preventing corruption in public administration: citizen...

Expert Group Meeting Strengthening Public Preventing Corruption In Public Administration: Citizen Engagement

For Improved Transparency And Accountability

ST/ESA/PAD/SER/181

Department of Economic and Social Affairs Division for Public Administration and Development Management

Preventing Corruption in Public Administration: Citizen Engagement for Improved Transparency and Accountability

Report of the Expert Group Meeting

Expert Group Meeting

Preventing Corruption in Public Administration:

Citizen Engagement for Improved Transparency and Accountability

25-28June 2012

New York, United States of America

United Nations

New York, 2012

ii Expert Group Meeting Strengthening Public Preventing Corruption In Public Administration: Citizen Engagement

For Improved Transparency And Accountability

DESA

The Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat is a

vital interface between global policies in the economic, social and environmental spheres and

national action. The Department works in three main interlinked areas: (i) it compiles, generates

and analyses a wide range of economic, social and environmental data and information on

which States Members of the United Nations draw to review common problems and to take

stock of policy options; (ii) it facilitates the negotiations of Member States in many

intergovernmental bodies on joint course of action to address ongoing or emerging global

challenges; and (iii) it advises interested Governments on the ways and means of translating

policy frameworks developed in United Nations conferences and summits into programmes

at the country level and, through technical assistance, helps build national capacities.

Note

The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this

publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of

the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country,

territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its

frontiers or boundaries.

The designations “developed” and “developing” economics are intended for

statistical convenience and do not necessarily imply a judgment about the state

reached by a particular country or area in the development process.

The term “country” as used in the text of this publication also refers, as

appropriate, to territories or areas.

The term “dollar” normally refers to the United States dollar ($).

The views expressed are those of the individual authors and do not imply any

expression of opinion on the part of the United Nations.

ST/ESA/PAD/SER/181

United Nations Publication

Copyright © United Nations, 2012

All rights reserved

iii Expert Group Meeting Strengthening Public Preventing Corruption In Public Administration: Citizen Engagement

For Improved Transparency and Accountability

Department of Economic and Social Affairs

Division for Public Administration and Development Management

Contents

Acknowledgments................................................................................................................. vi

Executive Summary .............................................................................................................. ix

Chapter 1: ................................................................................................................................1

Current Challenges in Corruption Prevention .........................................................................1 Corruption is harmful ..................................................................................................................................... 1

BOX 1: Millennium Development Goals ................................................................................................... 2 International instruments and resources ......................................................................................................... 3

BOX 2: UNCAC Chapter II – Prevention Measures .................................................................................. 3 Current challenges .......................................................................................................................................... 5

Chapter 2: ................................................................................................................................7

What We Know About Corruption in Public Administration: A Diagnostic Challenge ........7 What is it? ....................................................................................................................................................... 7

BOX 3: “Quiet” corruption......................................................................................................................... 8 Where and when does it happen? ................................................................................................................... 9

BOX 4: Corruption and trust .................................................................................................................... 10 Who, how and why? ..................................................................................................................................... 11

BOX 5: Corruption risk factors ................................................................................................................ 17

Chapter 3: ..............................................................................................................................18

What We Know About Preventing Corruption: An Implementation Challenge ..................18 Analysing conduct and context ..................................................................................................................... 18

BOX 6: Preventing Corruption: Lessons from Occupational Health and Safety ...................................... 19 BOX 7: The Singapore diagnosis ............................................................................................................. 20

Integrity systems ........................................................................................................................................... 21 BOX 8: An Ethics Infrastructure .............................................................................................................. 22

Implementing anti-corruption strategies ....................................................................................................... 23 BOX 9: Myth #6: Fight corruption by fighting corruption ....................................................................... 24 BOX 10: Mexico Ministry of Civil Service New Model of control and audit of public works ................ 25 BOX 11: The Integrity Assessment Korea Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission (ACRC) ...... 27 BOX 12: Public Sector Anti-Corruption Framework Independent Commission Against

Corruption, Mauritius ............................................................................................................................... 28

Chapter 4: ..............................................................................................................................30

Preventing Corruption: Turning What We Know Into What We Do ...................................30 The limits of regulation and law enforcement .............................................................................................. 30

BOX 13: SMS Information System Ministry of Justice Turkey ............................................................... 31 BOX 14: Administrative simplification to improve the efficiency of the government............................. 32 BOX 15: Asset declaration systems – designing for the context .............................................................. 33

Effective public institutions .......................................................................................................................... 35 BOX 16: Combining legal and administrative methods to prevent corruption in public

procurement .............................................................................................................................................. 36 BOX 17: Singapore Building and Construction Authority Promoting accountability for

procurement of public projects through the Contractor Registration System (CRS) ................................ 38 BOX 18: Mexico Ministry of Civil Service National Public Procurement System (Sistema

Nacional de Contrataciones Públicas) ...................................................................................................... 39 BOX 19: State Procurement Agency of Georgia Georgian Electronic Government Procurement

System (Ge-GP)........................................................................................................................................ 40 Developing human resources capacity to prevent corruption ....................................................................... 42

BOX 20: Proactive prevention – guidance for everyone .......................................................................... 43 BOX 21: More than an attitude: developing professionalism................................................................... 45

iv Expert Group Meeting Strengthening Public Preventing Corruption In Public Administration: Citizen Engagement




BOX 22: Hong Kong ICAC Ethical Leadership Programme (ELP) for the Government ........................ 47 BOX 23: Best practices to promote reporting and protecting whistleblowers .......................................... 48

Engaging citizens to prevent corruption ....................................................................................................... 49 BOX 24: Corruption Prevention and ICT: UNDP's experience from the field ................................. 50 BOX 25: Prevention, education and research in anti-corruption agencies ............................................... 54

Developing capacity in citizen engagement ................................................................................................. 55 BOX 26: Using citizen engagement as accountability to prevent four types of corruption ...................... 56

Chapter 5 ...............................................................................................................................58

Building Capacity to Prevent Corruption .............................................................................58 Conclusions .................................................................................................................................................. 59 Recommendations ........................................................................................................................................ 60

Annex 1: Sources and References.........................................................................................63

Annex 2 : List of Participants ...............................................................................................69

Annex 3: Agenda ..................................................................................................................73

v Expert Group Meeting Strengthening Public Preventing Corruption In Public Administration: Citizen Engagement




List of Text Boxes

BOX 1: Millennium Development Goals

BOX 2: UNCAC Chapter II – Prevention Measures

BOX 3: “Quiet” corruption

BOX 4: Corruption and trust

BOX 5: Corruption risk factors

BOX 6: Preventing Corruption: Lessons from Occupational Health and Safety

BOX 7: The Singapore diagnosis

BOX 8: An Ethics Infrastructure

BOX 9: Myth #6: Fight corruption by fighting corruption

BOX 10: Mexico Ministry of Civil Service New Model of control and audit of public works

BOX 11: The Integrity Assessment Korea Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission

(ACRC)

BOX 12: Public Sector Anti-Corruption Framework Independent Commission Against

Corruption, Mauritius

BOX 13: SMS Information System Ministry of Justice Turkey

BOX 14: Administrative simplification to improve the efficiency of the government

BOX 15: Asset declaration systems – designing for the context

BOX 16: Combining legal and administrative methods to prevent corruption in public

procurement

BOX 17: Singapore Building and Construction Authority Promoting accountability for

procurement of public projects through the Contractor Registration System (CRS)

BOX 18 Mexico Ministry of Civil Service National Public Procurement System (Sistema

Nacional de Contrataciones Públicas)

BOX 19: State Procurement Agency of Georgia Georgian Electronic Government Procurement

System (Ge-GP)

BOX 20 Proactive prevention – guidance for everyone

BOX 21: More than an attitude: developing professionalism

BOX 22: Hong Kong ICAC Ethical Leadership Programme (ELP) for the Government

BOX 23: Best Practices to Promote Reporting of Concerns and Protecting Whistleblowers

BOX 24: Corruption Prevention and ICT: UNDP's experience from the field

BOX 25: Prevention, education and research in anti-corruption agencies

BOX 26: Using citizen engagement as accountability to prevent four types of corruption

http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/mdgoverview

http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un-dpadm/unpan049778.pdf

vi Expert Group Meeting Strengthening Public Preventing Corruption In Public Administration: Citizen Engagement




Acknowledgments

The United Nations Expert Group Meeting Proceedings on Preventing Corruption in

Public Administration: Citizens Engagement for Improved Transparency and Accountability

have been prepared under the leadership of Haiyan Qian, Director of the UNDESA Division

for Public Administration and Development Management (DPADM).

An expert, Alexandra Mills provided valuable substantive inputs to these proceedings,

including in particular a technical background paper on “Causes of Corruption in Public

Sector Institutions and its impact on Development”, which helped frame the meeting

discussions/deliberations. John-Mary Kauzya, Garegin Manukyan, and Angela Capati-Caruso

provided drafting and substantive editing of the proceedings.

vii Expert Group Meeting Strengthening Public Preventing Corruption In Public Administration: Citizen Engagement




Foreword

The key role of governance and anti-corruption as influencing factors has been recognized

and is increasingly prioritized in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and post-2015

global development agenda. However, in spite of the progress made towards modernizing the

public sector in both the developed and the developing countries, corruption remains, due to its

complexity, vitality and pervasiveness, a major challenge that slows down the economic

development and impedes the achievement of MDGs.

The MDG Summit Outcome Document stressed that fighting corruption at both the

national and international levels is a priority and that corruption is a serious barrier to effective

resource mobilization and allocation and diverts resources away from activities that are vital

for poverty eradication, the fight against hunger and sustainable development. It also pointed

out that the member States are determined to take urgent and decisive steps to continue to

combat corruption in all of its manifestations, which requires strong institutions at all levels. It

urged all States that have not yet done so to consider ratifying or acceding to the United

Nations Convention against Corruption and begin its implementation.

In an environment of rapid change and global uncertainties permeated by the negative

consequence of unfolding financial crisis, it becomes imperative for the governments to

develop and implement effective anti-corruption strategies, empower individuals and

communities, promote greater government accountability and transparency, and strengthen

institutional capacity to improve citizen oriented service delivery.

The Joint Experts Group Meeting and Capacity Development Workshop (EGM/CDW) on

“Preventing Corruption in Public Administration: Citizens Engagement for Improved

Transparency and Accountability,” was organized in furtherance of DPADM objective to

strengthen public administration and to fight corruption in public sector with a view to making

public administration more open, transparent, accountable and responsive to citizens in all

countries, as recently reaffirmed by ECOSOC Resolution 2011/22 of 27 July 2011, which

among other things requested the Secretariat to continue activities around the themes of public

service delivery and engagement of citizens in accountability for preventing corruption.

Exploring the causes and consequences of corruption in public sector institutions and its

impact on development; examining the effectiveness of public sector institutional

arrangements for preventing corruption and engaging citizens in anti-corruption initiatives;

identifying strategies for public sector human resources capacity development for preventing

corruption and engaging citizens in anti-corruption initiatives; and promoting accountability

through transparency by harnessing the potential of ICT in governance for engaging citizens

were the major themes of the EGM/CDW, which attempted to find out some of the ways to

fight corruption in the Public sector.

viii Expert Group Meeting Strengthening Public Preventing Corruption In Public Administration: Citizen Engagement




Eighty-two (82) participants —of whom twenty-nine (29) were women (35%)—from

twenty-five countries (Australia, Austria, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, China,

Ecuador, Georgia, Greece, Jordan, Kenya, Mauritius, Mexico, Republic of Korea, Slovakia,

South Africa, Singapore, Sweden, Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United

Kingdom, United States of America, and Zambia) in five world regions attended the meeting.

They represented governments, civil society, academia, and regional and international

organizations.

The EGM/CDW highlighted the need for a multi-pronged strategy for mainstreaming

public service ethics and professionalism and helped identify a number of factors in human

capacity development, contributing to the erosion of ethical and professional values and

standards in public administration. The event, based on the lessons learned in preventing

corruption in the public sector, enabled participating experts, practitioners and academics to

arrive at a consensus on some recommendations concerning anti-corruption strategies and

citizen engagement.

Haiyan Qian

Director

Division for Public and Administration and Development Management

United Nations

December 2012

ix Expert Group Meeting Strengthening Public Preventing Corruption In Public Administration: Citizen Engagement




Executive Summary

The effects of corruption on the agencies of public administration can be particularly

pernicious. When corruption is believed to be the way the public sector, or one of its agencies,

routinely operates the damage goes beyond the loss of misdirected resources. Public

administration risks losing both its capacity to be effective and the trust of citizens in the fair

and impartial application of public resources and authority (Thompson 1992). In the public

domain it becomes difficult to guarantee compliance with public standards or respect for the

rule of law (Caiden 2001; Rothstein 2011). A particularly damaging institutional consequence

for the public administration is that competent and honest employees can be lost or deterred

from working for government at all, further reducing its capacity for integrity and

effectiveness (Quah 2007).

The challenge of controlling corruption in public administration has been brought into

sharper focus by the international commitment to achieving the Millennium Development

Goals (MDGs) by 2015. The intended beneficiaries of those goals suffer, disproportionately,

the costs of corruption and the waste of public resources caused by corruption has affected

both developed and developing economies in their attempt to meet the MDGs.

The international response to the challenges posed by corruption has produced an

international legal architecture comprising the Inter-American Convention against Corruption

(1996), the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption and Civil Law

Convention on Corruption (1999), OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (1999), the African Union

Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (2003) and the United Nations

Convention Against Corruption (2005) among others. These instruments are supported by

model laws, policy frameworks, strategies, guidance for prevention and enforcement

mechanisms.

The amount of information now available for policy makers and governments to apply

presents a challenge in itself. The UNCAC resources alone present an impressive list of

ingredients from which to create an anti-corruption strategy. But knowing what to implement

when and where depends on an accurate diagnosis of the type of corruption and the conditions

that allowed it to happen.

The challenges of both diagnosis and implementation can be met by understanding the

context in which corruption occurs, building the capacity needed to deal with it and

maintaining continuity of effort. Once implemented, anti-corruption measures are not self-

sustaining. They depend on adequate public administration capacity as well as the support and

participation of citizens.

Why is it so important for citizens to be engaged in preventing corruption? One of the

EGM/CDW conclusions helps to answer this question by recognising the overriding

importance of tailoring anti-corruption strategies to their context (as the UNPSA entries aim to

http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=173&CM=1&DF=&CL=ENG



x Expert Group Meeting Strengthening Public Preventing Corruption In Public Administration: Citizen Engagement




do). Citizens are one of the best sources available to policy makers for understanding the

context of corruption. They can bring knowledge of the types of corruption and corruption

risks as well as the challenges for implementing anti-corruption policy that exist in the context.

Citizens form the societal values and expectations that help or hinder anti-corruption strategies

and, importantly, they may also be perpetrators of corruption who need to be discouraged.

If their contribution is so significant, why has it not received more attention in the past? In

the last 20 years corruption has been studied, classified, measured, defined and proscribed by

policy makers and practitioners, theorists and researchers - mostly in the disciplines of

political science, law, economics and philosophy. Prevention responses have predominantly

applied law enforcement methods. But, looking only to law enforcement capacity to prevent

corruption applies a prevention model that relies on an incomplete diagnosis of corruption.

Insights from many more disciplines now contribute to our understanding of corruption.

Social psychology, organizational theory, regulatory theory, business ethics, criminology and

behavioural economics, among others, all have something to offer the corruption prevention

endeavour. These disciplines indicate roles for citizens beyond penalties and compliance.

Better understanding of the relationship between corruption and societal factors, such as

human rights, gender equality, press freedom, social trust and the effectiveness of institutions

outside the public administration, also highlight the significance of citizens in preventing

corruption in public administration.

This publication brings together conclusions of papers, presentations and discussions from

a week of events held in June 2012 in New York under the auspices of UNDESA/ DPADM.

The United Nations Public Service Awards (UNPSA) for 2012 were presented in the same

week and the category for Preventing and Combating Corruption included several initiatives

that acknowledged the role of citizens in preventing corruption in public administration.

The Joint Expert Group Meeting and Capacity Development Workshop on Preventing

Corruption in Public Administration captured the perspectives of experts in public

administration and corruption prevention including elected officials, statutory officers,

academics, researchers, advisers and practitioners from every continent as well as many

international agencies (see Agenda Appendix 1). Despite the diversity of topics and

perspectives, they developed recommendations that are based on initiatives presented in the

Workshop and the UNPS Awards and referred to in more detail in this publication.

1. Enhancing the effectiveness of public sector institutional arrangements for

preventing corruption and engaging citizens in anti-corruption initiatives.

Activities that could give effect to this recommendation would build capacity in:

1.1 Enforcing and implementing regulation particularly by improving the design

and efficiency of regulation and targeting it better to those expected to comply with it.

xi Expert Group Meeting Strengthening Public Preventing Corruption In Public Administration: Citizen Engagement




An example discussed was a Ministry of Public Administration in Mexico program to

improve the efficiency of the government by drastically reforming the regulatory framework to

reduce, standardize and simplify existing rules across the public sector (see Box 14).

1.2 Targeting corruption prevention initiatives to local circumstances particularly

considering the differences between international, national, local and organisational contexts

and the nature of various public sector functions.

If we accept that risk factors for corruption can be found at “the macro-level of

globalisation and nation states, the meso-level of organizations and the micro-level of

interactions of individuals” (Huisman and Vande Walle 2010), it is important to do the

analysis and the implementation at the site of the corruption problem. Currently much of the

data being used applied to prevention policy and interventions concerns national and

international levels of activity yet many of the standard responses are for implementation at

the organisation level.

Local and municipal government for example has particular corruption risks. A large

number of submissions to the United Nations Public Service Awards (UNPSA) have targeted

local government operations. An initiative from Romania ran a participatory corruption risk

assessment process run at local government level. Other initiatives from the Netherlands

(UNDESA 2011) and Mauritius (see Box 11) addressed corruption risks at organisational

level.

1.3 Building an evidence base of what works to prevent corruption so that policy

solutions can be tailored to specific circumstances and corruption risks.

Reliable data is needed by public sector agencies to develop their own responses and

capacities to prevent corruption. The Korea Anti-corruption and Civil Rights Commission

(ACRC) Integrity Assessment identifies corruption risks at the level of specific government

activities or tasks rather than agencies or sectors by assessing tasks at the organisational level.

Anti-corruption authorities (ACAs) with research capacity can be the location of an evidence

base for corruption prevention by using data from complaints received or other sources.

2. Public sector human resource capacity development for preventing corruption and

engaging citizens in anti-corruption initiatives.

The methods considered for implementing this recommendation were:

2.1 Building the professionalism of public administrators so that they act competently

and ethically

Many public managers have no experience or training before taking management

positions. The Hong Kong ICAC Ethical Leadership Programme (ELP) for the Government

(see Box 22) provides leadership training for public sector managers. Well trained public

xii Expert Group Meeting Strengthening Public Preventing Corruption In Public Administration: Citizen Engagement




sector managers are in a position to communicate outside their public sector agency to the

citizens it serves about the professional ethics that apply to public officials particularly in

situations where they are pressured by societal expectations to act corruptly (Kauzya 2012).

2.2 Raising the awareness of corruption and ways to prevent corruption with

continuous occupational training for officials and by using public education campaigns about

the harm of corruption and the successes of anti-corruption efforts.

Programs such as those run by the Hong Kong ICAC Community Relations department

produce resources including for school-aged children,1 to help members of the public to

identify and act on corrupt conduct (See Box 25).

The 2012 UNPSA finalist, Malaysia Anti-Corruption Commission’s (MACC) publicity

campaign, was designed to inform citizens and public officials about corruption offences that

were poorly understood. Investigation of bribery by the MACC had previously targeted the

public officials who solicited or received bribes. This education campaign was used to inform

the public that paying a bribe is also a criminal offence and encourage reporting of bribes

paid2.

Many ACAs communicate other information about their work such as successful

outcomes of corruption investigations. Public awareness and information campaigns about

corruption or public integrity need not be the exclusive responsibility of government or anti-

corruption agencies and might be facilitated by community-based or grass roots organisations

or social media (see Box 24).

2.3 Encouraging reporting of corruption by developing best practices in

whistleblowing that protect against retribution, provide advice and allow anonymity.

The United Nations Ethics Office emphasises that best practice to promote reporting and

protecting whistleblowers includes raising awareness and encouraging speaking up about

corruption; executive sponsorship of the policy; protection from retaliation that is prompt,

robust, and comprehensive; and remedies for retaliation that are clearly defined and applied

(see Box 23).

3. Accountability through transparency: engaging citizens to prevent corruption in

the Public Sector such as through information and communication technologies.

