probabilistic analysis of safe return to port (public version)
TRANSCRIPT
Probabilistic Analysis of Systems Availability
Designing Ships for Post-Damage Return to Port
Safe Return To Port• Ship abandonment is a very dangerous
undertaking. There is a broad category of accidents for which it is safer to stay within the ship in the wake of the accident than abandoning her in lifeboats.
• In such cases ships must return to a nearby port to offload her occupants. This return journey must, despite the damages, satisfy some basic minimum conditions in order to be safely viable.
Functionality Critical to Safe Return to Port
• Habitability : The ability of the ship to ensure health and safety of her occupants.
• Propulsion and Steering : The ability of the ship to travel to one of the nearest ports for offloading.
Conditions for Viable Return to Port
• A large ship has to serve as a (temporarily) self-sufficient microcosm of urban settlements in terms of facilities such as fresh-water supply, food supply, illumination, sewage, air conditioning, waste treatment, communication, fire safety services, emergency medical provisions etc.
• Most of these provisions are critically important for people to live in the ship an extended period of time.
A Natural Next Step from Index-A
• Index-A : Probability of post-damage sustenance of stability.
In addition we could target higher degrees of robustness through a similar approach to other functions besides ‘stability’.
• Index-X : Probability of post-damage sustenance of X.
X could be functions such as habitability, propulsion, steering.
Dependency Tree Based AnalysisThe dependency tree for a system represents a Boolean
expression describing whether the system can function properly based on the condition (``failure'' or ``working'') of its components and dependencies.
Here the systems don’t necessarily refer to tangible machinery or equipment – they can be functions or facilities.
The high level functionality is expressed in terms of their dependency on their sub-functions or sub-systems.
Dependency Model for Safe Return to Port
“Safe return to port” would be the top level function, and hence the root of the tree.
The leaves of the tree would be localized subsystems or machinery components.
Increasing Level of Detail
High Level Functionality
Localized Subsystems
Dependency Notation (the negated form of usual fault trees)
Z works if all of A,B and C work.
A
B
C
A
B
C
Z
Z works if of A or B or C works.
B
C
Z
A
Z works if A works and, B or C works.
Z
Locality of SystemsBelow a certain level of detail, systems and sub-systems
are localized, i.e. they are located in a confined region onboard the ship.
Several high level systems and functions are not localized – they have their components spread out widely across the ship.
In order to associate systems with damage cases, it is necessary to reason about their location in the shipboard environment. The damages are expressed in terms of subdivisions of the shipboard space. This is addressed by the spatial data model of Helios.
Damage CasesThe damage cases defined for probabilistic damage stability are the
damage cases considered for probabilistic analysis of safe return to port. Maybe the non-survivable cases could be excluded because they render return-to-port irrelevant.
If p(i) is the probability of the i-th damage case, and g(F,i) is a function that takes the value 1 if the functionality F fails in the i-th damage case and takes the value zero otherwise.
Then we can define a probabilistic failure index for that functionality as follows:
idx(F)=
N
i
N
i
ip
iFgip
1
1
)(
),()( [as Proposed for simplicity, but the expression could be slightly different if Monte-Carlo trials are used to accommodate probabilistic failure rates for flooded systems]
Towards Computing the Probabilistic Index
As to what will be the exact mathematical formulation for the index may be decided at a later stage, but to start with we must devise the technology for evaluation of system availability vis-à-vis damage situations.
We would need a computing tool that allows (i) modelling of the ship systems and their inter-dependence, (ii) modelling of damage cases and their probabilities and (iii) calculate availability of systems and functions relevant to “return to port” for each damage case.
An extension of our simulation tool viz. Helios has been developed to address the above. It allows both the modelling and analysis tasks involving ship systems and damage cases.
The Modelling Task
Produce a labelled drawing showing the subdivisions along with their names as labels.
Hull surface (in IGES or any other surface format is nice to have.
