primer on three aspects of the unfccc

8/10/2019 Primer on Three Aspects of the UNFCCC

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/primer-on-three-aspects-of-the-unfccc 1/19

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A Primer on Three Aspects of the UNFCCC:

Historical Responsibility Mechanisms for Change and Legal

Form of the Agreement

By lison Kirsch

R e s e a r c h e r T h e C l i m a t e a n d D e v e l o p m e n t L a b

B r o w n U n i v e r s i t y

January 2015

Table of Contents

General Background .................. .................. .................. .................. ....... 2

Historical Responsibility ................. .................. .................. .................. . 2

Mechanisms for Change ..................... .................. .................. ................ 7

E m i s s i o n s T r a d i n g

...................................................................................................................... 7

C l e a n D e v e l o p m e n t M e c h a n i s m ............................................................................... ............ 8

J o i n t I m p l e m e n t a t i o n

......................................................................... ....................................... 8

Legal Form of the Agreement ... .................. .................. .................. ..... 10

Further Readings ................. .................. .................. .................. ........... 14

About ................................................................................................... 15

Works Cited .............................. .................. .................. .................. ..... 16



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General Background

The most recent report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change — a

collaboration of close to 300 leading scientists from around the world — calls the warming

climate “unequivocal” and “unprecedented,” and says that there is a 95-100% probability

that post-1950 warming is human-caused.1 Scientists have agreed that to avoid catastrophic

climate change, we must prevent the world from warming more than 2°C above pre-industrial levels. Theoretically, we could burn 565 gigatons (1 gigaton = 109 tons) of carbon

dioxide or its equivalent and stay under the 2° limit. Yet the world currently has access to

2,795 gigatons of carbon in global reserves, meaning four fifths of these reserves must

remain untapped in order to avoid devastating climate change.2 The effects of climate

change are already apparent worldwide in changing precipitation patterns, rising sea levels,

shrinking glaciers, shifting crop yields, and more.3

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was created in 1992

as the first international response to the problem of human-induced climate change.

According to the UNFCCC, the parties agreed to bring global greenhouse gas emissions to

“a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”Each year, the convention’s 195 members meet for a Conference of the Parties (COP). In

1997, 192 of the members of the convention adopted the Kyoto Protocol to the United

Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, with binding greenhouse gas emission

targets for developed countries.4 The goal was to reduce global emissions to 5% below

1990 levels by 2012. Though President Clinton signed the treaty, the US Senate never

ratified it. Soon after, Canada withdrew. The treaty came into effect with the participation of

the EU, Japan, and Russia, yet without two of the world’s largest carbon emitters.5

Historical Responsibility

The Industrial Revolution can be considered the beginning of anthropogenic (human-induced) climate change. Around 1750, anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions began to

increase substantially primarily due to a burgeoning coal industry. However, this revolution

of transportation and technology did not occur evenly around the globe, and thus, historical

greenhouse gas emissions are also concentrated in certain areas — namely, the US, UK,

Russia, and Germany.6

Under the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate

Change, signed in 1997, industrialized nations are referred to as the Annex I countries, and

today include parties such as Australia, the European Union, the Russian Federation, the

United Kingdom, and the United States of America.7 These developed countries produced

79% of global greenhouse gas emissions between 1850 and 2000; proportionally by

1 http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf

2 http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/global-warmings-terrifying-new-math-20120719

3 http://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/images/uploads/WG2AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf

4 https://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php 5 http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1162/glep.2007.7.4.1

6 http://www.wri.org/blog/2014/05/history-carbon-dioxide-emissions

7 https://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/annex_i/items/2774.php



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population, these countries should have only accounted for 20% of global emissions in this

time period.8 Historically, the economies of these industrialized nations have been positively

correlated with their greenhouse gas emissions.

However, these are not the countries that are overall most affected by the negative

impacts of climate change. Within the United Nations, the Least Developed Countries (LDCs)

group is comprised of 49 non-Annex I parties that have the lowest socioeconomicdevelopment indicators.9 These countries, which make up 12% of the world population,

have produced 1% of historic greenhouse gas emissions. Yet between 2010 and 2013, they

experienced 67% of global deaths from climate-related disasters (including tropical storms

and storm surges, floods, heat waves, droughts, malaria outbreaks, and more). This is 4.7

times what would be expected if deaths from climate-related disasters occurred evenly

around the world.10 See the graphs at the end of this section for a visualization of this

tension.