The specific mechanisms identified for providing citizens with the resources to observe

and hold the public administration to account included:

1 www.icac.org.hk/en/community_relations_department/s/index.html accessed 8 June 2012.

2www.unpan.org/DPADM/UNPSDayAwards/KnowledgeBaseofUNPublicServiceAwards/tabid/1260/langu

age/en-US/Default.aspx accessed 8 December 2012

http://www.icac.org.hk/en/community_relations_department/s/index.html

http://www.unpan.org/DPADM/UNPSDayAwards/KnowledgeBaseofUNPublicServiceAwards/tabid/1260/language/en-US/Default.aspx


xiii Expert Group Meeting Strengthening Public Preventing Corruption In Public Administration: Citizen Engagement




3.1 Making government information more easily accessible, such as about expenditure

of public funds and disclosure obligations of officials such as asset declarations, but also

routine facts about the cost of services and the proper roles of public officials.

In the Slovakian town of Martin, public concern about corruption in procurement

encouraged the city government to undertake a comprehensive transparency initiative to

ensure that all decisions described as “affecting the efficiency of the handling of public

resources and properties are done transparently” by making them all available online

(UNDESA 2011: 24).3

The same objective was behind two finalists in the 2012 UNPSA: the Georgia Civil

Service Bureau Online Asset Declaration System allows any citizen to monitor the asset

declarations of public officials; and the Saudi Ministry of social affairs database of non-profit

organisations who receive public funds.4 A contract monitoring system developed by Slovenia

Commission for the Prevention of Corruption combines information from several public

agencies to provide a comprehensive online database of information about government

business transactions5.

The Singapore Building and Construction Authority Contractors Registration System (see

Box 17) for any contractor wanting to be considered for a government construction contract,

features once-only registration and is transparent to government agencies and contractors. It is

intended to reduce opportunities for manipulation and increase public trust. The State

Procurement Agency of Georgia also won a UNPS Award for a procurement system that

executes every stage of all public procurements by all government agencies on line (see Box

18).

3.2 Building the capacity of citizens and civil society to participate effectively in all of

the roles they have with government whether reporting corruption, complying with regulation,

receiving services or as commercial partners.

Many of the UNPSA winners used information and communications technology (ICT) in

order to streamline services so that citizens find them easier to use. ICT systems are also

effective in reducing corruption risks in manual and face-to-face transactions: they operate

according to a predetermined process; they reduce the need and opportunity for discretionary

decisions; they increase the security of information, access and approvals; and they create

audit trails. Examples from the UNPSA include:

3 http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un-dpadm/unpan049777.pdf accessed 9

December 2012 4www.unpan.org/DPADM/UNPSDayAwards/KnowledgeBaseofUNPublicServiceAwards/tabid/1260/langu

age/en-US/Default.aspx accessed 8 December 2012 5www.unpan.org/DPADM/UNPSDayAwards/KnowledgeBaseofUNPublicServiceAwards/tabid/1260/langu







xiv Expert Group Meeting Strengthening Public Preventing Corruption In Public Administration: Citizen Engagement




electronic scanning of the original election result notices from voting stations to reduce the

risk of fraud and increase efficiency (South Africa Electoral Commission Result Slip Scanning

Project, UNDESA 2011);

an electronic database of migrant worker applications replacing a system of contracted

private labour hire brokers (Korea Human Resources Development Service Migrant &

Business-Friendly Recruitment System, UNDESA 2011);

a recruiting system that allows job applicants to submit applications by mobile phone

(Oman Civil Service Central, UNDESA 2011);

an electronic system for managing the application, award and monitoring of educational

scholarships (India (Andhra Pradesh) Centre for Good Governance ePASS).6

3.3 Engendering trust between government and citizens (as well as more generally in

the community) by responding to citizen complaints, delivering tangible results, and treating

citizens fairly.

To increase trust in local government tax officials in Korea, the Seoul Metropolitan

Government since 2008 has moved from closed examinations of tax appeals to an open court

system in which the taxpayer is represented by an advocate and officials must defend the

imposition of tax (UNDESA 2011). Reducing abuses and engendering trust in the court

system were some of the goals of an innovative project of the Ministry of Justice in Turkey to

use SMS technology to inform litigants of court appearances and decisions (see Box 13).

Three themes recurred throughout the discussions, presentations and papers that formed

the basis of this publication and the recommendations of the meeting.

The first is that, even in a healthily democratic context, citizen engagement is only one

possible ingredient in a “corruption prevention cocktail”. Nevertheless, it becomes one of the

essential ingredients if we consider all of the ways that citizens interact with government.

They may be using public services, consulting or lobbying, monitoring and scrutinising, being

regulated in commercial relationships such as for the procurement of goods and services by

government, or they may be reporting corruption.

Each of these types of interaction between citizens and government makes different

demands on public administration. All have the potential to be an opportunity for either

corruption or corruption prevention. For corruption prevention purposes, satisfactory

interactions between citizens and government can encourage social trust, an understanding of

public sector values, compliance with anti-corruption regulation and reporting of suspected

corrupt conduct (Langseth 2001; see Box 4).

6www.unpan.org/DPADM/UNPSDayAwards/KnowledgeBaseofUNPublicServiceAwards/tabid/1260/langu

age/en-US/Default.aspx accessed 9 December 2012.



xv Expert Group Meeting Strengthening Public Preventing Corruption In Public Administration: Citizen Engagement




The second theme concerns how we know what corruption prevention measures will be

most effective in context. Citizens are one of the best sources for understanding corruption in

its context that policy makers have. They can bring knowledge about the types of corruption

and corruption risks in the local context and the challenges it poses for implementing anti-

corruption policy. Citizens form the societal values and expectations that can help or hinder

anti-corruption strategies and, importantly, they may also be perpetrators of corruption who

need to be discouraged.

Finally, there was an acknowledgment that success in corruption prevention will take time.

Corruption is notorious for its ubiquity, longevity and resilience and no country will ever be

entirely free of it. Rather than assume that the task of corruption prevention is futile, this

realisation should encourage us to produce accurately targeted strategies that incorporate long-

and medium-term objectives as well as short-term goals and, most of all, to develop the

capacity for as many players as possible to participate in that task.

Against the background of what we know about corruption and preventing corruption, this

publication points to some of the roles for citizens within the policy levers commonly used

against corruption and where the capacity of both citizens and public institutions can continue

to be developed.

… capacity and capacity building (or capacity development) are concepts

applicable at various levels: individuals; organizations integrated by individuals,

encompassing firms, civil society organizations and public sector organizations;

… institutions adopted by the people to guide their personal and collective

behaviours, … informal institutions of a societal nature, as well as formal

institutions such as laws and regulations; and whole large social systems, such

as countries.7

7 Villareal 2012:29.

1 Expert Group Meeting Strengthening Public Preventing Corruption In Public Administration: Citizen Engagement




Chapter 1:

Current Challenges in Corruption Prevention

“……corruption has proven to be a major obstacle for countries and regions to

reach the MDGs by 2015 as pledged. The costs of corruption can be explicit,

implicit and hidden. Decision-makers must recognize these problems and find

solutions that integrate the MDG and anti-corruption agendas”8

Corruption is harmful

Every year data is published about the extent of public revenue and resources lost

to corruption. The damage to a nation’s economic development from resources wasted

on unproductive expenditure, such as bribes, and misallocated to those with influence

has long been recognised to impair trade, deter investment and increase the cost of

doing business.

Not only revenue but democratic legitimacy is also lost when public official effort

is diverted from the public interest to self-dealing and unfair allocation of public

entitlements. At the political level, unstable government and alienated citizens are all

recognised costs of corruption. The social consequences of corruption are seen in the

form of poor quality consumer products, reduced public safety and entrenched poverty

as government spending is diverted from public goods such as education and health

(Mauro 1998; Rose-Ackerman 1996).

The effects of corruption on the agencies of public administration can be

particularly pernicious. When corruption is believed to be the way the public sector, or

one of its agencies, routinely operates the damage goes beyond the loss of misdirected

resources. Public administration risks losing both its capacity to be effective and the

trust of citizens in the fair and impartial application of public resources and authority

(Thompson 1992). In the public domain it becomes difficult to guarantee compliance

with public standards or respect for the rule of law (Caiden and Dwivedi 2001;

Rothstein 2011). A particularly damaging institutional consequence for the public

administration is that competent and honest employees can be lost or deterred from

working for government at all, further reducing its capacity for integrity and

effectiveness (Quah 2007).

8 Transparency International 2010 The anti-corruption catalyst: Realizing the MDGs by 2015 TI Berlin.





The circular relationship of these damaging phenomena to corruption adds to its

complexity. Deficits in economic development, institutional capacity or the rule of

law, have been said to “run in both directions” meaning that they could be a cause or a

consequence of corruption, or both (Lambsdorff 2005). Recently, this challenge has

been brought into sharper focus by the international commitment to achieving the

Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015 which target these same issues -

health, education, human rights and economic development.

Achieving the MDGs is symbiotic with corruption prevention and reinforces the

importance of achieving them (UNDP 2008; OECD /DAC 2006) since the major

beneficiaries of those goals also suffer disproportionately the costs of corruption.

The waste of public resources caused by corruption affects both developed and

developing economies in their attempt to meet the MDGs. A major threat to the

achievement of the MDGs has emerged in the global financial crises of the past few

years which have reduced public spending on programmes to achieve the MDGs in

both low income countries and in donor countries. The financial position of most

donor countries has been affected by the crisis with the result that aid budgets have

been or may still be reduced. Low income countries (LICs) have not been able to

sustain spending in the areas targeted by the MDGs. Crises in food prices have been

particularly damaging (World Bank / IMF 2012) and most LICs are cutting MDG

spending, especially on education and social protection (Kyrili and Martin 2010)

together with “agricultural extension, environment protection, roads, energy [which]

have a direct linkage to the achievement of the (MDGs) and National Development

Strategies” (Kauzya 2012: 7).

BOX 1: Millennium Development Goals

1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger

2. Achieve universal primary education

3. Promote gender equality and empower women

4. Reduce child mortality

5. Improve maternal health

6. Combat HIV / AIDS, malaria and other diseases

7. Ensure environmental sustainability

8. Develop a global partnership for development

Source: UNDP

www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/povertyreduction/focus_areas/focus_mdg_st

rategies/

http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/mdgoverview

http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/mdgoverview/mdg_goals/mdg1












International instruments and resources

In an effort to come to grips with the nature of corruption much of the early anti-

corruption activity produced research data, model laws, frameworks and strategies for

prevention ultimately producing international agreements for cooperation and

enforcement. The most prominent, in chronological order, are the Inter-American

Convention against Corruption (1996), the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention

on Corruption and Civil Law Convention on Corruption 1999, the African Union

Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption 2003, and most recently the

United Nations Convention Against Corruption entered into force in 2005.

The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the United Nations Convention Against

Corruption represented a change in approach by introducing the potential for very

wide application, engaging locally enforceable policy levers and international

obligations, and enabling monitoring of enforcement. The United Nations Convention

Against Corruption (UNCAC) has applied the same attributes to a wider focus.

Explicitly incorporating the implementation of prevention policy and mechanisms has

encouraged wave of activity focused on the challenge of reducing or preventing the

incidence of corruption particularly in the public sector environment.

BOX 2: UNCAC Chapter II – Prevention Measures

The United Nations Convention Against Corruption includes 10 articles (an entire

chapter) devoted to prevention. They are interlinked and mutually reinforcing

measures that address both PUBLIC and PRIVATE sectors with the “key components

of enhance integrity, transparency and accountability” (Pilgrim). Signatories are

expected to implement:

Policies (Art.5)

“effective and coordinated anti-corruption policies” that “promote participation of

civil society, reflect the rule of law and proper management of public affairs, and

review legal and administrative measures”.

Law enforcement (Art.6 and Art.36)

Anti-corruption bodies to implement the policies and disseminate anti-corruption

knowledge that are independent, adequately resourced and properly trained.

Public sector (Art. 7)








Civil servants’ recruitment, hiring, retention, promotion and retirement to be based on

merit and aptitude

Special measures for selection, training and rotation for public positions vulnerable to

corruption

Training programmes

Transparency in the funding of candidatures and political parties

Codes of conduct (Art. 8)

Public officials’ reporting of corruption

Disclosures of activities or gifts from which conflicts of interest may derive

Disciplinary measures

Public reporting (Art. 10)

Citizens’ access to information and decision-making process of public administrations

Administrative procedures to be simplified

Information on activities of public administrations to be published

Comprehensive Preventive Measures in Private Sector (Art. 12)

Enhanced accounting and auditing standards

Prohibition of off-the-book account and other acts

No tax deductibility of expenses constituting bribes

Proportionate and dissuasive civil, administrative or criminal sanctions

Promote cooperation between law enforcement and private entities

Prevent conflicts of interest

Participation of civil society (Art.13)

Ensure active participation of civil society

Enhance transparency in decision making processes

Provide public access to information

Encourage citizens to report on offences and protect the freedom to seek, receive and

publish information concerning corruption (subject to restrictions/ balancing of rights)

Source: Presentation by Julia Pilgrim “The United Nations Convention against Corruption

Chapter II: Preventive Measures” presented at Joint Expert Group Meeting and Workshop 2-

Preventing Corruption in Public Administration: Citizen Engagement for Improved

Transparency and Accountability 25 June 2012 New York.

The prevention provisions in Chapter II of the UNCAC (Articles 5 -14) also

include more preventative and proactive measures such as enhancing transparency and

public engagement, establishing standards, and reducing opportunities for corruption

in high risk activities such as the judiciary and public procurement. The UNCAC

gives the same importance to preventive measures as to control and punitive measures

(UNODC 2009:4).







Many countries may put emphasis on control measures in such fields as legislation,

investigation and prosecution. Such an approach is only a part of effective anti-

corruption policies; it is also expensive and focuses on the failings of and the abuse of

rules, procedures and public funds. Emphasis should be given to prevention because it

not only safeguards the integrity of government and the political system and ensures

the application of rules, procedures and funds, but has wider benefits in promoting

public trust and managing the conduct of public officials.

These more proactive and preventative measures are left to states to implement

according to local conditions but technical support is provided in the UNODC

Technical Guide which acknowledges (2009:55):

consensus among policymakers and practitioners alike that in the case of

prevention and control of corruption, a comprehensive array of measures is

essential, especially in view of the multifaceted nature of the phenomenon.

States parties to the OECD Anti-Bribery Conventions and the UNCAC now find

themselves in an era of implementation. Both instruments have been accompanied by

instruction manuals, handbooks, databases and training tools to measure and assess

corruption and guide technical and policy implementation. These resources deliver a

virtual supermarket of measures for policy makers to choose from in devising law

enforcement based anti-corruption strategies.9

Useful information continues to be produced by other sources. Data and technical

support for local initiatives is available from international NGOs and academic

research centres that study both corruption itself and prevention techniques that can be

used to develop skills and share best practice. Local efforts are also supported by

regional capacity building programmes and initiatives led by domestic integrity

agencies such as public service authorities, anti-corruption agencies and aid donors.

Current challenges

The amount of information now available for policy makers and governments to

apply presents a significant challenge in itself. The UNCAC resources alone present an

impressive list of ingredients from which to create an anti-corruption strategy. But

knowing what to implement when and where depends on an accurate diagnosis of the

type of corruption and the conditions that allowed it to happen.

9 Notable examples available through the UNODC TRACK portal such as the Legal Library and Stolen

Asset Recovery Initiative (StAR) that support states parties to respond to bribery and corrupt

embezzlement by recovering, or cooperating in the recovery of lost state assets.





There are continuing gaps in our knowledge about how and why corruption

happens and consequently how best to prevent it. At the same time we know that new

forms of corruption are continually emerging to adapt as conditions change. Its forms

are endless and many of them may never have been considered by theorists. The bad

apple theory of corruption maybe long gone but if we are to do more than detect and

punish individual perpetrators then an accurate diagnosis of the less apparent as well

as the obvious conditions is needed. Identifying activities and locations that are

vulnerable to corruption, the types of corruption they attract and the dynamics of that

corruption can inform decisions about the capacities needed to support prevention

efforts. This is a challenge of diagnosis that can be met with more and better evidence

which can, in turn, help to address the challenge of implementation.

Understanding corruption – how and why it happens - is the diagnostic challenge.

Understanding prevention – what works, when and where - is the implementation

challenge. Both diagnosis and implementation can be met by understanding the

context, building capacity and maintaining continuity of effort. The implementation of

anti-corruption measures will fail if they are not soundly based in an accurate

diagnosis of the corruption problem. But, these measures are not self-sustaining. They

depend on adequate public administration capacity as well as the support and

participation of citizens.





Chapter 2:

What We Know About Corruption in Public

Administration: A Diagnostic Challenge

What is it?

Early typologies of corrupt behaviour proposed two types of corruption: grand and

petty. These are essentially illicit transactions distinguished from each other by the

amount of benefit conferred, the position of the public official involved (high or low,

political or administrative) and the degree of damage incurred by the corrupt act. As

corruption has become better understood the typologies have become more complex.

Both grand and petty corruption, for example, might also be classified as

administrative or political (UNDP 2008), incidental, systemic or systematic (Kpundeh

1998), passive or active (UNODC 2009), a way of life or a fact of life (Quah 2007),

well-organised or chaotic (Mauro 1998:13), administrative corruption or state capture

(Hellman and Kaufmann 2001). Typologies can overlap and combine so that state

capture, for example, is almost always a form of political corruption while the idea of

corruption as a way of life, rather than a fact of life, usually applies to acts that are

petty, administrative and systemic. There is no single “correct” analysis of corrupt

acts.

The word “corruption” has social, moral, political, economic dimensions with

significance in different contexts. Its kaleidoscopic character has made a workable

universal definition difficult although the definition in current international use, “the

misuse of entrusted power for private gain”10

usefully reduces corruption to its

component concepts and avoids identifying specific acts or offences. It is not restricted

to a particular context or transaction and can apply equally to conduct of either party in

a corrupt relationship, or to a perpetrator acting alone. It implicitly acknowledges that

“corruption” is an umbrella term for many types of behaviour (Gorta 1998) and cannot

be understood – or, for that matter, prevented – as a one behaviour or offence.

Traditionally typologies of corruption have been based on the concept of

corruption as an observable transaction, usually a bribe. In fact, behaviours that do not

always involve a simple exchange, such as misuse of official information and

resources, abuse of office (including nepotism, favouritism and bullying), exploiting

10

UNDP 2008; www.unpan.org/DPADM/ProductsServices/Glossary/tabid/1395/language/en-

US/Default.aspx





conflicts of interest or personal interests, and the phenomenon labelled “quiet

corruption” (see Box 3) can all be equally harmful.

BOX 3: “Quiet” corruption

A recently documented form of corruption that is usually observed in service

delivery contexts has been called “quiet corruption” and described by the World Bank

as:

various types of malpractice of frontline providers (teachers, doctors, inspectors,

and other government representatives) that do not involve monetary exchange. These

behaviours include both potentially observable deviations, such as absenteeism, but

also hard-to-observe deviations from expected conduct, such as a lower level of effort

than expected or the deliberate bending of rules for personal advantage.

Quiet corruption is not limited to developing countries. Widespread timesheet

manipulation was discovered in parts of an Australian public railway operator and had

been for decades. Nicknamed “job and knock” it was most common in services to

maintain and repair railtrack such as welding. One employee was calculated to have

obtained more than $30,000 in a 15 month period with 89% of his timesheets

fraudulently recording one third more hours than he was actually at work. The practice

was so pervasive that it was impossible for RailCorp to accurately estimate actual

labour requirements for infrastructure maintenance and infrastructure projects. Despite

being clearly unlawful workers justified it as an “incentive” to get the work done as

quickly as possible; “that’s how we were rewarded”; or a “pat on the back” simply for

having completed the job.

There was evidence that supervisors’ tolerance of “job and knock” allowed it to

continue and encouraged new staff to adopt it. A focus on outcomes was said to be

used to justify bending rules to get things done so that as long as rail track was being

repaired or maintained, management and staff were willing to ignore proper tender

procedures and record-keeping requirements.

Non-reporting of misconduct was well-known to management and was a

behavioural norm making effective management almost impossible, because without

accurate knowledge of staff activities managers were unable to exercise control. The

workplace environment imbued staff who were inclined to report misconduct with a

sense that if they did so they would be disloyal. The effect of this behaviour is that

corruption was not reported and was covered up. Employees inclined to engage in





corruption were probably more confident that they would not be caught as a result of

this behavioural norm.

Managerial inaction in response to fraud or non-compliance contributed to the

corruption in the Division. Staff and contractors realised there were few consequences

for misconduct or corrupt conduct. Witnesses agreed that it was generally believed that

nothing happened to you if you were caught doing something wrong.

