presentation, representation and the self
TRANSCRIPT
8/2/2019 Presentation, Representation and the Self
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/presentation-representation-and-the-self 1/19
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Vol. LXIV, No. 2, March 2002
Self-presentation, Representation and
the Self“
KEITH LEHRER
University of Arizona and University of Graz
Chisholm held that some states of ourselves are self-presenting and provide a stopping
place in the quest for justification. The justification we have for accepting that we are inthose states is transparent to us in a way that enables us to answer questions about justi-
fication. Representation enables us to apprehend such self-presenting states through
themselves in a representational loop. It is a loop of exemplarization wherein the state is
used as an exemplar to represent the kind of state it is. The result is that the representa-
tion of the state provides the subject with a kind of rep resenta tion that loops back onto
itself escaping the bondage of stratified mentality. This form of representation by
exemplarization is shown to resolve problems and paradoxes concerning subjectivity,
consciousness and the self raised by the writings of H ume, Kierkegaard , Ferrier, Sartr e
and Frank Jackson.
Chisholm held that some statesof ourselves are self-presenting. Seeking for a
place where the quest for justification might find a stopping place, Chisholm
writes,
Sextus Em piricus remarked that every object of apprehension seem s to be apprehended either
through itself or through another object. Those things, if there are any that are “apprehended
through themselves” might provide us with a stopping place.’
He introduces the terminology of the self-presenting by attributing it toMeinong as follows:
Borrowing a technical term of Meinong, let us say that what is directly evident to a man is
always some state of affairs that “presents itself to him”.2
Chisholm goes on to remark that thoughts, including appearings and under-
takings, are among those states that are self-presenting. Chisholm was espe-
cially concerned with the claim that when a person is in such a state, then it
Editor’s note:This special symposium, contain ing this paper and the two that follow it,
derives from a memorial conference in honor of Roderick M. Chisholm held at Brown
University in the year 2000.
Roderick M. Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, ( E n g l e w d Cliffs: Rentice-Hall, 1966),26 .
Chisholm,Theory ofKmwledge, 28 .
’
412 KEITH LEHRER
8/2/2019 Presentation, Representation and the Self
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/presentation-representation-and-the-self 2/19
must be evident to the person that he is in such a state. H e modified his
formulation in later work, but the claim that self-presenting states are directly
evident remained central to his view.
My concern in this paper is with those states that are apprehended through
themselves. Chisholm initially, in Perceiving, was inclined toward the view
that it would make no sense to suppose that a person was mistaken in believ-ing that he was in a self-presenting state.3 However, over time he sought to
disconnect his theory of evidence from both considerations of truth and
p s y ~ h o l o g y . ~evertheless, there is something about the character of self-
presenting states that allows us to apprehend them through themselves in a
way that m akes it difficult to see how we could be in error in believing that
we are in such states. This feature of such states has, of course, been of
considerable interest in the philosophy of mind as well as epistemology.
Chisholm sought to distance himself in his epistemology from questionsabout how we apprehend such states through themselves and was content to
simply note that when we are in such states, and understand what it means to
be in them, it is evident to us that we are in those states. Nonetheless, such
questions remain germane to Chisholm’s thought.
I am convinced that Chisholm remained convinced that there was some-
thing about those states and about us that explained how we could apprehend
them through themselves, even if his allergy to psychologism and naturalism
ledhim to turn away from such questions. Moreover,
Iam also convincedthat he remained convinced that our apprehension of those states through
themselves protected us from error concerning them even if, as he turned
away from questions abou t truth toward questions of rationality, he turned
away from that the issue of how they protect us from error.
Representation of Self-presenting States. My concern, however, is with
how we represent those states that are self-presenting. There are, Chish olm
affirmed, states of ourselves, consc ious states, Hume’s impressions and ideas,
that are self-presenting, immediate and directly evident. My claim is that it is
something about the way we represent those states that explains how we can
apprehend them through themselves. Such an explanation of how we
represent those states also explains why we are secure from error in our r e p -
sentation, though not beyond the logical possibility of error, as many have
noted, and how we are justified in accepting that we are in such states when
we represent them in the way that makes them self-presenting.
I shall explain why the justification we have for accepting that we are in
those states is transparent to us in a way that enables us to answer questions
’
‘
Roderick M. Chisholm, Perceiving: A Philosophical Srudy, (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1957), 67 .
Cf. “My Philosophical Developm ent,” in The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm, Lewis
Edwin Hahn, ed., (Chicago:Open Court, 1997). 3-41.
SYMPOSIUM 413
8/2/2019 Presentation, Representation and the Self
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/presentation-representation-and-the-self 3/19
about justification when we are justified in accepting that we are in such
states. The equation of justification with being able to answer questions
about how we are justified and how we know , is not a confusion of levels, as
Alston suggested: but, rather the result of a manner of representation. Repre-
sentation enables us to apprehend such self-presenting states through them-
selves in a representational loop . I have suggested that the representationalloop is a loop of exemplarization, wherein the state is used as an exemplar to
represent the kind of state it is. The result is that the representation of the
state provides the subject with a kind of representation that loops back onto
itself escaping the bondage of stratified mentality.
Problems and Paradoxes. I shall propose that this form of representation,
exem plarization, enables us to solve a number of problems about the repre
sentation of consc ious states and the representation of the self. The first prob-
lem is that the experience of conscious states fails to include the representa-tion of them. The representation of such states is left over as a kind of residue
of representation. I call this the representation problem . Th e second problem
concerns the impossibility of representing the subjectivity of consc ious states
and the conscious self. This problem is the mirror opposite of the representa-
tion problem in that it affirms that any representation of conscious states and,
therefore, of the conscious self, will fail to include the subjective knowledge
of the activity of consciousness. Representation will always leave out this
remainder of subjective knowledge. I call this the problem of subjectivity.Finally, there is the paradox involved in combining the problems of represen-
tation and subjectivity to account for our know ledge of consciousness and the
consc ious self. The paradox is that consc iousness transcends the subjectivity
of consciousness to yield the representation of it required for subjective
knowledge while at the sam e time consc ious transcends any representation of
it. I call this the problem of transcendence. These problems, I shall argue,
admit of solution in terms of representation by exem plarization, but first let
us formulate the problems.
