prevent and defend: threat perceptions and iran's defence...

Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 3, Fall 2011, pp. 7-34

Prevent and Defend: Threat Perceptions and Iran's Defence Policy

Saideh Lotfian∗

Abstract Many western politicians and commentators have described Iran's national security policies in the years after the Islamic Revolution as antagonistic, “breaking the rules of the game" and threatening to other countries. While most Iranian scholars have argued that Iran should not be viewed as a threat to the Middle East and the international society at large. In fact, their counter-argument is that the post-1979 Iran has played a “pacifying” role in its unstable and conflict-prone environment. Important dimensions of Iran’s defense policy will be examined in order to find answers to the following questions: What are the main challenges and opportunities for Iran’s ambition to improve its relative power position in the region, considering the perceptions of the great powers and key regional states of the “Iran threat”? Is Iran’s foreign and security policies expansionist or defensive? Should its defense policy be viewed as a threat to regional security?

Keywords: Islamic Republic of Iran, Defense Policy, Security, Threats, Perceptions, Middle East.

∗ Professor of Political Science, University of Tehran.


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Introduction In political circlesthe past lessons and the future directions of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s foreign policy have been expressed. A group of Iranian realist specialists concentrating on longcountry have strongly recommended that Iranian government should move in the direction of improving its relations with its Arab neighbors in the region and withthis view have argued that any attempt to normalize relaUS and to enhance ties with the West will be detrimental to Iranian national interest. They have pointed out that Iranian government under President Khatami implemented a more constructive foreign policy, and went as far as giving some assisin Afghanistan with the aim of overthrowing the Taliban regime in Kabul, despite the fact that Iranians were opposed to the US bombing of Afghan territories.foreign forces which had ties wacknowledging Iran’s constructive role in its antiformer US President Bush placed Iran in an “Axis of Evil” alongside Iraq and North Korea, and continued economic sanctions against Iran. To advanceWest, the Islamic republic has concentrated on military modernization and efforts to expand bilateral and multilateral ties with diverse countries excluding Israel and the US.

For the purpose of understandinthe implications of Iran’s defense policies, the following questions

Defend: Threat Perceptions and Iran's Defence Policy

s inside and outside the country, different views on and the future directions of the Islamic Republic of licy have been expressed. A group of Iranian realist

entrating on long-term national interests of theongly recommended that Iranian government should rection of improving its relations with its Arab region and with the Western countries. The critics of gued that any attempt to normalize relations with the nce ties with the West will be detrimental to Iranian

They have pointed out that Iranian government Khatami implemented a more constructive foreign as far as giving some assistance to the US war efforts

with the aim of overthrowing the Taliban regime in the fact that Iranians were opposed to the US han territories.1 Taliban fighters were assisted by the hich had ties with the al-Qaeda network. Instead of ran’s constructive role in its anti- terrorism campaign, dent Bush placed Iran in an “Axis of Evil” alongside Korea, and continued economic sanctions against e its security interest without dependency on the amic republic has concentrated on military nd efforts to expand bilateral and multilateral ties ntries excluding Israel and the US.rpose of understanding the complex dimensions and of Iran’s defense policies, the following questions

ews on blic of realist

of theshould

Arab itics of

with the Iranian rnment foreign efforts ime in he US by the

tead of mpaign, ongside against on the military ral ties

ns and estions

must be answered:international levels have been perceived by Iranian policymakers? What are Iranian security the threat perceptions of major regional and extrathe Middle East in regard to Iran’s objectives, capabilities and policies, what foreign policy instruments have the Iranian government used to remove the most serious threats to its security?adopting increasingly ambitious defense strategies, given its resource constraints?

I. Perceptions of Power, Status and Threats in Iran’s Defense Policymaking Realists in international relatthat power inequality could lead to heightened threat perception and even conflicts. They assert that the states, which are in a militarily weak position, are more likely to have a heightened sense of being threatened by others. international relations argue that having a shared identity might change threat perceptions leading to a cases, to the elimination of mutual suspicion and mistrust among nations.3 If these hypotheses are true, then a major part of the mutual suspicion between the Sunni Arab regimes in the Persian Gulf and the predominantlynational attributes of the two sides. The major reasonconcerns of the smaller Arab states about Iranian intentions and defense policies could be sought in the preponderance of Iran’s military power; and its ability to project its “soft” power in the neighboring areas. Iran has been the biggest winneregional security environment, created by the fall of Saddam’s regime in Baghdad and the Taliban’s rulers in Kabul. Although the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan brought more American troops near Iranian borders, but Iran’s elites have viewed the in the Persian Gulf and the economic sanctions imposed on Iran as

Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs

ed: What security threats at national, regional and els have been perceived by Iranian policymakers? security and defense policy objectives? Considering

ptions of major regional and extra-regional actors in n regard to Iran’s objectives, capabilities and policies, icy instruments have the Iranian government used to t serious threats to its security? And why is Iran ngly ambitious defense strategies, given its resource

f Power, Status and Threats in Iran’s Defense

ational relations and foreign policy analysis2 puality could lead to heightened threat perception and They assert that the states, which are in a militarily re more likely to have a heightened sense of being others. Social constructionists in the field of ations argue that having a shared identity might rceptions leading to a reduction, and even in some mination of mutual suspicion and mistrust among hypotheses are true, then a major part of the mutual n the Sunni Arab regimes in the Persian Gulf and ly-Shiite Iran has to do with the differences in the es of the two sides. The major reasons for the

smaller Arab states about Iranian intentions and could be sought in the preponderance of Iran’s

and its ability to project its “soft” power in the as. Iran has been the biggest winner in the new environment, created by the fall of Saddam’s regime the Taliban’s rulers in Kabul. Although the wars in

nistan brought more American troops near Iranian n’s elites have viewed the presence of foreign forces ulf and the economic sanctions imposed on Iran as

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predict on and ilitarily f being eld of

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wars in Iranian forces

Iran as


10

surmountable security challenges which would create a stronger and more independent Iran.

According to the realists, threat perception is a function of power inequality and imbalanceits neighboring country B, the latter must feel more threatened since nothing in the international system will prevent A from using force against B as a means of dealing with a bilateral conflict. InHobbesian world, all states must be suspicious of the intentions of their adversaries and allies alike, because today’s friends might become tomorrow’s enemies in a future wartheory advocates have posed a key question concerninimportance of ideology in threat perceptions of the elites and top decision-makers: To what extend do they value ideology over national interest in their calculation of costs of security policies?

It is then extremely crucial to understand the perceIranian policymakers, and the misperceptions of their opponents. attempts to analyze Iranian intentions on the basis of simplistic stereotypes are misleading. Iran’s domestic political dynamics and its frecent years, Iranian political elites have tried to mobilize domestic political support in opposition to US military presence in the Persian Gulf, and in defense of the country’s nuclear program.

II. An Assessment of Iran’s DefIran’s defense policy is formulated to protect sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence, and vital interests of the country. Looking at the current Iranian strategic debate about what kind of role should the Islamic republic the glorious days of the Persian Empire have long passed, there is a remarkable consensus among the rival political groups that Iran should progressively regain its great power status.experts have argued that Iran should be concerned with economic development, and not military power. Others have said that Iran’s


curity challenges which would create a stronger and nt Iran.to the realists, threat perception is a function of and imbalance.4 If country A is more powerful than ountry B, the latter must feel more threatened since

nternational system will prevent A from using force means of dealing with a bilateral conflict. Ind, all states must be suspicious of the intentions of

and allies alike, because today’s friends might w’s enemies in a future war.5 The balance of power s have posed a key question concernin

deology in threat perceptions of the elites and top To what extend do they value ideology over national alculation of costs of security policies?6

extremely crucial to understand the perceptions of kers, and the misperceptions of their opponents. lyze Iranian intentions on the basis of simplistic

misleading. One cannot ignore interactions between political dynamics and its foreign policy positions. In nian political elites have tried to mobilize domestic in opposition to US military presence in the Persian nse of the country’s nuclear program.

ent of Iran’s Defense Policy Objectives olicy is formulated to protect sovereignty, territorial ndence, and vital interests of the country. Looking at an strategic debate about what kind of role should

blic play in the world, one main point is clear: Eof the Persian Empire have long passed, there is a

ensus among the rival political groups that Iran ively regain its great power status.7Some Iranian ued that Iran should be concerned with economic d not military power. Others have said that Iran’s

ger and

ion of ul than d since g force In the ons of might power

ng the nd top ational

ons of ts. Any

mplistic etween ons. In omestic Persian

ritorial king at should

Even if ere is a at Iran Iranian onomic

Iran’s

role as a security player in the region should be expanded since the Islamic Republics military capabilities are evaluated as signifimproving. The importance of major foreign policy issues to political leaders has been determined by domestic political developments and system preservation more than regional or international security considerations.

What are the limits of Iran’sexternal pressuresIran’s economic weakness and strategic isolation, despite its inherent regional status originating from its geostrategic advantages and its population size relative to its neighbors.about the ability of the Iranian government to enhance the relative position of Iran in the Middle East, we have witness the rise of a stronger Iran as a result of positive changes in the regional seenvironment, most notably the overthrow of the Baathist regime in Baghdad, the removal of Taliban in Kabul, the gradual move by Ankara to distant Turkey from Israel, and the onset of “Arab uprising” threatening the proIran has been able to overcome the West and become “a new emerging world power in International Relations.”

