principles of peacetime readiness · principles of peacetime readiness ... stand down from their...

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n 1947, Christian Dior presented acollection of women�s clothing that

revolutionized the world. Almostovernight, women were slipping intoclothes from his New Look. After wartimerationing, the conspicuous consumptionembodied in the meters of materialrequired for each outfit signalled the endof the lean, sleek, efficient wartimefashions. Concomitant with the civilianworld�s entry into a period of extravagantconsumption, military leaders were �rightsizing� their organizations so their

Principles of Peacetime ReadinessBy Lieutenant Commander P. Richard Moller*

[Leadership] is an act of faith. In an age where no secret is sacred, where fabrications and falseconfidences are the stuff of daily life, [leadership] has retained its mystery� and never has it beentalked about so much�the best possible proof of its power and enchant.1

Christian Dior

countries could realize the �peacedividend,� to use the modern vernacular.

Even after 5 March 1946, when theRight Honourable Sir Winston Churchilldeclared that an Iron Curtain had de-scended across Europe, signalling the startof the Cold War, countries continued tostand down from their wartime footingand commenced the evolution into peace-time militaries. With only a brief pauseduring the fledgling United Nations�policing action on the Korean peninsula,bureaucracies grew as the number of sail-

ors, soldiers, and airmen diminished. Itis not surprising that bureaucratic battlesbecame the way admirals and generals wontheir promotions and positions.2 Thisis not a new phenomenon; the Comte deGuibert wrote about it in his general es-say on tactics: �If by chance, there ap-pears in a nation a good general, the poli-tics of the ministers and the intrigues ofthe bureaucrats will take care to keep himaway from the soldiers in peacetime. They prefer entrusting their soldiers tomediocre men, who are incapable of train-ing them, but rather are passive and doc-ile before all of their whims and withinall of their systems� Once war begins, onlydisaster can force them to turn back tothe good general.�3

* Lieutenant Commander P. Richard Moller is a Canadian Naval Reserve Officer and is currently Operations Officer at HMCS Cataraqui, andDirector of Conference Planning at the Royal Military College of Canada. Comments can be sent to him at [email protected] or care of, HMCSCataraqui, PO Box 17000 Station Forces, Kingston, Ontario, K7K 7B4

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Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini alsowarned that �it is particularly necessaryto watch over the preservation of armiesin the interval of a long peace, for thenthey are most likely to degenerate.�4 Oneway to combat this tendency would, ofcourse, be to continue to find enemies tofight and keep our countries in a per-petual state of full-scale war. Few, how-ever, would argue that the benefits to ourmilitaries under this strategy would out-weigh the costs to our societies. The ques-tion then remains: Short of continuouscombat, how can we keep our militariesready to fight while avoiding, or at leastmitigating, the initial wartime disasterGuibert predicted?

From Sun Tzu to the present, manyhave written about the waging of war.Few, however, have provided guidance forstructuring and training militaries dur-ing the intervals of peace we increasingly,and thankfully, find ourselves livingthrough. The problem today is that ethi-cists tend to write only about ethics andvalues, political scientists about politicsand policy, psychologists about individual

leadership and organizational behaviour,and sociologists about society and culture.While these groups provide useful theo-retical models, it is up to the members ofthe military profession�who ultimatelymust apply the various theories�to developways to integrate their guidance into ourmilitary organizations. The challenge fortoday�s senior military leaders is to developself-sustaining, learning organizations thatwill minimize the initial wartime slaugh-ter that Guibert predicted. This paper willexamine the guidance provided in the past,and then derive a set of Principles of Peace-time Readiness from the ideas and theo-ries of educators, historians, ethicists, man-agement gurus, psychologists, sociologists,leaders, and other academics. The betterwe focus our efforts during peacetime, thebetter we are prepared to plan and fightbattles when called on to do so.

1. The �lantern on the stern�5

Over the generations, military offic-ers have developed theories about whatis required to successfully prosecute

war. These theories have become knownas the principles of war. Sun Tzu�s TheArt of War was �the first known attemptto formulate a rational basis for the plan-ning and conduct of military opera-tions.�6 Since that time, many othershave either refined his work or indepen-dently developed their own concepts.Today, the principles of war have becomestandard fare at staff colleges around theglobe. Different countries award impor-tance to different numbers and differ-ent aspects of principles; however, thereis some overlap among almost all ofthem. A review of principles of war fromdifferent countries reveals that France hasthe fewest (at three) and Canada andChina tie with the most (eleven). 7 Wealso see that only two principles�concen-trating one�s forces in action and sur-prise�appear on all lists. When workingwith coalitions, Major General Meille ofthe French Army advises us that �theseprinciples can be applied differently de-pending on the operational situation,the personality of the commander, theexperience and the nationality of [the

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coalition�s] main assistants and collabora-tors.�8

What is common among countries is afeeling that there is a requirement for anaide-mémoire for planning to fight a cam-paign or battle. It should be noted thatthese principles are focused on planningbattles and�except, perhaps, for Canada�sinclusion of Administration�say little abouthow to prepare forces to fight that battleor how one�s forces should be structured.Perhaps examining personal characteristicswill provide us with a clearer framework.

Like the principles of war, there aremany points of view on what is requiredto make up the perfect admiral or gen-eral. Jomini wrote: �The most essentialqualities for a general will always be asfollows: First, A high moral courage, ca-pable of great resolutions; secondly, A physicalcourage which takes no account of danger. Hisscientific or military acquirements are sec-ondary to the above-mentioned charac-teristics, though if great they will be valu-able auxiliaries.�9

Some countries have delineated a listof characteristics required for a person

to effectively exercise command. TheBritish Army Doctrine Publication providesus with the following list of characteris-tics and traits such a person should have:leadership, professional knowledge, visionand intellect, courage and resolve, self-con-fidence, ability to communicate, integrityand example.10

Once again, this is a useful list of ele-ments to develop in our leaders, but theyprovide little guidance as to how to en-sure that our leaders actually possess themor how to structure our military organi-zations and training systems to routinelydevelop them. We are still left with thequestion: How should we structure ourforces in peacetime so as to avoid or miti-gate a disaster during the first battles ofthe next war? Perhaps the lessons are inthe past.

Not surprisingly, most people whowrite about military history write abouttactics, doctrine, and the strategy of wag-ing war; this is, after all, what militariesultimately exist to do. Jomini did sug-gest that there are some things our mili-taries should have and do:

1. To have a good recruiting system;2. A good organization;3. A well-organized system of national

reserves;4. Good instruction of officers and

men in drill and internal duties as well asthose of a campaign;

5. A strict but not humiliating disci-pline, and a spirit of subordination andpunctuality, based on conviction ratherthan on the formalities of the service;

6. A well-digested system of rewards,suitable to excite emulation;

7. The special arms of engineering andartillery to be well instructed;

8. An armament superior, if possible,to that of the enemy, both as to defensiveand offensive arms;

9. A general staff capable of applyingthese elements, and having an organiza-tion calculated to advance the theoreticaland practical education of its officers;

10. A good system for the commissariat,hospitals, and of general administration;

11. A good system of assignment tocommand, and of directing the principaloperations of war;

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12. Exciting and keeping alive the mili-tary spirit of the people.

To these conditions might be added agood system of clothing and equipment;for, if this be a less direct importance onthe field of battle, it nevertheless has abearing upon the preservation of thetroops; and it is always a great object toeconomize the lives and health of veter-ans.11

Our societies and militaries have de-veloped considerably since Jomini pro-vided us with this list. Advances in mili-tary technology continue to change thenature of the battle space, significantlycomplicating the task of training our of-ficers and non-commissioned members.The entry of non-state actors into the arenaof conflict confuses the very definitionof war. The spread of democracy has cre-ated corps of commissioned and non-com-missioned members no longer willing tolive with the �theirs not to make reply, /theirs not to reason why, / theirs but todo and die�12 standard; while they arestill willing to ride �into the jaws ofDeath,�13 they expect a say in how they

are governed and led to that threshold.All these elements have created revolutionsin our military affairs14 �at least equal tothose in our civil societies�that Jominicould hardly have predicted. Concomi-tant with the technological changes thathave occurred over the last 200 years, therehas been a dramatic increase in the studyand development of management and lead-ership models in the civilian (mainly busi-ness) community.

