus.Fromtheauthor’sviewpoint,bestpracticeswoulddictatethatthisdeterminationbemadeviadirectinquirytothesocialsecurityadministration(SSA)foravarietyofreasons.Importantly,itshouldbenotedthatCMS’QueryFunctionprocessestablishedtodetermineaclaimant’sMedicarestatusinthecontextofMedicare’snewnoticeandreportinglaw(Section111oftheMedicare,MedicaidandSCHIPExtensionActof2007)18willnotprovideanyinformationrelatedtotheclaimant’ssocialsecuritystatus.
Inaddition,specialattentiontofactors(b)and(c)isalsoinorder.Specifically,itshouldbenotedtheultimateapplicabilityofthesefactorscouldhingeontheclaimant’sintentionsandrepresentations.Forexample,assumetheSSAprovidesconfirmationthattheclaimant’sapplicationforSSDwasdenied,andthathe/shehasnotappealedorre-filedforSSD.Thisinformationisindeedimportant,butitisonlypartoftheanalysis.
PerCMS’definition,iftheclaimantinthissituation“anticipates appealing that decision”oris“in the process of appealing and/or re-filing” forSSD,CMSconsidershim/hertohaveareasonable expectation of Medicare enrollment.Thus,aspartofclaimspractice,practitionersshoulddevelopthenecessarypracticalapproachestoproperlyaddressthisaspectofCMS’definitionintermsofdocumenting(asbestaspossible)aclaimant’sintentionsandrepresentations.Defensepractitionersshouldconsultwiththeirclientstodetermineiftheyhaveanyspecificprotocolstobefollowedinthissituation.
Part IINon-Threshold Cases: Addressing Settlements That Do NotMeet CMS’ WC-MSA Review Thresholds
IfitisdeterminedthatthesettlementdoesnotmeetCMS’WC-MSAreviewthresholds,thefocusshiftstowhatobligationsthepartiesmayhavefromCMS’perspectivetoconsiderMedicare’sinterestsin“non-threshold”cases.
Onthispoint,CMSstatesasfollowsinitsJuly11,2005memo:
Q1 Clarification of WCMSA Review Thresholds – ShouldIestablishaWorkers’CompensationMedicareSet-asideArrangement(WCMSA)evenifIamnotyetaMedicarebeneficiaryand/orevenifIdonotmeettheCMSthresholdsforreviewofaWCMSAproposal?
A1 ThethresholdsforreviewofaWCMSAproposalareonlyCMSworkloadreviewthresholds,notsubstantivedollaror“safeharbor”thresholds
forcomplyingwiththeMedicareSecondaryPayerlaw.UndertheMedicareSecondaryPayerprovisions,Medicareisalwayssecondarytoworkers’compensationandotherinsurancesuchasno-faultandliabilityinsurance.Accordingly,allbeneficiariesandclaimantsmustconsiderandprotectMedicare’sinterestwhensettlinganyworkers’compensationcase;evenifreviewthresholdsarenotmet,Medicare’sinterestmustalwaysbeconsidered.(EmphasisbyCMS).
CMSrevisitedtheissueinitsApril25,2006,stating,inpertinentpart,asfollows:
TheCMSwishestostress[thatthe$25,000monetarythresholdrelatedtoMedicarebeneficiaries]isaCMSworkload review thresholdandnotasubstantivedollaror“safeharbor”threshold.Medicarebeneficiariesmust stillconsiderMedicare’sinterestsinallWCcasesandensurethatMedicareissecondarytoWCinsuchcases.(EmphasisbyCMS).
Fromthesestatements,important(andtroubling)piecesofthepuzzlefallintoplace:First,CMSdoesnotconsideritsWC-MSAreviewthresholdstobesafeharbors.Second,CMSexpectsitsintereststobeconsideredandprotectedinallWCsettlements,regardlessofwhetherornotthesettlementmeetsthereviewthresholds.Butwhatdoesthismeanexactly?
Unfortunately,CMShasnotreallyprovidedmuchbywayofguidance.Asaresult,CMShasessentiallyplacedtheindustryintheverypeculiarpositionofhavingtodevelopitsownpracticeprotocolsregardingwhen,andhow,toconsiderandprotectMedicare’sinterestsinrelationtonon-thresholdsettlements.
Inresponse,manyprimarypayershavedevelopedspecificinternalprotocolsregardinghownon-thresholdcaseswillbeaddressed.Theseprotocolstypicallyinvolveincludingsomeformoffuturemedicalallocationorprojectionaspartofthesettlement.Acommonmechanismusedinthiscontextisa“non-thresholdMSA.”(Forpurposesofthisanalysis,theauthorwilldiscusstheissueintermsofusinganon-thresholdMSA).Itisimportanttonotethatanon-thresholdMSA(orwhateverothermechanismthatmaybeused)isnotsubmittedtoCMSforreviewandapprovalastheclaiminthiscontextdoesnotmeettheagency’sreviewthresholds.19
Determiningexactlywhentoincludeanon-thresholdMSAinvolvesconsiderationofmanydifferentfactorsthatdifferfromprimarypayertoprimarypayer,andpractitionertopractitioner.Fromtheauthor’sexperienceandobservation,somefactorscommonlyconsideredbytheindustryweighinginfavorofincludinganon-thresholdMSAare:
1. AcaseinvolvingaMedicarebeneficiarywherethetotalsettlementis$25,000,orless.Inthisinstance,therationaletoincludeanon-thresholdMSAisthatMedicare’sinterestsarealreadyimplicatedastheclaimantisaMedicarebeneficiary.(CMS’April25,
8 Workers’ Compensation Law Section
2006memorandumcouldbeviewedassupportingthisrationale).
2. Asettlementinvolvinganon-Medicarebeneficiarywhereone,butnotboth,ofCMS’WC-MSAreviewthresholdsfornon-Medicarebeneficiariesismet.
Forexample,thesettlementisbelowthe$250,000monetarythreshold,butthefactsindicatethattheclaimanthasareasonable expectation of Medicare enrollment;orithasbeendeterminedthattheclaimantwillinfactbecomeaMedicarebeneficiaryatsomepointafterthesettlement(e.g.theclaimantwhoisaSSDbeneficiaryatthetimeofthesettlement,butwhoseMedicarebenefitsinconnectiontotheSSDawardarenotscheduledtocommenceuntilsomepointaftersettlement).Therationaletoincludeanon-thresholdMSAintheseinstancesispremiseduponthefactthatMedicare’sinterestscould be,orwill in fact be, implicatedafterthesettlement.
3. Adecisionmaybemadetoincludeanon-thresholdMSAinrelationtoasettlementthatexceedsthe$250,000monetarythreshold,eventhoughtheclaimantdoesnothaveareasonable expectation of Medicare enrollment.Therecouldbeseveraldifferentrationalesorconcernsatplaypromptingthisdecisionbaseduponthespecificfactualsituation.
Theaboveconsiderationsarebynomeansinclusive,andeachnon-thresholdcaseshouldbecloselyanalyzedtodetermineiftakingaffirmativestepstoconsiderandprotectMedicare’sinterestswouldbeappropriate.
Inaddressingthisissue,defensepractitionersshouldcontacttheirclientstodetermineiftheyhaveinfactestablishedspecificnon-thresholdprotocols.Ifso,thedefensepractitionershouldbecomefamiliarwiththeclient’sprotocolstoensurethathe/sheisproperlycomplyingwithsameaspartofhis/herclaimshandlingandsettlementpractice.Iftheclienthasnotestablishednon-thresholdcriteria,thedefensepractitionershouldconsultwiththeclienttoconfirmthattheyhaveacompleteandproperunderstandingoftheissue.
Asforclaimantpractitioners,itwouldbeprudenttoinquireastowhetherornottheprimarypayerinvolvedinyourcasewillrequireanon-thresholdMSA.Additionally,claimantpractitionersshouldindependentlyaddressthisissueandconsiderdevelopingtheirownnon-thresholdprotocolsandpracticeparameters.
ConclusionInmanyrespects,thereiscertainlymorethanmeets
theeyewhenassessingpossibleapplicabilityofCMS’WC-MSAreviewthresholds.Determiningwhetherornotasettlementmeets(ormaymeet)areviewthresholdrequirescarefulexaminationofthevariousdefinitionalcomponentsestablishedbyCMS.Thisanalysiscanbecomplicatedinparticularsituationsinlightofthefactthereremainseveralquestionsanduncertaintiesregardinghowspecificcomponentsofthereviewthresholdsaretobeinterpreted
(orcouldbeinterpreted).
Whenthedustsettles,itisimperativethatthepractitionerhasafirmunderstandingofCMS’WC-MSAreviewthresholdsandrecognizestheissuespresentedbynon-thresholdcasesinrelationtoeffectiveclaimshandling,protectingclientinterests,andminimizingpotentialexposure(forboththeirclientsandthemselves).
Mark Popolizio, Esquire, is the Vice President of Customer Relations for NuQuest/Bridge Pointe
Prior to joining NuQuest, he practiced workers’ compensation and liability legal defense for 10 years. During this time, he developed a national Medicare practice which included MSA and Medicare Compliance. Mark is very active on the national MSA/Medicare educational and training circuit. He is a regularly featured speaker on MSA/Medicare issues before carriers/TPAs, state bar associations and industry specific organizations.
Popolizio served as vice president of the National Alliance of Medicare Set-Aside Professionals (NAMSAP) from 2006-2008 and remains active with NAMSAP concentrating on educational and legislative matters. Mark is also involved with current MSP reform efforts in Congress (H.R. 4796). Mark has also published numerous articles on MSA/ Medicare issues.
He is licensed to practice law in Florida and Connecticut and can be reached at 786-457-4393 or via e-mail at [email protected].
(Endnotes)1. ParasherB.Patel,CMSMemorandumtoAllRegional
Administrators,Workers’CompensationCommutationof FutureBenefits,July23,2001.
2. TheMedicareSecondaryPayerStatute(MSP)iscodifiedat42U.S.C.§1395y,et.seq.Inaddition,pertinentprovisionsrelatedtoMSPcompliancearecontainedinSubpartsB,CandDof Title42of theCodeof FederalRegulations(42C.F.R.§§411.20through411.50,et.seq.)
3. Theauthorunderstandsthelargerargumentsraisedinsomequartersquestioningtheunderlyingvalidityandlegalauthorityof CMS’WC-MSAprocess,administrativeframework(orlackthereof),andpolicymemorandainregardtotheissueof whatever“legal”obligationsmayexist,orwhichmaybeconsideredappropriateundertheMSP.Whiletheauthoracknowledgestheseissuesandarguments,thatlargerdebateisnotthefocusof thisarticle.
4. ParasherB.Patel,CMSMemorandumtoAllRegionalAdministrators,Workers’CompensationCommutationof FutureBenefits,July23,2001,p.2-5andThomasL.Grissom,CMSMemorandumtoAllRegionalAdministrators,MedicareSecondaryPayer–Workers’Compensation(WC)FrequentlyAskedQuestions,April22,2003,p.2-3(FAQNo.4).