Islamic Republic did not seek to overcome its vulnerability by alliance with great powers. The price of Soviet protection against western aggression would have been loss of freedom and political choice, and sacrifice of cherished autonomy. Iran opted to maintain a modern defense capability, not for fighting but for deterring foreign invasion.Dehshiri and Majidi indicated that an enduring princiIran’s foreign policy is “pacifism”, which is based on an Islamic principle of maintaining peace.populated Middle Eastern states, and possesses significant oil and gas resources. Yet, the Islamic republic’s militand relative terms have been lower than the military spending of most Middle Eastern countries.Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) data


y player in the region should be expanded since the s military capabilities are evaluated as signifmportance of major foreign policy issues to political determined by domestic political developments and

tion more than regional or international security

he limits of Iran’s power and its capacity to withstand s? In 1994, Chubin presented a dismal picture of weakness and strategic isolation, despite its inherent

originating from its geostrategic advantages and its elative to its neighbors.8 Contrary to the pessimism of the Iranian government to enhance the relative in the Middle East, we have witness the rise of a a result of positive changes in the regional se

ost notably the overthrow of the Baathist regime in moval of Taliban in Kabul, the gradual move by nt Turkey from Israel, and the onset of “Arab ning the pro-American regimes. Against all

able to overcome the West and become “a new power in International Relations.”9

public did not seek to overcome its vulnerability by at powers. The price of Soviet protection against

on would have been loss of freedom and political fice of cherished autonomy. Iran opted to maintain a capability, not for fighting but for deterring foreign i and Majidi indicated that an enduring princiolicy is “pacifism”, which is based on an Islamic ntaining peace.10Iran is one of the largest and most e Eastern states, and possesses significant oil and gas he Islamic republic’s military expenditures in absolute s have been lower than the military spending of most countries.11According to the Stockholm International nstitute (SIPRI) data shown in Table, Iran’s military

s

11

nce the ficantly olitical

nts and ecurity

hstand ture of nherent and its simism relative e of a ecurity

gime in ove by “Arab odds,

a new

ility by against olitical ntain a foreign iple of Islamic d most and gas bsolute f most ational

military


12

burden (military exp2.9-4% in the 1999equal to less than onemilitary spending .

Iran’s Military Expenditure, total and as a % of G

2007Military

Expenditure, $

6486

Military Burden, (%)

2.9

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)Cordesman claims that “Iran has limited capabilities today but could become a much more threatening power if it modernized key elements of its forces and its neighbors did not react.”added that “any invasion of Iran that produced a strong nationalist response, rather than a broadwould almost certainly turn into a bloody and pointless war of attrition.”14 Obama Administration is aware that a war waged against the much stronger and determined Iranian forces will not be 2003 US invasion of IraqPanetta talked about world economic consequences of a strike on Iran.15

To counterbalance US policy of isolating Iran, the more conservative Ahmadinejad adopted the same strategy that reformist Khatami and pragmatist Rafsanjani pursued. He is trying to increase Iran’s economic and political ties in a way that adds to Iran’s friends and partners among the nonAsia and Africa. His government permitted nuclear facilities in Natanz and Isfahan. He consented to the formation of a multilateral consortium for fuel supply, and accepted to sign the TurkeyIran’s low enriched uranium to Tufuel from the Bushehr power plant to Russia to be disposed of in a


expenditures as a percentage of GNP) was between 99-2007 period. Its military expenditures in 2008n one-fourth of the Saudi, and about half of Israeli .

y Expenditure, total and as a % of GNP, 1999200712

2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 20007811 7213 5816 4594 3926 5220 4731

3.8 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 4.0 3.8

kholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)ms that “Iran has limited capabilities today but could h more threatening power if it modernized key orces and its neighbors did not react.”13 However, he invasion of Iran that produced a strong nationalist than a broad-based uprising against the regime,

ertainly turn into a bloody and pointless war of ma Administration is aware that a war waged against er and determined Iranian forces will not be like the n of Iraq. Recently, U.S. Defense Secretary Leon bout world economic consequences of a strike on

rbalance US policy of isolating Iran, the more hmadinejad adopted the same strategy that mi and pragmatist Rafsanjani pursued. He is trying to onomic and political ties in a way that adds to Iran’s

ners among the non-Aligned states in Latin America, His government permitted the IAEA to monitor the

in Natanz and Isfahan. He consented to the multilateral consortium for fuel supply, and accepted ey-Brazil’s brokered nuclear fuel swap deal to send ed uranium to Turkey. He agreed to return the spent

ushehr power plant to Russia to be disposed of in a

etween 08 was Israeli

999-

19993200

3.0

t could ed key ver, he ionalist regime, war of against ike the

y Leon ike on

more at the ying to

o Iran’s merica, tor the to the cepted o send e spent of in a

safe manner. Finally, he agreed to work with the UN to create a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East.

Iran is engaged in strengthening its militUS military intervention in the Persian Gulf. Iranian forces must be prepared to defend the country against ballistic missile attacks, terrorist attacks, invasion of Iranian islands in the Persian Gulf, intrusion into Iranian terrlarge-scale aerial bombardment and land invasion. Iran now has the most advanced missile and space programs and domestic arms industry in the Arab Middle East.With the removal of Saddam’s regime after the USthe only anti-status quo regional state with the actual and potential capability to challenge Israel’s qualitative military superiority. It is no wonder that Israeli leaders have expressed strong objection to Inuclear and missile programs since the late war of words against the Islamic Republic in the hope of an “Iraqlike” scenario of regime change for Iran.

Iran under the Shah had an ambition to become a major regional naval powersupported their trusted ally in the Persian Gulf in this endeavor, because a militarily strong Iran would have then been responsible for its own defense and for sharing the burden of protecting the US interest in the region.interest in strengthening its naval forces can be explained by the following goals: patrol oil shipping lanes, collect intelligence on the movement of foreign naval vessels, defend Iranian cargo ships piracy, be ready for search and rescue missions, Iranian naval power amid reports of possible strike against its nuclear sites. Iran’s naval forces have been sent to the Bab elRed Sea, and the Gulf of Aden since hijacked an IranianJamaran, its first domesticallyGulf in February


nally, he agreed to work with the UN to create a free zone in the Middle East.

aged in strengthening its military capabilities to deter vention in the Persian Gulf. Iranian forces must be fend the country against ballistic missile attacks,

invasion of Iranian islands in the Persian Gulf, anian territorial waters by the US naval forces, and bombardment and land invasion. Iran now has the missile and space programs and domestic arms Arab Middle East.With the removal of Saddam’s

US-led military invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran became tus quo regional state with the actual and potential lenge Israel’s qualitative military superiority. It is no eli leaders have expressed strong objection to Iile programs since the late 1990s, and are waging a ainst the Islamic Republic in the hope of an “Iraqregime change for Iran.

the Shah had an ambition to become a major ower. Based on the Nixon Doctrine, the Americans trusted ally in the Persian Gulf in this endeavor, ily strong Iran would have then been responsible for and for sharing the burden of protecting the US egion.16 The Islamic Republic of Iran’s renewed gthening its naval forces can be explained by the patrol oil shipping lanes, collect intelligence on the eign naval vessels, defend Iranian cargo ships afor search and rescue missions, and demonstrate

wer amid reports of possible strike against its nuclear l forces have been sent to the Bab el-Mandeb, the

he Gulf of Aden since 2008 when Somali pirates an-chartered cargo ship.17 The Iranian Navy launched domestically-manufactured destroyer, in the Persian y 2010. The recent US “rapid reaction” joint war

s

13

reate a

o deter must be attacks,

Gulf, es, and has the c arms ddam’s became otential t is no Iran’s

aging a “Iraq-

major ericans deavor, ble for he US newed by the on the against nstratenuclear eb, the pirates

unched Persian nt war


14

games with Bahrain, which hosts thForces Central Command, are considered as part of Washington’s psychological warfare waged against Iran. With a ‘tit for tat’ strategy, Iran plans to conduct a naval exercise, called Oman and the north

The self-assessment and the threat perception of the Iranian leaders have led to Iran’s growing inventory of ballistic missiles, particularly the deployment of the medium and its space launch vehicle programannounced the allocation of (ISA) over the next five years, after the launch of Iran’s first commercial satellite on a Russian rocket. Since then, Iran has joined the club of a few countrieinto space. Iran launched its first satellite called Omid (hope) into orbit in February (observation) aboard Iranian ‘Safir’satellite2011 on a “topography” mission.satellite launch center with the cooperation of the Ministry of Defense in the less

III. Iran in the Threat Perceptions of Other Statesa. The Perceptions revolution, Iran has become not just an impending but an actual political problem for American foreign policymakers. Speaking to the journalists after the AsiaNovember 2011,weapons would pose a threat not only to the region but also to the United States.”23IIranian “actions over many years now ... create the possibility ofdestabilizing the region and are not only contrary to our interests, but I think are contrary to the interests of international peace.”

In the Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence


rain, which hosts the 5th Fleet and the US Naval Command, are considered as part of Washington’s rfare waged against Iran. With a ‘tit for tat’ strategy, duct a naval exercise, called Velayat 90, in the Sea of

orth of the Indian Ocean.18 sessment and the threat perception of the Iranian

to Iran’s growing inventory of ballistic missiles, eployment of the medium -range Shahab-3 m

unch vehicle program.19In 2005, Iranian government allocation of $500 million for Iran’s Space Agency next five years, after the launch of Iran’s first

lite on a Russian rocket. Since then, Iran has joined w countries with the capability of launching satellites

launched its first satellite called Omid (hope) into ary 2009;20 and its second one named Rasad oard Iranian ‘Safir’satellite-launching rocket in June graphy” mission.21 The ISA is planning to establish a center with the cooperation of the Ministry of ss-populated southeastern parts of the country.

Threat Perceptions of Other Statesof Iran Threat in US Middle East Policy: Since

has become not just an impending but an actual for American foreign policymakers. Speaking to the

the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in , President Obama feared that: “Iran with nuclear pose a threat not only to the region but also to the n 2009, he had reportedly made similar commentsover many years now ... create the possibility of

region and are not only contrary to our interests, but ary to the interests of international peace.”24 nual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Naval ngton’s rategy, Sea of

Iranian missiles, missiles,rnment Agency s first joined

atellites e) into Rasad

n June ablish a try of .22

ce the actual to the

mmit in nuclear to the ments:ility ofsts, but

ligence nce on

February 2010, fBlair mentioned “Iran” and “Iranian” about sixty times and called Iran a real threat to the national interest of the US and its allies. He complained about Iranian inattention to the UN SecuriResolutions calling on Iran to limit its nuclear and missile programs. He then expressed concern that the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear program might lead to a regional arms race if the other states in the Middle East follow the example of capability. Blair stated that:

“We continue to assess Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons in part by developing various nuclear capabilities that bring it closer to being able to produce such weaponit choose to do so. We do not know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.”

