press and polls in irish politics

8/2/2019 Press and Polls in Irish Politics

1/26

Press and Polls in Irish politics:The influence of media content on public opinion regarding

divorce referenda in Ireland

MICHAEL J. BREEN, Ph.D.Department of Media and Communication Studies

Mary Immaculate CollegeUniversity of Limerick

IRELAND


2/26

Purpose of the StudyThe forces that shape a society are clearly of interest to researchers. Irish

society is in a process of change and development, like most societies; publicopinion fluctuates, attitudes shift, and values can change. Unlike the UnitedStates, for example, the development of Irish society has taken place against abackground of Church influence, almost unique in Western Europe. As Ireland hasbecome more modernized, the clash between Church and state has becomemore evident and more acrimonious.

Huntington (1968, p. 32) defines modernization as a multifaceted processinvolving changes in all areas of human thought and activity. The principalaspects of this process include urbanization, industrialization, secularization,democratization, education and media participation. As a society changes, thereoccurs a shift in values, attitudes, and expectations. One central element to thischange is the diffusion of information in a society through increased literacy,mass communications and education. Social modernization, which followspolitical modernization, involves improving economic conditions along withincreased mass media circulation (Huntington, 1968, p. 35).

According to Palmer (1989, p. 91) education and information exposure are among the most profound agents of change. As Irish society becomes moreurbanized and more educated, this process of social modernization isaccelerated. The changes that have taken place, as Ireland moved from atraditional rural economy to a more modern urban economy, have beenprofound. Such change has been influenced by the provision of education andmedia availability. Education, along with media exposure, serves to remove theisolation of traditional societies (and therefore diminish the power of traditionalelites) by providing new ideas and describing alternative lifestyles.

It is the conjunction of these elements industrialization, urbanization,education, and information that form the catalyst for rapid social change.When these four elements occur, traditional societies (predominantly rural, lesseducated, interpersonal communication is primary) begin to give way to modernsocieties (predominantly urban, more educated, communication is mediaintensive); this process of transition is not without difficulty (Palmer, 1989, p.31). In Ireland this process of change is usually seen as a shift from traditionalCatholicism to a more secular society. Much of the difficult social change,therefore, has been in the clash between those who hold traditional Catholicvalues and those who seek a pluralist, secular society in which the values of onechurch are not given any special recognition.

Ireland has had several referenda in recent years dealing with contentioussocial and political issues, e.g., prolife issues, the introduction of divorce, thespecial place of the Catholic church. The Irish Constitution, drawn up in 1937 toestablish a confessional Catholic state, banned divorce and established theCatholic Church as having a special role in Irish society, amongst other things.This Constitution has been amended over the years. The special position of theCatholic Church was deleted from the Constitution in 1972. Challenges to theconstitutional ban on divorce came in 1986 and 1995. In 1986 support for divorcefell from 61 per cent at the start of the campaign to 36.5 per cent on the day of


3/26


4/26

choice of material used in Ireland, as in most of the developed world, is nothaphazard. It is a conscious choice that certain material is used while othermaterial is omitted. A viewer of television news in Ireland would conclude thatthere is a world outside Irish shores, but that world is generally limited to thedeveloped nations we now seek to emulate. Only passing reference is given tothe emerging nations of Africa or South America and usually in the context ofnatural disasters which are being ameliorated by whites. This gatekeeping bymedia producers serves two functions it ignores the plight of many in the world(thereby suggesting that the poor are irrelevant) and furthers the notion thatdeveloped lifestyles are to be adopted uncritically as the only way forward.

Irish national television, Radio Teilifs ireann, was launched in 1959. Themodel was based on the BBC with one essential difference some measure ofadvertising would be allowed as the Irish population was too small to allowsufficient revenue to be raised via a license system. From the beginning RTEmade its independence clear in a variety of ways, not least of all in its dramaticcontent (Sheehan, 1985, p.271; Kearney, 1988, p. 228). But it was essentiallynationalistic and Catholic at the outset. This was to gradually change.

RTEs most notable strengths were, and are, in the area of current affairs.The national Irish audience is news hungry and a large quantity of high qualitynews and analysis programs continue to draw high ratings. Initially this seemedthat it might be due to a lack of alternatives for noncable subscribers, but ascable extended its reach nationally, the current affairs audiences did notdecrease. It is, however, in the dramatic arena that most of the controversyarose about media content. Ireland as a nation has a splendid record in terms ofthe arts, especially in writing, with four Nobel prizes for literature. It is hardlysurprising that television drama provided an outlet for such creativity. But RTEsprimetime, homeproduced drama left little untouched by way of socialcontroversy they were far from the sanitized safety that marked earlyAmerican television. Among issues challenged were the representation of sexroles, moral codes, urbanrural tensions, religious belief, churchdenominationalism, political power, domestic violence, emigration, nationalismand the education system. Irish viewers were encouraged to reflect on thechanging face of Irish society, thrust at them through the dramatic medium.While the effect of media content in this specific instance is relativelyundocumented there is little doubt, given the place of the arts in the nationalconsciousness, that such coverage at least raised many issues of social change inthe minds of Irish viewers.

The impact of foreign media has also been felt at first through thereception of British television (four further channels to RTEs two channels), andeventually through the advent of cable and satellite, currently offering 18channels and expected soon to rise to 50. Much of this content is clearly createdfor foreign consumption and therefore appeals to the lowest commondenominator American films, the mainstay of many cable companies, aredesigned to be followed in the main without being able to understand spoken


5/26

English.1[1] The net result of this, at least in the visual media, is a concentrationon entertainment and a concomitant devaluation of news and analysis of currentaffairs.

The inroads made by British newspapers has also had an effect on Irishaudiences. The British papers that have the biggest circulation in Ireland are ofthe tabloid, yellow journalism variety, whose most common feature is that theyrequire a reading age of seven for comprehension. As these tabloids haveincreased their market share, Ireland's premier newspaper, The Irish Times, haslost ground. The other major national dailies, The Irish Independent and TheIrish Press, have also suffered, the latter having gone out of business. It shouldbe noted, however, that this influx of British media was discounted by theNational Competition Authority which examined the situation in 1995:

The analysis of both daily and Sunday newspaper sales shows that,apart from certain tabloids, sales of UK newspapers in Ireland arerelatively low when compared to the circulation of Irish papers. Inthe case of daily newspapers there is little indication that thequality and middle market UK titles have been able to make anysignificant inroads in terms of sales in Ireland.

In terms of Irish newspapers, The Irish Times is now seen as thenewspaper of the urban/educated while The Irish Independent is seen as thepaper of the rural/less sophisticated constituencies. It is clear that the increasein media availability, be it visual or literary, has coincided with risingurbanization and increasing challenge to the traditional way of life. Media

exposure in traditional communities inevitably leads to change (Palmer, 1989, p.136). Yet the power of the media in Ireland is apparently limited despiteHerculean efforts over the years, with major campaigns regularly on television,the effort to promote the national language, Gaelic, has failed miserably. In theface of change, there are many who wonder what is happening to Irish identityand culture, long associated with religion and nationalism, especially in thecontent of Irelands membership of the European Community.Summary

Irish society is undergoing immense change. Its people are moreeducated, and better off than previous generations; the influence of theCatholic church is waning; Irish insularity is becoming less of a force as a result

of European Community membership; and the number of media sources hasincreased dramatically, exposing the Irish people to a new set of values andpossibilities. De Fleur and BallRokeach (1989, p. 15) refer to the effects ofinteraction between mass media, society, and the process of masscommunications as being fourfold: social stability, social change, social conflict,

1[1]Large budget American movies almost always require success overseas to turn a profit. With some films

costing as much as $200 million to make and distribute, there is little hope of recouping such financial outlayfrom the domestic market alone. If such films are to be seen unaltered in countries where English is not theprimary language, they must of necessity be stunning visually and capable of being understood even without

sound.


