private equity and long run investments: the case of ... · • we study changes in r&d and...
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Private Equity and Long Run Investments: The Case of
Innovation
Josh Lerner, Morten Sorensen, and Per Stromberg
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Motivation • We study changes in R&D and innovation for
companies involved in buyout transactions.
• This helps us distinguish two opposing views of buyout transactions: – Buyouts liberate firms from short-term agency
problems arising in public firms (Jensen [1989]). – Buyouts compromise long-term values to extract
short-term rents (Shleifer, Summers [1988]).
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Hypothesis 1: Private Equity investors as long-term investors • Jensen [1989] “The eclipse of the public
corporation” predicts that LBOs will become the dominant corporate organization form: – Superior corporate governance. – Concentrated ownership by active owners. – Strong managerial incentives.
• Impact on innovation: – Facilitate long-run investments that myopic (quarter-
to-quarter) public firms cannot. – Avoid wasteful expenditures of others (Jensen [1993])
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“I realize, gentlemen, that thirty million dollars is a lot of money to spend. However, it’s not real
money and, of course, it’s not our money either.”
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Hypothesis 2: Private Equity investors as short-term investors • Critics suggest different view (Shleifer, Summers
[1988]): – Investors compromise long-term value creation to
enhance short-term performance. • Renege on implicit and explicit obligations to employees and
retirees. – This helps investors “flip” offerings quickly, to pay
large dividends: • Boosts IRR and allow raising new funds sooner, enhancing
fee income. • Implication for innovation is a temptation to defer
expenditures: – These depress current accounting earnings with few
immediate gains.
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What we do • We examine investment in innovation as one
form of long-run investment. • Investment in innovation presents an attractive
testing ground: – Costs must be written off immediately. – Benefits may not be apparent for many years.
• But clearly important to long-term success.
– Systematic, well-understood measures available. • We use patent data to overcome problems with gathering
data for private firms.
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Rationale for study • Growth of private equity industry:
– Larger sample to work with. – Investors now have more operational orientation…
but also more intense competition. • Recently have observed greater representation
of technology transactions. • Patent data allow us to look beyond the “public-
to-private” transactions: – Private-to-private deals may have different features.
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Relevant Literature (1/2) • R&D and capital constraints:
– Greenwald, Salinger and Stiglitz [1991]: “Case studies” of auto and airline industries.
– Hall [1992]: 1247 R&D-performing manufacturing firms.
– Hao and Jaffe [1993]: Panel data on 81 firms in five high-tech industries.
– Himmelberg and Petersen [1994]: Panel data on 179 small high-tech firms.
• Conclusions: – Internal finance availability important for R&D. – Interpretation of pattern is challenging.
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Relevant Literature (2/2) • Hall [1992] considers public-to-private LBOs
during 1980s: – Notes these firms were doing little R&D before
transaction. – 4% of 1982 employment, but 1% of R&D. – Concludes LBO wave unlikely to have much impact
on innovation. • Lichtenberg and Siegel [1990]: 43 whole-firm
LBOs that filled out RD-1 survey – R&D expenditures appear to increase after LBO on
absolute and relative basis. – More likely for R&D to increase for LBO firms than for
matches.
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Data: Transactions (1/4) • Begin with CapitalIQ database:
– Transactions between 1/1/80 and 12/31/05. – Focus on leveraged buyout investments.
• Classified in CIQ as “Going Private,” “JV/LBO,” “LBO,” “Management Participated,” or “MBO.”
• Closed and effective deals. – Supplement with information from Dealogic,
other CapitalIQ databases, Directory of Corporate Affiliations, Hoovers on financial characteristics, previous parents, exits.
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Data: Match to patents (2/4) • Match CIQ data to HBS patent database:
– Contains of all patents awarded through May 2007.
– Assignee names have been cleansed (relative to original USPTO data).
• Identify all LBO targets assigned at least one patent from three years prior to five years after buyout: – Match on name and location.