5. Patel,atp.2andGrissom,atp.2.
6. Patel,atp.3andGrissom,atp.2
7. Id.
Winter 2011 9
8. Patel,atp.2-3andGrissom,atp.2.
9. Patel,atp.2-3andGrissom,atp.2-3.ThefollowingstatementandexamplecontainedinCMS’April23,2003,memorandumhighlightstheagency’spositiononthispoint:Additionally,asettlementpossessesacommutationaspectif itdoesnotprovideforfuturemedicalexpenseswhenthefactsof thecaseindicatetheneedforcontinuedmedicalcarerelatedtotheWCillnessorinjury.Example:Thepartiestoasettlementmayattempttomaximizetheamountofdisability/lostwagespaidunderWCbyreleasingtheWCcarrierfromliabilityformedicalexpenses.If thefactsshowthatthisparticularconditioniswork-relatedandrequirescontinuedtreatment,MedicarewillnotpayformedicalservicesrelatedtotheWCinjury/illnessuntiltheentiresettlementhasbeenusedtopayforthoseservices.
10. Asstated,theWC-MSAandCMS’reviewprocessregardingsameistheagency’srecommendedmethodtoprotectitsfutureinterestsundertheMSP.Inthisregard,CMShasstatedthatitsreviewprocedureisavoluntarycomplianceprocess.WhileCMS’WC-MSAprocessistechnicallyavoluntaryprocess,fromtheauthor’sexperienceasignificantsegment(if notthemajority)of theclaimsindustryhasbeen,andis,complyingwiththeagency’sWC-MSAreviewprocess.IndustrycompliancewithCMS’reviewprocessisbasedprimarilyuponthebelief thatobtainingCMSapprovalprovidesadegreeof securityfromfutureliability.ThethoughtbeingthatthepartieswouldbeinafarbetterpositiontodefendanyfutureclaimbyCMSif theagencywasaffordedtheopportunitytoreviewthesettlementandapprovetheproposedWC-MSA.
11. CMSsetsforthanddiscussesitsWC-MSAreviewthresholdsinthefollowingagencypolicymemoranda:ParasherB.Patel,CMSMemorandumtoAllRegionalAdministrators,Workers’CompensationCommutationof FutureBenefits,July23,2001,p.4-6;ThomasL.Grissom,CMSMemorandumtoAllRegionalAdministrators,MedicareSecondaryPayer–Workers’Compensation(WC)FrequentlyAskedQuestions,April22,2003,p.1-2(FAQNos.2and17);GeraldWalters,CMSMemorandumtoAllRegionalAdministrators,MedicareSecondaryPayer(MSP)–Workers’Compensation(WC)AdditionalFrequentlyAskedQuestions,July11,2005,p.2(FAQNos.1and2);andGeraldWalters,CMSMemorandumtoAllRegionalAdministrators,Workers’CompensationMedicareSet-AsideArrangement(WC-MSAs)andRevisionof theLowDollarThresholdforMedicareBeneficiaries,April25,2006.ItshouldbenotedthatCMShasreservedtherighttoadjust,modifyoreveneliminatethereviewthresholds.
12. GeraldWalters,CMSMemorandumtoAllRegionalAdministrators,Workers’CompensationMedicareSet-AsideArrangement(WC-MSAs)andRevisionof theLowDollarThresholdforMedicareBeneficiaries,April25,2006.
13. Seealso,ThomasL.Grissom,CMSMemorandumtoAllRegionalAdministrators,MedicareSecondaryPayer–Workers’Compensation(WC)FrequentlyAskedQuestions,April22,2003,p.6(FAQNo.17).
14. A“conditionalpayment”canbedefinedas“aMedicarepaymentforservicesforwhichanotherpayerisresponsible.”See,42C.F.R.§411.21.
15. ForfurtherinformationregardingMedicareconditionalpayments,CMS’currentconditionalpaymentprocess,andrecentreformlegislationintroducedinCongressthatwouldrevisecertaincurrentagencypracticesinrelationthereto,seetheauthor’sarticleascontainedinSettlement News,April2010entitled:The Medicare Secondary Payer Enhancement Act of 2010 (H.R. 4796) ProposesAmendmentstotheMedicareSecondaryPayerStatute:MajorChangesAreProposedtotheMedicareConditionalPaymentProcess,Section111of theMMSEA&OtherGeneralMSPComplianceMattersThisarticlecanbeobtainedbyloggingontowww.NQBP.com(select“ResourceLibrary”andthenchoose“SettlementNews”).
16. Anotherpossibleconsiderationinthisregardishowandtowhatextent(if atall)conditionalinformationthatmaybeobtainedfromMyMedicare.govcouldpossiblybeused.Throughthissite,itmaybepossibletoobtainconditionalpaymentinformation.However,fromafewaccountsreceivedbytheauthor,thissitemaynotalwayscontainthemostcurrentinformationFurthermore,theremaybeissuesregardinginformationalaccuracyandsystemaccessinparticularsituations.
17.Thefollowingexamplesmayhelpbetterillustratethequestionsandpossibleissuesbeingraisedbytheauthor:Example#1:Thepartiesreachasettlementagreement(SA)involvingaMedicarebeneficiaryintheamountof $20,000.Atthetimeof thesettlement,ithasbeendeterminedthatMedicareisassertingconditionalpayments(CP)intheamountof $5,000.01.(Note:Forpurposesof theforegoingexamples,itisassumedthattheCPamountcouldinfactbeobtainedasof thetimeof thesettlementor,alternatively,thatsameisbasedonaninterimconditionalpaymentamountthatthepartiesmayhaveobtainedfromCMSduringthecourseof theclaim.Furthermore,theexamplesassumethatCMSwouldinfactbeagreeabletoevenconsidersaidapproaches.)Inthisexample,if CMStookthepositionthatitisthegrossamountof conditionalpaymentsbeingclaimedatthetimeof settlementthatshouldbeincludedincalculatingthetotalsettlementamount,thesettlementinthisinstancewouldmeetCMS’WC-MSAreviewthresholdasthecombinedtotalof thesefigureswouldequal$25,000.01[$20,000SA+$5,000.01CP=$5,000.01]whichexceedsthe$25,000monetarythresholdunderThreshold#1.Example#2:Thepartiesreachasettlementagreement(SA)involvingaMedicarebeneficiaryintheamountof $12,000.00.Atthetimeof thesettlement,Medicareisassertingconditionalpayments(CP)intheamountof $14,000.If,asinExample#1,CMStookthepositionthatitisthegrossamountof conditionalpaymentsbeingclaimedatthetimeof thesettlementthatshouldbeincludedincalculatingthetotalsettlementamount,thesettlementinthisinstancewouldmeetthereviewthresholdsasthecombinedtotalof thesefiguresequals$26,000[$12,000SA+$14,000CP=$26,000]whichexceedsthe$25,000monetarythresholdunderThreshold#1.However,adifferentresultcouldseeminglybereachedemploying42C.F.R.§411.24(c).Underthissection,if CMSdoesnotneedtotakelegalactiontorecoveritsconditional
10 Workers’ Compensation Law Section
paymentclaim,theamountof recoverableconditionalpaymentsisthelesserof either(a)theMedicareprimarypayment,or(b)theamountof thefullprimarypaymentthattheprimarypayerisobligatedtopay.AssumingthatCMSwouldpermitapplicationof thisformulaatthisjunctureof theclaim,thenMedicare’sconditionalpaymentrecoverywouldbelimitedto$12,000.Thisamountrepresentsthelesserof factors(a)and(b)above.Thus,inthisinstance,thesettlementwouldnotmeettheWC-MSAreviewthresholdsasthecombinedfigureswouldonlytotal$24,000[$12,000SA+$12,000CP=$24,000]whichisbelowthe$25,000threshold.Bywayof note,aninterestingquestionthatcouldariseusingtheseapproachesinvolveshow,if atall,shouldconditionalpaymentamountsthatthepartiesmayquestionordisputebetakenintoaccount?Also,towhatextent(if atall)wouldCMSpermitthedeterminationtobereducedby“procurementcosts”which,per42C.F.R.§411.37,arepermittedinreducingaparties’ultimatereimbursementobligation?(Note:Theabovearepresentedforillustrativediscussion
purposesonly.Inpresentingsame,theauthorisnotstatingorotherwisesuggestingtheseapproachesrepresent,orcouldrepresent,aproperinterpretationof CMS’policyonthispoint,orwouldotherwisebeacceptedbytheagency).
18. Section111of theMMSEAiscodifiedat42U.S.C.§1395y(b)(7)and(8).
19. Asasupplementtotheauthor’sdiscussionof non-thresholdcasesherein,thereadermayalsowishtoreviewtheexcellentoverviewof thistopic(whichincludesareviewof variousoptionsforconsideration)aspreparedbyPattyMeifertcontainedinSettlement News,March,2007entitled:MSP Compliance in Settlements NOT Meeting the CMS Review Thresholds: Options for Primary Payers.Thisarticlecanbeobtainedbyloggingontowww.NQBP.com(select“ResourceLibrary”andthenchoose“Articles”).
AswecloseinonthefirstyearofmytenureasChairmanoftheStateBoardofWorkers’Compensation,Iampleasedtoreportthatwe
attheBoardcontinuetomakeeveryefforttoserveourcustomersinafair,impartial,andefficientmannerineveryDivision.ItismypleasuretoupdateyouonseveralinitiativesthatDirectorsWarrenMassey,SteveFarrowandIhaveimplementedand/orwillhavecompletedintheverynearfuture.
First,theGeorgiaGeneralAssemblyrecentlypassedlegislation,whichtheGovernorsigned,allowing,forthefirsttimeinhistory,thepublicationofAwardsissuedatboththetrialandappellatelevels.Thisinnovationhasbeenlongrequestedbytheworkers’compensationcommunity,anditisnowavailable.WehavebegunbypublishingAwardsfromOctober,2009forward.WearestartingwiththosecasesheardbythecurrentAppellateDivision.Thus,ifacasewasappealedinorafterOctober,2009,boththeAdministrativeLawJudgeandAppellateAwardswillbepublished.Wewillbeaddingadditionalawardsasourresourcesallowus.
The2010sessionoftheGeneralAssemblyalsosawthepassageoflegislation,signedbytheGovernor,whichessentiallyrewroteandstrengthenedtheabilityoftheGeorgiaSelf-InsurerGuarantyTrustFundBoardofTrusteestopursueanon-compliantmemberwhichfailstofulfillitsobligationstocontinuepaymentoncompensableclaimsfiledbyinjuredworkers.
Inaddition,duringthepastyear,wehaveseenterritorychangesforadministrativelawjudges,whichtheAppellateDivisionbelieveswillenhancethedecision-makingprocessatthetriallevel.Ashasbeenmentionedpreviously,theturnaroundtimeforapprovalofStipulationsandAgreementsbytheSettlementDivisionhasimproveddramatically.Nowadays,approximately90to95%ofstipulationssubmittedforapprovalwillbeapprovedwithin10daysofsubmission.Also,Awardsatboththetrialandappellatelevelscontinuetobeissuedinatimelymannersoastoexpeditethedecision-makingprocessforallpartieswithregardtohandlingofaclaim.