The Representation Problem: Reid versus Hume. Consider the problem
of the representation of self-presenting states, consc ious s tates. The best
articulation of the problem is to be found in the 18th century dispute between
David Hume and Thomas Reid. Hume said that the perceptions of the mind
divide into impressions and ideas. Impressions are conscious states. Hume
says that as the force and vivaciousness of impressions fade, they become
ideas, indeed, ideas of the initial impressions! Now Hume is fam ous for his
attem pt to account for our belief in the external world in terms of impres-
5
6
414
William Alston, “Levels-Confusions in Epistemology,” in Midwesf S f d i e s in Philosophy,
P.A. French, T.E. Uehling and H.K. Wettstein, eds., (Minneapolis: University of Minne-
sota Press, 1980).
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, L.A. elby-Bigge, ed., (Oxford Clarendon
Press, 1888), 1-8.
KEITH LEHRER
8/2/2019 Presentation, Representation and the Self
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/presentation-representation-and-the-self 4/19
sions, even if he finds n o line of reasoning to d e f d the existence of the
external world starting from premises restricted to impressions and ideas.
Reid, his opponent, a f f i e d that no external object or quality thereof even
resembles an impression. Hume’s attempt to account for our belief in exter-
nal objects and the qualities thereof in terms of impressions is, Reid thought,
doom ed from the outset.’Reid does not leave his criticism of Hume at this level, however, but
proceeds instead to a deeper and more fundam ental criticism . The c riticism is
that Hume cannot account for our belief in the existence of impressions and
ideas themselves. Hence, even if, per impossible, Hume could succeed in
giving an account of our belief in the ex istence of external objects and their
qualities based on only our belief in the existence of impressions and ideas,
Hum e’s project would falter at the initia l step of giving an account of our
belief in the ex istence of im pressions and ideas themselves. The reason is thatthere is a critical distinction between an impression, on the one hand, and a
belief and conception of the im pression, on the other.’
Take, for example, a sensation, the sensation of taste one experiences
upon drinking the first cup of coffee in the morning . The sensation is one
thing and a conception of it, a though t of it, is another. Reid contended that
the claim becomes more obvious when the sensation is past, when I remem-
ber the sensation I experienced upon drinking the cup of coffee. For now the
sensation is past, but the conception of it and the belief that i t existed aresomething present. The past sensation is obviously not identical with the
present thought of it on the grounds that nothing that is past can be identical
with something present. The fundam ental point, however, is that the concep-
tion, thought or belief concerning the sensation, whether past or present,
must be distinguished from the sensation itself. Consider another example,
that of pain. It is one thing to feel a pain, and it is another to have a concep-
tion, thought or belief concerning the pain. Reid says that the pain is the
immanent object, what we would after Brentano call the intentional object, ofthe conception, thought or belief. The pain must be distinguished from the
thought about it. The reason is that the pain may have no immanent object,
no intentional object, while the thought of the pain has the pain as the
immanent or intentional object of it? So, if the impression has no immanent
object and the conception, thought or belief of the pain does have an imma-
nent object, namely, the pain itself, then the conception, thought or belief of
the pain m ust be distinct from the pain. In general, put in modern terms, the
point is that im pressions lack the intentional structure of concep tion, thought
’ Thomas Reid, The Works of Thomas Reid, Eighth Edirion, Sir William Hamilton, ed.,
(Edinburgh: James Thin, 1895). 105.
Reid, Works. 356-57.
’ Reid, Works, 183.
SYMPOSIUM 415
8/2/2019 Presentation, Representation and the Self
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/presentation-representation-and-the-self 5/19
and belief, which have immanent or intentional objects. Hence, Reid
concluded, Hum e, starting with impressions alone cannot give us an account
of our conception, thought or belief concerning even impressions. Hume's
philosophy leaves us with an unexplained residue of representation beyond
impressions, namely, our conception, thought and belief about them.
The Represenration o f f h e Self. This problem leads to a second problemof a representation for Hume, one concerning the self. H ume says that when
he turns in upon himself and perceives what he is pleased to call him self, he
always perceives som e impression or idea and nothing else. He concludes that
he must be composed of impressions and ideas." The problem is that when
Hume turns in upon himself and perceives his impressions and ideas, there
seems to be something omitted, namely, the perceiver of those impressions
and ideas. This argument suggests that the perceiver is a substance, and might
beg the question against Hume.However, even if we do not assume that the perceiver is a substance ad
acknowledge that it migh t be a collection of impressions and ideas, there
remains at least the perception of those impressions and ideas, when Hume
looks into himself in order to represent what he is, left dangling beyond the
impressions and ideas perceived. The perceptionof the impressions and ideas,
even if that is nothing but another impression, appears to be left outside the
bundle of impressions and ideas perceived. Any attempt, therefore, by a self
to represent the self as a bundle of impressionsand
ideas will leave theperception of those impressions and ideas dangling outside the bundle. That
perception will be unrepresented and not included in the representation of the
bundle of impressions and ideas constituting the self. The attempt to repre
sent the self by observ ing the impressions and ideas composing it is self-
defeating.
These are problems about the representation of impressions and, conse-
quently, about the representation of the self in terms of the representation of
impressions and ideas. The two problems constitute the problem of represen-
tation. I shall eventually argue that the solution to the problem of representa-
tion is contained in Hume's own work, but it is important to notice the
relationship between this problem and other problems concerning conscious-
ness and evidence implicit in the doctrine of the self-presentation of our
conscious states. For, if Reid is correct in his argument, then it appears that
the psychological doctrine of self-presentation, of consc ious states appre-
hended through themselves, cannot be correct." The apprehension of the
10
I I
416
Hume, Treatise.252.