Although leadership and managementgo back to ancient times, they only be-came a field of specialized study in theearly part of the last century. Histori-cally, management and leadership theoristslooked to the military for their role mod-els. People like Frederick W. Taylor,Henry Fayol, Max Weber and others fash-ioned the classical management modelfrom the authoritarian, rigidly structuredleadership and management style used inthe military. During the early 1930s, thehuman relations management theoryemerged, based mainly on research con-ducted by Elton Mayo at the HawthornWorks of the Western Electric Company.

Mayo�s studies were the first to methodi-cally explore the role of personality andhuman psychological processes in the workenvironment. Mayo and his researchersconcluded that workers wanted more thanjust money from their jobs, and that effec-tive management required social as well astechnical skills. Today, Modern Systemsand Contingency Management views theorganization as a total system with com-plex interactions both internally and ex-ternally. This recognises that each organi-zation is unique and that no one organi-zational system will be appropriate in allsituations.15 The military has lagged be-hind in the development of managementand leadership theory and models.

Looking at the past, we find that thereare few guiding principles for peacetimemilitaries that can act as a corollary to theguidance provided by the principles ofwar during times of conflict. So, thequestion posed above still remains: Shortof continuous combat, how can we keepour militaries ready to fight while avoid-ing, or at least mitigating, the initial war-time disaster Guibert predicted?

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While the requirements of military andcivilian leadership are different, they arenot mutually exclusive. In an attempt tolearn from others� mistakes and view ourorganizations from a different perspec-tive, we will look to the civilian world tohelp us formulate our principles. Thefive principles we will examine are: pro-fessional engagement, innovation, ethicalclarity, probity, and cultural health.

2. Professional engagement

My vision of the future is�of individualspassing from one stage of independence to ahigher, by means of their own activity, throughtheir own effort of will, which constitutes theinner evolution of the individual.16

Maria Montessori

Life-long learning programmes helpdevelop individuals. While professionsdo need to ensure that their members arecurrent and capable, more important fortheir long-term health is that they con-tinuously expand and refine their profes-sional body of knowledge through their

own efforts of will. Some suggest thatlife-long learning is the key to organiza-tional health. Life-long learning is a soli-tary endeavour�an individual engaged, alltoo often, in the arid transmission ofknowledge�even when he or she shares aclassroom with other students. The mili-tary profession, like all professions, re-quires the practical application of knowl-edge to accomplish specific goals, and istherefore by its very nature not a prima-rily academic endeavour. Our learningtherefore must remain focused on ourvocation, although some academic rigourwill be required as well.

The applied professions�engineering,medicine, et cetera�all have a strong linkto an adjunct academic group. Today,the military profession seems, along withmost of society, to be almost overtakenby technological advances, but it is his-tory that provides us with lessons of strat-egy and tactics that must guide our useof these new technologies.17 Our historyis the one field that must be studied todevelop our professional body of knowl-edge and to understand the essence of the

leadership challenges that face us. Usedwisely, the lessons of the past can assistthose of us who will be called upon topractice the management of violence sothat we can develop useful models andtheories to aid in future warfare. We mustbe mindful of Samuel Coleridge�s obser-vation: �If men could learn from his-tory, what lessons it might teach us! Butpassion and party blind our eyes, and thelight which experience gives us is a lan-tern on the stern, which shines only onthe waves behind us.�18

Those who study and theorize aboutwar generally represent two broad groups. First are those who prepare for the chal-lenges of battle and warfare�members ofthe military. Second are those who theo-rize about or study war because they havean interest in military history�academ-ics. These two groups have distinctlydifferent goals. The former primarily seekthe most effective and efficient ways tocarry out the orders of their superiorsand attain victory in the battle space. The latter seek to expand the known byexploring and recounting the past. Be-

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cause these two groups have differentgoals, they view history�and each other�in distinctly different ways. If we ratio-nalize the views of these two groups, ourhistory can become a powerful tool forour defence structure and our nations.

Each group has something to offer theother; however, too often their differentgoals stifle what should be an open dia-logue and co-operative relationship. Asystemic and reciprocal relationship couldlead to useful theories, thoughts, and ideasthat would help win or avoid war or otherfighting that spans the spectrum of con-flict, and hence support our national in-terests by providing greater national se-curity. Failure to build a systemic, re-ciprocal relationship between these twogroups will mean that useful ideas willcontinue to simply be lanterns on thestern, ignored or unseen by those whocould use them to greatest effect.

The conflict between these two groupsstarts with the way that they view eachother. Academics tend to treat themilitary�s principles of war with a certaindisdain and have tried to marginalize

them. For instance, Paret described theinfluence of the principles of war on mili-tary thinking as having �served genera-tions of soldiers as an excuse not to thinkthings through for themselves.�19

Equally, military officers ignore thework done by academics. Henry Lloydsummed this up by saying that �themoderns, who have undertaken to writethe history of different wars, or of somerenowned Commanders, being chieflymen of learning only, and utterly unac-quainted with the nature of military op-erations, have given us indeed agreeable,but useless productions.�20 Both of thesegroups use historic examples to supporttheir ideas and theories, but because theyview each other with at best professionalsuperciliousness, they rarely benefit fromeach other�s insights. By merging theproblem-solving, results-oriented skills andintellectual output of both groups, ourcountries would realize great benefits.

Both historians and military officers(and hence our nations) can benefit fromthe combined experience and intellectualpower that these two seemingly disparate

groups bring to the study of warfare. Military officers, being focused on presentand future warfare or preparations forthe same, tend to engage in superficialreviews of historical data to prove theirtheories. This is dangerous because �itis well known that military history, whensuperficially studied, will furnish argu-ments in support of any theory or opin-ion.�21 The information, ideas, and theo-ries that could help these military offic-ers more rigorously examine their ownmodels are unavailable to them because�historians are inclined to write for eachother.�22 The challenge, therefore, is formilitary officers to develop their under-standing of historical analysis and to en-courage military historians to engage awider audience in their writings. Through this process, both communitieswould see that there is an opportunityfor mutual benefit rather than the cur-rent state of mutual distrust or disdain. Models already exist for the developmentof such a symbiotic relationship.

In the scientific realm, physicists, chem-ists, and biologists observe the world

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around them in an attempt to discoverhow and why it works the way it does. The scientists then publish their work. Once published, engineers�the appliedscientists�and doctors�the applied bi-ologists�use these observations, theoriesand ideas to solve the practical problemspresented to them. The dialogue be-tween these two different but closely re-lated groups was built over many gen-erations.

At the other end of the spectrum, asimilar model exists in the arts. Paint-ers, sculptors, musicians, and writers ob-serve the world around them and pro-duce works that symbolize what they con-sider important from those observations. Periodically a new �school� will developwhen groups of artists witness similarchanges in their societies. Applied art-ists�fashion designers, graphic artists, ar-chitects, et cetera�take these artistic tech-niques, styles and symbols and use themto produce tangible objects to fulfill spe-cific practical uses. Once again, the rela-tionship between these two groups hasbeen built over many generations.

A similar systemic dialogue does notyet exist between military historians, whogather the threads of history, and mili-tary officers, who spin the threads intopractical tools, tactics, and strategies forfighting wars. Developing a deeper un-derstanding of history, an expanded aware-ness of past lessons, and how these pastideas influenced the practical problem ofwarfare in their time, will help us build astronger officer corps for the future. Inessence: �Leadership...is strengthened andmore effective when leaders at all levelsknow about and understand the implica-tions of trends, developments and newideas.�23 Visionaries in both communi-ties must search for examples in the pastthat will help us develop our leaders inthe future. By developing a strong sys-temic dialogue between the two groupswho study and theorize about war, wecan create enduring trust, respect and co-operation that will inspire those who fol-low, and create a strong learning organi-zation.