6/26

and shared meanings. Although frequent reference was made in the divorcedebate to social stability and to the shared meaning components, the interest inthis study lies with social change and social conflict.

Social change is facilitated by the provision of communications just associal control is facilitated by their restriction. The swift transmission of ideas,particularly those that challenge the status quo, has been made possible onlywith the advent of mass media. But the provision of media possibility alone isinsufficient for change there must also be some context in which changebecomes both possible and desirable. Any understanding of media influence inIreland in relation to the divorce must take into account the substantial changeprocess already taking place in Irish society.

The social conflict paradigm is also significant here. According to De Fleurand BallRokeach, media organizations work under a web of restraints placed onthem by courts, government agencies, social moral codes, their ownorganizational structures and other groups (1989, p. 20). As these social moralcodes change, so too will media content. Shoemaker and Reese suggest that thecharacteristics of the community within which a medium operates may influenceits content (1996, p. 270). We can therefore expect the mass media to reflect insome measure the change that is taking place within the society. Whether mediacontent mirrors such change, as manifested by fluctuations in public opinion, orstimulates it, is open to question. It is this influence issue that forms centralresearch focus of this study.Theoretical Perspectives

Scholarship traditionally locates the notion of public opinion in theeighteenth century but it is a much more ancient concept. While the term isformally used for the first time in the writings of Voltaire, Rousseau, Locke,Hobbes, and Hume, the concept itself is much older, being found in the writingsof Aristotle and Cicero, and in various medieval manuscripts. Rousseau iscredited as the first to use the term public opinion (NoelleNeumann, 1993). Itis no accident that the term comes into general usage in Rousseaus time as thesocial sciences came to birth. At the heart of this was a new understanding ofwhat constitutes society, and how society can change.

If a society can be compelled or encouraged to hold a particular opinion,then those who hold the power to disseminate such opinions hold real power. Inmedieval times, such power belonged to the Church and to the social system,effectively the aristocracy. Widespread control of public opinion was exercisedby the church and the legal systems as mechanisms of social control. It is onlywith the advent of printing that alternative influences to public opinion cancome into play as open access to the public becomes a possibility. The free flowof information allied with critical reasoning became important in politicalaffairs. It is in this open process that public opinion is truly formed.

It is selfevident that public opinion involves at least two constituentelements. But beyond the elements of public and opinion lie a host of subcategories such as open debate, issue type, possible perspectives on a givenissue, the role of power, and the possibility of change. As public opinion


7/26

becomes a political force, various questions arise: how is public opinion formed,what influences public opinion, how can public opinion be changed?

Foote and Hart (1953) suggest that both problem and proposal arerequired stages in the development of public opinion. If there is no problem thenthere is little possibility of a response nor of emerging opinion to challenge thestatus quo. Public opinion is centered on issues and therefore requires, a priori,dissemination of information in some fashion, either interpersonally or throughthe mass media.

It is in this role of information provision that the mass media come to thefore with respect to public opinion. But scholarship suggests that the media arenot simply dispassionate observers of the social milieu. The opinions expressed inthe mass media about social realities is not necessarily coextensive with equalpublic opinion; media opinion can, however, reinforce and direct public opinion.There is a real issue of concern as to whether public opinion is really the productof a public engaged in debate or simply a faithful reflection of an eliteviewpoint.

Agenda setting theory states that those issues that receive prominentattention in the media become the problems the reading and listening publicsregard as the nation's most important. Lippmann referred to the pictures insidethe heads of individuals which were altered by information and developed theidea that the pictures influenced by the media were not a matter of randomchance, but arose directly from media choices (1922, p. 12). Lazarsfeld,Berelson, and Gaudet (1948) discovered that increasing coverage of campaignissues by the news media resulted in voters seeking more information. McCombsand Shaw (1972) examined the connections between media content and issuesalience, building on Lippmanns assertion that it is the pictures in our headsthat drive our behaviors.

McCombs and Shaws original research on the agenda setting function ofthe mass media concluded that voters tend to share the medias compositedefinition of what is important (1972, p. 184). Iyengar and Kinder's (1987)research reinforced the idea that news content shapes public opinion. Mediacoverage can not only set the public agenda but can also alter publicperceptions of the issues and people involved (Brewer & McCombs, 1996). Thereis also compelling research evidence of intermedia agenda setting. The newsmedia can also set the agenda for themselves by repeated coverage of eventsand industry definition of newsworthiness.

While it can be demonstrated that there are a series of agendas held incommon by various publics, there is, however, no guarantee that media contentis the primary source of those agendas. Many research outcomes support theidea of agenda setting (NoelleNeumann,1993, pp. 151 154) and the massmedia clearly influence the publics ranking of the salience of issues. There isalways a possibility that agenda setting research is measuring audienceperception of media importanceranking rather genuine audience importanceranking.

Magleby (1989, p. 112) indicates that one element of opinion formation isthe conflict in campaigns between those who argue from different sides of an


8/26

issue. It is this conflict that engenders public debate toward resolution. Mostvoters decide on their voting strategy fairly close to the actual vote date, andopinion on referenda propositions can be very volatile (p. 113). Thus it is theactual campaign that defines the issues in referendum proposals.

The influence of opinion poll results on electoral outcomes has been amatter of debate for years. Frazier and Graziano see such polls as serving anotification function, informing the public as to what is important and directingpeople toward a consensus (1979, p. 37). Ginsberg argues that public opinionpolling as a mechanism of social control (1989, p. 271 ff.). Choices are forced inopinion polls because of the limited choice of options available to respondentsand polls serve only to provide the desired response set rather than any realmeasure of public opinion (Bourdieu, 1979, p. 128 ff.). For Bourdieu, publicopinion does not exist.

Patterson (1993) characterizes poll coverage as a consequence of achange in media routines with more analysis and less news. Polls stories get highprominence and are often commissioned by media sources. Popkin (1991) pointsout that polls results are taken at face value by people who perceive them assignals of change, particularly if they are in a minority, and who tend to becomemore willing to shift their own opinion toward the poll winners (p. 124).

The general hypothesis of this study is that media content, as measuredin two national daily newspapers and two national Sunday newspapers, directedthe trend of public discourse as measured by the opinion polls. In the prepollperiod, media content was weighted in favor of divorce; in the postpoll period,media content was dependent on poll outcomes in a manner which indicated adefinite effort to influence referenda outcomes.Research Design

This study uses a content analysis in conjunction with opinion poll datafrom Ireland. The content analysis portion examines four newspapers, two dailynewspapers (The Irish Times, and The Irish Independent) and two Sundaynewspapers (The Sunday Independent, and The Sunday Tribune). The study isfocused entirely on newspaper content, bearing in mind that it is primarilynewspapers that set the agenda at the subissue level, i.e., beyond simple issuerecognition (Benton & Frazier, 1976; McLeod, Becker, & Byrnes, 1974).

The opinion poll data have been gathered from a variety of nationalpolling organizations and have been published in Irish Political Studies on ayearly basis. The poll data have overall results for a national sample in responseto the question If you were asked to vote on a law which would permit divorcein this country, would you vote in favor or against such a law?

The methodology used in this study is well established. Winter and Eyal(1981) tried to determine the optimal effect span or peak association betweenmedia and public emphasis of an issue (p. 377). Stone and McCombs (1981)found the time lag to be between two and six months for the transfer of issuesalience from the media agenda to the public agenda. In this study, time lag is avariable of interest that is, the time lag between media content and thesubsequent polls.