This problem is not a problem about the completeness of a representation of the states of
the self which may fail to be achieved because of the complexity of the bundle or, as
Hume himself noted, difficulties specifying the relation between the impressions and
ideas that make them a self. It is a more elementary problem, namely, that the very
KEITH LEHRFR
8/2/2019 Presentation, Representation and the Self
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/presentation-representation-and-the-self 6/19
conscious state, the pain, must be distinguished from the conception, thought
or belief about it . Consider a thought about a sensation or other conscious
state. We must distinguish the thought about some state, even a thought
about a thought, from the state itself. For the thought about a state has that
state as an intentional object, it is about that state, and hence must be distin-
guished from it.”Transparency of Consciousness. As a doctrine in philosophy of mind, a
doctrine about the psychology of consciousness, this might seem harmless
enough. Indeed, RosenthalI3and P01lock’~ ave thought that this doctrine has
the simple consequence that consciousness is metamental ascent to a next
level to obtain representation of a state. The ascent beyond the first level is
consciousness of them, and consciousness of a state at any level takes you up
a level to obtain the conscious representation of the state. Why not be satis-
fied with simply accepting Reid’s objection and this consequence of it? Firstof all, the doctrine of self-presentation has a point. Conscious states do seem
to present themselves to the subject in a way that makes the representation of
those states immediately transparent to us. The phenomenology may, of
course, be misleading. But they do seem to be apprehended through them-
selves. One might object that this phenomenology is simply the result of the
state playing a causal role in their representation. However, the existence of
many objects plays a causal role in our representationof them, so self-presen-
tation is missing from the account. Moreover, though this is controversial,the account that takes us to a higher level to obtain a conscious representa-
tion of a state always leaves us with an unrepresented level. We might, of
course, move up a level, but, once again, we are left at any point with an
unrepresented residue. The controversial but interesting feature of conscious-
ness is that the thought of a conscious state seems representationally trans-
parent. Consciousness seems, at least in some especially clear and salient
instances, a toothache, for example, to be representationally transparent all
the way up, down and through.
When we turn to the question of evidence the point iterates. Some
philosophers, Alston originally, have suggested that we may be justified in
believing that we are in some conscious or self-presenting state or, like
attempt to represent the bundle by perceiving what is in the bundle defeats the represen-
tation of the self as a bundle by leaving a perception unrepresented.
I t should be noted that when Reid wrote about consciousness he suggested that conscious
states signified or were signs of themselves as well as of other things. Nevertheless, he
distinguished between the sensat ion and the thought of the sensation. The sensation may
give rise to the thought of it and be a sign of it in that way, but the thought and the sensa-
tion giving rise to i t are distinct.
David Rosenthal, “Two Concepts of Consciousness,” Philosophicd Studies 49 (1986).
329-59 and “Consc iousness and Metacognition,” in Meturepresentutions: A Multidiscipli-
nary Perspective, Dan Sperber, ed., (Oxfo rd Oxford University Press. 20 00) , 265-98.
John Pollock, How to Build u Person: A Prolegomenon, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986).4
SYMPOSIUM 417
8/2/2019 Presentation, Representation and the Self
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/presentation-representation-and-the-self 7/19
C h i ~ h o l m , ’ ~hat it might be evident to us that we are in such states, even
though we cannot give any answer to the question of how we are justified.
Indeed, Alston has gone so far as to suggest that the supposition that we need
to be able to answer the question of how we are justified in order to be justi-
fied, of how such states are evident to us in order to be evident to us,
involves confusing one level with another.16 It is advantageous in dealingwith skeptical challenges to be able to claim that one is justified and to be
able to answer the query, “How are you justified?’ by saying, “I just am, nd
I don’t have to say how I am justified in order to be justified.” But the answer
is unsatisfying. The object of philosophy is to provide explanation, other-
wise the point of it is lost. And when asked for an explanation, if one
answers, “I don’t have to answer,” one may be right, but one loses credibility
in philosophical inquiry. Finally, however, the unsatisfying answer seems
unnecessary because there is a correct and satisfying answer that I can give,namely, “I can tell whether I am in pain because the exis tence of the pain is
transparent to me in a way that provides me with justification for accepting
the existence of it.” The pain presents itself to me in a way that makes the
existence of it transparent to me. The pain provides me with an explanation
of how I am justified in believing that I am in pain because of the way I
apprehend it. There is no confusion of levels, because, contrary to the stan-
dad view, the justification is transparent in the way the representation is. I
am justified all the way up, downand
through the state. But how is thispossible? It might argued that justification like representation always leaves
us with a residue of justification at another level jus t as representation always
leaves us with a residue of representation at another level. This argum ent is a
fundamental philosophical mistake, however.
The Problem of Subjectivity. Before turning to the solution, which is
suggested in Hum e, let us consider the way in which the problem of subjec-
tivity has inserted itself into discussions of consciousness. Another Scot,
James Frederick Fem er,” who had the distinction of introducing the term
“epistemology” along with the opposite “agnoiology” into English, picked
up on the point that Reid made against Hume concerning representation and
the object of thought. He used it to argue against materialism. His argum ent,
starting with Reid’s point, is simple. Consider the subjective activity of
conscious thought. Now when I think of a material thing, it is an object of
thought, and has a kind of objectivity, with no aspect of it lost or omitted.
But when I direct the sub jective activity of thought toward something, toward
I’ Chisholm,Theory of Knowledge, 26-30.
l 6 Alston, “Levels-Confusions n Epistemology.”” James Frederick Ferrier, Introduction to the Philosophy of Consciousness (1938-39) PIS.
I-VII in Lectures on Greek Philosophy and other Philosophical Remains, vol. 11, Sir
Alexander Grant and E. L. Lushington, eds. (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood
and Sons, 1866).