ThemostthoroughandfarreachingchangepresentlytakingplaceistheICMSII“refresh”projectwhichwill,amongotherthings,seeareplacementofbothsoftwareandhardwareinthepresentICMSsystemandanupgradeandimprovementinthoseareaswhichwerefoundtobedeficientthroughtheICMSIprocess.
Finally,IwouldliketotakethisopportunitytothankallofthewonderfulpeoplewhoworkwithmeandtheotherDirectorsattheStateBoardofWorkers’Compensationandwhodevoteagreatdealoftimeandefforttoimprovingourworkers’compensationdeliveryservicestoyou,ourcustomerbase.IwouldalsoliketothankthemembersoftheChairman’sAdvisoryCouncilwhodevoteuntoldnumbersofhoursofunpaidtimetothecareandnurturingoftheGeorgiaworkers’compensationsystem.Withouttheirhelpandassistanceinguidingthesystem,Georgia’sworkers’compensationsystemwouldnotbeashiningexampleforotherstatestoemulate.
Message from the ChairmanBy Richard S. ThompsonChairman, State Board of Workers’ Compensation
Winter 2010 11
Inthisdayofupsidedownmortgagesand“201ks”,itiseasytogetanegativeattitude.Ourtrainingandworkaslawyersincreasesthatrisk,sinceitisourjobtoflyspeck
documentsandadversetestimony.It’snowonderthatlawyersexperienceahighlevelofdepressionandburnout.Sowhatcanwedotomakeitbetter?
Theanswerissimple–dowhatmatters.Boththedoingandthematteringareimportant.I’venoticedI’mmygrumpiestrightbeforeIbeginpreparingfortrial–atthetimewhenIamnotyetdoingit–Iamjustdreadingit.OnceIstartactuallydoingit,thedreadgoesaway.I’vealsonoticedthatIammuchhappierdoingtheworkiftheworkmatters.Winningonatechnicalityisnotnearlyassatisfyingaswinningonthemerits.
ButwhyamIwritingaboutthisinourtradejournal?Howdoesallthisapplytoworkers’compensationlaw?Itappliesbecausedoingwhatmatterswillmakeoursystemwork.Makingoursystemworkisworthwhile.Doingworthwhileworkisfulfilling.
Inarecentcase,opposingcounselcaughtupwithmeafterthehearingandsaid:“YouknowthatIMEIjustputinevidence–itisonadifferentclaimant.”WeagreedtosubstitutethecorrectIME.LaterthatsameclientwasreceivingTTDbutfoundajob.Therewasnothingnewordifferentaboutthenewemployer.Myclienttriedthejobforseveralweeks,butcouldn’tdoit.WhenIprovidedinformationshowingthosefacts,thedefenseattorneyandinsurervoluntarilyrecommencedTTDwithoutforcingmyclientthroughanotherhearing.
BothsubstitutingtheIMEandavoidinganunnecessary
hearingweretherightthingstodobecausetheymattered.Itmattersthatthejudgegetsthecorrectinformation,eventhoughitmighthavebeenkeptoutonatechnicality.Itmattersthattheinjuredworkergetspromptpaymentofbenefitseventhoughthedelayofahearingmighthavegiventhedefenseastrategicadvantage.ThatdefenseattorneyandIwillcontinuetozealouslyrepresentthoseclientsandothers.Hewillkickmytailsome,andhopefullyIwillkickhissometoo.Butregardlessofwhokickswhose,wewillbothenjoythefightmorebecauseitwasafairone.
IknowIammainlypreachingtothechoirwhenIwritethis.IthasbeensaidoverandoveragainwhatapleasureitistopracticeinthissectionofthebarbecausethelawyersdopracticewhatIampreaching.ButpreachinghappenseverySundayforareason–wehumansareterriblyforgetfuloflessonswehavelearned.Itneverhurtstoberemindedofwhatmatters.SoItakethisopportunitytogetuponmysoapboxandpreach.
Remembertodowhatmatters.Devoteyourtimetothejusticesystemaswellastoyourparticularclients.Encourageyourclientsandotherswhoworkinoursystemtodothesame.Makeyourfightsaboutthemeritsofthecase.Don’tappealeverycase–noteventotheappellatedivision.Astheappellatedivisiondirectorsmadeclearattheseminar,theywanttoreviewonlythecasesthatinvolveobviouserrorsoffactandfocusmoreonthefewcasesthatinvolverealissuesoflaw.Giveyouropponentthebenefitofthedoubt.Rememberheorshe,likeyou,istryingtodotherightthing,andthatbothofyouwilloccasionallyneedagentleassistwhenyoufallshortofthatgoal.Themorewefocusonthesethings,themorewewillloveourwork.
Message from the ChairBy Cliff PerkinsChair, Workers’ Compensation Section
Clifford C. Perkins Jr.PerkinsLawFirmLLP
Kelly Alyne BenedictBenedict&TorpeyP.C.
John G. Blackmon Jr.DrewEckl&Farnham,LLP
John Douglas Christy JohnD.ChristyP.C.
Gary M. Kazin
Lynn Blasingame Olmert CarlockCopeland&StairLLP
Gregg Mitchel PorterSavell&WilliamsLLP
Jo H. Stegall III McRaeStegallPeekHarmanSmithManning
A special thanks to the 2010-11 Workers’ Compensation Law Section Officers:
12 Workers’ Compensation Law Section
ICMS-2:We’vejustaboutgotthisthingfiguredoutasitis–whychangeanything?
Issues:WearehighlydependentupontheICMSandWCONLINEsystems.
• Softwaremustbeupgradedtotakeadvantageofnewfunctionality.
• Existingsoftwareishighlycustomizedandnoteasilyupgradeable.
• Accessforadditionaluserswithoutaffectingcurrentsystemperformance.
• Existinghardwareisnearingendoflifeandcoresoftwareisatendofsupport.
• ProjectScope:SBWCispartneringwithIBMandGTA(GeorgiaTechnologyAuthority)for:
• Theimplementationofnewinfrastructureenvironments(hardwareandsoftware).
• ApplicationupgradesandImplementationservices.
• SecurityforthesystematGTA’sNorthAtlantaDataCenter.
Project Objectives:• Newclassesofusers–
RehabSuppliers,ClaimsOffices/TPAs,Self-InsuredEmployers,andCarriers.
• HardwareandSoftwareupgrades–newer,faster,morereliable.
• Upgradedapplicationswithflexibledesign,whichareeasiertomaintainandenhance.
• Morerobustsystems–abletosupport1500newusers.
• SBWCshouldbeabletostandonourownformaintenanceandenhancements.
• Maintaincurrentsystemfunctionality
• Scalablesystem–createtheabilitytoaddmoreusersasneeded.
Some Items on SBWC’s Enhancement “Wish List”:• Provideaconsistentlooktoallformsviewedbyall
classesofusers.
• Improvethesettlementapprovalnotificationprocessforenhancedreliabilityandverifiability.
What Will Users Need?• Thenewsystem,likethecurrentsystem,willbe
windows-based.
• Accommodatemultiplebrowsers.
• HIPAA/HITECHCompliant(security,privacy,access,etc.)
• Intuitiveexperiencewithoutextensivere-training.
What is SBWC doing now, and when will ICMS-2 “Go Live”? • SBWC’sITstaffistraining
toenhanceandbroadentheirexistingskills;criticalskillshavebeenaddedasneededtofulfilladditionalrolesincludingProjectManager.
• AProjectTeamofkeySBWCstafffromvariousdivisionshasbeenmeetingtogettheprojectunderway.
• Developmentwilloccurinanisolatedsecureenvironmentwithoutrisktothecurrentsystem.
• Requirementsanddesigndetailsarebeingcaptured;thisprocesswillcontinuethroughsequentialrefinementscalled“iterations”.
• ThecurrenttargetforswitchoverisJuly2012.
• Asyoucansee,thisisalong-termprojectforSBWC.Ourgoalistocreateasystemthatwillprovideallthesamecapabilitiespresentinthecurrentsystem,buttomakeitmoresecure,morerobust,andfaster,friendlier,andeasiertouse.
ICMS UpdateBy Stan Carter
Winter 2011 13
Idiopathic Injuries and the Harris TestBy Robert Hendricks
RecentdecisionsintheCourtofAppealshavecloudedratherthanclarifiedthecompensabilityofidiopathicinjuries.Withoutclearguidanceonthis
issue,employers,insurers,andemployeeswillcontinuetolitigatecompensationforthesetypesofinjuries.Todate,theclearestandmostpracticaltesthasbeentheonelaidoutinHarris v. Peach County,296Ga.App.225,674S.E.2d36(2009).Inthatcase,acustodianbentovertopickapilloffthefloor,asrequiredbytheconditionsofheremployment.Intheprocessofpickingupthepill,herownbodyweightcausedherkneetodislocate.Shedidnotcomeintocontactwithanythingintheprocess.TheCourtofAppealsheldthatthisinjurywascompensablebecausetheactivitytheemployeewasengagedinwasinfurtheranceofherjobduties.Thistestofwhethertheactivityconstitutesanemploymentfunctionisaclearandeasydistillationoftherelevantlanguagefromapplicablecaselaw.
ThislanguagewasoriginallyimportedintoGeorgiacaselawin1923.TheCourtofAppealsinNew Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Sumrell30Ga.App.682,118S.E.786(1923) addressedtheissueofwhetheraninjury“aroseoutof”theemployment.ThislanguagewasthenadoptedbytheGeorgiaSupremeCourtin Fried v.United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.,192Ga.492,15S.E.2d704(1941).Specifically,incitingNew Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Sumrell,theCourtinFriedstated:
TheCourtofAppealsofGeorgiahasveryaptlydefinedtheterm“arisingoutof”theemployment,asfollows:“It‘arisesoutof’theemployment,whenthereisapparenttotherationalmind,uponconsiderationofallthecircumstances,acausalconnectionbetweentheconditionsunderwhichtheworkisrequiredtobeperformedandtheresultinginjury.Underthistest,iftheinjurycanbeseentohavefollowedasanaturalincidentofthework,andtohavebeencontemplatedbyareasonablepersonfamiliarwiththewholesituationasaresultoftheexposureoccasionedbythenatureoftheemployment,thenitarises‘outof’theemployment.Butitexcludesaninjurywhichcannotfairlybetracedtotheemploymentasacontributingproximatecause,andwhichcomesfromahazardtowhichtheworkmenwouldhavebeenequallyexposedapartfromtheemployment.Thecausativedangermustbepeculiartothework...Itmustbeincidentaltothecharacterofthebusiness,andnotindependentoftherelationofmasterandservant.