Developing countries with fewer economic resources are least able to take protective

measures or adapt to a changing climate through technology. Climate-related disasters are

expected to increase in the coming years, which means these already vulnerable countrieswill continue to be exposed to the resulting dangers. Recent climate-related disasters have

called attention to this issue, such as Typhoon Haiyan, which devastated the Philippines just

as parties to the UNFCCC were convening in Warsaw for the 19th Conference of the Parties.

There is now a growing conversation about ‘climate justice,’ which demands financial

support for vulnerable countries to help them adapt, as well as recover the costs of losses

and damages.

Thus, there is a clear disparity between the countries that have historically

contributed the most to anthropogenic climate change and those who are the most

vulnerable and are currently suffering from its effects. This perspective suggests that those

who brought on climate change should bear the financial and political burden of stopping it,especially since these countries are also the most economically capable of doing so.

Of course, this is not the only lens through which to view the burden of responsibility

for confronting climate change. Traditionally, as countries begin to develop, their

greenhouse gas emissions increase rapidly. Thus, in recent years, developing countries have

begun to make up a larger share of annual global emissions. China and India have been

particularly large contributors due to their recent high-carbon industrialization. In 1990,

developing (non-Annex I) countries accounted for 33% of global greenhouse gas emissions.

By 2008, this increased to 53%, thus exceeding global emissions of developed countries. By

2030, developing countries are predicted to account for 70% of the world’s greenhouse gas

emissions.

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Under the expiring Kyoto Protocol, these countries are not required to pledgeemission reductions, and thus are free to develop in the same ‘dirty’ manner as the

8 http://www.erc.uct.ac.za/Basic_Experts_Paper.pdf

9 https://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/items/2704.php

10 All statistics here are based on calculations by the Brown University Climate and Development Lab, 2013,

based on CRED-EMDAT database. Data on LDCs are for the 44 of 49 LDCs included in the CRED-EMDAT

database. http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/17181IIED.pdf 11

http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/publications/Policy/docs/transition-low-carbon-economy.pdf



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developed nations. Another important note is that the parties to the UNFCCC were divided

into annexes in 1992 upon the convention’s creation, and the classifications have only

shifted slightly since. This means that a country like China, a growing world power in the

midst of rapid economic development, is subject to the same stipulations as an LDC such as

Nepal.

If business continues as usual, these non-Annex I countries will pursue developmentpaths similar to those taken by the Annex I nations. That means using carbon-intensive fuels

such as coal and oil in order to grow and develop, and only then considering lower-carbon

or renewable fuel sources, which require expensive new technology investments.

Developing countries argue that they should not be restricted in how they develop and work

to eradicate poverty, and that they have the right to the same high-carbon development

pathway taken by the already industrialized nations. Moreover, they argue that they do not

have the technological or economic capacity to focus on sustainable, low-carbon

development in their current economic standings. Instead, their position is that developed

countries should allocate more funds to mitigate climate change (cut back on their

greenhouse gas emissions), since they are already in a position to do so. Anotherconsideration comes from the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) whose very existence is

threatened by climate change’s rising sea levels. For example, sea level rise in Haiti

threatens coastal infrastructure and makes storm surges all the more dangerous, while a

reduction in the area’s rainfall is also lowering agricultural output and available drinking

water.12 Though they have contributed little to global emissions, SIDS invoke a moral

responsibility in the big emitters to act ambitiously.

On the other hand, industrialized countries argue that developing countries can

‘leapfrog’ many of the ‘dirty’ development steps (such as en economy based on coal), and

develop more sustainably from the start. With today’s knowledge about the harmful

atmospheric effects of fossil fuel emissions, developed nations argue that everyone shouldengage in low-carbon development from the start. The best and most equitable way to

ensure this, then, would be to set binding emissions limits on developing countries as well as

developed countries. Additionally, since developing nations are growing contributors to the

global emissions picture, many argue that a new climate treaty should include binding

emissions targets for all parties.

How does the current UNFCCC text deal with this issue? The convention calls on

Annex I countries to “take the lead in combating climate change.” This is developed through

the notion “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” (CBDR-

RC). Of course, the broad nature of this phrasing incites debate as to which is more

important: a country’s responsibility or its capability. Taking responsibility for climate changecan include setting mitigation targets (pledges to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in order

to avoid further climate change) or financially supporting other countries as they lower their

greenhouse gas emissions or adapt to existing climate change. The developed Annex I

countries have binding emissions reductions targets under the Kyoto Protocol, while the

12 http://www.sidsnet.org/country-profiles/haiti



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developing non-Annex I countries are not required by the UNFCCC to reduce emissions

without financial support from developed nations.