There were no references to fraud and corruption in position descriptions for

managers in RailCorp despite their accountabilities including “identifying risks and

developing and implementing reduction strategies to minimise the impact of those

risks”. And there was no uniform performance review system for managers.

Sources: World Bank 2010 Africa Development Indicators 2010; ICAC 2008 Investigation into

bribery and fraud at RailCorp – Eighth Report December 2008 ICAC Sydney

Conceiving of corruption in ways other than a direct exchange between two individuals

allows more scope to diagnose the common dynamics of corruption that might help to guide

prevention policy. Identifying “syndromes” of corruption that operate, variously, as influence

markets, elite cartels, oligarchs and clans, or official moguls (Johnston 2005) is one example.

Theories that explain social relationships, structural and cultural contexts have all been

suggested as relevant analytical frameworks to develop our knowledge of the way corruption

happens and might be reduced (Della Porta 1999 cited in Warburton 2007). Many more

characterisations can be developed by applying a wider range of theoretical frameworks to the

analysis of the corrupt act.

Where and when does it happen?

We know that corruption is not exclusively a problem for any particular part of the world

or type of administrative system. But, we also know that it takes many forms and patterns and

that some forms of corruption occur more in some locations than others. Comparative studies

of the geographic location of corrupt activity have found relevant factors in a “region’s relative

wealth, political stability, social cohesion, cultural mores, administrative capability and degree

of modernization” (Caiden 2001: 26.). Countries are believed to be more corrupt if they

“depend on fuel exports, have intrusive business regulation and suffer from unpredictable

inflation” (Treisman 2007). The level of social, or “generalised”, trust in a location has also

been observed to have a relationship with corruption as (Rothstein 2011: 147):

Cities, regions and countries with more trusting people are likely to have better working

democratic institutions, more open economics, greater economic growth and less crime and

corruption.





Other data indicates that some government activities appear to be more prone to corruption

than others. The most recent Global Corruption Barometer reported which government

functions they had paid bribes to in the previous 12 months (TI 2010-11):

police

registry and permit services

judiciary

utilities

medical services

education systems and

tax authorities.

Data maintained by Australian anti-corruption authorities show similar results for the

sectors or agencies of public administration most often reported for corruption in that country

(ICAC 2011a; CMC 1011; CCC 2011):

police,

health and human services,

local government (which has a significant regulatory role in these jurisdictions)

custodial or corrective services and

infrastructure agencies (including utilities)

BOX 4: Corruption and trust

Corruption is commonly characterised as a breach of the trust placed by the public in its

officials and, not surprisingly, the “distrust of public institutions” has been identified as a

consequence of corruption (World Bank Africa Development Indicators 2010: 6) and one of

the damaging consequences of corruption. But the relationship between corruption and trust is

circular and complex.

On the side of the corrupt perpetrator, particularised, or “in-group”, trust between

members of corrupt networks is necessary for maintaining networks such as organised crime

groups (Uslaner 2005; Warburton 2007). A lack of trust has also been identified as a

rationalisation, or “normative motivation”, for corrupt behaviour that comes into play when

perpetrators refuse to accept the legitimacy of an authority imposing rules or do not trust that

those rules will be properly applied (Batory: 2012). A survey of suppliers of goods and

services to government suggests that in Australia there is room for more trust in some

commercial relationships between government agencies and citizens. It found that

“approximately one-third of suppliers stated that they had not bid on one or more public sector

procurement contracts because of corruption concerns” (ICAC 2011c:7).

Corruption may also be a consequence of citizens being disinclined to trust each other. An

explanation for a lower incidence of corruption in contexts with high generalised or social trust

and a higher incidence in contexts with low social trust (Rothstein 2011: 146), proposes that





corruption occurs when economic inequality lowers social trust (Uslaner 2005) with the result

that:

inequality > low trust>corruption>more inequality.

Without social trust individuals will not contribute to public goods such as paying tax or

abstaining from corruption instead acting solely from self-interest as a form of self-

preservation (Rothstein 2011: 148). An example was reported by Transparency International in

its National Integrity System Assessment of Greece (2011):

Overall, Greeks appear to show a deficit in terms of social capital and trust in their

interpersonal relations. Patron‐client relationships are often accompanied by indifference for

the public interest, formalistic interpretation of the law or its frequent bypass. The traditional

values that formed the foundation of post‐war Greece are in serious doubt. Greek people live

in a state of “corrupt legality” (Diamantopoulos Ath.,“Interventions”, in Transparency

International‐Greece, The State and Corruption: How are we going to cut the umbilical cord?,

2008, p. 145.), meaning that the law often condones or even fosters corrupt practices.

Corruption is endemic: not limited to any party or social class, nor to the public sector. For this

reason, the present research attempts a holistic approach to bring out the interactions between

the key institutions of the Greek society.Inside organisations such as public sector agencies

trust is an influential factor on employee behaviour.

Sources: Batory A 2012 “Why do anti-corruption laws fail in Central Eastern Europe? A

target compliance perspective” Regulation & Governance (2012) 6, 66–82; Rothstein B

2011 The Quality of Government: corruption , social trust and inequality in international

perspective University of Chicago Press Chicago and London; Transparency International

(TI) 2011 National Integrity System Assessment: Greece Executive Summary TI Berlin TI

website; Uslaner Eric M 2005 “The Bulging Pocket and the Rule of Law: Corruption

Inequality and Trust” paper for presentation at the conference The Quality of Government:

what it is, how to get it, why it matters Goteborg University, Sweden November 2005;

Warburton J 2007 The Social Nature of Corrupt Networks in the Queensland Police Force

1960-1987 PhD Thesis Department of Government and International Relations University

of Sydney March 2007; World Bank Africa Development Indicators 2010.

Who, how and why?

Just as the observable features of corruption – where and when it occurs are noticeably

variable so are the underlying reasons why it happens. Few studies of corruption claim to

identify deterministic causes and views about where to look for “causes” of corruption vary

with the analytical framework of the researcher. The act of bribing a public official might look

to an economist like rent seeking, to a prosecutor like a criminal offence and to a public

administrator like a failure of accountability. Each theory will suggest a different causal

sequence and response (deGraaf 2007: 45-6):

1. public choice theory assumes an official makes a rational choice to act corruptly





2. bad apple theories assume an official with “bad” character necessarily acts corruptly

3. organisational culture theories propose that group culture and aspects of the workplace

encourage the official to act corruptly

4. clashing moral values approach maintains that societal or personal values and norms

permit corruption

5. ethos of public administration theories maintain that pressure on the official to perform

override integrity considerations and allow corruption

6. correlation theories propose no casual theory only correlations.

The human factors

Traditionally attempts to understand the causes of corruption focused on the individual

perpetrator. Corrupt public officials were designated “bad apples” and the only motivations

ascribed to them either “need or greed”. Bad apple theories rely on assumptions about an

individual perpetrator’s “character” and are less popular than they once were. Analyses of

perpetrators and their motivations have produced more sophisticated taxonomies. One from

the regulation literature that classifies perpetrators as amoral calculators, political citizens,

organisationally incompetent or irrational non-compliers (Black 2001: 9) while another

analysis of police corruption labelled perpetrators “grass eating” and “meat eating” (Knapp

1972).

The famous formula for corruption that combines three “ingredients” of corruption

“monopoly + discretion – accountability” (Klitgaard 1988:75) needed for an individual to act

corruptly is an economic analysis of corruption. Monopoly here refers to the “availability of

rents” such as trade restrictions, industrial policies and the presence of scarce natural resources

which allow public officials to exercise discretion and demand personal benefits (Mauro

1998). Together these ingredients describe a situation that provides an opportunity for

corruption. The ingredient missing from the formula is why an individual would exploit this

opportunity. Instead it assumes that the public official is a rational actor weighing up the

benefits to be gained from a corrupt act against the likelihood and consequences of getting

caught. The possible motivation for doing so is not apparent.

Individual motivation is more apparent in another approach that suggests that the

combination of drivers for corruption varies in each context and might include (Khan 2011: 4-

6):

a rational official

the potential for “off-budget” distribution by politicians

weak institutions

low salaries

low social acceptance of emergent rights.

The role of low salaries as an incentive for corruption has been both assumed and disputed

and low pay is clearly not the only incentive for a public official to act corruptly. The “human”

factors go well beyond the chance of financial reward (OECD 2007). A well-paid public sector





manager will have different personal pressures than a counter clerk or a politician but may be

equally susceptible to corruption.

There are also incentives for those on the non-government or “supply” side of a corrupt

transaction that can arise from a perceived need to, either pay for benefits, such as licences or

public housing, or to pay to avoid costs such as tax or a regulatory penalty (Rose-Ackerman

1996) or to level a perceived unfair procurement process (OECD 2007). But, just as not

everyone who is lowly paid engages in corruption, not everyone who is obliged to pay tax or a

fine resorts to bribery.

An OECD study of bribery in procurement reported the range of motivations for both

bribers and bribees to engage in corrupt conduct. The list for public officials included personal

relationships with suppliers, workplace pressures or dissatisfaction and general personal

ambitions (OECD 2007: 50-51). Motivations for perpetrators of corruption of all kinds can be

classified as instrumental or normative (Batory 2012). Relevant instrumental motivations

might be the penalties or the cost to the perpetrator, detection or monitoring, and the autonomy

and information available to the potential perpetrator. Normative motivations on the other

hand might lie in social expectations or social norms arising from culture, tradition or family

ties.

Theories that characterise potential perpetrators in the organisational context can be

particularly relevant to corruption in public administration. Some countenance the possibility

that individuals may act corruptly for reasons that go beyond “need and greed”. Employees

might act contrary to rules as a result of simple opportunistic non-compliance or principled

non-compliance. Non-compliance can even result from ignorance about rules or ignorance

about whether a rule applies to them (Warren 2006: 132). One study based on perpetrator

interviews produced nine propositions about the process of “becoming corrupt” (Graaf and

Huberts 2008):

1. Next to material gain the most important motives for officials to become corrupt are

friendship or love, status and making an impression on colleagues and friends.

2. Officials “slide down” toward corruption; most processes of becoming corrupt can be

considered a slippery slope.

3. Often corrupt officials have dominant and strong personalities, know how to “get

things done”, take or get the freedom to do thinks independently, and overstep formal

boundaries of authority.

4. More “business type” public officials bring the risk of more corruption.

5. In most corruption cases, supervision of the corrupt official is not strong.

6. In most corruption cases, management has not promoted a clear integrity policy.

7. Because of loyalty and solidarity, colleagues are hesitant to report suspicions of

another’s corrupt activities.

8. The relationship between briber and the official is most often enduring.

9. Corrupt officials including those who operate outside so-called corrupt networks, do

not limit their corruption to one incident.





The organisational context

It is clear that people who engage in corruption do not act in a vacuum. The contexts in

which they operate carry varying opportunities and potential incentives for corrupt conduct.

The context of almost all public sector corruption is an organisation of some kind – usually a

public authority or agency.

Inside each public agency, the nature of the work they do, the way they are structured, the

processes they use and the way they reward their staff can all contribute to the risk of

corruption. Cultures exert a powerful influence on behaviour and exist in communities of all

kinds and large public institutions commonly display subcultures and countercultures in their

various subdivisions and outposts. An agency’s policies, procedures and operating norms and

the quality of management can all affect employee behaviour by contributing to the ethical

climate (Victor & Cullen 1988) or culture (Thorne & Jones 2006) of an organisation.

Operating norms and practices can be systemic like “workarounds” that depart from

proper process and leave an agency exposed to corruption by creating an opportunity for a

motivated individual. Some norms and practices become the kind of “under the radar

behaviour” such as withholding effort or shirking that might constitute quiet corruption (see

BOX 3), or invisible risks in the workplace. In the language of fraud detection they can be ‘red

flags’ that indicate a larger problem if enough information is available to identify them. They

effectively become informal governance mechanisms that influence employee compliance in

the organisation in a generalised way rather than through a specific manager-employee

relationship.

The conduct of managers and supervisors, however, is particularly influential on

employees (Trevino and Brown 2005) and at least two types of managerial behaviour are

significant. The first is the way managers and supervisors respond to specifically ethical

issues. Apart from “individual ethics, personal ambition and poor supervision” relevant

behaviour includes tolerating or rewarding unethical behaviour, failing to consistently take

action about corruption and emphasising the “bottom line” of the organisation over other

values (ICAC 1999). But, failures of general management capacity – described elsewhere as

“organisational incompetence” (Ott and Shafritz 1994) – evident in the failure to supervise,

monitor performance or implementation, or to plan strategically are deficits in institutional

capacity which, in public administration, have been linked to failures to control corruption

(Khan 2012; Villareal 2012).

The wider public sector context

Political, economic, and societal factors that originate outside public sector organisations

can affect the organisational context and, in turn, the decisions of an individual perpetrator.

Policy changes in the public sector environment that result in organisational restructure and

the introduction of new functions can increase administrative uncertainty while increased

competition and commercialisation of an agency could lead to more opportunities to obtain

personal benefits.





In many situations the agencies of public administration are at the front line of corruption

activity so that their capacity to prevent or resist corruption is critical to the success of any

prevention strategy. Historically the institutional culture of public administration has been a

form of protection against corruption (Theobald 1997) and prevention efforts within the

control of the public administration are often directed at supporting the professional integrity

of public officials (UNODC 2009).

A structural effect of the public sector reforms of the 1980s that introduced competition

and “market-type mechanisms” into the public sector (OECD 1995) has been to disaggregate

public administration from the traditional public service corps into smaller offices, agencies,

authorities and business units. The external “boundaries” of the institutions of public

administration have reduced or shifted with privatisation, outsourcing and the introduction of

competitive business practices. One consequence has been to increase the need for public

procurement which OECD has noted (OECD 2009: 9):

Of all government activities, public procurement is also one of the most

vulnerable to fraud and corruption … Bribery in government procurement is

estimated to be adding 10-20% to total contract costs.

Public procurement has been the single most represented public function in United

Nations Public Service Awards for Preventing and Combating Corruption in the Public

Service in 2011 and 2012.

Ensuring the accountability of public services delivered by semi-privatised entities,

outsourced providers services and contracted staff can be difficult or expensive. Contracts

have been increasingly used as accountability mechanisms introducing a new set of risks from

contractor opportunism, poor legal drafting, reduced public accountability, high enforcement

costs, captured officials, and dissonant values in the performance of the contracted service.

The growth of contractualisation in public administration has also challenged the

traditional model of professional public administration. Staff employed from the private sector

on short term contract may not have the benefit of training or experience of the professional

ethics of public administration. Contractors are increasingly needed for technical expertise that

is not available inside the public agency can constitute a corruption risk if not supervised

adequately or recruited with due diligence (ICAC 2008a).

The answer may not be as simple as returning to the traditional Weberian bureaucracy

characterised by hierarchical structures, guaranteed lifelong careers, formalized recruitments

and strong legal protection for civil servants. In fact these measures can create a more isolated

or closed public administration away from political interference that creates an incentive for

politicians to create “para-administrative structures” away from constraints on power

concentrated in elected officials. It is argued that just as opening the policy process to citizens

for scrutiny of operations can reduce corruption opportunities, opening the administrative

design beyond a public service “corps” can also reduce opportunities by diversifying the

sources of power (Dahlstrom and Lapuente 2012).





Ultimately no form of public administration can be assumed to be free of corruption.

Staying alert to corruption risks will be necessary in any administrative structure.

Rigorous recruitment processes that include background checking are now essential

corruption controls. The nature of management structures now means that managers

themselves are expected to constantly reiterate and demonstrate expected standards of conduct

in the absence of more centralised controls (OECD 2004; Waldersee 2012).

National and international contexts

For many years the analysis of corruption has been pitched at the international level. The

Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index has been used extensively since 1995

as the basis for indicators of the extent and likelihood of corruption in a given location. Since

1996 the World Bank Institute Worldwide Governance Indicators Research Project has added

to the body of information about enabling environments that might inform corruption

prevention policy. Aggregated data in relation to more than 200 countries, based on over 350

variables, from sources worldwide have produced six dimensions of “institutional quality or

governance” that can be used to measure the political, economic, and institutional aspects of

governance, one of which is corruption control (Kaufmann 2005: 82-3).

More recently the OECD has developed a diagnostic tool to help identify the

“international drivers of corruption” described as the “global or regional factors that influence

the domestic political economy” that nations are exposed to. It is said to be intended for use

“across a broad range of subject areas – including international relations, trade, investment, tax

co-operation and security” using a political economy model (OECD 2012: 18):

processes that cause corruption and governance weaknesses at the country level.

It then seeks to examine how international drivers interact with these processes

and attempts to explain likely outcomes. The aim of the analysis is to generate

relevant and practical recommendations for action. … The analytical tool

follows a four-step analysis of:

Step 1: Understanding the domestic political economy

Step 2: Identifying the international drivers

Step 3: Tracking the effects of the international drivers

Step 4: Drawing conclusions and assessing the scope for action.

The analysis from many sources acknowledges that “drivers” of corruption in fact occur at

three levels: the individual, the organisation and the enabling environment (OECD/DAC

2006). Part of that environment are a nation’s social and community characteristics that can

encourage corruption or impede anti-corruption reforms seen as complex and foreign to local

traditions and values (Kauzya 2012; ADB 2004).

Personal values based on history and tradition that are unique to the locality or people

constitute informal rules and norms that can be helpful or fatal to anti-corruption efforts

(Ocampo 2000). In many countries an individual’s social obligations to support family





members or comply with historical tradition may well outweigh recently imposed public

service rules to treat strangers fairly (Boona 2012).

Once identified in a particular context, risk factors can be thought of as providing

individuals with incentives or opportunities – or “triggers” – for corruption in the context in

which they live and work – whether organisational, political, economic or social (de Graaf

2007:72):

Whether an official becomes corrupt depends on his or her disposition to become

corrupt. … Since these dispositions do not always lead to corruption, they cannot

be called causes in the strictest sense of the word. What is important is the

receptiveness of an individual to corruption, and whether that receptiveness is

triggered. … Dispositions can be so strongly determined by the social context

that it is hard to escape the behaviour of that context. When consistently

reinforced in certain ideas and acts, it is difficult for an agent to step outside that

culture.

BOX 5: Corruption risk factors

Factors which enable/optimise

occurrence of corruption:

Factors which aid in the perpetuation

of corruption:

Nature of the work performed:

Discretion exercised by position

Position in organisation

Service associated with delays

Working conditions

The role of salary and its relationship to need

Lack of benefits for remaining with employer

Employee dissatisfaction

Work pressures

Individual histories and dependencies

Ethical decision making history

Dependence on employer

Dependence on alcohol, drugs and gambling

Organisational culture:

Unclear messages about what is acceptable;

Attitudes of colleagues;

Example set by management;

Lack of reinforcement of ethical behaviour;

Other workplace practices.

Failure to identify the behaviour as

wrong

Factors which affect taking action

about corruption

Individual beliefs

Features of the wrongdoing

Organisational culture:

Unclear messages about what is

acceptable;

Attitudes of colleagues;

Example set by management;

Lack of reinforcement of ethical

behaviour;

Other workplace practices.

Source: Summarised from Gorta A 1998 Minimising Corruption Some Lessons from the

Literature ICAC





Chapter 3:

What We Know About Preventing Corruption: An

Implementation Challenge

“the best prevention strategies are not the ones which propose the most

interventions; rather they are the ones that are best tailored to solve the problem

at hand”11

Analysing conduct and context

If the reasons for corruption go beyond need and greed then prevention must involve more

than crime and punishment. Just as the various forms of conduct that are called corruption can

be analysed and understood in their context so can the activities that will be effective

“prevention”.

Corruption has been linked with other “harms, threats or risks” such as “violence and

crime, pollution, fraud, occupational hazards, transportation hazards, many forms of

discrimination, product safety risks and so on” (Sparrow 2008:1) in the sense that techniques

to control these phenomena tend to have features in common. Regardless of the harm being

targeted, many of the same policy levers can be employed to address these problems (PIC

2011; see Box 6).

Using what we know about the “dynamics and dependencies” (Sparrow 2008: 27) and the

“enabling environment” (OECD /DAC 2006) of corruption is the first step to preventing it.

Analysis of how and why corruption occurs generally produces a mixture of situations,

attitudes and processes that might be better understood as enabling factors, indicators or

conditions that allow or facilitate corruption. None of these factors in isolation can be said to

cause a corrupt act to occur. Neither are they causes in the sense that corruption will

necessarily occur if they are present in a given location. They are more like risk factors for

diseases, or accidents, that combine – or align – in a given time and place to create an

environment that is conducive to an individual perpetrating a corrupt act. For prevention

purposes they indicate “areas or opportunities to intervene to prevent” something that might

happen in future (PIC 2011: 6).