9/26

Media data were analyzed for the entire time period for each campaign.The optimal effect span in which the cumulative effect of media content isreflected in poll outcomes was analyzed. The traditional agenda settinghypothesis is that the media set the public agenda. This study also tested thereverse, that the media agenda is set by public opinion, using time lag analysis(Shoemaker, Wanta, & Leggett, 1989).

This study uses opinion poll data gathered between 1981 and 1995. Figure1 shows these polls and the trends in public opinion over that time. It should benoted that there were in fact two campaigns, each of which culminated in areferendum, on June 26, 1986, and November 20, 1995, respectively. This studyexamines both campaigns, July 1983 to June 1986, and July 1992 to November1995.

Figure Error! Bookmark not defined.: Trends in public attitudes to proposed

change to the constitutional position on divorce, 19831986 and 19931995.

The general hypothesis of this study is that media content, as measuredin two national daily newspapers and two national Sunday newspapers directedthe trend of public discourse as measured by the opinion polls. As the pollsindicated a trend against support for divorce, the content of the media changedto be more in favor of the proposed referendum. This change will be seen to bemore significant in the later (successful) campaign. This study uses a contentanalysis in conjunction with opinion poll data from Ireland. The content analysisportion examines four newspapers, two daily newspapers (The Irish Times, andThe Irish Independent) and two Sunday newspapers (The Sunday Independent,and The Sunday Tribune). The study is focused entirely on newspaper content,


10/26

bearing in mind that it is primarily newspapers that set the agenda at the subissue level, i.e., beyond simple issue recognition (Benton & Frazier, 1976;McLeod, Becker, & Byrnes, 1974). U.S. research indicates that newspapercontent is the best predictor of longterm information gain and there is noreason to expect that this is any different in Ireland (Robinson & Levy, 1996, p.135).

The opinion poll data have been gathered from a variety of nationalpolling organizations and have been published in Irish Political Studies on ayearly basis. The poll data have overall results for a national sample in responseto the question If you were asked to vote on a law which would permit divorcein this country, would you vote in favor or against such a law? While thisquestion is sometimes altered, the level of alteration is sufficiently small as toallow it to be understood as substantially the same question.

Survey responses to the variously worded questions from the pollingorganizations will be tested to see if there are any significant differences. Thereare 29 opinion polls being used for the analysis. Twelve of these polls relate tothe first campaign and seventeen to the second.

Winter and Eyal (1981) point out the time frame within which agendasetting effects occur is crucial; the central question is to determine the optimaleffect span or peak association between media and public emphasis of an issue(p. 377). Stone and McCombs (1981) found the time lag to be between two andsix months for the transfer of issue salience from the media agenda to the publicagenda. In this study, time lag is a variable of interest that is, the time lagbetween media content and the subsequent polls.

Media data were analyzed for the entire time period for each campaign.What is of interest is the optimal effect span in which the cumulative effect ofmedia coverage is analyzed. The traditional agenda setting hypothesis is that themedia set the public agenda. This study will also test the reverse, that themedia agenda is set by public opinion, using time lag analysis (Shoemaker,Wanta, & Leggett, 1989).

Winter and Eyal did a content analysis of The New York Times andcorrelated the outcomes with Gallup Poll data (1981). They found a slightmonotonic descent moving back to a point four months prior to the survey datacollection. After four months there was a significant drop in correlation. Thebest predictors of public salience turned out to be simply the two monthsimmediately prior to the opinion poll date, leading them to conclude that theoptimal effect span is the four to sixweek period immediately prior tofieldwork (p. 381). The research was based on N=27 with the opinion poll as theunit of analysis.

Shoemaker, Wanta, and Leggett (1989) did a similar study on the drugissue using 46 polls and correlating the data with the media agenda as measuredby the number of stories about drugs in a variety of media as compared withWinter and Eyal who only used newspaper content in their analysis. Theyanalyzed Pearson correlation coefficients based on the number of months priorto each poll and found that there were two important time periods for coverageof illegal drugs the month immediately preceding the poll and the fourth


11/26

month prior to the poll. They also found some evidence of media agenda settingin their postpoll content analyses.

Brosius and Kepplinger (1990) linked a content analysis of Germanpublications with a series of 53 opinion polls. They, too, regard the time intervalas crucial, but distinguish between static and dynamic effects. Their dynamicmodel revealed that some coverage caused problem awareness while problemawareness itself also generated coverage. Yagade and Dozier (1990) did a similarpiece of research in the US dealing with various issues and using 53 Gallup polls,finding a difference between issue salience based on the level of abstraction inthe media content.

Gonzenbach took a similar approach in 1992 in dealing with the drug issuein America. His analysis used ARIMA modeling analysis of 54 polls and dealt withcrosslagged correlations. He found that press coverage fluctuated more thanpublic opinion, but concluded that the press does mirror and immediately setpublic opinion but the public agenda also filters into the press agenda (1992, p.143).

Fan (1988) used a mathematical model, which he called ideodynamics, topredict opinion poll trends from computerized analysis of media content on sixissues. He concluded that there is no lag before the onset of persuasion and thatthe impact of a mass media message decreases exponentially with a halflife ofonly one day (p. 5). The ideodynamic method on which he based such aconclusion is statistically valid (p. 68 ff.). His predicted outcomes matchedactual poll outcomes quite closely.

This study follows previous research in its methodology although thetheoretical base is somewhat different. The focus in this study is on publicopinion change in relation to a single issue over time the possibility ofconstitutional change to permit divorce rather then with the rank ordering of aseries of items for salience. The opinion poll is the unit of analysis and the polloutcomes are analyzed in conjunction with media coverage of the divorce issuein monthly increments preceding and following the polls. The advantage of doingpre and postpoll analysis is that it allows for testing of the parallel influenceapproach.Variables

The variables of interest are the level of media support for change in theconstitutional position on divorce, public support for change in the constitutionalposition on divorce, campaign and time. Media support for change in theconstitutional position on divorce was measured by a variety of measures in acontent analysis as outlined below. The percentage support for change in theconstitutional position on divorce, the percentage opposed, and the percentagedont know/no opinion are taken from previously published opinion poll data(Irish Political Studies, 1986 1996). Campaign refers to the three year timeperiod prior to the 1986 referendum and the three year period prior to the 1995referendum. Time is measured as the date of the newspaper article or the dateof the opinion poll as appropriate.


12/26

InstrumentationMedia content was coded to ascertain media level of support for change in

the constitutional position on divorce. Content was coded for placement, length,valence, and date. The coding scheme was pretested and elaborated at theoutset of study. A copy of the coding instructions is given in Appendix B. Theelements of the coding scheme are defined as follows:

PlacementPlacement refers to the actual position of the item in the newspaper. It is

evident that those items which have the greatest prominence are regarded asbeing of the greatest significance front page headlines and stories clearlycontain the most important news of the day. Placement is used in conjunctionwith length to determine prominence. Items were scored 5 for a front pagearticle in the front section of the newspaper, 4 for a front page article in anyother section, 3 for an opinion or editorial piece, 2 for a feature or report, and 1for letters to the editor. The prominence of media coverage is measured asplacement and length of each story (Shoemaker, 1984). A value for prominencewas obtained by multiplying the number of words in a story by the placementvalue of that story.

LengthThe length of a story is a measure of its importance. Longer stories

indicate greater significance. Story length was estimated by counting thenumber of lines in a story. A sample of ten lines was counted to get a words perline measure and this was then multiplied by the number of lines to yield a totalword count for the item. Measuring the length of stories yields more precisemeasures than simple enumeration (AlEnad, 1991).