418 KEITH LEHRER
8/2/2019 Presentation, Representation and the Self
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/presentation-representation-and-the-self 8/19
some object, the object of that subjective activity is not itself a subjective
activity of thought but rather the object of the subjective activity. The object
must be distinguished from the subjective activity directed toward it. Femer’s
point was not merely an objection to materialism but to any attempt to give
an objective account of the subjective activity of consc ious thought. We
may, of course, think about our thought, but then we will be thinking aboutsom e past thought rather than som e present subjective activity of thinking .
That sub jective activity is always left as a remainder.
The argument concerning subjectivity recurs in Kierkegaard’* who claims,
in a witty moment, that Hegel, in a moment of cosmic absentmindedness,
forgot to include something when he was thinking about his absolute system
of the totality of objective reality. He forgot to include Hegel, and, moreover,
Hegel engaged in the subjective activity of thinking about the total system of
objective reality. Kierkegaard, hot in pursuit of Hegel and his total objectivesystem, asks us to imagine a man, call him for our convenience, Joe, who
spends his life studying love objectively. Joe has never felt the subjective
experience of love. So, Kierkegaard says, for all his objective study and
knowledge of love from a third person objective perspective, Joe lacks the
subjective truth about love, that is, he does not know what love is subjec-
tively for all his objective kn ~ w le d g e. ’~magine, to reinforce the point, that
Joe, having done his research, wonders what the subjective experience of love
is like, what it feels like to be in love. Imagine further that he subsequentlyfalls in love. He might well say, “So that is what love is. Now I know what
it is like.” (For those of you who do not think that love is a feeling, it will
suffice to substitute having an orgasm for being in love in the example and
imag ine that Joe , though he studied the orgasm never experienced one . And
then he did.)
Kierkegaard’s point is that there is a kind of knowledge of an experience, a
kind of subjective knowledge that remains beyond any objective account and
all objective knowledge. So, once again, there is the claim that conscious
experience leaves a remainder whenever one attem pts to represent that experi-
ence. Like Ferrier, he claims that any attempt to give an objective account of
subjec tive consc ious experience will fail. Of course , Kierkegaard places great
emphasis on the subjective experience for knowledge of it. But Kierkegaard
would agree that thought about an experience is distinct from the experience,
as Ferrier insisted, and, therefore, any thought of an experience will leave out
a way of knowing the experience, by having it , by being the experiencing
subject. The primary claim of Kierkegaard, however, was that any objective,
~~
I ’
l 9 Ibid., 51.
Seren Kierkegaard, Concluding CJnscienriJicPosfscript, D.F. wenson trans., (Princeton:
Princeton University Press. 1941). 267, 271, 273.
SYMPOSIUM 419
8/2/2019 Presentation, Representation and the Self
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/presentation-representation-and-the-self 9/19
that is, third person account of subjective experience leaves a remainder of the
subjective knowledge of it.
There is an interesting similarity between the example from Kierkegaard
and the twentieth century argument from Jacksonzoagainst materialism based
on subjective experience. The exam ple is too well know to rehearse in detail,
but it is the exam ple of a scientist, Mary, who comes to know all that thereis to know about physics and physical phenomena in an advanced state of
scientific knowledge. However, Mary has spent her life in a monochromatic
room to date, and so, though she knows all there is to know about the
physics of red objects and how they interact with the human body, she does
not know what it is like to experience the color red. She has never done so.
Imagine that she now leaves the room and perceives an object she knows to
be red. Now she knows what red is like. So all her objective knowledge
leaves a residue of something to know by having the consc ious experience ofred.
A Paradoxical Theory: S a m e . Two other twentieth century philosophers,
Sam e2’ and Nagel” have insisted that conscious experience gives us knowl-
edge of what something is like, indeed, what it is like to be the person or
subject of consciousness one is. Sartre, in some remarks reminiscent of
Ferrier, claims that this knowledge of consc iousness by consc iousness creates
an opposition because the intentional object of knowledge cannot be the
conscious activity. An object cannot be the same thing as a subjective activ-ity. Nevertheless, Sartre claims that consciousness contains within itself
knowledge of consciousness in some primal and imm ediate way that does not
make consc iousness an intentional object of consc iousness. Rather than say-
ing that the conscious state involves consciousness of consciousness, imply-
ing that consciousness is an intentional object of itself, Sartre suggests we
should recognize the reflexive character of consciousness giving us knowledge
of consciousness by speaking somewhat ungrammatically of consciousness
(of) consciousness. This gives us a way of expressing how consciousness
gives us subjective knowledge of consciousness without making it an inten-
tional object of itself. The problem of the remainder of subjective knowledge
appears to be treated in Sartre by accepting the paradox of saying that
consciousness gives us knowledge of consciousness without making it an
intentional object. Thus, according to Sartre, consciousness both is and is not
the object of consciousness in giving us knowledge of what it is like.
Sartre also offers us a paradoxical account of the self to accommodate the
problem of the residue. Suppose I reflect on what I am. I must reflect, he
2o
2’
22
Frank Jackson, “Epiphenomena1 Qualities.” Philosophical Quarterly, 32 (1982). 127-36.
Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, Hazel E. Barnes, trans., (New York:Philose
phical Library, 1956). Introduction, 3-21.
ThomasNagel, The V iewf rom Nowhere, (New York Oxford University Press, 1986).