On the issue of Iran’s Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), He added that:

“Iran’s technical advancement, particularly in uranium enrichment, strengthe scientific, technical and industrial capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons, making the central issue its political will to do so. These advancements lead us to reaffirm our judgment from the enough HEU for a weapon in the next few years, if it chooses to do so.”26

This perceived ‘Iran threat’ has greatly influenced the US foreign policy towards the Middle East. American politicians have openly voiced anti-Iran views, and some of them have called for arming the enemies of the Islamic Republic. There have even been calls for preemptive strikes on Iran. Initially, Iranian politicians invested a great


former Director of National Intelligence Dennis C“Iran” and “Iranian” about sixty times and called to the national interest of the US and its allies. He

ut Iranian inattention to the UN Security Council ng on Iran to limit its nuclear and missile programs. d concern that the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear

ead to a regional arms race if the other states in the w the example of Iran in the development of nuclear tated that:

tinue to assess Iran is keeping open the option to develop weapons in part by developing various nuclear capabilities g it closer to being able to produce such weapons, should e to do so. We do not know, however, if Iran will ly decide to build nuclear weapons.”25

ue of Iran’s Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), He

technical advancement, particularly in uranium ent, strengthens our 2007 NIE assessment that Iran has ntific, technical and industrial capacity to eventually nuclear weapons, making the central issue its political will . These advancements lead us to reaffirm our judgment

e 2007 NIE that Iran is technically capable of producing HEU for a weapon in the next few years, if it chooses to

ved ‘Iran threat’ has greatly influenced the US foreign he Middle East. American politicians have openly views, and some of them have called for arming the slamic Republic. There have even been calls for preon Iran. Initially, Iranian politicians invested a great

s

15

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ies. He Council grams.

nuclear in the

nuclear

develop abilities should an will

U), He

uranium ran has entually ical will dgment oducing oses to

foreign openly ing the or pre-a great


16

deal of efforts in creating ambiguities over how thattack. Due to the increased frequency of military threats issued by the Americans and Israelis, and the changed in the minds of the Iran’spolitical and military elites, the Iranians have become more outspoken analysis of Iran’s reactions to an attack is the Supreme Leader’s own word. Ayatollah Khamenei recently stressed that: “Anybody who cherishes the thought of attacking the Islamic Republic of Iran should be prepared to receive strong slaps and powerful punches from the Iranian nation, the Revolutionary Guards, the Army and Basij.”

Earlier, he had mentioned the high cost of Iranreminded the potential attackers that: "The resistance and victory of the Iranian nation in the imposed war proved to the world that attacking the Islamic Republic is costly."US forces if it comes under attack by the US or Israel. Ayatollah Khamenei had said that "the Americans should know that if tassault Iran, their interest will be harmed anywhere in the world that is possible."29Major General Commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps who is now a senior military advisor to the Supreme Leadenew warning to the Americans: “The IRGCdestination of every US warship which intends to pass through the Strait of Hormuz.”

Iran has been a controversial topic of discussion by the presidential candidates froRepublican presidential candidates made some provocative comments about the US policy towards Iranian nuclear program. Rick Perry said: "Obviously, we are going to support Israel. And I've said that we will support Israel in every way that we can, whether it's diplomatic, whether it's economic sanctions, whether it's overt or covert operations, up to and including military action."

The GOP candidatesneoconservative political analyst


creating ambiguities over how they will react to an he increased frequency of military threats issued by nd Israelis, and the changed saliency of these threats he Iran’spolitical and military elites, the Iranians have utspoken in their retorts. A good place to begin an

reactions to an attack is the Supreme Leader’s own Khamenei recently stressed that: “Anybody who

ught of attacking the Islamic Republic of Iran should eceive strong slaps and powerful punches from the

he Revolutionary Guards, the Army and Basij.”2

had mentioned the high cost of Iran-Iraq war, and tential attackers that: "The resistance and victory of on in the imposed war proved to the world that mic Republic is costly."28Iran would retaliate against

comes under attack by the US or Israel. Ayatollah aid that "the Americans should know that if tr interest will be harmed anywhere in the world that or General Yahya Rahim Safavi, a former Chief the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (1997nior military advisor to the Supreme Leader issued a he Americans: “The IRGC controls the identity and

very US warship which intends to pass through the .” 30 en a controversial topic of discussion by the 2012didates from the two largest political parties. dential candidates made some provocative comments icy towards Iranian nuclear program. Rick Perry said: re going to support Israel. And I've said that we will

n every way that we can, whether it's diplomatic, onomic sanctions, whether it's overt or covert and including military action."31 candidates have been described by an American

political analyst as “hawkish and exceptionalist, neo

t to an ued by threats

ns have egin an ’s own y who should

om the 27

ar, and tory of ld that against atollah if they ld that Chief

7-2007) sued a ity and gh the

012 US parties.

mments ry said: we will omatic, covert

merican t, neo-

Reaganite and neoconservative, proskeptical of the U.N. and the State Department”.rivals in the presidential race, Barak Obama is trying to show that he has not been too belonged to an “Axis of Evil”, and he expected the western allies to work together in order to punish Iran in the hope of changing its foreign policy behaviors. Barak Obama’s position in regard to the issue of Iran’s nuclear issue had been ambivalent. While indicating that he supports diplomatic means of conflict resolution, he says “all options are on the table”. claimed that his administration’s policies has slowednuclear program, stymied Iran’ssystem, hindered Iran’s oil and gas sector, exposed Iran’s support for terrorism, and demonstrated US support for universal human rights.Will a new republican president wiable to create a regionthe region? Will the reelected Obama be able to engage Iran?the US goals is to ensure that the other Muslim Middle Eastern states do not follow Iranian enrichment program. For Israelis, the goal is to safeguard their nuclearno other regional state would acquire nuclear capability or even get near “break-out” capacity.

A reason for Iranian reluctanhas been given by President Ahmadinejad in February commented on the nature of the "aggressive powers": "If you pull back, they will push ahead, but if you stand against them, because of this resistance, thnegotiation with the US are expressed by Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi, who rejected to the latest offer of direct TehranWashington talks made by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in following statement: "As long as you are not honest in your intention, talks would be meaningless."animosity from the


neoconservative, pro-defense and pro-Israel, and U.N. and the State Department”.32 In reaction to his idential race, Barak Obama is trying to show that he o soft on Iran. George Bush made clear that Iran Axis of Evil”, and he expected the western allies to

n order to punish Iran in the hope of changing its ehaviors. Barak Obama’s position in regard to the uclear issue had been ambivalent. While indicating diplomatic means of conflict resolution, he says “all

he table”. In a recent White House press release, it is administration’s policies has slowed the Iranian stymied Iran’s access to the international financial Iran’s oil and gas sector, exposed Iran’s support for monstrated US support for universal human rights.lican president wining the US presidential election be egion-wide anti-Iranian alliance for a third US war in the reelected Obama be able to engage Iran? Oo ensure that the other Muslim Middle Eastern states anian enrichment program. For Israelis, the goal is to uclear monopoly in the region by making sure that l state would acquire nuclear capability or even get capacity.34

or Iranian reluctance for the renewal of nuclear talks y President Ahmadinejad in February 2007, when he the nature of the "aggressive powers": "If you pull ush ahead, but if you stand against them, because of ey will back off."35These distrustful attitudes towards the US are expressed by Iranian Foreign Minister Ali ho rejected to the latest offer of direct Tehranmade by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in

ent: "As long as you are not honest in your intention, meaningless."36 Some key leaders still harbor antihe 1979 revolution, while others cannot get over the

s

17

l, and to his

that he at Iran llies to

ging its to the icating

ays “all se, it is Iranian nancial ort for rights.33 tion be war in

One of n states al is to re that

ven get

ar talks hen he ou pull ause of owards ster Ali

Tehran-n in the ention, nti-US ver the


18

resentment they feel towards the American gorole in ousting the government of Prime Minister Mossadegh. The experience of the perceptions of the Iranian leaders to such an extent that most of them are obsessively concerned with forethe regime in Tehran by force.by the neoconservative pronouncements of the US “regime change” policy during the Bush Administration.

Russia as one of the PCouncil has become an important partner for the Islamic Republic. Since the 1990stechnology due to the refusal of the Western countries to cooperate with Iran in the construction of the Bushehr nuclear reactothe geostrategic value of Iran, the Russian government has not terminated its economic and political ties with Tehran despite increasing pressures exerted by Washington. On the one hand, Moscow considers the economic benefits of cooperating with Iits expanding nuclear reactor programs, and looks forward to being able to sign more lucrative contracts to build more nuclear power plants in Iran as well as other Middle Eastern countries. On the other hand, Russia does not want a nuclearinfluence in Central Asia and Caucasus. This concern has led the Russians to vote in favor of the UN Security Council resolutions which imposed several rounds of sanctions on Iran since

The opposition to the deployment of missile defeUS and the NATO in their neighborhood is a point of convergence in Russo-Iranian bilateral relations. Iranian and Russian officials have expressed concerns over the contentious issue of Ankara's decision to host early warning radar for NATO mterritory. In general, Russia has its own misgivings about the stationing of US missile