Fouryearslater,theGeorgiaSupremeCourtinThornton v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co.,198Ga.786792,32S.E.2d816(1945)gaveaslightlyrewordeddefinition:
Thewords“arisingoutof”meanthattheremustbesomecausalconnectionbetweentheconditions
underwhichtheemployeeworkedandtheinjurywhichhereceived.Thecausativedangermustbeincidentaltothecharacteroftheemployment,andnotindependentoftherelationofmasterandservant.Theaccidentmustbeoneresultingfromariskreasonablyincidenttotheemployment.Andariskisincidenttotheemploymentwhenitbelongsto,orisconnectedwith,whataworkmanhastodoinfulfillinghiscontractofservice.“Ariskmaybeincidentaltotheemploymentwhenitiseitheranordinaryriskdirectlyconnectedwiththeemploymentoranextraordinaryriskwhichisonlyindirectlyconnectedwiththeemploymentowingtothespecialnatureoftheemployment.
Thislanguageiscitedinthemajorityofthemajorcasesaddressingidiopathicinjuriesandhasformedthebasisfordeterminingwhetheranidiopathicinjuryiscompensable.
AfterThornton,twocasesdealingwithidiopathicinjurieswereaddressedbytheCourtofAppeals:United States Casualty Company v. Richardson,75Ga.App.496,43S.E.2d793(1947) andOrkin v. Wright,92Ga.App.224,88S.E.2d205(1955).U.S. Casualty Co. dealtwithanemployeewhosufferedanepilepticseizureandstruckhisheadonatable,whileOrkin dealtwithanemployeewhosufferedaheartattack.Therewasevidenceinbothcasesthattheemployees’conditions(seizureandheartattack)hadbeeninducedbyworkrelatedexertion.Thisworkrelatedexertionwasenoughofacausalconnectiontosustaintheawardinbothcases.However,inaddressingtheissueofwhethertheawardwaslegallysustainableinU.S. Casualty Co.,theCourtofAppealsnotedthattheawardwouldbesustainableundereitheroneoftwotheories.Thefirstwasthattheworkrelatedexertionwasacausalconnectiontotheepilepticseizure.Thesecondwasthat“ifthefallisonastairwayorintoamachineoragainstanythingexceptthebarefloor,andespeciallyifthefallisfromaheight,astheriskofinjuryisincreased,orisa‘specialdangeroftheemployment’”itarisesoutoftheemployment.Thisadditionhascausedsomeconfusioninthecaselaw.
InPrudential Bank v. Moore, 219Ga.App.847,467S.E.2d7(1996),acomputerclerkapparentlyfaintedandstruckherheadonthebaseboardasshefell.SheclaimedthatunderU.S. Casualty Co. herinjuryaroseoutofheremployment.TheCourtofAppealsinPrudential Bankdistinguishedbetweenastructuralhazard(suchasthebaseboardorawall)andanincreasedrisk(anobjectspecificallyrelatedtotheworkplace).TheCourtalsodistinguishedthiscasefromU.S. Casualty Co. inafootnotestatingthattheinjurysufferedbytheemployeeinU.S. Casualty Co. wasduetoworkrelatedexertionandnotanidiopathicfall,aswasthecasehere.Thisdistinction
14 Workers’ Compensation Law Section
highlightsthenecessityofacausalconnectionbetweentheemploymentandtheinjury.InbothU.S. Casualty Co. andOrkin,theemployee’sinjurywasbroughtaboutbytheperformanceofajobfunction.InPrudential Bank,therewasnoevidenceofacausalconnectionbetweenthecomputerclerk’sjobandherinjury.
Prudential BankwassubsequentlyoverruledbyJohnson v. Publix,256Ga.App.540,568S.E.2d827(2002) andthenreinstatedbyChaparral Boats v. Heath,269Ga.App.339,606S.E.2d567(2004).TheCourtinJohnsonopinedthatPrudential Bank hadmisinterpretedU.S. Casualty Co. inthatPrudential BankstatedthatU.S. Casualty Co. standsforthepropositionthatanidiopathicfalliscompensableonlywhentheclaimantstrikesawork-relatedobject.WhiletheCourtinPrudential Bankdidbaseitsdecisiononthefactthattheemployeedidnotstrikeawork-relatedobject,italsonotedthattheemployee’sfallwasnotbroughtonbywork-relatedexertionasithadbeeninU.S. Casualty Co.Thus,theCourtinPrudential Bankseemstodistinguishbetweenaninjuryfromanidiopathicconditionandaninjuryfromanidiopathicfall.
Ifanemployeehassomesortofidiopathicconditionthatisinsomewayexacerbatedoractivatedbysomethingincidentaltohisorherwork,thatinjurywouldbecausallyconnectedtotheemployment,thusfallinginlinewithU.S. Casualty Co.However,iftheemployeeisinjuredinafallcausedbypurelyidiopathicreasons,thereisnocausalconnectiontotheemploymentandtheinjurywouldnotbecompensable,aswasthecaseinPrudential Bank.ThedissentinJohnson pointedoutthat“therewasnoevidencetoshowthat[theemployee’s]injuriesweretheresultofanythingotherthananidiopathicfall.”Additionally,therewasnoevidencetoconnectthecauseofthefalltoanyaspectoftheemployee’semployment.Thus,theCourtofAppeals’disapprovalofJohnson in Chaparralwasappropriate.
Despiteitseffortstothecontrary,theCourtinChaparraldidlittletoclarifytheissue.Indicta,theCourtdistinguishedbetweensituationsinwhichtheapplicationofthepositionalriskdoctrinewouldbeappropriatetoestablishacausalconnectionandsituationsinwhichitwouldnot.1Insituationswheretheapplicationofthepositionalriskdoctrinewouldbeinappropriate,thegeneralruleaslaidoutinFried, supra,wouldapply2.TheCourtwentontosaythatthe“peculiartotheemployment”analysisisnotareplacementfor“analyzingcompensabilityintermsofwhethertherewasacausalconnectionbetweentheemploymentandtheinjury.”TheCourtfurtherexplainedthatthe“peculiartotheemployment”analysisisessentiallyananalysisofwhethertheemployeewouldbeequallyexposedtotheriskapartfromtheemployment.Thisanalysiscontemplateswhethersomeconditionoftheemploymentwasrelatedtotheinjury.
CitingDavis v. Houston, 141Ga.App.385,233S.E.2d479(1977), theCourtattemptedtoillustratethispoint.InDavis,anurse’saidewasdeniedcompensationafterinjuringherbackwhileputtingonhercoattoleavework.
TheCourtaffirmedthefindingoftheALJandtheappellatedivisionthat“theriskofincurringsuchabackinjurywhileputtingonacoat‘wasahazardtowhichshewasequallyexposedapartfromheremployment.’Inotherwords,theriskwasnot‘peculiar’totheemployment,butcommontotheemployeeandthepublicatlarge.”TheCourtinChaparralfurtherexplainedthat“[b]ecausethecausativeriskwasnotpeculiarorincidentaltothecharacteroftheemployment,andtherewasnoevidenceofacausalconnectionbetweenaconditionoftheemploymentandtheinjury,Davisheldthattheinjurydidnotariseoutoftheemploymentandwasnotcompensable.”Thusindicatingthathadthecausativeriskbeenpeculiarorincidentaltothecharacteroftheemploymentorhadtherebeenevidenceofacausalconnectionbetweenaconditionoftheemploymentandherinjury,theinjurywouldhavearisenoutofheremploymentandbeencompensable.
AlthoughChaparralpresentedalengthydiscussionofthelawregardingidiopathicinjuries,itdidlittletocutbackonorreallyclarifythelanguageaddressingtheissueofwhetheraninjuryarisesoutofemployment.ThatstepwastakenbytheCourtofAppealsinHarris v. Peach County.Thefactsofthatcase,supra,wouldexcludetheapplicationofthepositionalriskdoctrineandtheincreasedriskdoctrine.Thusfortheemployee’sinjurytobecompensable,
Winter 2011 15
itmustfallwithintherequirementsofthegeneralruleaslaidoutinFried.TheCourtinHarrisdistilledthegeneralruletoaclearandeasytoapplytest:Didtheactivityconstituteanemploymentfunction?Thisdistillationlooksdirectlyatwhethertherewasacausalconnectionbetweentheinjuryandaconditionoftheemployment.BecausetheemployeeinHarriswasrequiredbyaconditionofheremploymenttopickthepilloffthegroundandbecauseshewasinjuredwhiledoingso,theCourtofAppealsfoundthattherewasacausalconnectionbetweentheconditionsofheremploymentandherinjury.
TheCourtofAppealsinHarrisalsoaddressedtheissueofwhethertheemployeemustsufferaninjurythatheorshewouldnotsufferoutsideofworktobecompensable.TheCourtexplainedthat“thefactthat[theemployee]couldhavebeeninjuredinasimilarmannerawayfromworkdoesnotrequireadifferentresult...[because]shewascarryingoutjobdutieswhenshewasinjuredinthatway.”Thisfallsinlinewiththediscussionofthemeaningof“peculiartotheemployment”inChaparral.TheCourtinChaparralusedtheinjurysufferedbytheemployeeinDavisasanexampleofaninjurythatwasnot“peculiartotheemployment”becausetherewasnonexusbetweenaconditionofheremploymentandherinjury.InHarris,theCourtprovidestheothersideofthatanalysisbyexplainingthataninjuryis“peculiartotheemployment”ifthereisanexusbetweenaconditionoftheemploymentandtheinjury.
ApplyingthetestlaidoutinHarristoU.S. Casualty Co.,Orkin,Prudential Bank,Davis,andChaparral,onewouldseethesameresults.Inthecaseswhereevidenceofanemploymentfunctioncontributingtoinjurywaspresented,thecourtsfoundacausalconnection(U.S. Casualty Co. andOrkin).Incasesthatlackedthatevidence,nocausalconnectionwasfound(Prudential Bank,Davis,andChaparral).Underthisanalysis,onlyJohnsonmighthavebeendecideddifferently.
Unfortunately,thecaseatissueinSt. Joseph’s Hospital v. Ward,300Ga.App.845,686S.E.2d443(2009)waspresentedtotheAppellateDivisionafterthepublicationofChaparralbutbeforethepublicationofHarris.WithouttheguidanceofHarris,theAppellateDivisionframedtheactivitytheemployeewasengagedinatthetimeofherinjury(turningtogetapatientaglassofwatersohecouldtakemedicine)initsmostbasicsense:simplyturning.TheAppellateDivisionfoundthatthiswasahazardthegeneralpublicwasexposedto,thusitwasnotacompensableinjury.ThatdecisionwasappealedtotheSuperiorCourtandreversed.TheSuperiorCourtheldthattheappellatedivisionmisappliedChaparralbynotconsideringthecausalconnectionbetweentheconditionsofthenurse’semploymentandherinjury.TheCourtofAppeals,however,notedthataccordingtothesufficiencyoftheevidenceruletheAppellateDivision’sfindingthatshe“wasnotexposedtoanyriskuniquetoheremploymentbystandingandturning”wassupportedbysomeevidence,andthustheSuperiorCourtandtheCourtofAppealswererequiredtodefertothatfinding.