420 KEITH LEHRER
8/2/2019 Presentation, Representation and the Self
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/presentation-representation-and-the-self 10/19
thought, perhaps following Hume, on my conscious states. So following
Hume, I might say that those conscious states are what I am. What else could
I say I am? But my consciousness projects beyond those conscious states, and
so that is not what I am. It is what I am and is not what I am. As Sartre puts
the matter paradoxically, I am what I have been, those conscious s tates of
me, in the mode of not being them. I am that in the mode of not being it. Ofcourse, Sartre is concerned with projection into the future from the present
and not just with the residue of representation of those conscious states
dangling outside of them. But consciousness would suffice for knowing all
that I can know about what I am as consciousness. Given the residue of
representation of consciousness, on the one side, and the remainder of subjec-
tive knowledge of consc iousness on the other, I can know what I am as a
conscious being in the mode of not being it. I am, o put the matter in
Humean terms, a bundle of impressions in the mode of not being it.There is depth in the Sartrian formulation, though, as I shall argue, we
need not settle for the paradoxical conception of the self. It is an honest
attempt to deal with the problems of the residue of representation and the
remainder of subjective knowledge concerning the self derived from Hume
and, indeed, from Kant. Some might be inclined to prefer a conception of the
self as som ething I know not what, an unknown and unrepresented some-
thing, a simple substance, a monad, which has the conscious states. But that
leaves us with a conception of the self as a surd, something incapable ofrational explanation. What reason is there to prefer a surd to a paradox in
philosophy?
Thomas Nagel, influenced by Sartre, has argued that consciousness, and,
indeed, the form of consc iousness peculiar to us is what it is like to be what
we are.23One might doubt the assumption of Hume, Sartre and Nagel that
what we are or what it is like to be what we are consists of our conscious
states. I would be inclined to say that however salient and essential conscious
states are to my being what I am and to what it is like to be me, that is not
the whole story about me. Of course, what it is consciously like to be me
consists of my conscious states, but there may be more to me, the uncon-
scious and many material aspects of me, which are part of me and what is
like to be me, though, of course, not what it is consciously like to be me.
However, those parts of me can be represented by myself or another, in prin-
ciple , if not in fact, without residue. It is consc iousness that leaves a residue
in the representation of the self.
The Problem of Transcendence. What we find in Sartre is the combina-
tion of the problem of representation and the problem of subjectivity in a
paradox. The two problem s are mirror opposites. The p roblem of representa-
tion affirms that any conscious state is distinct from the representation of i t
23 Ibid.
SYMPOSlUM 421
8/2/2019 Presentation, Representation and the Self
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/presentation-representation-and-the-self 11/19
and thus leaves a residue of representation. The representation is som ething
beyond the conscious state. The problem of subjectivity a f f i s that any
representation of the consc ious state is distinct from the consc ious state and
thus leaves a remainder of the subjectivity of the conscious state. Suppose,
then, that you attempt to represen t the self. The conscious state leaves a resi-
due of representation and representation leaves a remainder of sub jectivity.So, according to Sartre the representation of the conscious self is the r e p
sentation of consciousness without a residue of representation and a remainder
of subjectivity. That representation must be paradoxical. The paradox is that
what I am transcends any representation I can give of my conscious self at the
same time I transcend representation as a conscious self to know what I am.
That is the problem of transcendence. I can only represent myself as being
what I am not and not being what I am.
Exemplarization: A Solution. We have confronted the problems of repre-sentation, subjectivity and transcendence. Some will be impressed with them,
others may not. I am impressed with them. As I reflect on the history of the
discussion of the representation of the se lf, I consider the proposal of Sartre
that the self is paradoxical a natural outcome of the problems of representa-
tion and subjectivity. However, both problems have a solution. The basis of
the solution is the apprec iation of the way in which a state, even a subjective
activity, can function as an exemplar or model to represent a class of states,
including itself. This process of representation I have called exemplarization.My fundamental thesis is that we exemplarize our conscious states automati-
cally, or, at least, most of them unreflectively. Once one notices the possibil-
ity of exemplarization, the solution to the problem s we have considered will
become transparent. A conscious state serving as a vehicle to represent
consc ious states, including itself, will leave no residue of representation, for
it functions as a representation. A representation of a conscious state will
leave no remainder of subjective activity or subjective knowledge of it,
because the representation is the subjective activity.
Exemplarization is familiar enough as Goodmanz4 as taught us. Consider
an instance. You have heard of a song, Twinkle Twinkle Little Star, for
exam ple, and you ask me what song that is. I accommodate you by singing
the song. My singing of the song represents singings of the song . It is an
exemplar of a singing and represents singings , including , of course, itself.
This is representation by exemplarization. If I sing th e song, and you object
that I have not represented the singing of the song because I have just
provided an exemplar of a singing, I answer that the singing of the song is an
exemplar of singing which represents singings of the song at the same time
that it is a singing of the song.
24 Nelson Goodman, hnguages ofArr, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Menil l, 1968).
422 KEITH LEHRER
8/2/2019 Presentation, Representation and the Self
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/presentation-representation-and-the-self 12/19
Solving the Problem of Subjectivity. Exemplarization solves the problem
of subjectivity. Suppose I have a feeling , a feeling of pain, for exam ple. Now
i t might appear that any representation of the feeling will be an objective,
third person, representation and will leave out subjective knowledge of what
the experience is like in the way in which loveless Joe, who has lived a love-
less life, will not know what the feeling of love is like no matter what objec-tive knowledge of love he has obtained. Similarly, monochromatic Mary,
who has lived in a monochromatic room all her life, will not know what the
sensation o f red is like no matter what objective materialistic representation
of color she has. Does this drive us to the conclusion that feeling and sensa-
tion cannot be represented without leaving out the remainder of subjective
knowledge of what these states are like?