Thus, a country’s responsibility in confronting climate change — how strict their

mitigation targets must be, if they have any at all, and whether or not they provide financial

support to other countries — can be measured by many factors. These include its historical

emissions, current emissions, projected emissions, economic standing, economic growthand development rates, etc. Some proposed solutions try to integrate these factors. For

instance, one possibility is to divvy up the emissions remaining in the carbon budget

according to a country’s historical emissions and current population.13 The

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) explores four different focuses for

setting mitigation goals in regards to rights, liability, poverty, and opportunity.14

In considering the historical and current responsibility of each country in the face of

the global problem of climate change, there are many questions to consider in order to

propose the mechanisms for change and the legal form of this new climate treaty:

! In the 2015 international climate treaty, how should countries be categorized, if at

all?! Should developing countries have binding emissions reduction targets?

! Who should be most responsible for taking action to stop further climate change?

! What forms of development should be allowed or encouraged for developing

countries? Do they have the right to develop as they choose?

! How will the notion of CBDR-RC appear in the 2015 agreement?

! What metric should be used to determine the extent of a country’s responsibility?

Does it make most sense to focus on historical emissions, current emissions,

emissions projections, economic standing, economic growth, etc.?

13 http://www.wri.org/blog/what-equity-context-climate-negotiations

14 http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/tar/wg3/index.php?idp=58



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Countries Sized According to Annual CO 2 Emissions, 2013

Countries Sized According to Historical CO 2 Emissions from Energy Use, 1850-2011

Countries Sized According to Climate Change Vulnerability (Number of People Impacted)

Viewers can manipulate this data and more at http://www.carbonmap.org.



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Mechanisms for Change

The UNFCCC sets emission targets for its Annex I member countries. Each country

can implement any type of policy or project within its boundaries to lower its domestic

emissions to the target levels. If the enforcement board finds an Annex I party has failed to

achieve its emission education promises, the country must make up that difference, and

reduce an additional 30%, in the succeeding commitment period.15 However, as aninternational body, the UNFCCC also provides for international mechanisms that help

countries achieve their emission reduction pledges. Currently, the Kyoto Protocol outlines

three mechanisms: emissions trading, the clean development mechanism, and joint

implementation. All of these mechanisms are market-based.

E m i s s i o n s T r a d i n g

An emissions trading scheme turns greenhouse gas emissions into an exchangeable

commodity. A country is assigned a limit on its emissions, meaning it is allowed to emit a

certain quantity of greenhouse gases over a given time period. This emissions limit can be

viewed in terms of ‘units’ of a greenhouse gas that a country is permitted to emit. If a countryemits less than their allotted amount of greenhouse gasses, it can sell its spare emission units

to a country whose emissions exceed its limit. The market is often referred to as the carbon

market, as most of a country’s greenhouse gas emissions are in the form of carbon dioxide.

However, emissions trading takes into account all other greenhouse gases, such as methane

or nitrous oxide, by measuring units in the form of ‘carbon dioxide equivalents’.16

An emissions trading scheme gives a country flexibility with respect to its given

greenhouse gas emissions limit, as it can buy or sell emission capacity depending on its

needs. Emissions trading also allows for global greenhouse gas emissions to be lowered

over time, in what is referred to as a cap-and-trade scheme. That is, as countries’ allotted

greenhouse gas emissions lower over time, they can buy or sell emissions units amongstthemselves, though the set number of units in existence assures that global emissions stay

under a certain quantity. When countries know that their emissions allotment is set to lower,

investment is encouraged in clean technologies, and selling emissions units gives countries

money to put toward these projects. Currently, there exist many domestic and regional

emissions trading schemes, such as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the

northeastern United States, and the European Union Emission Trading Scheme.

Emissions trading is critiqued for allowing the biggest and richest polluters to

continue polluting and merely buy emission credits from countries or bodies who are not

financially equipped to do the same. It also allows for potential cheating problems in

tracking and reporting emissions data.