ThedecisioninSt. Joseph’semphasizedthe“peculiartotheemployment”languagediscussedinChaparral,butseemstohavemissedtheinstructionthatthe“peculiartotheemployment”analysisisnot“agoodsubstituteforanalyzingcompensabilityintermsofwhethertherewasacausalconnectionbetweentheemploymentandtheinjury.”Ironically,thethreejudgepaneldecidingSt. Joseph’snoteinnonbindingdictathat“anystatementsinHarris, supra,thatmightbeconstruedascontrarytoourwholecourtdecisioninChaparral, supra,arenonbindingdicta.”Thiswasnotonlyunnecessarytodecidetheissueathand,butwasalsounnecessarysinceHarrissimplydistilledthetestthatwaslaidoutin Chaparralandis,infact,consistentwithChaparral.
WhileitisunclearhowtheCourtofAppealswilladdressthisissueinthefuture.ItseemsthatthereasoningappliedinSt. Joseph’sisunlikelytostandfortworeasons.First,ifitdid,thenwhenawarehouseworkerliftsafiftypoundboxandsuffersabackinjury,itwouldnotbecompensablebecausetheinjurywouldbearesultofliftingwhichwouldbearisktheemployeewouldhavebeenequallyexposedapartfromtheemployment.Second,thedecisioninSt. Joseph’salsocitesChaparraloutofcontextinregardtoitsunderstandingofthe“peculiartotheemployment”analysis.St. Joseph’ssawthe“peculiartotheemployment”analysisasrequiringthattheworkactivitybeanactivitythatthepublicdoesnotgenerallyengagein.However,Chaparralexplainedthatthe“peculiartotheemployment”analysisissimplyananalysisofwhethertheinjurywasrelatedtoorcausedbythepeculiarnatureofaconditionoftheemployment.Ultimately,themostlikelyresultseemstobeanaffirmationoftheprincipleslaidoutinChaparral,whichcanbeappliedeffectivelythroughtheHarristest.
A special thanks to Justin Lowery, a law student at Emory, for his assistance with this article.
(Endnotes)1. Essentially,thepositionalriskdoctrinewasmeanttoextend
protectiontoemployeesif adutyrelatedtotheemploymentplacestheemployeeinalocalewhichexposestheemployeetoarisk,evenif itisnotpeculiartotheemployment.However,itdoesnotapplywheretheriskwhichcausestheemployee’sinjurywouldoccurindependentlyof place,employment,orpursuit.
2. [Aninjury]‘arisesoutof ’theemployment,whenthereis...acausalconnectionbetweentheconditionsunderwhichtheworkisrequiredtobeperformedandtheresultinginjury....Butitexcludesaninjurywhichcannotfairlybetracedtotheemploymentasacontributingproximatecause,andwhichcomesfromahazardtowhichtheworkmenwouldhavebeenequallyexposedapartfromtheemployment.Thecausativedangermustbepeculiartothework...Itmustbeincidentaltothecharacterof thebusiness,andnotindependentof therelationof masterandservant.
16 Workers’ Compensation Law Section
TheWorkers’CompensationLawInstituteinOctobermarkedthetenyearanniversaryofthefirstDistinguishedServiceAwardtoaworkers’
compensationpractitioner.Thelistofrecipientsreadslikeawho’swho,andincludesBillGeorge,CharlieDrew,EarlMallard,JimHiers,JohnWilliams,JohnSweet,LamarGammage,CurtisFarrar,JoeSartain,LaviniaGeorge,CarolynHall,DonHartman,BobbyPotter,LeeSouthwellandJohnRoss.Criteriafortheawardarethatthenomineemust:(1)beatleast50yearsold,(2)hasbeenworkingintheworkers’compensationareafor20yearsand(3)hasbeenworkingforthegoodofthesysteminparticularandthecommunityingeneral.
Asyoumightexpect,itisadifficultdecisiontomakeconsideringthenomineessubmitted.JohnRosswasgiventheawardthisyearandwasastatesmanifthereeverwasone.Forthoseofyouwhocouldnotattendtheseminar,JohnFerguson,CarolynHall,StanCarterandJohnSweetspokeonhisbehalf.JohnpassedawayayearagoandpracticedlawinGeorgiaforalmost30years.HewascounselforCWMatthewsContractingCompany,an“asphaltman”ashedescribedhimselfandalong-termmemberoftheChairman’sAdvisoryCommittee.Hisspecialtywasbringingtwosidestothemiddleandhewasasskilledasanyoneindoingso.Johnwasaproblemsolver,anddevotedagreatdealofhistimeworkingtoresolveissuesinmannerthatbenefittedbothinjuredworkersandemployers.IfthereisonethingIrememberaboutJohn,itcamefromaspeechhegaveseveralyearsagoatanICLEseminar.HetalkedabouthisloveofGeorgia,thegreenpines,theredclayandthebluesky.Neverhavingbeenafanofredclay,hechangedmymindthatdayandwasamasteratgettingyoutoviewsomethinginadifferentlight.JohnRossneversoughtthelimelight,wasgenuineandhiscontributionswillbewithusforalongtime.
OneoftheotherindividualsnominatedthisyearwasMarvinPrice,andiftherewasanexampleofgoingaboveandbeyondthecallofdutyinrecentyears,itwasMarvin.Afterbeingtoldthatoneofhisclientswouldnolongerreceivebenefitsbecausetheinsurerwentoutofbusiness,Marvinfoughttirelesslytorightthatwrongandrestorebenefitstoagentlemanwhohadsufferedaseverebraininjury.Whilezealouslyrepresentinghisotherclients,andtryingtokeephispracticeafloat,Marvinworkedprobono
togetlegislationpassedthatwouldensurethathisclient,aswellasseveralotherssimilarlysituated,receivedlosttimeandmedicalbenefits.Thesewerecatastrophicallyinjuredworkerswho,forlackofabetterdescription,wereabouttobeturnedoutintothecold.ForthosewhoknowMarvin,thefactthathewouldundertakesuchanendeavorwouldcomeasnosurprise.
PerhapsthebestwaytodescribewhatqualitiesarecipientshouldpossessistolookatthecriteriafortheAlgernonSydneySullivanNationalAward.Itprovidesforrecognitionofanindividualwhohas“finespiritualqualities,practicallyappliedtodailyliving…theobjectof
eachoftheAwardsisnotsomuchtoencourageanyoneindividualasitistoreachandinfluencemany.”Competency,integrity,compassion,dedicationandservice.ThosequalitiesshouldbepossessedbyeveryindividualwhoisnominatedandwhoreceivestheDistinguishedServiceAward.
Overthelastseveralyearstherehasbeenquiteabitofdiscussionaboutwhetherweshouldhaveoneortworecipients.Suggestionhasbeenmade
thatthereshouldbeatleasttwoeachyear,onewhorepresentsinjuredworkersandtheotherfromthedefenseandperhapsathirdfromtheStateBoard.TheExecutiveCommittee,atleastthispastyear,didnotleanstronglyeitherway.Instead,thefocuswasongivingtheawardtoanindividualwhometthecriteria,anditwasnotadecisionhastilymade.Thefactofthematteristhatweareallinthistogether,andthesideyoupracticeonisirrelevantinthegrandschemeofthings.Ifapersonisdeservingoftheaward,heorsheshouldreceiveitwithoutregardtohisorherclients.However,thereismuchroomfordiscussiononthissubjectandifyouwouldlikegiveusyourideas,sendittoamemberoftheExecutiveCommittee,whichcurrentlyconsistsofCliffPerkins,LynnOlmert,GaryKazin,JohnChristy,JoStegall,KellyBenedict,GreggPorterandJohnBlackmon.
Whileallofthepastrecipientswereuniqueintheirownright,theircontributionstotheworkers’compensationpracticeandtotheircommunitywereextraordinary,whichiswhytheydeservedtheDistinguishedServiceAward.BecauseitisgivenattheannualseminarinlateSeptemberorOctober,nominationsshouldbesubmittedtotheExecutiveCommitteenolaterthanMay31.Ifyoudecidetosubmitaname,pleasetelluswhythatpersonshouldbehonored.Themoreinformationyouprovide,thebetter.
Distinguished Service Award By John G. Blackmon Jr. Drew Eckl & Farnham, LLP
As you might expect, it is a difficult decision to make considering
the nominees submitted.
Winter 2011 17
Discovering What Is In The Adjuster’s FileThe Injured Worker’s Perspective
Are theadjuster’sfileandtheadjuster’snotesdiscoverable?ThescopeofdiscoveryissetoutinO.C.G.A.§9-11-26(b)(1).“Partiesmayobtain
discoveryregardinganymatter,notprivileged,whichisrelevanttothesubjectmatterinvolvedinthependingaction….Itisnotgroundforobjectionthattheinformationsoughtwillbeinadmissibleatthetrialiftheinformationsoughtappearsreasonablycalculatedtoleadtothediscoveryofadmissibleevidence.”
Basedonthestatute,thefirstquestioniswhetherthefilesand/ornotesarerelevant.Whilethehearingissuesaregoingtodeterminewhetherthediscoveryrequestis“relevanttothependingaction”,thereareanumberofsituationswhereinformationcontainedintheadjuster’sfile,includingtheadjusternotes,arerelevant.Thefileandnotesshouldcontaininformationaboutwhethertheadjusterreceivedacertaindocumentordocuments,suchasaFormWC-205,ifthatisatissue.Ifassessedattorney’sfeesareanissue,thefileandnoteswilldocumenttheadjuster’sinvestigationand/orhandlingoftheclaimandwhetheritwasreasonableorunreasonable.IfO.C.G.A.§34-9-18civilpenaltiesareanissue,thefileandnoteswilllikelyprovidedocumentationofviolationofboardrulesand/orfalseormisleadingstatementsmadeforthepurposeofdenyingbenefits.
Thesecondquestioniswhethertheadjuster’sfileandnotesareadmissibleor,ifnotadmissible,reasonablycalculatedtoleadtothediscoveryofadmissibleevidence.Whiletheadjusternotesaremostlikelyreasonablycalculatedtoleadtothediscoveryofadmissibleevidence,theanalysisshouldnotevenneedtogothatfarbecausetheelectronic“adjusternotes”shouldbeadmittedatahearingasabusinessrecordpursuanttoO.C.G.A.§24-3-14.Underthatcodesection,“Anywritingorrecord…madeasamemorandumorrecordofanyact,transaction,occurrence,oreventshallbeadmissible…ifthetrialjudgeshallfindthatitwasmadeintheregularcourseofanybusinessandthatitwastheregularcourseofsuchbusinesstomakethememorandumorrecordatthetimeoftheact,transaction,occurrence,oreventorwithinareasonabletimethereafter.”Electronicadjusternotesclearlyfitwithinthisdefinition.TheyroutinelydocumenttheactionsoftheadjusterfromreviewofamedicalrecordtoassignmentofcasemanagementtounreasonableactionsandfailuretofileBoardRules.Theyarecreatedand
maintainedintheordinarycourseofaninsurer’sbusinessofclaimsmanagement.1
So,whataboutthosetwowords:notprivileged?Themostcommonlyassertedobjectiontothefilesand/ornotesisthattheyareprivilegedbecausetheywerepreparedinanticipationoflitigationandaretheworkproductoftheadjuster.Theinsurer,asthepartyassertingthisprivilege,willhavetheburdenofshowingthatthedocumentswerepreparedinanticipationoflitigation.2Itisnotsufficientthatthepartymakingtheassertionofprivilegesimplyobjectonthegroundsthatthematerialrequestedwaspreparedinanticipationoflitigation.Thepartymustpresentsomeevidencetoshowwhytheinformationisprivileged.