ValenceAll stories were coded using a five point scale, from +2 to 2: Strongly pro

divorce, prodivorce, neutral, antidivorce, or strongly antidivorce. Theinstruction to coders specifically referred to valence coding as the mostimportant part of the coding task. The instruction further stated that valencerefers to the implicit statement about the proposed constitutional ban ondivorce as conveyed by the tone, content and context of the letter. This iswhere your own judgment comes into play. The scale used by the coders wastransformed to a 1 to 5 scale for analysis to remove the problems created by theuse of zero in multiplication.

DateThe date of each story was recorded.

Sampling Media Coverage of Divorce IssuesA systematic sample was used to determine the choice of material for

coding because of the amount of material involved. For weekdays in the sample,both daily papers were sampled as outlined below whereas all issues of theSunday papers were used. Each story dealing with divorce in each selectednewspaper was copied from microfilm and subsequently coded. The sample waschosen for a period covering three years before the referendum date to a pointone month afterward.


13/26

The weekday papers were sampled using a constructed week approachfor daily newspapers. As people tend to have more time to read on Sundays, andas more news papers tend to be purchased on a Sunday, every Sunday wasincluded in the analysis. This resulted in approximately 1280 individualnewspaper issues being examined for divorce related stories. Once the materialwas gathered, it was distributed to three coders for whom intercoder reliabilityhad already been established. The reliability coefficients are included with otherresults in Chapter IV. The coded data were received back from coders andaggregated into the dataset for analysis. This required using a table of dates asshown in Appendix C. The aggregation resulted in a dataset which allowedexamination of stories according to when they occurred in time in relation to theopinion poll, starting six months before the poll, and working in one monthincrements to one month after the poll.

Intercoder reliability was measured by both Scottsp

and Holstiscoefficient. The aggregation of the individual newspaper variables into

composite indices was tested with Cronbachsa. The differences between thepoll data from IMS and MRBI was tested by ttests for comparison on means foreach campaign.

Results and Analysis

Some startling findings emerged in relation to the relationship between presscoverage and public response as measured through public opinion polls. It may be that there is grwith similar research outcomes (Shoemaker, Wanta & Leggett, 1989, p. 71).

There is also an almost universal rise in valence of stories about divorceand prominence of stories about divorce between the month before the poll andthe month after it (the exception being prominence in The Irish Times). Initialcomparisons of the means for these content variables shows little disparitybetween the first and second campaigns; the standard deviations are slightlylarger in the second campaign than the first indicating some slight difference invariance between the two campaigns.

Comparing the first campaign with the second, the dont know/no opinionpercentage stayed relatively constant, between 8 and 9 per cent. The supportfor change rose in the second campaign as opposition fell; while this is largely tobe expected, the two do not operate in lockstep. This is also evident from thehigher minimum for support for change in the second campaign than in the first(40 per cent vs. 45 per cent) and the lower minimum for opposition to change(26 per cent vs. 30 per cent).

The mean of 53.83 per cent for the first campaign is misleading,suggesting on its face that divorce would be carried in the first referendum. The26point spread from a low of 40 per cent to a high of 66 per cent is centralhere. The higher support levels for change were registered in the beginning ofthe campaign; as the referendum date grew closer, support fell in a dramaticfashion belied by this mean figure. The referendum outcome, of course, is basedon a single event, and not a mean of previous outcomes. Any use of means,therefore, in an analysis such as this is always open to misinterpretation. What is


14/26

ultimately important is the mood of the public on the day of a referendum,irrespective of what has been expressed as public opinion in prior polls.

Confirmation of Previous ResearchThere is evidence of an optimal effect for the relationship between of

media content and poll outcomes. This span varies from one to two months andfour to five months depending on the media variable. The analysis in this studysuggests that Winter and Eyal are mistaken when they state that there is littlereason in doing content analysis for any period prior to one month before anevent of interest (1981, p. 381). The outcome of this study indicates that thereis no simple gross effect of accumulation of content over time. Earlier contentproves in some cases to be more significant that more immediate content. Thismay, however, be entirely dependent upon the kind of issue under investigation.This is consonant with the results of Shoemaker, Wanta and Leggett, indicatingthat media coverage affected public opinion outcomes in two time periods: oneor two months prior to the measurement of public opinion and four or fivemonths prior to the poll.

In this study those time frames were dependent upon the media variablein question. The prominence of stories about divorce two months prior to thepoll affected the support outcome in the polls. The valence of such stories forboth the second and fourth months prior to the poll affected the supportoutcome. The number of stories about divorce in the fourth month affected thesupport outcome. In all these cases, the correlation of poll outcomes for thesupport variables with media content variable were negative, i.e., the more thenewspaper content supported divorce, the less public support there was fordivorce.

The fourthmonth effect that is evident in this study also supports theresearch by Stone and McCombs (1981) in tracing the time lag in agenda setting.They found a period somewhere between two and six months as the optimaltime lag for maximum effect. Brosius and Kepplinger (1990) suggest that thereare different optimal time spans for different events. They characterizeenvironmental issues as long term, requiring several years, and electoralcampaigns as typically requiring four to six weeks. It could be that there is aninterim time span for social issues which hinges on the fourmonth cycle seenhere and in Shoemaker, Wanta and Leggett.

What is not evident here is whether or not the optimal time span isdependent equally upon the public opinion issue. There may be a different timespan for social issues such as divorce or abortion, and an entirely different timespan for other constitutional issues such as economic sovereignty or politicalaspirations.

Effects on poll outcomesBut that is only half the story. Looking at the relationship between the

media content variables on the dont know/no opinion outcome in the polls, thedata suggest that the prominence of divorce stories had no effect. The valenceof stories, however, did have a positive effect on the don't know/no opinion


15/26

outcome: the more supportive of divorce these stories were, the more the dontknow/no opinions. The number of divorce stories also had a positive effect onpoll outcomes in terms of the dont know/no opinion measure the data suggestthat this effect arises in the fourth month also.

Overall, these findings indicate that media content prior to polls doeshave an effect on poll outcomes. That effect is found primarily in the content ofthe fourth month preceding the poll. But the effect varies according to the pollvariables studied. The prominence, valence and number of stories about divorcehad a negative effect on the support outcome whereas it was only the valenceand number of stories that had a positive effect on the don't know/no opinionoutcome. We know from the data that the trend was for support for divorce todiminish and opposition to divorce to increase in both campaigns. We also knowthat the don't know/no opinion measure reached its highest point in the periodjust prior to the referendum, eighteen percent in 1986 and fourteen percent in1995. This suggests that the main increase in the don't know/no opinion votewas a transfer from support for divorce to don't know/no opinion.

These are important findings for several reasons. They suggest that theeffects of media content on poll outcomes are not necessarily immediate, atleast in terms of newspaper content. In the context of European politics, wheremost elections are fought over a threeweek campaign, this may be veryrelevant indeed. Given the fourthmonth effect that is evident here, newspapercontent in the course of a campaign may be of less significance than precampaign coverage. They further suggest that the media may be best able toinfluence shift from one voting position (opposition) to another (support) via aninterim position (don't know/no opinion).Other Findings

One surprising finding in these data is that there is a negative correlationbetween the media content variables and public support for change in theconstitutional position on divorce for all the months prior to the poll, althoughonly certain months were statistically significant. This was entirely unexpectedand contrary to the research hypotheses. There is clearly no hypodermic effectat work here. This may suggest a distrust of the media in Ireland and a real needfor research on press credibility. Given that the media favored the constitutionalchange from the very beginning, this result may simply point to the disparitybetween public opinion and journalistic opinion, with the public growingincreasingly disenchanted as journalists used the media to present a onesidedview of the issue. This outcome debunks the idea of slavish following of mediacontent it is clear that some audiences at least are capable of makingjudgments about media content that do not simply adhere to the direction ofthat content and suggests that Irish consumers are critical consumers of news.

