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TRANSCRIPT
Can we avoid SPAD
presentation by ELTC/TATA
TIGER
LURKS
ON YOU
BEHIND
THE
RED SIGNAL
Loco pilot shall responsible for a large number of cases of Signal Passing At Danger (SPAD) and if a engine crew overshoot the signal, their own lives are at stake. Hence the procedure of avoiding such accidents must be initiated by the engine crew themselves.
Therefore we should find out the root causes of the SPAD, and chalk out an action plan to ignite each and every mind of loco pilot to avoid SPAD cases.
SPAD CASES OVER INDIAN RAILWAY
Since Dt: 01.04.13 to 30.09.13
Total No. of cases-26
RESPONSIBILITY
-92%
8%
(Till date)
(3)
(0)
(4)
(0)
(1)
DUTY HOURS-WISE (S E RAILWAY)
AGE-WISE (S E RAILWAY)
DRIVING EXPERIENCE-WISE
(S E RAILWAY)
BLOCK WORKING-WISE
(S E RAILWAY)
57
BLOCK WORKING WISE
AUTOMATIC BLOCK SYSTEM OTHERS
SPAD ?
Let us see
Through the
Case study
CASE NO-1
A
Issued Caution Order
to LP
On dt.3.4.2013, PUI-DURG Exp stopped at
MCS at 20.03Hrs.On duty Dy.SS. issued a
sectional caution order stating
“you will passAS-8 and AS-10
at danger aspect”.
A
18425 Exp
After taking OFF the signal train left
MANCHESWAR
and proceeded towards
BARANG
A A A A A A A
MCS Adv.
starter BRAG
Home
AS 2 GSA
4
GAS
6
AS
8
AS
10
GAS
12
Signaling arrangement in between
MANCHESWAR & BARANG
Double line Automatic block system
DN Line
A A
AS
8
AS
10
Train no DN TLHR BOBRN (E) started
at 20.12Hrs after following the rule
passing Auto signal at ON
Km. No.
423/32
A
AS
8
Train No.18425 Exp while proceeding
to wards BRAG, passed AS-8 at
Danger and while on run between
AS-8 & AS-10the train dashed at a
speed of 41Kmph with B/V of
TLHR/BOBRN(E) at about 20.15 Hrs.
Could the accident
have been averted ?
1) Yes, the accident could have
been averted had the rules
prescribed in GR & SR 9.02
were followed by the LP and
Gd. Of 18425 Exp.
2) The Dy. SS had not issued the
mislead caution order stating
“you will pass AS-8 & AS-10 at
danger aspect.”
Lesson learnt:-
1) Always pass a signal at ON/
Defective with applicable
rule/proper authority.
2) LP & Gd. Read the caution
order carefully and understand
the instructions properly
before starting the train.
3) SM should not issue mislead
caution order to LP & Gd.
CASE NO-2
DN Line-2
DN Line-1
RNG
Starter
On dt:19.12.2012 train No. DN/HDCG
was standing on DN line-2 at starter
signal of RNG from 00.30Hrs
RNG
Home
DN Line-2
DN Line-1
Train no. DN/BTPC stopped at
DN line-2 Home Signal at 00.44Hrs as
the signal was danger.
DN Line-2
DN Line-1
RNG
Home
LP of DN/BTPC started the train
without authority to proceed at about
1.12Hrs. from DN line-2 Home signal
by possible misreading the aspect of
Home signal of DN line-1, which was
taken OFF for MEMU(E) and bumped
with B/V of DN/HDCG
Yes, the accident could have been
averted if the LP/ALP of DN/BTPC
identify & call out the aspect of signal to
each other after checking the aspect of
the signal pertaining to them .
Could the accident
have been averted ?
Lesson learnt:-
1) The LP of a train shall not pass a
Home signal at ON or defective
unless he is either authorized by a
written authority/ Calling ON
signal/ authorized by signal post
telephone along with proceed
hand signal where required.
2) The LP shall not however trust
entirely to signal but always be
vigilant and cautious
CASE NO-3
DN Line- 3
RKSN
Starter
On Dt: 02.05.2008, BCN/RXL was stabled
at RKSN on L-3.
Gd & LP conducted GDR ‘A’ check.
The Brake power was as per check
memo 97%. After taking of signal, train
left RKSN at 13.05Hrs
Train passed AS-38,AS-36 & GSA-34
at One Yellow.