Loading the 3d Subdivision in Helios
The drawing is automatically converted into a 3D spatial database faithfully representing the subdivisions and located objects.
Interactive 3d interface is available for grouping of spaces, if necessary.
The hull or superstructure does not play a role in the computation involved in this analysis but may be used for virtual reality look-and-feel.
Placement of SystemsSystems can be placed on the spatial subdivision model by mouse clicks.
They may be moved around, renamed or deleted interactively.
All such interactive operations are recorded in a journal file for inclusion in the model file.
One can also assign the probability of failure of a system in the event of its space being flooded. This is 1.0 by default but may be 0.0 or any other value for sealed systems.
Specification of System Functionality and Interdependence
Interdependence of systems can be entered by mouse clicks.
Simple and/or dependencies can be specified only using mouse clicks ( e.g. Select n systems, and click the and-dependency hyperlink, this specifies the first selected system to be dependent on all of the rest of the selected system through an and node.
More complicated dependencies may be typed in easily, e.g.
{& A {| B C}} represents the following tree branch :
B
C
A
The dependencies may also be scripted as follows:
declareDependency Z {& A {| B C}}
Systems may be declared as non-local, by which they are not directly damaged by the location of their graphic avatar in a damaged compartment.
Description of Damage Cases
Damage cases as used for index-A calculation may be used directly.
Since “return to port” is relevant to survivable damages, severe damage cases may be excluded.
Probability Case ID Rooms Flooded
The Required Information Model
R7002
3D Subdivision/GA
Systems Dependency and Location
Room Names
Damage Cases
B
C
A
Graphic User Interface : Just another Helios Input Page
Display of Model Structure and Results
•The dependency graph and its expanded form is visualized and interactively manipulated.
•Results are displayed on the 3d viewer and dependency graph viewer.
•Numerical results are also saved in an Excel file for post-processing.
The Algorithm used for Availability Calculation
The dependency expressions are syntactically expanded as much as possible. That is :
If A refers to {| B {& P Q}}, B refers to {& R Q} and Q refers to {| M N} then A would be expanded into
{| {& R {| M N}} {& P {| M N}}, assuming M,N,P,R are leaf level components. The failures are also translated into such expanded expressions. For example
the failure of Q becomes the expression {~ {| M N}}.
Binary decision diagrams (BDDs) are made out of such expanded expressions, where the leaf level systems represent independent Boolean variables. System expressions are composed by conjunction (i.e. &-node) with failure expressions to give BDDs representing the state of the systems.
Satisfiability of such a BDD for a system is equivalent to the propositional value that it can work. Satisfiability problem for a BDD is a simple vertex reachability problem which has been implemented within our system.
Binary Decision DiagramBased on the idea of Shannon expansion i.e. the following expansion:
f(X1,X2,...,Xn) = X1f(1,X2,...,Xn) + X1'f(0,X2,...,Xn) followed by the expansion for two variables, and noting that expansion can be continued for any number of variables.
Shanon expansion leads to a tree structure which can be folded into a DAG by eliminating duplicate sub-expressions. Whether folded or not, “SATISFIABILITY” of the original expression is equivalent to “REACHABILITY” on this graph. The general problem itself is NP-hard (i.e. there is no guarantee of efficient solution yet), but BDDs are “usually” efficient for most expressions.
f(x1, x2, x3) = -x1 * -x2 * -x3 + x1 * x2 + x2 * x3
References• Fault Tree Handbook For Aerospace Applications: Dr. Michael
Stamatelatos, NASA HQ, OSMA, Dr. William Vesely, SAIC, Report prepared for NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC 20546, August, 2002
• Graph Based Algorithms for Boolean Function Manipulation, Randal Bryant, IEEE Transactions on Computers, C-35-8, pp. 677-691, August, 1986
• Fault Tree Analysis and Binary Decision Diagrams, R. Sinnamon and J. Andreas, Proceedings of the Reliability and Maintainability Symposium, January 1996, pp 215-222.