In order for the military professionand our own militaries to remain viable,

we must recreate ourselves as learning or-ganizations. Having members of the pro-fession engaged in life-long learning is agood start, but it will not in and of itselfensure the long-term health of our pro-fession, and hence the long-term securityof our nations. In order for our profes-sion to evolve into a learning organiza-tion, we as individuals must evolve pastthe life-long learning plateau and becomelife-long teachers. While it is importantto have strong ties to our profession�sadjunct academics, who provide the pro-fession with data and insight, it is themembers of the profession who must takethat information, turn it into knowledge,and apply that knowledge when solvingpractical problems both in and out ofthe battle space. It is the members of themilitary profession who bear the respon-sibility of command, and hence for thelives of our subordinates�not the profes-sors who teach us our history, math andother courses. When members of theprofession engage in life-long teaching,they encourage the growth of a broader,better-informed, robust professional com-

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munity. In short, they create a learningorganization.

The transition from life-long learning tolife-long teaching, however, will require mostof us to change the way we respond in dif-ferent circumstances. It will also requireorganizational structures to change, becauselife-long teaching also requires us to learnfrom our superiors, peers, and subordinatesas the situation dictates. Given the tradi-tionally hierarchical structures of militaryorganizations, there is bound to be somedefensiveness when superiors are faced withsituations in which they must acknowledgethat their subordinates have more experi-ence than they. �Teaching people how toreason about their behaviour in new andmore effective ways breaks down the defencesthat block learning,�24 and it is these de-fences that will limit our ability to shareexperiences that will help strengthen ourprofession. Once we have military mem-bers who are professionally engaged, we needto develop and encourage innovation sothat our whole organization can developand move forward with the least possiblewaste of energy.

3. Innovation

The most grievous danger for any Pope liesin the fact that encompassed as he is by flatter-ers; he never hears the truth about his own per-son and ends by not wishing to hear it.25

Pope Alexander IV

Innovation is more than creativity. Be-ing creative means that you are �inven-tive and imaginative.�26 Having a cre-ative mind is all well and good, but webelong to a practical profession that mustaccomplish real-world tasks. In this pa-per, �innovation� is used to mean �ap-plied creativity,� id est, having a novelidea and then implementing it. Of course,for our militaries to be innovative, wemust develop people who can produceoriginal ideas. The issue facing us is howto develop our organizations to allowthese creative people to thrive. Sinceimplementing inventive and imaginativeideas by definition means changing theway things are done, those who engage inthis activity will be disruptive.

Encouraging and supporting peoplewho dissent from the status quo will bethe biggest challenge for our military or-ganizations, which seem to prize obedi-ence and hierarchy above almost all else.Especially in peacetime, with governmentskeenly watching expenditures and themedia searching for government waste,taking the risk of trying new ways of do-ing business will be a leadership challengedifficult for some to conquer. If we suc-ceed in encouraging innovation, we canlead our militaries into an era where �forthe first time in history we can work back-ward from our imagination rather thanforward from our past.�27 Supportingdissent is the basic building block forcreating an innovative organization.

Like so many other things, dissent hasboth positive and negative characteristicsand outcomes. Positive dissent is more thansimply saying, �This is wrong.� It involvesdefining the problem, proposing a viablesolution, and then working toward imple-mentation. As leaders, we must use ourpositional authority to protect and encour-age the innovative people who work for us.

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Those who are comfortable with the statusquo will, among other things, try to labelinnovators as troublemakers and malcon-tents. � �What the defenders of orthodoxysee as subversive, the champions of newthinking see as enlightenment.� [GaryHamel] points out that dissenters are sub-versive, but their goal is not subversion.�28

A person who dissents for the purpose ofinnovation is doing so to benefit the orga-nization and not simply for personal gain.Those opposed to change will attempt tothrow up as many roadblocks as they can.

Our militaries respect and revere tradi-tion; this means that, especially for ourorganizations, �one of the hardestthings�[will be] getting people to acceptthat the way they work just might not bethe best [way].�29 Military organizations facemany challenges when trying to build aninnovative culture. The flow of emotionswill be strong. As leaders, we must prepareto deal with �the dangerous brew of fearand complacency�[the desire to stay] where[we] are out of fear of failing, of blowingtoo much money, or of placing the wrongbets�30 that we and our subordinates will

feel. The military�s strong sense of com-munity and experience in dealing withsimilar strong emotions in the battle spacewill stand us in good stead, but also bringwith them some drawbacks.

Richard Florida, Robert Cushing, andGary Gates in their paper When SocialCapital Stifles Innovation present researchto show that in cultures where group re-lationships are highly valued, �relation-ships can get so strong that the commu-nity becomes complacent and insulatedfrom outside information and challenges.Strong ties can also promote the sort ofconformity that undermines innova-tion.�31 Individuals in these strong socialgroups may be wary of upsetting the restof the group, something that will certainlyoccur when they try to change the waythings are done or challenge long-heldbeliefs. The way the group reacts will bestrongly influenced by its leaders. If theyridicule and shun the dissenter, new ideasare not likely to be brought forward inthe future. Achieving acceptance for thesedissenters will require most of us to changethe way we respond in various situations.

Leading disruptive change is difficultfor even the most liberal of organizations.The established hierarchy of the militaryand our reliance on doctrine and stan-dard operating procedures makes the chal-lenge for us especially difficult. As lead-ers, we must realize that dissenters areproviding us with indications of impend-ing adaptive challenges. As such, we must�provide cover to people who point tothe internal contradictions of the enter-prise. Those individuals often have theperspective to provoke rethinking thatpeople in authority do not.�32 Once theareas requiring change are identified, itcan take time�sometimes years�to changedoctrine even when everyone acknowledgesthat the change needs to happen. ClaytonM. Christensen and Michael Overdorf inMeeting the Challenge of Disruptive Changewarn: �It�s no wonder that innovation isso difficult for established firms. Theyemploy highly capable people�and thenset them to work within processes andbusiness models that doom them to fail-ure.�33 In addition to the systems, we mayhave problems changing the behaviours

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of the very people who must adapt first:our senior leaders.

While it is generally good that our lead-ers have risen to their current positionsbased on merit, the road taken�especiallyin risk-averse, bureaucratic peacetime or-ganizations�most often means that theyhave rarely openly admitted failure. Gen-erally, they have either avoided failure bynot taking risks, or rationalized failureswhen they occurred. �Because they haverarely failed, they have never learned howto learn from failure.�34 Instead, they havelikely developed defensive reasoning mecha-nisms designed to shield them from hav-ing to change the way they perform.�What�s more, those members of the orga-nization that many assume to be the bestat learning are, in fact, not very good at it.I am talking about the well-educated, high-powered, high-commitment professionalswho occupy key leadership positions inthe modern corporation.�35 We can seethat it will take a strong desire and a strongwill to make this change occur. To facili-tate modeling this change, let�s look at sometools we can use to plot our course.

As with all significant leadership chal-lenges, the �experimentation has to startat the top.�36 But where do we begin?Gary Hamel suggests the model of Sili-con Valley. The people and organiza-tions in Silicon Valley bring to market abreathtaking number of innovativeproducts every year�everything fromcomputer games to robot pets to busi-ness software. �Those who populate Sili-con Valley don�t have brains the size ofbasketballs. They don�t live in some spe-cial energy field. What sets the Valleyapart is not its people or its climate butthe way of doing business� There arenone of the numbing bureaucratic con-trols that paralyse creativity in traditionalbusinesses.�37 In his paper Bringing Sili-con Valley Inside, Hamel posits that dy-namic markets for ideas, capital, and tal-ent are the elements that make SiliconValley so innovative.38

How to translate these elements into amilitary ethos that retains a need for hi-erarchy and obedience in at least part ofits actions is the great challenge. This willvary from country to country depend-

ing on the current organizational struc-ture and cultural norms.