15 http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/compliance/items/3024.php

16 http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/emissions_trading/items/2731.php



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C l e a n D e v e l o p m e n t M e c h a n i s m

The clean development mechanism creates an exchange between developed and

developing countries. Recall that under the Kyoto Protocol, developed countries have

binding emission limits, whereas developing countries do not. Nonetheless, when

developing countries invest in emission-reducing projects, they earn a quantity of certified

emission reduction credits equivalent to the tons of carbon dioxide (or its equivalent in theform of another greenhouse gas) that the project prevents from being emitted. Developing

countries can then trade or sell the emission reduction credits to industrialized countries,

which can count these reductions toward their emissions reduction limits as set by the treaty.

Thus, the clean development mechanism incentivizes developing countries to lower their

emissions (without imposing binding limits), as it provides them with a source of income for

doing so.

It also provides flexibility to industrialized countries in meeting their emissions

reductions targets, in that not all of the progress must come directly from lowering in-

country emissions.17 Instead, they offset their emissions by funding sustainable development

projects in developing countries. As of 2012, in its 5,000+ projects, the clean developmentmechanism “has provided carbon reductions equivalent to the emissions from about a fifth

of the world’s cars over one year and saved at least USD3.6 billion in emissions reduction

costs.”18 For instance, a Bus Rapid Transit system was implemented in Bogotá, Colombia,

and is expected to generate $17.3 million per crediting period due to the sale of emission

credits.

As with any offset system, the clean development mechanism has its critics. How can

participants ensure that the projects create new and additional emissions reductions, and

don’t solely double-count declines in emissions that are already taking place? How can both

parties ensure that the projects are truly environmentally beneficial overall? How can the

monitoring and measuring of these projects be standardized? Another issue is that countrieswith small economies and low greenhouse gas emissions may not attract investments

through the clean development mechanism, though the development and funds would be

useful for them.19

J o i n t I m p l e m e n t a t i o n

The third mechanism set up by the Kyoto Protocol is joint implementation, which

encourages emission reduction projects amongst developed countries. With joint

implementation, one industrialized country finances a project that reduces greenhouse gas

emissions in another industrialized country. The project creates emission reduction units,

which the host country sells to the investor party. Similar to the clean developmentmechanism, the investor party can then count that amount of carbon dioxide toward its own

emission reduction pledge. There are various eligibility requirements that a party’s proposed

17 http://cdm.unfccc.int/about/index.html

18 https://cdm.unfccc.int/about/dev_ben/CDM-Benefits-2012.pdf

19 http://cdm.unfccc.int/about/dev_ben/about/dev_ben/ABC_2012.pdf



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project must meet in order to qualify for the emission reduction credit.20 Keep in mind that

this transfer occurs between two countries with binding emissions reduction targets, so the

reductions would have to occur either way. Thus, the country hosting the emission reduction

project is more interested in the success of said project than a developing country benefiting

from clean development mechanism investment might be.21 This sharing of responsibility

can also make the emission reduction process more flexible and financially viable. Similarconcerns to the clean development mechanism remain, such as the monitoring and

reporting of projects.

One successful example is Denmark’s funding of a technology update on a fertilizer

plant in the Czech Republic. The fixes mean that the plant will emit less nitrous oxide, a

potent greenhouse gas. Over the period from 2008 to 2012, the project is expected to avoid

approximately 1,250,000 tons of carbon dioxide equivalent. Additionally, the agreement for

the project states that the Czech Republic will use the money it receives for selling its

emission reduction credits to Denmark for further sustainable investments in the plant.22

Each mechanism requires an enormous amount of UN oversight to run smoothly and

effectively. For instance, the joint implementation mechanism has its own governing body(including a conglomeration of subcommittees and working groups) that meets annually to

write new rules and to review projects. To participate in any of the three, a party must have a

national procedure for measuring and reporting greenhouse gas emissions — though this

process is not standardized internationally.

These three mechanisms together create a global carbon market, which in 2014 is

worth $61.8 billion.23 The value continues to grow as emission targets are lowered and the

amount of carbon to be traded decreases. Many civil society organizations criticize the entire

‘green economy’ approach, arguing that the climate’s current problems exist due to

capitalistic faults, and that a solution by the same method will only continue to favor

industrialized countries.24

Other mechanisms have been proposed to effectively involve the parties, as well as

the private and public sectors, in lowering global greenhouse gas emissions. The current

agreement of the Kyoto Protocol, for instance, does not include any non-market-based

approaches. In the 2011 Conference of the Parties in Durban, the parties called for a new

market-based mechanism, and since then many parties have submitted position papers with

suggestions for this25 or alternative non-market-based26 mechanisms.

