preview of “ned geneva epistemic excuses .pdf”

Another Plea for Excuses

Clayton Littlejohn (KCL)

Thursday, 12 September 13

Coh

en’s

Dem

on

Let’s

say

that

the

epist

emic

ext

erna

lists

thin

k th

at s

ome

of th

e fa

cts

that

ha

ve t

o do

with

epi

stem

ic j

ustifi

catio

n (e

.g.,

whi

ch p

ropo

sitio

ns o

ne

has

just

ifica

tion

to b

elie

ve,

whi

ch r

easo

ns j

ustif

y on

e’s

belie

fs,

whi

ch

reas

ons

one

has,

etc

.) d

on’t

stro

ngly

sup

erve

ne u

pon

the

fact

s ab

out

an in

divi

dual

’s n

on-fa

ctiv

e m

enta

l sta

tes.

Coh

en

(198

4)

pres

ents

an

in

fluen

tial

obje

ctio

n ag

ains

t ep

istem

ic

exte

rnal

ism, t

he n

ew e

vil d

emon

pro

blem

.

Thur

sday

, 12

Sept

embe

r 13

Coh

en’s

Dem

on

I th

ink

the

evil

dem

on h

ypot

hesis

… u

ncov

ers

a de

fect

in th

e Re

liabi

list

posit

ion.

We

can

see

this

by

supp

osin

g th

e hy

poth

esis

to

be t

rue.

Im

agin

e th

at u

nbek

now

n to

us,

our

cog

nitiv

e pr

oces

ses

(e.g

., pe

rcep

tion

mem

ory,

infe

renc

e) a

re n

ot r

elia

ble

owin

g to

the

mac

hina

tions

of t

he m

alev

olen

t dem

on. I

t fo

llow

s on

a R

elia

bilis

t vie

w th

at th

e be

liefs

gen

erat

ed b

y th

ose

proc

esse

s ar

e ne

ver

just

ified

.

Is th

is a

tena

ble

resu

lt? I

mai

ntai

n th

at it

is n

ot. O

f cou

rse,

we

are

not h

ere

supp

osin

g th

at w

e kn

ow th

at th

e de

mon

hyp

othe

sis is

true

. Cer

tain

ly if

we

wer

e to

kno

w th

at o

ur c

ogni

tive

proc

esse

s ar

e un

relia

ble

then

the

belie

fs t

hey

gene

rate

wou

ld n

ot b

e ju

stifi

ed.

Wha

t w

e w

ant

to s

uppo

se i

s th

e m

ere

truth

of

the

dem

on

hypo

thes

is. N

ow p

art

of w

hat

the

hypo

thes

is e

ntai

ls is

that

our

exp

erie

nce

is j

ust

as i

t w

ould

be

if ou

r co

gniti

ve p

roce

sses

wer

e re

liabl

e. T

hus,

on

the

dem

on h

ypot

hesis

, we

wou

ld h

ave

ever

y re

ason

for

hold

ing

our

belie

fs, t

hat w

e ha

ve in

the

actu

al w

orld

.

It st

rikes

me

as c

lear

ly fa

lse to

den

y th

at u

nder

thes

e ci

rcum

stan

ces

our

belie

fs c

ould

be

just

ified

. If w

e ha

ve

ever

y re

ason

to b

elie

ve e

.g.,

perc

eptio

n, is

a r

elia

ble

proc

ess,

the

mer

e fa

ct t

hat u

nbek

now

n to

us

it is

not

re

liabl

e sh

ould

not

affe

ct it

s ju

stifi

catio

n - c

onfe

rrin

g st

atus

.

(Coh

en 1

984)

Thur

sday

, 12

Sept

embe

r 13

Coh

en’s

Dem

on

He

cont

inue

s...

My

argu

men

t hin

ges

on v

iew

ing

just

ifica

tion

as a

nor

mat

ive

notio

n. In

tuiti

vely

, if S

's be

lief i

s ap

prop

riate

to

the

avai

labl

e ev

iden

ce, h

e is

not t

o be

hel

d re

spon

sible

for

circ

umst

ance

s be

yond

his

ken.

The

Relia

bilis

t mig

ht a

ckno

wle

dge

that

ther

e is

a c

lear

epi

stem

ic d

istin

ctio

n be

twee

n th

e be

liefs

of A

and

B,

but

that

the

dist

inct

ion

has

noth

ing

to d

o w

ith t

heir

just

ifica

tiona

l st

atus

. Ra

ther

the

diff

eren

ce i

s th

at A

's be

liefs

are

rea

sona

ble

or r

atio

nal w

here

as B

's ar

e un

reas

onab

le o

r irr

atio

nal.

This

man

euve

r w

ould

be

of

no h

elp.

Firs

t of a

ll, 'r

easo

nabl

e' a

nd 'r

atio

nal'

are

virt

ual s

ynon

yms

for

'just

ified

'. Bu

t we

need

not

qui

bble

ov

er s

eman

tics.

If th

e Re

liabi

list w

ants

to d

istin

guish

'jus

tified

' fro

m 'r

easo

nabl

e' o

r 'ra

tiona

l' he

may

do

so.