Theproperwaytobeginaddressingtheissueofanassertionofprivilegewithregardtotheadjuster’sfileand/ornotesiswithaprivilegelog.WithintheRequestsforProductionofDocuments,thepartyseekingdiscoverycanincludeinstructionsthatrequestaprivilegelogwithregardtoanydocumentclaimedtobeprivileged.Also,thepartyseekingdiscoverycanrequestaprivilegelogafterreceivingtheresponses.
Theprivilegelogshouldprovideageneraldescriptionofthedocument,thedateofcreationofthedocument,theidentityofthepersoncreatingthedocument,thesubjectmatterwithinthedocumentwhichiscontendedtobeprivileged,thespecificprivilegeasserted,andthelegaland/orfactualbasisfortheprivilege.Thepointisthatareasonabledeterminationcannotbemadeastowhethertheinformationisactuallyprivilegedwithoutthisinformation.Theinformationprovidedinaprivilegelogallowsthepartyseekingdiscoverytomakereasonableargumentsregardingwhytheinformationisnotprivilegedwithoutrequiringthepartyseekingtoprotectthedocumentstoactuallyrevealthosedocuments.
ThereisscarceGeorgialaw,especiallywithregardtoWorkers’Compensationclaims,aboutifandwhenelectronicadjusternotesarepreparedinanticipationoflitigation.Theevaluationofclaimsofpolicyholdersispartoftheordinarybusinessofaninsurancecompanyandsuchevaluationdoesnottakeplaceinanticipationoflitigationjustbecauselitigationoftenresultsfromadeniedclaim.3Activitiesroutinelyhandledbytheadjusteraspartofadjustingaworkers’compensationclaimwillbedocumentedintheadjusternotes.Becausemostoftheadjusternotesdocumentroutineactivities,theyshouldbediscoverablewhenotherwiserelevant.4Ifthereisdisagreementoverwhethercertainadjusternoteswerepreparedinanticipationoflitigationafteraprivilegeloghasbeenprovided,theadministrativelawjudgewilllikelyneedtoconductanincamerareviewoftheadjusternotes.
This and That in DiscoveryBy Jason Perkins
Theemployer/insurermaydemonstratethatsomeadjusternotesorotherportionsoftheadjuster’sfilewerepreparedinanticipationoflitigation.However,eveniftheemployer/insurerdemonstratesthatcertaindocuments/noteswithintheinsurer’sfilewerepreparedinanticipationoflitigation,theinjuredworkercanstillobtainthosedocumentsifitcanshowthatheorshehassubstantialneedforthematerialsinpreparationofitscaseandisunablewithoutunduehardshiptoobtainthesubstantialequivalentofthematerialsbyothermeans.O.C.G.A.§9-11-26(b)(3).Theinjuredworker,asthepartyseekingdiscovery,wouldhavetheburdenonthisissue.5Iftheadministrativelawjudgedeterminesthattheinjuredworkerhassatisfiedthisburden,thecourtshouldstillorderremovalofthementalimpression,conclusions,opinionsorlegaltheoriesoftheemployer/insurer.6
Whataboutsurveillance?Georgialawaddressingsurveillancehasheldthatprivateinvestigatorsthatareprovidingevidenceabouttheirobservations,asopposedtoinvestigativetechniques,aretestifyingasfactwitnessesinsteadofexperts.Assuch,theobservationsmadebyaninvestigatorarenotprivilegedandonlytheinvestigator’sconclusionsorotherworkproductshouldbeprotectedfromdiscovery.7Asurveillancetapeshouldsimplybearecordingofwhathappenedonaparticulardayordays.8Assumingthatitissurveillanceoftheinjuredworker,itisreallyjustastatementofthatinjuredworker’sactions.Asaresult,itisdiscoverablejustlikeanyotherstatementoftheinjuredworkerorrecordingofhowtheinjuredworkerwasfeelingonaparticularday.
Ontheotherhand,theactualreportoftheinvestigatorcouldcertainlycontainworkproductinadditiontothereportingoftheinvestigator’sobservations.Ifworkproduct,includingmentalimpressionsand
conclusion,ispresentinthereport,thentheanalysisoftheinvestigator’sreportbecomesadifferentissuefromprovidingthetape.However,wheninterrogatoriesaresenttotheemployer/insurerseekingfactsaboutwhattheinvestigatorobserved,theemployer/insurershouldanswerthoseinterrogatoriestotheextentthatitdoesnotrequirethemtorevealworkproduct(andmayneedtouseinformationfromthereporttodoso).
Shouldtheemployer/insurerbeabletowithholdtheotherwisediscoverableinformationuntiltheyhavetakentheinjuredworker’sdeposition?Theemployer/insurerwillarguethattheywillnotbeabletoimpeachtheinjuredworkerifthesurveillanceinformationhastobeproducedindiscoverypriortothedeposition.Firstofall,thelitigationprocessisnotanefforttowinthecasebytrickeryorconcealment.Itisanefforttoarriveatthetruth.Second,thereisastatutorilyenactedprocessforservingandrespondingtodiscovery.Ifdiscoveryhasbeenservedbytheinjuredworkerandtheanswerstothatdiscoveryareduepriortotheinjuredworker’sdeposition,itisnotproperfortheemployer/insurertoviolatethediscoveryrulesandwithholddiscoveryuntilafterthedeposition.
Partiesshouldnotbeencouragedtobenefitstrategicallyfromimproperobjectionsandthefailuretocomplywithdiscoveryrequirements.Infact,Georgiacourtshaverecognizedthatdiscoveryofotherwisediscoverableinformationshouldnotbepreconditionedonapartyfirstsubmittingtoadeposition.9Thisrulesupportsthepolicyoffullandtimelydisclosurethatisthebasisofourdiscoverystatutes.Ifitwereotherwise,partieswouldsimplywithholdalldiscoverableinformation10fromtheopposingpartyuntilafteradepositionwastaken.Ontheotherhand,if
thedepositionhasbeenproperlyscheduledbeforetheemployer/insurer’sresponsestodiscoveryaredue,thenthedepositionshouldcertainlytakeplacebeforethediscoveryhastobeprovided.
The Employer/Insurer’s PerspectiveOften,Ireceiverequestsforanentire
adjuster’sfile.Whilesomematerialsinthefilearecertainlydiscoverable(forexample,medicalrecords),othersclearlyarenot.Forexample,requestsareoftenspecificallymadeforadjusterfilenotespreparedbytheadjusterregardingthecase.Asdiscussedbelow,thereisnoGeorgiacaselawdirectlyonpointregardingthediscoverabilityofsomeofthesematerials,however,whenobjectionsaremadetotheproductionofsuchmaterials,theassertionshouldbethattheyareprivilegedundertheattorney/clientprivilegeand/ortheattorneyworkproductdoctrine.Inthesamevein,it
shouldbepointedoutthatadjuster’sfilecontentsvaryfrominsurertoinsurer,
Winter 2011 19
andthisisaverybroadapproachtothemostcommonelementsandcontentsofthesefiles.
Georgiahasnotbeenasclearasotherstatesindefiningwhatisandisnotgovernedbytheattorney/clientprivilege(“theprivilege”),butgenerallyspeaking,theprivilegeinGeorgiaincludesagentsandemployeesoftheattorneyandhis/herclient,actingunderthedirectionofeithertheclientortheattorney,infurtherance/tofacilitatethelegalrepresentation.OCGA§24-9-24;Eglin Fed. Credit Union v. Cantor, Fitzgerald Securities Corp.,91F.R.D.414(N.D.Ga1981).Theprivilegednetworkoftheattorneywouldincludepeoplesuchasadministrativeassistantsandlegalassistants,thelattercategorybeinganyonefromlawclerkstosecretaries.In re Fulton County Grand Jury Proceedings,244Ga.App.380,535SE2d340(2000).Theprivilegeisnotnecessarilyatooltobeusedtoexcludefacts,butrather,itmerelybarstheuseofcommunicationsbyonepartytoprovefactsnotyetinevidence.Gilbert v. State,169Ga.App.383,313SE2d107(1983).InGeorgia,theprivilegeismostbroadlyconstruedwhenanexpertorconsultantishiredbytheattorney;whenthisisdonecommunicationsbetweentheexpertandclientareprivilegedbecausetheyarebetweentheattorney’sagentandtheclient.G.M.C. v. Moseley,213Ga.App.875,447SE2d302(1994).However,itisimportanttorememberthatwhentheexpertishiredbytheclient,theexpertbecomestheagentoftheclient,nottheattorney,andthustheprivilegewillnotapply,eventosensitivemattersinvolvinglegalstrategy.Id.
Theattorneyworkproductdoctrine(“thedoctrine”)ismoreclearlydefinedinGeorgia.Thepurposeofthedoctrineissimple;itisinplacetoprotectagainsttheuseofdiscoverymethodstoobtainanotherparty’strialpreparationmaterials.Sturgill v. Garrison,219Ga.App.306,464SE2d902(1995).Theapplicationofthedoctrine,however,isn’tassimple.Thedoctrineisonlywaivedwhenanoppositepartycanprovesubstantialneedoftheotherwiseundiscoverablematerials,andthesamepartymustalsoprovethattherewillbeunduehardshipinacquiringsubstantiallyequivalentmaterials(whicharediscoverable)byothermeans.OCGA§9-11-26(b)(3).Itisonlyaftersuccessfullyarguingbothsubstantialneedandunduehardshipthatthemovantwillbegrantedaccesstothesematerials,butevenifthemovantcanprovethesetwoelements,theCourtmustguardagainstdisclosureofmentalimpressions,conclusions,opinionsand/orlegaltheoriesofanattorney/otherrepresentativeconcerningthelitigationatissue.McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. Adler,254Ga.App.500,562SE2d809(2002).Evenaftersuchanargumentissuccessfulbythemovant,thetrialcourtwillalmostalwaysperformanincamerainspectionofthematerialstosafeguardagainstthedisclosureofanyoftheaforementionedcategoriesofinformationwhichcouldgivethemovantanunfairadvantageinthelitigation.Id.