Noticing AS-32 at Danger, LP tried to
control the train but failed & overshoot
AS-32 at about 13.28 Hrs.
A A A A
AS
38
GSA
34 AS
36 AS
32
RKSN MMV
MMV
Home
Resulting BCN/RXL collided in rear of
NSL/BURN which was standing at
Out side of MMV Home signal as it was
Danger.
A
Km. No. 285/22-18
The accident took place due to total loss
of brake power caused by discontinuity
in the brake pipe near to the train engine
and subsequent failure on the part of LP
& Gd in not ensuring brake continuity
test before starting
1) Yes, the accident could have been
averted if the LP/ALP & Gd of BCN/RXL,
had checked brake continuity before
starting, they could have detected the
discontinuity in the brake system and
rectified it.
2) If the LP had been vigilant enough to
do the brake feel check immediately
after starting.
Could the accident
have been averted ?
1) Perform GDR check properly and
ensure prescribed brake power during
clearing of stable load with invalid
BPC.
2) Before starting do the brake
continuity test.
3) The LP of a train shall invariably test
the adequacy of brake power of his
train at the start of his journey, before
hitting continuous down gradient.
Lesson learnt:-
CASE NO-4
On 30.6.2011 train no 12073 UP
(Janastabdhi Exp) was programmed to
cross with 18425 Exp and 58514 Pass at
GBK. 12073 Exp left CTC at 19.53Hrs
and kept outside Home of GBK for
admiting 18245 Exp. On R/1 L/Line.
18425 Exp
18425 Exp arrived on R/1 L/line at
19.59Hrs.
After taking OFF H/Signal for admitting
Janasatabdhi Exp on M/Line and Starter
was kept Danger as per program, but the
LP without stopping overshoot the
Starter & Adv Starter signal and passed
the station.
The LP & ALP of 12073 Exp have not
given attention to the aspect of signals
and callously gave attention to the VHF
instructions which was not meant for
them and speeded up the train with out
ensuring the aspect of Starter signal.
1) Yes, the accident could have been
averted if the LP & ALP had paid
immediate attention to and obeyed
the signal aspect following the rule
GR 3.78(i),GR 3.81 & GR 3.83
2) If they were vigilant and cautious.
3) If they were not attentive to the
instructions given on VHF.
4) Gd. Fails to obey GR 4.45 and
OPM 17.25(c)
Could the accident
have been averted ?
1) The LP shall pay immediate attention
to and obey every signal whether the
cause of the signal being shown is
known to him or not.
2) ALP shall callout the aspect of signal
sighted by him to LP who after
checking the aspect himself, shall
repeat the same.
3) VHF sets should not be used for
communicating the aspect & as an
alternative to written authority
to proceed, authority to pass a signal
at danger etc.
Lesson learnt:-
4) The Gd. Should attract the attention
of LP when he sees reason to
apprehend danger or consider it is
necessary for any reason to stop the
train.
Lesson learnt:-
COLLISION OF GOODS TRAIN
Date & Time of accident:- 08.10.2013
at 5.35 Hrs
Division:- BSP
Sec:- BSP Jn- GEVRA Road
Station:- KORBA at Km- 702/04
System of Working:- D/L Abs. block system
Train No.:- 1) DN BOX(N)/E-HC
2) DN BOX(NHL)/E-16148
Loco No:- 1) 28536 (WAG-7)
2) 28595 (WAG-7)
Other information:-
Duty of LP 13.00 Hrs.
VCD isolated since last 10 days.
Brief particulars:-
While the train No. DN BOXN/E-HC was
approaching KORBA Stn. Its loco pilot
disregarded the danger aspect Of DN
H/Signal and dashed with B/V of train No.
DN BOXNHL/E-16148 on line No.-2,
resulting which the B/V and ‘3’ BOXN of
DN BOXNHL/E-16148 derailed out of which
‘2’ wagons capsized blocking DN line No-
1(L/L) and DN line No-2(M/L).
Prima facie cause:-
Overshooting of H/Signal by LP.
ROLE OF CC/CCC : Proper learning road of the crew in all section of their jurisdiction
must be ensured. Also ensure that running staff are booked on all the routes so that their LR does not become overdue.
Close monitoring of PR, H/Q and Outstation Rest in accordance to duty hours must be ensured.
Breach of rest booking should be avoided.