But c

lear

ly t

he im

port

ant e

pist

emic

conc

ept,

the

one

epis

tem

olog

ists

hav

e be

en co

ncer

ned

with

, is

wha

t the

Re

liabi

list

wou

ld c

all

'reas

onab

ility

' or

'ra

tiona

lity.

' Th

e di

ffere

nce

betw

een

the

belie

fs o

f A

in

the

evil

dem

on w

orld

and

the

belie

fs o

f B in

the

evil

dem

on w

orld

see

ms

to c

aptu

re th

e co

ncep

t tha

t epi

stem

olog

ist

have

bee

n w

orrie

d ab

out r

athe

r th

an th

e di

ffere

nce

betw

een

the

belie

fs o

f A

in th

e ac

tual

wor

ld a

nd th

e be

liefs

of A

in th

e ev

il de

mon

wor

ld. I

n ef

fect

, the

Rel

iabi

list w

ould

be

chan

ging

the

subj

ect.

A lo

t of e

pist

emol

ogist

s ap

peal

to th

e ne

w e

vil d

emon

intu

ition

and

take

Coh

en’s

obj

ectio

n to

be

deci

sive.

I ta

ke i

t th

at t

hey

agre

e w

ith C

ohen

’s v

erdi

ct.

Do

they

also

agr

ee w

ith h

is r

atio

nale

? I

thi

nk t

hat

they

sh

ould

n’t.

Thur

sday

, 12

Sept

embe

r 13

Coh

en’s

Dem

on

Whi

le e

very

one

seem

s to

be

fixat

ed o

n C

ohen

’s c

ritic

ism o

f re

liabi

lism

, le

t m

e ju

st fl

ag o

ne p

assa

ge th

at g

ets

very

lit

tle a

ttent

ion:

The

stro

nges

t vi

ew o

ne c

ould

tak

e re

gard

ing

the

truth

con

nect

ion

is th

at t

aken

by

Des

cart

es.

The

Car

tesia

n vi

ew is

tha

t ju

stifi

catio

n lo

gica

lly e

ntai

ls tr

uth.

To

put

it sc

hem

atic

ally

: It

is a

conc

eptu

al t

ruth

tha

t, if

cond

ition

s C

just

ify b

elie

f B

for

subj

ect S

, the

n C

logi

cally

ent

ails

that

B is

true

.

The

lega

cy o

f th

e C

arte

sian

view

is

skep

ticism

. D

esca

rtes

dem

onst

rate

d in

the

firs

t m

edita

tion

that

no

such

con

nect

ion

is fo

rthc

omin

g ...

Giv

en a

ny p

laus

ible

spe

cific

atio

n of

C fo

r an

y S,

it w

ill a

lway

s be

logi

cally

con

siste

nt to

sup

pose

that

not

B.

This

is w

hat t

he e

vil d

emon

arg

umen

t sho

ws.

Whe

re,

e.g.

, C

com

prise

s fa

cts

abou

t sen

sory

dat

a, a

nd w

here

B is

a b

elie

f ab

out

the

truth

of

som

e em

piric

al p

ropo

sitio

n, i

t is

alw

ays

logi

cally

pos

sible

tha

t th

e ev

il de

mon

has

arr

ange

d fo

r C

to

obta

in w

here

B is

false

. Not

wish

ing

to b

e sa

ddle

d w

ith th

is s

kept

ical

res

ult,

mos

t con

tem

pora

ry p

hilo

soph

ers

have

reje

cted

th

e C

arte

sian

view

and

hav

e op

ted

inst

ead

for

a fa

llibi

list

theo

ry o

f ju

stifi

catio

n. A

fal

libili

st t

heor

y al

low

s th

at w

here

C

mak

es B

just

ified

for

S, it

is s

till p

ossib

le th

at B

is fa

lse (

Coh

en 1

984)

.

Hav

ing

show

n to

his

sat

isfac

tion

that

just

ifica

tion

does

n’t

requ

ire tr

uth,

he

targ

ets

the

prob

abili

stic

acc

ount

s of

the

tru

th-

conn

ectio

n. I

’ll s

ay s

omet

hing

abo

ut th

is pa

ssag

e in

the

final

sec

tion

of th

e pa

per.

Thur

sday

, 12

Sept

embe

r 13

Coh

en’s

Dem

on

Resp

onse

s to

the

NED

obj

ectio

n:

(i) A

ccep

t Coh

en’s

arg

umen

t for

inte

rnal

ism a

nd li

ve u

p to

its

scep

tical

con

sequ

ence

s. (

Free

for

the

taki

ng!)

(ii)

Try

to v

indi

cate

Coh

en’s

intu

ition

s by

tink

erin

g w

ith y

our

(pur

port

edly

) ex

tern

alist

acc

ount

of

just

ifica

tion

(e.g

., A

lvin

G

oldm

an, S

arah

Saw

yer,

and

Mar

tin S

mith

).

