WPI 060

Shafiah Fifi Muhibat

January 2004

International Relations Working Paper Series http://www.csis.or.id/papers/wpi060

This paper is a revised version of the author’s Masters Dissertation at the London School of Economics and Political Science (September 2003)

Third World States in the Midst of the Cold War

A Study of ASEAN’s Decision to Establish the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality

(ZOPFAN) Proposal, 1971-1972

CSIS WORKING PAPER SERIES

© 2004 Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta

The CSIS Working Paper Series is a means by which members of the Centre for Strategic andInternational Studies (CSIS) research community can quickly disseminate their research findings andencourage exchanges of ideas. The author(s) welcome comments on the present form of this WorkingPaper. The views expressed here are those of the author(s) and should not be attributed to CSIS Jakarta.

Third World States in the Midst of the Cold War: A Study of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)’s Decision to Establish the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) Proposal, 1971-1972

Shafiah Fifi Muhibat CSIS Working Paper Series WPI 060 January 2004

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the decision making in ASEAN in its policy to declare

Southeast Asia as a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in 1971. Two significant and

interrelated factors served as the basis for the ASEAN member states in their decision to

establish the ZOPFAN proposal: first, the international and regional security condition during

that period; and second, the differing national interests of each ASEAN state members which

resulted in a compromise. The new power pattern in the region forced the ASEAN state

members to come up with a scenario that could best protect regional security. Each state

realised that its security might be in danger if the regional security situation did not improve.

At this point, the ASEAN states decided to collaborate to guard themselves against the worst

possible consequences. The fact that ASEAN decided to come up with such an optimistic

policy is particularly interesting to observe, because it gives an insight of how the Third

World states placed and saw themselves within the Cold War theatre.

Keywords: Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); Zone of Peace, Freedom and

Neutrality (ZOPFAN), regional security, cold war

Shafiah Fifi Muhibat shfifi@csis.or.id Department of International Relations CSIS Jakarta

Introduction

Nicholas Tarling avowed that “Historians writing about Southeast Asia struggled with

some success to make their writings take proper account for both the Asian and the European

elements in its history.”1 This divergent part of the world requires meticulous comprehension

when trying to make sense of how it has developed throughout history the way it did. Writing

a history of Southeast Asia presents challenges because it means writing about “societies that

often took quite different view of the past… (and) a region where the implications of that

historical tradition may have a political significance.”2 Just as challenging as writing the

history, an attempt to analyse foreign policy decision making of the Third World3 countries in

this region may encounter the same problem.4

The early 1970’s period was a significant turning point for the states in Southeast

Asia. It was during this period that the five original member states of the Association of

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) decided to define its position in the ongoing Cold War

between two world superpowers by claiming to assert regional neutrality. The fact that

ASEAN decided to come up with such an optimistic policy is particularly interesting to

observe, because it can give an insight of how the Third World states placed and saw

themselves within the Cold War theatre.

In the early post-World War II years, most of Southeast Asia was engaged in its

struggle for national independence from the colonial rule of France, Great Britain, and the

Netherlands. Many of the states which had succeeded in gaining independence then soon

were confronted by the challenges of communism, nation building, national unity, and

economic modernisation. In the interim, the Cold War brought about great power rivalries in

the region, and turned Southeast Asia into a Cold War battleground with the regional states

being used as spears by the adversaries to contend each other. Having been oppressed by

external powers for centuries, the ASEAN states saw the situation as a hardship for their

chance to develop as respectable actors in the international arena. Hence, they tried to come

up with formulas to create a region free from external interference.

1 Nicholas Tarling, Southeast Asia: A Modern History (South Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.

508 2 Ibid, p. 503 3 The ‘Third World’ terminology emerged as a consequence of the Cold War, created by the tension between the

competing poles of attraction (the US and the Soviet Union). For further explanation of the use of the terminology during the Cold War, see for example John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), Chapter Six.

4 See Christopher Hill, “Theories of Foreign Policy Making for the Developing Countries”, in Christopher Clapham (Ed.), Foreign Policy Making in Developing States: A Comparative Approach, (Farnborough: Saxon House, 1977)

1

‘Neutrality’ implies non-participation by a state in a war between other states, thus,

the neutral state abstains from involvement in a particular war and treats both belligerents

equally.5 In the context of Cold War, the United States (US) and the Soviet Union both

attempted to spread their spheres of influence to create blocs which support their position in

the war, at least ideologically. A neutral state thus means a state which treats both super

powers equally and non-alignment with neither of the two military blocs lead by one super

power.

The ASEAN foreign ministers adopted the neutrality concept in 1971 as the Kuala

Lumpur Declaration, and agreed to

“exert initially necessary efforts to secure the recognition of, and respect for, Southeast

Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), free from any form or

manner of interference by outside powers”.6

By this declaration, ASEAN states affirmed their chosen position in the ongoing Cold War,

and committed themselves to the neutralisation of Southeast Asian region. The Kuala

Lumpur declaration was since then acknowledged as the ZOPFAN proposal.

As optimistic as it was, the ZOPFAN proposal was the outcome of a decision making

process influenced by a variety of factors. This paper argues that two factors were typically

significant: first, the international and regional security condition during that period; and

second, the differing national interests of each ASEAN state members which resulted in a

“compromise”. Changes in the international system and the need to collaborate with other

states become influential factors in a state (or a group of state)’s decision making, mainly

because the international political system is nonetheless an important structure for those

responsible for designing foreign policy as “it both constrains them and shapes their

opportunities”.7 In this condition, states are required to conduct a foreign policy which can

represent their national interests and is compatible and responsive to the international trend

and changes. An organisation like ASEAN can serve as a means to respond to external

challenges and of coordinating regional position in international arena, and can also be a

means to secure welfare gains, promote common values or solve common problems,

especially problems arising from increased levels of regional interdependence.8

5 Heiner Hanggi, ASEAN and the ZOPFAN Concept (Singapore: ISEAS, 1991), p. 1-2 6 ASEAN Documents Series, 1967-1985 (Hereafter ADS): “Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration”,

Kuala Lumpur, 27 November 1971. 7 Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (London: Palgrave, 2002), p. 174 8 Andrew Hurrell, “Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics”, Review of International

Studies, Vol. 21, No. 4, October 1995, p. 336

2

This paper represents a case study in International History by aiming to do a historical

research based upon primary sources on Southeast Asia and ASEAN prior and shortly after

the establishment of ZOPFAN, while also to a certain degree endeavours to explain the

decision making process in the association through foreign policy analysis approach.

This paper is divided into three parts: the first part deals with the historiography of

the events leading to the establishment of the ZOPFAN proposal; the second part presents an

analysis of the decision making process in the Association which resulted in the proposal;

and the third part explains about the efforts to define and implement the proposal. This paper

then closes with a conclusion.