On the other hand, this may also suggest that there are other powerfulideological/extramedia forces at work these would include the Church, socialmores, and antichange pressure groups which have a counterbalancing effectto media content. No matter which, if any, of these obtains, it is clear thatfurther research is indicated on this issue. Following on the backgrounddeveloped in Chapter 1, it is also clear that the media do not have a clear


16/26

playing field in regard to setting the agenda for social change. There are anumber of conservative forces at work which also wield much influence. Apartfrom agencies like the Church, which has stood against change for the most part,various social structures also militate against change. The various processeswhich Huntington outlines (1968, p. 32) are not yet complete. Urbanization isnot yet complete and other social and communal structures still hold large sway.People therefore still look to their families and communities of origin rather thanthe mass media for orientation and direction.

This idea of extramedia influence is further supported by the lack offindings of difference between the two campaigns in terms of media coverage.The analysis shows that there was no difference between campaigns on any ofthe media content variables prominence, valence and number of stories aboutdivorce in any of the time intervals, both pre and postpoll. If the differentoutcomes cannot be explained by the media coverage, then the source of suchchange clearly lies elsewhere. The history of the Catholic Church in Ireland inthe last decade has been marked by various scandals involving bishops andclergy. While the level of Church influence is undocumented there can be nodenying that it has decreased during the intervening period between the tworeferenda.

A further suggestion from the fourthmonth effect mentioned above maybe one of media routines which warrants further investigation. The notion ofmedia routines is supported by other elements in the data. The lack ofdifferentiation between the referenda campaigns in terms of the all of themedia content variables points to a consistency in approach even though thereferenda are separated by a period of nine years.The various poll variables

The more significant part of this study is that postpoll media content isstrongly correlated with poll outcomes on two poll outcome measures supportfor change and don't know/no opinion but not on the third, opposition tochange.

These correlations suggest some orienting of media content in response tothe polls, more than simple reporting of poll outcomes. The more public supportfor change falls, the more the media encourage change, and the more the don'tknow/no opinion outcome increases, the more the media encourage change. It isthese two groups, supporters for change and don't know/no opinion, thatrepresent the best option for achieving change from the status quo. Theopposition to change group tends to be much more resistant to media influence.

The don't know/no opinion outcome is more strongly correlated with themedia content variables in the postpoll analysis than is the support measure.This is the don't know/no opinion group that is most likely to shift opinion,representing as it does the interim between voting one way or the other. Thisgroup is therefore most likely to be influenced by media content, given that it isthe most volatile; in the latter stages of the campaigns, the membership of thisgroup is partly composed of those who have shifted their opinion, but are unsureof their new stance.


17/26

The relationship between poll outcomes and media content is furthersupported by the change in the media content variables over the duration of thecampaign. Not only do the stories about divorce increase in number as thereferendum day draws near this is as expected on the basis of the news valueof timeliness alone but both the prominence of such stories and the valence ofthose stories increase as well. The closer to the campaign, the more the mediafavored divorce in both campaigns. Looking back at the narrowness of thewinning margin in 1995, it is clear that any influence on the don't know/noopinion grouping was very significant indeed. This is a referendum that wascarried by those who failed to declare a position or who shifted their positionfrom that with which they started.

Once again, in the context of European politics, this could be veryimportant indeed. Much of Europe, Ireland included, uses multiseatconstituencies for parliamentary representation and a electoral system thatallows small parties great representation through the operation of a singletransferablevote arrangement. The outcome of such an electoral system is thatthe last seat in many constituencies is decided by a very narrow margin, in whichthe voters who express don't know/no opinion on an issue may well carry theday. The findings of this study suggest a powerful media effect in thosesituations where electoral outcomes are tightly contested, precisely because themedia exercise their greatest influence over those who are uncertain of theirvoting intention and require orientation. It is this group that most often decidestight battles. The 1992 general election in the United Kingdom, which wasnotable for the difference between opinion polls and electoral outcome, hingedon the undeclared vote; the outcome in that election completely confoundedpoll predictions.

It is important therefore to consider the don't know/no opinion groupingas increasingly significant in poll research. It is evident that the respondents inthis group cannot be simply redistributed in some proportion to the support andopposition grouping. This indicates a need for further data in opinion pollresearch, particularly some data on the reason that people have for notexpressing an opinion at a given time does this choice in fact represent noopinion, or is it simply a reluctance to express an opinion to the pollster? If theformer, what are the elements that come into play in influencing a person tomove in one direction or another? How can researchers best acquire data as tothe these influences?

Taking the two elements together media influence on poll outcomesfrom the months prior to the poll, and poll outcome influence on media contentin the month following the poll it is clear that at one level both of theseoperate simultaneously, as Gonzenbach points out.

There is a clear indication that postpoll divorce stories are stronglyrelated to poll outcomes. This suggests a pattern of media content which is notentirely consonant with social reality. There may be other influences here apartfrom the mutual influence model in which media coverage sets the publicagenda and public opinion sets the media agenda. It appears from these findings


18/26

that the media endeavor to influence public opinion and use the expression ofpublic opinion as a barometer to determine strategies for their own agenda.Limitations

This study is clearly limited in regard to its scope in three respects: therange of media, the choice of newspapers, and the public opinion issue chosen.The study is limited by the fact that it is limited to newspaper coverage. In theconceptual stage, it was intended that the study would encompass television andradio news as well but RTE refused access to its archives for this purpose. Somecognizance of the role of advertising would also be helpful.

The sample is limited to national newspapers. While this is clearly ofbenefit in terms of overall circulation and given that the opinion polls werebased on national samples, it might also be useful to include regionalnewspapers in any further study. Finally, the study is limited somewhat in itsapplicability to other issues given that the core issue was so contentious. Thelevel of generalizability is somewhat restricted although the support of previousresearch is very heartening in this respect. Even so, further research using thesame methodology but with a different core issue might be worthwhile.Further Research

The direction of further research is dictated by the findings and by thelimitations of the study. Do the effects found here apply for all social issues,e.g., for abortion legislation, for criminal law referenda, etc? Do they apply forall media, radio, television, advertising, and for the regional press?

On a wider level the data suggest that some research is required intomedia credibility in Ireland, given the negative correlations between the mediacontent variables and the poll outcome measures. At this level it is clear thatsome effort to research the role of interpersonal communication is also required.The media do not exercise effects in a vacuum it is clear that people talk toone another, and debate the issue in public fora of various kinds, not least onsome television and radio talk shows. Such debate also happens to a morelimited degree in the context of the Church. Some analysis is warranted as to thenature, role, and effect of such interpersonal communication.

As indicated in the text above, the role of extramedia influences needsfurther elaboration. While the data are not available for these referenda, it maybe possible to use the International Social Science Project data to examine suchinfluences in the future.

Finally, the question of agenda setting needs further elaboration in thecontent of public opinion. A simple cause and effect model was insufficient inthis study as an explanation of outcomes. This may be due in part to the issue, inpart to the audience. For this reason, further research on other public opinionissues, and in other nonIrish and nonAmerican audiences might be helpful insketching the limitation of some of these theories.Conclusion

Media coverage of the divorce issue in both referenda is insufficient toexplain the disparate outcomes. Media coverage tended to be similar in bothcampaigns. While there is correlation between media content and polloutcomes, this does not of itself explain the outcome. There is an optimal effect


19/26

span in within which media content is most closely related to poll outcomeswhich varies according to both the media variable and the poll measure inquestion.