(iii)

Acc

ept C

ohen

’s a

rgum

ent f

or in

tern

alism

and

insis

t tha

t it h

as n

o sc

eptic

al c

onse

quen

ces.

(Alm

ost e

very

epi

stem

olog

ist

I mee

t who

isn’

t her

e in

Gen

eva

toda

y, a

nd p

ossib

ly s

ome

that

I’ll

hear

from

in Q

&A

.)(iv

) A

ccep

t not

hing

.

I do

n’t r

eally

sha

re C

ohen

’s in

tuiti

ons

abou

t jus

tifica

tion

and

I th

ink

that

the

vario

us c

laim

s th

at h

e m

akes

abo

ut r

easo

ns,

ratio

nalit

y, e

vide

nce,

just

ifica

tion,

res

pons

ibili

ty, e

tc. a

re a

ll de

eply

pro

blem

atic

. I’ll

exp

lain

why

.

I’ll a

lso c

onfe

ss th

at I

just

mig

ht n

ot u

nder

stan

d w

hat h

is c

urre

nt p

ositi

on is

. S

ome

of h

is c

laim

s ab

out r

atio

nalit

y st

rike

me

as b

eing

rat

her

plau

sible

. I d

on’t

unde

rsta

nd w

hy h

e eq

uate

s ra

tiona

lity

with

just

ifica

tion

and

will

exp

lain

why

I th

ink

this

equa

tion

is p

robl

emat

ic b

elow

. A

t any

rat

e, le

t me

just

flag

one

pos

sible

sou

rce

of c

onfu

sion.

I

thin

k th

at t

he fo

llow

ing

clai

ms

abou

t ‘ra

tiona

l res

pons

es’ a

re p

retty

pla

usib

le:

* Ap

pear

ance

s ra

tiona

lize

- The

way

thin

gs a

ppea

r to

you

det

erm

ine

whi

ch d

oxas

tic, a

ffect

ive,

and

pra

ctic

al r

espo

nses

are

ra

tiona

l.*

Doxa

stic

prio

rity

- If y

ou r

atio

nally

take

F-in

g to

be

the

thin

g to

do,

it w

ould

n’t b

e ra

tiona

l for

you

to m

aint

ain

this

belie

f an

d do

oth

erw

ise.

Jus

t as

fact

ual m

istak

es d

on’t

nece

ssar

ily im

pugn

the

ratio

nalit

y of

a b

elie

f (e.

g., t

he b

elie

f tha

t F-in

g is

the

thin

g to

do)

, th

ey d

on’t

nece

ssar

ily i

mpu

gn t

he r

atio

nalit

y of

the

act

ions

rat

iona

lized

by

the

belie

f (e

.g.,

F-in

g).

[Def

ende

d by

Ric

hard

Fol

ey, J

ohn

Gib

bons

, and

Ral

ph W

edgw

ood.

]

For

som

e re

ason

, I t

hink

Coh

en m

ight

rej

ect t

hese

. Fo

r so

me

reas

on,

I thi

nk C

ohen

mig

ht a

ccep

t the

se.

I’ll j

ust a

ssum

e he

ac

cept

s th

em a

nd d

eal w

ith m

esse

s in

the

Q&

A.

Thur

sday

, 12

Sept

embe

r 13

Coh

en’s

Dem

on

Let’s

con

sider

my

pref

erre

d re

spon

se to

the

NED

obj

ectio

n to

epi

stem

ic e

xter

nalis

m:

(iv)

Acc

ept n

othi

ng.

Ther

e’s

a ve

rsio

n of

thi

s re

spon

se in

Prit

char

d’s

new

boo

k, E

pist

emol

ogic

al D

isjun

ctiv

ism.

He

says

that

the

subj

ect i

n th

e ba

d ca

se i

s bl

amel

ess

and

so b

lam

eles

sly h

olds

the

fal

se b

elie

fs b

ased

on

hallu

cina

tions

. H

e do

esn’

t th

ink

that

the

se

belie

fs a

re b

acke

d by

the

sor

ts o

f re

ason

s th

at s

uppo

rt o

ur b

elie

fs in

the

good

cas

e.

I co

mpl

etel

y ag

ree.

(W

e di

sagr

ee

abou

t wha

t tho

se r

easo

ns a

re, b

ut th

at’s

for

anot

her

day.

)

Ther

e’s

a st

anda

rd r

espo

nse

to t

his

resp

onse

in th

e lit

erat

ure

that

Prit

char

d do

esn’

t disc

uss.

(W

hy d

oesn

’t he

? I t

hink

he’

s no

t ver

y co

mba

tive.

) T

he r

espo

nse

is to

say

som

ethi

ng t

o th

e ef

fect

that

this

is r

ight

, but

it d

oesn

’t go

far

eno

ugh.

W

hile

th

e su

bjec

ts ar

e bl

amel

ess,

so

too

are

subj

ects

that

are

bra

inw

ashe

d, o

r dr

ugge

d, o

r un

der

the

age

of t

hree

, or

sub

ject

s th

at s

uffe

r fro

m m

enta

l illn

ess,

or

have

bel

iefs

sta

mpe

d in

to th

eir

brai

ns b

y al

iens

, or

subj

ects

who

are

kitt

ens,

etc

.