Since militaries don�t generally havethe option of hiring people from out-side the organization to bring new ideasor practices to the culture, building aninternal market for talent may be the mostdifficult challenge. Let me suggest thatdeveloping personnel systems that giveindividuals predominant control overtheir postings would provide a means ofdeveloping an internal talent market andallow us to reap the benefits described byHamel. Rather than having centralisedpostings control, commanders would com-pete to lure people to come work forthem. Commanders who failed to leadtheir people might find it difficult torecruit talented individuals to their orga-nizations. If certain organizations hadproblems finding staff, it could indicateto senior leaders that the commander hadrisen above his or her leadership capa-bilities.

Establishing a market for capital couldbe far easier than establishing a marketfor talent. By no means do I intend to

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suggest that organizations throw all oftheir money on the table for everyone�spet projects. For militaries required toaccount to the government and public,this would be impossible to justify.Rather, I suggest we identify a portion ofthe overall budget that can be used toimplement new ideas or practices. Thenallow all members of the organization toput forward projects and apportion themoney accordingly. Brilliant ideas arenot the sole prerogative of senior leaders,and hence all members should be given ashot at the money. Obviously, a corpo-ral lacks the positional authority to imple-ment major organizational redesigns, buthe or she may require seed money to de-velop a new procedure that is within his/her sphere of influence. Monitoring theimplementation of small projects can alsogive leaders a good measuring tool, indi-cating potential for career progression.

Remember, however, that success shouldnot be the only meter stick. If the initialidea does not work as planned, what theindividual and the organization learnedfrom the failure and how they adjust their

plans is just as important as, if not morethan, the plan�s initial success or failure.

Since we have defined innovation asapplied creativity, the suggestion is notthat we throw out all of our current man-agement, command, and control systemsin favour of organizational anarchy.�For innovation to be reliable, it needsto be addressed systematically, like anybusiness issue in which you define theproblem and then solve it: What do wewant to accomplish, and how? What re-sources will we need? Who will be on theteam? How do we motivate and rewardthem? And how will we measure suc-cess?�39 Before we reach this stage, how-ever, we must ensure that our organiza-tions are ready to accept the challenge.We must have people willing to bringforward new and possibly unpopularideas.

The necessity for military organizationsto be innovative comes down to the factthat if we continue to do the same thingswe have always done, we will become pre-dictable. Predictable military forces causepeople to be needlessly killed in battle.

In short, for military organizations, quiteliterally �those who live by the sword willbe shot by those who don�t.�40 Buildingan innovative organization will help usdevelop past our historic constraints.

4. Ethical clarity

Ethical theory and applied ethics are closelyrelated: theory without application is sterile anduseless, but action without a theoretical perspec-tive is blind.41

Louis P. Pojman

Recently, much has been said aboutvalues and ethics in the business world.A business organization looks at its defi-nition of values as a way to differentiateitself from other companies in order toderive a competitive advantage in the questfor profit. Militaries, on the other hand,seek to define values to save the lives oftheir members and the civilian citizensthey are sworn to protect. To a large ex-tent, our values also assist us in maintain-ing the psychological well being of thepeople in our organizations. Knowing

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that, even in war, there are things that wewill not be asked to do provides us witha certain psychological comfort.

The boundaries on behaviour thatmilitaries establish sometimes comprise athin, easily cracked veneer. In his novelLord of the Flies, William Golding providesus with a masterful study of both the easewith which humanity can shed its veneerof civilization when confronted with fearand the role of military officers in main-taining that veneer. Golding presents astory of a group of British schoolchil-dren left to fend for themselves on anuninhabited island. Frightened and alonein unfamiliar surroundings, forced tokill�in their case animals�in order tosurvive, we can see many parallels withmilitaries in battle. Golding shows us that�Beelzebub�s ascendancy proceeds throughfear, hysteria, violence, and death�42 �allelements that are commonplace for mili-taries during battle.

One of the main roles of a military�svalue system is to help combat the ero-sion of civilization�s veneer and sustainthe humanity of our people; however,

�civilization�s power is weak and vulner-able to atavistic, volcanic passion.�43 It isthe responsibility of military officers toestablish rules and processes that will pre-vent the breakdown of civilization�spower. In the closing scene of Lord of theFlies, it is a naval officer who steps in andre-establishes the rule of civilization amongthe group. This provides a strong re-minder of our ongoing role in the heatof battle. A responsible leader �is one ofthe things that distinguishes a mob froma people. He maintains the level of indi-viduals. Too few individuals, and a peoplereverts to a mob.�44 By ensuring thatour subordinates remember to reason asindividuals rather than allowing themselvesto be subsumed by group think we canensure that our military units don�t be-come mobs. How then should leadersmaintain the required level of individu-als and clearly establish the presence ofcivilization in an organization establishedto apply violence on behalf of its coun-try? Before we address that question, let�sexamine other ways in which values affectour organizations.

When we establish a set of values, wemust remember why we are doing it.�Values initiatives have nothing to dowith building consensus�they�re aboutimposing a set of fundamental, strategi-cally sound beliefs on a broad group ofpeople.�45 Forcing people to conformto an established set of values will not bepainless. Some will feel like outcasts. Manywill have to modify their behaviours, ifnot their beliefs. Values initiatives also�limit an organization�s strategic and op-erational freedom and constrain thebehaviour of its people. They leave ex-ecutives open to heavy criticism for evenminor violations. And they demand con-stant vigilance.�46

Why would any organization inflict thispain on itself? Values carry strong ben-efits. �They serve as fixed points. Theydetermine what is right and wrong, ap-propriate and inappropriate on a univer-sal basis, every time.�47 When a ship leavesharbour, her crew must use known pointsto fix her position. Whether they areheavenly bodies, fixed points of land, ororbiting Global Positioning System satel-

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lites, these known points allow the crewto determine where they are and how toplot a course to their destination. In herpaper Ethics, Virtuousness, and ConstantChange, Professor Kim Cameron presentsthe results of several studies that relateorganizational virtuousness with perfor-mance. Evaluation of the results leads tothe conclusion that �organizations withhigh scores on virtuousness significantlyoutperform organizations with low scoreson virtuousness.� 48 She concluded thatmore virtuous firms made more money,recovered from downsizing faster, retainedcustomers and employees more effectively,and were more innovative than non-vir-tuous firms. The studies looked at valuessuch as compassion, integrity, forgiveness,trust, and optimism when evaluating thevirtuousness of the organizations.49 De-fining what values we want, however, willbe easier than creating a code of behaviourthat encourages these actions.

Establishing a set of governing valuesthat guide ethical reasoning may providea more robust ethical culture than tryingto regulate behaviour with rules and

codes. Malham M. Wakin warns us that�The immature or unsophisticated fre-quently narrow their ethical sights to thebehaviour specifically delineated in thecode so that what may have originallybeen intended as a minimum listing be-comes treated as an exhaustive guide forethical action.�50 One of certainly manycontributing factors to the recent crisisof corporate leadership in the UnitedStates of America was the rule-based legaland accounting systems that let compa-nies find loopholes that they could ex-ploit to accomplish their nefarious de-sires while still sticking to the letter ofthe law. Since they seemed focused onfollowing the rules, they never steppedback and asked whether the path they weretaking led to a beneficial destination.51

Outlined above are some values thatmight be appropriate for our militaries;however, we must recognize that our or-ganizations exist for different reasons thando businesses, and use different meansthan do other government bodies to ac-complish our ends. For this reason, anorganizational value such as �do not kill

without sanction� may be appropriate onour list. Because ultimately we may beasked to kill for our country�and hencethe outcomes of our decisions are signifi-cantly direr�encouraging ethical reason-ing, rather than dictating conduct, mayprovide a more effective road to follow.52

As was examined above, developingand enforcing a set of values in an orga-nization can cause pain. One way sometry to avoid this pain is to develop vagueor unenforced�or even unenforceable�sets of values.53 Some leaders considerthese kinds of statements to be harmless,but in actuality �they�re often highly de-structive. Empty values statements createcynical and dispirited employees, �andundermine managerial credibility.�54

Alternatively some organizations try tocover all possible contingencies, thus cre-ating complex codes of behaviour. Overlycomplex value statements can lead to con-fusion, having them ignored, or seeingemployees use them to justify whateveractions they wish to take. James Bakercautions that we should be alert to �deci-sions that follow the letter of the law but

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violate the spirit of the law. [For instance]accounting rules today are so esoteric anddifficult to understand that you mightbe literally within the legal constraints ofa particular rule�but way outside itsspirit.�55

As James Wilson said in The Moral Sense,�I am a bit suspicious of any theory thatsays that the highest moral stage is one inwhich people talk like college profes-sors.�56 We do need the theoretical per-spective, but as members of militaries wemust use that perspective to help focusour daily actions.