20 http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/joint_implementation/items/1674.php

21 http://www.ffem.fr/webdav/site/ffem/shared/ELEMENTS_COMMUNS/U_ADMINISTRATEUR/5-

PUBLICATIONS/Changement_climatique/GuideC_projets_Kyoto_angl.pdf 22

http://ji.unfccc.int/about/multimedia/ji_highlights.pdf 23 http://www.rtcc.org/2014/01/08/global-carbon-market-to-rise-15-in-value-in-2014-bloomberg-analysts/ 24

http://www.rtcc.org/2014/07/22/venezuela-climate-summit-calls-for-end-to-green-economy/ 25

https://unfccc.int/cooperation_support/market_and_non-market_mechanisms/items/7710.php 26

http://unfccc.int/cooperation_support/market_and_non-market_mechanisms/items/7711.php



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Alternative non-market-based approaches include:

! Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing

Countries (REDD+): Deforestation and land use change are estimated to make up

20% of global greenhouse gas emissions. This program provides financial incentives

to developing countries to keep their forests intact.27 When emission reduction

credits from REDD+ are privately bought and sold, however, this becomes a market-based mechanism.

! Technology mechanism: This involves a transfer of technological knowledge to help

developing countries develop sustainably to both mitigate climate change and to

adapt to its effects.28

Questions to consider include:

! How effective and just are the existing mechanisms?

!

What should the mechanisms be for the 2015 agreement?

! How can these mechanisms scale up mitigation ambition — that is, continue to lower

global greenhouse gas emissions by lowering national emissions?! Parties can create any plan of action to lower their national greenhouse gas emissions

(i.e. increasing energy efficiency, retiring coal-fired power plants, removing fossil fuel

subsidies, updating transportation systems, etc.). Should any of these strategies be

mandated at the international level?

! Should the focus be on market-based or non-market based approaches?

! Should there be a standardized methodology for measuring and reporting

greenhouse gas emissions?

! How should an international agreement account for national and/or regional

emission reduction mechanisms already in place to avoid double counting of

emission reductions? Should existing carbon markets be linked under a standardizedtrading scheme?

! How can the UNFCCC ensure the environmental integrity of the projects

implemented through these mechanisms?

Legal Form of the Agreement

The commitments agreed upon under the Kyoto Protocol are set to expire in 2020;

the UNFCCC looks to design a new treaty that kicks in by that same year. The main question

is, what will the new international climate regime look like?

At COP17 in 2011, UNFCCC parties decided two vague aspects of the 2015

agreement: it must be “under the convention” and have “legal force.” The first of these

stipulations means that any new agreement must comply with the existing UNFCCC

structure, or amendments thereof. Any instruments used or provisions outlined must be

consistent with the convention as is. Note that the process for amending the UNFCCC is

27 http://www.un-redd.org/aboutredd/tabid/102614/default.aspx

28 http://unfccc.int/ttclear/templates/render_cms_page?TEM_home



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accessible, since the agreement is already operational and thus has legal force. The new

treaty can amend an existing agreement that already has legal backing. For instance, the

2015 agreement can be written out of the text of the UNFCCC itself, or it can build upon and

extend the Kyoto Protocol. The text can also come from COP decisions — which is perhaps

an easier option in regards to writing the text in a timely manner — though with careful

evidencing of the two stipulations mentioned above. COP decisions are written by way of adirect connection to a provision of the UNFCCC or Kyoto Protocol already in force. 29 There

are other international instruments that can be used as well. Secondary legislation

necessitated by a treaty can derive legal force from the agreement itself. International

organizations can make recommendations, such as the decisions made at a COP.

Additionally, political agreements that are not ratified as treaties can encourage compliance,

though they don’t involve formal punishment for not following through.30 The UNFCCC must

acknowledge difficulties due to various national situations. For instance, President Obama

has addressed the concern that the US Senate won’t ratify a climate treaty by exploring the

option of an accord instead.31 Adopting a protocol would require consensus, while three

quarters of the parties would have to agree to amend the UNFCCC.An agreement could also build off of existing international laws. For instance, one

could argue that it is an international human rights violation to ignore the consequences of

sea level rise on small island nation states, and that funding must be provided for

adaptation. Sea level rise can also be considered in relation to the International Tribunal Law

of the Sea. 32 Essentially, existing international laws can be a sort of crutch to the difficult

ordeal of constructing a new compromise.