On

one

appr

oach

, ig

nora

nce

and

mist

ake

mig

ht e

xcus

e w

ithou

t ju

stify

ing.

On

anot

her,

igno

ranc

e an

d m

istak

e de

fens

es

can

be ju

stifi

cato

ry, n

ot m

erel

y ex

cusa

tory

. I h

ope

peop

le c

an s

ee th

e re

leva

nce

of th

e qu

estio

n as

to w

heth

er ig

nora

nce

and

mist

ake

excu

se o

r ju

stify

to d

ebat

es a

bout

whe

ther

just

ifica

tion

is an

inte

rnal

ist o

r an

ext

erna

list n

otio

n.

Thur

sday

, 12

Sept

embe

r 13

Aus

tin’s

Ple

as

Beca

use

‘A P

lea

for

Excu

ses’

is th

e fir

st a

nd o

nly

thin

g m

ost p

eopl

e re

ad a

bout

exc

uses

if th

ey e

ver

read

any

thin

g at

all

abou

t exc

uses

, let

’s s

tart

with

Aus

tin:

In g

ener

al, t

he s

ituat

ion

is on

e w

here

som

eone

is a

ccus

ed o

f hav

ing

done

som

ethi

ng, o

r (if

tha

t will

kee

p it

any

clea

ner)

whe

re s

omeo

ne is

sai

d to

hav

e do

ne s

omet

hing

whi

ch is

bad

, w

rong

, in

ept,

unw

elco

me,

or

in s

ome

othe

r of

the

num

erou

s po

ssib

le w

ays

unto

war

d. T

here

upon

he,

or

som

eone

on

his

beha

lf, w

ill

try

to d

efen

d hi

s co

nduc

t or

to g

et h

im o

ut o

f it.

One

way

of

goin

g ab

out t

his

is to

adm

it fla

tly t

hat h

e, X

, di

d do

tha

t ver

y th

ing,

A,

but t

o ar

gue

that

it

was

a g

ood

thin

g, o

r th

e rig

ht o

r se

nsib

le th

ing,

or

a pe

rmiss

ible

thin

g to

do,

eith

er in

gen

eral

or

at le

ast

in t

he s

peci

al c

ircum

stan

ces

of t

he o

ccas

ion.

To

take

this

line

is to

jus

tify

the

actio

n, t

o gi

ve r

easo

ns fo

r do

ing

it: n

ot t

o sa

y, t

o br

azen

it o

ut,

to g

lory

in it

, or

the

lik

e. A

diff

eren

t w

ay o

f go

ing

abou

t it

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A’.

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som

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it isn

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bal

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may

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Nat

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ly t

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ts c

an b

e co

mbi

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or o

verla

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run

int

o ea

ch o

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. In

the

one

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ence

, br

iefly

, we

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nsib

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but

den

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bad

: in

the

othe

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mit

that

it w

as b

ad b

ut d

on't

acce

pt fu

ll, o

r ev

en a

ny, r

espo

nsib

ility

.

Thur

sday

, 12

Sept

embe

r 13

Aus

tin’s

Ple

as

In th

e pa

ssag

e ab

ove,

Aus

tin in

trodu

ces

the

dich

otom

ous

sche

me:

•!In

offe

ring

a ju

stifi

catio

n, w

e in

sist

that

bla

me

isn’t

appr

opria

te

beca

use

the

agen

t had

suf

ficie

nt r

easo

n to

do

wha

t she

did

.•!

In o

fferin

g an

exc

use,

we

conc

ede

that

the

age

nt d

idn’

t ha

ve

suffi

cien

t rea

son

to d

o w

hat s

he d

id b

ut a

rgue

tha

t bla

me

wou

ld b

e in

appr

opria

te in

spi

te o

f thi

s.

For

Aus

tin,

excu

ses

cove

r al

l th

e ca

ses

of b

lam

eles

s bu

t un

just

ified

w

rong

doin

g.

Did

you

not

ice

Aus

tin’s

pos

itive

acc

ount

of h

ow e

xcus

es e

xcus

e? N

o, o

f co

urse

not

. I

don’

t thi

nk h

e th

inks

that

this

can

be d

one.

It

seem

s th

at

his

attit

ude

is th

at a

ll th

at e

xcus

es h

ave

in c

omm

on i

s th

at t

hey’

re

excu

lpat

ory

and

they

’re

not j

ustifi

catio

ns.

Thur

sday

, 12

Sept

embe

r 13

Austin’s Pleas

If I’m right about this, Austin would take a dim view of contrast arguments, arguments designed to show that a kind of defense is justificatory rather than excusatory because it differs from a paradigmatic case of non-justificatory defense in some salient way.