3

I. The Establishment of ZOPFAN

Even though the idea of neutralisation was not a new issue in international relations

including in Southeast Asia, it was Malaysia that first loudly voiced the urgency of

neutralisation in the region. Its movement towards neutralisation may be traced back to the

debate in the Malaysian House of Representatives on 23 January 1968, when Malaysia’s

Deputy Prime Minister Tun Ismail suggested that:

“(the time was) ripe for the countries in the region to declare collectively the neutralisation of

Southeast Asia. To be effective, this must be guaranteed by the big powers, including the

Communist China.”9

Although Singapore’s Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, in fact proposed neutralisation as early

as April 1966 in his comment during a meeting of the Socialist International in Sweden10,

Malaysia was the one that came up with a thoroughly planned initiative of the issue, and it

took the country two years of internal debate before making the idea an official state policy in

1970.

In was in the Fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Manila that Malaysia

first introduced its neutralisation policy. The meeting itself commenced on 12 March 1971

and lasted for two consecutive days. The discussion about the neutralisation proposal was a

significant part of the meeting, although a number of other subjects were discussed with the

same degree of importance. However, the neutralisation topic was specially highlighted by

international press and commentaries due to the optimistic nature of the policy in the period

of uncertainties during the Cold War. The meeting was concluded the next day, and a Joint

Communiqué was produced. The communiqué, however, did not mention anything about the

neutralisation issue.11

It was reported that Malaysia’s proposals evoked the other members a negative

reaction: the Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman referred to the fate of Belgium (as bad

example); the Philippines considered that the neutralisation concept would take decades to

realise, and that “American umbrella was necessary for the security of the smallest Asian

paves”.12

Malaysia did not lose the spirit to continue pursuing its policy. The neutralisation

proposal was presented at the United Nations General Assembly in the fall of 1971 by the 9 Quoted in Noordin Sopiie, ”The ‘Neutralisation’ of South-East Asia”, in Hedley Bull (Ed.), Asia and the

Western Pacific (Melbourne: Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1975), p. 137 10 Ibid, p. 139 11 ADS: “Joint Communiqué of the Fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting”, Manila, 12-13 March 1971 12 Public Records Office, London, United Kingdom (Hereafter PRO): FCO 24/967/11b Letter from British

Embassy in Manila to Douglas, 22.3.71

4

Malaysian delegates, but its reception was not very encouraging.13 Malaysia was

understandably disappointed by this episode. However, Malaysia succeeded in making the

neutralisation issue a central topic in the region after being highlighted at the AMM. A

number of ASEAN States officials gave their comments on several occasions throughout the

year.

The decision to hold the Kuala Lumpur meeting came after a two-hour meeting in

New York in October, attended by ASEAN foreign ministers as called by the Malaysian

Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, to review the recent international developments and to

find common answers. The meeting in Kuala Lumpur was designed not to be the regular

annual AMM, rather, it was a special Foreign Ministers Meeting which was held to specially

discuss the latest international developments.14 It appeared that Malaysia was hoping that the

meeting would produce some kind of public declaration about the desirability of regional

neutralisation, which would be subscribed by all ASEAN ministers.15

The Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, Jose Ingles, stated on 1

November that the Philippines was willing to consider Malaysia’s proposal concerning a

‘Neutral Zone’ scheduled to be discussed in the following Kuala Lumpur meeting.16

However, in his article in the Philippines Quarterly that month he wrote that rather than using

a negative approach in the form of neutralising the region, Southeast Asian states could

accomplish more by giving a more positive contribution to disarmament and total

demilitarisation, or at least denuclearisation in the region.17

Just before leaving for Kuala Lumpur, on 22 November Indonesia’s Foreign Minister

Adam Malik spoke in front of the press after having a meeting with President Soeharto. He

explained that any discussion on neutralisation would inevitably involve military issues,

however that should not automatically lead to an establishment of a military pact.

Neutralisation was indeed different than a pact, even though Malik also confessed that the

implementation of neutrality would still be a problem since its interpretation still differed

among the ASEAN states. There would be a number of military officials joining the

Indonesian delegation. Malik refused to explain what interpretation Indonesia had of the

13 Dick Wilson, The Neutralisation of Southeast Asia (New York: Praeger, 1975), p. 22 14 Special meetings of the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN may be held when necessary as an ad hoc meeting.

Discussions in the past meetings have included the formulation of a common stand and approach to the situation in the region, relations with big powers and the declaration and subsequent measures towards the establishment of ZOPFAN.

15 PRO: FCO 24/967/25 Letter from J.K. Hickman to A.A. Duff, 12.10.71 16 Dokumentasi: ASEAN dalam Berita, Harapan, dan Kenyataan, 1967-1977 (Hereafter ABHK): Excerpts from

Antara/AFP, 4.11.71, p.117 17 ABHK: Excerpts from Antara/AFP, 14.11.71, p. 117

5

concept, but he explained that his delegation would come to the meeting with a set of

working paper as the guideline of its policy. Indonesia signalled its growing seriousness in

responding to the neutralisation issue. 18

Responding to Malik’s statement, the Philippines’s Foreign Minister, Carlos Romulo,

explained that he still had not had any idea about military issues being a topic to be discussed

in Kuala Lumpur. The press interpreted his reaction as the Philippines being sceptical about

the regional neutralisation plan.19

As for Thailand, internal developments did not cause a drastic shift in its policy

concerning neutralisation. The new military leaders who had just taken office confirmed the

new government’s appreciation of the proposal. On 24 November, the new state leader

Chalermchai Charuvastr appointed Thanat Khoman, then already a former foreign minister,

to head the Thai delegation to Kuala Lumpur. On the same day the Singaporean Foreign

Minister S. Rajaratnam commented that the neutralisation proposal was necessarily good,

however ASEAN states needed to rectify some problems before taking the step towards

implementing the proposal.20

On his arrival in Kuala Lumpur, Romulo immediately held a meeting with Tun Abdul

Razak to suggest a new alternative for neutralisation in Southeast Asia. The detail of the

alternative proposition was not publicised to the press, but he explained that neutralisation

should not strictly mean disarmament, rather, it could also be achieved through a form of

non-aggression pact and multilateral alliance.21

The Kuala Lumpur meeting was formally opened on 25 November, with Adam Malik,

Tun Abdul Razak, S. Rajaratnam, Carlos Romulo and Thanat Khoman representing each

state. The session was specially scheduled to discuss the neutralisation proposal and the

declaration draft formulated by Thanat Khoman based on Malaysia’s request, and also to

discuss a working paper for the neutralisation implementation prepared by Malaysia. The five

representatives held a three-hour meeting to come up with an efficient way to approach the

People’s Republic of China, the Soviet Union and the United States to guarantee the

implementation of regional neutralisation in Southeast Asia. The first day of the meeting

ended after six hours of discussion, however it failed to produce a common policy regarding

Malaysia’s neutralisation proposal, especially concerning the scope of the implementation in

the region and how to gain guarantee from the big powers. 18 ABHK: Excerpts from Antara/AFP, 22.11.71, p.118 19 Ibid. 20 ABHK: Excerpts from Antara/AFP, 24.11.71, p. 119 21 Ibid.

6

The second day of the meeting, 26 November, started off with the same discussion

concerning ‘Neutral Zone’, later followed by a discussion about the rapprochement with the

People’s Republic of China (PRC). After three days of discussion, the Kuala Lumpur

Declaration, containing the ZOPFAN Proposal, was established.