• New Algorithms for Fault Tree Analysis, A. Rauzy, Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Vol. 40, 1993, pp 203-211.
• The Synthesis of Two-Terminal Switching Circuits, Claude Shannon, Bell System Technical Journal, vol.28, pp.59-98
System Availability Analysis of [Name Witheld]
• We have received a large dataset of drawings and documents and are currently in the process of interpreting the data.
• There was an initial phase of difficulty with
interpreting the data, it has been addressed by collection of data from the site.
• Systems availability analysis has been carried out with the collected data.
Data Collection
[Name Witheld] went to [Name Witheld] and collected data on the systems locations and inter-dependence.
He came back with a 880 node dependency tree involving 100 sub-systems of steering and propulsion.
Progress on [Name Witheld]• The ship subdivision and the damage cases have been
modelled for the availability analysis tool.
• Some ambiguities in the subdivision labels have bee resolved in consultation with Tony.
• A new feature of propagating damage along “compartment connections” was necessary for modelling the damage cases of [Name Witheld].
• Availability analysis has been performed for the propulsion+steering systems onboard [Name Witheld].
• Systems spanning multiple rooms is supported.
Damage Cases for [Name Witheld]
560 damage cases have been modelled
657 three-dimensional sub-divisions have been modelled.
Probabilistic Analysis of Propulsion and Steering
100 systems and functions were defined along with their dependencies.
Dependency Tree
Dependency Graph
and Systems Placement
Constructed from Data
Collected Onsite
Individual and Aggregated Damage Cases
Effect of individual damage cases can be studied.
Aggregated distribution of damage cases can be used as a design aid.
Bayesian analysis for probabilistic quantification criticality of components is being investigated.
Systems Placement MethodSystem placement can be made according to damage probability distributions (joint distributions over space pairs).
Results (1/14)
% of damage cases that lead to failure to return to port
for each damage category defined by the number of damage compartments
% Cases of Failure to Return to Port
0.0010.0020.0030.0040.0050.0060.0070.0080.00
1 co
mpartm
ent d
amag
e
1 to
2 co
mpa
rtmen
t dam
age
2 co
mpartm
ent d
amag
e
1 to
3 co
mpa
rtmen
t dam
age
2 to
3 co
mpa
rtmen
t dam
age
3 co
mpartm
ent d
amag
e
1 to
4 co
mpa
rtmen
t dam
age
2 to
4 co
mpa
rtmen
t dam
age
3 to
4 co
mpa
rtmen
t dam
age
4 co
mpartm
ent d
amag
e
Damage Case Category
Fa
ilure
in %
-ag
e o
f c
as
es
Results (2/14)
Probability of Failure to Return to Port
0.00000.05000.10000.15000.20000.25000.30000.35000.40000.45000.5000
1 compartmentdamage
2 compartmentdamage
All SOLAS 2009damage
Damage Case Category
Pro
ba
bili
ty o
f F
ailu
re
Probability of Steering System Failure
0.0000
0.0200
0.0400
0.0600
0.0800
0.1000
0.1200
0.1400
0.1600
1 compartment damage 2 compartment damage All SOLAS 2009damage
Damage Case Category
Pro
ba
bili
ty o
f F
ailu
re
Probability of failure to return to port for three significant damage categories, and probability of failure of the two main sub-functions thereof, viz. Propulsion and Steering.