Unlike Russia, China is cautious about its nuclear cooperation with Iran. Both are eager to pursue a pe


feel towards the American government for its key he government of Prime Minister Mossadegh. The

he 1953 Iranian coup d'état has influenced threat e Iranian leaders to such an extent that most of them oncerned with foreign hidden agenda to undermine hran by force.37This perception has been reinforced rvative pronouncements of the US “regime change” Bush Administration.ne of the P5 with veto power at the UN Secur

ome an important partner for the Islamic Republic. , Moscow has been a major source of nuclear o the refusal of the Western countries to cooperate construction of the Bushehr nuclear reactor. Given value of Iran, the Russian government has not

economic and political ties with Tehran despite ures exerted by Washington. On the one hand, rs the economic benefits of cooperating with Iclear reactor programs, and looks forward to being re lucrative contracts to build more nuclear power well as other Middle Eastern countries. On the other oes not want a nuclear-capable Iran with more ntral Asia and Caucasus. This concern has led the e in favor of the UN Security Council resolutions everal rounds of sanctions on Iran since 2006.38

tion to the deployment of missile defense system of TO in their neighborhood is a point of convergence bilateral relations. Iranian and Russian officials have ns over the contentious issue of Ankara's decision to ng radar for NATO missile defense shield on its neral, Russia has its own misgivings about the missile defense system near its territory.39 sia, China is cautious about its nuclear cooperation

are eager to pursue a peaceful resolution, and

its key h. The threat

f them ermine

nforced hange”

ecurity public. nuclear operate Given

as not despite

hand, Iran in

o being power

e other more

ed the lutions 8

tem of rgence ls have sion to on its

ut the

eration n, and

acknowledge that Iran has a legitimate right to peaceful nuclear technology, and that the security concerns of Iran should be understood. Being the major trading partners of Iran, both states are reluctant to impose harsh sanctions athat might curtail their trade ties. Some Iranian analysts have highlighted the value of energy resources of Iran as a bargaining chip in its negotiations with China and the other Asian powers.result of tightening omore involved in Iran’s energy sector. As expected, Iranian officials have rejected the adverse impact of sanctions on the Iranian economy. For example, a former Foreign Minister of Iran Ali Akbar Velayati (1981-1997Foreign Relations Supreme Leader) downplayed the impact of the new sanctions by saying that these antiUnited States and will have no impact on Iran.foreign policy towards the Islamic Republic will bedetermined by its economic interest, its relations with the United States, and its ties with the oil-rich counties in the region.

b. Arab Threat Perceptions Focused on Iran1979 Iranian revolution with its Islamic characterizationdominant views of the Arab traditional regimes was that the new Iranian government’s intention is to export its brand of revolutionarideas. The Iranian officials usually responded to these accusations by saying that Iran had no plan to expand its influence beyond its border by force, or to intervene in the internal affairs of the other countries, because Iranians were satisfied with tthey have also said that Iran will remain faithful to the Islamic principles and will work toward the unity of the Islamic World. Iranian government’s policy of supporting Islamic movements was exceptionally true in the early y

The indiscreet or misreported words spoken by some Iranian politicians have contributed to the Arab concerns about the long


at Iran has a legitimate right to peaceful nuclear that the security concerns of Iran should be

ng the major trading partners of Iran, both states are ose harsh sanctions against the country in such a way ail their trade ties. Some Iranian analysts have alue of energy resources of Iran as a bargaining chip

ns with China and the other Asian powers.40

ng of sanctions, Chinese companies might become n Iran’s energy sector. As expected, Iranian officials he adverse impact of sanctions on the Iranian ample, a former Foreign Minister of Iran Ali Akbar 997), and a member of the Strategic Council on s (since 2006) at the Beit-e Rahbari (the Office of the ) downplayed the impact of the new sanctions by

anti-Iran sanctions are ineffective weapons of the d will have no impact on Iran.41It is clear that Chinese wards the Islamic Republic will bedetermined by its t, its relations with the United States, and its ties with ies in the region.eat Perceptions Focused on Iran: In the aftermath of the evolution with its Islamic characterizationof the Arab traditional regimes was that the new

ent’s intention is to export its brand of revolutionarn officials usually responded to these accusations by

had no plan to expand its influence beyond its border ntervene in the internal affairs of the other countries,

were satisfied with their political map. However, said that Iran will remain faithful to the Islamic

will work toward the unity of the Islamic World. ent’s policy of supporting Islamic movements was e in the early years of the revolution. eet or misreported words spoken by some Iranian ontributed to the Arab concerns about the long

s

19

nuclear uld be tes are

h a way s have ng chip

As a ecome fficials Iranian Akbar

ncil on of the

ons by of the

Chinese d by its es with

of the n, the he new tionaryons by border

untries, wever, Islamic World. ts was

Iranian g-term


20

strategic objectives of Iranmisquoted comment made by a former(Majlis) Hojjatoleslam14th province of Iran was expertly taken out of contextthe tension between Iran, Bahrain and its Arab friends. Morocco cut off its diplomatic relaleaders stated that they are “concerned and astonished.” After his provocative remarks, Iranian foreign ministry tried to restore confidence by reassuring Manama that Iran respects Bahrain’s sovereignty and indepautocratic Arab governments have tried to underscore the tactless or blundering statements made by some Iranian officials and commentators on regional issues in the hope of causing discord between Iran and the AMuslim nations from the Israeli occupation of Palestine and other issues which are likely to breed Arab hostility towards their leaders.

According to the classified US material released by the WikiLeaks, the rulUS to launch an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities and put an end to the Iranian nuclear ambition.these allegations, and said: “these malicious moves will have no effect on our relations.” Other Iranian politicians accused the CIA of producing these documents.44The nature of Iran’s bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia will be a function of changes in the regional security enHowever, a certain degree of rivalry between the two countries over the distribution of power in thein the near future. the region by claiming that Iran is invArab World in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine. He accuses Iran of snatching these affairs from the hands of the Arabs who were previously responsible for handling them.

A political scientist at the University of Tehran, Ebrahi


es of Iran. For example, the 2009 undiplomatic and ment made by a former speaker of Iranian Parliament eslam Ali Akbar Nategh-Noori that Bahrain is the f Iran was expertly taken out of context, and led to een Iran, Bahrain and its Arab friends. Morocco cut c relations with Iran, and even pro-Iranian Hamas at they are “concerned and astonished.” After his

marks, Iranian foreign ministry tried to restore reassuring Manama that Iran respects Bahrain’s independence. Israeli officials and the unpopular

governments have tried to underscore the tactless or ements made by some Iranian officials and n regional issues in the hope of causing discord d the Arabs. The aim is to divert attention of the from the Israeli occupation of Palestine and other ikely to breed Arab hostility towards their leaders.to the classified US material released by the

ulers of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia secretly urged the attack on Iranian nuclear facilities and put an end to ar ambition.43Iranian President Ahmadinejad rejected and said: “We neighboring countries are friend

moves will have no effect on our relations.” Other ans accused the CIA of producing these nature of Iran’s bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia n of changes in the regional security environment.

ain degree of rivalry between the two countries over of power in the Persian Gulf subsystem will continue e. A Saudi commentator bemoans Iran’s influence in iming that Iran is involved in all major issues of the Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine. He accuses Iran of affairs from the hands of the Arabs who were

nsible for handling them.45 scientist at the University of Tehran, Ebrahi

tic and iament is the led to

cco cut Hamas fter his restore hrain’s

popular less or s and discord of the

d other ers.42

by the ged the end to ejected ds, and Other these

Arabia nment. es over ontinue ence in of the ran of

o were

brahim

Mottaghi asserts that the US has created an effective anticoalition of the authoritarian Arab regimes to widen the gap between the Shia Iran and the predominantly Sunni Middle Easterners in order to confront the growth of Iranian influence in the rGulf is a region where Iran has the greatest concern. To confront the expansion of American military presence in its periphery, Iranian government has tried to improve its relations with its neighbors bilaterally,47 and through a multilaterafrom the two key Arab regional organizations (the GCC and the Arab League). Some of the blame for the antigovernments lies at the door of the U.S., which is believed to have exaggerated the threat of tnetwork of military bases in the region.

Iran’s regional adversaries and rivals particularly the traditional monarchies in Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE welcome any measure aimed at reducing the power and influRepublic because they are worried that the United States and the other major extraascendancy of the nonnot favor confrontation with Iran, because itsee more regional instability. The Iranian policymakers have been keen on gaining the support of the Arab countries for Iran’s position on the nuclear issue in the Middle East, and have drawn their attention to the discriminatoregime which has largely ignored Israel’s nuclear arsenal

c. Iran’s Place in the Threat Perceptions of the NonStates: Turkey and IsraelIran have changeIran-Iraq war (1trading partner for the Islamic Republicwhich Turkey and Iran concluded two trade and natural gas supply deals, the existence of a secret Turcowas revealed. The bilateral security and defense agreements permitted


that the US has created an effective antiuthoritarian Arab regimes to widen the gap between the predominantly Sunni Middle Easterners in order

growth of Iranian influence in the region.46 Pwhere Iran has the greatest concern. To confront the merican military presence in its periphery, Iranian

tried to improve its relations with its neighbors through a multilateral mechanism. Iran is excluded

y Arab regional organizations (the GCC and the Arab of the blame for the anti-Iran stance of the Arab

at the door of the U.S., which is believed to have hreat of the Iranian nuclear program to maintain its ry bases in the region.nal adversaries and rivals particularly the traditional ordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE welcome any

at reducing the power and influence of the Islamic e they are worried that the United States and the tra-regional powers might recognize the regional he non-Arab Iran. However, most Arab nations do ntation with Iran, because it is not in their interest to al instability. The Iranian policymakers have been the support of the Arab countries for Iran’s position issue in the Middle East, and have drawn their discriminatory character of the non-proliferation largely ignored Israel’s nuclear arsenal.

e in the Threat Perceptions of the Non-Arab Middle Eastern d Israel: The bilateral relations between Turkey and ed from what were called “uneasy” to friendly.980-1988) transformed Turkey into an important or the Islamic Republic. In 1996, the same year in

nd Iran concluded two trade and natural gas supply ce of a secret Turco-Israeli “open skies” arrangement e bilateral security and defense agreements permitted

s

21

nti-Iran etween n order Persian ont the Iranian ghbors cluded e Arab e Arab o have tain its

ditional me any Islamic nd the egional ons do erest to e been osition n their eration

Eastern ey and

y.48 The portant year in supply

gement rmitted


22

Israel to use Turkish airspace for training and surveillance. Not surprisingly, this disclosure led to Iranian suspicion ofAnkara.49 It was obvious that Iran would be concerned about the Turkish-Israeli military cooperation, which had broughtvicinity of Iranian borders “in the form of intelligence listening posts on Turkish soil”, and access to Tof Iranian military infrastructure in an operation similar to Israel’s 1981 air strike against Iraq

Since it is crucial for Iran to seek deeper economic integration with Turkey as a window rapprochement with its northwestern neighborand Ankara signed a border security agreement which designates the PKK as a terrorist organization.suspected of sabotagepipelines in the past.on border security, and become major energy partners, despite US opposition. Iran, which ranks second in the world in natural gas reserves, has indicated that it is willing to increase its natural gas export to Turkey.