11

Gorta 2008: 5





BOX 6: Preventing Corruption: Lessons from Occupational Health and Safety

Identifying ‘integrity hazards’ and their associated corruptions and determining how best

to manage them are significant and practical steps that agencies can take to prevent corruption

or serious misconduct (before it happens). Organisations use Occupational Health and Safety

(OHS) strategies to minimise workplace injuries by identifying work-related safety hazards,

assessing the risk of injury arising from the hazards, determining strategies to treat the risk and

communicating these hazards and treatment strategies. A similar hazard identification,

treatment and communication process can be used to minimise corruption.

1. Identify integrity hazards as opportunities to intervene to minimise future corrupt conduct.

2. Take a systematic approach to identifying and managing integrity hazards and risks.

3. Look beyond the individual employees and link integrity hazards to the work undertaken

or to the work environment.

4. Examine near misses as a strategy to identify and understand integrity hazards and risks.

5. Consult workers to identify integrity hazards and risks

6. Communicate the hazards and associated risks to enable employees to recognise and

manage the hazards they face.

7. Tailor information and training to specific types of work.

8. Use indication training as one means to equip employees to recognise and manage the

integrity hazards and risks specific to their work.

9. Incorporate a focus on protecting the employee.

10. Learn from experience to improve strategies to minimise corruption risks.

Source: Summarised from NSW Police Integrity Commission 2011 Research and Issues

Papers Number 8 June 2011 Sydney; Prevention Prompts Number 2 July 2011 PIC Sydney.

Understanding the context or environment is just as necessary for successful prevention

because not all corruption prevention measures will be successful in all situations, rather “For

programs to work, they must identify the type of corruption they are targeting and tackle the

underlying, country-specific causes, or “drivers,” of dysfunctional governance.” (Shah 2007:

230).

The “diagnosis” of corruption in Singapore for example (see Box7) led to a particular set

of prevention measures chosen to respond to the identified drivers. Their success has also been

attributed to a number of conducive local conditions shared with some other contexts: “small

populations; stable government; high standards of living; efficient civil service systems; and

well-developed infrastructure” (Quah 2004: 4).

Using the popular anti-corruption measure of citizen engagement in governance to

increase transparency and the accountability of the public administration has been described as

likely to be effective against some types of corruption, less effective with others and ineffective

against another (Khan 2012).





BOX 7: The Singapore diagnosis

Singapore which is often cited as a corruption prevention success story provides an

instructive example. In Quah’s analysis (2007:17) corruption was understood to be facilitated

by a combination of low salaries, inefficient administrative systems and inadequate

enforcement.

Efforts to address these factors were the basis for the development of an anti-corruption

strategy comprising:

an independent, well-resourced anti-corruption agency

a dynamic, monitored strategy

civil service salaries competitive with private sector

reduced red tape.

In addition to diagnosing the underlying contributory factors, the context also provided

conditions that facilitated the success of the strategy. An analysis of these reforms has

concluded that their success benefited from a context that featured “small populations; stable

government; high standards of living; efficient civil service systems; and well-developed

infrastructure” (Quah 2004: 4).

Source: Summarised from Quah Jon ST 2007 “Combating Corruption Singapore Style:

Lessons for other Asian Countries” Maryland Series in Contemporary Studies No 2 –

2007(189).

Each theoretical framework used to diagnose corruption in context employs different

diagnostic tool and is likely to recommend a different kind of response (Larmour 2006). Some

responses are reactive, such as investigations and penalties while others are preventative, such

as education, organisational controls and work processes (Huberts 1998):

Theoretical

basis

Prevention response

economic emphasises the need for the economic stimuli for corruption to be

reduced and suggests that such might be achieved by, inter alia, paying

higher civil service salaries

educational aims at altering the attitudes and values of the populace and civil

servants alike via training and education campaigns and engagement of

the media

cultural ensuring that the behaviour and attitudes of those in power are subject

to stringent codes of conduct and their behaviour filters down to civil

servants

organisational strengthening internal control systems such as auditing to detect corrupt





or bureaucratic activity, and staff rotation to reduce the propensity for individuals to

establish themselves in entrenched corruption

political increasing in transparency in terms, for example, of the monitoring of

party finances and more broadly, a clearer and more definite separation

of powers in terms of the judiciary and the state

judicial or

repressive

measures

advocates harsher penalties for corrupt practices but also the creation of

independent anti-corruption agencies

Integrity systems

Anti-corruption strategies that aim to affect both incentives and opportunities for

corruption integrate a set of mechanisms intended to reinforce desired behaviour (eg,

education, leadership, culture, decision processes) and deter or detect impropriety (eg, law

enforcement, auditing, sanctions) referred to respectively as “values-based” and “rules-based”

– or “integrity-based” and “compliance-based”- methods (Paine 1994; Menzel 2005). The

regulatory compliance literature distinguishes between “deterrence and compliance” or

“punish and persuade” methods (Braithwaite 1985). The labels used are not as important as the

recognition that many types of mechanisms are needed to address the many types and causes

of corruption.

Because the components of a prevention system or strategy work in different ways they

can be selected and applied to different parts of the causal chain of corruption. The integrity

system concept is one that presents a list of reactive, preventative and proactive measures and

mechanisms to be applied in ways that meet the needs of the specific circumstances.

In the 1990s Transparency International developed a model National Integrity System

(NIS) comprising a set of institutions and multiple stakeholders that together support the

integrity of a nation using both enforcement and enabling methods (TI 2011a).

Figure 1: National Integrity System, Transparency International





The OECD’s “ethics infrastructure” similarly proposed that standard public administration

institutions and activities can be coordinated to promote and maintain integrity at the public

sector level by setting standards, encouraging compliance and enforcing sanctions for breach

(OECD/PUMA 1996).

BOX 8: An Ethics Infrastructure

A well-functioning Ethics Infrastructure supports a public sector environment which

encourages high standards of behaviour. Each function and element is a separate, important

building block, but the individual elements should be complementary and mutually

reinforcing. The elements need to interact to achieve the necessary synergy to become a

coherent and integrated infrastructure. The elements of infrastructure can be categorised

according to the main functions they serve – guidance, management and control – noting that

different elements may serve more than one function.

Guidance is provided by strong commitment from political leadership; statements of

values such as codes of conduct; and professional socialisation activities such as education and

training.

Management can be realised through co-ordination by a special body or an existing central

management agency, and through public service conditions, management policies and

practices.

Control is assured primarily through a legal framework enabling independent investigation

and prosecution; effective accountability and control mechanisms; transparency, public

involvement and scrutiny.

The ideal mix and degree of these functions will depend on the cultural and political-

administrative milieu of each country.

Source: OECD 2000 Trust in Government Ethics Measures in OECD Countries OECD Paris

p 23; OECD 1996 Ethics in the Public Service: Current Issues and Practice OECD Paris.

Organisational integrity systems (Paine 1994) operate on the same principle but using

components that exist – or should exist – in all public sector organisations similar to models

of organisational fraud prevention systems such as (CMC 2005: 3-4):

1. Agency-wide integrated [fraud and corruption] policy

2. Risk assessment

3. Internal controls

4. Internal reporting

5. External reporting

6. Public interest disclosures

7. Investigations





8. Code of conduct

9. Staff education and awareness

10. Client and community awareness.

Implementing anti-corruption strategies

An obvious danger of an integrity system approach, or indeed any kind of model, is that

they can easily become a shopping list of ingredients that policymakers will apply without

discrimination so that “… good ideas are pulled ‘out of the box’ and expected to work.

Whether they will work at all and how they might interact with each other are very

complicated questions” (Spector et al. 2005:228).

Decisions about what precise action can and should be taken in a particular context are

ideally based on evidence of corruption, knowledge of the context and the prevention goal to

be achieved. The UNCAC Technical Guide (p 3-4) advises addressing this implementation

challenge with a preparatory assessment of the degree of corruption vulnerability or risk in the

relevant context (UNODC 2009:3-4):

that identifies the trends, causes, types, pervasiveness and seriousness or impact

of corruption. This will help develop a better knowledge of the activities and

sectors exposed to corruption, and the basis for the development of a preventive

strategy, buttressed with relevant policies and practices for better prevention and

detection of corruption.

The OECD tool for analysing “international drivers of corruption” (OECD 2012; see

BOX) is a technique with the potential to refine prevention interventions by delivering a better

understanding of the context. It is designed for use at a national rather than organisational or

sector level, its audience or users are external to the unit of analysis (i.e. advisers, funders etc)

and the range of factors or drivers are limited, expressly, to those that can be identified by

using political economy analysis – specifically “elite strategies” (OECD 2012: 83-84).

Enterprise risk assessment and management is mandatory in many public and private

sector organisations and, as a prevention technique, imposes a small administrative burden.

The international risk management standard:

sets out principles, a framework and a process for the management of risk that

are applicable to any type of organization in the public or private sector. It does

not mandate a “one size fits all” approach, but rather emphasises the fact that

the management of risk must be tailored to the specific needs and structure of the

particular organisation.12

Although not intended specifically for corruption risks, it describes a generic five-step risk

management process that begins with understanding the context:

12

ISO 31000:2009 www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/management_and_leadership_standards/risk_management.htm

accessed 25 May 2012.

http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/management_and_leadership_standards/risk_management.htm





establish the context;

identify risks (what can happen, when, where, how and why);

analyse risks (to determine the level of risk);

evaluate risks; and

treat risks.

A risk based approach is sufficiently simple to apply at most sites of corrupt activity

(national, regional, sectoral or organisational). It has the advantage of being open-textured so

that all sources of information about relevant risks and all methods of treating risks can be

incorporated.

Many techniques for understanding the relevant organisational, sectoral or national context

can be incorporated into a risk analysis regardless of the particular process used. In a move

away from perception-based data the UNODC Programme on Assessing Corruption Through

Evidence-based methods “adopts an evidence-based approach to quantify the extent and

describe the patterns of corruption at country level”13

.

Standard research methods such as surveys, literature reviews, case studies and analysis of

allegations and comparative methodology (UNODC 2009: 16-17; Gorta 2008) can be used to

expose the potential for corruption in a context, while ex post methods such as financial and

performance audits can enable learning from specific corrupt events using (Kaufmann, Kraay

and Mastruzzi 2007:5):

a wide variety of different indicators, both subjective and objective, individual as

well as aggregate, cross-country as well as country-specific, in order to monitor

results on the ground, assess the concrete reality of corruption, and develop

anticorruption programs.

A close examination of a particular context may even reveal that, in some circumstances,

the best prevention strategy is in fact not about corruption at all; anti-corruption campaigns,

anti-corruption commissions, ethics agencies, laws, decrees, codes of conduct and strategies

that concentrate on prosecution may not actually address the corruption incentives that exist in

a particular context and as a result not be genuinely preventative (Kaufmann 2005; see Box 9).

In some locations, for example, rather than establishing a specialised enforcement agency, a

better anti-corruption outcome might be achieved by less direct policy action that has no

immediate or apparent connection to the corrupt conduct being observed. More and better

schools (Rothstein 2011:163) or a fairer legal system (Uslaner 2005) or uniform public finance

standards (UNCAC Article 9) could be more effective.

BOX 9: Myth #6: Fight corruption by fighting corruption

A fallacy promoted by some in the field of anti-corruption, and at times also by the

international community, is that the best way to fight corruption is by fighting corruption—

13

http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/corruption.html accessed 6 December 2012

http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/corruption.html





that is, by means of yet another anti-corruption campaign, the creation of more anti-corruption

commissions and ethics agencies, and the incessant drafting of new laws, decrees, and codes

of conduct. Moreover, in some settings, the disproportionate emphasis on prosecutions—

typically of a few corporations or individuals, and often of the political opposition—at the

expense of a focus on prevention and incentives for integrity, has reduced the effectiveness of

anticorruption efforts. An instinctive tendency to over-regulate, which may take place in the

throes of a corruption scandal, is not infrequent, and can also be counterproductive. Excessive

regulations not only do not address the more fundamental causes of corruption, but often

create further opportunities for bribery. Overall, these anti-corruption initiatives-by-fiat appear

to have little impact, and often serve as politically expedient ways to react to the pressure to

“do something” about corruption. Often, this results in neglect of more fundamental and

systemic governance reforms.

Source: Daniel Kaufman “Myths and Realities of Governance and Corruption”, Chapter 2 in

Global Competitiveness Report 2005-06, World Economic Forum, October 2005 p 88.

This analysis suggests that matching the level of analysis to the level of application is

critical. Currently much of the data being used applied to prevention policy and interventions

concerns national and international levels of activity yet many of the standard responses are

for implementation at the organisation level.

If we accept that risk factors for corruption can be found at “the macro-level of

globalisation and nation states, the meso-level of organizations and the micro-level of

interactions of individuals” (Huisman and Vande Walle 2010), it is important to do the

analysis and the implementation at the site of the corruption problem.

For example a diagnosis of corruption that points to a corrupt syndrome involving elites is

not likely to be susceptible to a code of conduct for front line public officials or penalties for

failing to report corruption. Similarly, establishing an investigation agency at a national level

might be wasteful and counter-productive if the corruption problem is only serious in one

region or sector such as police or infrastructure and prevention initiatives can be directed at

specific administrative functions such as procurement.

Some recent initiatives have implicitly acknowledged the effect of context by examining

and responding to corruption in specific sectors or locations such as the OECD anti-bribery

typologies (OECD 2007; 2009; 2012) and the UNDP sector governance analysis of water,

health and education services (UNDP 2011a; UNDP 2011b; UNDP 2011c).

BOX 10: Mexico Ministry of Civil Service New Model of control and audit of

public works

This initiative relates to the creation of a new unit for control and auditing of public works

processes in Mexico. Since 2009, there has been a series of new policy initiatives from this





unit including training, the hosting of international forums on the auditing of public works,

and the development of strategies for specific sectors, such as the health sector.

The unit focuses on prevention of corrupt acts and control of public works, analysing all stages

of the work process: from planning to completion. Risk analyses, internal assessments, and

monitoring tools were adopted to prevent errors and to detect possible corruption in time, as

well as ensuring that the work was completed in time, within the budget and with the desired

quality.

The initiative’s approach and goal was to create a cleaner, more transparent and accountable

government, with citizens partaking and trusting the public institutions. With the help of the

monitoring of public work processes, including visits, direct audits and quality control to

ensure that the processes meet the required standards, the quality of the processes has greatly

improved.

Source: UNPAN UNPSA 2012 Programme Handbook p 65, Regional 1st Prize winner 2012

Local and municipal government for example has particular corruption risks. The concept

has been adapted at subnational levels for example in a local integrity system model (LIS) that

can be used to compare integrity systems at the municipal or city level around the world

(Huberts, Anechiarico and Six 2008). A large number of submissions to the United Nations

Public Service Awards (UNPSA) anti-corruption category have also targeted local government

operations. An initiative from Romania that won an award in the 2011 UNPS Awards was a

participatory corruption risk assessment process run at local government level. It identified six

activities particularly vulnerable to corruption (issuing of building permits; control of

construction works, public asset management, public procurement, property registration and

human resources management) and devised specific treatment and prevention plans (UNDESA

2011).

Several initiatives awarded in the United Nations Public Service Awards (UNPSA)

provide the kind of data needed by public sector agencies to develop their own responses and

capacity to prevent corruption. In 2012 one of the award winning entries was the Korea Anti-

corruption and Civil rights Commission (ACRC) Integrity Assessment. It identifies corruption

risks at the level of specific government activities or tasks rather than agencies or sectors by

assessing tasks at the organisational level. This gives public sector managers information

about their specific corruption problems that they can use to target their anti-corruption effort

efficiently. It was a conscious attempt to “shift the policy paradigm from punishment toward

prevention in order to address corruption in a more fundamental way and minimise the cost of

corruption” (see Box 10).





BOX 11: The Integrity Assessment Korea Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights

Commission (ACRC)

During the late 1990s and early 2000s the Korean government made strenuous efforts to

reduce corruption. In response to a perception that a reactive and passive anti-corruption

system focusing on detection and punishment could not solve the problem the Korea Anti-

Corruption and Civil Rights Commission (ACRC) developed the Integrity Assessment.

The Assessment was intended to help to shift the policy focus away from punishment to

prevention and to encourage public sector agencies to voluntarily take action to reduce

corruption. It gives public sector agencies information about the level of corruption in the

tasks they perform so that they can focus their corruption prevention efforts more efficiently.

Unlike other tools to diagnose corruption it provides information about the level of corruption

on evidence and experience rather than on perceptions of corruption. It also differs from

previous methods that examine corruption in broad areas of government activity such as

national defence, education, and taxation, by using the task as the unit of analysis.

The Assessment is based on the results of a survey of the users (internal and external) of

more than 2,700 tasks of about 700 public organizations, including central administrative

organizations, local governments and public-related organizations. The number of respondents

has increased to over 250,000 which is the largest number of respondents for any survey

conducted by a government organisation.

Respondents are asked about their perception of corruption, their experience of corruption,

the transparency of process and the accountability of public officials. The scores calculated

from these results are disclosed to the public through the media showing the “integrity level”

of each public organisation.

Since the Integrity Assessment was introduced in 2002, the “overall integrity index” of the

Korean public sector has increased consistently and the level of corruption experienced by

citizens dealing with public service is declining. This information has been used as a reference

by lawmakers, media, and academics.

Many public sector agencies conduct the survey more frequently than the annual national

Assessment to enable more specific corruption risk management. The methodology can be

readily adapted and has attracted interest from several other countries in the region.

Source: Edited from Korea Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission (ACRC) submission

to United Nations Public Service Awards 2012 (Regional 1st Prize Winner)

The same objective prompted three other initiatives entered in the 2012 UNPS Awards.

The 2012 award-winning project of the Mauritius ICAC to institutionalise strategic corruption

prevention also proposes a more genuinely preventative, rather than reactive, anti-corruption

approach but at the level of public sector agencies (see Box 11). Its distinctive features were to

identify and deal with specific agency level corruption risks and use the agency’s own

leadership and staff to implement the strategy with the ICAC as an available resource.





BOX 12: Public Sector Anti-Corruption Framework Independent Commission

Against Corruption, Mauritius

The Mauritius ICAC has a threefold role to investigate complaints of corruption, educate

the public about the dangers of corruption and oversee integrity systems in public sector

agencies. As part of this mandate the ICAC developed Corruption Prevention Reviews (CPRs)

to identify the corruption risks in specific government agencies and develop appropriate anti-

corruption measures to address them. These reviews have been in high demand by public

agencies but the ICAC found that they consume a lot of ICAC staff time and encourage public

sector agencies to rely on the ICAC for ongoing anti-corruption efforts.

As a solution the ICAC developed the Public Sector Anti-Corruption Framework

(PSACF) to be a self-administered, proactive tool for detecting and preventing corrupt

practices in organisations which also builds the capacity of public agencies to develop,

implement and sustain their own anti-corruption initiatives.

For the United Nations Public Service Award, the ICAC demonstrated the PSACF using

the example of two public sector organisations which regularly experience allegations of

corruption against their staff. The Civil Status Division (CSD) is responsible for registration of

birth, death, marriage and civil status certificates and was found through a CPR to have high

levels of staff autonomy and demands from the public for prompt certificate delivery and the

celebration of marriages (especially of minors under 16 years, which is illegal in Mauritius).

These factors provided opportunities for bribery, abuse of office, and favouritism in posting

officers to offices where registration of marriage between foreigners is high.

The CPR of the Mauritius Police Force (MPF), whose responsibilities include the

enforcement of road traffic offences, identified high levels of discretion of officers in the

exercise of their functions and the lack of a comprehensive database on contraventions as

factors allowing bribery in issuing and processing contraventions, tampering with data and the

protection of offenders from punishment for road traffic offences.

Both the CSD and MPF followed the main elements of the PSACF by:

having their management teams sign Anti-Corruption Commitments to demonstrate

their commitment to implement the framework,

designating a person at management level to head the project

setting up an implementation committee to formulate their own anti-corruption policy

which were disseminated to staff, management and stakeholders to ensure effective

implementation.

The next step is a corruption risk management (CRM) exercise by the implementation

committee to identify and analyse risks of corruption and develop methods to minimise and

manage the risks. Preventative strategies will be implemented and monitored by the

Implementation Committee, reviewed against performance indicators to measure the





effectiveness of strategies and progress reported to management and the ICAC. The ICAC also

provides:

corruption prevention tools such as model policies, templates and guidelines

an ex officio member of the implementation committee to advise A representative of

the ICAC was also assigned to join the implementation committee to provide assistance and

guidance.

education sessions and programmes for expertise and technical knowledge (Capacity

Building Programme), and awareness of corruption offences and ethical obligations (Integrity

Building Programme).