Condition of crew booking lobbies and running rooms should be improved to ensure proper quality of rest.
Posters, narrating accident cases and action taken by crew to avoid such occurrences should be displayed for mass awareness in liaison with safety department.
Ensure breath analyzer test of crew before SIGNING ON and SIGNING OFF.
Over due PME/CRC crew should not be booked on line.
Signal defects register entries should be dealt with promptness to rectify the defect. Proper redressed mechanism for Crew grievances should be
improved. Ensure all the competency / training imparted on due date. The activities of welfare inspector deputed for each lobby to be
closely monitored.
Date Tr. No.
Signal No. Nature of defect
30.12.09
K-103
EMU
KGP inner
Home Signal Signal was lowered to admit EMU on P/F-
1 but path was obstructed by 2810 Exp.
01.09.10
MH-131
EMU
PKU UP
Middle Line
Home Signal
After passing MH-131 signal became
yellow instead of getting back to danger.
27.10.10
MH-101
EMU
KGP Inner
Home signal
LP passed the signal one yellow but point
was set for P/F-1 instead of CTC-2
25.11.10
K-102
EMU
AS-98/2 &
AS-96 AS 98/2 was double yellow but AS-96
danger.
19.01.11
12444
DN
KGP H/S On approaching put back to danger from
yellow but it was showing one yellow on
RRI panel.
SIGNAL IRREGULARITIES
REPORTED BY LP
ROLE OF CLI : Do the effective counseling to develop safety consciousness
among crew and identify their personal weakness and rectify the same. A regular inspection and ambush checks including night
footplate to ensure that staff follow regular and sound practices . Surprise breath analyzer checks to be carried out during
footplate.
ALP needs to be counseled applying Emergency brakes by opening RS valves quickly in case they find lack of alertness on the part of LP while approaching signals .
CLI should ensure during footplate ALPs are calling signal aspects loudly with pointing out and LPs are also acknowledge the same after ensuring the same .
Increased interaction with family members of crew for bringing about an awareness of the need for proper rest of crew at the home station.
Regular inspection to be carried out for proper up keeping of running rooms and crew lobbies .
Categorisation of engine crew should be done as per the RB’s guideline.
ROLE OF LOCO CONTROLLER :
Monitor properly the distress train and Loco. Minimize the pre-departure detention of train and long
hours duty. Check and avoid unnecessary harassment of crew.
ROLE OF ENGINE CREW
Take proper rest at home and out station.
Keep yourself healthy and active.
Don’t take sedative, narcotic and stimulant drugs.
Go through the current circulars during signing on.
Ensure that the Engine is in good working condition , the braking apparatus is in efficient and effective working condition before leaving the shed.
Before starting of train read caution order carefully and
observe it meticulously.
Before starting the train satisfy yourself that all correct fixed signals are given and where necessary hand signal are given and line is clear of visible obstruction and guard has given signal to start.
Callout each and every signal aspect clearly and loudly by each other pointing out with finger.
Don’t fail to exchange hand signals with the Station and Cabin staff.
Do the brake feel test to check the adequacy of brake power at first opportunity.
Always obey authorized speed limit.
Don’t use mobile phone and misuse VHF set during footplate duty.
Engine crew should acquainted themselves to the topography
and terrain and location of signals of section properly.
Always try to keep the train under your control whenever the view of signal is obstructed due to fog, storm or any other reason.
Keep a sharp lookout for each signal. Don’t take off your
mind and eyes while approaching the signal.
Don’t presume that the train will run through because daily it is passing through.
Be more vigilant and cautious during abnormal working. Don’t entirely trust on signal but be vigilant and cautious.
Defective signals should identified in time and pass it as per prescribed rules and report the same.
Perform GDR check properly.
Do the air pressure continuity test whenever required.
Before negotiating descending gradient, ensure that the brakes are working efficiently.
Avoid strictly packing of bag and baggage before the halt. Stay alert when driving .
Sec : TATA TO CKP Running time for super first train : 53 min. Total Stations : 06 Total Signals : 50 Neutral sections : 04 (16 Boards) Manned Level crossing : 08 Un Manned Level Crossing : 22 Permanent speed Restrictions : 02(08 boards) Temporary Speed Restrictions: 04 (16 boards)---(On date 11/10) Grand total : 114
BOX N SER 17128
Alone, we can do so little, Together, we can do so much