Turkey decided not to cooperate with U.S. forces in invading Iraq, and thus Washington's relations with Turkey deteriorated. The US military occupation of Iraq had a negative impsecurity environment, because of the increased chance of sectarian violence in Iraq, and the autonomy of the Iraqi Kurds. Turkish officials are concerned that the empowerment of the Iraqi Kurds might strengthen the position of the Kurdistanrebels, which have long been viewed as a threat to the territorial integrity of Turkey.

In January 2Davos forum after a public confrontation with Israeli President Shimon Peres over Isfor Turco-Israeliship, “Mavi Marmara” which was part of a flotilla carrying


urkish airspace for training and surveillance. Not disclosure led to Iranian suspicion of the motives of obvious that Iran would be concerned about the

military cooperation, which had brought Israeln borders “in the form of intelligence listening posts and access to Turkish airspace to facilitate bombing ry infrastructure in an operation similar to Israel’s ainst Iraq's Osirak nuclear facility.50 crucial for Iran to seek deeper economic integration a window to Europe,Iran has pursued a policy of

with its northwestern neighbor. In June 2004, Ted a border security agreement which designates the rist organization.51 The PKK militants have been otage operations aimed at damaging Iran-Turkey gas past.52The two neighbors have held regular meetings ity, and become major energy partners, despite US

which ranks second in the world in natural gas dicated that it is willing to increase its natural gas .53 ided not to cooperate with U.S. forces in invading

Washington's relations with Turkey deteriorated. The upation of Iraq had a negative impact on Turkey's ment, because of the increased chance of sectarian , and the autonomy of the Iraqi Kurds. Turkish cerned that the empowerment of the Iraqi Kurds the position of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) ve long been viewed as a threat to the territorial

ey. 2009, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan walked out of fter a public confrontation with Israeli President ver Israel’s assault on Gaza. A major breaking point relations was the May 2010 IDF attacks on Turkish armara” which was part of a flotilla carrying

e. Not ives of

out the in the

g posts ombing Israel’s

gration licy of Tehran tes the e been key gas eetings ite US ral gas ral gas

vading d. The urkey's ctarian

Turkish Kurds (PKK) ritorial

out of esident g point Turkish arrying

humanitarian aid to the Palestinian people in Gaza.gradually changed fantagonist. In reference to the flotilla incident, Turkish ForeignMinister Ahmet Davuto�Turkish-Israeli friendship intoby killing nine of our citizens.” exercise involving military forces of US, Isrcarried out in January of Israel. The last was held in August joint naval maneuver in

A Turkish commentator argues that Turkey has adopted a new “self-confident, multiapproach”.56 Other analysts believe that Turkey’s Middle East policy towards the Middle Eastern countries (Iraq, Iran, Isbe explained by domestic public opinion as well as its policy alignment with the EU.transformation iIslamization of the country,society seeking to advance Turkish national interests.factors influencing new Turkish foreign policy orientation are: disillusionment with the EU, conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, the personal attributes of a new generation of fForeign Minister Davutog˘have ‘‘zero conflict’’ with all of its neighbors, and must capitalize on its soft power and the legacy of the Ottoman Empire’s involvement in the Middle East. Turkeyactors including the US, EU, NATO, Greece, Iran, Syria, Hamas, and others.

There has been a shift in Turkey’s perceptions of threats from Iran and Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East in recent years. The factors affecting this change in attitude include the growth of Islamism in Turkey which has led to the importance


d to the Palestinian people in Gaza.54Turkey has d from a major ally of Israel in the region to an eference to the flotilla incident, Turkish ForeignDavuto�lu recently said that “Israel has buried the iendship into the deep waters of the Mediterranean our citizens.” 55 “Reliant Mermaid”, a trilateral naval

ng military forces of US, Israel, and Turkey was nuary 1998 in the Mediterranean waters off the coast st (10th) annual joint naval search and rescue exercise ust 2009. Turkey stayed out of the 11th and the uver in 2010 and 2011. commentator argues that Turkey has adopted a new multi-dimensional and dynamic foreign policy

er analysts believe that Turkey’s Middle East policy dle Eastern countries (Iraq, Iran, Israel and Syria) can y domestic public opinion as well as its policy

the EU.57 It has been pointed out that the n AKP’s foreign policy is not due to further he country, but rather the growth of an active civil to advance Turkish national interests.58 The other ng new Turkish foreign policy orientation are:

with the EU, conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, the es of a new generation of foreign policymakers led by

Davutog˘lu. He has asserted that Turkey should ict’’ with all of its neighbors, and must capitalize on

nd the legacy of the Ottoman Empire’s involvement st. Turkey could have cordial relations with all major the US, EU, NATO, Greece, Iran, Syria, Hamas, and

been a shift in Turkey’s perceptions of threats from h foreign policy towards the Middle East in recent s affecting this change in attitude include the growth

Turkey which has led to the importance of issues of

s

23

ey has to an

Foreigned the ranean l naval

ey was e coast xercise he 12th

a new policy policy ia) can policy

at the further ve civil

other n are: aq, the led by

should lize on vement l major as, and

s from recent

growth sues of


24

the Islamic World the acceptance of Turkey’s membership in the EU, a lrelative importance of Turkey’s role in the expansion of the US and NATO’s influence in the periphery of Moscow due to the appearance of potential and actual allies and partners in Central Asia and the Caucasus for the Western states,Ankara and the expansionist policies of the extremist Netanyahu’s government, and the deadly attack on a Gazaled to the killing of several Turkish nationals.

American Neoconservatives with an IsraelMiddle East believe that Turkey under the government of Prime Minister Erdo�an is not a reliable ally and “does not even deserve to be a NATO partner anymore,” because Ankara is no longer “on good terms with Israel.” The Turkish analysts in tAmericans should view the postvalued non-Arab ally of Washington in the volatile Arab North Africa and the Middle East. By agreeing to host a missile defense radar in its own territory, Ankara is indimember.60

Raising the issue of secret Israeli nuclear arsenal, Turkish President Abdullah Gül called for an understanding of Iranian position. He said: “It is important to put oneself in their [Iranian] shoes and see how they perceive threats.” He added that “We want a Middle East that is free of nuclear weapons. There are already enough tensions in the region. We believe Iran will behave responsibly.”Turkish newspaper editorials say that Ankara will not support a wagainst Iran.62The Erdo�any military operationunpredictable outcome, and hinting that the American forces will not be permitted to use Turkish military facilities, particularly Incbase to conduct such an attack.

Some Turkish commentators have criticized Ankara’s government for making their country dependent on the export of


d e.g the occupation of Palestine, the slow process of f Turkey’s membership in the EU, a lowering of the ce of Turkey’s role in the expansion of the US and

ce in the periphery of Moscow due to the appearance actual allies and partners in Central Asia and the Western states,59 a wish to put a distance between

expansionist policies of the extremist Netanyahu’s the deadly attack on a Gaza-bound flotilla, which

of several Turkish nationals.Neoconservatives with an Israel-centric view of the ieve that Turkey under the government of Prime n is not a reliable ally and “does not even deserve to ner anymore,” because Ankara is no longer “on good el.” The Turkish analysts in turn claim that the d view the post-Cold War Turkey as an assertive but ally of Washington in the volatile Arab North Africa

East. By agreeing to host a missile defense radar in its nkara is indicating that it is still a steadfast NATO

e issue of secret Israeli nuclear arsenal, Turkish lah Gül called for an understanding of Iranian

d: “It is important to put oneself in their [Iranian] w they perceive threats.” He added that “We want a is free of nuclear weapons. There are already enough region. We believe Iran will behave responsibly.”er editorials say that Ankara will not support a wErdo�an government has declared its opposition to

erations against Iranian nuclear facilities, fearing tcome, and hinting that the American forces will not use Turkish military facilities, particularly Incirlik air uch an attack.63 rkish commentators have criticized Ankara’s making their country dependent on the export of

cess of of the

US and earance nd the etween nyahu’s

which

of the Prime

erve to n good

hat the ive but Africa

ar in its NATO

Turkish Iranian ranian] want a

enough sibly.”61 t a war tion to fearing

will not rlik air

nkara’s port of

natural gas from Russia and Iran, and for creating vulnerabilities by moving away from the US and Ncooperation in energy sector goes back to the early Justice and Development Party (AK Party) came into power in November 2002.of the “zero problems with neighbors” policy of Turkey has been scolded. According to this policy, Turkey must expand its foreign relations with its past regional adversaries like Iran. Yet, Turkey has abandoned this policy in the case of Syria and has taken side with the anti-government opposition groups.towards Syria have been at odds, since the challenging Areached the territory of one of the closes allies of Iran in the Arab World. Most Iranian analysts thought that it was not in Turkish interest to get directly involved in the US wars in the Middle East. Yet, Ankara has been at the forefront ofEU to topple the Alawite Sultimate goal of eliminating the Shia Hezbollah in Lebanon. If they succeed, two major regional allies of Iran will disappear from the political scene. Even if Irsignificantly affected, because it has already gained Iraq as a new strategic ally and is hopeful to get closer to the new postrevolutionary governments in the Arab World.

