price and entry regulation transportationand regulation of “competitive” industries
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Price and Entry Price and Entry RegulationRegulation
TransportationTransportation
AndAnd
Regulation of “Competitive” Regulation of “Competitive” IndustriesIndustries
Price & Entry RegulationPrice & Entry Regulation Formerly applied to Formerly applied to
Railroads Railroads Motor CarriersMotor Carriers AirlinesAirlines
With deregulation (1976-1990), little used With deregulation (1976-1990), little used Differs from natural monopoly reg. Differs from natural monopoly reg.
Non-exclusive licenses/territoriesNon-exclusive licenses/territories Regulated P > MCRegulated P > MC Eliminate “discriminatory” pricingEliminate “discriminatory” pricing Promote “universal service” thru cross-subsidyPromote “universal service” thru cross-subsidy Incentive for entry by less efficient Incentive for entry by less efficient
providers/substitutesproviders/substitutes
Effects Effects
If PIf PRR > MC > MC11, then less efficient firms may enter , then less efficient firms may enter and take whole market at Pand take whole market at P22<P<PRR PPRR > P > P2 2 >> MC MC22 > MC > MC11 Must regulate substitutes (Railroads, Trucks)Must regulate substitutes (Railroads, Trucks)
Entry may Entry may reducereduce welfare welfare P > AC, but just enough firms so each produces MES P > AC, but just enough firms so each produces MES
quantity to maximize profitquantity to maximize profit Entry then results in P = AC at lower quantity per firm Entry then results in P = AC at lower quantity per firm
and higher ACand higher AC ““Quality” competition with entry blockedQuality” competition with entry blocked
may raise AC up to Pmay raise AC up to P but consumers may prefer higher “quality”but consumers may prefer higher “quality” Effect on SW ambiguous Effect on SW ambiguous
Transportation Regulation Transportation Regulation
RailroadsRailroads Elements of natural monopolyElements of natural monopoly
Cartelization through capture of regulatorsCartelization through capture of regulators No price discrimination (uniform pricing)No price discrimination (uniform pricing)
Cross-subsidy creates incentive for entry (trucks)Cross-subsidy creates incentive for entry (trucks) Entry/Exit regulatedEntry/Exit regulated
No abandonment of unprofitable routes No abandonment of unprofitable routes Value of Service pricingValue of Service pricing
Transport rates based on value of goodsTransport rates based on value of goods Deregulated under demands of railroads and Deregulated under demands of railroads and
large shippers in 1980slarge shippers in 1980s
Transportation RegulationTransportation Regulation
Motor Carriers (Trucks)Motor Carriers (Trucks) Substitute for railroadsSubstitute for railroads Cartelization through Rate BureausCartelization through Rate Bureaus Entry and Exit RegulationEntry and Exit Regulation
Likely welfare enhancing under the Likely welfare enhancing under the circumstancescircumstances
Undermined by growth of contract haulers Undermined by growth of contract haulers and vertical integration by large shippersand vertical integration by large shippers
Effectively deregulated by 1990s Effectively deregulated by 1990s
Transportation RegulationTransportation Regulation AirlinesAirlines
Originated as subsidy for mail carriersOriginated as subsidy for mail carriers Protection from “ruinous” competitionProtection from “ruinous” competition
Cross-subsidized routesCross-subsidized routes Promote “universal service”Promote “universal service” Necessitated entry and exit regulationNecessitated entry and exit regulation
Quality competition eroded profits while keeping prices Quality competition eroded profits while keeping prices highhigh
Unregulated intrastate routes in TX and CA had much lower Unregulated intrastate routes in TX and CA had much lower prices than interstate regulated routes of similar length prices than interstate regulated routes of similar length
Deregulated in 1970s Deregulated in 1970s Carter Administration (Alfred Kahn at CAB; Ted Kennedy)Carter Administration (Alfred Kahn at CAB; Ted Kennedy) Both airlines & passengers saw benefits from Both airlines & passengers saw benefits from
competitioncompetition Lower prices better service on high volume routesLower prices better service on high volume routes Some low-volume routes to small cities were lostSome low-volume routes to small cities were lost