Customs Administration of the Netherlands

5 december 2016

Dutch customs and Free Trade Zones

Mr Cees Fossen Dutch customs

5 december 2016

Content 1. Dutch customs and

volumes 2. FTZ approach 3. Case Peru (Colon) 4. Case Turkye (Mersin) 5. Problem or challenge

Sea port of Rotterdam

Customs Administration of the Netherlands: Pushing boundaries 4

Containers (x 1.000)

Customs Administration of the Netherlands: Pushing boundaries 5

Declarations

6 Customs Administration of the Netherlands: Pushing boundaries

Declaration 2015

Import 129,626,022

Export 10,094,779

Entry ICS sea

4,823,821

Exit ICS sea 8,918,326

Our Enforcement is a mix of knowledge/intelligence/technology/cooperation : •Risk assessed approach •Services and communication •Fysical and administrative inspections

Strategic goal is: 100% supervision, the flow of goods is monitored

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Our (maritime) perspective In total over 1800 profiles in our entry system, incl ad-random, CRC EU, other authorities and In total 1030 profiles in importing system: Incl. ad-random, on request other authorities and national law (e.g. excise) But: based on the declaration and/or manifest

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Bascap study in 2013: Controlling the zone The study of Bascap focussed on IPR and mentioned also the FTZ: balancing facilitation vs control to combat illicit trade. Identified the worldwide lack of controls concerning IPR in the FTZ’s. A lot of case studies concerning the control on IPR, transhipment and production. Production of IPR is also determined inside the FTZ’s, assembling of legitimate goods with brandlabels turning those goods into illegal trade.

The paradox of free trade zones study of Florida International University 2014

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Economy vs transnational crime (IPR, Narcotics, Arms etc)

ftz volume regulations Ipr routes nearby

Drug routes nearby

Arms routes nearby

Colon 4 mln teu Security Camera’s

Yes Yes Yes

Jebel Ali 14/15 mln teu

Goods regulated and documents

Yes Yes No

Shanghai 29 mln teu Public sec Vehicle inspection

Yes Yes

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Situation in Mersin (2014) Custom officers control at the gate not the incoming goods from sea. Thousands of workers in all kind of factories in FTZ but mostly clothing. No control in the FTZ unless investigation or specific information. No “export”control by transport to other countries.

What happens inside the FTZ, stays in the FTZ???

Example Panama

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Containers from USA (eg San Francisco) with generators in FTZ Colon in a warehouse. Containers from Peru/Panama with bananas in FTZ Colon in a coldstore with cocaine. Cocaine is replaced, within a few days inside the generators, no officials are controlling in the warehouses. Containers with generators are transported to Rotterdam.

(Pre) Arrival in Rotterdam: any control on narcotics?

Rotterdam Pre-arrival selection: based on the manifest/declaration and the FTZ is not in the manifest mentioned. Containers with generators from USA: Low risk

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Containers are loaded in Colon: • Profile on rip-on/ rip off, possibility for a control:

• Control rip-off load by physical check or scan (backscatter) • Control by opening container and look for bags/boxes etc

• Control in generators: only by ad-random or investigation/information

Recommendations of the Florida University -cooperation with neighboring countries (influence organised crime is mostly regional) -sharing intelligence on ongoing investigations (regional) -transparency with the FTZ policy -transparency with documentation -training and education of the harbour workers/employees -tackle networks -One big remark: the university underlined the effect of corruption in many FTZ’s

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Bascap study in 2013: Recommendations The study of Bascap focussed on IPR. Recommendations to: •WCO •WTO Specific recommendations •National governments (role customs) •FTZ operators (responsibility and information sharing)

Recent article: The economist/intelligence unit The illicit trade environment index, (limited 2016) : Conclusion and a Quote pag 12: “Shipments that enter FTZs are stored in a warehouse, where they can be re-packaged, re-labelled, processed, or assembled before being imported into the national territory, re-exported to the country of destination, or re-exported to another FTZ. In FTZs that are not monitored by customs or law enforcement, smugglers are free take a variety of actions to hide or disguise illicit shipments, including mislabelling the country of origin and the packages themselves, as well as consolidating and mixing cargoes.”

5 december 2016

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Conclusions

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1. FTZ’s are important for the economy but the paradox remains.

2. Control of and in the FTZ’s is necessary but, in general, still very limited

3. The chances for the OCG’s are still huge and wellknown

4. There is no enough knowledge/awareness in the harbour of destination that the goods have been in a FTZ’s

5. The risks are still unknown or still underestimated.

specific policies to remedy the situation ??

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In the FTZ’s: -Implementation of recommandations of Bascap and studies

Achievable in Europe: -Awareness of the FTZ’s situation in Europe

- Specific EU actions to underline the risks

We can catch the sharks if …..we want

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Thank you!!!