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Data: Divisional targets (3/4) • If LBO target is a unit of a larger firm,
patents likely to be assigned to parent. • Identify all corporate parents in [-3,+5]
window: – CapitalIQ, Dealogic, DCA, Factiva, Google.
• Identify all patents assigned to parent with same inventor as LBO target.
• This method captures some, but not all, of the relevant parent patents.
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Data: Trimming (4/4) • For CapitalIQ buyouts from 1980 to 2005:
– 496 firms have successful patent applications filed from years -3 to +5 relative to buyout:
• Due to many recent buyouts • Due to “old economy” nature of firms.
– 8,938 patents filed in this window, but >1/4th assigned to Seagate:
• Second largest firm has 4%. • We eliminate Seagate, leaving us with 6,398
awarded patents.
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Investments and Exits by Year
0
10
20
3040
50
60
7080
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
InvestmentsExits
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Patent Applications and Grants
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007
ApplicationsGrants
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Methodology: three measures of innovation • We measure three aspects of innovation:
– Patent quality: • Economic impact. • Basic/fundamental nature.
– Number of patent filings. – Patent portfolio composition.
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Patent quality measures • Citation counts:
– Proxy for economic importance – We use three year window to count citations
• Originality: – One minus Herfindahl of classes of patents
cited by patent. • Generality:
– One minus Herfindahl of classes of patents citing patent.
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Need for benchmark • Citation rates change over time:
– Changing importance. – Changing technology mixture. – Changing propensity to cite overall.
• Use all patents in same USPTO technology class and grant year as control group: – Compute baseline citation rates for these matching
patents. • Similar issues for originality, generality.
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Citations through 3rd Year after Patent Grant For Patents Applied for in Years Relative to Buyout….
Citations -3 to 0
+1 to +5 P-Value
Unadjusted 1.99 2.49 [0.000]
Relative 0.24 0.74 [0.000]
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Multivariate statistical analysis • We use Poisson and Negative Binomial
specifications for citations. • Consider both unadjusted and relative
citation counts. • Use individual year dummies as well as
combined “Post” dummy.
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Amount of patenting • Truncation challenges:
– As-yet unissued patents. – Assignment to corporate parents.
• Responses: – Year and firm fixed effects. – Limiting to observations before 1999. – Limiting to firms with “early” and “late”
patents. • Still, this analysis is less conclusive
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Composition of patent portfolios • Now looking at firm level:
– Does the distribution of areas in which firms pursue innovation change?
– Where is increase in citations taking place?
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Summary of empirical evidence • Patent quality appears to improve
following buyouts: – Not sacrificing originality or generality.
• Amount of patenting is probably not affected: – More challenging analysis, due to data
limitations. • Composition of patent portfolio appears to
focus on the more central technologies.
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Concern #1 • We may be double counting secondary
buyouts: – Same patents may appear both before and
after a transaction. • Repeat analysis, treating these patents
separately: – We count only first transaction. – We delete these patents entirely. – Makes little difference.
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Concern #2 • Are three years sufficient to capture
patents’ citation counts? • Citations are strongly serially correlated:
– Three-year citation count is a good proxy for total citation count.
• We also repeat analysis using 2 and 4 years windows: – Find little or no difference to results.
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Concern #3 • Are differences due to investors “cherry
picking” in divisional buyouts? – Parent company may keep the best patents.
• We repeat analysis excluding divisional deals: – Magnitude of difference in citations increases,
still significant. – Other results unchanged.
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Concern #4 • Results may be due to investors selecting
targets with promising innovation portfolios: – However, most targets are “old economy”
firms where innovation is relatively small part of business potential.
– Pattern shows most of the improvement in years 2-3 following the transactions.
– Selection of targets unlikely to introduce large distortions.
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Wrapping Up • Innovation present a natural testing ground for
understanding motivation of private equity firms. • Our results are consistent with the positive view
of private equity: – We find an increase in innovation quality. – No evidence of decline in fundamental nature of
research. – See a focusing of patent portfolios. – Focusing of awards on high-impact areas.