Probability of Propulsion Failure
0.0000
0.0500
0.1000
0.1500
0.2000
0.2500
0.3000
0.3500
0.4000
1 compartmentdamage
2 compartmentdamage
All SOLAS 2009damage
Damage Case Category
Pro
ba
bili
ty o
f F
ailu
re
Results (3/14) : RTP Failure Probability for All Solas 2009 cases Failure Probability : All Systems
Systems/Functions
_Return_To_Port_
Port_Propeller
Prop_Shaft_P
Propeller_Pitch_Control_P
Prop_Shaft_S
Propeller_Pitch_Control_S
Propulsion_System
Starboard_Propeller
Cooling_Water_System_P
Engine_Driven_Pump_P
Gearbox_P
Hydraulic_Control_P
Lube_Oil_System_P
Main_Engine_3_P
Main_Engine_4_P
Prelube_Pump_P
Pumps_Engine_Heat_Exchangers_P
SW_Cooling_System_P
SW_Heat_Exchangers_P
Booster_Pumps_S
Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_S
AE_3_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P
AE_4_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P
Main_Switchboard_P
AE_1_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S
Cooling_Water_System_S
Engine_Driven_Pump_S
Gearbox_S
Hydraulic_Control_S
LO_Transfer_Pump_P
LO_Transfer_Pump_S
Lube_Oil_System_S
Main_Engine_1_S
Main_Engine_2_S
Main_Switchboard
Main_Switchboard_S
Prelube_Pump_S
Pumps_Engine_Heat_Exchangers_S
SW_Cooling_System_S
SW_Heat_Exchangers_S
AE_2_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S
HFO_Heating_Boiler_S
HFO_Heating_Boiler_P
AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_S
Port_Rudder_P
Rudder_Stock_P
Rudder_Stock_S
Starboard_Rudder_S
Steering_System
Service_Tank_S
AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_P
Fuel_System
Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_P
Service_Tank_P
FW_Cooling_S
Pneumatic_Fuel_Pump_Blackout_Pump_S
LO_Tank
Air_System_Control_P
Engine_Casing_P
Exhaust_Systems_P
Engine_Casing_S
Exhaust_Systems_S
Gearbox_Lubrication_P
Gearbox_Lubrication_S
Heat_Exchangers_S
ME_Room_Reservoir_S
Self_Contained_Lubricating_Oil_System_P
Self_Contained_Lubricating_Oil_System_S
AE_Room_Reservoir_P
Emergency_Closing_Control
Pro
babi
lity
0
0.2
0.4
Results (4/14) : Propulsion Failure Probability for All Solas 2009 cases Failure Probability : Propulsion Systems
Systems/Functions
Port_Propeller
Prop_Shaft_P
Propeller_Pitch_Control_P
Prop_Shaft_S
Propeller_Pitch_Control_S
Propulsion_System
Starboard_Propeller
Cooling_Water_System_P
Engine_Driven_Pum
p_P
Gearbox_P
Hydraulic_Control_P
Lube_Oil_System
_PMain_Engine_3_P
Main_Engine_4_P
Prelube_Pump_P
Pumps_Engine_Heat_Exchangers_P
SW_Cooling_System
_PSW
_Heat_Exchangers_P
Booster_Pumps_S
Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_S
AE_3_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P
AE_4_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P
Main_Sw
itchboard_P
AE_1_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S
Cooling_Water_System_S
Engine_Driven_Pum
p_S
Gearbox_S
Hydraulic_Control_S
LO_Transfer_Pump_P
LO_Transfer_Pump_S
Lube_Oil_System
_SMain_Engine_1_S
Main_Engine_2_S
Main_Sw
itchboard
Main_Sw
itchboard_S
Prelube_Pump_S
Pumps_Engine_Heat_Exchangers_S
SW_Cooling_System
_SSW
_Heat_Exchangers_S
AE_2_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S
HFO
_Heating_Boiler_S
HFO
_Heating_Boiler_P
AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_S
Service_Tank_S
AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_P
Fuel_System
Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_P
Service_Tank_P
FW_Cooling_S
Pneumatic_Fuel_Pump_Blackout_Pum
p_S
LO_Tank
Air_System
_Control_P
Engine_Casing_P
Exhaust_System
s_P
Engine_Casing_S
Exhaust_System
s_S
Gearbox_Lubrication_P
Gearbox_Lubrication_S
Heat_Exchangers_S
ME_Room_Reservoir_S
Pro
babi
lity