In contrast to Turkey which could be strategic ally, Israel as the other nonremain a security threat and a potential enemy of the Islamic Republic. What distinguishes region is the US and exceptional support, which is expressed in various forms. The special US-Israel relations has developed rapidly since the reached a point where one imagines that the interests of the two allies in the region are intertwined. Washington and Tel Aviv are actively working to contain and weaken Iran. The options available to them to stop Iranian nucl


Russia and Iran, and for creating vulnerabilities by rom the US and NATO. The two neighbors’ nergy sector goes back to the early 1990s before the velopment Party (AK Party) came into power in

Foreign Minister Ahmet Davuto�lu as the architect oblems with neighbors” policy of Turkey has been ng to this policy, Turkey must expand its foreign past regional adversaries like Iran. Yet, Turkey has olicy in the case of Syria and has taken side with the opposition groups.64Turkish and Iranian policies

ve been at odds, since the challenging Arab uprising tory of one of the closes allies of Iran in the Arab anian analysts thought that it was not in Turkish rectly involved in the US wars in the Middle East. been at the forefront of the attempts by the US and e Alawite Syrian regime of Bashar al-Asad with the eliminating the Shia Hezbollah in Lebanon. If they

ajor regional allies of Iran will disappear from the Even if Iran losses Syria, its power status will not be cted, because it has already gained Iraq as a new nd is hopeful to get closer to the new postvernments in the Arab World.

to Turkey which could be a neutral friend or a ael as the other non-Arab Middle East country will ty threat and a potential enemy of the Islamic distinguishes Israel from the other players in the -- and to a lesser degree the European-- widespread support, which is expressed in various forms. The relations has developed rapidly since the 1960

where one imagines that the interests of the two allies intertwined. Washington and Tel Aviv are actively

in and weaken Iran. The options available to them to lear program are as follows: a military strike against

s

25

ties by ghbors’ ore the wer in chitect s been foreign key has ith the

policies prising e Arab

Turkish e East. US and ith the If they

om the not be a new

post-

d or a try will Islamic in the spread s. The 0s, and o allies actively hem to against


26

Iranian nuclear centers in Natanz and Qom;economic, trade, scientific and military sanctions to compel the Iranian leaders to implement the UNSC resolutionslive with a near-n

It is not hard to find issues of grave contention in Irandisrupted bilateral relations.leading to the emergence of Iran as a leading hostile military power in the region.The official Israeli threat perception of Iran can best be shown by referring to the various statements made by Israel’s politicians over the yearsa threat, "maybe the main existential threat" to Israel.minister Avigdor Liebermanthreat to world order."makers know that a war waged against Iran would be costly, miscalculation of destructive consequences might still lead them to attack Iranian nuclear facilities.

Deputy Head of the General Staff of Iran's Armed Forces Major General Gholam Ali Rattacked) we will pound all Israeli centers thanks to [our] missile power.”71 Israel is located less than within the range of the ShahabBrigadier General Ahmad Vahidi called these threats as part of an anti-Iran “psychological warfare” operations with the aim of putting pressures on the Iranian government to change its behaviors and policies.72Yet, the Iranian military commanders are not letting thguard down just because the Israeli officials have softened their antiIran rhetoric. They are making sure that their adversaries understand the magnitude of Iranian retaliatory attacks against the Israeli cities with the help of Lebanese Hezbollah andHamas.73According to Cordesman and Kleiber, the IRGC has created a special Al Qudsunconventional warfare componentstrong Force “conduct unconventional warf


centers in Natanz and Qom;65 imposing new , scientific and military sanctions to compel the o implement the UNSC resolutions;66and accept and uclear Iran.67 rd to find issues of grave contention in Iran-Ial relations. Israel views Iranian military build

mergence of Iran as a leading hostile military power in official Israeli threat perception of Iran can best be ring to the various statements made by Israel’s he years. In 2004, Ariel Sharon stressed that Iran was e the main existential threat" to Israel.68FLieberman said that "Iran poses the most dangerous rder."69Even if the American and the Israeli decisionhat a war waged against Iran would be costly, f destructive consequences might still lead them to clear facilities.70 ad of the General Staff of Iran's Armed Forces Major Ali Rashid said: "We are always ready and (if we are l pound all Israeli centers thanks to [our] missile is located less than 1000 km west of Iran,e of the Shahab-3 missiles.Iran’s Defense Minister al Ahmad Vahidi called these threats as part of an ological warfare” operations with the aim of putting e Iranian government to change its behaviors and e Iranian military commanders are not letting thbecause the Israeli officials have softened their antiey are making sure that their adversaries understand f Iranian retaliatory attacks against the Israeli cities

of Lebanese Hezbollah and the Palestinian ng to Cordesman and Kleiber, the IRGC has created Force as part of its “large intelligence operation and

warfare component.” The members of this 1nduct unconventional warfare overseas using various

g new pel the pt and

Israel’s d-up as ower in best be Israel’s an was

Foreign gerous cision-costly,

hem to

Major we are missile and is

Minister of an

putting rs and g their ir anti-erstand i cities stinian

created on and 15000-various

foreign movements” (i.e., Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, Iraqi and Afghani Shiite groups) as proxies.

An Israeli political scientist compares of the situation to a card game, by saying: “Now we’re not seeing talk of unilateralcall for a broader approach… This is all part of an ongoing complex poker game… Before the [IAEA] report’s release, there was more public discussion of a military option because Israel wanted to influence [other nations] to deal with increaseof military action was the best way to do that. Now that the report is out, Israel has succeeded in making sure the report would be a catalyst for more sanctions; it achieved its goal.”the creation of a nonnuclear disarmament, an end to the occupation of the Palestinian lands, and refuses to recognize Israel. The Israeli leaders do not seem to have an intention to join the NPT, or to agree to a denuclearization of the Middle East, or to stop calling for an end to Iran’s nuclear program. The two antagonists are poles apart.

Conclusion Iran is a country surrounded by unstable neighbors and nonactors (e.g., al-Qinstability. As long as there arethe security of the regional states and to justify a concentration of US forces on Iran’s borders, the Iranian government will keep its optionopen by building up its conventional militaforeign aggression. in order for Iran to attain its sustainable development goals, “the country must not be seen as a threat to international peace and stability.76 The current Iranian of his predecessors in his attempts to reduce tensions with Iran’s immediate neighbors. Iran is dependent on the Persian Gulf sea lanes, and has come to the realization that it must work within a strategy which takes its neighboring countries’ interests into account when


nts” (i.e., Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, Iraqi and oups) as proxies.74 political scientist compares of the situation to a card “Now we’re not seeing talk of unilateral action but a r approach… This is all part of an ongoing complex

Before the [IAEA] report’s release, there was more n of a military option because Israel wanted to nations] to deal with increased sanctions. The threat was the best way to do that. Now that the report is

succeeded in making sure the report would be a sanctions; it achieved its goal.”75 Iran is insisting on

a non-discriminatory nuclear non-proliferation and ment, an end to the occupation of the Palestinian s to recognize Israel. The Israeli leaders do not seem ion to join the NPT, or to agree to a denuclearization ast, or to stop calling for an end to Iran’s nuclear o antagonists are poles apart.

y surrounded by unstable neighbors and nonQaeda, PKK, MKO) which are sources of regional ng as there are efforts to portray Iran as a “threat” to e regional states and to justify a concentration of US

borders, the Iranian government will keep its optiong up its conventional military capability to deter n. Iranian scholar Dehghani Firouzabadi argues that n to attain its sustainable development goals, “the ot be seen as a threat to international peace and rrent Iranian President has followed in the footsteps ors in his attempts to reduce tensions with Iran’s bors. Iran is dependent on the Persian Gulf sea lanes, o the realization that it must work within a strategy neighboring countries’ interests into account when

s

27

aqi and

a card n but a omplex s more ted to threat

port is d be a ting on on and stinian t seem ization nuclear

n-state egional eat” to of US

optionsdeter

es that s, “the ce and otsteps

Iran’s a lanes, trategy

when


28

formulating defense policies.To resolve the nuclear crisis, Iran’s preference is for diplomacy;

and does not want to get involved in a costly war with the US.The utility of foreign direct interventiowith Iran has been overrated. against Iran is very low, but ta desperate attack on Iranian nuclear centers as a distraction from problems at home.the flag" sentiment at times of national crises threatening country’s territorial integrity. Consequently, such a war will not be contained to the territory of Iran, and will rapidly spread to parts of the Middle East. It is in the interest of the international community to find ways to avoid a costly war in the region,could trigger an energy crisis with profound international implications. Iran’s current defense policy is to build capability to prevent war and to defend the country. The confrontational approach has increased the pressure to invest more on arms build-up.

The goals of Iranian defense policymakers are clear: to deter foreign aggression, to defend Iran (and ito gain a prestigious status as a dominant power. It is reasonable that Iran wants to be a key player in the Persian Gulf which is strategically important to its national security. Iranian government can live with efforts aimed at weakening Iranian economy through sanctions; and might even achieve selfundermining the internal affairs on a scale that might threaten Islamic Republic’s socstability or its very existence are viewed as unacceptable hostile acts. This threat assessment will continue to influence Iranian defense policy in the years to come.


nse policies.the nuclear crisis, Iran’s preference is for diplomacy; nt to get involved in a costly war with the US.The direct intervention as a means of setting disputes

en overrated. It is true that the likelihood of a war ry low, but there is a possibility of Israel’s launching k on Iranian nuclear centers as a distraction from

me.Iranians tend to unite and show the "rally around ment at times of national crises threatening

ial integrity. Consequently, such a war will not be territory of Iran, and will rapidly spread to

ddle East. It is in the interest of the international nd ways to avoid a costly war in the region,an energy crisis with profound international n’s current defense policy is to build a mrevent war and to defend the country. The

approach has increased the pressure to invest more .of Iranian defense policymakers are clear: to deter n, to defend Iran (and its allies) at times of war, and ous status as a dominant power. It is reasonable that a key player in the Persian Gulf which is strategically national security. Iranian government can live with weakening Iranian economy through sanctions; and

hieve self-sufficiency. Any operations aiming at system legitimacy by directly intervening in Iran’s

n a scale that might threaten Islamic Republic’s socry existence are viewed as unacceptable hostile acts. ssment will continue to influence Iranian defense s to come.

omacy; US.The isputes f a war nching n from around g their not be

o other ational which

ational military . The t more

o deter ar, and

ble that egically ve with ns; and ing at Iran’s

s social le acts.

defense

Notes 1. Former IRGC commander, Mohsen Rezaie had claimed that members of the IRGC played

an important role in toppling the Sunni PashtunAfghanistan by helping the rebel forces. Even before the intervention of the US and its allies, Iran was one of the major supporters of the Northern Alliance composed of Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara warlords and militias

2. See for example, John MearsheimerN. 1 (1995): pp. York: Random House

3. David L. Rousseau and Rocio GarciaA Cross-National Experimental Study(October 2007): p

4. Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism, New York: Norton, 1997.