Within the selected legal structure(s), the text can be served as a package deal, or

parties can be permitted to select which parts they will and will not commit to. The

combination of mandatory and optional clauses can allow for both flexibility and

complication. For example, the United States is party to the UNFCCC, but did not ratify theKyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol itself, however, is a take-it-or-leave-it deal.

Yet the legal force called for in Durban is a separate issue from the legally binding

nature of the treaty. Though technically legally binding, the Kyoto Protocol has no real teeth.

Nine years after it was signed, the parties developed a complex procedure for the case of

non-compliance. Sanctions include suspending flexibility mechanisms (that is, prohibiting

participation in joint implementation and clean development projects, and emissions

trading) for a certain country. Another possible sanction is to reduce the amount of

greenhouse gases a country is allowed to emit in the coming commitment period; this isn’t

the biggest motivator considering the existence of another commitment period is never

assured. Due to the slow-moving nature of oversight and punishment, it may be that themost risk a country runs by not following through on emission reductions is the damage to

its reputation.33 In contrast to the ‘stick’ measures, one ‘carrot’ of the situation is that

29 https://blogs.dal.ca/melaw/2014/05/29/legal-form-options-for-the-2015-climate-deal/

30 http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/durban-platform-issues-and-options.pdf 31

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/27/us/politics/obama-pursuing-climate-accord-in-lieu-of-treaty.html 32

http://cdkn.org/2012/03/what-legal-form-should-a-global-climate-change-deal-take/ 33

http://amsterdamlawforum.org/article/view/133/255



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participating in the carbon market through the agreement’s mechanisms can be

economically attractive for a given country.

Many of the developed countries that committed to emission reductions in the Kyoto

Protocol have actually increased their overall greenhouse gas emissions since ratifying.34

Overall, the Kyoto Protocol’s emission reduction targets should have amounted to a 5%

reduction in global emissions by 2012 — instead, emissions grew by 58%.35 The 2015 agreement can be designed ‘top-down,’ ‘bottom-up,’ or contain elements

of both. A top-down agreement is contractual and includes more punitive measures for

noncompliance. This can result in more success in reaching stringent targets, but can also

alienate countries that find it too restricting. A bottom-up, voluntary-based approach can

encourage broader participation, though it may be more difficult to get countries to commit

voluntarily to ambitious emission reductions. In the same vein, methodology for measuring

greenhouse gas emissions, for instance, can also be dictated top-down. Or, each country can

design its own plan, though this could make for inconsistency. The UNFCCC demonstrates a

more bottom-up approach, as it depends upon national commitments and plans to reduce

emissions made by its member parties. The Kyoto Protocol is top-down, as national emissiontargets were decided for each country by the governing body.

Most countries, but not all, call for the 2015 agreement to be binding — that is, to

have mandatory provisions such as the greenhouse gas emission limits, with punitive clauses

in play to ensure compliance. After all, reducing global greenhouse gas emissions requires

more than just promises to cut emissions. Parties need to be held accountable for their

actions and to follow through effectively on their promises. However, parties may be more

hesitant to make bold commitments if failing to achieve a binding target results in harsher

consequences. There also exists the opinion that in order to reach a binding agreement that

all parties would be comfortable signing, there would need to be too much compromise,

and the agreement would emerge too weak. Thus, perhaps the answer is to rely on nationalambition and advancing technology to foster bolder pledges. Moreover, to avoid watering

down the agreement in an effort to please almost 200 parties, some experts advocate for a

‘mini-lateral’ approach that deals with the 20 or so countries that make up the lion’s share of

global emissions.36 Essentially, this contends with the question of starting with more

countries and less stringent commitments, or fewer countries with deeper commitments. The

wording of the agreement matters too, in regards to its legal forcefulness. At COP19 in

2013, in reference to greenhouse gas emission reductions the word ‘commitments’ was

changed to ‘contributions.’37 Parties agreed to submit Intended Nationally Determined

Contributions (INDCs) by early 2015 that outline how they would contribute to the global

effort. At COP20 in 2014 in Lima, parties hashed out what would be the structure of these

INDCs. They decided that each country could describe the greenhouse gas mitigation it are