Theclaimant’srecordedstatement,whengiven,isdiscoverable.Itisnotastatementbyanagentoremployeeoftheattorney;itshouldnotcontainanymental
impressionsortrialstrategyoftheattorney.Assuch,neithertheprivilegenorthedoctrinewillbaritfrombeingdiscoverable.Whetherithasbeentranscribedoritistheoriginalrecording,thestatementitselfisadiscoverableportionofthefileasitistheclaimant’sownwords.Sincethestatementisnottakenunderoathithaslimitedtrialuseforanyoneonceitisobtained,however,itcouldbeausefuldiscoverytoolforeitherside.Ialwaystakethepositionthatthisisadiscoverableportionoftheadjuster’sfilematerialasitisnodifferentthantheclaimant’sdiscoverydepositiontranscriptandtestimonyexceptforthefactthatitisnottakenunderoathandcannotbeusedassuchinahearingortrial.Itcan,however,beusedasevidenceasfarasthereisapriorinconsistentstatementmadebytheclaimantastoamaterialfactorrelevantmattertotheissueinlitigation.O.C.G.A.§24-9-83.Itshouldbenotedthatbeforecontradictorystatementsmaybeprovenagainsttheclaimant,unlesssuchstatementsarewrittenandmadeunderoathwithsomejudicialproceedings,thecircumstances(time,manner,place,andpersonsstatedto)attendingtheformalstatementmustbecalledtotheclaimant’smindwithasmuchcertaintyaspossible.Thisusuallymeansthatarecordedstatementmustbeshowntothedeclarantorreadattheclaimant’shearing.
SurveillanceisanothertopicforwhichthereisnocaselawdirectlyonpointinthestateofGeorgia.Generallyspeaking,theStateBoardhastakenthepositionthatwhenthereisadisputeoverthediscoverabilityofsurveillance,theemployerandinsurerareentitledtotakeadiscoverydeposition,andfollowingthat,thesurveillancemustbeproduced.Thisseemstobeacompromisebetweenthepositionssomedefensecounseltake,thatthesurveillanceisattorneyworkproduct,therefore,privileged,orconversely,thepositionthattheclaimant’sattorneysometimestakes,thatthesurveillanceisantherrecordedstatementoftheclaimant,andassuch,iscompletelydiscoverable.
Themajorityofjurisdictionsthathavedeterminedtheissueastowhetherornotvideosurveillanceisdiscoverableholdthatitis.19ALR4th1236.Mostofthejurisdictionsfavoringdisclosureplacealimituponit,andthisissimilartothepositionthattheStateBoardhastakeninthepast,thattheproductionofthesurveillancetapewillnotberequireduntilaftertheemployerandinsurerhashadareasonableopportunitytoconductadeposition(post-surveillance)oftheclaimant.Therearetwocasesdirectlyonpointwhichoutlinetheintersectionbetweensurveillanceandworkproductdoctrine.Ranft v Lyons,163Wis.2d282(Wisc.App.1991)andHikel v Abousy,41FRD152(d)Md.(1966).TheCourtinRanftreasonedtherehadtobeabalancebetweentheworkproductdoctrineandtheneedtoconductdiscoveryinanopenmanner,findingthatthe“strategicdecisiontoinvestaclient’sresourceson…videosurveillanceisprotectedworkproduct.Thedecisionnotonlyreflectsthelawyer’sevaluationofthestrengthsorweaknessesoftheopponent’scase,butalsothelawyer’sinstructionstothepersonorpersonsconductingthesurveillancealsorevealsthelawyer’sanalysisofpotentiallyfruitfulareasofinvestigation.”Ranft,163Wis.2d301.
20 Workers’ Compensation Law Section
Interestingly,theRanftCourtrejectedthecompromisepositionofallowingpost-surveillance/pre-productiondepositiontestimonyfromtheclaimant(thepositiontheStateBoardhasadopted).Conversely,theHikelCourtfoundthesurveillancematerialstobenon-discoverableinsofarasrevealingtheirexistenceinresponsetoaninterrogatorywouldpreventeffectivecross-examination.
Ontheoppositeendofthespectrum,severalstateshavetakenthepositionthatsuchmaterialsarediscoverabledespitethefacttheyareworkproduct.Forexample,inCabral v Arruda,556A.2d.47(R.I.1989),theSupremeCourtofRhodeIslandheldsurveillancematerial,whileworkproduct,wasdiscoverableuponashowingofunduehardship.TheCourtreasonedthatthesematerialsbeingusedtosurpriseaplaintiffordefendantattrialpotentiallycreatedunduehardship,andassuch,thematerialswouldbediscoverableundertheunduehardshipdoctrine.AsimilarconclusionbydifferentreasoningwasarrivedatbytheNewJerseySupremeCourtinJenkins v. Rainner,69N.J.50(1976).TheJenkinsCourtreasonedthatwhilethematerialswereworkproduct,theinabilityofthemovanttofilmhisprioractivitiescreatedunduehardshipinacquiringsubstantiallythesamematerials,therefore,theexemptioncreatedbythedoctrinewouldbelifted.
Medicalrecordsfortheinjury/accidentinquestionintheadjuster’sfilesarealwaysdiscoverableunderBoardRule200,andbarelydeservementioninthisarticleotherthantostatethatallmedicalrecordsshouldbeproducedassoonaspossible,again,topreventunduehardship.ThisseemsimplicitintheRuleandintheGeorgiaCivilPracticeAct.Thisisespeciallysoinworkers’compensationclaimssincephysiciansarenotcompelledtotestifyaswitnessesathearings,therefore,therelianceupontheserecordsisevengreaterbybothparties.Thussaid,however,adifferentapproachmightbetakenwithrespecttomedicalrecordswhichdonotpertaintotheworkaccident/injuryinquestion.Certainlythisisatopicwhichremains“inplay”intermsofthescopeofamedicalrecordsrequestbyinsurersforaclaimant’smedicalrecords,andthesameprivacyconcernsmustbegivenconsiderationwhenanadjuster’sfileisrequested.Certainlyanyrequestingclaimantwhoseekstolimitthemedicalrecordsbydateandinjuryoforigincannot,atthesametime,demandallthemedicalrecordsintheadjuster’sfileoutsideofthatlimitation.Sucharequestmight,infact,opentheclaimantupforthediscoveryofhisorherownentiremedicalhistoryasheorshehassuddenly“openedthedoor”intermsofwaivingasupposedprivilege.
There,ofcourse,willbemultiplecorrespondencesfromattorneysandotheragentsintheadjuster’sfile.Thesematerialsareclearlyprotectedundertheattorneyworkproductdoctrine.Whiletheattorney/clientprivilegeisofteninvokedasaprivilegetothesematerials,itshouldberememberedthattheattorney/clientprivilegeonlyappliestotestimony.Tenet Healthcare Corp. v Louisiana Forum Corp.,273Ga.206,538S.E.2d441(2000);GeorgiaRulesofProfessionalConduct,Rule1.6(a).Whilenopartyorwitnessshouldberequiredtomakediscoveryofthe
adviceofhisprofessionaladvisorsorconsultationwiththem[O.C.G.A.§24-9-27(c)],becausethecommunicationsarewrittenandproducedwithstrategyusuallyinmind,theworkproductdoctrineisthemoreproperobjectiontoassert,andindeed,suchcorrespondenceshouldbeprotectedunderthesame.Ofcoursetheattorney/clientprivilegewouldlikelybartheproductionofthesematerialsaswell.Thussaid,attorneycorrespondenceintheadjuster’sfileclearlyisworkproductandnotdiscoverablewithoutunduehardship,andeventhen,portionsofsuchmaterialswilllikelyberedactedbytheCourtafteranin camerainspection.
Last,butcertainlynotleast,aretheadjuster’snotes.Thereisalotofconfusionandcontroversysurroundingtheirdiscoverability,andGeorgiacourtshavenotdeterminedonewayortheotherwhetherornottheyarediscoverable(notunlikesurveillance).Adjuster’snotesgenerallycontainabroadvarietyoftopicsincluding,butnotlimitedto,notesofconversationswiththeircounsel,excerptsofcorrespondencefromcounselandcommunicationswithemployerrepresentativesconcerningthefactsoftheclaimindispute.Itwouldcertainlyseem,therefore,thatatleastpartsthesenotesarebeingkeptinpreparationfortrialusebytheattorneyinvolved,andthereforefallundertheworkproductdoctrine.
Whilemanycounselseekingthesematerialswouldpointoutthatthisisnot“product”preparedbydefensecounsel,trialpreparationmaterialsfallingundertheprivilegealsoincludereportspreparedbythoseworkingfortheattorneyortheclientrelated to anticipated or pending litigation.InTobacco Road, Inc. v Callaghan,174Ga.App.539,330S.E.2d768(1985)(emphasisadded),theinvestigator’sreportofawitness’statementwasdeemedprivileged[See,also,Copher v Mackey,220Ga.App.43,467S.E.2d362(1996)]andstatementstakenbyaninsuranceinvestigatorinanticipationoflitigationwerepartofprotectedworkproduct.Adjuster’snotesarecertainlypartoftheprocessforpreparingforlitigationand/ortrial,anddocumentevidence,strategyandinformationtobeusedinthesame.Again,ifthemovantpartycanprovebothsubstantialneedandunduehardshipinacquiringtheequivalentmaterialselsewhere,itispossiblethatthenotesmighthavetobeproduced,buteventhen,thetrialjudgewilllikelyperformanincamerainspectiontoexcludeallotherwiseprivilegedandprotectedmaterialswithinthenotes.Suchaninspectionmightmakethenotesworthlesstothemovantafterredactionbythejudge.
ItwouldcertainlyseemundertheCallaghanandCophercasesadjusternoteswouldbeworkproduct.Thus,withoutashowingofunduehardshipbythecounselfortheplaintiff,thenoteswouldbedeemednon-discoverable.Evenifunduehardshipwereshown,theworkproductnotes,notunlikeattorneycorrespondenceasoutlinedabove,wouldlikelyfirstbesubjecttoanen camerainspectionbytheCourtunderthesamemandatescitedaboveinthattheCourtshallprotectfromdisclosureallmentalimpressions,etc.,inthegenerationoftheproduct.Inotherwords,and
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insumandsubstance,Georgiacourtshavenotbeenverygenerouswithrequestsforsuchreportsormaterials,andlikely,anAdministrativeLawJudgewouldnotbeeitherwithoutshowingofunduehardshipbytherequestingparty.
The Interaction of the Right to Discovery and the Right to PrivacyHowmuchinformationaboutherprivatelifeisaninjuredworkerrequiredtorevealsimplybecauseshegotinjuredatwork?ThestandardforadepositionissetbyO.C.G.A.§9-11-26thesameasitisforotherdiscoverymatters.Itisessentiallyathreeprongedtestinthatthemattermustbe“relevanttothesubjectmatterinvolvedinthependingaction”,“reasonablycalculatedtoleadtothediscoveryofadmissibleevidence”and“notprivileged.”Theissueofprivilegewillnotbediscussedspecificallyinthisportionofthisarticle,butitisobviouslyimportanttoconsiderwhetherinformationisprivilegedindepositionsorotherformsofdiscovery.