Postpoll content, which is clearly driven in part by the polls themselves,is positively correlated with two of the three poll outcome measures dontknow/no opinion and support and not at with the third opposition. This maysuggest that the media were more interested in change than in the status quo,possibly as a matter of the normative understanding of newsworthiness. It mayalso suggest that the media were more in favor of change in the constitutionalposition on divorce than not; if this is the case, it is a weak enough bias giventhe overall balance of content during the campaigns.References

AlEnad, A. H. (1991). Counting items versus measuring space in content analysis. Journalism Quarterly,68(4), 657662.

Allport, F. H. (1937). Toward a science of public opinion. Public Opinion Quarterly, 1(January), 23.Althaus, S. (1996). Opinion polls, information effects, and political equality: Exploring ideological biases in

collective opinion. Political Communication, 13, 321.Altheide, D. L. (1976). Creating reality : how TV news distorts events (Sage library of social research ; No. v.

33). Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.Altschull, J. H. (1995). Agents of power: The media and public policy. White Plains, NY: Longman.Aristotle. (1959). Politics. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.Bass, A. Z. (1969). Refining the "gatekeeper" concept: A UN radio case study. Journalism Quarterly, 46(1),

6972.Beam, R. A. (1996). How perceived environmental uncertainty influences the marketing orientation of U.S.

daily newspapers. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 73(2), 285303.Becker, L. B. (1980). The mass media and citizen assessment of issue importance: A reflection on agenda

setting research . In G. C. Wilhoit, & H. de Bock (Eds.), Mass communication review yearbook,volume 1 (pp. 521536). Beverly Hills, CA : Sage.

Bell, Desmond. "Ireland Without Frontiers?: The Challenge of the Communications Revolution." In Across the

Frontiers: Ireland in the 1990s, Ed. Richard Kearney, 21930. Dublin: Wolfhound Press, 1988.Beniger, J. R. (1992). The impact of polling on public opinion: Reconciling Foucault, Habermas, and

Bourdieu. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 4(3), 204219.Bennett, W. L. (1996). News : the politics of illusion (3rd ed. ed.). White Plains, N.Y: Longman.Bennett, W. L., & Lawrence, R. G. (1995). News icons and social change. Journal of Communication, 45(3),

2039.Benton, M., & Frazier, P. J. (1976). The agenda setting function of the mass media at three levels of

"information holding." Communication Research, 3(3), 261274.Binkley, R. C. (1927). The concept of public opinion in the United States. Social Forces, 6, 389396.Blumer, H. (1946). Collective behavior. In A. M. Lee (Ed.), Principles of sociology (Second ed., pp. 166222).

New York: Barnes and Noble.Blumer, H. (1948). Public opinion and public opinion polling. American Sociological Review, 13, 542554.Bogart, L. (1972). Silent politics : polls and the awareness of public opinion. New York: WileyInterscience.Bourdieu, P. (1979). Public opinion does not exist. In A. Mattelart, & S. Siegelaub (Eds.), Communication and

class struggle (pp. 124131). New York, NY: International General.Breed, W. (1960). Social control in the newsroom: A functional analysis. In W. Schramm (Ed.), MassCommunications (pp. 178194). Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Breen, R., Hannan, D. F., Rottman, D. B., & Whelan, C. T. (1990). Understanding contemporary Ireland:State, class, and development in the Republic of Ireland. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Brewer, M., & McCombs, M. (1996). Setting the community agenda. Journalism & Mass CommunicationQuarterly, 73(1), 716.

Bryce, J. (1888). The American commonwealth. London: Macmillan and Co.Busteed, M. A. (1990). Voting behavior in the Republic of Ireland. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Cantril, A. H., Haudet, H., & Herzog, H. (1940). The invasion from Mars. Princeton: Princeton University

Press.Carey, J. W. (1978). A plea for the university tradition. Journalism Quarterly, 55, 846855.Carey, J. (1976). How media shape campaigns. Journal of Communication, 26(2), 5057.Chaney, D. (1981). Public opinion and social change: The social rhetoric of documentary and the concept of


20/26

news. In E. Katz & T. Szecsko (Eds.), Mass media and social change . London: Sage Publications.Childs, H. L. (1965). Public opinion: Nature, formation, and role. Princeton, N.J: Van Nostrand.Cicero. (1957). Pro Quinto Roscio Comoedo. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.Clare, A. (1992). Some reflections on Irish Catholicism. Unpublished lecture to the National Library

Association.Cohen, B. C. (1963). The press and foreign policy. Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press.Corrigan, D. M. (1990). Value coding consensus in front page news leads. Journalism Quarterly, 67(4), 653

662.Courtney, D. A. (1986). Demographic structure and change. P. Clancy, S. Drudy, K. Lynch, & L. O'Dowd

(Eds.), Ireland: A sociological profile (pp. 2246). Dublin: Institute of Public Administration.Cummins, P. (1986). Rural social change. In P. Clancy, S. Drudy, K. Lynch, & L. O'Dowd (Eds.), Ireland: A

sociological profile (pp. 4769). Dublin: Institute of Public Administration.Dickson, S. H. (1994). Understanding media bias: The press and the U.S. invasion of Panama. Journalism

Quarterly, 71(4), 809819.Dillon, M. (1993). Debating divorce: Moral conflict in Ireland. Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky.Dimmick, J., & Coit, P. (1982). Levels of analysis in massmedia decisionmaking A taxonomy, research

strategy, and illustrative dataanalysis. Communication Research, 9(1), 332.Fan, D. P. (1988). Predictions of public opinion from the mass media: Computer content analysis and

mathematical modeling. New York: Greenwood Press.Fico, F., & Soffin, S. (1995). Fairness and balance of selected newspaper coverage of controversial national,state, and local issues. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 72(3), 621633.

Foley, M. (1995). Newspaper trade under fire after report. The Irish Times, (April 15), 5.Foote, N. N., & Hart, C. W. (1953). Public opinion and collective behavior. In M. Sherif, & M. O. Wilson

(Eds.), Group relations at the crossroads (pp. 308331). New York: Harper & Brothers.Fraser, A. C. (1894). An essay concerning human understanding by John Locke: Collated, and annotated,

with prolegomena, biographical, critical and historical. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Frazier, P. J., & Gaziano, C. (1979). Robert Ezra Park's theory of news, public opinion and social control.

Columbia, SC: Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication.Gans, H. J. (1979). Deciding what's news: A study of CBS evening news, NBC nightly news, Newsweek, and

Time (1st ed.). New York: Pantheon Books.Gault, R. H. (1923). Social psychology. New York: Henry Holt.Ginsberg, B. (1989). How polling transforms public opinion. In M. Margolis, & G. A. Mauser (Eds.),

Manipulating public opinion: Essays on public opinion as a dependent variable (pp. 271293). Pacific

Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company.Glynn, C. J. (1987). The communication of public opinion. Journalism Quarterly, 64(4), 688697.Gollin, A. E. (1987). Polling and the news media. Public Opinion Quarterly, Winter, S86S93.Graber, D. A. (1982). The impact of media research on public opinion studies. In D. C. Whitney, E. Wartella,

& S. Windahl (Eds.), Mass communication review yearbook, volume 3 (pp. 555564). Beverly Hills,CA: Sage.

Graber, D. A. (1993). Mass media and American politics. Washington, D.C: CQ Press.Graber, D. A. (1984). Media power in politics. Washington, D.C: CQ Press.Gross, H. E., & Merritt, S. (1981). Effect of Social Organizational Context on Gatekeeping in Lifestyle Pages.