As a result of the PSACF process both the MPF and CSD have permanent internal

structures to deal with corruption prevention and ethical issues and anti-corruption plans which

are publicly available on the agencies’ websites. The number of complaints of corruption in

the CSD has declined and the staff of the MPF are now reporting members of the public who

offer benefits. The MPF has applied the PSACF to the whole police force and 10 more public

sector bodies have begun to apply it.

Source: Edited from Mauritius Independent Commission Against Corruption submission to

United Nations Public Service Awards 2012 (Regional 1st Prize Winner)

The capacity needed in public administration to prevent corruption is generally thought of

in terms of specialized anti-corruption policies or agencies such as law enforcement skills and

effectiveness. In fact, because investigation and enforcement methods are essentially reactive

measures they have a limited preventative role. If corruption is understood to occur as the

result of a wide range of factors and enablers, public administration capacity can, and should,

be developed to address all of them. In addition to legal and regulatory frameworks, three

other areas can be prioritised to prevent corruption: the effectiveness of public institutions,

human resources management and the engagement of citizens.

These are the principal policy levers used in public administration against a range of

societal harms including corruption. Like responses to other harms, effective prevention will

start from an accurate understanding of the conduct and the context in which it happens. This

calls for capacity in research and data collection about what works in which circumstances

(deGraaf 2007), continuous learning and an open mind to other communities of practice

(Sparrow 2008) and, given the dynamic and complex character of the corruption problem,

some patience, because (Khan 2012:7):

The incremental steps that a society needs to take to address corruption depend

very much on identifying what can be feasibly achieved in that context and then

focusing public energies on making what is feasible happen. The result may not

be a measurable reduction of aggregate corruption and it is therefore very

important not to define a reduction in aggregate corruption indicators as an

immediate target. This is important in order to avoid demoralization and public

exhaustion with anticorruption agendas.





Chapter 4:

Preventing Corruption: Turning What We Know Into

What We Do

If there is one lesson to be learnt from the history of anti-corruption activity, it is

that there are no individual solutions but a cocktail of measures, no silver bullets

but a mixture of successes and failures and no quick fixes but a long hard

learning process.14

The limits of regulation and law enforcement

Regulation and accompanying law enforcement is often the first response to any

undesirable phenomenon and laws proscribing bribery and misconduct in public office

have existed for centuries in many countries. In 2001 the World Bank reported that

because “enacting an anti-corruption law is a speedy, inexpensive way to start

addressing” corruption proscriptive anti-corruption laws had “proliferated throughout

the developed world” (Messick 2001: 1).

In anti-corruption terms a state’s legal systems play a unique role in raising

awareness by authoritatively articulating undesirable conduct, and in their potential to

deter corrupt conduct by prosecuting and imposing penalties. The behaviours

traditionally targeted by corruption offences have been bribery and actions that

equated to improper public official behaviour misconduct in public office or breach of

public trust. The range of specific types of corrupt behaviours commonly regulated

now includes those required by the United Nations Convention Against Corruption

(UNCAC) to be criminalized: bribery, embezzlement, influence peddling, abuse of

office, illicit enrichment, and money laundering (UNODC 2004a).

Formal proscription of these behaviours is not always straightforward and policy

makers are faced with choices. Breaches of electoral law, lobbying regulation, post-

separation employment and mandatory disclosure rules can constitute either criminal

or administrative offences while less serious impropriety might also be dealt with in

administrative legal instruments such as civil service laws or codes that govern the

employment of public officials. UNCAC Article 8 requires codes articulating

standards of conduct.

14

deSousa 2009:12





Proscribing conduct does not guarantee it will be prevented. Criminal, civil and

administrative instruments used to prevent corruption all face similar kinds of

challenges such as chronic non-compliance, a tendency to use laws and rules as a

quick fix, and the risk of overregulation and inefficiency. Understanding these

challenges can highlight opportunities for building the capacity of regulatory

frameworks.

Non-compliance with anti-corruption and other regulation can happen for several

reasons. It may be that a country “has all the requisite laws and institutions in place.

The challenge comes in enforcement of the laws” (Boona 2012).

Understanding the reasons for a lack of enforcement might lead to repealing or

amending failed laws so that chronic non-compliance or non-enforcement does not

undermine the credibility of the legal system. The perceived legitimacy of the

authority imposing rules, the fairness and reasonableness of those rules and trust that

they will be properly applied can all be relevant to citizens failing to comply with

regulation (Batory 2012).

Reducing abuses and engendering trust in the court system were some of the goals

of an innovative project of the Ministry of Justice in Turkey to use SMS technology to

inform litigants of court appearances and decisions.

BOX 13: SMS Information System Ministry of Justice Turkey

The SMS Information System, introduced by the Ministry of Justice, was designed to

address declining confidence in judicial bodies as a result of abuse of judicial procedures by

parties to proceedings, lawyers and even staff of the judiciary. Proceedings could be

commenced and finalised against individuals without their knowledge. Judgements could be

entered against parties in their absence when they did not receive notification of the

proceedings. In some instances lawyers might fail to attend court without informing their

clients resulting in an unfavourable outcome.

Turkey has the most concentrated population in its region and a very high rate of mobile

phone use - the number of mobile phones in Turkey equals the number of people. It also has a

high rate of court cases. However not all citizens have the same awareness of the law or the

capacity to assert their legal rights.

The aim of the System is to ensure that all parties to proceedings in law courts receive

accurate and reliable information about any proceedings that affect them. It provides an

automatic update of information directly from the court to the parties by SMS to their mobile

phones. This removes the opportunity for abuse of information and allows for all relevant

parties to receive the information they need to enforce their legal rights.





The technical integration of all GSM operators and SMS services operating in Turkey

allows messages to be transmitted directly to a single sender name and only a single number

displayed without the intervention of a service provider. The System has proven to be reliable,

time saving and cost effective and is being used by all parties to legal proceedings and their

lawyers. Other government services have begun to apply similar SMS delivery systems.

The main impact of this initiative has been to increase the transparency of the judicial

system and trust in the judiciary. Parties to judicial proceedings can more easily identify any

abuses of process encouraging judicial offices to be more careful and try not to make any

mistakes. Subscribers to the SMS System have begun to lodge complaints with judicial

offices when they observe problems and to send appreciative emails about the System.

Source: Edited from Turkey Ministry of Justice submission to United Nations Public Service

Awards 2012 (Regional 1st Prize Winner 2012)

Excessive regulation is another possible incentive for non-compliance and

avoidance. A “panoptic” vision of corruption control that accumulates new regulatory

measures without discarding old ones has been associated with increased corruption

opportunities and economic burdens for those who comply (Anechiarico & Jacobs

1994: 472). Regular reviews of the amount and efficiency of regulation can be part of

a national anti-corruption strategy (see Box 14).

BOX 14: Administrative simplification to improve the efficiency of the

government

All Mexican Federal Public Administration (APF) agencies have internal rules whose

purpose is to regulate administrative activities carried out by these agencies. The Ministry of

Public Administration devised a strategy to reform the regulatory framework to reduce,

standardize and simplify existing rules across the APF. This involved generating quality

standards, automation and integration of internal processes of all agencies with a vision

centered on the citizen, across all nine areas. The government began a series of reforms,

including the elimination of unnecessary rules, placing limits on the issuance of new rules,

granting limited exceptions in attempts to issue provisions, and provide assurance through

transparency, to citizens concerning such reforms. Improvements include: a significant

reduction of rules, simplification of procedures for standardization, and an increase in the

efficiency of administrative processes.

Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2011 Good Practices and

Innovations in Public Governance United Nations Public Service Awards Winners, 2003-2011

New York, 2011 p 26





Legal regulation and enforcement can be a blunt instrument whose effectiveness is

improved when it is used in conjunction with administrative processes. An example from

Greece to control corruption in government procurement contracts uses law as a framework

for a traditional administrative oversight mechanism - audit. The process is conducted under

the auspices of the Supreme Audit Court which has the authority to invoke legal sanctions in

the event of impropriety or corruption found by the audit. The audit is used as a prevention

tool and the legal penalty reactively as a last resort combining the threat of judicial

enforcement with a capacity to perform (see Box 16).

Compliance can also be improved if legal regulatory measures selected are suited to the

purpose to be achieved. Asset declaration rules, for example, requiring public officials to make

regular public disclosure of their personal assets might be introduced in one jurisdiction for the

purpose of managing conflicts of interests of public officials. In another context these rules

might be part of a legislative regime to expose illicit enrichment (see Box 15). The design of

the system will vary with the outcome to be achieved.

Successful regulation will also be designed with a knowledge of the population it is

intended to target. Citizens who do not comply with regulation might be affected by the

possible penalties or the cost; the likelihood of getting caught; their capacity to comply; and

the amount of information they have about the regulation, their rights, how to comply or report

corruption. Ideally it will be implemented using an approach that would raise “awareness

among target groups, take existing social norms into account, and rely on positive incentives

as well as, or rather than, increasing penalties” (Batory 2012: 1).

The effectiveness of a legal framework in preventing corruption depends on the capacity

of individual public officials who develop regulation, public authorities who implement it and

the cooperation of institutions – cultural, social and political. Compliance with most

regulation requires knowledge, skills, time, and economic resources on the part of citizens.

Ultimately it can be undermined by regulation that cannot be complied with because those

being regulated do not have capacity to comply in terms of cost, information, skills or trust

(Villareal 2012). Regulation that is designed in a way that reduces the capacity required to

comply with it; easy to understand, to access and to comply with as well as easier to

administer allows all regulatory stakeholders to function as anti-corruption actors (Villareal

2012: 31; 47; Box 12; Box 13).

BOX 15: Asset declaration systems – designing for the context

Income and asset declaration (IAD) systems require that public officials declare their

income, assets, and financial interests. They are intended to prevent and help detect the use of

public office for private gain, and to help build a climate of integrity in public administration.

As a corruption prevention mechanism, an IAD system can provide timely and much-needed

guidance to officials about the principles and behaviors of ethical conduct in public office, and

remind them that their behavior is subject to scrutiny.





There are a wide variety of approaches in IAD system design and implementation and a

wide variety of challenges faced by different systems … there is no single optimal approach to

IAD system design and implementation. Context is essential.

Understanding the context … the effectiveness of an IAD system is, to a large extent,

dependent on elements of the broader institutional, cultural, and political environment in

which it operates (effective prosecution in the courts for the enforcement of criminal

sanctions; the availability of banking, tax, or property databases for verifying declarations;

degree of institutionalization of ethics codes and their enforcement in the public sector, and so

forth). These elements could ultimately determine the effectiveness of an IAD regime. An

assessment of these factors prior to designing or upgrading an IAD system is, therefore,

important to ensure a good fi t between the agency’s role, functions, and procedures and the

broader environment. The key principle here is that context matters. These external factors

should also be reviewed as they evolve and change over time. And it is worth noting that an

IAD agency and its procedures may influence developments in the broader environment. For

example, an IAD agency can proactively work to alter public understanding and attitudes

toward ethics and corruption, thereby altering the environment in which it operates.

There is no single best-practice design that will achieve optimal outcomes in every

context, because these outcomes depend on factors that vary in scope and intensity across

countries. In practice, IAD systems are far from standardized internationally and may differ

within a country between branches of government and from federal to regional and municipal

levels. Despite these variations, there are a number of key questions that all policy makers and

administrators face when determining which type of IAD system to adopt, or when making

changes or improvements to an IAD system:

What needs or behaviors is the system intended to address? Decisions about the design of

an IAD system should be determined by the behaviors the system is intended to address, and

by consideration of the environment (institutional, political) in which it will operate. … for

countries where perceptions of corruption are high, a system designed to detect illicit

enrichment might be important. Assisting officials to detect and avoid potential conflicts of

interest, while a priority for most countries, acquires greater significance within an IAD

framework if oversight mechanisms are not institutionalized in public service—for example, if

there is not yet a code of ethics that civil servants understand and behave in accordance with,

or an environment in which line managers or designated ethics officials can credibly provide

oversight and guidance on potential conflicts of interest.

Source: Extracted from World Bank 2012 Public Office, Private Interests Washington DC: pp

1-5; 17; 20.





Effective public institutions

We know that corruption is more prevalent when the institutions of governance and public

administration are weak or ineffective (Khan 2012). Corruption has often been described as

evidence of institutional failure, specifically the failure of public administration in one or more

of its many agencies

Public sector institutions are the place where corruption happens but they also play a

significant role in preventing corruption. They are needed not only to enforce anti-corruption

regulation but to implement some of the “more fundamental and systemic governance

reforms” that are sometimes overlooked when resources are focused on legal institutions

(Kaufman 2005:88).

Structurally, agencies of public administration take many administrative and legal forms.

They might be state authorities, departments, public offices, schools or hospitals that deliver

government policies and programs all with greater and lesser proximity to the budgetary and

authoritative centres of government.

We know that most corruption occurs at the boundaries of public sector organisations

where a government official interacts with the private actor such as in public procurement.

Recognising the high risk of corruption in procurement the UNCAC, in Article 9, requires the

development of public procurement systems that include:

(a) The public distribution of information relating to procurement procedures and

contracts, including information on invitations to tender and relevant or pertinent

information on the award of contracts, allowing potential tenderers sufficient time to

prepare and submit their tenders;

(b) The establishment, in advance, of conditions for participation, including selection and

award criteria and tendering rules, and their publication;

(c) The use of objective and predetermined criteria for public procurement decisions, in

order to facilitate the subsequent verification of the correct application of the rules or

procedures;

(d) An effective system of domestic review, including an effective system of appeal, to

ensure legal recourse and remedies in the event that the rules or procedures established

pursuant to this paragraph are not followed;

(e) Where appropriate, measures to regulate matters regarding personnel responsible for

procurement, such as declaration of interest in particular public procurements,

screening procedures and training requirements

In addition to these fundamental measures for preventing corruption in procurement many

governments are developing unique initiatives to suit their circumstances. In Greece, the

system of “domestic review” that allows for government contracts to be audited by the

Supreme Court of Audit before the contract is awarded uses a traditionally ex poste review

process in a preventative way to prevent corruption in public procurement.





BOX 16: Combining legal and administrative methods to prevent corruption in

public procurement

Anti-corruption measures operate in many different ways. Some target individuals while

others are aimed at the systems within which individuals operate. They may apply at national,

organisational or international level and derive from legal or administrative sources of

authority on the basis of any of a range of technical or theoretical disciplines. The most

apparent difference is that they may be imposed before or after the corrupt act that they are

intended to prevent.

Most prevention initiatives possess more than one of these features, but this does not mean

that all available approaches are simply applied to every kind of corruption. This principle

informed the national system for the audit of public contracts introduced in Greece as a

measure to prevent corruption in the high risk activity of public procurement.

The procedure to be followed by all public authorities in awarding a public contract in

Greece has a well-defined legal framework regulated by national and European Union statutes.

Despite being governed by precise rules and a predetermined, auditable methodology,

procurement processes can still be undermined. Typical examples are when non-technical

members of evaluation panels are swayed by others, or panel members have personal

associations with tenderers. This sort of conduct is hard to prove beyond reasonable doubt and

may be part of a long-term relationship that no party will expose. In any case legal processes

are slow and expensive. Consequently a punitive prevention model based on legal remedies

was considered not effective to prevent corruption in procurement.

The judicial audit of public contracts by the Supreme Court of Audit that has been

introduced in Greece is preventative in time as well as in purpose. It begins immediately after

the selection of a preferred tenderer but before award of the contract and must be completed

before the contract is signed. An auditor or judge of the Supreme Court of Audit (depending

on the value of the contract) audits the entire procedure from start to finish by examining the

whole file of the procedure for breaches of the procedural rules. If breaches are found, the

Contracting Authority and the bidder are ordered to abstain from signing the public contract.

If none are found, the Contracting Authority and the bidder are ordered to sign the public

contract.

Any one of the Contracting Authority, the bidder, the other tenderers, or the Office of the

Commissioner General of the State (representing the public interest) can, within 15 days,

challenge the decision in a trial before the relevant Court which can annul the audit result. This

decision must be issued within 30 days and a final appeal can be made to the Grand Chamber

of the Court. If no appeal is made or substantiated, the initial decision is irrevocable and binds

all litigants.





The system is preventive, and objective focusing on process without investigating the

actual events of the specific case or the intentions of the persons involved. It is based on the

principle that predetermined, defined procedures reflected in written procedures and supported

by a legal framework and make corrupt conduct more difficult to perpetrate.

Source: An edited summary of a paper by Ioannis P. Karkalis presented at

UNDESA/UNPADM Joint Experts Group Meeting and Capacity Development Workshop on

Preventing Corruption in Public Administration: Citizens Engagement for Improved

Transparency and Accountability 26-28 June 2012.

In the Slovakian town of Martin, public concern about corruption in procurement

encouraged the city government to undertake a transparency initiative which was a

prizewinner in the 2011 UNPS Awards. Part of the strategy was an online bidding system that

minimises corruption opportunities in public procurement.15

The finalists and winners in the United Nations Public Service Awards for Preventing and

Combating Corruption in the Public Service in 2011 and 2012 included more initiatives to

reduce corruption in public procurement than in any other activity of public administration.

Most initiatives used information and communication technology (ICT) applications to create

online systems for bidding for government contracts, registration for government tenders or

both.

A similar procurement system to coordinate procurement across the Egyptian

Government’s ministries received a regional award in 2011. The new on-line portal allows

suppliers to search for government tenders across Egypt and submit electronic proposals

ensuring equal opportunity for suppliers and price competitiveness for government (UNDESA

2011: 23) and reducing the risk of improper interference in the process.

In 2012 UNPSA finalists included the Saudi Arabia Commission for Tourism and

Antiquities Procurement and Contracts Portal which replaced a manual bidding system that

was slow, labour intensive and not transparent. The electronic bidding system requires bidders

to register only once, holds confidential information in a secure accessible format, and creates

an audit trail to enhance accountability.16

15

http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un-dpadm/unpan049777.pdf accessed 9

December 2012 16

www.unpan.org/DPADM/UNPSDayAwards/KnowledgeBaseofUNPublicServiceAwards/tabid/1260/langu









BOX 17: Singapore Building and Construction Authority Promoting

accountability for procurement of public projects through the Contractor

Registration System (CRS)

Public sector procurement of infrastructure and building services projects in Singapore

constitutes about 40-60% of total construction demand annually. The Contractor Registration

System (CRS) was set-up in 1985 to amalgamate the registers of all public sector agencies and

provide a one-stop registration service to all contractors who tender for public sector

construction projects.

Before 1985, contractors interested in government projects had to register separately with

each of the major government agencies responsible for public housing, schools, hospitals and

industrial and infrastructures on roads, drainage, waterworks and port facilities. Each agency

had its own construction project procurement criteria for pre-qualifying contractors for

inclusion in its register. Each register had its own procurement criteria, registration fees,

tendering limits, pre-qualification requirements and procedural rules. No registration

information was shared between agencies so that poorly performing contractors could be

awarded contracts from agencies unaware of their record.

The cost to potential contractors of complying with all of the relevant procurement rules

was high and the various systems of individual agencies were not transparent to contractors or

the public. There was also a corruption risk in an agency performing two potentially

conflicting roles in relation to contractors: regulating their admission to the agency’s register

and awarding contracts to them.

Since 1985 the Building Construction Authority has maintained the CRS independent of

all public sector agencies, reducing the opportunity for kickbacks and collusion in awarding

contracts. It is now mandatory for all government agencies wishing to procure construction of

building and infrastructure to use a contractor who is registered on the CRS.

To become registered contractors must satisfy a uniform set of criteria about experience,

financial resources and technical expertise. The BCA retains a searchable database of reports

on the performance of registered contractors in each project together with a list of contractors

debarred from tendering of public projects due to malpractice. This allows the BCA to

encourage the professional and technical skills of contractors. The number of registered

contractors has risen from 2000 in 1985 to more than 9500 today, including foreign companies

wishing to tender for projects in Singapore. The CRS has also attracted interest from other

countries in the region and other parts of the world.

Source: Edited from Singapore Building and Construction Authority submission to United

Nations Public Service Awards 2012 Regional 2nd

Prize Winner.





The Singapore Building and Construction Authority Contractors Registration System (see

Box 17) also features once-only registration, is transparent to government agencies and

contractors reducing opportunities for manipulation and increasing public trust. The State

Procurement Agency of Georgia won a UNPS Award for a procurement system that executes

every stage of all public procurements by all government agencies on line (see Box 18).

Inefficiency in the delivery of public services is an obvious corruption risk as processes

that are slow or hard to understand can affect both incentives and opportunities for corrupt

conduct on both sides of a potential corrupt transaction (Rose-Ackerman 1996; ICAC 2003;

CIPE 2011). This was recognised by many of the submissions to the UNPS Awards in 2011

and 2012 which included initiatives to reduce the amount of regulation and streamline public

processes in order to in turn reduce the risk of corruption. In Mexico, the introduction of the

online National Public Procurement System was combined with a review of obsolete and

obscure procurement regulation as a way of increasing efficiency and reducing corruption

risks.