In his press conference after the meeting Tun Abdul Razak commented that the Kuala

Lumpur Declaration which declared ASEAN’s effort to establish neutralisation in Southeast

Asia would be registered at the United Nations. The five Southeast Asian states outside

ASEAN, namely Burma, Laos, Cambodia, North Vietnam and South Vietnam, which had

been included in the proposed ‘Neutral Zone’, would be contacted through diplomatic

channel and be asked to give their full support. He added in the press statement that after all

ten states had declared their full support for the proposal, the big powers, namely the People’s

Republic of China, the United States, and the Soviet Union would be approached to

“guarantee” neutrality.22 It is interesting to note that the press reported that Razak used the

word “guarantee”, while at ASEAN plenary session he used the term “recognise and respect”

to express the same statement23.

President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines also expressed his appreciation for the

result of the Kuala Lumpur meeting, and commented that the upcoming ministerial meeting

had been agreed to be held in Manila in March 1972 for three consecutive days. After

receiving report on the meeting from his foreign minister, Marcos, in his presidential

statement, stated that he wished for the ASEAN states to be able to establish a joint action for

the sake of regional security and development.24

Officials from outside ASEAN states also gave their comments on the Kuala Lumpur

meeting. A spokesperson from the South Vietnamese government stated that they were

willing to consider the neutralisation proposal, however they had not yet received the official

text of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration. This statement was given as a clarification to the

growing media reportage about the South Vietnamese government already agreeing to the

declaration.25 Meanwhile in North Vietnam, the government’s official newspaper wrote on 1

December that the proposal could be accepted as long as it implied the withdrawal of US

troops from the region.26

22 ABHK: Excerpts from Antara/AFP, 27.11.71, p. 121 23 Russell Fifield, National and Regional Interests in ASEAN: Competition and Cooperation in International

Politics, ISEAS Occasional Paper No. 57 (Singapore: ISEAS, 1979), p. 14 24 ABHK: Excerpts from Antara/AFP, 29.11.71, p. 121 25 PRO: FCP 24/ 967/50 Letter from R. Brash to J.W.D. Margetson, 30.11.71 26 ABHK: Excerpts from Antara/AFP, 1.12.71

7

The Secretary of the Foreign and Commonwealth office of the Great Britain, Anthony

Royle, stated during his visit to Kuala Lumpur on 30 November that his government was

happy with the result of the Kuala Lumpur meeting. He explained that for the time being the

Five Power Defence Arrangement (involving Malaysia, Singapore, Great Britain, Australia

and New Zealand) would still be maintained due to the neutralisation proposal was still in its

early phased.27 Meanwhile from Australia, Foreign Minister Nigel Bowen stated on 25

November in Canberra that Australia welcomed the good intentions of the ASEAN states to

discuss the issues of peace, security and stability in Southeast Asia based on regional

cooperation.28

New Zealand’s Defence Minister, J.F. Robertson, during his four-day visit to Kuala

Lumpur in early December commented that the neutralisation proposal was an effort towards

the good of the regional citizens, and for this New Zealand was willing to give active support

to realise the plan.29

27 PRO: FCO 24/967/38 Excerpts from BBC, 30.11.71 28 ABHK: Excerpts from Antara/AFP, 1.12.71, p. 123 29 Ibid.

8

II. Factors Affecting the Decision Making

In International Relations, there is a type of condition known as ‘interdependence’.

When changes occur in one actor, others also experience some disturbance because “their

internal system is in part plugged into that of the outsider”30. This situation makes the

international system a factor that defines the foreign policy decision making process of a

state. It cannot be easily left out of foreign policy, and obscures relations between

governments. This is particularly so in circumstances where states are intensively connected,

whether through some regional community, or conversely through an adversary

partnership.31 And in a world which has for quite some time become more and more global,

interdependence is an inescapable condition. States are required to conduct foreign policy

which does not only represent their national interests, but is also compatible and responsive

to the current international trend.

Governments also collaborate because it is their perception that they cannot achieve

their goals at an acceptable cost through unilateral action, and because they believe that they

can do so more effectively through cooperation with others.32 Especially for small and newly

independent states with less bargaining power, this is more likely to occur, principally based

on two objectives: firstly, to gain a greater bargaining power in international arena; and

secondly, to get themselves heard or at least make a mark in world politics. One consequence

of this policy is that in pursuing their national interests, states have to come across their

collaborators’ national interests, which more that often are different to theirs. In this case,

compromising own foreign policy line is inevitable.

In his article “Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics”33,

Andrew Hurrell attempted to open up a series of theoretical approaches to study

contemporary regionalism. He explained that cooperative arrangements in regional

cooperation could serve a wide variety of purposes:

“On the one hand, they can serve as a means of responding to external challenges and of

coordinating regional positions in international institutions or negotiating forums. On the

other, they can be developed to secure welfare gains, to promote common values or to solve

30 Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, p. 175 31 Ibid., p. 176 32 The neoliberal institutionalism approach argues that institutions matter because of the benefits that they

provide, and because their impact on the calculations of the players and the ways in which states define their interests. Hence, states cooperate with each other not only because the increasing levels of interdependence demand them to do so, but also because the cooperation provides more benefits for them. See, for example: Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

33 Hurrell, “Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics”

9

common problems, especially problems arising from increased levels of regional

interdependence. In the security field, for example, such cooperation can range from the

stabilisation of a regional balance of power, to the institutionalisation of confidence-building

measures, to the negotiation of a region-wide security regime.”34

This theoretical approach is predominantly useful in the attempt to understand

ASEAN’s decision making process in the establishment of the ZOPFAN proposal. Two

different but closely interrelated factors became the significant decisive inputs to the process.

The first is the security situation, international and more importantly regional, at the time;

and second, the inevitable compromise of differing national interests.

II. 1. International and Regional Security Situation

At the time when ASEAN was still struggling to establish a suitable framework for

regional cooperation and to gain recognition from the international world, it already had to

face major strategic changes in the region. The shift in the power and influence pattern in the

region meant the need for adjustment, which might be difficult in a situation where regional

cooperation had not yet moved at the same pace and level for all of its members. The

alterations and realignments among the great powers were not only vital because of the

changes in ideological and political perceptions in the super power relations. It was also

noteworthy that the realignments among the great powers also transformed the character of

Southeast Asia as a problem area for each of the great powers and thus impinged on the

character of the political and economic interests they attached to the region.35

In the US, the Nixon administration had decided to begin a negotiated withdrawal of

American forces from the ongoing battlefield in the Vietnam War. En route to Asia in July

1969, Richard Nixon stopped at Guam and explained about the new line of US policy to Asia

to the press, which then became known as the Guam Doctrine (or Nixon Doctrine). In the

doctrine, Richard Nixon projected to attempt to encourage a satisfactory resolution of the

issues in Asia through the use of indigenous Asian forces without the involvement of any US

ground troops.36 The US’s intention to limit its involvement in Asia was uttered by the

statement:

“... the United States, in its relations with all of its Asian friends, should be quite emphatic on

two points: one, that we would keep our treaty commitments ... And two, that as far as the

34 Ibid., p. 336 35 Yuwono Sudarsono, “Problems of Internal Stability in the ASEAN Countries”, in Bull (Ed.), Asia and the

Western Pacific, p. 79 36 The Nixon Doctrine, July 1969.