34 http://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2012/nov/26/kyoto-protocol-carbon-emissions 35

http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/kyoto-climate-change-treaty-sputters-to-a-sorry-end-1.1184986 36

http://www.rtcc.org/2014/07/02/mini-lateral-approach-could-spare-un-climate-talk-gridlock/ 37

http://www.rtcc.org/2013/11/28/un-climate-chiefs-agree-path-to-2015-looks-tough-post-warsaw/



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willing to take on according to its domestic circumstances, and can also choose to include

adaptation efforts.38

Thus, it is unlikely that a new agreement could take a similar top-down, legally

binding approach as was taken in the Kyoto Protocol, given. INDCs, though not the only

aspect of the agreement, create a structure in which countries determine their contributions

and plans to achieve them. Of course, a hybrid approach is possible where some bindingrequirements are supplemented by bottom-up commitments. Thus, the 2015 agreement can

include elements of multiple approaches.

Some questions to consider:

! What will the new international climate regime look like?

!

How can countries be held accountable to their pledges? What should be the treaty’s

enforcement mechanism? Should it be centrally strengthened or weakened in favor

of party sovereignty? What is more effective: punitive measures or the invisible hand

of the market?

!

To what extent should the legal form of the treaty rely on existing international law?! How can a new agreement written ‘under the convention’ — which itself was originally

written in 1992 — adapt to changing times?39

! How can the legal form of the agreement encourage broad participation and

ambitious commitments at the same time?

38 http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/lima_dec_2014/application/pdf/auv_cop20_lima_call_for_climate_action.pdf

39 http://www.field.org.uk/blog/2014/06/12/getting-the-right-legal-design-in-time-for-the-2015-climate-

agreement



14

Further Readings

http://unfccc.int/essential_background/glossary/items/3666.php

Glossary of Climate Change Acronyms

Climate change negotiations are riddled with acronyms and wordy

terminology. Though technical, the UNFCCC website in general explains a lot ofbackground information and up-to-date decisions.

http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/tar/wg3/index.php?idp=57

What is the Challenge?

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change provides background on the

numbers game of mitigating human-induced climate change by reducing

greenhouse gas emissions.

http://www.theguardian.com/environment/series/the-ultimate-climate-change-faq

The Ultimate Climate Change FAQ A thorough and clear collection of facts and resources on climate change from

The Guardian.

www.carbonmap.org

The Carbon Map

This user-friendly tool can be used to explore how global responsibility for

greenhouse gas emissions depends on the perspective taken. Watch countries on the

world map grow and shrink according to their wealth, emissions, carbon reserves,

and more.

http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/durban-platform-issues-and-options.pdf

The Durban Platform: Issues and Options For a 2015 Agreement

Abstract : The Durban Platform talks, aiming for a new global agreement in

2015, present an opportunity to assess and strengthen the international climate

change effort. Since launching the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change

two decades ago, governments have tried both “top down” and “bottom up”

approaches. Neither has achieved the level of participation or ambition needed to

reverse the continued rise of global greenhouse gas emissions. Going forward,

governments should draw on both models to forge a more effective global

agreement.

http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1162/glep.2007.7.4.1

The Comparative Politics of Climate Change

This article gives a background to international climate politics and the

influence of national politics from the member parties. It analyzes why the US and

Canada did not participate in the Kyoto Protocol.



15

http://www.precopsocial.org/sites/default/files/archivos/margarita_declaration_on_climate_

change.pdf

Margarita Declaration on Climate Change

This declaration came out of the Social Pre-COP Preparatory Meeting that

took place in Margarita Island, Venezuela, from July 15-18, 2014. It represents the

voice of civil society social movements and organizations, and demands changes inthe system, not the climate.

http://www.rtcc.org/2014/08/22/what-would-a-fair-un-climate-change-deal-look-like/

What Would a Fair UN Climate Change Deal Look Like?

RTCC explains a new online tool that allows users to input certain parameters

for an international agreement and see the necessary emission reduction

commitments that each country would have to make. You can play around with the

calculator tool at http://www.gdrights.org/calculator/.

O t h e r s i te s :

World Resources Institute: http://www.wri.org/blog

Responding to Climate Change: http://www.rtcc.org/

About

Alison Kirsch is a researcher with the Climate and Development Lab at Brown University.

The Climate and Development Lab is a think tank in the Institute at Brown for Science and

Society, committed to informing a more just, equitable, and effective global climate change

policy.

www.climatedevlab.org



16

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