0
0.2
0.4
Results (5/14) : Steering Failure Probability for all Solas 2009 cases Failure Probability : Steering Systems
Systems/Functions
Booster_Pumps_S
AE_3_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P
AE_4_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P
Main_Switchboard_P
AE_1_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S
Main_Switchboard
Main_Switchboard_S
AE_2_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S
HFO_Heating_Boiler_S
HFO_Heating_Boiler_P
AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_S
Port_Rudder_P
Rudder_Stock_P
Rudder_Stock_S
Starboard_Rudder_S
Steering_System
Service_Tank_S
AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_P
Service_Tank_P
FW_Cooling_S
Pneumatic_Fuel_Pump_Blackout_Pump_S
Heat_Exchangers_S
ME_Room_Reservoir_S
AE_Room_Reservoir_P
Booster_Pumps_P
HFO_Storage_Tanks
Emergency_Steering_S
Hydraulic_Pumps_P
Hydraulic_Pumps_S
Steering_Gear_P
Steering_Gear_S
AE_Control_System
ECR
Working_Air_System_Service_Air
Bridge
Control_System
Em_Gen_Fuel_Tank
Em_Gen_PumpsControl_System
Emergency_Generator
Emergency_Switchboard
Pro
babi
lity
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Results (6/14) : Common Systems for all Solas 2009 cases Failure Probability : Shared Systems
Systems/Functions
Booster_Pumps_S
AE_3_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P
AE_4_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P
Main_Sw
itchboard_P
AE_1_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S
Main_Sw
itchboard
Main_Sw
itchboard_S
AE_2_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S
HFO
_Heating_Boiler_S
HFO
_Heating_Boiler_P
AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_S
Service_Tank_S
AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_P
Service_Tank_P
FW_Cooling_S
Pneumatic_Fuel_Pump_Blackout_Pum
p_S
Heat_Exchangers_S
ME_Room_Reservoir_S
AE_Room_Reservoir_P
Booster_Pumps_P
HFO
_Storage_Tanks
AE_Control_System
ECR
Working_Air_System
_Service_Air
Bridge
Em_Gen_Fuel_Tank
Em_Gen_Pum
psControl_System
Emergency_Generator
Emergency_Sw
itchboard
Pro
babi
lity
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Results (7/14) : RTP Failure Probability for All 1 CMPT cases Failure Probability : All Systems
Systems/Functions
_Return_To_Port_
Port_Propeller
Prop_Shaft_P
Propeller_Pitch_Control_P
Prop_Shaft_S
Propeller_Pitch_Control_S
Propulsion_System
Starboard_Propeller
Cooling_Water_System_P
Engine_Driven_Pum
p_P
Gearbox_P
Hydraulic_Control_P
Lube_Oil_System
_PMain_Engine_3_P
Main_Engine_4_P
Prelube_Pump_P
Pumps_Engine_Heat_Exchangers_P
SW_Cooling_System
_PSW
_Heat_Exchangers_P
Booster_Pumps_S
Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_S
AE_3_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P
AE_4_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P
Main_Sw
itchboard_P
Port_Rudder_P
Rudder_Stock_P
Rudder_Stock_S
Starboard_Rudder_S
Steering_System
AE_1_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S
Cooling_Water_System_S
Engine_Driven_Pum
p_S
Gearbox_S
Hydraulic_Control_S
LO_Transfer_Pump_P
LO_Transfer_Pump_S
Lube_Oil_System
_SMain_Engine_1_S
Main_Engine_2_S
Main_Sw
itchboard
Main_Sw
itchboard_S
Prelube_Pump_S
Pumps_Engine_Heat_Exchangers_S
SW_Cooling_System
_SSW
_Heat_Exchangers_S
AE_2_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S
HFO
_Heating_Boiler_S
HFO
_Heating_Boiler_P
FW_Cooling_S
AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_S
Service_Tank_S
AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_P
Fuel_System
Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_P
Service_Tank_P
LO_Tank
Emergency_Steering_S