10

problems of international security are concerned, as far as problems of military defense,

except for the threat of a major power involving nuclear weapons, that the United States was

going to encourage and had a right to expect that this problem would be increasingly handled

by, and the responsibility for it taken by, the Asian nations themselves.”37

The US government officials gave further confirmation concerning the attainment of the

Nixon Doctrine, which confirmed how seriously the US planned to significantly reduce its

involvement in Southeast Asia.38

The American policy shift occurred the same time as the PRC’s entry to the United

Nations, which was subsequently followed by Nixon’s visit to Beijing. The US-PRC

rapprochement occurred as the ties between Moscow and Beijing deteriorated to the point of

military exchanges along the Ussuri River and the Soviet’s cross-border penetrations into

Xinjiang. At his visit to China in February 1972, Nixon held a meeting with Premier Chou

En-Lai, which concluded with a US-China Communiqué, in which both leaders clearly stated

their intention to normalise relations.39 The visit and the Shanghai Communiqué symbolised

the end of more than two decades of hostility between the US and China.

These events resulted in anxiety for the ASEAN states. Carlos Romulo and Thanat

Khoman expressed annoyance that the US government failed to consult them in advance

about Nixon’s visit to China.40 All of the Southeast Asian states were concerned about the

US’s withdrawal from the region. However, there was substantial disagreement among the

states about the timing and terms of the withdrawal. Supporters of the American involvement

argued against a swift withdrawal while the other extreme urged a rapid exit. But on the

prospect of the American role in the region, most of the Southeast Asian states agreed to a

certain extent that an American presence was desirable in order to offset the influences of

China and other powers. As long as intervention and confrontation could be avoided, it was

important to gain the US’s “guarantee” of the region.

The increasing power and international role of the PRC came as a blow and seen as a

challenge in the eyes of Southeast Asian states, due to the uncertainties of how they could

deal with the new giant. The possibility that China might carry out threatening foreign policy

towards Southeast Asia resulted in apprehension for the ASEAN leaders. They feared that the

new power pattern might lead to Southeast Asia being forcefully shaped into different

spheres of influence. At the fifth AMM in Singapore in 1972, all of the ASEAN Foreign

37 Ibid. 38 PRO: FCO 15/1375/2 Letter from J.D. Boyd to E.C. Glover, 15.2.1971 39 The US-China Communiqué at the Conclusion of President Nixon’s Visit to China, 27 February 1972 40 PRO: FCO 24/967/34 Telegram from Johnston to FCO, 26.11.71

11

Ministers mentioned in their opening statements the significant developments in the

international scene, particularly Nixon’s China visit and the PRC’s entry to the United

Nations. They all agreed that these events marked important changes in international settings

which were highly influential to the Southeast Asian region.41 To respond to these changes,

ASEAN decided to formulate a common stance.

As Ghazalie Shafie argued, the idea to assert regional neutralisation was not premised

upon a euphoric view of the world or of the natural tendencies of states in international

relations, rather, it was based on the long view of the developing mood on the regional as

well as the international stage.42 It was to regulate these ongoing changes and their negative

impacts that ZOPFAN was instigated to ostensibly safeguard the security of Southeast Asia

in general, and the non-communist ASEAN states in particular. The Manila Chronicle in its

26 November edition highlighted that whatever the result of the Kuala Lumpur meeting was,

the meeting itself had shown that there had been a significant dialog to show the region’s

awareness of its security importance, which could only be achieved through regional

cooperation.43 The ASEAN states felt like they had to have a common voice, which was

deemed to be stronger than an individual state’s voice to get itself heard in the midst of the

world’s big powers’ rivalries. Coming up with a perfect scenario for this was seen inefficient,

because a quick and loud response was necessary, or at least considered necessary, to prevent

unexpected impacts of the international changes.

Even though the idea of neutralisation had been introduced openly for discussion

before, the decision to establish the Kuala Lumpur Declaration was accelerated, deliberately

or not, due to these international changes. The uncertainties caused by the new power pattern

forced the ASEAN leaders to come up with the second best scenario of compromise within

the least possible amount of time, and thus established the ZOPFAN proposal. Collaborative

undertaking between Southeast Asian states suggested a common ambition that foreign

powers should become more responsive to them, whose destiny was largely moulded by the

big powers. There was also the expectation that regional cooperation could generate greater

bargaining power with foreign powers that individual government lacked.

41 In their opening statements, all ministers mentioned clearly Nixon’s China visit as significant events affecting

the region (Malik phrased the event as “process of rapprochement in the relations between the USA and the PRC”), while Ingles and Tun Ismail also clearly mentioned the PRC’s UN entry. See the ADS: “Opening Statements of the Fifth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting”, Singapore, 13 April 1972

42 Ghazali Shafie, “The Neutralisation of Southeast Asia”, in Hamzah (Ed.), Southeast Asia and Regional Peace, p. 43

43 ABHK: Excerpts from Antara/AFP, 26.11.71, p.121

12

From this perspective, it was clearly demonstrated how the ASEAN states, in their

capacity as Third World states in the midst of the ongoing Cold War, would like to create

‘borders’ to their attachment to the war. They had the strength of mind to demand the

fulfilment of their interests, which they thought could be jeopardised by the creation of a

front line of the war in their region.

II.2. Compromising National Interests

For the attainment of neutralisation, a commitment of any single state was not

sufficient. The full commitment of all five ASEAN states was compulsory. This was not an

easy compromise to achieve, since each state had its own foreign policy line and agenda to

fulfil. The five ASEAN members, with differing history and political cultures, could barely

be expected to cooperate intensely, especially when regional cooperation had only been

recent phenomena.

Malaysia embarked on a policy to obtain international recognition of, and support for,

its neutralisation idea. However, other ASEAN states had other interests in mind. Indonesia

was pursuing a policy to have Southeast Asia assuming its own responsibility for the

management of regional affairs. Thus it sought to have the great powers interference out of

the region and was in search of all possibilities to become a regional power itself. Thailand

and the Philippines, bound by alliance commitments with the US, were at a different position

from neutralisation. As for Singapore, being tiny in size it was in great need of economic and

security guarantee, thus was also in favour of a permanent great power presence in the region,

particularly that of the US.

Domestic political aspect played an essential role in Malaysia’s promotion for

neutralisation. In 1969, Malaysia had contended with racial riots between ethnic Malay and

Chinese. By reaching out to the PRC, Malaysia sought to encourage domestic reconciliation,

and neutralisation was considered to be able to accommodate emerging Chinese interests in

Southeast Asia.44 External changes also influenced Malaysia’s decision making, especially

the fact that its relations with its patron, the Great Britain, had gradually been loosened.