Exemplarization reveals the way in which representation avoids the
remainder. Suppose that Mary leaves her monochromatic room and sees Joe’sred tee shirt or that Joe sees Mary and is suffused with feelings of love for the
first time. Let us remain with the simpler case of Mary who has the sensa-
tion of red for the first time. Mary now knows for the first time what the
sensation is like which is subjective knowledge that transcends her previous
objective representation of knowledge about the color red. Though others
have objected, it seems clear to me that Mary knows something in a new
way, know s what the sensation of red is like in a new w ay, which she did not
know before. We explain Mary’s new knowledge of the sensation of red bysupposing that she exemplarizes it. The sensation of red becomes an exem-
plar of a class of sensations. The exemplarized sensation represents the class
of sensations including , of course, itself. By exem plarizing the sensation, the
sensation is at the sam e time represented and representa tiona l. Her new
knowledge of what the sensation of red is like represents the sensation by
exemplarizing it. The sensation which is new to her becomes a new represen-
tation of a class of sensations by being used to represent a class of sensations
of which it is a member. The exemplarized sensation becomes a generalrepresentation of a class of sensations. The particular becomes conceptual as a
result and represents a class of particulars of which it is a mem ber.”
It may occur as an objection to some that a concept is general and that
there are many ways to generalize from a particular, from a particular sensa-
tion, for example. That is obviously a correct point. Two observations avoid
converting an obviously correct point into a difficulty. The first is that
animals generalize in their responses jus t as we do, and how they and we
generalize is in some cases determined by our biology and in others by
tutelage. We do not need to formulate a rule in order to generalize any more
2 5 Exemplarization is here treated as using a particular to represent a class. For the
purposes of this paper it could be construed as using a particular to represent a kind or
sort. I chose the more nominalistic construal to harmonize with Hume.
SYMPOSIUM 423
8/2/2019 Presentation, Representation and the Self
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/presentation-representation-and-the-self 13/19
than other creatures do. The second observation is that the ability to general-
ize is a necessary though not sufficient condition for exemplarization. For
one might respond to a class of particulars in the same way without using
any of the particulars in the class to represent the rest, or, for that matter to
represent anything else. However, when one exemplarizes, one uses a particu-
lar to represent a class.26Finally, it should be noted that we use activities torepresent a class of activities, that is, we exemplarize activities. Thus the
problem of subjectivity is solved when the new sensation is exemplarized and
becomes, while remaining a subjective activity, a representation of the sensa-
tion in the new knowledge of it.
Solving the Problem of Representation: Hume’s View. Does this solve
the problem of representation raised by Reid against Hume? It does. The
exemplarized sensation, the impression, represents the impression becoming
an idea of it. There is no residue of representation beyond the sensation whenthe sensation is exemplarized. It is, I think, important to note that Hume
insists that when impressions fade they become ideas of the original impres-
sion. Thus, i t is open to Hume to reply to Reid that the impression becomes
an idea as it is exemplarized to represent a class of impressions including
itself. Is this Hum e’s view? There is no doubt that Hume held that particular
ideas, faded impressions, are used to stand for a class of ideas and become
general. As for the reflexive character of exemplarization whereby the exem-
plarized impression becomes an idea that represents the impression, Humeremarks at the beginning of the Treatise,
The first circumstance, that sbikes my eye, is the g reat resem blance betwixt our own impres-
sions and ideas in every other particular, except their degree of force and vivacity. The one
seems to be in a manner the reflexion of the other; so that all the perceptions of the mind are
double, and appear both as im pressions and ideas.”
When noting that we use general terms to stand for a class of objects, Hume
indicates that he regards it as obvious that the particular is used to stand for
the class. He writes when discussing abstract ideas and general terms,
However this may be, ‘ t is certain rhaf we form the idea of individuals, whenever we use any
general term; thar we seldom or never can exhaust these individuals; and rhnr those, which
remain, are represented by means of that habit, by w hich we recall them, whenever any
present occasion requires it?’
As for the power by which we bring to mind the other impressions repre-
sented by a particular, Hume admits that,
26
2 1
2a
424
Whether the exemplarized particular can be used to formulate a rule may be controver-
sial. However, the rule to the effect that the particular should be used to stand for
members of the class it represents is at least implicit in function of exemplarization.
H u m , Treatise.on page 2. The italics on the word reflexion are Hume’s.
Hume, Treatise,22.
KEITH LEHRER
8/2/2019 Presentation, Representation and the Self
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/presentation-representation-and-the-self 14/19
Resemblance suggests further ideas to us when they become useful or necessary. One would
think the whole world of our ideas was at once subjected to our view. There may not, be any
present, beside those very ideas, that are thus collected by a kind of magical faculty in the
~ 0 ~ 1 . ~ ~
My intention here is not to defend an interpretation of Hume, however, but
rather to ind icate that the resources for h is defense and the solu tion of theproblem of representation are contained explicitly in his work.
Solving the Problem of the Representation of the Self. Does the exem-
plarization of impressions solve the problem of the residue in the representa-
tion of the self? The problem was that when Hume turns into himself and
perceives his impressions and ideas, that perception of the impressions and
ideas is not represented as part of the bundle of impress ions and ideas. Hence,
there is always an unrepresented perception outside the bundle of impressions
and ideas. So, it appears that what Hume ca lls himself canno t be that bundlesince Hum e’s perception of the impressions and ideas is left dangling outside
the bundle. Exem plarization solves this problem as well. When H ume looks
into himself and perceives his impressions and ideas that is a perception of
the mind, that is, an impression. Assume that impressions are exemplarized.
Then Hume’s perception of his impressions and ideas is itself exemplarized.
The exemplarized perception represents itself as well as the other impres-
sions. So the unrepresented perception le ft dangling outside the represented
bundle is an illusion. As Hume looks into himself and represents himself tohimse lf, that perception, assum ing it to be exem plarized, represents itself at
the sam e time that it represents other states. Impressions are exem plarized and
avoid the problem of representation by looping back onto themselves. The
perception of the other impressions and ideas of the self is also exemplarized
and represents itself as well other impressions and ideas. Consequently, the
perception of the other perceptions in the bundle is itself represented and
included in the representation of the bundle. The representation of that percep-
tion is not left dangling outside the representation of the bundle but is itselfrepresented as part of the bundle.