Unlike our doctrine, tactics, and stan-dard operating procedures, which changebased on the level of education and train-ing in our organizations, and on changesin technology, our values must remainrelatively constant. Like all things in-volved with organizational leadership, theyshould be regularly reviewed and clari-fied as required, but fundamental changeor amendment should be rare. �Devel-oping a Teachable Point of View is a criti-cal step for any leader, but especially whenessential topics such as ethics� must be

demonstrated and communicated to anorganization.�57 In order to understandhow to develop our ethical teachable pointof view, it may be useful to understandsomething of our ethical development.

As we mature, our cognitive and physi-cal abilities develop together. Just as ourmobility develops from crawling to walk-ing to running, so there are developmen-tal stages in our moral reasoning. LawrenceKohlberg, in his model describing moraldevelopment, defines three stages:preconventional morality, conventionalmorality, and postconventional morality.We tend to move from preconventional(�I�d better act a certain way or I�ll getinto trouble�) to conventional (�we needto accomplish a task together; therefore,I�ll uphold the rules�) in early adolescence.While there is some debate overKohlberg�s postconventional stage,58 weenter it when we begin to balance indi-vidual rights against the desires of thegroups or societies that we belong to. Thistends to occur in late adolescence.59 Sincemost of our recruits join the military asthey are entering the postconventional

moral development phase, we have theopportunity and responsibility to helpthem develop their moral reasoning. Aclearly defined ethical system is fundamen-tal to accomplishing that goal, and as wehave seen can also have other positiveorganizational benefits. How we canachieve this, as well as determiningwhether our stated values reflect the real-ity within our militaries, forms a largeportion of the next principle of organi-zational readiness.

5. Probity

It is a delightful harmony when doing andsaying go together.60

Michel Eyquem de Montaigne

We see that, since militaries tend torecruit from our countries� respectivepools of adolescents, we have a signifi-cant ability�and responsibility�to mouldthe moral reasoning of our people. Ourteachable point of view is best presentedby example. �In the end, in business asin politics, credibility is hard to acquire,

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but very easy to lose.�61 Defining andcommunicating a clear set of values is use-less unless we also take action to ensurethat they are firmly rooted in ourmilitary�s culture and followed by all mem-bers of the organization.

Probity means uprightness and hon-esty.62 As leaders in the military profes-sion, it is not enough to simply be per-sonally honest and upright. We mustensure that our organizations�more spe-cifically every individual within the mili-tary�act in a moral and upright fashion.

Living up to our stated values can bechallenging. There may be political, fi-nancial, and social pressures to cut cor-ners. �It�s much harder to be clear andunapologetic for what you stand for thanto cave in to politically correct pres-sures,�63 but it is vital if we wish tomaintain a healthy moral climate in ourmilitaries. �The test [of our leaders]should be moral courage�. Resolutionand valour, not that which is sharpenedby ambition but that which wisdom andreason may implant in a well orderedsoul.�64

Many organisations have value state-ments posted on their walls. What hap-pens when they fail to live by these valueshas been recently experienced in theUnited States. The bankruptcy of EnronCorporation demonstrated some greatironies for those examining values systemsand statements. In its 2000 annual report,Enron listed its values as communication,respect, integrity, and excellence. Further,it said, �We have an obligation to com-municate. Here, we take the time to talkwith one another� and listen. We be-lieve that information is meant to moveand that information moves people.�65

In August 2001, Sherron Watkins(Enron�s VP for Corporate Development)warned Ken Lay (Enron�s CEO) that therewere financial problems stemming from�a wave of accounting scandals.�66 Not-withstanding the company�s stated valueof communication, Lay promoted to hisown employees and to the general investingcommunity the purchases of companystock. When the company finally declaredbankruptcy, thousands of people, particu-larly those who had company 401(k) plans,

lost a significant chunk of their life sav-ings.67 While there are certainly lessonsto be learned from this incident, thereare perhaps more direct parallels to bedrawn from the case of Enron�s auditors,Arthur Andersen LLP.

There is little evidence to show thatEnron ever took its stated values seriously.However, Arthur Andersen had a longhistory of operating under a strong moralcompass. Within a year of opening hisaccounting firm, Arthur Andersen refusedto certify the books of a client railroad.Andersen lost the client but provided theexample that developed into thecompany�s value of independence. Fordecades, the firm inculcated this value intoits employees, partners, and corporatestructure. Exactly when it started to driftaway from this core value is debatable,but it was clearly occurring throughoutthe 1990s. When Arthur Andersen signedoff on Enron�s financial statements forthe year 2000 that, in October 2001, hadto be corrected, reducing company worthby US$1.2 billion, Andersen signed itsown death warrant. Its conviction for

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obstruction of justice and the eventualdemise of the company was preordained.

Ironically, the same principles thathelped Arthur Andersen build a strongethical compass into its employees alsosowed the seeds of its demise. �Like manyvisionary firms that expend considerableenergy and resources to preserve theircore, Arthur Andersen recruited young,trained heavily, and fostered a culture thatbred a sense of upholding a higher re-sponsibility to the investing public.�68

Dubbed �androids� by non-Andersenemployees, a culture of obedience to rulesand the leader was encouraged and fos-tered. �When the rules and leaders stoodfor decency and integrity, the lockstepculture was the key to competence andrespectability,� wrote Barbara Ley Toffler,partner-in-charge of the ethics and respon-sible business practices group at Andersenfrom 1995 to 1999. �When the game andthe leaders changed direction, the cultureof conformity led to disaster.� 69

Andersen had no structure in place toallow people to question the moral integ-rity of the leaders, so they led the com-

pany to ruin. If Andersen had fulfilledits role as auditor, perhaps Enron wouldnot have been forced to declare bank-ruptcy. While it is a tragedy that so manylost large amounts of their retirement sav-ings, they can recover from this giventime and prudent investing. When mili-tary organizations stray from their corevalues, people don�t lose their life savings�they lose their lives. An important pointin this case is that Andersen�s leaders knewthey could sculpt the ethical beliefs oftheir associates, and originally set out todo just that.

Above, we examined Kohlberg�s stagesof moral development and discovered thatwe bring recruits in at the very time theyare developing the beginnings ofpostconventional reasoning. If they donot routinely see examples of organiza-tional members who live by the statedvalues, this will model their moralbehaviour in ways that our countriesmight live to regret decades down the line.We have it within our power to modeltheir moral development along just andcaring lines. When role models and lead-

ers �practice what they preach, their moralprinciples have an impact. Such was trueof the caring parents of those who coura-geously protected Jews in Nazi Europe�.And when acted upon, moral ideas growstronger. We are as likely to act ourselvesinto a way of thinking as to think our-selves into action. To stand up and becounted, to explain and defend our con-victions, to commit money and energy isto believe our convictions even morestrongly.�70 Only by believing in ourconvictions can we mould our militariesinto the kinds of organizations that willmake our countries proud, rather thanembarrassing them on the internationalstage.71

We need to develop people who havewhat �the romantic in Clausewitzcalled��an intellect that, even in the dark-est hour, retains some glimmerings of theinner light which leads to truth; and sec-ond, the courage to follow this faint lightwherever it may lead.� �72 Over the lastfew decades, members of militaries fromcountries otherwise thought to be pro-gressive, cultured, and civilised have com-

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mitted acts that have brought shame anddisgrace upon them.73

In short, �integrity, compassion, andtrust� create an environment where peopleare encouraged to be their best, whereinnovativeness, loyalty, and quality are likelyto be higher. That�s the virtue cycle. Theamplifying nature of virtuousness causesit to reproduce itself and to improve or-ganizational performance over time.�74 Wemight do well to remember the advice ofGianfrancesco Pico Iella Mirandola: �If weare to win back the enemy and the apos-tate to our faith, it is more important torestore fallen morality to its ancient ruleof virtue than that we should sweep withour fleet the Eurine Sea.�75 Of course, itwould be much better if we act to main-tain our military�s moral standing beforeit falls and needs restoration.