In his opening statement at the Fourth AMM, Tun Ismail introduced Malaysia’s

neutralisation policy to his fellow ASEAN colleagues. He stated that

“The (neutralisation) policy is meant to be a proclamation that this region of ours is no longer

to be regarded as an area to be divided into spheres of influence of the big powers. It may be

44 Narine, Explaining ASEAN, p. 20

13

regarded as a project to end or prevent small countries used as pawns in the conflict between

the big powers...to ensure stability and preserve peace in this area...”45

He also explained in the statement that the policy was to be guaranteed by the big powers,

namely the US, the Soviet Union, and the PRC. However, before seeking such undertaking,

Tun Ismail suggested that it was imperative to develop a strong sense of regional

consciousness and solidarity.46

For Indonesia, membership in a regional organisation was to a certain degree regarded

as a means of introducing its free and active foreign policy doctrine to a wider region.47 The

pursuit for a greater degree of regional autonomy by reducing the roles of external powers

has been the central spirit of Indonesia’s preoccupation in ASEAN. In April 1971, when Tun

Razak asked him to support the Malaysian neutralisation idea, Indonesia’s President Soeharto

emphasised the need for “national resilience”, which had been known as the Indonesian

doctrine of self-reliance.48 With the doctrine, Indonesia stressed the importance of being

reliant at the least possible degree on external backing in guaranteeing national and regional

security. A declaration of neutralisation guaranteed by the great powers would be

unfavourable for Indonesia, because it would provide a way in for great power intervention in

the region and would also make the regional situation inflexible for the Southeast Asian states

in pursuing their national interests.

Adam Malik had before the Kuala Lumpur Meeting expressed his government’s

policy to minimise dependence on external powers. In his opening statement at the Fourth

AMM, Malik emphasised this policy by affirming that “...the primary responsibility for

prosperity and stability in Southeast Asia rests on ourselves.”49 Later, at the 3rd Asian Press

Foundation meeting in Bali on 24 August 1971, Malik in his opening speech titled “Asia’s

Role in the World Politics of the 70’s” proposed three alternatives to the development of

Asia’s role, more specifically Southeast Asia, in the international arena.50 First, the Southeast

Asian states could become allies with one or a combination of the big powers, with which the

Southeast Asians could trust to assist them with security and welfare aids. The second

alternative was to gain the big powers’ support in declaring Southeast Asia as a neutral

region, free from external interference. The last alternative was to develop among the 45 ADS: “Opening Statement by H.E. Tun Ismail Bin Dato Abdul Rahman Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia at

the Fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting”, Manila, 12 March 1971 46 Ibid. 47 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism (Singapore: ISEAS, 1994)p. 174 48 Wilson, The Neutralization of Southeast Asia, p. 56 49 ADS: “Opening Statement by H.E. Mr. Adam Malik Foreign Minister of the Republic of Indonesia at the

Fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting”, Manila, 12 March 1971 50ABHK: Excerpts from Antara/AFP, 13.3.71, p. 116

14

Southeast Asian states a stable condition, relying on their own social, political and economic

strengths. Malik explained that the first alternatives seemed to be the easiest but the least

productive, while the second was an alternative which had been previously brought up by

European and Asian statesmen but still had very vague interpretation. The third alternative

could be considered the most possibly effective to guarantee a long term stability and

harmony in the region. He also added that by developing an internal cohesion and stability

through the region’s own social, political and economic strengths, Southeast Asia could

develop a new balance in Asia and be free of external intervention.51

The following year, at the Fifth AMM, Malik proudly introduced Indonesia’s

National Resilience doctrine to other ASEAN states in his opening statement. He stated that

“(National Resilience) means to enhance the capabilities and abilities of each member country

and its people in all fields of national endeavour, in order to withstand and to overcome all

kinds of outside interference and adverse influences, harmful to its sound and harmonious

development...therefore, our regional response to the challenges of the Seventies should lie

within the concept of National Resilience...that should become the guiding principle for each of

us, in our present strategic approach, towards regional peace and stability.”52

After the ZOPFAN proposal had been established, Indonesia seemed to be unwilling

to shift away from this doctrine. It was obvious that Indonesia wished to spread its line of

policy to its neighbours, and being the largest and influential state in the region, it had the

opportunity to do so.

Thailand could not escape the fact that it was bound by alliance commitment with the

US, and it was in its best interest to continue such commitment. In his opening statement at

the Fourth AMM Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman did not propose any concrete

suggestions on how to confront the new international challenges. He used diplomatic words

to comment on the future of regional security and stated that “our common interest will be

well protected if we continue to have a strong and united stand in dealing with other

parties.”53 He then made a remark during a press conference after the meeting about

Malaysia’s neutralisation concept, of which he considered positive, and could be effectively

achieved only with respectful interaction between the member states and also with external

powers.54 From this statement, Thailand seemed to be very cautious in considering the

51 Ibid. 52 ADS: “Opening Statement by H.E. Mr. Adam Malik Foreign Minister of the Republic of Indonesia at the Fifth

ASEAN Ministerial Meeting”, Singapore, 13 April 1972 53 ADS: “Opening Statement by H.E. Mr. Thanat Khoman Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand at the

Fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting”, Manila, 12 March 1971 54 ABHK: Excerpts from Antara/AFP, 13.3.71, p. 116

15

neutralisation plan, while at the same time doing its best not to jeopardise its good relations

with, and dependency on, the US.

On 7 August 1972, Thailand’s Vice Chairman of National Executive Committee,

Praphas Charisthira, commented that the ZOPFAN Proposal would not guarantee peace. He

viewed it impossible to establish neutralisation of the communists still conducted aggressive

acts and stressed that peace should be attained before neutralisation could be thought of.55

This highly pessimistic view of the regional neutralisation plan raised questions on

Thailand’s commitment on ZOPFAN. Some analysts questioned the background of the

comment, accusing that it might have been influenced by pressures from the big powers.56

As for the Philippines, it seemed that it had a difficult time to respond to the

neutralisation idea at the beginning, because it was imperative for the Philippines to first

clarify the concept as to whether it meant the elimination of foreign military bases in

Southeast Asia. Its close ties with the US, including in military, prevented the Philippines to

embrace the idea of being totally dependent of external powers. In his opening statement at

the Fourth AMM, Carlos Romulo deliberately avoided any mentioning of the issue. In the

statement, he made long and thoroughly review of ASEAN’s economic cooperation during

the past year, but not a single remark concerning the current security issue.57

Jose Ingles’s Philippines Quarterly article reflected this policy line. He wrote that

rather than using a “negative approach” in the form of neutralising the region, Southeast

Asian states could be better off with giving a more positive contribution to disarmament and

total demilitarisation, or at least denuclearisation in the region.58 This article reflected the

initial not-so-eager spirit of the Philippines to consider Malaysia’s suggestion. At the Fifth

AMM, Ingles who represented the Philippines presented an opening statement without

making a significant reference to the ZOPFAN proposal which was established just five

months earlier. He only brought up ZOPFAN when speaking of Nixon’s visit to Beijing, and

commenting the result of the visit as in harmony with the principles of ZOPFAN.59

Even though it was clear that the Philippines sought to avert both Southeast Asia’s

neutralisation and the withdrawal of America’s naval presence, its position was nonetheless

characterised by ambivalence. On the one hand, the Philippines greatly benefited from its

55 ABHK: Excerpts from Indonesia Raya, 8.8.72, p. 151 56 ABHK: Excerpts from Merdeka, 11.8.72, p. 151 57 ADS: “The Opening Statement by H.E. Mr. Carlos P. Romulo Foreign Minister of the Republic of the

Philippines at the Fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting”, Manila, 12 March 1971 58 ABHK: Excerpts from Antara/Reuter, 14.11.71, p. 117 59 ADS: “The Opening Statement by H.E. Dr. Jose D. Ingles Under Secretary of the Republic of the Philippines

at the Fifth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting”, Singapore, 13 April 1972

16

defence ties with Washington, while on the other hand it was also tempted to reduce its

security dependence on Washington for nationalistic reasons.60 The foremost problem for the

Philippines was the future of the American bases in its territory, and this was more than a

simple question of defence.61 This complex situation made it difficult for the Philippines to

express a definite support for the neutralisation plan.