Journalism Quarterly, 58(3), 420427.Habermas, J. (1989). The structural transformation of the public sphere: An inquiry into a category of

bourgeois society. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.Harmon, M. D. (1989). MR Gates Goes Electronic The What and Why Questions in Local TVNews.

Journalism Quarterly, 66(4), 857863.Hartley, E. L., Hartley, R. E., & Hart, C. (1955). Attitudes and opinions. In W. Schramm (Ed.), The process

and effects of mass communication (pp. 216250). Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.Herbst, S. (1993). History, philosophy, and public opinion research. Journal of Communication, 43(4), 140

145.Herbst, S. (1992). Surveys in the public sphere: Applying Bourdieu's critique of opinion polls. International

Journal of Public Opinion Research, 4(3), 220229.Holloway, H., & George, J. H. (1986). Public opinion: Coalitions, elites, and masses. New York: St. Martin's

Press.Holsti, O. R. (1969). Content analysis for the social sciences and humanities. Reading, MA: AddisonWesley

Publishing Company.Hovland, C. I., Janis, I. L., & Kelley, H. H. (1954). Communication and persuasion: Psychological studies of

opinion change. New Haven: Yale University Press.Huntington, S. P. (1968). Political order in changing societies. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Huntington, S. P. (1991). The third wave. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.Hussey, G. (1994). Ireland today: Anatomy of a changing state. London: Viking.


21/26

Insko, C. A. (1967). Theories of attitude change. New York: AppletonCenturyCrofts.Iyengar, S. (1991). Is anyone responsible?: How television frames political issues. Chicago: University of

Chicago Press.Iyengar, S., & Kinder, D. R. (1987). News that matters: Television and American opinion. Chicago: University

of Chicago Press.Jacobsen, J. K. (1994). Chasing progress in the Irish Republic: Ideology, democracy and dependent

development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Kennedy, R. E. (1973). The Irish: Emigration, marriage and fertility. Berkeley, California: University of

California Press.Key, V. O. (1961). Public opinion and American democracy. New York: Knopf.Kirby, P. (1988). Has Ireland a future? Cork: The Mercier Press.Klapper, J. (1960). The effects of mass communication. New York: Free Press.Koch, H. (1970). Portrait of an event. Boston: Little Brown and Company.Lacy, S., Robinson, K., & Riffe, D. (1995). Sample size in content analysis of weekly newspapers. Journalism

& Mass Communication Quarterly, 72(2), 336345.Lasorsa, D. L., & Reese, S. D. (1994). News sources in the crash of 1987: A study of four national media. In

D. A. Graber (Ed.), Media Power in Politics (Third ed., pp. 110122). Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.Lasswell, H. D. (1927). Propaganda technique in the world war. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Lasswell, H. D., Casey, R. D., & Smith, B. L. (1935). Propaganda and promotional activities. Minneapolis: TheUniversity of Minnesota Press.Lazarsfeld, P. B., Berelson, B., & Gaudet, H. (1948). The people's choice. New York: Columbia University

Press.Lazarsfeld, P. F., & Merton, R. K. (1955). Mass communication, popular taste and organized social action. In

W. Schramm (Ed.), The process and effects of mass communication (pp. 554578). Urbana, IL:University of Illinois Press.

Le Bon, G. (1982). The crowd: A study of the popular mind. Atlanta, Georgia: Cheroke Publishing Company.Lee, A. M. (1946). Principles of sociology. New York: Barnes and Noble.Lippmann, W. (1922). Public opinion. New York: Macmillan.Lucey, C. (1955). Report of the Commission on Emigration and Other Population Problems, 19481954.

Dublin: Government Publications Office.Luttbeg, N. R. (1983). News consensus Do UnitedStates newspapers mirror societies happenings.

Journalism Quarterly, 60(3), 484.Machiavelli, N. (1965). Discorsi. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

MacKinnon, W. A. (1828). On the rise, progress, and present state of public opinion in Great Britain andother parts of the world. London: Anon.

Margolis, M., & Mauser, G. (1989). Public opinion as a dependent variable: An empirical and normativeassessment. In M. Margolis, & G. A. Mauser (Eds.), Manipulating public opinion: Essays on publicopinion as a dependent variable (pp. 294320). Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company.

Marsh, C. (1984). Back on the bandwagon: The effect of opinion polls on public opinion. British Journal ofPolitical Science, 15(1), 5174.

McCombs, M. E., & Shaw, D. L. (1993). The evolution of agenda setting research: Twentyfive years in themarketplace of ideas. Journal of Communication, 43 (Spring), 6170.

McCombs, M., & Shaw, D. (1972). The agendasetting function of the mass media. Public Opinion Quarterly,36, 176185.

McLeod, J. M., Becker, L. B., & Byrnes, J. E. (1974). Another look at the agenda setting function of thepress. Communication Research, 1(2), 131166.

McManus, J. (1995). A marketbased model of news production. Communication Theory, 5(4), 301338.Moynihan, M. (1983). Speeches and statements of Eamon de Valera, 1917 1973. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan.Neuman, W. R., Just, M. R., & Crigler, A. N. (1992). Common knowledge: news and the construction of

political meaning. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.NoelleNeumann, E. (1993). Schweigespirale. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Page, B. I., & Shapiro, R. Y. (1989). Educating and manipulating the public. In M. Margolis, & G. A. Mauser

(Eds.), Manipulating public opinion: Essays on public opinion as a dependent variable (pp. 294320).Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company.

Palmer, M. (1989). Dilemmas of Political Development. Itasca, IL: F. E. Peacock Publishers.Palmer, P. A. (1936). The concept of public opinion in political theory. In C. Wittke (Ed.), Essays in history

and political theory in honor ofCharles Howard McIlwain . Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Pan, Z. D., & McLeod, J. M. (1991). Multilevel Analysis in MassCommunication Research. CommunicationResearch, 18(2), 140173.

Park, R. E. (1904). Masse und publikum. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Patterson, T. E. (1980). The mass media election: How Americans choose their president. New York:


22/26

Praeger.Patterson, T. E. (1993). Out of order. New York: A. Knopf.Peer, L. (1992). The practice of opinion polling as a disciplinary mechanism: A Foucaldian perspective.

International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 4(3), 230242.

Penniman, H. R., & Farrell, B. (1987). Ireland at the polls 1981, 1982, and 1987. Durham, NC: DukeUniversity Press.

Peterson, S. (1981). International News Selection by the Elite Press A CaseStudy. Public Opinion Quarterly,45(2), 143163.

Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1981). Attitudes and persuasion: Classic and contemporary approaches.Dubuque, IA: Wm. C. Brown Company Publishers.

Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986). The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion. Hillsdale, NJ:Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Popkin, S. L. (1991). The reasoning voter: Communication and persuasion in presidential campaigns.Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Price, V. (1992). Public opinion. Newbury Park: Sage Publications.Robinson, J. P., & Levy, M. R. (1996). News media use and the informed public: A 1990s update. Journal of

Communication, 46(2), 129140.Rogers, E. M., & Chaffee, S. H. (1994). Communication and journalism from "Daddy" Bleyer to Wilbur

Schramm. Columbia, SC: Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication.Salwen, M. B., & Garrison, B. (1989). Press freedom and development UnitedStates and LatinAmericanviews. Journalism Quarterly, 66(1), 87.92

Salwen, M. B. (1988). Effect of accumulation of coverage on issue salience in agenda setting. JournalismQuarterly, 65(1), 100106.

Schrott, P. R. (1990). Electoral consequences of winning televised campaign debates. Public OpinionQuarterly, 54(4), 567585.