First Person Representation: The Loop of Exemplarization. Notice,
however, that the solution to these three problem s does not in any way reduce
the representation of the self to a third person representation or description of
the self or conscious states of the self. If I exemplarize a state of myself, I
may also describe the sam e state in a third person manner as you might
describe it. The subjective point remains, nonetheless, that in exemplarizing
the conscious state I represent the state in a different way, in a uniquely first
person way, by exemplarizing my own conscious state. You may represent
my state, but you canno t represent it in the same way that I do when I exem-
plarize a conscious state of myself so that it represents itself. This accounts
2q Hume, Treatise,24.
SYMPOSIUM 425
8/2/2019 Presentation, Representation and the Self
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/presentation-representation-and-the-self 15/19
for and explains the limitation of third person representation of first person
states and the limitations of third person knowledge based on such representa-
tion and description. Another can know a great deal of what it is like for me
to have a feeling, for he can represent that feeling to himself in words or in
terms of his own feelings. When another feels something she thinks is what I
am feeling and says , “Now I know how Lehrer, feels, he feels this way,” sheis then exemplarizing a feeling she has, using it to represent feelings, includ-
ing my feelings. However, she is still not representing the feeling, whether
of love or pain, or both, in exactly the way that I represent it and know it
when I exemplarize my own feelings. She may, in principle, represent the
sam e feelings by exemplarizing her feelings as I represent by exemplarizing
my feelings, but she does not represent them in exactly the sam e way that I
represent them. Her vehicle of representation is her pain, and my vehicle of
representation is my pain. The state represented may be the same fo r us both,but the thing representing the state is differen t for each of us.
If the other person represen ts the subjective state in terms of words rather
than by exemplarizing the s tate, a state of feeling , for example, because she
has not experienced that state, then she does not represent the state with even
the same kind of vehicle of representation that I do when I exemplarize the
feeling. I represent that subjec tive state by exemplarizing that state, while she
represents it with a conventional symbol, a word. Furthermore, we can take
this difference home to the first person. I can represent feelings of love withthe word “love” or by exemplarizing the fee lings of love. When I represent
those feelings by exemplarizing them, I have immediate knowledge of what
the feeling is like. The feeling represents feelings including itself in exem-
plarization. So the represented state is used to represent what it is like, and
that is a different way of representing what the state is like than by using
som e words to describe it.
Thus, the problems o f representation, subjectivity, and transcendencemsolved by bringing the alleged residue of representation and remainder of
subjectivity into the loop of exemplarization. But do we exemplarize our
conscious states, our impressions and ideas? The question is an empirical
one, and the claim that we do so a conjecture. The major advantage of the
assumption that we exemplarize our conscious states, other than solving the
problem s of representation, subjectivity and transcendence, is that it explains
in what way our consc ious states are imm ediately known and self-presenting.
To use the language of Hume, impressions and ideas must come to us repre
sented for them to be immediately known self-presenting states. This doctrine
of the self-presenting character of impressions, of their apprehension through
themselves, is explained by exemplarization. Otherwise we are threatened
with a regress of one impression representing another ad infiniturn to obtain
the representation of any impression by another impression.
426 KEITH LEHRER
8/2/2019 Presentation, Representation and the Self
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/presentation-representation-and-the-self 16/19
Solving the Paradox of Transcendence. Finally, consider the issue of
transcendence that Sartre raised. He argued that the subjectivity of the
consciousness is lost as it becomes an object. The attempt to make
consciousness an object of consciousness, whether this is an attempt of the
other or oneself, undermines the subjectivity of consciousness. There is, he
affirms, some primal consciousness (of) consciousness, some reflexivity ofconsciousness that gives as subjective knowledge of it. But Sartre a f f i s
that this cannot be consciousness of consciousness mak ing itself an object of
consciousness. The problem of transcendence, which leads Sartre to a para-
doxical representation of the self is that it appears that the self m ust transcend
itself, consciousness must be consciousness of consciousness to yield
conscious knowledge, at the same time that it is not an intentional ob ject of
conscious knowledge. However, exemplarization allows us to obtain an
account of the conscious self without paradox. The conscious self can repre-sent itself without loss of subjectivity. The subjectively conscious activity
can be exemplarized and represent itself as it remains subjective activity.
Exemplarization explains the reflexivity of conscious without supposing that
the conscious self must be conscious of itself at the same time that i t does
not become an intentional object of conscious knowledge.
Moreover, from the theory of exem plarization we obtain an explana tion of
the importance of the subjective perspective. It provides us with a way of
representing our states and, therefore, with a knowledge of what those statesare like that is different from other kinds of knowledge even if it is knowledge
of the same states. It is a different, first person and subjective way of know-
ing. It accounts for what existentialists and subjectivists have insisted, that
there is a way of knowing that is different from the third person objective
way of knowing. Monochrom atic Mary knows what red is like in a new way
when she exem plarizes the sensation.
It is crucial, however, to notice that such an observation cannot prove that
any fact is om itted in a third person or, for that matter, m aterialistic represen-
tation of the self and the conscious states of the self. When I exemplarize a
conscious state, pain, for example, my pain represents pain for m e. What the
nature of pain is remains an open question of metaphysics. It may be that
loveless Joe and monochromatic Mary exemplarize sensations of love and
color which thus represent material states without knowing this is the case.
New knowledge does not always reveal a new kind of fact. It may only
express a new and unrecognized way of knowing an old fact. Epistemic
contexts are opaque. A person who knows that she is drinking water may fail
to know that she is drink ing H,O. When she com es to know that she is
drink ing H,O, she knows something new, but it is a new way of knowing an
old fact. The fact that she is drinking water is the same fact as that she is
drink ing H,O. The exem plarization of our conscious states to yield a new way
SYMPOSIUM 421
8/2/2019 Presentation, Representation and the Self
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/presentation-representation-and-the-self 17/19
of knowing may be like this example. It may not. What I have said leaves
the metaphysical issue open. My interest was with representation and
knowledge. Ontology is another matter.