6. Cultural Health

�She asked me to tell her what it is to rule,�Paul said. �And I said that one commands.And she said I had some unlearning to do�.She said a ruler must learn to persuade and not

to compel. She said he must lay the best coffeehearth to attract the finest men.�76

Frank Herbert

Militaries fundamentally exist to pro-tect the citizens, interests, and values ofthe society and country they serve. Twoof the first questions we need to honestlyanswer in order to determine the culturalhealth of our military are: Do we reflectthe society that we serve, and are we acredit to that society?

Whether or not our subordinates arewilling and able to provide us with an-swers to these questions will also indicatethe condition of our organization�s cul-ture. Strong internal voices, indicatingan innovative culture, will also be able toraise and openly debate ethical issues.With weakened internal voices, ourmilitary�s ability to hear internal and so-cietal concerns will be diminished, thusleading to its ossification. Listening tothese voices will help us reflect the valuesand goals of our parent society.

These internal voices can be silencedin many subtle ways. One of the most

common is by supervisors who avoidconflict by accentuating the positive andavoiding discussions about negative issueswithin their work groups. �The empha-sis on being positive condescendingly as-sumes that employees can only functionin a cheerful world, even if the cheer isfalse.�77

B. W. Tuchman, a pioneer of group-development theory, developed what to-day is the standard four-phase model ofteam development: forming, storming,norming, and performing.78 If we con-tinually avoid conflict, we will never getthrough the �storming� developmentphase, thus preventing our organizationsfrom performing up to their potential.Yes, we must not allow the storming todegenerate into personal attacks, but �lead-ers who cultivate emotional fortitudesoon learn what they can achieve whenthey maximize their followers� well-beinginstead of their comfort.�79 Allowingdissent, protecting those who voice un-popular ideas, and developing our sub-ordinates� emotional fortitude are not theonly leadership challenges we will face.

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The leadership challenges surroundingorganizational structural changes may beeven harder to achieve. �When the capa-bilities have come to reside in processesand values, and especially when they havebecome embedded in culture, change canbe extraordinarily difficult.�80 Often inour militaries, organizational capabilitiesand structures have been unquestioned forso long that they, and their outputs, be-come confused with values. When thisoccurs, discussions can become polarizedrapidly, and the debate itself, let alone anysubsequent change that takes place, is pain-ful. Leaders can move their organizationsthrough these changes by asking questionsrather than providing answers.

We need to expose our people to thereality of the world we live in rather thantrying to insulate them from change. Byallowing all members of our organizationsto become part of, rather than pawns of,the system of change, we can draw outissues that need to be faced and allow themto set goals worthy of their best efforts.�Instead of quelling conflict, leaders haveto draw the issues out. Instead of main-

taining norms, leaders have to challenge�the way we do business� and help othersdistinguish immutable values from histori-cal practices that must go.�81 To success-fully adapt our culture, we must under-stand the fear and pain of change, but stillmaintain a steady hand on the helm andthe pressure on our subordinates to learnand adapt. We need to �communicate con-fidence that [we] and they can tackle thetasks ahead.�82 Ensuring that we have adiverse organization that reflects the soci-eties we serve can be a strong asset whenwe seek to make organizational changes.

Our militaries should not be congru-ent with society, but rather reflect thevalues and make-up of the societies weserve. For instance, many societies havegroups of conscientious objectors or paci-fists. While they may provide an impor-tant point of view within society at large,their presence within a military commu-nity would be destructive. Unfortunately,every country also seems to have a groupof habitual criminals. Militaries are quitejustified in trying to eliminate thesegroups from their ranks.

It is important to note that it is theideas and values of these groups, not theindividuals themselves, that so deeply con-flict with the values of our militaries andthat we can exclude from our organiza-tional structure. Other than obviousgroups like those above, striving to re-flect the cultural make-up of the societywe serve will help our militaries maintainand develop ties to the people we serve.There may be some justification for re-fusing enrolment to people who belongto groups that do not share the core val-ues of our militaries, but to excludepeople because they espouse different cul-tural norms or belong to groups not tra-ditionally part of our militaries is uncon-scionable and may ultimately limit ourability to fulfill our role. �Companiesthat foster diversity and openness inter-nally�even at the cost of some cohesive-ness�may do better in attracting talented,creative employees and encouraging in-novative collaboration.�83 Militaries thatcan bring innovative collaboration to thebattle space will provide their enemieswith a significantly more difficult strate-

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gic and tactical problem. This is at thecore of surprise, one of only two princi-pals of war adopted by all countries.

Healthy organizational cultures canadapt and change to fit changing threatsand opportunities. �As long as the or-ganization continues to face the samesorts of problems that its processes andvalues were designed to address, manag-ing the organization can be straightfor-ward. But because those factors also de-fine what an organization cannot do,they constitute disabilities when theproblems facing the company changefundamentally.�84 The transition frompeace to war might be one of those timeswhen the problems facing us change fun-damentally. Dramatic changes in the glo-bal politic might be another. A diverseand healthy culture will make our mili-tary more prepared to provide for theongoing security of our nation.

7. Shifting the lantern to the bow

Professional engagement, innovation,ethical clarity, probity, and cultural health:

If we can increase our militaries� function-ing in all of these areas during peacetime,we will be better able to implement theprinciples of war when called on to doso. A significant part of a military�s raisond�etre during peacetime is to act as a deter-rent to potential enemies so that the useof force is unnecessary. �A deterrentthreat�requires that the deterrer bothmaintain a relevant capability and also aperceived credibility to employ that ca-pability. It is the product of capabilityand will that deters by threat of retalia-tion. This �product� is the source of theparadox, well known even to the Romans:si vis pacem, para bellum (If you seek peace,prepare for war).� 85 If we allow our mili-tary organizations to ossify during peace-time, we are, in effect, making it morelikely that they will have to be used, sincepotential adversaries will not see that acredible deterrent exists.

It is time for militaries not only torecapture a prominent place in the devel-opment of management and leadershiptheory, but also to actively examine thedevelopments that have occurred around

us and adapt the appropriate elements foruse in our organizations. The presentedPrinciples of Peacetime Readiness are anattempt to move us toward that goal.While cultural health appears last in thislist of principles, it may be wise to con-sider it as primus inter pares. A healthy cul-ture will allow the dissent required forinnovation and the ability to have openand frank debates about ethical values orthe composition of our professional bodyof knowledge. These debates and discus-sions can only effectively take place in anorganizational culture that values diver-sity and inclusion and reflects the societythat it serves.

In his book Principles of War, Carl vonClausewitz included the following com-ment: �These principles, though the re-sult of long thought and continuousstudy of the history of war, have none-theless been drawn up hastily, and thuswill not stand severe criticism in regardto form. In addition, only the most im-portant subjects have been picked from agreat number, since certain brevity wasnecessary. These principles, therefore, will

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not so much give complete instructionto Your Royal Highness, as they will stimu-late and serve as a guide for your ownreflections.�86

A similar need for brevity is claimedin this paper. The Principles of Peace-time Readiness that have been proposedare general in nature and only brieflydefined. As was seen when examining theprinciples of war, different countries willwish to focus on different issues, and there-fore give more importance to some prin-ciples than others. The realization thatthe disaster Guibert referred to wouldcome at the cost of an unknown numberof lives spurred the development of theseprinciples, and is an omnipresent issuethat should help motivate us to adapt ourmilitaries.