Hydraulic_Pum
ps_P
Hydraulic_Pum
ps_S
Steering_Gear_P
Steering_Gear_S
Air_System
_Control_P
Engine_Casing_P
Engine_Casing_S
Exhaust_System
s_P
Exhaust_System
s_S
Gearbox_Lubrication_P
Gearbox_Lubrication_S
Heat_Exchangers_S
ME_Room_Reservoir_S
Pro
babi
lity
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Results (8/14) : Propulsion Failure Probability for 1 CMPT cases Failure Probability : Propulsion Systems
Systems/Functions
Port_Propeller
Prop_Shaft_P
Propeller_Pitch_Control_P
Prop_Shaft_S
Propeller_Pitch_Control_S
Propulsion_System
Starboard_Propeller
Cooling_Water_System_P
Engine_Driven_Pump_P
Gearbox_P
Hydraulic_Control_P
Lube_Oil_System_P
Main_Engine_3_P
Main_Engine_4_P
Prelube_Pump_P
Pumps_Engine_Heat_Exchangers_P
SW_Cooling_System_P
SW_Heat_Exchangers_P
Booster_Pumps_S
Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_S
AE_3_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P
AE_4_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P
Main_Switchboard_P
AE_1_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S
Cooling_Water_System_S
Engine_Driven_Pump_S
Gearbox_S
Hydraulic_Control_S
LO_Transfer_Pump_P
LO_Transfer_Pump_S
Lube_Oil_System_S
Main_Engine_1_S
Main_Engine_2_S
Main_Switchboard
Main_Switchboard_S
Prelube_Pump_S
Pumps_Engine_Heat_Exchangers_S
SW_Cooling_System_S
SW_Heat_Exchangers_S
AE_2_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S
HFO_Heating_Boiler_S
HFO_Heating_Boiler_P
FW_Cooling_S
AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_S
Service_Tank_S
AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_P
Fuel_System
Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_P
Service_Tank_P
LO_Tank
Air_System_Control_P
Engine_Casing_P
Engine_Casing_S
Exhaust_Systems_P
Exhaust_Systems_S
Gearbox_Lubrication_P
Gearbox_Lubrication_S
Heat_Exchangers_S
ME_Room_Reservoir_S
Self_Contained_Lubricating_Oil_System_P
Pro
babi
lity
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Results (9/14) : Steering Failure Probability for all 1 CMPT cases Failure Probability : Steering Systems
Systems/Functions
Booster_Pumps_S
AE_3_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P
AE_4_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P
Main_Switchboard_P
Port_Rudder_P
Rudder_Stock_P
Rudder_Stock_S
Starboard_Rudder_S
Steering_System
AE_1_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S
Main_Switchboard
Main_Switchboard_S
AE_2_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S
HFO_Heating_Boiler_S
HFO_Heating_Boiler_P
FW_Cooling_S
AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_S
Service_Tank_S
AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_P
Service_Tank_P
Emergency_Steering_S
Hydraulic_Pumps_P
Hydraulic_Pumps_S
Steering_Gear_P
Steering_Gear_S
Heat_Exchangers_S
ME_Room_Reservoir_S
Pneumatic_Fuel_Pump_Blackout_Pump_S
HFO_Storage_Tanks
Booster_Pumps_P
AE_Room_Reservoir_P
AE_Control_System
ECR
Working_Air_System_Service_Air
Bridge
Control_System
Em_Gen_Fuel_Tank
Em_Gen_PumpsControl_System
Emergency_Generator
Emergency_Switchboard
Pro
babi
lity
0
0.1
0.2
Results (10/14) : Common Systems for all 1 CMPT cases Failure Probability : Shared Systems
Systems/Functions
Booster_Pumps_S
AE_3_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P
AE_4_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P
Main_Switchboard_P
AE_1_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S
Main_Switchboard
Main_Switchboard_S
AE_2_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S
HFO_Heating_Boiler_S
HFO_Heating_Boiler_P
FW_Cooling_S
AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_S
Service_Tank_S
AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_P
Service_Tank_P
Heat_Exchangers_S
ME_Room_Reservoir_S
Pneumatic_Fuel_Pump_Blackout_Pump_S
HFO_Storage_Tanks
Booster_Pumps_P
AE_Room_Reservoir_P
AE_Control_System
ECR
Working_Air_System_Service_Air
Bridge
Em_Gen_Fuel_Tank
Em_Gen_PumpsControl_System
Emergency_Generator
Emergency_Switchboard
Pro
babi
lity
0
0.1
0.2
Results (11/14) : RTP Failure Probability for All 2 CMPT cases Failure Probability : All Systems
Systems/Functions
Port_Propeller
Prop_Shaft_P
Propeller_Pitch_Control_P
_Return_To_Port_
Cooling_Water_System_P
Engine_Driven_Pum
p_P
Gearbox_P
Hydraulic_Control_P
Lube_Oil_System
_PMain_Engine_3_P
Main_Engine_4_P
Prelube_Pump_P
Pumps_Engine_Heat_Exchangers_P
SW_Cooling_System
_PSW
_Heat_Exchangers_P
Prop_Shaft_S
Propeller_Pitch_Control_S
Propulsion_System
Starboard_Propeller
Booster_Pumps_S
Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_S
AE_3_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P
AE_4_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P
Main_Sw
itchboard_P
AE_1_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S
Cooling_Water_System_S
Engine_Driven_Pum
p_S
Gearbox_S
Hydraulic_Control_S
LO_Transfer_Pump_P
LO_Transfer_Pump_S
Lube_Oil_System
_SMain_Engine_1_S
Main_Engine_2_S
Main_Sw
itchboard
Main_Sw
itchboard_S
Prelube_Pump_S
Pumps_Engine_Heat_Exchangers_S
SW_Cooling_System
_SSW
_Heat_Exchangers_S
AE_2_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S
HFO
_Heating_Boiler_S
HFO
_Heating_Boiler_P
AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_S
FW_Cooling_S
Service_Tank_S
AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_P
Fuel_System
Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_P
Service_Tank_P
LO_Tank
Air_System
_Control_P
Engine_Casing_P
Engine_Casing_S
Exhaust_System
s_P
Exhaust_System
s_S
Gearbox_Lubrication_P
Gearbox_Lubrication_S
Heat_Exchangers_S
ME_Room_Reservoir_S
Self_Contained_Lubricating_Oil_System
_PSelf_Contained_Lubricating_Oil_System
_SPneumatic_Fuel_Pump_Blackout_Pum
p_S
Emergency_Closing_Control
AE_Room_Reservoir_P
HFO
_Storage_Tanks
Port_Rudder_P
Rudder_Stock_P
Rudder_Stock_S
Starboard_Rudder_S
Pro
babi
lity
0
0.2
0.4
Results (12/14) : Propulsion Failure Probability for 2 CMPT cases Failure Probability : Propulsion Systems
Systems/Functions
Port_Propeller
Prop_Shaft_P
Propeller_Pitch_Control_P
Cooling_Water_System_P
Engine_Driven_Pum
p_P
Gearbox_P
Hydraulic_Control_P
Lube_Oil_System
_PMain_Engine_3_P
Main_Engine_4_P
Prelube_Pump_P
Pumps_Engine_Heat_Exchangers_P
SW_Cooling_System
_PSW
_Heat_Exchangers_P
Prop_Shaft_S
Propeller_Pitch_Control_S
Propulsion_System
Starboard_Propeller
Booster_Pumps_S
Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_S
AE_3_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P
AE_4_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P
Main_Sw
itchboard_P
AE_1_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S
Cooling_Water_System_S
Engine_Driven_Pum
p_S
Gearbox_S
Hydraulic_Control_S
LO_Transfer_Pump_P
LO_Transfer_Pump_S
Lube_Oil_System
_SMain_Engine_1_S
Main_Engine_2_S
Main_Sw
itchboard
Main_Sw
itchboard_S
Prelube_Pump_S
Pumps_Engine_Heat_Exchangers_S
SW_Cooling_System
_SSW
_Heat_Exchangers_S
AE_2_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S
HFO
_Heating_Boiler_S
HFO
_Heating_Boiler_P
AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_S
FW_Cooling_S
Service_Tank_S
AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_P
Fuel_System
Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_P
Service_Tank_P
LO_Tank
Air_System
_Control_P
Engine_Casing_P
Engine_Casing_S
