Presidency--Historical Development--Presidential Elections--Presidential Institution--Presidential Relations 1

Presidency—Historical Development• I. Initial Constitutional Provisions• A. Institutionally strong with vague, shared powers

• II. Historically Weak, Occasionally Strong• A. Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, T. Roosevelt, W.

Wilson• III. Franklin Roosevelt: Establishing the “Modern Presidency”

(1933 – 45)• A. Foundation: Progressivism• B. Trigger Events: the Great Depression• C. Response: the “1st 100 Days”• D. Results: the “New Deal” programs• E. Elected to four terms, served 12+ years• F. Created a mandatory leadership role for presidents

2

Presidential Elections• II. “Old” and “New” Styles of Running for President• A. Nominations: Caucuses (old) vs. Primaries (new)

• 1. Caucuses were party-dominated• 2. Primaries are candidate-dominated, appealing directly to party

members• a. “frontloading”

• B. General Elections• 1. Organization: Party (old) vs. Candidate (New)• 2. Strategies• a. Canvassing (old) vs. TV (new)• b. Insider (old) vs. Outsider (new) appeals

• C. Financing: Unrestricted (old) vs. Regulated (new)• 1. 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act• Candidates had to report sources/amounts of donations 3

Presidential Elections• C. Financing: Unrestricted (old) vs. Regulated (new)—CONTINUED

• 2. 1974 FECA Amendments• a. Tried to limit campaign donations and expenditures

• i. Buckley v. Valeo (1976): unlimited “independent spending” is protected free speech

• 3. 1979 FECA Amendments: worries about declining role of parties• a. “soft money”

• 4. 2002 McCain-Feingold Act—why McCain in 2002?• a. limited the amount of soft money• b. limited interest group ads

• 5. Citizens United v. FEC (2010): Corporations/labor unions can spend unlimited amounts as “independent spending”• a. undermines most of McCain-Feingold—fundraising figures 2012

• 6. McCutcheon v. FEC (2014): Individual contribution limits remain per candidate ($2600), but no annual limit for contributions to ALL candidates.

4

Presidential Elections• III. The Electoral College• A. Rules: 538 total votes (the number of representatives AND

senators for each state, plus District of Columbia)• 1. Votes cast by state (51 elections): use the “unit rule” • 2. Must win a majority (270) to win presidency• 3. If no majority in the Electoral College, Congress selects• a. House of Representatives selects president• b. Senate selects Vice President

• B. Consequences• 1. Small State “advantage”• 2. Big State advantage: comes from unit rule• 3. “Swing States”

• C. Effects: Magnifies Victory• 1. Usually, Popular Vote winner = Electoral College winner• 2. Rarely, Popular Vote winner ≠ Electoral College winner(?)

5

Presidential Institution• I. Powers of the Presidency• A. What are the boundaries?

• 1. Strict Constructionist: Example—W.H. Taft• a. Powers granted are ONLY those listed in the Constitution or granted by

Congress• b. All other powers are forbidden• c. Not a feasible point of view after FDR

• 2. Trustee/Stewardship: Example—Teddy Roosevelt• a. Powers granted are those NOT STRICTLY FORBIDDEN by Constitution• b. All others are allowable, if used in the public’s interest

• 3. Public President: Example—Woodrow Wilson• a. President helps define the public interest• b. President is the only voice in politics with a national constituency• c. President helps lead public opinion

• “His office is anything he has the sagacity and force to make it.” 6

Presidential Institution• 4. Prerogative President: Example—Abraham Lincoln• a. In times of crisis, president has no bounds on power• b. Can even violate the Constitution• c. Has no choice, if it is to save the Union• MODELS COMPARED

• B. Sources of power• 1. Constitution• a. veto power

• 2. Statute law—laws passed by Congress• a. central legislative clearance: budget-making power (1921 Budget and

Accounting Act)• 3. Precedent• a. executive privilege

7

Presidential Institution• II. Structure of the Presidency• A. pre-FDR: small, informal• B. Executive Office of the President (1939)

• a. The Brownlow Commission: “The president needs help…”• 1. Growth of the EOP (1940s – 1973)• 2. Decline in the size of the EOP (1974 – 1978)• Congress passed laws to cap the number of EOP employees—WHY?

• 3. Stability in size (1979 – present)• 4. Composition of the EOP

• III. Internal Operations of the Presidency• A. Presidential Management Styles

• 1. Pyramid model• 2. Wheel model

• B. Staff Orientations• 1. Originally, EOP was to service the institution of the presidency• 2. Now, serve the person who is president

8

Presidential Relations• I. The Nature of Presidential Relations• A. The Presidential Perspective: Permanent Crisis

• 1. EXPECTATIONS: • a. Must take the initiative (“Do something!”)

• i. President as “Chief…”• b. Short Time Frame for Action—“windows of opportunity”

• i. “First 100 Days” (think of your first semester in high school)• ii. “Presidential Honeymoon”

• 2. INSTITUTIONAL: Interdependent Relations• a. Richard Neustadt: Not really a “separation of powers,” but rather

“separate institutions sharing power.”• 3. PARTISAN DIFFICULTIES• a. Rise of “Split Ticket Voting”

• i. Leads to chronic divided government• b. Disappearing “Moderate Middle” in Congress: Senate Example

• Consequence: More difficult to lead9

Presidential Relations• B. Methods of Achieving Goals: Persuasion, NOT Command

• 1. The Exchange Model: the “inside” strategy—bargaining with elites• a. President has bargaining advantages

• i. Reputation is extremely important• ii. Prestige of office is important

• 2. The “Going Public” Model: the “outside” strategy—using the public• a. Going public has become more popular with presidents.

• i. Leadership in Congress has become more decentralized• ii. Fragmented interest group structure• iii. Increased salience of public opinion

• b. The costs of “going public” have decreased, while the costs of the “exchange model” have increased.

10