BOX 18: Mexico Ministry of Civil Service National Public Procurement System

(Sistema Nacional de Contrataciones Públicas)

This initiative relates to the National Development Program (2007-2012) which sought to

overhaul the public procurement system and related policies in Mexico. The National Public

Procurement System achieved inter-institutional coordination of public procurement policy,

eliminated obsolete and redundant regulations and established clear rules. Specialized areas

were strengthened, and procedures for dealing with disputes and sanctions were established.

Additionally, the system implemented CompraNet, an electronic system for government

procurement. Since 2009, the changes have led to savings of approximately 3,500 million

pesos, and a reduction in execution time of up to 95%. As of the second half of 2011,

CompraNet had served almost 10,000 users, consisting of more than 2300 units, and had 300

buyers from different agencies and entities. The outcomes of the new system also signified an

establishment of an evaluation mechanism that favours quality over price.

Source: United Nations Public Service Awards 2012Programme Handbook Awards Ceremony

and Forum p 66

These initiatives range from a comprehensive review of regulatory frameworks across

government to eliminate unnecessary rules and duplicated procedures, such the Mexican

Ministry of Public Administration administrative simplification program in 2011, to initiatives

intended to streamline specific government programs such as:

electronic scanning of the original election result notices from voting stations to reduce

the risk of fraud and increase efficiency - South Africa Electoral Commission Result

Slip Scanning Project (UNDESA 2011);





an electronic database of migrant worker applications replacing a system of contracted

private labour hire brokers - Korea Human Resources Development Service Migrant &

Business-Friendly Recruitment System (UNDESA 2011);

a recruiting system that allows job applicants to submit applications by mobile phone -

Oman Civil Service Central (2011);

an electronic system for managing the application, award and monitoring of

educational welfare scholarships - India (Andhra Pradesh) Centre for Good Governance

ePASS (2012);17

automatic notification by SMS all parties to court proceedings of developments in their

case - Turkey Ministry of Justice SMS Information System (2012) (see Box 13).

These examples all use information and communications technology (ICT) to reduce

corruption risks that exist in manual and face-to-face transactions. Automated systems feature

many standard systemic corruption prevention techniques: they operate according to a

predetermined process; they reduce the need and opportunity for discretionary decisions; they

increase the security of information, access and approvals; and they create audit trails.

BOX 19: State Procurement Agency of Georgia Georgian Electronic Government

Procurement System (Ge-GP)

In 2010 the Georgian Electronic Government Procurement System (Ge-GP) replaced the

traditional paper-based tendering system for all government procurement in Georgia. The

reform of the state procurement system was part of a broader economic liberalisation strategy

and the general anti-corruption strategy. It aimed to achieve rational expenditure of funds

designated for the state procurement, promote healthy competition in procurement area to

guarantee fair and non-discriminatory market.

Corruption risks were endemic in the former State Procurement System providing

opportunities for kick-backs, bribery, trading in influence and unlawful acceptance of gifts.

The need for multiple paper copies made document registration and control difficult.

Some tenders required qualification documents from other agencies which were time

consuming to obtain.

Tenderers were often required to attend in person at the procuring agency’s premises

several times as part of the tender process which disadvantaged contractors who were

geographically remote.

The high cost of participation in tenders discouraged many companies and encouraged

the formation of a group of privileged suppliers.

17www.unpan.org/DPADM/UNPSDayAwards/KnowledgeBaseofUNPublicServiceAwards/tabid/1260/language/en-US/Default.aspx accessed 9 December 2012.







These practices are no longer necessary because by law all procurement procedures for

tenders valued over $3000 must be executed using the Ge-GP. In an effort to increase

transparency and a fair marketplace all procurement information is also now accessible and

available online including annual procurement plans of all procuring entities (over 3000),

tender notices, tender documentation, bids and bidding documents, decisions of tender

evaluation panels, all relevant correspondence, and all contracts.

Using an easily accessible electronic system allows even low value contracts to be

efficiently tendered for in an open and transparent way (previously, contracts could be directly

negotiated for goods valued at less than $30000 and services valued at less than $60000.) Even

bidders who are geographically remote can participate equally in tenders and the number of

tenders has risen from 2000 tenders in 2008 to more than 33000 in 2011. The Ge-GP also has

a facility to identify blacklisted companies automatically preclude them from tenders.

Source: Edited from State Procurement Agency of Georgia submission to United Nations

Public Service Awards 2012 Regional 2nd

Prize Winner

Anti-corruption agencies are also public institutions whose effectiveness is critical to the

prevention of corruption. These agencies are by definition and role distinctive and separate

from the mainstream public sector. Maintaining their unique skill sets and operational integrity

are among their greatest challenges. For this reason UNCAC Article 6 notes that (UNCAC Art

6(2):

Each State Party shall grant the body or bodies referred to in paragraph

1 of this article the necessary independence, in accordance with the fundamental

principles of its legal system, to enable the body or bodies to carry out

its or their functions effectively and free from any undue influence. The necessary

material resources and specialized staff, as well as the training that such

staff may require to carry out their functions, should be provided.

Since the 1990s, more than 30 countries have established some form of anti-corruption

agency (Meagher and Voland 2006) and they continue to appear. Often this is to comply with

UNCAC Article 36 or Article 6 (Hussman et al 2009) which requires the existence of anti-

corruption bodies to implement the policies and disseminate anti-corruption knowledge.

A number of initiatives entered in the UNPS Awards demonstrated the unique opportunity

that centralised or independent integrity agencies18

have in supporting the work of public

sector organisations to prevent corruption (see Box 11; Box 12).

The design of the classic tripartite model for anti-corruption agencies comprises three

main functions: investigation, prevention and education with the overriding twin goal of

exposing corruption or misconduct and promoting integrity. Typical of the prevention work of

18

Such as those from Korea, Romania, Mauritius, Slovenia and Malaysia; and from Netherlands Public

Ethics Office and Mexico Central Audit Unit.





ACAs is an initiative of the Netherlands BIOS (Office for promoting ethics and integrity in the

public sector) to provide an independent specialised agency to support public sector

organisations maintain their own integrity strategies. Its role is to develop resources and tools,

disseminate research and knowledge about best practice, and facilitate coordination between

agencies (UNDESA 2011).

Anti-corruption authorities with research capacity can be the location of an evidence base

for corruption prevention. Data from complaints received can highlight corruption risks inside

organisations in addition to actual corrupt conduct. Formal surveys of citizens experience of

corruption, and corruption risks, are a valuable supplement to perceptions data (Treisman

2007; Lambsdorff 2005; Langseth 2001) and information from perpetrators using ACAs data

have been found to be useful (DeGraaf and Huberts 2008; Haigh and Tasker 2011). In some

contexts the independence of ACAs from the agencies of public administration will also make

them particularly suitable for supporting and promoting corruption prevention initiatives that

involve citizens as well as agencies.

Some of the key opportunities for developing the effectiveness of public institutions to

prevent corruption demonstrated by these examples are:

Using ICT to maintain efficient systems that reduce corruption risks and engage

citizens

Being aware of the specific risks facing each public sector organisation or the tasks it

performs

Maximising the prevention role of anti-corruption agencies to support public sector

organisations to treat these risks.

Developing human resources capacity to prevent corruption

Institutional responses to corruption often focus on an individual public official.

Corruption investigations seek to find culprits, lay blame and punish. The best to be hoped for

in such a situation might be that a sufficient penalty will deter others from doing the same. But

because corruption is complex simple deterrence will not always work unless part of a larger

strategy.

Many of the corruption risk factors that originate with individuals (the “people” factors)

can be addressed to some extent by the organisation using its human resources policy and

practice. Developing capacity in human resources management (HRM) has the potential to

prevent corruption at two levels. The first is ensuring that individual public officials have the

skills and motivation to do their work ethically. At the wider organisational level the way

individuals are managed and rewarded can support or undermine individual motivation to do

the right thing. The relevant UNCAC provisions appear in Article 7 Public sector (see Box 2).

Factors that motivate public officials vary but the question of remuneration of public

officials is longstanding in the anti-corruption literature. Early analysis maintained that

increasing public sector salaries would only increase the size of bribes but in fact the role of

low salaries as a corruption risk may be more complex. When public sector salaries are at least





competitive with the private sector (as recommended by the UNCAC Technical Guide:

UNODC 2009: 16) public officials may have less incentive to ask for a bribe than those who

are “under the pressure of unmet critical needs such as food, housing, education and health for

themselves and their dependants” (Kauzya 2012: 16). A low paid, but not impoverished,

public official who feels, nonetheless, aggrieved by the salary and entitled to pick up extra

benefits where possible, may be less inclined to ask for a bribe but still inclined to accept one.

Alternatively, good workers who are offered a higher salary to join a private firm might not do

so if they have other incentives to stay, thereby retaining important public sector skills which

are also valuable weapons against corruption (Quah 2004).

A perception of unfair treatment in terms of pay or other reasons is one risk factor for

deviant workplace behaviour (Tomlinson and Greenberg 2005) that can be managed by human

resources practices. Policies such as those listed in UNCAC Article 7 that ensure fair

remuneration and advancement and access to entitlements are a core part of an organisation’s

corruption prevention framework.

Attendance at training programs is often prescribed for individuals who engage in less

serious forms of corrupt conduct as a rehabilitative measure. But, as envisaged in the UNCAC

Technical Guide (UNODC 2009: 16) training programs should be a standard element of

organisational integrity systems (Paine 1994). All public officials need guidance and

reminders about the professional ethics expected of them and regular training can keep public

officials aware of essential preventative action such as managing conflicts of interest (see Box

20) and whistleblowing (see Box 23). This is particularly important for preventing the kind of

inadvertent non-compliance or “unintentional deviance” (Warren 2005:133) that can be the

beginning of a slippery slope into more serious behaviour if not controlled.

Public officials who work in isolated locations with high exposure to corruption risks such

as public procurement or revenue collection are likely to benefit from more frequent or

targeted corruption awareness training. They are also more likely to be affected by

organisational prevention policies controlling conflicts of interest, the receipt of gifts and

benefits and asset disclosure. The UNCAC groups these guiding and correcting corruption

prevention policies with codes of conduct in Article 8 as awareness raising measures for public

officials.

BOX 20: Proactive prevention – guidance for everyone

Regulation, such as conflicts of interest and anti-corruption laws, applies to the following

groups of public officials in different ways:

The incorruptible – Whose conduct reflects the nation’s values and who comply with

the applicable laws, rules, and regulations, provided the official knows what those rules and

regulations are and understands them

To guide their actions, these officials require only an understandable conflicts of interest

code, timely advice and training, and clear personnel rules.





The corrupt – Whose conduct reflects a view of public service as a means to personal

enrichment, scorning the nation’s values and disregarding applicable laws, rules, and

regulations.

Having little regard for the public interest, these officials must be removed from public

service as quickly as possible and criminally prosecuted.

The corruptible – Whose conduct will usually reflect the nation’s values and who will

generally follow the applicable laws, rules, and regulations, but who are susceptible to the

temptation to go astray.

These officials require not only knowledge of the conflicts of interest code, timely advice

and training, and clear personnel rules but also convincing proof that the code, rules, and

official misconduct criminal laws will be strictly enforced. Anti-corruption laws focus

overwhelmingly on the corrupt official. These laws address corrupt activity like bribery and

kickbacks and theft of government funds and services. The enforcement of these laws requires

undercover agents and wiretapping and sting operations.

Throughout the world, most public servants are honest and want to do the right thing. So

what are we doing for those honest public servants? Are we providing them with guidance on

how to stay out of ethical trouble? Are we protecting them against superiors or co-workers or

outside forces that try to lead them astray? Are we reassuring our citizens that our public

servants are serving the public and not themselves? Do we have a system in place that keeps

our honest public servants honest and that discourages dishonesty, not by punishing it but by

preventing it? Are we creating a culture of integrity, not because of a fear of being caught but

because of a commitment to values? That is what a conflicts of interest system does. And that

is why it is so critically important. Yet, too often in the concern over corruption and the rush to

combat it, a government fails to address the needs of its honest officials.

A conflicts of interest system guides the incorruptible and helps deter the corruptible. It

has virtually no effect on the corrupt – on the bribe receivers and kickback takers; for them

society has those undercover operations and criminal laws and jail time. But that is for

prosecutors, not for conflicts of interest agencies. Conflicts of interest agencies are not in the

business of catching crooks.

Source: Summarised from a paper prepared by Mark Davies for UNDESA/DPADM Joint

Experts Group Meeting and Capacity Development Workshop on Preventing Corruption in

Public Administration: Citizens Engagement for Improved Transparency and Accountability

26-28 June 2012 pp4-5

Codes of conduct are sometimes derided as meaningless pieces of paper but they can

articulate the professional ethical standards that public officials aim for so that they clearly

understand what is acceptable and what is not. Ideally all of these measures will give practical

effect to the aspirations of codes of conduct and, together, encourage professionalism among

public officials that (Kauzya 2012:3):





can be located at the point where expertise in terms of knowledge and skills meet with

integrity and ethics to form a competent whole of a highly capable, committed,

responsible, and responsive public service.

Developing professionalism in the public service is more complex than codes and training

because professionalism does not operate in a vacuum but in organisations (see Box 21). At

the very least, it calls for competent work performance (Kauzya 2012: 15) to ensure the

“correct, honourable and proper performance of public functions” (UNCAC Article 7(1) (d))

which includes core job competencies as well as an ethical attitude. The role of general

competence as a control on corruption is not well explored in the research literature but

evidence from corruption inquiries reports that managers and supervisors can be unable to

detect corrupt behaviour by subordinates who had more knowledge of workplace functions

and technical processes (Mills and Cooper 2007).

BOX 21: More than an attitude: developing professionalism

Professionalism needs to be taught in its principles, practices, and conduct. However,

since “teaching” is not the same thing as “developing” even if the two are linked. If

professionalism is an amalgam of character, attitude, conduct, excellence, and competence, the

question is: of all these what can be developed and how? What needs to be done and how in

order to develop professionalism in the Public service? This is a critical question for Ministries

responsible for public service, human resource managers in the public service, and

management development institutions. It is tantamount to wasting time and resources to only

focus on Public service agents in developing professionalism for preventing corruption in the

public service.

Societal norms and values must be examined and progressively changed to align them

with the requirements of professionalism in the public service; in other words there must be

efforts to develop an anti-corruption citizenry. Public governance systems, institutions and

structures must be revisited and readjusted to suit the needs of developing professionalism.

And capacity for professionalism, integrity and ethics must be developed among the human

resources including leadership in the public service.

Developing professionalism needs to be undertaken holistically to include society,

governance and the public servants … supportive institutional arrangements including

systems, structures, laws, rules and regulations as well as professional infrastructure such as

professional associations are necessary for professionalism to be developed. Above all

leadership is critical in supporting the growth of professionalism for example by developing

the following capacities:

institutional capacity by assessing the institutional set up in the public service including

organization structures, systems, laws, rules, and regulations, codes of conduct and

institutional arrangements for enforcement of such codes





service and development-oriented leadership - an institution/organization that seeks to

promote and develop professionalism among its employees must clearly stipulate what

professionalism entails

human resource management practices - how are agents selected, recruited, deployed,

supervised, motivated, etc.

training and an on-going commitment to learning and improving skills - developing

professionalism in the public service entails the development of public servants who are

experts at their jobs and who conduct carry out their work ethically and with integrity …

ensuring that the necessary competences are developed through training and other staff

development activities is critical to the development of professionalism.

motivation and incentives using improvements in the remuneration of public servants to

ensure that they do not get the temptation to behave unprofessionally under the pressure of

unmet critical needs such as food, housing, education and health for themselves and their

dependants.

professionalization infrastructure such as supportive institutional arrangements

including systems, structures, laws, rules and regulations as well as professional infrastructure

such as professionals associations are necessary for professionalism to be developed

an anti-corruption citizenry because there are some societal norms and values that may

encourage or even support corruption in the public service … in certain societies, sometimes

there exist contradictions between the values of the society a public servant lives in and those

demanded by the bureaucracy of a Public Service that employs him/her.

Source: Summarised from a paper delivered by John-Mary Kauzya at UNDESA/UNPADM

Joint Experts Group Meeting and Capacity Development Workshop on Preventing Corruption

in Public Administration: Citizens Engagement for Improved Transparency and

Accountability 26-28 June 2012.

Managers also have roles as organisational leaders. Management behaviour has been

recognised as a significant organisational influence on the ethical (and unethical) behaviour of

individual employees. Particularly influential are the ‘individual ethics, personal ambition and

poor supervision’ of senior managers (Clinard 1983: 70).

The specific actions that can be expected of public sector senior managers to prevent

corruption in their organisations include (ICAC 1999: 1; 23):

taking effective and visible action against corrupt behaviour

effective training for middle managers

being consistent in their actions and communications with staff

ensuring that middle managers as well as top management are reflecting the desired

values and behaviours.

The role of trust in the capacity of organisations to prevent corruption has also been noted.

Specifically, the way managers apply the “roles, rules, and structured relations of the

organization … to increase employee trust in management include (ICAC 1999:33):





opportunities for professional development

job security and

perceptions that the performance appraisal system is fair”.

Many public managers have no experience or training before taking management

positions. Awareness of these issues can be incorporated into leadership training for senior

managers to ensure that their actions do not undermine corruption prevention efforts (See Box

22).

BOX 22: Hong Kong ICAC Ethical Leadership Programme (ELP) for the

Government

An effective prevention program to promote ethical culture in an organization involves the

adoption of a code of conduct to help staff to deal with ethical issues they are sometimes

required to handle. The code is a basic part of integrity management, as it shapes the culture of

the organization and sets out the management’s expectation of its staff’s ethical standard. The

ICAC encourages and assists GBDs and public bodies in drawing up their code of conduct,

which should cover the organization’s uncompromising stand against corrupt practices and its

adherence to good governance. It should also clearly state the restrictions in respect to staff

accepting commissions, gifts and entertainment, as well as other integrity related issues, such

as managing conflict of interest and maintaining confidentiality of sensitive information, and

the consequence of non-compliance. For Government departments, officers who have

breached the code are subject to disciplinary actions, which could take the form of suspension

or removal from office, loss of pension etc.

To reinforce the code of conduct, the CRD of ICAC conducts regular integrity training for

Government officers to strengthen their understanding of the anti-corruption legislation and

the provisions of the code, to heighten their awareness of the corruption risks involved and to

remind them of the importance of upholding a high standard of integrity. Apart from

government officers, the ICAC also provides integrity and anti-bribery training for staff of

PBs, which include public hospitals, public utilities companies, public transport companies,

Tertiary Education Institutes, etc.

Apart from providing regular integrity and anti-bribery briefings to Government officers,

to further enhance probity culture and promote ethical leadership in the civil service, the ICAC

and the Civil Service Bureau of the Hong [10] Kong Government jointly launched the ELP in

December 2006. Under the ELP, each GBD is requested to appoint a senior directorate officer

as the organisation’s Ethics Officer, to be responsible for developing and sustaining ethical

culture in the GBD and assumes the overall responsibility for all integrity management work.

The Ethics Officers are each required to submit to the Civil Service Bureau an annual integrity

management plan. The plan helps the Ethics Officers to identify inadequacies in their

respective organizations and the corrective actions required, such as strengthening of existing

controls, organising integrity trainings on specific themes such as conflict of interest and





misconduct in public office, or requesting ICAC’s assistance in conducting corruption

prevention studies on high risk areas. At present, there are some 150 Ethics Officers, with

whom the ICAC has built a strong partnering relationship in promoting an ethical culture and

implementing the integrity management plans.

Periodic seminars on different topics concerning integrity, conduct and discipline are also

organized for the Ethics Officers and their assistants to enhance their awareness in issues

relating to corruption prevention and governance. A website called “Online Community for

Ethics Officers” has also been developed to facilitate the sharing of resources and reference

materials on integrity management and enhance communication between the Ethics Officers,

the ICAC and the Civil Service Bureau.

Source: Extract from paper by W H Mok for UNDESA/UNPADM Joint Experts Group

Meeting and Capacity Development Workshop on Preventing Corruption in Public

Administration: Citizens Engagement for Improved Transparency and Accountability 26-28

June 2012.

Senior public managers are also in a position to communicate outside their public sector

agency to the clients and constituents that it services about the professional ethics that apply to

public officials particularly in situations where they are pressured by societal expectations to

act corruptly.