5. Rousseau and Garcia6. Ronald L. Jepperson, and et al. “Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security,” in

Peter J. Katzenstein, ed. The Culture of National Security: Norms, and Identity in World Politics, New York: Columbia

7. For a discussion of how foreign invasion, and the historical legacy of the mighty Persian Empire have created “Iran’s feelings of victimization, insecurity, and inferiority”, see: Thaler, David E. Alireza Nader, ShahrFrederic Wehrey. Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics, Santa Monica, CA: the RAND National Defense Research Institute, Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defensehttp://www.rand

8. Shahram Chubin, Iran’s National Security Policy: Capabilities, Intentions and Impact, Washington, DC: the

9. Ibid, p. 17. 10. M. R. Dehshiri and M. R. Majidi. “Iran’s Foreign Policy in Post

Holistic Approach,” (Winter-Spring 2008

11. In the 1994-1997, the value of Saudi arms export


mander, Mohsen Rezaie had claimed that members of the IRGC played ole in toppling the Sunni Pashtun-dominated Taliban regime in elping the rebel forces. Even before the intervention of the US and its

one of the major supporters of the Northern Alliance composed of Hazara warlords and militias. See, Iran News, 12 June 2005, p

hn Mearsheimer, “A Realist Response,” International Security82-93; and Kenneth W. Waltz, Theory of International Politicsouse, 1979. and Rocio Garcia-Retamero, “Identity, Power, and Threat Perception: l Experimental Study,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, V. 5

pp.744-771. Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism, New York:

a-Retamero, Op. Cit. n, and et al. “Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security,” in tein, ed. The Culture of National Security: Norms, and Identity in ew York: Columbia University Press, 1996, pp. 27-28. how foreign invasion, and the historical legacy of the mighty Persian

eated “Iran’s feelings of victimization, insecurity, and inferiority”, see: Alireza Nader, Shahram Chubin, Jerrold D. Green, Charlotte Lynch, Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian Leadership

a Monica, CA: the RAND National Defense Research Institute, he Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2010. Available at

d.org/pubs/monographs/ MG878.html. Iran’s National Security Policy: Capabilities, Intentions and Impact,

the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994

nd M. R. Majidi. “Iran’s Foreign Policy in Post-Revolution Era: A h,” The Iranian Journal of International Affairs, V. 2008-9): pp. 101-114, p. 109. he value of Saudi arms exports from the United States was estimated $

s

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36.4 bn. For the arms transfers to the Middle East“Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing NationsCongress, 23 October

12. Stockholm International Peace ReArmaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford: Press, for SIPRI,

13. Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran: “Weakling”or “Hegemon”? Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies

14. Ibid, p. 10. 15. Phil Stewart, “Strike on Iran could hurt World Economy, Panetta says

17November11/18/us-usa-iran

16. The Nixon Doctrine was most explicitly applied iIranian troops to help Sultan Qaboos in his fight with the rebel forces. In a similar manner, security forces from Saudi Arabia and the UAE were deployed to Bahrain in March 2011 in an attempt to defend the Almovement.

17. “Iranian Fleet of Warships in Suez Canal,” Available at: http:

18. “Iran Navy to Hold War Game in Intl. Waters,” 2011. Available 1470098.

19. Andrew Feickert, Iran’s Congressional Research ServiceAvailable at: http:

20. “Iran’s Omid Satellite Launched into Orbit,” M2009.Availableat:=satellite%20&N

21. “Iran’s Second Satellite reach22. “Iran to establish a Satellite Launch Center,”

Available at:http://www.mehrnews.com/en/NewsDetail.aspx?pr=s&query=satellite%20&NewsID

23. “Obama Vows New Bid to ThwarAvailable at: n_africa/t/obama

24. Barack Obama, Press Conference by the Presidentcited in Thaler and others

25. Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence2010, p. 13. Available at h

26. Ibid.


he arms transfers to the Middle East, see Richard Grimmettrms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2000-2007,” CRS Report for ober 2008.ational Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Yearbook armament and International Security, Oxford: Oxford University 2009, pp. 229, 236, and 243.

esman, Iran: “Weakling”or “Hegemon”? Washington, DC: Center for ernational Studies, 20 February 2007, p. 7.

ike on Iran could hurt World Economy, Panetta says,” Reuters, 2011. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article

n-economy-idUSTRE7AH02O20111118 ne was most explicitly applied in Oman in 1973 when the Shah sent o help Sultan Qaboos in his fight with the rebel forces. In a similar forces from Saudi Arabia and the UAE were deployed to Bahrain in n attempt to defend the Al-Khalifa regime against a pro-democracy

Warships in Suez Canal,” Fars News Agency, 3 March //english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8912120586. d War Game in Intl. Waters,” Mehr News Agency, 26 Ne at: http://www.mehrnews.com/en/newsdetail.aspx?NewsID=

Iran’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities, CSR Report for Congress, esearch Service, the Library of Congress, RS21548, 23 August //fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/39332.pdf

atellite Launched into Orbit,” Mehr News Agency, 3 Fhttp://www.mehrnews.com/en/NewsDetail.aspx?pr=s&query

ewsID=828639 llite reaches Orbit,” Mehr News Agency, 17 June 2011. Satellite Launch Center,” Mehr News Agency, 20 November

at:http://www.mehrnews.com/en/NewsDetail.aspx?pr=s&query=wsID=1464922 w Bid to Thwart Iran Nuclear Effort,” MSNBC, 14 November http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/45282473/ns/world_news-ma-vows-new-bid-thwart-iran-nuclear-effort. ess Conference by the President, Washington, D.C., 9 February d others, Op. Cit., p. 1. irector of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the US munity for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2 Fable at http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20100202_testimony

Grimmett,eport for

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27. “Supreme Warns Enemies against Military Threats,” Supreme Leaderhttp://www.leader

28. “Supreme Leader: Attacking the Islamic Republic is Costly,” Website of the Office of the Supreme Leaderhttp://www.leader

29. Iran News, Thursday30. “Leader's Aide: Iran Controlling US Warships Passing through Strait

News Agency/newstext.php?nn

31. “Republican Perry would back Israel Strike on Iran Nuke Sites,” 2011. Available at60313720111104

32. William Kristol, “Special Editorial: A Flock of Hawks: The Weekly Standardhttp://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/special

33. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, against Iran, 21 Noffice/2011/11/21

34. Some alarmist have predicted that Iran “could be a de facto nuclear poweover”. See: Bipartisan Policy Center, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status and Breakout Timing, 12 September sites/default/files

35. Iran News, Saturday36. “Salehi Turns Down Clinton's Offer for Iran

October 2011.9007271226.

37. It is assumed that the covert operations of the foreign intelligbeen intensified to sabotage the Iranian nuclear program. Recently, the Iranian officials announced the discovery of a CIA spy network in IranCIA Agents,”http://english.farsnews

38. For a discussion of Iran and Russian cooperation, see: MahjoobZweiri and Matthew Wootton, “The Durability of Managed Rivalry: Iran’s Relations with Russia and the Saudi Dimension,”Asian Polit

39. This is not the first time that Russia shows its opposition to the US and European missile shield. In 2007, Kand the Czech Republic for thetheir territories for the declared goal of protecting Europe againstNorth Korea and Iran. Putin threatened to make these missilethe Russian strategic m


Enemies against Military Threats,” Website of the Office of the der, Seyed Ali Khamenei, 10 November 2011. Available ater.ir/langs/en/index.php?p=contentShow&id=8878. Attacking the Islamic Republic is Costly,” Website of the Office of the r, Seyed Ali Khamenei, 13 October 2011. Available ater.ir/langs/en/index.php?p=contentShow&id=8696. ay, 27 April 2006, p. 1. n Controlling US Warships Passing through Strait of Hormoz,” cy, 23 Nov 2011. Available at: http://english.farsnewsn=9007274591. would back Israel Strike on Iran Nuke Sites,” Reuters, 4 Nble at: http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/11/04/idINIndia

pecial Editorial: A Flock of Hawks: The GOP's Encouraging Debate,” Standard, 23 November 2011, Available at

klystandard.com/blogs/special-editorial-flock-hawks_610077.hOffice of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: U.S. Pressure and Sanctions

November 2011. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the21/fact-sheet-us-pressure-and-sanctions-against-iran predicted that Iran “could be a de facto nuclear power before

rtisan Policy Center, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status and Breakout tember 2011, p. 4. Available at: http://www.bipartisanpolicys/Iran%20NuclearProgram.pdf. y, 24 February 2007, p. 1.

wn Clinton's Offer for Iran-US Direct Talks,” Fars News AgencyAvailable at: http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.p

the covert operations of the foreign intelligence agencies in Iran have o sabotage the Iranian nuclear program. Recently, the Iranian officials iscovery of a CIA spy network in Iran. See: “Iran Arrests

Fars News Agency, 24 November 2011. Availablrsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9007274713. of Iran and Russian cooperation, see: MahjoobZweiri and Matthew Durability of Managed Rivalry: Iran’s Relations with Russia and the ,”Asian Politics & Policy, V. 1, N. 1 (2009): pp. 113–126. time that Russia shows its opposition to the US and European missile

Kremlin had criticized Bush administration’s agreements with Poland Republic for the stationing of missile interceptors as well as radar in or the declared goal of protecting Europe against future missiles from d Iran. Putin threatened to make these missile-defense sites targets for egic missile forces. Moreover, Russian President Putin proposed US

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Russia joint use of offered the use of the Qabala Radar Station in Azerbaijan, which was leased to Russia for Suggests Azerbaijan fohttp://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/putinshield/196430.htmlNovosti, 18November 168801283.html;AZ, 25 June 2011

40. Farzinnia, Ziba. “IranIran,” The Iranian Journal of International Affairs151-190, p. 182.

41. “Anti-Iran Sanctions are U.S. ‘Blunt Weapons’: Velayati,” Mehr News Agency, 23November http://www.mehrnews

42. For example see, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, The Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commonwealth Centerat: http://www.terrorisinfo.org.il/malam

43. Andy Jack and Richard Williams,”WikiLeaks: Arab Leaders Urged US to Attack Iran,”Sky News Onlineworld-news/article

44. See, “WikiLeaks documents not credibleNovember 2010=s&query=wikile

45. Frederic Wehrey and et al. Dangerous But Not Omnipotent: Exploring the Reach and Limitations of Iranian Power in the Middle East

46. Mottaghi, Ebrahim. “The U.S. Strategy of Entangling Iran in PeripheIranian Journal of International Affairs68 and 70.

47. “Salehi Describes Expansion of Ties with Neighbors ‘Iran's Priority’," Agency, 29 October nn=9007271252.