Singapore was also in favour of a permanent big power existence in the region,

predominantly that of the US. Economy was the main issue in Singapore’s foreign policy,

due to the significance of its economic development. Its area size and population hindered

Singapore to achieve higher bargaining power in international relations, thus it relied on its

advancement in economy to mark its strength as a respectable state. Of all the countries of

Southeast Asia, Singapore was the most dependent on world markets and the “friendship” of

the big powers62, but it was determined to affirm its sovereignty. In this sense, economic

development came first in any of Singapore’s policies. In particular, Singapore saw ASEAN

as restrictively an economic association thus disliked the suggestion that ASEAN should be

given political or defence teeth.63

In his opening statement at the Fourth AMM, Rajaratnam spoke comprehensively

about the importance of dynamic national economies for an effective regionalism. He

emphasised that economic development was the best strategy to elevate Southeast Asia’s role

in world politics, which implied Southeast Asia being “something more than a convenient

arena to stage big power conflicts.” 64

With this background, the Kuala Lumpur meeting was characterised by fierce debate

between Malaysia on one side, and the Philippines on the other.65 The discussion heated up

when it touched the definition and use of the neutralisation concept. The delegation of the

Philippines was reported to be strongly opposing the declaration draft prepared by Thailand,

which stated the Southeast Asian region as a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality with the

support of the big powers. The Philippines had a problem with the use of the concept

‘neutrality’ because it viewed it as a vague and unclear concept, and asked for it to be

60 Jurgen Haacke, ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Developments and Prospects (London:

RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 57 61 PRO: FCO 24/1269/4 Letter from J.J. Taylor to A. Grant, 2.12.71 62 Nicholas Tarling, The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia. Volume: The Nineteenth and Twentieth

Centuries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) p. 620 63 PRO: FCO 24/967/4 Letter from R.C. Samuel to P.J. Sullivan, 2.2.71 64 ADS: “The Opening Statement by H.E. Mr. S. Rajaratnam Foreign Minister of the Republic of Singapore at

the Fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting”, Manila, 12 March 1971 65 Hanggi, ASEAN and the ZOPFAN Concept, p.17

17

eliminated from the declaration.66 Meanwhile, the Indonesian delegation was also reported to

be not so keen on the use of the concept, while Singapore held on to its wait-and-see policy.67

It was not Malaysia’s neutralisation proposal which had been agreed upon by the

foreign ministers in the meeting, but simply the idea that the neutralisation issue was an

important topic which needed to be specifically addressed. The “real” talk about

neutralisation as proposed by Malaysia was actually difficult to discuss. At the end of the

second day, a compromise was reached, and the ZOPFAN proposal came out as a modified

version of Malaysia’s neutralisation proposal. The important modification was that the three

major powers were no longer asked to be guarantors. There was no mentioning of external

powers’ guarantee in the Declaration.68

The meeting also compromised on the scope of the Neutral Zone to cover all ASEAN

states plus Burma, Laos, Cambodia, North Vietnam and South Vietnam. However, the issue

of big powers’ guarantee was decided to be put aside at the end of the meeting.69 It seemed

that the five ASEAN states preferred to concentrate on the internal regional security issues

first.

As an approach to enhance regional security and to engage the regional major powers,

ZOPFAN was very different from the original Malaysian proposal of regional neutralisation.

When ASEAN foreign ministers agreed on a collective response at the Kuala Lumpur

meeting, they started off from a draft prepared by Thanat Khoman. During the discussion,

Indonesia’s version of neutrality seemed to succeed in influencing the others’ position.

Indonesia objected to the original neutralisation proposal because Indonesia sought not legal

guarantees but political pledges to attain a zone of neutrality. Significantly, the revised draft,

which was later adopted as the Kuala Lumpur Declaration, followed Indonesia’s version. It is

important to note that Indonesia, whose officials previously made objecting remarks

concerning Malaysia’s idea, had a shift of policy and decided to take the lead in establishing

ASEAN. Indonesia started to have a shift in policy in early 1971 when Adam Malik and the

Deputy Commander in Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces, General Panggabean, on

different occasions gave surprising comments about the possibility of defence arrangements

among ASEAN countries.70 This surprising shift appeared to be influenced by the

government’s consideration that Indonesia’s security was bound to be affected by the defence 66 ABHK: Excerpts from Antara/Reuters, 25.11.71, p. 121 67 Ibid. 68 ADS: “Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration”. 69 ABHK: Excerpts from Antara, 26.11.71, p. 121 70 PRO: FCO 24/967/2 Letter from R.M. Hunt to P.J. Sullivan, 26.1.71; FCO 24/967/3 Letter from R.M. Hunt to

P.J. Sullivan, 2.2.1971

18

capabilities and security situation of its neighbours in the region. The security situation at the

time was not very promising, for example there had been social problems in Malaysia with

the racial issue. This situation apparently convinced Indonesia that a joint action was needed

to improve its own security environment.

Haacke argued that although the Kuala Lumpur Declaration was a compromise, which

revolved around a shared commitment to the norms of sovereign equality and non-

interference, it best articulated Indonesia’s foreign policy position, in terms of its struggle for

security and recognition.71 This is an interesting point, because as had been explained,

Malaysia was the one that first voiced the neutralisation idea. Malaysia was also the one who

requested Khoman to write the draft. But at the end, Indonesia gained a larger voice in

influencing the declaration. As argued by Michael Leifer, Indonesia had scored a diplomatic

victory in Kuala Lumpur, because “it had been able to set to one side the concept of

neutralisation and had reinstated its own strategic perspective as the common platform of the

ASEAN states, though without making more than a declaratory impact”72. This more or less

reflected the bargaining positions within the Association at the time.

ZOPFAN, like other major documents and agreements signed by the ASEAN leaders,

was established as the outcome of a process of diplomatic interaction which centred on

consultation and consensus among the member states.73 It was thus forged to satisfy the

diverse national interests. To make it acceptable to all of the members and to satisfy the

divergent and conflicting interests, generality and ambiguity were the hallmark of the Kuala

Lumpur Declaration.74 Because of the different security perceptions and different preferred

means of overcoming perceived threats, the declaration had to be loosely worded to make it

documentarily acceptable for all of the five states, even though this risked the possibility that

the ZOPFAN proposal might not be proper to be realised or made effective. As argued by

Hanggi, the Kuala Lumpur Declaration was not an ASEAN declaration of neutrality but a

mere declaration of intent which did not impose legal obligations on its signatories.

