privatizing commercial diplomacy
DESCRIPTION
EUROPOS SÀJUNGA Europos socialinis fondas. MYKOLO ROMERIO UNIVERSITETAS. Privatizing Commercial Diplomacy. Institutional Innovation at the Domestic-International Frontier. Richard Sherman Assistant Professor of Political Science Leiden University, Faculty of Social Sciences, 2004-now - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
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Privatizing Commercial Diplomacy
Institutional Innovation at the Domestic-International Frontier
EUROPOS SÀJUNGAEuropos socialinis fondas MYKOLO ROMERIO
UNIVERSITETAS
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Who is this person?
Richard Sherman
Assistant Professor of Political Science
Leiden University, Faculty of Social Sciences, 2004-now
Syracuse University, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, 1996-2004
Ph.D., University of Washington, 1996
What I do International Relations Political Economy Empirical Political Science Comparative Politics
Where I publish The World Economy Comparative Political Studies Journal of Conflict Resolution International Interactions Economics Letters Social Science Quarterly International Politics Current Politics and Economics of
Europe
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My research
Intersection of domestic politics and international relations
International trade politics, related economic & regulatory issues
Connections:
The liberal-realist debate: (how) does domestic politics matter?
The “two-level game” idea (Putnam, Milner, Moravcsik)
International regimes & organizations
Political markets vs. political contests
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Privatizing commercial diplomacy
Institutional mechanisms that let private-sector actors:
petition for the initiation of trade disputes
consult formally with government on trade-negotiation agenda issues
attend WTO talks with government officials
negotiate privately (industry-to-industry) on regulatory reform
EU Trade Barriers Regulation US Section 301
US: Private Sector Advisory CommitteesEU: UNICE, WWF, civil-society dialogues
Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue, related organizations
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Institutional innovation
Nihil nove sub sole?
Industry influence on government
Petition processes for trade complaints (anti-dumping, etc.)
Government organizing industry (corporatism)
But...
Formal avenues for industry to influence government on trade negotiations
Market-opening pressure is institutionalized, not only protectionist pressure
International industry groups are being organized by states
Civil-society groups, as well as industry, are given formal access
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Why is this interesting?
The state as a literal agent of interest groups at the international level
Alternative sequencing of actions in two-level games
An open question: can government organize interest groups internationally?
Growing immediacy between domestic politics and international institutions
Normative issues
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Research questions
Positive: What are the factors giving rise to “privatized” commercial diplomacy? Which industries & groups are most active, influential? What explains the pattern of activity & access across groups? What are the differences across institutions and polities?
Normative: Is “the cart leading the horse”? Does the government grant of access exclude some important voices ? Can privatized diplomacy be accommodated within the existing global trade
regime? Do these institutional innovations add legitimacy to the process, or do they
lend ammunition to its critics?
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Quantitative analysis
Qualitative analysis
Research strategy
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Research strategy
Quantitative analysis
Qualitative analysis
• Data set: annual data at industry level, EU and US• Political-economy analysis:
--use industry-level and economy-level factors to explain industry use of TBR and Section 301--compare to corresponding patterns in industry use of protectionist measures (anti-dumping)
• Institutional analysis--compare to broader pattern of WTO disputes
• Cross-polity analysis--compare patterns in US with those in EU
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Research strategy
Quantitative analysis
Qualitative analysis
• Data set: annual data at industry level, EU and US• Political-economy analysis:
--use industry-level and economy-level factors to explain industry use of TBR and Section 301--compare to corresponding patterns in industry use of protectionist measures (anti-dumping)
• Institutional analysis--compare to broader pattern of WTO disputes
• Cross-polity analysis--compare patterns in US with those in EU
• Interviews and analysis of documents• Information / opinion from industry,
government, and civil-society groups• Emphases:
--implementation and politics / process--extent of business-government cooperation--connection to global trade regime--normative questions
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Conclusions
The petition processes are relatively successful still, government might be more enthusiastic than industry
“International corporatism” has proved difficult Civil-society groups are reluctant to become involved in state-organized consultation The petition processes are likely to attract “difficult” cases
It is more striking, then, that they are relatively successful Explaining origins:
institutional causes political/electoral causes hegemony/state-power causes
Normative issues: “nuisance” disputes are perhaps less likely under privatized diplomacy petition processes provide a relatively immediate path to disputes against unauthorized
retaliatory measures Privatized diplomacy provides a documented record of state-industry interaction