There is no claim that an exhaustivelist has been presented. The intent is toencourage debate and thought on thecauses, rather than the symptoms, of or-ganizational decay, and to provide mili-tary leaders an aide-mémoire to use dur-ing peacetime when they are evaluatingthe readiness of their organizations to face

an unknown, undefined�and often un-definable�enemy during the next periodof war. The principles can help framethis debate, but like the principles of war,are also meant to guide the design andredesign of our organizational structures,how we develop leaders, and the develop-ment of our organizational visions andcultures.

The manner in which these principlesare implemented is predominantly up togenerals and admirals, or perhaps evenstatesmen and politicians. After all, lead-ership does begin at the top. BaronAntoine Henri de Jomini observed: �Ifthe skill of a general is one of the surestelements of victory, it will readily be seenthat the judicious selection of generals isone of the most delicate points in thescience of government and one of themost essential parts of the military policyof a state. Unfortunately, this choice isinfluenced by so many petty passions, thatchance, [civil] rank, age, favour, partyspirit, and jealousy, will have as much todo with it as the public interest and jus-tice.�87

In peacetime, this is an even greaterissue, and always has been. We need onlyhearken back to Guibert�s warning to seethis. Those of us who are not generalsand admirals can but bring forward thedebates when the opportunities arise anddevelop our own work groups and unitswith these principles in mind. To someextent, there can be some leadership frombelow; so we end the way we began, withan observation from Christian Dior:

By being natural and sincere, one often cancreate revolutions without having sought them.88

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Annex A � Comparative Principles of War

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1 Marie-France Pochna, Christian Dior: The ManWho Made the World Look New (Arcade Publishing,Inc, New York, 1994) p. vii.

2 For a longer examination of this concept, see�The Dangers of Doctrine� in The Baltic DefenceReview 5.

3 Comte de Guibert, Écrits Militaires 1772-1790,préface et notes du Général Ménard (Paris: Edi-tions Copernic, 1976), p. 192. « Si par hasard ils�élève dans une nation un bon général, lapolitique des ministres et les intrigues descourtisans ont soin de le tenir eloigné des troupespendant la paix. On aime mieux confier cestroupes à des hommes médiocres, incapables deles former, mais passifs, dociles à toutes lesvolontés et à tous les systèmes... La guerre arrive,les malheurs seuls peuvent ramener le choix surle général habile. »

4 Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, The Art ofWar (Greenhill Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 1992)p. 47.

5 Samuel Coleridge, Quoted in: Barbara W.Tuchman, The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 383.

6 Samuel B. Griffith, Translator. Sun Tzu TheArt of War (Oxford University Press, New York,1971) p. X.

7 A summary is presented at Annex A. Thenumber of principles of war that a countrychooses to adopt may, in and of itself, make foran interesting framework on which to evaluate itslevel of bureaucracy and organizational readi-ness, but that is a topic for another paper.

8 Major General Meille, Commanding the Di-

vision (Objectif Doctrine No 34: La Division ,Commandement de la Doctrine et del�Enseignement militaire Supérieur de l�armée deterre, Paris, 2003) p. 23.

9 Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, The Art ofWar (Greenhill Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 1992)p. 55.

10 Army Doctrine Publication, Volume 2, HQDT/18/34/51 dated 1995, Army Code No 71564,(Crown Publications, London, England) p. 2-15.

11 Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, The Art ofWar (Greenhill Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 1992)pp. 43-4.

12 Alfred Lord Tennyson, The Charge of theLight Brigade (Alfred Lord Tennyson: Selected Poems,Penguin Books, Toronto, 1991) p. 289.

13 Alfred Lord Tennyson, The Charge of theLight Brigade (Alfred Lord Tennyson: Selected Poems,Penguin Books, Toronto, 1991) p. 289.

14 There has been plenty of debate about whetherthere has been a revolution in military affairs, anevolution in military affairs, or a simple progres-sion of activity and development. I would arguethat there is an ongoing revolution in militaryaffairs, but perhaps not in the manner meant bymost. The Oxford Concise English dictionaryincludes the following definition for revolution:�motion in orbit or a circular course; rotation.�This, I submit, is the true revolution in militaryaffairs. With all the talk of lessons learned, wewould probably be more accurate in describingmost of them as lessons re-learned.

15 Paul Lerman; John H. Turner, One Day MBA(International Center for Creative Thinking, New

York, 1992) p. 3.16 Maria Montessori, From Childhood to Adoles-

cence (Schocken Books, New York, 1973) p. xii.17 Some might argue that defence scientists,

political scientists, and policy analysts hold equalclaim to status as adjunct academic groups forthe military profession. I would respond thathere, I mean history in its largest sense, the totalaccumulation of past events, of which technologi-cal and policy changes are a part. Further, one ofthe things that generally distinguishes democra-cies from dictatorships is the concept of civiliancontrol of the military. This means that militaryinput into government policy should be limitedto providing analysis of the impact of govern-ment policy on the military structure. For in-stance, providing input on the cost of variousgovernment policies in capital, operations andmaintenance funds, and lives, or providing ad-vice on military options available to accomplishdefined strategic goals. While scientists may pro-vide us with tools, the lessons of history willprovide us with the knowledge required to evalu-ate the most efficient way to use those tools toaccomplish our military aim.

18 Samuel Coleridge, Quoted in: Barbara W.Tuchman, The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 383.

19 Lanir Zvi, �The �Principles of War� and Mili-tary Thinking,� The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol16, No 1 March 1993: 2.

20 Henry Lloyd. Quoted in: Hew Strachan,European Armies and the Conduct of War (New York:Routlege, 2001), 1.

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21 General Bronsart von Schellendorf, Quotedin: Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Conductof War (New York: Routledge, 2001), 2.

22 Admiral Sandy (Sir John) Woodward, OneHundred Days: The Memoirs of the Falklands BattleGroup Commander, (Annapolis, Maryland: Na-val Institute Press, 1992), xi.

23 General J.M.G. Baril, �Message from the Chiefof the Defence Staff,� Canadian Military Journal 1,No 1, spring 2000: p 4.

24 Chris Argyris, Teaching Smart People Howto Learn (Harvard Business Review May-June 1991)p. 6.

25 Pope Alexander IV, quoted in Barbara W.Tuchman, The March of Folly: From Troy To Vietnam(Alfred A. Knopf, Inc, New York, 1984), p. 85.

26 Judy Pearsall; Bill Trumble, Ed, The OxfordEnglish Reference Dictionary (Oxford University Press,Toronto, 1996), p.335

27 Gary Hamel, Leading the revolution (HarvardBusiness School Press, Boston, MA, 2000), p. 10.

28 Frances Horibe, Creating the Innovation Cul-ture (John Wiley & Sons Canada Ltd, Etobicoke,2001), p. 41.

29 Thomas Fogarty, Voices: Inspiring Innova-tion (Harvard Business Review, August 2002) p. 5.

30 Betty Cohen, Voices: Inspiring Innovation(Harvard Business Review, August 2002) p. 9.

31 Richard Florida, Robert Cushing, Gary Gates,When Social Capital Stifles Innovation (HarvardBusiness Review August 2002) p. 3.

32 Ronald A. Heifetz, Donald L. Laurie, TheWork of Leadership (Best of Harvard Business Re-view 1997) p. 11.

33 Clayton M. Christensen, Michael Overdorf,Meeting the Challenge of Disruptive Change(Harvard Business Review March-April 2000) p. 67.