We (might) find an instance of a contrast argument in Audi’s argument that defenses that point to mistakes based on hallucinations justify rather than excuse:

I am in no way at fault for believing what I do, nor do I deserve any criticism (at least on the non-skeptical assumption that we may generally trust our senses in this way). Far from it. I am like a surgeon who skillfully does all that can be expected but loses the patient. There I should feel regret, but not guilt; I should explain, but need not apologize; and when we know what my evidence was, we approve of what I did. We consider it reasonable (Audi 2001).

It looks like Audi is arguing that mistakes and ignorance justify rather than excuse because defenses that involve them differ from excusatory defenses.

Pryor seems to do something similar in his ‘Highlights’ paper. He argues that systematically deceived subjects can have justified beliefs on the grounds that there is more to be said for them and their belief forming practices than some systematically deceived subjects who are merely blameless.


Austin’s Pleas

Pryor seems to do something similar in his ‘Highlights’ paper. He argues that systematically deceived subjects can have justified beliefs on the grounds that there is more to be said for them and their belief forming practices than some systematically deceived subjects who are merely blameless. After asking us to consider three BIVs, one who is reckless, one who is careful but follows defective standards, and one who reasons just like we do, he says:

It seems natural to say that, although there’s a sense in which the second and third brains are both epistemically blameless, only the third is conducting his epistemic affairs properly, and so only he is justified in his beliefs. This indicates that there’s a kind of positive epistemic status which goes beyond mere epistemic blamelesness, but which one can possess even if one’s beliefs are reliably false, as the brains’ beliefs are. Such considerations incline me to an internalist, non-deontological account of justification (Pryor 2001).

There are actually two problems with these passages. The first is that they seem to deploy dubious contrast arguments. The second has to do with what the pleas make salient. If Audi’s plea and Pryor’s plea focused on the reasons to believe or the absence of reasons not to believe, this might be an argument for justification, but that’s not what’s salient to me in this passage. What’s salient is that we shouldn’t feel guilt, that the subject was reasonable, responsible, etc. I don’t think Austin would think that these were the marks of justification.


Austin’s Pleas

One reason to think that Austin wouldn’t be impressed is that Austin’s list of excusatory conditions included humdrum factual mistakes.

If excuses excuse by showing that blame is inappropriate, how could ignorance or mistake excuse if the operative mistaken belief wasn’t rationally held or the ignorance helped to explain who the relevant operative beliefs were rationally held?

If the subject didn’t take all the care and concern that could be reasonably expected of them, there couldn’t be an excuse because the agent’s actions would manifest the kind of de re unresponsiveness by virtue of which culpable actions are culpable.


Austin’s Pleas

Because there’s this unfortunate tendency to think that contrast arguments are helpful ways of thinking about the border between justification and excuse, it might help to remind people that there are more elaborate schemes available.

Consider the trichotomous scheme of defenses:•! Justification - Either no wrong is committed or it is done for adequate reason. (Let’s let a

wrong be the violation of a norm.)•! Excuse - While the agent can be held to account for her actions generally, the local

conditions exculpate.•! Exemption/Denial of Responsibility - There are global exculpating conditions that would

preclude us from holding the agent accountable for her deeds generally.

If there are indeed three kinds of defenses, the contrast arguments are bound to fail. There’s just no good inference from the observation that, say, a particular defense differs in salient ways from some non-justificatory defense to the conclusion that this defense must be a justification.

We know this already, of course. Accidental slips are, according to most, excusatory, not justificatory, but they differ in important ways from defenses that cite mental illness or the lack of developed rational capacity.


Austin’s Pleas

While nothing of substance turns on whether we adopt Austin’s scheme or the more complicated scheme we get from Strawson, something substantive does turn on whether defenses that focus on ignorance and mistake are excusatory or justificatory.

I’ll explain why I think ignorance and mistake excuse rather than justify and why it would be a mistake to counter this by insisting that rationality is the mark of justification on the grounds that rationality just is justification.

To defend externalism about practical justification, he’d have to respond to two familiar arguments for internalism about practical justification...


On Ignorance and Mistake

Why think that ignorance and mistake excuse?

Excuses are fitting when they can show that it is inappropriate to blame an agent who has the rational capacities necessary to assume responsibility for her deeds.

They function by showing that the agent’s deeds (or failures to act) don’t manifest de re unresponsiveness.

Factual ignorance and mistake can do both things.

The tricky question isn’t really why ignorance and mistake figure in defenses, but why successful defenses that cite ignorance or mistake don’t constitute justificatory defenses?

In discussing Williams’ petrol and tonic example, they insist that ignorance does justify because it can make an attitude and action rational, sensible, the thing that it makes most sense to do:

Notice that if we asked the unlucky fellow why he did such a thing, he might reply with indignation: ‘Well, it was the perfectly rational thing to do; I had every reason to think the glass contained gin; why in the world should I think that someone would be going around putting petrol in cocktail glasses!?’ Here the unlucky subject … is not providing an excuse for his action or treating what he did as a reason; he is defending it as the action that made the most sense for him to do … He is providing a justification, not an excuse.

What’s wrong with this?