Itisoftendifficulttodeterminewhethersomethingisbothrelevantandreasonablycalculatedtoleadtothediscoveryofadmissibleevidence.However,itisimportanttorememberthat“relevance”and“reasonablycalculated
toleadtothediscoveryofadmissibleevidence”aretwoseparatestandards.UnderO.C.G.A.§9-11-26,theinformationsoughtmustberelevantandadmissibleorreasonablycalculatedtoleadtothediscoveryofadmissibleevidence.“Themostacceptabletestforrelevancyiswhethertheevidenceofferedrendersthedesiredinferencemoreprobablethanitwouldbewithouttheevidence.”11Ofcourse,onemuststartwiththecurrentlitigationissuestodeterminewhatisrelevant.Toooften,discoveryisnotnarrowlytailoredtothependingissues.WhiletheClaimant’spreviousinjuriestothesamepartofthebodyandfunctionalcapacityarecertainlyrelevantinadepositioninanallissuesclaim,theyarenotrelevantinaclaimwherethedeterminationofthecorrectaverageweeklywageistheonlyhearingissue.
Eveniftheinformationsoughtisrelevant,admissible(orreasonablycalculatedtoleadtothediscoveryofadmissibleevidence)andnotprivileged,theinformationstillmaynotbediscoverable.TheStateofGeorgiarecognizestherighttoprivacy.Infact,theSupremeCourtofGeorgiawasthefirstcourtofhighestresortinthecountrytorecognizetherighttoprivacy.TherightofprivacyinGeorgia“isfarmoreextensivethantherightofprivacyprotectedbytheU.S.Constitution…”12This
righttoprivacyaffectsdiscoverybecause“thecompetinginterestsinanindividual’srighttoprivacymustbeaccommodatedinthediscoveryprocess.”13
Howshouldthecompetinginterestsinanindividual’srighttoprivacybeaccommodated?Theremustbeabalancingtestbetweentheneedfortheinformationofthepartyseekingdiscoveryandtheprivacyinterestsofthepartyprovidingtheinformation.Withregardtoworkers’compensation,thefilingofaworkers’compensationclaimdoesnotforcesomeonetomakeherentirelifeanopenbook.Iftheemployee’sinterestinkeepingtheinformationprivateoutweighstheemployer’sinterestindiscoveringtheinformation,thentheinformationshouldnotbediscoverable.Injuredworkersareoftenstigmatizedbyemployers,co-workersandothersforfilingWorkers’Compensationclaims.Theyaresometimesmadetofeellikeitistheirfaultthattheygothurt.Theyhaveastronginterestinkeepingprivateinformationthatmayonlybemarginallyrelevant.
Thatprivacyinterestisespeciallyimportantindiscovery.Whenan
22 Workers’ Compensation Law Section
injuredworkerrevealspotentiallyembarrassinginformationtoherattorney,thatinformationwillnotberevealedelsewhere.Whenpotentiallyembarrassinginformationisrevealedinadeposition,theinjuredworkermustrevealthatinformationtotheotherattorney,someonesheknowsishiredtoworkagainsther.Thatinformationisalsorevealedtothecourtreporter.Itwilllikelytoberevealedtoemployeesoftheemployerandtheinsurerasclientsoftheattorney,anditcancertainlygoevenfurtherthanthat.ThestrongrighttoprivacyinGeorgiashouldprotectinjuredworkersfromhavingtorevealmarginallyrelevantinformationwhentheyhaveaninterestinkeepingthatinformationprivate.
Proper Subpoena UseGenerallyspeaking,subpoenasareanorderfroma
courtcompellinganindividualtoprovidetestimonyonamatterbeforeit.Asofficersofthecourt(s),itisincumbentuponusassuchtousethesubpoenapowerofthecourt(s)inamannerthatisjustandwillaidinthefurtheranceofthecasesbeforeit.UnfortunatelythereareanumberofattorneysinGeorgiawhoissuesubpoenasinanabusivemannerandcertainlydonotissuethemproperly.Outlinedbelowaretheproperproceduresfortheutilizationof
subpoenastosecuretheattendanceofwitnesses,toprocureandtopreserveevidence.
Title24,Chapter10,oftheCodeofGeorgiasetsforththeproceduresbywhichtouseasubpoenaforlitigationpurposes.O.C.G.A.§24-10-20(a)mandatesthateverysubpoenashallbeissuedbytheClerkundersealoftheCourtwhosepoweritisissuedfrom.Inworkers’compensation,we,ofcourse,haveourownsubpoenasinformthatcanbeacquiredfromtheStateBoard/ICMS.Whenserved,itisimportanttonotethatforwitnesses,thepowerofthesubpoenatocompeltheirattendanceonlyextendstothelinesofthestateofGeorgia.O.C.G.A.§24-10-21.Inotherwords,out-of-statewitnessescannotbecompelledbyuseofaStateBoardsubpoena.Subpoenasforproductionofdocumentaryevidencearegovernedby§24-10-22,andundersection(a),asubpoenaissuedtoapersonforwitness’testimonymayalsodirectsuchpersontoproducebooks,papers,documents,orothertangiblethingsdesignatedonthesubpoena.Section(b)oftheStatutenotesthattheCourtissuingthesubpoena,uponwrittenmotionfiledbytheopposingpartybeforethetimespecifiedinthesubpoena,mayquashormodifythesubpoenaifitis“unreasonableandoppressive,”orconditionallydenythemotionupontheadvancementbythepersoninwhosebehalfthesubpoenaisissuedthereasonablecostofthematerialsrequested.
Asubpoenamaybeservedbyanysheriff,deputy,orbyanyotherpersonnotlessthan18yearsofage,proofofwhichmaybeshownbyreturnorcertificateendorsedonacopyofthesubpoena.O.C.G.A.§24-10-23.Subpoenasmayalsobeservedbyregisteredorcertifiedmailorstatutoryovernightdelivery,andthereturnreceiptshallconstituteprima facieproofofservice.Id.Itisimportanttonotethatserviceuponapartymaybemadebyservinghiscounselofrecord.Id.
Wheresubpoenasareoftennotservedproperlyiswhenfeesandmileagearenotpaid.UnderO.C.G.A§24-10-24,awitnessfeeshallbe$25 per day.Thepaymentofthefeeshallnotbedemandedasaconditionprecedenttotheattendanceofawitnessresidingwithinthecountywheretestimonyistobegiven.Whenawitnessresidesoutsidethecountywherethetestimonyistobegiven,however,theserviceofthesubpoena,inordertobevalid,mustbeaccompaniedbythetenderofthefeeforoneday’sattendance($25)plusmileageof$0.20permilefortravelingexpensesforgoingtoorfromthewitness’placeofresidencebythenearestpracticalroute.Inotherwords,unlessthewitnessliveswithinthecountywherehisorherattendanceiscompelledbythesubpoena,non-paymentofbothoneday’switnessfeeandmileagewilldeemtheserviceofthesubpoenatobeinvalid.
Finally,practitionersmustconsidertheenforcementmechanismunderTitle24,Chapter10.UnderO.C.G.A.§24-10-25,subpoenasmaybeenforcedbyanattachmentforcontemptwhichcanresultinafinenotexceeding
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$300.00andimprisonmentofnomorethan20daysifthewitness,afterbeingproperlyserved,failstoattend.However,acaveattothissubsection(SectionA)isthatinallcasesunderthissectionoftheCode,theCourtwillconsiderwhetherunderthecircumstancesofthecasethesubpoenawasservedwithin“areasonabletime.”Whilethisvariesfromcasetocase,innoeventshallareasonabletimebelessthan24hourspriortothetimethatappearancewasrequiredbyserviceofthesubpoena.
Insum,practitionersshouldusesubpoenassparinglyandonlyinclearfurtherancetheirclient’scase.Forexample,subpoenasshouldnotbeissuedtotheentirestaffofanemployerorinsurerto“scare”themintosettlement,norshouldtheybeissuedtotheentirefamilyofanemployeeforthesamepurposes.Thediscoveryprocessleadinguptoahearingortrialshouldgivebothsidesampleopportunitytoexamineanywitnessesunderoath,anddeterminewhocanbestadvancetheirclient’sinterestsatahearingortrial.Surprisingtheothersidewithsubpoenaswhicharenotissuedwiththispurposeinmind,orevenservedproperly,doesn’tdoeithersideanygood,andrisksangeringthesittingjudge.
(Endnotes)1. SeeBurchv.TiogaManorNursingHome,649So.2d545
(La.Ct.of Appeals,3rdCir.1994)(adjusternotesinhearingonissueof assessedattorney’sfeesforunreasonabledefenseandpenalties);
2. GeneralMotorsCorp.v.Conkle,226Ga.App.34(1997).
3. AtlantaCoca-ColaBottlingCo.v.TransamericaIns.Co.,61F.R.D.115(NDGa.1972).
4. SeeDepartmentof Transp.v.HardawayCo.,216Ga.App.262(1995)(discussingLowe’sof Ga.v.Webb,180Ga.App.755(1986)andexplainingthatroutineactivitieswerenotdoneinanticipationof litigationbutactivitiesinresponsetounusualcircumstancesorthreatsof litigationqualifiedasanticipationof litigation)
5. Lowe’sof Georgia,Inc.v.Webb,180Ga.App.755(1986).
6. TobaccoRoad,Inc.v.Callaghan,174Ga.App.539(1985).
7. Jonesv.Scarborough,194Ga.App.468(1990).
8. If ithasbeenmodifiedorenhancedtobesomethingotherthanjustarecordingof theinjuredworker’sactivities,thenthisisacompletelydifferentproblem.
9. SeeTruittv.Mason,189Ga.App.24(1988)(itwasimproperfortrialcourttoenterorderrequiringdefendanttofirstbedeposedbyplaintiff beforeplaintiff producedtranscriptof trafficcourtproceedings).
10. Examplesof suchinformationthatcouldbewithheldcouldincluderecordedstatementsof anyparty,medicalrecords,correspondenceseekingpaymentof medicalbills,etc.
11. SouthernRy.Co.v.Lawson,256Ga.798,802(1987).
12. Powellv.State,270Ga.327(1998).
13. SouthernOutdoorPromotions,Inc.v.NationalBanner,Inc.,215Ga.App.133(1994).
Presort First ClassU.S. Postage
PaidAtlanta, GA
Permit No. 1447
State Bar of GeorgiaWorkers’ Compensation Law SectionKelly A. Benedict & Jo H. Stegall III, Editors104 Marietta Street NWAtlanta, GA 30303
In This Issue
Preparing the Record for Appeal and Tips for Appellate Practice at the Board ................................. 1
Understanding CMS’ WC-MSA Review Thresholds & Addressing “Non-Threshold” Cases ..................... 4
Message from the Chairman ................................... 10
Message from the Chair .......................................... 11
ICMS Update .......................................................... 12
Idiopathic Injuries and the Harris Test ................... 13
Distinguished Service Award .................................. 16
This and That in Discovery .................................... 17