Schudson, M. (1989). The sociology of news production. Media Culture & Society, 11(3), 263282.Schudson, M. (1978). Discovering the news: A social history of American newspapers. New York: Basic Books.Shaw, D. L., & Martin, S. E. (1992). The function of mass media agenda setting. Journalism Quarterly, 69(4),

902920.Sheehan, H. (1987). Irish television drama: A society and its stories. Dublin : Radio Telefis Eireann.Shoemaker, P. J. (1991). Gatekeeping. Newbury Park: Sage Publications.Shoemaker, P. J. (1996). Hardwired for news: Using biological and cultural evolution to explain the

surveillance function. Journal of Communication, 47(2), 3247.

Shoemaker, P. J. (1984). Media treatment of deviant political groups. Journalism Quarterly, 61(1), 6675.Shoemaker, P. J., & Reese, S. D. (1996). Mediating the message: Theories of influences on mass media

content. White Plains, N.Y: Longman.Shoemaker, P. J., Wanta, W., & Leggett, D. (1989). Drug coverage and public opinion, 19721986. In P. J.

Shoemaker (Ed.), Communication campaigns about drugs: Government, media, and the public (pp.6780). Hillsdale, N.J: L. Erlbaum Associates.

Soley, L. C. (1992). The news shapers : The sources who explain the news. New York: Praeger.Stempel, G. H. (1985). Gatekeeping The mix of topics and the selection of stories. Journalism Quarterly,

62(4), 791799.Stone, G. C., & McCombs, M. E. (1981). Tracing the timelag in agendasetting. Journalism Quarterly, 58(1),

5155.Tipton, L., Haney, R. D., & Baseheart, J. R. (1975). Media agendasetting in city and state election

campaigns. Journalism Quarterly, 52(2), 1527.Todd, R. (1983). NewYorkTimes advisories and national international news selection. Journalism Quarterly,

60(4), 705708, 676Vogt, W. P. (1993). Dictionary of statistics and methodology: A nontechnical guide for the social sciences.

Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.Warner, L. (1939). The reliability of public opinion surveys. Public Opinion Quarterly, 3(July), 377.Weaver, D. H. (1982). Media agendasetting and media manipulation. In D. C. Whitney, E. Wartella, & S.

Windahl (Eds.), Mass communication review yearbook, Volume 3 (pp. 537554). Beverly Hills: Sage.White, D. M. (1950). The "GateKeeper": A case study in the selection of news. Journalism Quarterly, 27, 383

390.Wickham, J. (1986). Industrialization, work and unemployment. P. Clancy, S. Drudy, K. Lynch, & L. O'Dowd

(Eds.), Ireland: A sociological profile (pp. 7096). Dublin: Institute of Public Administration.Winter, J. P., & Eyal, C. H. (1981). Agenda setting for the civil rights issue. Public Opinion Quarterly, 45,

376383.Yagade, A., & Dozier, D. M. (1990). The media agendasetting effect of concrete versus abstract issues.

Journalism Quarterly, 67(1), 310.Young, J. T. (1923). The new American government and its work. New York: MacMillan.


23/26

Zaller, J. (1992). The nature and origins of mass opinion. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.


24/26

APPENDIX A : CHRONOLOGY OF DIVORCE LEGISLATION IN IRELAND

1937 De Valeras Constitution approved which includes prohibition on divorce. The Constitutionwas vetted by the Catholic Hierarchy prior to presentation to the cabinet for approval.

1985 Michael OLeary (Labour) introduces Private Members Bill to abolish the constitutional ban.The bill does not get a second reading.

1986April 23

Garrett Fitzgerald announced the introduction of a Divorce Amendment Bill. The CatholicChurch is the only church to dissent.

May 14/24 The Bill passes without opposition. It is strongly supported by all three Dublin newspapers.Poll shows 61 per cent in favor of removing the ban.

May 23 The AntiDivorce Campaign holds its first press conference. The ADC campaignedthroughout the remaining time before polling day, June 27. Fine Gael, Labour, and TheWorkers Party all ran prodivorce campaigns as did the Divorce Action Group, theoriginators of the prodivorce campaign.

June 11 The Catholic Bishops issue a joint statement recognizing the right of conscience in this votebut also stating that they were opposed to divorce.

June 25 A national poll shows 40 per cent in favor, 49 per cent against, 11 per cent undecided.June 27 First constitutional referendum on the divorce question, 62.7 per cent turnout, 63.5 percent against, 36.5 per cent in favor.

1989April 19

The Dil passes the Judicial Separation and Family Law Reform Act which addresses many ofthe fears and concerns raised in the course of the divorce referendum campaign.

1994February 11

The Family Law Reform Bill is published. It lays the groundwork for another divorcereferendum

April 12 The Government announces proposals to have an extensive information campaign in supportof a divorce referendum.

May 15 Archbishop Desmond Connell calls for the antidivorce forces to rally.July 5 Solidarity, a new, conservative, Catholic movement is launched.October 11 The Irish Times publishes a series of interviews with Gaetano Alibrandi, formerly the papal

nuncio to Ireland, in which he claimed to have been significantly involved with the antidivorce campaign.

1995

February 7

The Attorney General asks the Supreme Court to consider the Judicial Separation and

Family Law Reform Act as soon as possible.July 14 Supreme Court upholds the Judicial Separation and Family Law Reform Act.September 18 Antidivorce group refuses to accept taxpayers money to fund its campaign.October 2 The Dil passes the Family Law Act which deals which the issue of providing housing and

maintenance of judicially separated spouses.October 26 The Catholic Bishops reiterate their stance against divorce.November 13 The Dil passes the legislation necessary to hold the constitutional referendum.November 15 Government parties hold press conference to appeal for a YES vote. Mother Theresa calls

for a NO voteNovember 16 Conference of Religious in Ireland issue statement saying Catholics can vote YES or NO

according to conscience.November 21 Government publish advice from the Attorney General saying that the proposed divorce

amendment does not affect the status of the first family.November 22 Pope John Paul II calls on Catholics to reflect on the indissolubility of the marriage bond.November 24 Second constitutional referendum on the divorce question, 62.15 per cent turnout, 49.72

per cent against, 50.28 per cent in favor [after a recount].December 4 Leave given in the High Court to challenge the outcome of the referendum.1996Feb 8

High Court dismisses the challenge to the referendum outcome by AntiDivorce Campaignmember, Senator Des Hanafin.

Mar 1 Supreme Court rules that Senator Hanafin has a right of appeal against the High Courtdismissal of his challenge.

Jun 12 Supreme Court unanimously rejects challenge to divorce referendum outcome.Jun 20 Government publishes Divorce Bill.Sep 25 The Dil passes Divorce Bill allowing for divorce in accordance with the referendum results.1997January 17

The High Court grants a divorce to a terminally ill man who has been separated from hisspouse for many years. Given the urgency of the case this divorce was passed prior todivorce law becoming statute in the State. The man in question died some after remarryinghis partner.


25/26

February 27 Divorce becomes law in Ireland


26/26

Appendix B : Coding InstructionsThe coding sheets you have just received have four headings: Date, Type,Words, Value

DateDate refers to the date of the story. It is already filled in on the coding sheet andshould correspond to the date written or printed on the story page.TypeType refers to the type of story being coded. There are five values. 5corresponds to a front page story in section one of a newspaper, 4 to a frontpage story on any other section, 3 to an editorial or opinion piece, 2 to a normalarticle and 1 to a letter to the editor.WordsWords is the number of words in each story. Count the number of lines for theentire story, coding anything less than half a line as one half, and anythinggreater than half a line as a full line. Note this number. Then pick a ten linesegment at random from the article, count the number of words in it, divide byten and multiply this number by the total number of lines. Enter this values inthe Words column.

press and polls in irish politics

Documents