Part of my disagreement with them is substantive. Let’s suppose that justification requires norm conformity. If you think that there are norms that require us to keep promises, help others, refrain from harming, you’ll think that the objective nature of the deeds performed and the consequences of actions are part of what determines norm conformity. Their line might be based on the mistaken but coherent Kantian view that all moral assessment is concerned with the quality of the agent’s will.

If the disagreement is a disagreement about what it takes for a norm to be a norm, then it looks like they’re going to have trouble articulating a coherent account of norms.

In the next few slides, I’ll explain why we shouldn’t accept this equation (holding fixed the idea that justificatory defenses require that the agent conforms to the norms that govern her responses):

R=J: If it is rational for a conscientious agent A to respond doxastically, practically, or affectively by F-ing, A has justification to respond doxastically, practically, or affectively by F-ing.



Let’s focus on the case of factual mistake...

(1) N is a norm (i.e., One must X if C obtains and must not X otherwise.) [Assume].

(2) C obtains [Assume].

(3) A rationally believes C doesn’t obtain [Assume].

(4) It is rational for A to believe she must not X. [Because A rationally believes N is a norm and rationally believes that C doesn’t obtain].

(5) If it is rational for A to believe she must not X, A is justified in refraining from X-ing [On the assumption that non-culpable factual mistakes justify].

(6) A is justified in refraining from X-ing [From (4) and (5) because we’re assuming that mistake/ignorance justifies].

(7) A must X [From (1), (2)].

(8) A is not justified in refraining from X-ing [(7)].

But this is absurd as (8) contradicts (6).

If there are genuine norms with application conditions we can rationally but falsely believe not to obtain, the thesis that ignorance justifies must be mistaken. For just about any non-normative condition we can think of, it seems it would be possible to have strong but misleading evidence that this condition doesn’t obtain. So, the thought that factual mistakes don’t exculpate by justifying must be correct if any plausible objectivist account of obligation is correct but the correctness of such a point doesn’t require it.



Let’s focus on another case of factual mistake...

(1) A rationally believes that N is a norm (i.e., One must X if C obtains and must not X otherwise.) [Assume].

(2) C obtains [Assume].

(3) A rationally believes C doesn’t obtain [Assume].

(4) A is rationally required to believe she must not X. [Plausibly possible in light of (1)-(3).]

(5) If A is rationally required to believe she must not X and rationality just is justification, A is not justified in refraining from X-ing.

(6) A is not justified in refraining from X-ing.

(7) A must X.

Two observations.

First, while A might rationally believe N is a norm, A might be mistaken about that. C might have no normative significance whatever. R=J has the odd implication that A’s mistakes are potentially inculpating.

Second, A’s mistakes would seem to generate obligations where there shouldn’t be.

Both implications of R=J strike me as being quite troubling.



Cohen and Comesana say that rational beliefs about what it takes to conform to some standard excuse action. Even that’s a bit dubious.

Gideon Rosen, for example, has argued that an ancient slaveholder or a sexist father of the 50s might have rational but mistaken moral beliefs where the mistake doesn’t derive from a mistake in reasoning but a non-culpable normative mistake or instance of normative ignorance. Presumably, these subjects might have rationally held moral beliefs. Since their actions manifest de re unresponsiveness, I don’t see why their ignorance would be exculpatory.

Worse, if you think R=J, there might be a situation in which the only justified option would be for them to act on their abhorrent beliefs. If they suffered from akrasia and knowingly failed to do what they judged they ought to do, would we really blame them? The suggestion that their ignorance/mistake might be inculpatory is outrageous. Why would we blame them for failing to act on the beliefs that we rightly take to be abhorrent? Surely blaming them for failing to act in ways we judge to be abhorrent would be abhorrent.


Cohen’s Practical Demon

It’s interesting that Cohen thinks that rational beliefs about what to do can excuse without justifying as it seems quite natural to think that these theses are correct:

* Appearances rationalize - The way things appear to you determine which doxastic, affective, and practical responses are rational.* Doxastic priority - If you rationally take F-ing to be the thing to do, it wouldn’t be rational for you to maintain this belief and do otherwise. Just as factual mistakes don’t necessarily impugn the rationality of a belief (e.g., the belief that F-ing is the thing to do), they don’t necessarily impugn the rationality of the actions rationalized by the belief (e.g., F-ing).

We might imagine a demon sees to it that subjects in different external settings are nevertheless internally indiscernible. It looks like Cohen would have to countenance the possibility that one subject fails to meet her obligations while the other agent always acts with justification. Still, both subjects act rationally.

So, it looks like Cohen has to reject R=J and opt for some more restricted link between rationality and justification.


Cohen’s Practical Demon

If Cohen is going to defend externalism about practical justification, he has to deal with the newer evil demon problem and explain how it’s possible for two internally indiscernible agents to have rational beliefs about what to do and act on these beliefs with only one subject acting with justification.

The rationality rationale

The subjects in the good and bad case would be equally rational if they were to F. If they would be equally rational, they would have equally good justification. So, these subjects have equally good justification to F. If one has sufficient justification to F, both do.

The reasons rationale

The subjects in the good and bad case would have the same reasons for action. Reasons justify actions. So, these subjects would have to have equally good justification to F. If one has sufficient justification to F, both do.