In summary, the human resources capacity that can be developed to prevent corruption lies

in engendering professionalism, maintaining a fair and equitable workplace that facilitates

whistleblowing, and providing sufficient education and guidance to public officials and the

wider community about the core competencies and ethics of public administration and the

corruption risks it carries.

BOX 23: Best practices to promote reporting and protecting whistleblowers

A. Articulate the critical importance of reporting concerns/speaking up

(1) Legal, social, or moral duty to contribute to group’s welfare by identifying concerns

and problems requiring attention from recognized authority. This permits concerns to

be addressed before they escalate or become intractable.

(2) Method for speaking up is easy to access and easy to use.

(a) Clear procedures and channels for reporting concerns (i.e., central reporting

mechanism) are available to individuals at all levels.

(b) Reporter must be able to provide essential information about concern or problem.

(3) Reporter’s duty is to share information, not to investigate, find facts, reach a

conclusion, or take responsibility for outcome.

(4) Reports are always confidential. Reporter may choose to remain anonymous. Good

faith reports are protected.





(5) Purpose for encouraging speaking up and making reports is to identify and cure

problems before they escalate or become intractable.

B. Under executive sponsorship, adopt a comprehensive, clear, and widely distributed policy

that prohibits retaliation in order to protect those who have made reports of wrongdoing.

(1) Persons who are protected (and types of information that will warrant protection) are

clearly defined in terms of community, organization, employer, and/or government.

(2) Policy of protection from retaliation should extend to a wide range of reported

wrongdoing, not just a limited set of infractions or concerns.

(3) Types of prohibited retaliatory actions are clearly defined.

(4) Outline the remedies available to the whistleblower who has experienced detrimental

action because he/she has made a report of wrongdoing.

C. Raise awareness about speaking up and protecting whistleblowers in order to encourage

reporting of concerns (i.e., training and education, as well as informal discussions,

overseen by senior management).

D. Make interim protection measures available during the investigation and resolution process

in order to protect status quo and to limit additional potential harm to the whistleblower.

E. Investigate reports of retaliation. Investigations should be prompt, thorough, effective and

respectful. Investigation process is open, transparent, and trustworthy.

F. Periodically, evaluate and review the effectiveness of whistleblower protection.

G. Annually, issue a public report summarizing matters and outcomes.

MOST IMPORTANT FACTORS

H. Protection from retaliation must be prompt, robust, and comprehensive.

I. Remedies and sanctions for retaliation are clearly defined, applied, and provided.

Source: United Nations Ethics Office, 28 June 2012

Engaging citizens to prevent corruption

Citizens engage with government in many ways. They may be using public services,

consulting or lobbying, monitoring and scrutinising, being regulated, in commercial

relationships such as for the procurement of goods and services by government, or they may

be reporting corruption.

Each of these types of interaction between citizens and government makes different

demands on public administration. All have the potential to be an opportunity for either

corruption or corruption prevention. For corruption prevention purposes, satisfactory

interactions between citizens and government can encourage social trust, an understanding of

public sector values, compliance with anti-corruption regulation and reporting of suspected

corrupt conduct (Langseth 2001; see Box 4).

Accountability and scrutiny

The role of citizens in preventing corruption is based on both the principle that the public

administration should be accountable, and the practical power of external scrutiny to make it





accountable. The theory is that if public officials are less likely to act corruptly if they are

being observed and may have to explain their actions. Equally, engaged citizens who

understand and support government processes maybe less inclined to try to improperly

influence an official decision.

As envisaged by the UNCAC Article 10, legal obligations for public administration

agencies to provide access to information, give reasons for administrative decisions or publish

annual reports are generally used to enable citizen scrutiny. Several submissions to the UNPS

Awards in 2011 and 2012 also used procedural or ICT methods to enable citizens to monitor

the activities of government.

To increase trust in local government tax officials in Korea, the Seoul Metropolitan

Government since 2008 has moved from closed examinations of tax appeals to an open court

system in which the taxpayer is represented by an advocate and officials must defend the

imposition of tax (UNDESA 2011).

Another local government UNPS Award winner in 2011 was an initiative from Slovakia to

ensure that all decisions described as “affecting the efficiency of the handling of public

resources and properties are done transparently” by making them all available online

(UNDESA 2011: 24). Similar objectives were behind two finalists in the UNSPA 2012: the

Georgia Civil Service Bureau Online Asset Declaration System which allows any citizen to

monitor the asset declarations of public officials; and the Saudi Ministry of social affairs

database of non-profit organisations who receive public funds.19

A sophisticated contract monitoring system developed by Slovenia Commission for the

Prevention of Corruption was a finalist in the UNPS Awards in 2012.20

It is an online

database that combines information from several public agencies to provide comprehensive

information about government business transactions. It shows ownership and management

structures of Slovenian corporations and can produce reports to show “contracting parties, the

largest recipients of funds, related legal entities, date and amount of transactions and also

purpose of money transfers” presented as graphs or in printouts.

The news media have traditionally been seen as leaders in facilitating public scrutiny of

government and an independent media is regarded as an element of a national integrity system

(see Fig. 1). More recently less structured methods of public scrutiny that use existing

community groups with no obvious governance role have emerged as mechanisms for public

oversight of public official conduct. Many of these use the internet or electronic social media

formats (see Box 24)

BOX 24: Corruption Prevention and ICT: UNDP's experience from the field

19


age/en-US/Default.aspx accessed 8 December 2012 20












The approach of UNDP to corruption prevention addresses the supply side of corruption

through institutional reform, legal reforms and promoting anticorruption strategies and plans.

On the demand side UNDP encourages civic engagement, public awareness, education and

oversight by the media and community organisations.

The unprecedented spread of Information and communications technologies (ICT),

including social media, is changing the socio-economic and political dynamics in developing

countries. ICT have provided added ammunition in corruption prevention. Data gives

corruption a face, and ICT makes the availability, accessibility and dissemination of data easy.

Correlations have been found to exist between corruption and levels of ICT penetration, e-

government development, freedom of speech and the capacity for non-government

organisations to advocate. UNDP’s recent experiences highlight the role of three emerging

models of social media that can be used to support public transparency and accountability.

Information sharing media such as blogs, forums, social networks and video hosting sites, like

YouTube, facilitate disclosure of instances of corruption. Crowdsourcing technology such as

‘Truthmeters’ and electronic petitioning can be used to monitor service delivery and report

failures. The crowd-to-community model combines crowdsourcing with mechanisms that

allow visitors to interact with a project and between each other, transforming a ‘crowd’ into a

community of action. Two recent examples are:

The Huduma platform (used in Kenya, Nigeria, Philippines and India) allows citizens

to report public service failures directly to authorities and to service providers by SMS, email,

voice or video. It provides voice to citizens and offers service providers with real time

actionable data to respond to citizens’ concerns and measure improvement in service

provision.

In Kosovo, Kallxo.com is an online platform for citizens to report and monitor official

responses to reported corruption, organized crime, fraud, conflicts of interest, and other cases

of abuses of official capacity, neglect, inaction, infringement of rights of Kosovo citizens, or

infringement of general interests by any branch of government.

The success factors for using social media tools against corruption include:

posting new information regularly,

maintaining an emotional narrative and virtual interaction

coverage by traditional as well as online media

transparent verification mechanisms, e.g. photos, documents, comments by other

visitors

support from reputable individuals or institutions including relevant high-ranking

public officials with a proven track record in the field

converting information into action that leads to desirable outcomes, e.g. corrupt tenders

are cancelled, streets are fixed.





Source: Edited summary of a presentation by Tsegaye Lemma, Anti-Corruption Specialist,

BDP/UNDP at UNDESA/UNPADM Joint Experts Group Meeting and Capacity Development

Workshop on Preventing Corruption in Public Administration: Citizens Engagement for

Improved Transparency and Accountability 26-28 June 2012

Commercial suppliers and partners

Monitoring the behaviour of public officials is only one of the reasons for citizens to

engage with government. Increasingly citizens are interacting with government as contractors

and suppliers. Public and private sector partners frequently follow different operating

objectives and standards of conduct. Governments’ private sector partners and suppliers may

not always appreciate the practical implications of the ethic of stewardship in public

administration that (Kauzya 2012: 5):

Everything at the disposal of the Public Servant (i.e summarized as time, treasure, talent,

and treatment) is from the public entrusted to him/her for the satisfaction of the needs of the

public.

As many businesses establish their own fraud and corruption controls there are

opportunities for government to develop partnerships for prevention by implementing

standards of conduct and practice that protect commercial relationships from corruption.

Consequently the UNCAC in Article 12 requires the establishment of comprehensive

preventative measures in private sector including:

Enhanced accounting and auditing standards

Prohibition of off-the-book accounts and other acts

No tax deductibility of expenses constituting bribes

Proportionate and dissuasive civil, administrative or criminal sanctions

Promote cooperation between law enforcement and private entities

Prevent conflicts of interest

Government–business relationships can be vulnerable to corruption when trust between

the parties is undermined by concerns that government will act corruptly. A lack of

information and communication from government to contractors can raise suppliers’

suspicions that they are not being treated fairly (ICAC 2011c).

The most useful information for contractors is likely to be about their performance and can

be provided using regular performance reports such as those used by the Singapore Building

Construction Authority (BCA) Contractor Registration System (CRS) (see Box 17).

Contractors in Singapore are obliged to adhere to certain standards in order to pre-qualify for

government work using transparent criteria available online to the public. Contractors are

informed about their performance using reports from the agencies they were engaged by and

can be paid a bonus if workmanship is of high quality and penalised if it is poor.





Adherence to best practice in commercial and service relationships and communicating

expected standards of performance and business ethics can improve awareness of the proper

role and processes of government and reduce supply side incentives to act corruptly.

Awareness of anti-corruption and reporting

Citizens will not be inclined to scrutinise or to report corrupt behaviour if they do not

recognise it as wrong or even know that regulation exists. Ideally ‘Information campaigns

should be part of the process for the introduction of new rules seeking to curb corrupt

practices.’ (Batory 2012: 79).

The UNPSA 2012 finalist Malaysia Anti-Corruption Commission’s (MACC) campaign

was designed to inform citizens and public officials about corruption offences that were not

new but poorly understood. It was used to complement the MACC’s investigations work

which consumes over 70% of its resources. Investigation of bribery by the MACC had

previously targeted the public officials who solicited or received bribes. This education

campaign was used to inform the public that paying a bribe is also a criminal offence and

encourage reporting of bribes paid21

. It is an example of a social marketing information

campaign that can be applied to corruption prevention by ACAs and other government

agencies that run their own public education campaigns (Kindra and Stapenhurst 1998).

Educating the public about corruption and prevention is a core function of the

conventional anti-corruption agency (ACA) model and can go well beyond information about

the existence of criminal offences. Programs such as those run by the Hong Kong ICAC

Community Relations department produce resources for school-aged children, a YouTube

channel and a television drama22

to help members of the public to identify and act on corrupt

conduct when they encounter it (See Box 25). At a municipal level the Metropolitan

Commission Against Corruption in Quito Ecuador recently ran a comprehensive education

campaign about preventing corruption called Honesto Quito .23

Many ACAs communicate

other information about their work such as successful outcomes of corruption investigations.

Public awareness and information campaigns about corruption or public integrity need not

be the exclusive responsibility of government or anti-corruption agencies and might be

facilitated by community-based or grass roots organisations or social media (see Box 24).

Sometimes the most basic information can help to prevent corruption. Citizens who are better

informed about the proper processes of government, may be less suspicious of transactions

they do not understand and more able to detect wrongdoing when they do see it. Users of

public services who know whether there are fees for a service and, if so, the amount of the fees

and who to report to if they are overcharged, may be less vulnerable to exploitation by corrupt

public officials and more inclined to report wrongdoing.

21


age/en-US/Default.aspx accessed 8 December 2012 22

www.icac.org.hk/en/community_relations_department/s/index.html accessed 8 June 2012. 23

www.unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un-dpadm/unpan050013.pdf accessed 8

December 2012



http://www.icac.org.hk/en/community_relations_department/s/index.html





Convincing citizens of the reasons for anti-corruption efforts and public integrity may also

be necessary in situations where (Kauzya 2012: 14):

… there exist contradictions between the values of the society a public servant lives in and

those demanded by the bureaucracy of a Public Service that employs him/her.

In this situation engaging citizens may be necessary to establish values or a common

language for ethical public service in addition to any scrutiny or reporting role. Reforms

imposed without reference to these local values, whether organisational, sectoral or national,

can easily fail or, worse, be counter-productive (Batory 2012) if they fail to address informal

as well as formal rules and norms (Ocampo 2000). Consequently anti-corruption reforms are

said to work best if approached from the “bottom up” as well as the “top down” (Theobald

1997; Lambsdorff 2008). In some instances this could involve citizens in aspects of the reform

such as developing codes of conduct using broadbased consultation techniques like the

regional seminars for citizens established in the Pernambuco region of northern-eastern Brazil

to engage citizens in debating and prioritising policy proposals in a transparent way.24

BOX 25: Prevention, education and research in anti-corruption agencies

Many anti-corruption programmes have been considered instruments of the state, mainly

targeting the civil service and/or other relevant regulatory institutions. The Hong Kong

experience has shown that the education and awareness raising function is crucial in each anti-

corruption strategy.

Transparency is needed to establish a minimal level of credibility for prevention purposes

and as a measure of success. Hong Kong’s ICAC is noted for its unique outreach programme.

It has used press releases, public information announcements, interviews, documentaries,

posters, informational leaflets, meetings, public speaking and worked with schools and

universities to convey an anti-corruption message to the public. It sponsors sporting, cultural

and entertainment events that are aimed at youth and that emphasize anti-corruption themes. In

1995, it spearheaded a collaborative effort with six major chambers of commerce to found the

Hong Kong Ethics Development Centre to promote ethics in corporate governance. Today,

nearly one in ten reports of corruption in the private sector is made by senior business

managers (ref: ICAC website).

Apart from general education measures, the [anti-corruption agency] ACA should also be

in a position to develop, propose and, where appropriate, implement preventive measures,

and/or to collaborate closely with other agencies that have a mandate to do so. Hong Kong’s

ICAC has an extensive mandate in this area.

24

Department of Planning and Management of Pernambuco 2012 (Secretaria de Planejamento e Gestão do

estado Pernambuco) Participatory Regional Seminars,







This is to examine the practices and procedures of government departments and public

bodies in order to facilitate the discovery of corrupt practices and to secure the revision of

work methods/procedures which may be conducive to corrupt practices. Further, it is to

instruct, advise and assist any person, on the latter’s request, on ways in which corrupt

practices may be eliminated and to advise heads of government departments or of public

bodies of changes in practices or procedures compatible with the effective discharge of their

duties which the Commissioner thinks are necessary to reduce the likelihood of corrupt

practices. Prevention (and the community education and awareness-raising that goes with it)

has been a core activity of the Hong Kong model, often informed by the revelations of

investigators working on the enforcement side. This enabled the Commission to develop a

coherent and coordinated set of strategies, with results that are the envy of many. Those who

have tried to copy the model have largely failed because they have lacked both this coherent

approach and the resources necessary to carry it through.

Botswana’s DCEC, Singapore’s CPIB and New South Wales’ ICAC have similar

mandates. Indonesia’s KPK also has a broad mandate to monitor the governance of the State.

It can conduct reviews of the management system of all state institutions; if the

recommendations made by KPK are not adhered to, the KPK is to report this to the President,

the Parliament and the State Auditor. Tanzania’s PCB (Research, Control and Statistics

Division) carries out research on various policies, laws, regulations and operations of different

institutions in order to detect loopholes that lead to corruption. It also conducts research on

methods for combating corruption adopted in other countries. Part of these preventive

measures is the ability to take account of lessons learned and use them to propose amendments

to laws, regulations and procedures.

In some countries the ACA is authorized to make such recommendations to both

administrative and legislative bodies, publicly if necessary. The CPCB in Latvia and the SIS in

Lithuania are entitled to analyse legal acts and make proposals for review. The SIS has the

power to propose legislation to the President and to Parliament.

The capacity to conduct research into public opinion as well as trends and the nature of

corruption is essential in order to devise effective strategies for combating corruption. In its

assessment, the European Commission found that lack of research capacity in Latvia and

Lithuania was a concern, and it was recommended that capacity be developed in this regard.

Source: UNDP 2005 Institutional Arrangements to Combat Corruption: A Comparative Study,

UNDP Bangkok pp 9-10.

Developing capacity in citizen engagement

In addition to those already discussed, the UNCAC envisages some methods for

engagement in Article 13 Participation of civil society which requires that signatories ensure

the active participation of civil society, enhance transparency in decision making processes,





provide public access to information and encourage citizens to report on offences and protect

the freedom to seek, receive and publish information concerning corruption. The terms of

reference for the UNCAC Review Mechanism also suggest entry points for civil society

involvement such as:

28. The State party under review shall endeavour to prepare its responses to the

comprehensive self-assessment checklist through broad consultations at the national level with

all relevant stakeholders, including the private sector, individuals and groups outside the

public sector.

Specific avenues for building the capacity to develop citizen engagement can be found in:

the use of ICT resources to increase accessibility,

social marketing and related communication methodology to and

maintaining good business practices between the public and private sectors.

The capacity of citizens to participate and comply can be enhanced by ensuring that they

have equitable access to services, opportunities to easily monitor government and adequate

information to recognise corruption.

BOX 26: Using citizen engagement as accountability to prevent four types of

corruption

Four types of corruption with different determinants

Type I Market-Restricting Corruption

The best approach is to remove damaging capacities or discretion.

Type II State-Restricting Corruption

The long-run reduction of corruption involves the legalisation of rent seeking. Immediate

policies are to improve state capabilities and processes but incentives of ruling coalition

critical.

Type III Political Corruption/ Inadequate Institutionalization

Net effect depends on whether political stability and growth can be maintained. Long-run

transition to rule-following politics and formal institutions depends on a broadbased

productive sector emerging.

Type IV Predation/Theft

Terms of ‘exchange’ between parties to the corrupt act become one-sided or disappear. This

type of corruption dominates when the state is collapsing or if ruling coalition is very narrow

and has very short time horizon.

Policy Implications for the role of accountability and citizens’ engagement





Some types of corruption are difficult to remove in the short term (for instance Type III

corruption): important to prioritize and attack the most important areas that are a) very

damaging and b) can be feasibly targeted.

Accountability and citizens’ engagement is most likely to pay dividends with type I

corruption and least likely to have an effect on type III corruption

Type II corruption is very important as it can constrain developmental activities of states:

Improved bureaucratic/technocratic capacities can help to improve outcomes if policies

are aligned with ruling coalition interests and constraints

Citizens’ pressure against type II corruption can be very useful if it focuses on

outcomes and delivery and does not set itself high targets of total elimination of corruption

Type IV corruption is most difficult to address and requires state building in countries

where state is collapsing or reconstituting more stable ruling coalitions in countries where

ruling coalition has short time horizon.

Source: Extract from Khan, Mushtaq H Transparency, Accountability and Citizen’s

Engagement presented to the Committee of Experts on Public Administration, Eleventh

session, New York, 16-20 April 2011 pages 9-10





Chapter 5

Building Capacity to Prevent Corruption

… capacity and capacity building (or capacity development) are concepts

applicable at various levels: individuals; organizations integrated by

individuals, encompassing firms, civil society organizations and public

sector organizations; … institutions adopted by the people to guide their

personal and collective behaviours, … informal institutions of a societal

nature, as well as formal institutions such as laws and regulations; and

whole large social systems, such as countries.25

This publication brings together conclusions of papers, presentations and

discussions from a week of events held in June 2012 in New York under the auspices

of UNDESA/ UNPADM. The Joint Expert Group Meeting and Workshop on

Preventing Corruption in Public Administration: Citizen Engagement for Improved

Transparency and Accountability discussed current challenges facing anti-corruption

efforts and heard about examples where capacity is being developed to prevent

corruption particularly by engaging citizens to prevent corruption in public

administration. Despite the diversity of topics and perspectives, that meeting reached

some conclusions and produced three high level recommendations that reflected the

main themes that were reiterated throughout the week and have been explored in this

publication.

The United Nations Public Service Awards (UNPSA) for 2012 were presented in

the same week. The Award category for Preventing and Combating Corruption

included several examples of initiatives that acknowledged the role of citizens in

preventing corruption in public administration.

Why is it important for citizens to be engaged in preventing corruption? If they

can make such a significant contribution why has it not received more attention in the

past? In the last 20 years corruption has been studied, classified, measured, defined

and proscribed by policy makers and practitioners, theorists and researchers - mostly

in the disciplines of political science, law, economics and philosophy. Prevention

responses have predominantly applied law enforcement methods but looking only to

law enforcement capacity to prevent corruption relies on a prevention model which

25

Villareal 2012:29





rests on a diagnosis of corruption that is incomplete. It assumes that all corruption

occurs as the result of a rational cost benefit analysis of a single transaction. It ignores

the processes by which perpetrators arrive at the transaction in favour of concentrated

measurement of the observable transaction at the end of the process (Warburton

2007b).