Particularly, the declaration made no reference to foreign military bases in the region and

military alliances with foreign powers75, which implied that there were still a number of

71 Haacke, ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture, p. 58 72 Michael Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy (London: Allen & Unwin, 1983), p. 150 73 This type of informal intramural interaction is also known as the ‘ASEAN Way’. For more details of the

‘ASEAN Way’ see Haacke, ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture. 74 Bilveer Singh, ZOPFAN and the New Security Order in the Asia Pacific (Malaysia: Pelanduk Publications,

1992), p. 81 75 Hanggi, ASEAN and the ZOPFAN Concept, p. 19

19

unanswered question. Thus, the declaration was not more than the expression of the lowest

mutual denominator among ASEAN states.

20

III. Efforts to Define and Implement ZOPFAN

The year 1972 was marked by efforts to implement the result of the Kuala Lumpur

Meeting. On a press conference in Jakarta on 11 March 1972 during his visit to the

Indonesian capital, Tun Ismail commented on the current status of the progress of regional

neutralisation. He explained that every statement made by ASEAN head of states concerning

neutralisation had been own views, which implied that there had not been any organisational

policy concerning the implementation of the ZOPFAN proposal.76 After their meeting in

Jakarta, both Tun Ismail and Adam Malik agreed that major powers’ involvement in regional

neutralisation was vital.77

Post-Kuala Lumpur Declaration, ASEAN tried to clarify the meaning of ZOPFAN but

did not reach much success. To smooth the implementation process of the ZOPFAN

Proposal, a Committee of Senior Officials of ASEAN Countries (CSO) was established with

the tasks to: (1) formulate the regulations or working framework of the proposal; (2) take the

necessary steps to gain international recognition and respect to the proposal; and (3)

formulate a framework to strengthen the relations between the Southeast Asian states.78 With

these tasks at hand, the CSO held six consecutive meetings, starting in Kuala Lumpur on 6-8

July 1972, attended by 26 officials from the foreign ministers of all ASEAN members. The

sessions were all closed and confidential.

At the meeting, the Malaysians led off by suggesting that the paper which they had

prepared should be the basis of the meeting’s discussion. This idea was opposed by other

participants -Singapore being the strongest one to object- who claimed that the meeting’s

term of reference had been previously set to discuss the operative paragraphs of the Kuala

Lumpur Declaration and to concentrate on the ZOPFAN proposal, which was not the similar

thing as Malaysia’s neutralisation proposal.79 This triggered a heated debate between the

Malaysian and Singaporean participants, resulting in extended sessions with no efficient

results. Because of the semantic problems which occupied most of the first day of the

meeting, the committee set up a working group with the task to produce acceptable

definitions of the terms used to produce acceptable definitions of the terms used in the

76 ABHK: Excerpts from Suara Karya, 17.4. 72, p. 137 77 Ibid. 78 C.P.F. Luhulima et al., Laporan Penelitian: Dimensi Kerangka Kegiatan dalam Kerjasama ASEAN (Jakarta:

LIPI, 1985) 79 PRO: FCO/24/1270/29b, Telegram from the British High Commission in Kuala Lumpur to the British High

Commission in Wellington, 10.7.72

21

declaration, particularly the words “peace”, “freedom”, and “neutrality”. The working group

came up with a satisfactory result, but did not really resolve the semantic problems.

The Suara Karya daily in Jakarta reported on 14 July 1972 that although there had not

been a clear and uniform definition of the ‘neutralisation’ concept, the earlier CSO meeting in

Kuala Lumpur gave a lot of inputs for the Ministerial Meeting in Manila. The CSO meeting

resulted among others the understanding that neutralisation was a long term goal which

required a step-by-step implementation, and for this national resilience was the main pre-

requisite. Thus, what was more urgent to establish at the time being was not the

conceptualisation of neutralisation, but the efforts to move towards it as enabled by the

current regional condition. 80

The second ad hoc Foreign Ministers Meeting as, held as a continuation of the first

meeting in Kuala Lumpur, took place in Manila on 13-14 July. It was attended by Malik,

Rajaratnam, Tun Ismail, Romulo, and Thailand’s Vice Chairman of National Executive

Council Pote Sarasin, who requested that the sessions were closed to public, and no opening

speech or other official statements from the ministers were to be made.81

At the meeting, the ministers assessed the work of the CSO and came up with the

evaluation that:

“...the Committee had reached a common understanding of the interpretation of a “Zone of

Peace, Freedom and Neutrality” in the context of Southeast Asia. It reiterated the view that

neutralisation of Southeast Asia is a desirable objective and also noted with satisfaction that

the Committee at its next meeting will continue its study of neutralisation as a means of

establishing Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality and that other means

will also be considered.”82

The statement was somewhat vague and failed to make any clear definition of the

ZOPFAN Proposal. Even though it had an optimistic tone of the prospective work of the

CSO, such optimism seemed to be deliberately forced to cover the genuine stagnation of the

neutralisation plan.

Upon returning from Manila, Adam Malik explained to the Indonesian press that

neutralisation proposal was impossible to be realised as long as there was still a war going on

80 ABHK: Excerpts from Suara Karya, 14.7.72, p. 146 81 At the end of the meeting a document titled The ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting to Discuss International

Developments Affecting the Region, Manila, 12-14 July 1972 was produced. It served as a kind of Joint Communiqué but was not labelled as such.

82 ADS: “The ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting to Discuss International Developments Affecting the Region”, Manila, 13-14 July 1972

22

in the region. He said that the proposal had not yet been finalised and was still in its early

phase.83

For the rest of 1972, no significant progress was achieved in the realisation of the

proposal. ASEAN states officials spoke out their comments and views about the proposal, but

no actual action was taken. In Manila, Romulo in his interview with the Bangkok Post re-

emphasised the importance of cooperation and unity of the Southeast Asian region especially

due to the latest changes occurring in world politics.84 Meanwhile in Kuala Lumpur, during a

parliamentary session on 4 December, Tun Razak explained that ASEAN could not put high

hopes on the big powers to guarantee the regional neutrality.85 Another CSO meeting was

held in Jakarta on 18-20 December specially to discuss the definition of the neutralisation

concept. Although the meeting was said to have resulted in a common understanding about

the concept, no definite definition was explained to public to demonstrate it. The CSO

explained that more discussions were still needed to reach a compromise.

Even though efforts had been taken to fully define the substance of the proposal, at

least four significant problems still persisted. The first problem was of terminology. While

the definition of ‘Peace’ had been commonly understood, the extent to which the concept of

‘Freedom’ and ‘Neutrality’ can be measured was still indeterminate. There were still

confusions of whether the two concepts meant the elimination of all foreign military presence

in the region, prohibition of all ASEAN member states to take part in any form of security

pact, refusing any form of military aid and assistance, a number of other undefined clauses.

This was obvious if we take a look at the varying statements the five Kuala Lumpur

participants used during many occasions. Terms like “neutrality” and “neutralisation” were

often mixed as if they were identical.