The Rationality Rationale

The rationality rationale

The subjects in the good and bad case would be equally rational if they were to F. If they would be equally rational, they would have equally good justification. So, these subjects have equally good justification to F. If one has sufficient justification to F, both do.

It’s obvious where the rationality rationale errs. As we’ve seen, the mark of justification isn’t rationality.

Here’s a helpful suggestion: the reasons that apply to you determine whether you have justification to F but the way the reasons appear and what you would have justification to do if your grasp of the situation were accurate and complete determine what’s rational.

Of course, someone might say, “This maneuver would be of no help. First of all, ‘reasonable’ and ‘rational’ are virtual synonyms for ‘justified’’, but Cohen can plausibly say that these expressions aren’t synonymous at all and point to the earlier slides to explain why this equation must be rejected.


The Reasons Rationale

The reasons rationale

(i) The subjects in the good and bad case would have the same reasons for action. (ii) Reasons justify actions. So, these subjects would have to have equally good justification to F. If one has sufficient justification to F, both do.

I think it’s important to distinguish between two readings of these claims about reasons:

Same reasons apply: If two subjects are internally the same, the same reasons bear on whether they should believe p.

Same reasons possessed: If two subjects are internally the same, the subjects have the very same reasons for believing.


The Reasons RationaleNow we have two arguments to consider:

Same reasons possessed: If two subjects are internally the same, the subjects have the very same reasons for believing.

If the subjects have the very same reasons for believing, they will have the same justification to believe p.

C: If the two subjects are internally the same, they will have the same justification to believe p.

Same reasons apply: If two subjects are internally the same, the same reasons bear on whether they should believe p.

If the same reasons bear on whether they should believe p, they will have the same justification to believe p.




P1. Same reasons possessed: If two subjects are internally the same, the subjects have the very same reasons for believing.

P2. If the subjects have the very same reasons for believing, they will have the same justification to believe p.


Both premises are false. Against SRP. The reasons that a subject has are reasons. Reasons are facts. Any fact that a subject knows is among the reasons that the subject has. Since the subjects differ in terms of what they know, they differ in terms of the reasons they have.

We don’t need E=K to give us this. We only need to be clear about what reasons are (i.e., the facts that figure in reasoning) and accept a weak claim about possession (i.e., any fact that you know is among the reasons you have).

Against P2. The reason we distinguished between the reasons the subject has and the reasons that apply to the subject is that there are reasons that apply to us that aren’t in our possession. Such reasons include the reasons provided by norms that we’re not in a position to know apply to us. The categoricity of such norms turns on the idea that these reasons will apply to us even when we aren’t in a position to recognize their authority. [I’ll develop this point in the next slide.]


The Reasons RationaleP1. Same reasons apply: If two subjects are internally the same, the same reasons bear on whether they should believe p.

P2. If the same reasons bear on whether they should believe p, they will have the same justification to believe p.


This argument is also unsound, but that’s because of (P1), not (P2).

Suppose there’s a norm that says this:

N: One must not believe p if one lacks sufficient evidence to believe p.

In light of this, a reason applies to you if you, say, have the usual grounds for believing that the number of stars is even and you consider whether the number is indeed even. It may well be that the fact that there’s a reason for you to suspend judgment provided by N supervenes upon your mental states. The question is whether the presence/absence of all such reasons supervenes upon your mental states. There’s nothing in Cohen’s argument that would indicate that there are, but this is just what he would need to show to support P1.

For my own part, I think that there are norms with external application conditions. If there are such norms, it should be possible for internal twins to differ in terms of how well they conform to them. For example:

KN: One must not believe p unless one’s belief constitutes knowledge.



It looks like the reasons rationale could only succeed if Cohen could show that there are no epistemic norms with external application conditions.

Because it’s obvious that the points that Cohen could/would offer in response to criticisms of his externalism about practical justification can be carried over to respond to his criticisms of externalism about epistemic justification, I’ll simply note that and move on.

The interesting question, to my mind, is why he still thinks justified belief just is rational belief in spite of the fact that it looks like he rejects R=J.


Might epistemic rationality be the mark of epistemic justification?

In more recent work, Cohen has offered an argument for linking epistemic justification to rationality, one that doesn’t seem to commit him to the unfortunate view that the rationality of an action ensures that the action conforms to the norms that govern it.

He writes:

... distinguishing between rational beliefs and justified beliefs does not make any sense. It makes no more sense than distinguishing between moral acts and justified acts. Justification is domain relative. A justification for F-ing can be moral, rational, legal, etc. It is moral to F just in case F-ing is morally justified. In the same way, it is rational to F just in case one’s F-ing is rationally justified. So it is rational to believe just in case believing is rationally justified. When one distinguishes between rational belief and justified belief, one can only be distinguishing between rationally justified belief, and some other kind of justified belief. What is the other kind of justification? (‘Theorizing about the epistemic’, pp. 5.).