Infallible Belief of the Self-Presenting. Exemplarization does, however,
explain the psychology and semantics of self-presentation. The states a~
apprehended though themselves by serving as exemplars that represent theclass of things of which they are a member. Does this mean that exemplariza-
tion yields infallible belief concerning consc ious states? It depends on what
one requires in the way of infa llibility. It is logically possible to believe that
one is in pain when one is not as I have argued for a quarter of century
because one might believe that one is in pain on the basis of a false general
assumption about when one experiences pain. However, the question that
now confronts us is whether a person has infallib le belief in the existence of
a consc ious state based on the exem plarization of it. Again, however, theanswer is that it is logically possible to be in error. The psychology may go
awry in the activity of exemplarization, and I might, in fact, use the exem-
plarized state to represent a class of states that does not include the exemplar
itself.
It is worth noting at this point that a given state can be used to represent
diverse classes. It was Reid who noted that the same sensation that is a sign
of the existence of a sensation may, at the same time, be a sign of the exis-
tence of some external quality. A sensation of sound may signify the sensa-tion at the same time that it signifies an external property which gives rise to
the sensation. Exemplarization requires an exem plar and the generalization of
it to stand for a class of states or objects. Philosophers become much exer-
cised over the fact that we can generalize in different ways, that we can let the
same item stand for diverse classes of objects. One must note the fac t, but the
question of why we generalize the way we do rather than in som e other way
is, I think, of little philosophical interest. As we have noted, anim als gener-
alize, even ones of very modest cognitive capacities, and the question of why
they generalize as they do is a question of empirical inquiry. How they and
we generalize is the result of nature and nurture and a m ixture thereof which
cannot be sorted out by philosophical speculation. I do not see any deep theo-
retical issues connected with it. G eneralization is, though necessary for
exemplarization, not sufficient for exemplarization. A representation m ust
have a functional role in inference to supplement the application of the
exemplar to other states.30Since exemplarization is a psychological activity
30 For a more detailed account of the funCtiOM1 role invo lved in exemplarization, see Keith
Lehrer, “Meaning, Exemplarization and Metarepresentation,” in Metarepresentations: A
Mulridisciplinury Perspective, Dan Sperber. ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2000). 299-310 and Adrienne Lehrer and Keith Lehrer, “Fields, Networks and Vectors,”
in Grammar and Meaning, F. R. Palmer, ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1995), 26-41.
428 KEITH LEHRER
8/2/2019 Presentation, Representation and the Self
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/presentation-representation-and-the-self 18/19
involving generalizing to a class, it is logically possible that a person might
generalize from an exemplar to a class of things that fails to include the
exemplar itself. A person might be cognitively defective or just odd in the
way they exemplarize.
What should be noted, however, is that successful exemplarization will
yield a representation that represents the exemplar itse lf. So, here we reach akind of infallibility that explains Chisholm’s original suggestion that i t
makes no sense to suppose that we could be in error about such states. The
infallibility is grounded in the contingent fact of the success of our exem-
plarization. Moreover, this feature of exem plarization is epistemologically
significant because of the connection with self-presentation. We can appre-
hend, and, indeed, know the existence of such states immediately by our
exemplarization of them . Does that make m e a foundationalist about such
states? Not exactly. It is not sufficient for knowledge of our conscious statesthat they be exemplarized to represent themselves in the belief that they exist.
Exemplarization, as we have just noted, can be unsuccessfu l. What about
successful exemplarization? That will insure truth. How ever, the attainment
of truth by some successful process does not by itself insure the kind of ju sti-
fication that converts to know ledge, at least the kind of knowledge, reflective
knowledge, as Sosa3’ alls it, or discursive knowledge, as I have called it, that
plays a role essential in reasoning , most c ritically, in confirmation and refuta-
tion. I shall not repeat my arguments to avoid being tedious. My fundamental
claim is that one must be able to defend what one accepts against objections,
to reason about it and with it to defend it, in order to have knowledge. A
crucial assumption in such defense is that one is rational, trustworthy and,
finally, successfully reliable in what one accepts in the way one does, for
example, in the way one accepts what one does about one’s own conscious
states. Successful exemplarization insures success, to be sure, but it leaves
open questions and objections about one’s rationality, trustworthiness and
successful reli ab ilit~ .~’
The preceding remarks raise the question of how we can know that we are
rational, trustworthy and successfully reliable in what we accept. Let us
confine ourselves to rationality and a few remarks on how a referential loop
can solve the problem of the rationality of self. The problem is again one of
a threatened regress. Once I pose the question of whether I am rational to
accept what I do, it appears that I can only answer that question by appealing
to something else that I accept which I must be rational to accept. We may
avoid the regress by insisting that w e just are rational without explanation.
3 ’
’*
Ernest Sosa, “Reflective Knowledge in the Best Circles,” The Journal of Philosophy, vol.
XCIV, (1997),410-30.
For my most recent treatment of these issues, see Keith Lehrer, Theory of Knowledge,
Second Edition, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000). Ch. 9.
SYMPOSlUM 429
8/2/2019 Presentation, Representation and the Self
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/presentation-representation-and-the-self 19/19
That leaves us with an irrational surd as a starting point or ending point in
the philosophical discussion which will be unsatisfying to those, like
myself, who regard explanation as prime desideratum of philosophy. The
regress is avoided once we arrive at the representation of the self by itself as
rational. The rationality of the self explains why it is rational for the self to
accept what it does. The rationality of acceptance is explained by the rational-ity of the self. What about the acceptance of the rationality of self? The same
is true of it. The rationality of my accepting that I am rational is explained
by my rationality. That closes the loop of rationality which has an exact
analogy in the loops of trustworthiness and successful reliability.
Explanatory power is contained in the loop. Once the need for and the
power of the loop are recognized, the loop expands in widening circles of
explanation. Exemplarization is one central loop in the widening circle of
loops in ep istemological explanation. Contemplate the power of the loop.