Exhaust_System
s_P
Exhaust_System
s_S
Gearbox_Lubrication_P
Gearbox_Lubrication_S
Heat_Exchangers_S
ME_Room_Reservoir_S
Self_Contained_Lubricating_Oil_System
_P
Pro
babi
lity
0
0.2
0.4
Results (13/14) : Steering Failure Probability for all 2 CMPT cases Failure Probability : Steering Systems
Systems/Functions
Booster_Pumps_S
AE_3_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P
AE_4_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P
Main_Switchboard_P
AE_1_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S
Main_Switchboard
Main_Switchboard_S
AE_2_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S
HFO_Heating_Boiler_S
HFO_Heating_Boiler_P
AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_S
FW_Cooling_S
Service_Tank_S
AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_P
Service_Tank_P
Heat_Exchangers_S
ME_Room_Reservoir_S
Pneumatic_Fuel_Pump_Blackout_Pump_S
AE_Room_Reservoir_P
HFO_Storage_Tanks
Port_Rudder_P
Rudder_Stock_P
Rudder_Stock_S
Starboard_Rudder_S
Steering_System
Booster_Pumps_P
AE_Control_System
ECR
Working_Air_System_Service_Air
Emergency_Steering_S
Hydraulic_Pumps_P
Hydraulic_Pumps_S
Steering_Gear_P
Steering_Gear_S
Bridge
Control_System
Em_Gen_Fuel_Tank
Em_Gen_PumpsControl_System
Emergency_Generator
Emergency_Switchboard
Pro
babi
lity
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Results (14/14) : Common Systems for all 2 CMPT cases Failure Probability : Shared Systems
Systems/Functions
Booster_Pumps_S
AE_3_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P
AE_4_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P
Main_Sw
itchboard_P
AE_1_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S
Main_Sw
itchboard
Main_Sw
itchboard_S
AE_2_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S
HFO
_Heating_Boiler_S
HFO
_Heating_Boiler_P
AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_S
FW_Cooling_S
Service_Tank_S
AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_P
Service_Tank_P
Heat_Exchangers_S
ME_Room_Reservoir_S
Pneumatic_Fuel_Pump_Blackout_Pum
p_S
AE_Room_Reservoir_P
HFO
_Storage_Tanks
Booster_Pumps_P
AE_Control_System
ECR
Working_Air_System
_Service_Air
Bridge
Em_Gen_Fuel_Tank
Em_Gen_Pum
psControl_System
Emergency_Generator
Emergency_Sw
itchboard
Pro
babi
lity
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Further Development• The development team has been extended to
develop a high quality visualisation and high-usability user interface for systems availability analysis. [Name Witheld] has been assigned to develop the new user interface for this tool.
• The following few slides give a few glimpses of this development.
• This tool will serve to make the systems availability analysis accessible to a wider audience – (e.g. so that it could be used by operational personnel to learn about criticality in the systems).
Dedicated Tool For Systems Availability Analysis
Systems and their Dependency are Marked by Line Diagrams
New Tool for Systems Availability Analysis
Systems can be placed and their connections routed in the 3D subdivision model of the ship.
Currently the data connection is set up using XML communication with helios.
Eventually it will be independent of helios.
Future Directions • This system would allow
block diagram method of modelling of system dependencies.
• This tool would also be used for coupling systems failure with flooding and fire models (similar to the way passenger evacuation is dynamically coupled with flooding and fire models).
• This line of development was initiated quite recently, we are expecting this to be a very efficacious design tool.
Thank You