This strikes me as a bit odd. While I have only aesthetic objections to the introduction of this talk of ‘rationally justified’ believing and agree that ‘rationally justified believing’ is just ‘justified believing’, why can’t we distinguish the rationality of a belief from its justificatory status? Has he just pulled the absence of a distinction out of a hat?



Here’s how we can coherently argue that epistemic justification and rationality are distinct.

Step one: Specify the norms that govern belief (e.g., one must not believe p if C obtains).

Step two: Provide a theory of justification in terms of norm conformity (e.g., believing p if C obtains is unjustified and believing p otherwise might be justified, provided no further norm prohibits it).

Step three: Show that it’s possible for someone who knows the norms that govern belief to form rational, false beliefs about whether the norm’s application condition is satisfied.

If our aim is simply to show the coherence of distinguishing justification from rationality, we don’t need a good theory of what the norms are. If a bad theory of the substantive norms will do, this should do:

E: One should believe p iff one considers whether p and one has sufficiently strong evidence that supports p.

T: One should believe p iff one considers whether p and p.

It’s possible to be rational in believing falsely that you have sufficient evidence to believe p or to be rational in believing falsely that p. If you knew or rationally believed these norms were norms, it would be rational to believe in violation of E or in violation of T. Such violations cannot be justified, however.



Cohen writes, “The fact that F-ing is rationally (morally, legally) justified just in case F-ing is rational (moral, legal) underscore the obscurity of the appeal to epistemic justification ... Do those who distinguish between epistemic and rational justification want to say that an epistemically justified belief is an epistemic belief? We simply have no idea what normative domain ‘epistemic’ refers to.” (Theorizing the epistemic, pp. 6).

If my conjecture from earlier is correct and it’s possible to have rational false beliefs about just about anything, Cohen’s constraint on a theory of justification (i.e., that it equates justification with rational justification with rationality) would prevent us from formulating a coherent theory of justification.

Ordinary people who don’t do epistemology have some grasp of what epistemic assessment amounts to and a pretty good grasp of the difference between rationality and justification. Consider three cases of anger.

(i) p is the sort of thing you should be angry about. You learn p and you’re angry because p.

(ii) p is the sort of thing you should be angry about. You falsely believe p and you’re angry because you believe p.

(iii) p is the sort of thing you shouldn’t be angry about. You learn p and you’re angry because p.

People understand that there’s two ways for anger to be irrational or unreasonable. Anger might be the wrong response to the object of anger or it might be based on an irrational or unreasonable belief. Epistemic assessment is concerned with that second kind of case, not the first. Justified anger is limited to (i) and someone might be perfectly rational for being angry if they’re in (ii).

This idea that justification and rationality terms of art is silly. A little googling reveals plenty of discussions by non-philosophers of justified anger, doubt, fear, regret, etc. and show a willingness to distinguish fitting anger from reasonable anger. In turn, these distinctions have fed into the ways that the law understands things like the excusatory power of anger, fear, etc.



If we want to get a fix on the notion of justified belief and the distinction between epistemic justification and epistemic rationality, focus on cases where the fitting response to the fact that p would be to F and think about the difference between rational F-ing that’s merely excusable and justified F-ing.

We might characterize the fundamental epistemic norm this way:

R: One must not believe p unless one’s belief in p provides one with a reason for a doxastic, practical, or affective response.

If such a norm governs belief, we have a straightforward argument for externalism about justification.

Step One: Only true beliefs provide such reasons. [That’s because reasons are facts, not states of mind or falsehoods.]

Step Two: There is no norm that conflicts with R that requires violating it.

Step Three: There’s no further norm that prohibits believing p in conformity with R.

If it turns out that only beliefs that constitute knowledge provide reasons, justification isn’t an internalist notion.



Consider the hypothesis that justified beliefs are beliefs that provide reasons (J=RPR). On this view, justification entails truth. (False beliefs don’t provide reasons.)

Does this view lead to scepticism? It does vindicate the Cartesian view:

CV: It is a conceptual truth that, if conditions C justify belief B for subject S, then C logically entails that B is true.

It should be clear why Cohen’s objection to CV fails. Cohen assumes that C is the sort of thing that supervenes upon a subject’s non-factive mental states, the things that the demon can manipulate in order to deceive you. What justifies that assumption?

I think that Cohen assumes that the things that move you to believe determine whether the belief is justified. That’s part of it, surely, but the parallel with action is instructive. Nobody assumes that the justificatory status of an action depends just upon the states of mind that move you or could have moved you, but also upon whether in being so moved you’d conform to the norms governing action. The whole point of an excuse that cites, say, a gust of wind or a nudge is to remind us that facts about norm conformity don’t supervene upon facts about motivation. So, why should we assume in the epistemic case that facts about norm conformity supervene upon facts about potential or actual doxastic motivations?

If we model our theory of epistemic justification on a theory of practical justification, we might agree that norm conformity depends upon what moved you to believe, but we wouldn’t think that it does so the exclusion of everything else. And we surely wouldn’t think that the fact that the rationality of our responses depends upon the internal that it’s impossible for there to be external epistemic norms.


preview of “ned geneva epistemic excuses .pdf”

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