34 Chris Argyris, Teaching Smart People Howto Learn (Harvard Business Review May-June 1991)p. 6.

35 Chris Argyris, Teaching Smart People How toLearn (Harvard Business Review May-June 1991) p. 5.

36 Esther Dyson, Voices: Inspiring Innovation(Harvard Business Review, August 2002) p. 11.

37 Gary Hamel, Bringing Silicon Valley Inside(Harvard Business Review September-October 1999)p. 73.

38 Gary Hamel, Bringing Silicon Valley Inside(Harvard Business Review September-October 1999)p. 73.

39 Harvard Business Review, Voices: InspiringInnovation (Harvard Business Review, August 2002)p. 4.

40 Gary Hamel, Leading the revolution (HarvardBusiness School Press, Boston, MA, 2000), p. 11.

41 Louis P. Pojman, Ethics: Discovering Right andWrong (Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, Toronto,ON, 2002), p. xviii.

42 Louis P. Pojman, Ethics: Discovering Right andWrong (Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, Toronto,ON, 2002), p. 15.

43 Louis P. Pojman, Ethics: Discovering Right andWrong (Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, Toronto,ON, 2002), p. 15.

44 Frank Herbert, Dune (Ace Book, The BerkleyPublishing Group, New York, NY, 1987), p. 292.

45 Patrick M. Lencioni, Make Your Values MeanSomething (Harvard Business Review July 2002) p. 7.

46 Patrick M. Lencioni, Make Your Values MeanSomething (Harvard Business Review July 2002) p.6.

47 Kim Cameron, Ethics, Virtuousness, andConstant Change; Noel M. Tichy; Andrew R.McGill, Ed, The Ethical Challenge: How to Lead withUnyielding Integrity (Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA,2003) p.187.

48 Kim Cameron, Ethics, Virtuousness, andConstant Change; Noel M. Tichy; Andrew R.McGill, Ed, The Ethical Challenge: How to Lead withUnyielding Integrity (Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA,2003) pp.189-90.


50 Malham M. Wakin, The Ethics of LeadershipI, War, Morality, and the Military Profession (WestviewPress, Inc. Boulder, CO, 1986), p. 186.

51 James A. Baker III, Business Ethics in Scepti-cal Times, Noel M. Tichy; Andrew R. McGill, Ed,The Ethical Challenge: How to Lead with UnyieldingIntegrity (Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA, 2003) p.72.

52 In this paper, I do not intend to enter intothe debate about what values should and shouldnot be part of the military culture of each coun-try. I will simply say that while I rejoice in thewealth of cultural differences between peoples, Ireject that the benefits of diversity extend into themoral realm. Human morality is exactly that; idest, ethical standards are the same for all humans.Unlike the moral blank cheque espoused by moral

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relativism, I think we must judge others� moralbehaviour�and stand ready to be judged our-selves�then act on those judgements. Of course,being careful to distinguish between morality andcustom is crucial in this realm. What is impor-tant is for the military profession to understandthe importance of establishing clear ethical stan-dards for our organizations.

53 For a sample of this type of values set, seeCanada�s Statement of Defence Ethics at http://www.dnd.ca/crs/ethics/pages/statem_e.htm.


55 James A. Baker III, Business Ethics in Scepti-cal Times, Noel M. Tichy; Andrew R. McGill, Ed,The Ethical Challenge: How to Lead with UnyieldingIntegrity (Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA, 2003) p.72.

56 James Q. Wilson, in David G. Myers, Psychol-ogy, Sixth Edition (Worth Publisher, New York,NY, 2001), p. 148.

57 Noel M. Tichy; Andrew R. McGill, Ed, TheEthical Challenge: How to Lead with Unyielding Integ-rity (Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA, 2003) p. 58.

58 The postconventional stage tends to appearmost often in the educated of European and NorthAmerican and hence is claimed by some to bebiased against those cultures that don�t prize in-dividual rights as highly as this group does.

59 David G. Myers, Psychology, Sixth Edition(Worth Publisher, New York, NY, 2001), pp. 146-8.

60 Michel Eyquem de Montaigne, in David G.Myers, Psychology, Sixth Edition (Worth Publisher,New York, NY, 2001), p. 146

61 James A. Baker III, Business Ethics in Scepti-cal Times; Noel M. Tichy; Andrew R. McGill, Ed,The Ethical Challenge: How to Lead with UnyieldingIntegrity (Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA, 2003) p.73.

62 Judy Pearsall; Bill Trumble, Ed, The OxfordEnglish Reference Dictionary (Oxford University Press,Toronto, 1996), p. 1152.


64 Barbara W. Tuchman, The March of Folly: FromTroy To Vietnam (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc, New York,1984), p. 387.

65 Enron Annual Report 2000, http://www.enron.com/corp/investors/annuals/2000/ourvalues.html accessed 24 July 2003.

66 Enron Fraud InfoCenter http://www.enronfraudinfocenter.com/information.phpaccessed 24 July 2003.

67 There were numerous complaints that so largea percentage of the 401(k) (a tax deferral retire-ment savings plan) funds were invested in Enronstock after the bankruptcy announcement. Sincethe complaints were not so loud when the stocksoared through the $100 mark, they can justifi-ably be seen as somewhat disingenuous.

68 Bela Barner, Don�t Blame Joe Berardino forArthur Andersen, (Virtual Strategist, Issue 4 Fall2002, VirtualStrategist.net LLC, 2002) p. 3.

69 Barbara Ley Toffler, in John P. Mello Jr. Fallof Arthur Andersen began long before Enron(Boston Globe Online, 27 July 2003).

70 David G. Myers, Psychology, Sixth Edition(Worth Publisher, New York, NY, 2001), p. 148.

71 Several recent examples come to mind, per-

haps exemplified most recently by the actions ofMajor Harry Schmidt, and, to a lesser extent, hissquadron commander Major William Umbach,of the Illinois Air National Guard. MajorSchmidt, according to the report of the U.S. Boardof Inquiry (BOI), killed four Canadian soldiersby bombing their position after failing to followexisting rules of engagement, not following stan-dard operating procedure, and ignoring an or-der to hold fire. Notwithstanding the evidencepresented to both the BOI and the judge at theArticle 51 hearing, the command authority an-nounced that it would not proceed with thecharges (four counts of manslaughter, eight countsof assault, and one count of dereliction of duty)laid against Major Schmidt. Of course, somemight argue that this seems to say more aboutthe moral compass of the U.S. Air Force�s seniorleaders than it does about Major Schmidt.

72 Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Con-duct of War (Routledge, New York, 1983), pp. 92-3.

73 For instance the Canadian Airborne�s ac-tions in Somalia.


75 Gianfrancesco Pico Iella Mirandola, quotedin Barbara W. Tuchman, The March of Folly: FromTroy To Vietnam (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc, New York,1984), p. 112

76 Frank Herbert, Dune (Ace Book, The BerkleyPublishing Group, New York, NY, 1987), p. 31.

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77 Chris Argyris, Good Communication ThatBlocks Learning (Harvard Business Review July-August 1994) p. 84.

78 Bruce W. Tuckman in, Zenger Miller, Launch-ing and Refuelling Your Team: Tools and Techniques(Zenger Miller Inc, San Jose, CA, 1992) p. 4.





83 Richard Florida, Robert Cushing, Gary Gates,When Social Capital Stifles Innovation (HarvardBusiness Review August 2002) p. 3.


85 Roger W. Barnett, Asymmetrical Warefare:Today�s Challenge to U.S. Military Power (Brassey�sInc., Washington, D.C., 2003), p. 3.

86 Carl von Clausewitz, Principles of War (Trans-lated and edited by Hans W. Gatzke, The Mili-tary Service Publishing Company, 1942) http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/PrincWar/Princwr1.htm, accessed 11May 2003.

87 Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, The Art of War(Greenhill Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 1992) p.43.

88 Marie-France Pochna, Christian Dior: The ManWho Made the World Look New (Arcade Publishing,Inc, New York, 1994), p. 131.

89 Aerospace Doctrine for the Canadian Forces (B-GA-400-000/AF-000), http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/libradocs/library5-e.htm, accessed 11 May 2003.

90 The Joint Staff Officer�s Guide 2000, JFSC PUB 1(National Defense University, Norfolk, 2000), p.D-2

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