48. Iran and Turkey as members of the antiwere regional allies along with Iraq three pro-US countries (Iran, Turkey and PakiCooperation and Development (which was dissolved after the birth of the Islamic Republic of Iran in (ECO). The ECO was expanded in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. See, http://www.ecosecretariat.org.

49. John Calabrese, “Turkey and Iran: Limits of a Stable Relationship,”


of offered the use of the Qabala Radar Station in Azerbaijan, which ssia for 10 years in 2002 for an annual fee of $7 million. Seeaijan for Shield,” Moscow Times, 8 June 2007. Available atmoscowtimes.com/news/article/putin-suggests-azerbaijan-for-ml; “Russia seeks extension of Azerbaijan radar lease until 2025vember 2011. Available at: http://en.rian.ru/world/20111118and “U.S. to continue talks on Gabala radar station in 2012. Available at: http://abc.az/eng/news/55400.html.

ran-Asia Relations in the Ninth Administration of Islamic Republic of ian Journal of International Affairs,V. 20, N. 4 (Fall 2008

ons are U.S. ‘Blunt Weapons’: Velayati,” Mehr News Agency, 2011. Available at

rnews.com/en/newsdetail.aspx?NewsID=1467970. ntelligence and Terrorism Information Center, The Israel Intelligence monwealth Center, Iran and the Persian Gulf, 2 March 2009. A

http://www.terrorism_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/iran_e005.pdf. chard Williams,”WikiLeaks: Arab Leaders Urged US to Attack Iran,”nline, 29 November 2010. Available at: http://news.sky.comle/15837304. documents not credible: Ahmadinejad,” Mehr News Agency. Available at: http://www.mehrnews.com/en/NewsDetail.aspx?pr

eaks%20&NewsID=1201150 nd et al. Dangerous But Not Omnipotent: Exploring the Reach and anian Power in the Middle East, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009. “The U.S. Strategy of Entangling Iran in Peripheral Conflict,”

al of International Affairs, V. 20, N.2 (Spring 2008): pp. 67

Expansion of Ties with Neighbors ‘Iran's Priority’," Fars News tober 2011. Available at: http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?

members of the anti-Soviet Central Treaty Organization (1955ies along with Iraq (until 1959), Pakistan and the UK. In 1countries (Iran, Turkey and Pakistan) established the Regional

Development (which was dissolved after the birth of the Islamic in 1979), and in 1985 created the Economic Cooperation Organization CO was expanded in 1992 with the admission of Afghanistan, akhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. See, ecretariat.org.urkey and Iran: Limits of a Stable Relationship,” British Journal of

n, which e, “Putin lable at:

025,”RIA 0111118/2,” ABC

public of 008): pp.

Agency, at:

telligence Available errorism-

ck Iran,”m/home/

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each and 009.ct,” The 7-86, pp.

s News text.php?

55-1979) 1964, the Regional

e Islamic anization hanistan, tan. See,

urnal of

Middle Eastern Studies,50. Dov Waxman, "Turkey and Israel: a new Balance of Power in the Middle East."

Washington Quarterly51. F. Stephen Larrabee, Troubled Partnership: U.S.

Geopolitical Change52. “PKK Claims Responsibility for Blasting Iran

Agency, 14 August 9005230211.

53. “Iran’s Gas to Reach at: http://www.tehrantimes.com/index.php/economyto-reach-europe-v

54. “An International Law Analysis of the Flotilla Crisis between Turkey And Israel,” Journal of Turkish Weeklyhttp://www.turkishweekly.net; and Tarik Oguzlu, “Explaining Turkish and Israeli perseverance in the flotilla crisishttp://www.todayzaman.com/news

55. “Israel Buried Friendship: Davuto�Available at: davutoglu-2011-1

56. Bülent Aras, “Turkey's rise in the Greater Middle East: PeaceJournal of Southern Europe and the Balkans Online

57. Mustafa Aydin and Sinem A. Acikmese, “Europeanization through EU conditionality: understanding the new era in Turkish foreign policy,” the Balkans Online

58. Ziya Meral and JWashington Quarterly

59. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Ankara and Tehran became rivals for gaining more influence in the newly independent Cesides in the Armenia

60. Ali H. Aslan, “Old World Paranoiahttp://www.todayszaman

61. “Turkey says Iran's nuclear ambitions may be about threats it perceives,” Today’s Zaman, 22 November 2011says-irans-nuclear

62. See, “Turkey Firm against any Assault on Iran,” 2011; “Ankara will not Harm Tehran,”

63. F. StephenLarrabee, Op. Cit., p.64. Laleh Kemal, “Cracks occur within government over Iran

November 2011getNewsById.action

65. Podhoretz, Norman


n Studies, V. 25, N. 1 (May 1998): pp. 75-94, p. 82 and 87. urkey and Israel: a new Balance of Power in the Middle East."uarterly, V. 22, N. 1 (1999): pp. 25. ee, Troubled Partnership: U.S.-Turkish Relations in an Era of Global nge, Satna Monica, CA: RAND, 2010, p. 34. sponsibility for Blasting Iran-Turkey Gas Pipeline,” Fars News ust 2011. Available at: http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.p

ch Europe via Turkey,” Tehran Times, 25 November 2011. Aw.tehrantimes.com/index.php/economy-and-business/92883-iransvia-turkey. Law Analysis of the Flotilla Crisis between Turkey And Israel,” Turkish Weekly, 26 November 2011. Available atishweekly.net; and Tarik Oguzlu, “Explaining Turkish and Israeli the flotilla crisis,” Today’s Zaman, 12 September 2011. Available atyzaman.com/news-256498. iendship: Davuto�lu,” Hürriyet Daily News, 25 November http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=israel-buried-friendship1-25. ey's rise in the Greater Middle East: Peace-building in the Periphery,”

ern Europe and the Balkans Online, V. 11, N. 1 (2009): pp. 29-d Sinem A. Acikmese, “Europeanization through EU conditionality: e new era in Turkish foreign policy,” Journal of Southern Europe and ne, V. 9, N. 3 (2009): pp. 263-274, p. 273. Jonathan Paris, “Decoding Turkish Foreign Policy Hyperactivity,” rterly, V. 33, N. 4 (2010): pp. 75-86, p. 76 and 80. he Soviet Union, Ankara and Tehran became rivals for gaining more newly independent Central Asian republics, and supported the opposite nia-Azerbaijan conflict.

d World Paranoia,” Today’s Zaman, 17 November 2011. Available atyszaman.com/columnistDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=nuclear ambitions may be about threats it perceives,” Today’s Zaman,

011. Available at:http://www.todayszaman.com/news-263542r-ambitions-may-be-about-threats-it-perceives.html

m against any Assault on Iran,” Hürriyet Daily News, 13 Nll not Harm Tehran,” Hürriyet Daily News, 17 November , Op. Cit., p. 37. racks occur within government over Iran,” Today’s Zaman1. Available at: http://www.todayszaman.com/columnistDetailion?newsId=263065 n. “The Case for Bombing Iran,” Commentary, June 2007.

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66. Ben Meir, Alon. “Negotiating Strategy to Prevent A Nuclear Iran,” Journal on World Peace,

67. Chuck Freilich, Agenda Iran: Speaking about the Unspeakable, U.S.Iran’s Nuclear PPolicy, 2007.

68. “Iran to Israel: Dhttp://www.haaretz.com/print1.122229

69. Emma Hurd, “Israel Considers Pre2011. Available at

70. For a discussion of how misperceptions and misjudgments of an opponent’s intentions have led to war, see: Robert Jervis, “War and Misperception,” Interdisciplinary History

71. “Commander: Iran November 20119007274139.

72. “US, Israel anti-Iran Threats, PsywaAvailable at: http:

73. Major General Rahim Safavi, in a recent interview with ArabicAl-Alam issued a cIsrael, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza will also join the fighting". To demonstrate the IRGC’s vigilance, he added that Iranians are fully aware of IDF’s “joint exercises with which focused on long flights." See: “Leader's Top Military Aide Warns Israel of Rocket Rain,” http://english.farsnews

74. Anthony Cordesman and Martin Kleiber, Iran’s Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities, Washington, DC: the CIS Press

75. Stewart Ain, “Israel Shifting Tone On IranAvailable at:http://ww

76. Jalal Dehghani Firouzabadi, “Foreign Policy Requirements for National Development in Iran’s 20-Year View2005): pp. 69-100


“Negotiating Strategy to Prevent A Nuclear Iran,” International rld Peace, V. 26, N. 1 (March 2009): pp. 69-89.

genda Iran: Speaking about the Unspeakable, U.S.-Israeli Dialogue on rogram, Washington, DC: the Washington Institute for Near East

Don't Strike Nuclear Plants,” Haaretz, 12 May 2004. Available atetz.com/print-edition/news/iran-to-israel-don-t-strike-nuclear

el Considers Pre-Emptive Attack on Iran,” Sky News, 2 Nt: http://news.sky.com/home/world-news/article/16101552f how misperceptions and misjudgments of an opponent’s intentions ar, see: Robert Jervis, “War and Misperception,” Journal of

ry History, V. 18, N. 4 (Spring 1988): pp. 675-700. n to Hit All Israeli Centers if Attacked,” Fars News Agency1. Available at: http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=

ran Threats, Psywar,” Mehr News Agency, 20 November //presstv.com/detail/211068.html.

him Safavi, in a recent interview with Arabic-language satellite channel a clear warning to the potential aggressors that: "in case of an attack by h in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza will also join the fighting". To

IRGC’s vigilance, he added that Iranians are fully aware of IDF’s with NATO in the Mediterranean Sea and the joint drill with Italy, on long flights." See: “Leader's Top Military Aide Warns Israel of

Fars News Agency, 24 November 2011. Available atrsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9007274711. man and Martin Kleiber, Iran’s Military Forces and Warfighting shington, DC: the CIS Press, 2007, pp. 78-79. el Shifting Tone On Iran,” The Jewish Weekly, 15 November //www.thejewishweek.com/news/israel/israel_shifting_tone_iranouzabadi, “Foreign Policy Requirements for National Development in ew,” The Iranian Journal of International Affairs, N. 1, p. 84.

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