Insights from many more disciplines now contribute to our understanding of

corruption. Social psychology, organizational theory, regulatory theory, business

ethics, criminology and behavioural economics, among others, all have something to

offer the corruption prevention endeavour. These disciplines indicate roles for citizens

beyond penalties and compliance.

Analysis of the relationship between corruption and broader societal factors such

as human rights, gender equality, press freedom, social trust and the effectiveness of

institutions outside the public administration all represent opportunities for increasing

the roles of citizens in preventing corruption in public administration.

Against the background of what we know about corruption and prevention and

what we currently do to prevent corruption, this publication points to some of the roles

for citizens within the framework of existing policy levers commonly used against

corruption and where the capacity of citizens and public institutions can be – and are

being - developed further.

Conclusions

Three themes recurred throughout the discussions, presentations and papers that

formed the basis of this publication and the recommendations of the meeting.

The first is that, even in a healthily democratic context, citizen engagement as a

method of accountability is not a panacea for corruption (Villarreal 2012). It is only

one possible ingredient in a “corruption prevention cocktail” and, like the others, is

likely to be more effective in some contexts than others (see Box 26). It, nevertheless,

becomes one of the essential ingredients if we take a broader view that includes all of

the ways that citizens interact with government – as regulatees, contractors, recipients

of services, employees, voters or whistleblowers. Regulatory frameworks will not be

effective if citizens do not – or cannot - comply with laws and rules. Institutions will

be vulnerable to corruption if citizens are not aware of what constitutes proper and

ethical public administration or, if those citizens are employed as public officials, how

they should conduct themselves. Public officials will have difficulty maintaining those

standards if citizens expect them to act corruptly and no one will report corruption if

they cannot recognise it or know who to report it to. Each of these relationships is an

opportunity to prevent corruption by education, example or simply by building trust.





The second theme concerns how we know what will be more effective in context.

A background paper for the Workshop argued that there is a profound need for more

contextual evidence about corruption at individual, organizational and macro levels as

empirical research about which anti-corruption methods work under what

circumstances is scarce (deGraaf 2007). A plethora of indices and sources of relevant

perceptions data now exist26

and information from surveys of actual experience of

corruption are becoming available to complement perceptions data. We already know

a lot about what corruption looks like and when and where it happens. To prevent it,

we also need to know how and why it happens at the times and places it does. Citizens

are one of the best sources for understanding corruption in its context that policy

makers have. They can bring knowledge about the types of corruption and corruption

risks in the local context and the challenges it poses for implementing anti-corruption

policy. Citizens form the societal values and expectations that can help or hinder anti-

corruption strategies and, importantly, they may also be perpetrators of corruption who

need to be discouraged.

Finally, there was an acknowledgment that success in corruption prevention will

take time. Corruption is notorious for its ubiquity, longevity and resilience and no

country will ever be entirely free from it. Rather than assume that the task of

corruption prevention is futile this realisation should produce accurately targeted

strategies that incorporate long- and medium-term objectives as well as short-term

goals and, most of all, to develop the capacity for as many players as possible to

participate in that task.

Recommendations

The Joint Expert Group Meeting and Capacity Development Workshop on

Preventing Corruption in Public Administration captured the perspectives of experts

in public administration and corruption prevention including elected officials, statutory

officers, academics, researchers, advisers and practitioners from every continent as

well as international agencies (see Agenda Annex 3). It developed the following

recommendations that suggest directions for continuing work that will build the

capacity of both citizens and public administrators to prevent corruption.

26

Other indices include Transparency International Bribe Payers Index; Bertelsmann Transformation Index

(BTI); European Bank & World Bank Business Environment And Enterprise Performance Survey

(BEEPS); World Bank Country Policy And Institutional Assessment (CPIA), World Economic Forum

Global Competitiveness Index; Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer, Global Integrity

Global Integrity Index, Heritage Foundation & Wall Street Journal Index Of Economic Freedom; Political

Risk Services Group International Country Risk Guide; Mo Ibrahim Foundation Ibrahim Index Of African

Governance / Center On Budget And Policy Priorities Open Budget Index.





1. Enhancing the effectiveness of public sector institutional arrangements for

preventing corruption and engaging citizens in anti-corruption initiatives.

The activities that could give effect to this recommendation would build capacity

in:

Enforcing and implementing regulation particularly by improving the design

and efficiency of regulation and targeting it better to those expected to comply

with it.

Targeting corruption prevention initiatives to local circumstances particularly

considering the differences between international, national, local and

organisational contexts and the nature of various public sector functions.

Building an evidence base of what works to prevent corruption so that policy

solutions can be tailored to specific circumstances and corruption risks.

2. Public sector human resource capacity development for preventing corruption

and engaging citizens in anti-corruption initiatives.

The methods identified for implementing this recommendation were:

Building the professionalism of public administrators so that they act

competently and ethically

Raising the awareness of corruption and ways to prevent corruption with

continuous occupational training for officials and by using public education

campaigns about the harm of corruption and the successes of anti-corruption

efforts.

Encouraging reporting of corruption by developing best practices in

whistleblowing that protect against retribution, provide advice and allow

anonymity.

3. Accountability through transparency: engaging citizens to prevent corruption

in the Public Sector such as through information and communication technologies.

The specific mechanisms considered for providing citizens with the resources to

observe and hold the public administration to account included:

Making government information more easily accessible, such as about

expenditure of public funds and disclosure obligations of officials such as asset

declarations, but also routine facts about the cost of services and the proper

roles of public officials.

Building the capacity of citizens and civil society to participate effectively in all

of the roles they have with government whether reporting corruption, complying

with regulation, receiving services or as commercial partners.





Engendering trust between government and citizens (as well as more generally

in the community) by responding to citizen complaints, delivering tangible

results, and treating citizens fairly.





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Annex 2 : List of Participants Country First Name Last Name Title Organisation

1 Australia Mr. Peter Heijkoop Executive Director Universal Financial Management Solutions Pty Ltd

2 Australia Ms. Alexandra Mills UNDESA Consultant UNDESA

3 Australia Ms. Meredith Edwards Emeritus Professor University of Canberra

4 Austria Ms. Julia Pilgrim Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Officer Corruption and Economic Crime Branch, Division for Treaty

Affairs, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

5 Austria Mr. Georg-

Florian

Grabenweger Policy Advisor, International Transition Team International Anti Corruption Academy (IACA)

6 Bhutan Ms. Neten Zangmo Chairperson Anti-Corruption Commission

7 Bolivia Ms. Erika Karla Calderon

Monrroy

8 Bosnia and

Herzegovina

Ms. Ankica Tomic Head of department for international

cooperation

Ministry of Security

9 China Mr. Wah-hoi Mok Assistant Director, Corruption Prevention Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC/HKSAR)

10 China Mr. Kwong-

man

Fok Principal Corruption Prevention Officer Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC/HKSAR)

11 Ecuador Mrs. Rosario Utreras President Quito Honesto

12 Ecuador Mr. Carlos Pólit Faggioni Contralor General del Ecuador y Presidente de

la OLACEFS

OLACEFS

13 Ecuador Mr. Paul

Williams

Cueva Contraloria General del Ecuador

14 Ecuador Mr. Nelson Dueñas López Coordinador General de la contraloria

15 Ecuador Mr. Peter Dineiger OLACEFS

16 Georgia Mr. Tato Urjumelashvili Chairman State Procurement Agency

17 Georgia Mr. David Marghania Head of IT Department

18 Georgia Mr. Shota Chachkhunashvili Chief Information Officer National Agency of Public Register

19 Georgia Mr. Lasha Todria Chairman of Committee on Human Rights and

Civil Integration

Parliament of Georgia

20 Greece Dr. Ioannis Karkalis Vice Commissioner General of Greece and

Special Adviser to the Director on

Anticorruption Issues

European Public Law Organization





21 Jordan Mr. Zuhair Alkayed Associate Professor for the Doctorate Program

in Public Administration

World Islamic Sciences and Education University (WISE)

22 Kenya Mr. Julius Muia Secretary National Economic and Social Council, Presidency

and Cabinet Affairs Office/Office of the President

23 Kenya Ms. Beatriz Muiruri Ministry of Water and Irrigation

24 Kenya Mr. Bernard Muiwa Ministry of Water and Irrigation

25 Mauritius Mr. Anil Kumar Ujoodha Director-General and Chairman of the board of

ICAC

ICAC

26 Mexico Mr. Joel Salas Head Transparency and International Cooperation Unit, Ministry of

Public Administration

27 Mexico Mr. José Castelazo President Instituto Nacional de Administracion Publica (INAP)

28 Mexico Mr. Max Aranda Vice minister of Procurement and

Administrative Responsibilities

Ministry of Public Administration of Mexico

29 Mexico Mr. Juan Paratore Garcia Head Control and Audit of Public Works Unit

30 Mexico Mr. Noel Gonzales Segura Second Secretary Permanent Mission of Mexico to the United Nations

31 Mexico Mr. Javier Dávila Secretaría de la Función Pública

32 Republic of

Korea

Dr. Seongjun Kim International Cooperation Division, The Board of Audit and

Inspection of Korea (BAI)

33 Republic of

Korea

Mr. Minchul Shin Researcher Research, Audit and Inspection Research Institute of the Board

of Audit and Inspection(BAI),

34 Republic of

Korea

Mr. Sangsik Kim Assistant Chairman for Planning Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission

35 Republic of

Korea

Ms. Yoonjung Jung Deputy Director Anti-Corruption Survey & Evalution Division. Anti-Corruption

and Civil Rights Commission

36 Republic of

Korea

Mr. Eunsoo Jung Deputy Director International Relations Division, Anti-Corruption and Civil

Rights Commission

37 Republic of

Korea

Ms. Younkyung Lee Assistant director the International Cooperation Division of the BAI,

38 Singapore Ms. Phua Hui Chun Building and Construction Authority

39 Singapore Ms. Jeanny Das Building and Construction Authority

40 Singapore Mr. Neo Choon Keong Building and Construction Authority

41 Singapore Dr. John Keuny Building and Construction Authority

42 Singapore Ms. For Wai Xee Building and Construction Authority

43 Slovakia Mr. Robert Dubravec Head Architect Office





44 Slovakia Mr. Jozef Petras Senior Project Manager Project “Transparency Town”

45 South Africa Mr. Libisi Maphanga Chief Information Officer Electoral Commission (IEC)

46 Sweden Mr. Carl Dahlstrom Senior Lecturer and Associate Professor Quality of Government Institute (QoG)

47 Tanzania Mr. Mick Kiliba Public Service Management

48 Turkey Mr. Judge Mesut Orta President of IT Department Ministry of Justice

49 Turkey Mr. Ali Riza Cam Judge/Deputy Director

50 UAE Ms. Khamis Matar Al

Muzainah

Deputy Commandant General Dubai Police

51 UAE Mr. Taresh Eid Al Mansoori Director Department of Human Rights

52 UAE Mr. Tarish Al Mansoori Director Department of Human Rights

53 UAE Mr Mohammed Abdullah Al Mur Department of Human Rights

54 UAE Dr. Meshkam Mohammed Al

Awar

Dubai Police Academy

55 UAE Mr. Abdul Quddos Al-

Obaidli

Director Department of Total Quality

56 UAE Mr. Abdulla Ahmed

Ashkanani

Department of Total Quality

57 Uganda Ms. Emma Boona Member of Parliament Member of Public Accounts

58 UK Dr. Indira Carr Expert in Corruption, Professor of Law University of Surrey

59 USA Mr. Tsegaye Lemma Specialist, Anti-Corrpution Democratic Governance Group, Bureau for Development

Policy, Programme on Anti-Corruption for Development

Effectiveness (PACDE), United Nations Development

Programme (UNDP)

60 USA Mr. Don Fox Acting Director and General Counsel United States Office of Government Ethics

61 USA Prof. Taryn Vian Associate Professor of International Health,

Expert in Corruption, Faculty Director, Global

Management MBA-MPH Degree Program

Boston University School of Public Health

62 USA Ms. Nicole Anand Projects Manager Global Integrity: Innovations for Transparency and

Accountability

63 USA Dr. Yahong Zhang Assistant Professor School of Public Affairs and Administration, Rutgers

University

64 USA Ms. Cecilia Lavena Doctoral Candidate School of Public Affairs and Administration, Rutgers

University

65 USA Ms. Anna McDonald University of Southern California

66 USA Mr. David Winder New York University





67 USA Mr. Deniz Susar Chief UNPAN Management Unit, DPADM, DESA

68 USA Ms. Payel Chowdhury Intern DMB, DPADM, DESA

69 USA Ms. Angela Capati-Caruso Senior Governance and Public Administration

Officer

DMB, DPADM, DESA

70 USA Mr. Marc Holzer Dean of School of Public Affairs and

Administration

Rutgers University

71 USA Mrs. Joan Dubinski Director United Nations Ethics Office

72 USA Mr. Mark Davies Executive Director Conflicts of Interest Board of New York City

73 USA Ms. Elia Armstrong Officer-in-Charge DMB/DPADM/DESA

74 USA Ms. Bharati Sadasivam Director UNDP Partnerships Bureau/Civil Society Division

75 USA Dr. Lois Warner John Jay College of Criminal Justice

76 USA Mr. John-Mary Kauzya Chief, Public Administration Capacity Building

Branch

PACB/DPADM/DESA

77 USA Mr. Gary Manukyan Governance and Public Administration Officer PACB/DPADM/DESA

78 USA Ms. Flor Velazco-Juarez Technical Cooperation assistant PACB/DPADM/DESA

79 USA Ms. Patricia Penuen Technical Cooperation Assistant DMB/DPADM/DESA

80 Zambia Ms. Kayobo NG'andu Director Prevention and Education, Anti-Corruption Commission of

Zambia

81 Mr. Paulo Rodriguez

82 Khameis Al-Mazaines





Annex 3: Agenda

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs


Joint Experts Group Meeting and Capacity Development Workshop

on Preventing Corruption in Public Administration:

Citizens Engagement for Improved Transparency and Accountability

Programme

Monday, 25 June 2012

General Assembly Hall (UNHQ)

Visitor’s Centre at 46th

Street and 1st Avenue

10:00 - 18:00

The 2012 United Nations Public Service Day

Award Ceremony and Forum

Tuesday, 26 June 2012

Crowne Plaza Hotel – Broadway Ballroom 4th

Floor

1605 Broadway, between 48th

and 49th

Street

09:00 – 09:30

Main Facilitator: Dr. John-Mary Kauzya, Chief, PACB/UNDESA

General Rapporteur: Professor Meredith Edwards, CEPA

Registration

09:30 – 09:40 Opening of Meeting: Dr. John-Mary Kauzya, Chief, PACB/UNDESA

09:40 – 11:00

09:40 – 09:45

09:45 – 10:00

10:00 – 10:15

Session I: Causes and consequences of corruption in public sector

institutions and its impact on development

Chairperson: Professor Carl Dahlstrom, Quality of Government Institute

(QoG), Sweden

Presenter 1: Hon. Ms. Emma Boona, MP, Uganda, Expert/UNDESA

Presenter 2: Ms. Alexandra Mills, Consultant/UNDESA





10:15 – 11:00

General Discussion

11:00 – 11:20

Coffee Break

11:20 - 13:30

11:20 - 11:25

11:25 - 11:40

11:40 - 11:55

11:55 - 13:30

Session II: Effectiveness of public sector institutional arrangements for

preventing corruption and engaging citizens in anti-corruption initiatives

Chairperson: Dr. Roberto Villareal, IRA/UNDESA

Presenter1: Ms. Julia Pilgrim, Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice

Officer/UNODC

Presenter 2: Mr. Joel Salas, Head, Transparency and International Cooperation

Unit, Ministry of Public Administration, Mexico

Breakout Groups

Group A: Legal provisions in national anti-corruption legislation,

including codes-of-conduct

Co-facilitator: Dr. Ioannis Karkalis, Vice Commissioner of the State,

Special Adviser on Anticorruption, European Public Law

Organization, Greece, Expert/UNDESA

Co-facilitator: Dr. Indira Carr, University of Surrey, United Kingdom

Group B: Institutional mechanisms: anti-corruption offices/commissions;

citizen advisory councils

Co-facilitator: Dr. Marc Holzer, Dean, School of Public Affairs and

Administration, Rutgers University, Newark, New Jersey

Co-facilitator: Mr. Carlos Polit Faggioni, Controller General of Ecuador and

President of OLACEFS

Group C: Anti-corruption policies, institutions and mechanisms at

different levels of government

Co-facilitator: Mr. Mok, Wah-hoi, Assistant Director, ICAC/HKSAR, Hong

Kong, China

Co-facilitator: Mr. Mark Davies, Executive Director, Conflicts of Interest

Board of New York City, USA

13:30 – 15:00 Lunch Break

15:00 – 15:30

Breakout Groups Report in Plenary

15:30 – 17:30 Session III: Public sector human resources capacity development for

preventing corruption and engaging citizens in anti-corruption initiatives





15:30 – 15:35

15:35 – 15:50

15:50 – 16:05

16:05 – 17:30

Chairperson: Professor Jose Castelazo, INAP, Mexico, Expert/UNDESA

Presenter 1: Dr. John-Mary Kauzya, Chief, PACB/UNDESA

Presenter 2: Mr. Sangsik Kim, Assistant Chairman for Planning, Anti-

Corruption and Civil Rights Commission, Republic of Korea

Breakout Groups

Group A: Training

Facilitator: Mr. Georg-Florian Grabenweger, IACA/Vienna, Austria

Group B: Assets declaration

Co-facilitator: Mr. Don W. Fox, Acting Director and General Counsel, United

States Office of Government Ethics

Co-facilitator: Mr. Max Kaiser Aranda, Vice Minister of Procurement and

Administrative Responsibilities, Ministry of Public

Administration, Mexico

Group C: Whistler blowers’ protection

Facilitator: Mrs. Joan Dubinsky, Director, UN Ethics Office

17:30 – 18:00

Breakout Groups Report in Plenary

Wednesday, 27 June 2012

Crowne Plaza Hotel - Broadway Ballroom 4th

Floor

1605 Broadway, between 48th

and 49th

Street

09:30 – 11:00

09:30 – 09:35

09:35 – 09:50

09:50 – 10:05

10:05 – 11:00

Session IV: Accountability through transparency: Harnessing the potential of

ICT in governance and engaging citizens to prevent corruption in the public

sector

Chairperson: Professor Taryn Vian, SM, Ph.D, Boston University School of

Public Health

Presenter 1: Mr. Tsegaye Lemma, Anti-Corruption Specialist, BDP/UNDP

Presenter 2: Judge Mesut Orta, President, IT Department of Ministry of

Justice, Turkey

Breakout Groups

Group A: Open data and freedom of information procedures

Co-facilitator: Mr. Julius Muia, Secretary, National Economic and Social

Council, Presidency and Cabinet Affairs Office/ Office of the

President, Kenya

Co-facilitator: Mr. Slava Cherkasov, DMB/DPADM

Group B: Applications

Co-facilitator: Ms. Nicole Anand, Global Integrity





Co-facilitator: Ms. Dasho Neten Zangmo, Chief, Anti-Corruption Commission,

Bhutan

Group C: Citizens as watchdogs and contributors

Co-facilitator: Mr. Jozef Petras, Senior Project Manager, Project

“Transparency Town”, Bratislava, Solvakia

Co-facilitator: Ms. Erika Karla Calderon Monrroy, Former Director of

Planning Ministry of Transparency and Fight Against

Corruption, Bolivia

11:00 – 11:20 Coffee Break

11:20 – 11:50 Breakout Groups Report in Plenary

11:50 – 12:20

Special Plenary Session: Brainstorming on capacity-building for preventing

corruption in public administration

Chairperson: Dr. John-Mary Kauzya, Chief, PACB/UNDESA


12:20 – 13:00

Presentation and discussion of overall conclusions and recommendations

(to be continued the following day, Thursday, June 28 at South-South News

building)

13:00 – 15:00 Lunch Break

15:00 – 17:30

UNPSA FORUM Meetings in Plenary

Thursday, 28 June 2012

South-South News Building 48th

Floor 1 Dag Hammarksjold Plaza, 885 2

nd Avenue, between 47

th and 48

th Street

09:30 – 13:00 Resumed session of the meeting: The way forward, lessons learnt,

conclusions and recommendations

Chairperson: Dr. John-Mary Kauzya, Chief, PACB/UNDESA


Presentation and discussion of overall conclusions and recommendations

Concluding Remarks

Closing of Meeting