Secondly, there had not yet been any mechanism which was specifically designed to

implement the proposal. This mechanism issue seemed to have been abandoned by the

euphoria to merely establish the proposal. Consequently, the Kuala Lumpur Declaration was

announced without any clear elucidation of how to implement it, either through some forms

of dialogue, a special body within the ASEAN, some forms of international agreement, or

other measures.

The third problem was that there were still differing perceptions of the proposal,

especially in relation to each ASEAN state’s national interest and policy line. What is meant

83 ABHK: Excerpts from Nusantara, 20.7.72, p. 147 84 ABHK: Excerpts from Nusantara, 22.9.72, p. 152 85 ABHK: Excerpts from Berita Yudha, 6.12.72, p. 152

23

by ‘perception’ is how each state actually perceived regional neutralisation, whether they

really took the issue seriously or merely taking part due to its attachment to the association.

This condition was made worse by the fact that some of the ASEAN members were still

bound to certain security agreements with the world’s major powers. The last imminent

problem was created by the uncertainty of the major powers’ reaction and policy towards

ASEAN’s decision to establish the ZOPFAN proposal. These states had their own interests in

the Southeast Asian region, thus affecting their policy towards the regional movements.

These four problems hindered any efforts to realise ZOPFAN. Until the end of 1972,

ZOPFAN had not moved any step further than simply being a declaration to enunciate

ASEAN’s voice to the world. As depressing as it might seem, the ASEAN leaders seemed to

find the condition as satisfactory. Even though it was almost impossible to properly realise

the ZOPFAN proposal at the time, the fact that ASEAN had succeeded in establishing a

declaration which enabled them to express their important position in world politics was in

itself considered an achievement.

24

Conclusion: Third World States in World Politics

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the decision making in ASEAN in its policy to

declare Southeast Asia as a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in 1971. Two significant

and interrelated factors served as the basis for the ASEAN member states in their decision to

establish the ZOPFAN proposal.

The first factor was the international and regional security situation at the time. The

shift in US policy towards Asia, the US-PRC rapprochement, and the PRC’s entry to the

United Nations created a new pattern of big powers’ involvement in Southeast Asia. The

ongoing Cold War had come to a point where Southeast Asia was in danger of being used as

pawns by the big powers in their rivalries. This situation might have undesirable

consequences for Southeast Asian states as their fate more or less is defined by the outcome

of the big powers’ interaction.

The second factor was the differing national interests of ASEAN members, which

compelled them to come up with a compromise. A somewhat vague declaration of neutrality

was the result of this compromise, and for the five ASEAN states, it was what they desired. A

vague declaration could open opportunity for various interpretations which meant that no

state was put in the position to sacrifice its national interests for others’. Although this risked

a big problem in the realisation of the proposal, the ASEAN states were satisfied with the

declaration because it was sufficient to enable them to voice their stance in world politics.

This was considered the most important objective at the time.

Thus, the new power pattern in the region forced the ASEAN state members to come

up with a scenario that could best protect regional security. Each state realised that its

security might be in danger if the regional security situation did not improve. At this point,

the ASEAN states decided to collaborate to guard themselves against the worst possible

consequences.

Put in the wider context of the Cold War, this study gives an insight of how the Third

World countries placed themselves within the Cold War theatre. As had been argued by

Gaddis, the “Third World” was created by the tension between the competing poles of

attraction. These states did not fit easily within the “centre-periphery” relationships, due to

the fact there was not a single “centre”. As there was disparity in capabilities between the

“First World” and the “Third World” there was the potential for an imperial rivalry on a

global scale.86 Being the object in dispute, especially after having left their colonial past

86 Gaddis, We Now Know, p. 153-154

25

behind, the Third World states then actually were in a position to choose during the Cold

War. Not only the opportunity to choose, they also to certain degree could take advantage and

even manipulate the big powers because the big powers were competing to embrace them to

join their spheres of influence in order to gain more prestige and hegemony. Hence, the

Americans and their allies could not take these states for granted, while the collapse of

colonialism was also creating new opportunities for Soviet (and then Chinese)

expansionism.87 Having this opportunity to choose, the ASEAN states chose to declare their

region as a “zone of peace, freedom and neutrality”.

Brought into the context of the current era, ASEAN in the post-Cold War era has

endeavoured to maintain and enhance its institutional status in the region, and also

internationally, and at the same time has tried to assume significant responsibilities for

regional security. However, while the issue of ‘asserting regional neutrality’ is out of the

question with the end of competition between superpowers, the international politics of the

Asia Pacific is in fact currently determined by American hegemony. The significance of the

US in the Asia Pacific region can be understood within the framework of hegemonic stability,

which accounts for the need for a hegemonic power to make order and stability/equilibrium

in a region. The distribution of power among states constitutes the principal form of control

in every international system. The dominant state(s) organises and maintains the network of

political, economic, and other relationships within the system and especially in the sphere of

influence.88

In such a condition, the effort to assert regional neutrality is thus replaced by the

effort to limit the hegemony of a superpower upon the region. These are not similar issues,

but not so different in the context of freeing the region from external interference. Just as

ASEAN came up with ZOPFAN in 1971, more recent formulas to place ASEAN in the

driver’s seat for regional security have also been exercised, for example the ASEAN

Regional Forum (ARF). However, ARF’s success still requires the prior existence of a stable

region, which among other prerequisites the existence of a hegemon to guarantee stability.

The involvement of the US in ARF is inevitably determinant in its relevance in Asia Pacific.

Nonetheless, just as ZOPFAN emerged to enable ASEAN to voice their stance in

world politics in the midst of the Cold War, the ARF could also bear the same significance in

the contemporary world politics. ASEAN’s role in promoting the ARF reflected its growing

self-confidence about the relevance of its norms of regional cooperation. Through the ARF, 87 Ibid., p. 154 88 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 29-30.

26

ASEAN may be able to exercise a degree of influence over the Great Power geopolitics, and

even contribute to shape the balance of power by providing norms of restraint and avenues of

confidence building among the regional major powers.89 Indeed, another optimistic formula.

The dynamics in Southeast Asia can also be found in other parts of the world, as the

Third World states struggle to earn a greater role in the international arena, whether through a

regional organisation or individually. With this course of action, Third World states wish to

address the questions of whether they are less accountable for their international actions, and

also whether they have less independence in formulating their foreign policies. Having a

strong stance in world politics is inexorably one of the priorities of foreign policy, and this is

of a greater substance for small states.

89 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia, p. 184

27

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Unpublished Documents from the Public Records Office, London, United Kingdom:

- FCO 15/1375 - FCO 24/ 967 - FCO 24/1269 - FCO 24/1270

Published ASEAN Documents Series, 1967-1985 (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 1985) President Nixon’s Guam Doctrine, July 1969 (As reprinted in Sudershan Chawla et al (Eds.),

Southeast Asia under the New Balance of Power (New York: Praeger, 1974), Appendix Document 7)

Sudibjo (Ed.), Dokumentasi: ASEAN dalam Berita, Harapan dan Kenyataan, 1967-1977

(Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1978) The US-China Communiqué at the Conclusion of President Nixon’s Visit to China, 27

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