Journal of Criminal Justice, Vol. 4, PP. 9-16 (1976). Pergamon Press. Printed in U.S.A.

PROBABLE CAUSES FOR POLICE CORRUPTION: SOME THEORIES

MARK POGREBIN

Assistant Professor, School of Criminology

BURTON ATKINS

Associate Professor, Department of Government

Florida State University

Tallahassee. Florida 32306

ABSTRACT

Theories and explanations of police corruption presented in recent social science literature are reviewed to develop a conceptual framework for future study of the problem. Theories of corruption due to individual failings, organizational deviance, cynicism, lack of deterrence, and the lack of consensus on victimless crimes and their effects, are discussed.

In the past few years there has been renewed interest by social scientists in the sources and consequences of police misconduct, corruption, discretion, and discrimination in law enforcement. Much of the impetus in this area stems from publicity exposing police corruption in such cities as Chicago, Indianapolis, Cleveland, Houston, and Denver (Time, 1974). Two metropolises, New York and Philadelphia, have been the source of commission reports that have concluded that

illegal police activity is widespread and has been institutionalized in the routines within several of these departments. Nor are small cities apparently immune from police corruption: Newburgh, a city of 50,000 upstate from New York City, found itself the center of an organized theft ring operated by the local police department. Thus, while larger metropolitan areas may engender greater corruption as a result of dispersion of control and authority, they do not hold a monopoly over illegal police conduct.

Corruption itself, regardless of the political institution participating, functions to undermine citizens’ perception of government. Police corruption is a particularly troublesome problem in that those sworn to enforce the law are themselves participating in illegal ventures. Because of the effect of police corruption on the legal system and its significance as a political problem, many theories and hypotheses have been advanced in recent years that purport to explain it. This paper examines some of the explanations for police corruption that have emerged in social science

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10 MARKPOGREBINANDBURTON.~TKINS

literature. While we do not intend to offer any new data. periodic reviews of literature do aid in allowing us to sort out conceptual problems associated with explaining and understanding phenomena like police corruption. For the purposes of this review we shall adopt Roebuck and Barker’s (1974) definition of police corruption in which they encompass ‘*. .any type of proscribed behavior engaged in by a law enforcement officer who receives or expects to receive. by virtue of his official position. an actual or potential unauthorized material reward or gain.” Although there are many other ways in which police misuse or misrepresent their official role. i.e.. not issuing traffic citations to acquaintances, we will only be utilizing the term corruption when it involves a monetary transaction for profit.

individual Causes of Corruption

In examining the major causes of police criminal behavior. the Chicago Crime Commission placed an emphasis on the type of police officer on the force. The commission concluded that

poor recruitment methods permitted many men to enter the department who were not suited for law enforcement work. The commission recommended that all police candidates be subjected to a complete character investigation (Peterson, 1960). This explanation implies that corrupt activities stem from the low moral caliber of certain police recruits. It suggests further that corruption could possibly be avoided if recruiting methods were sufficiently rigorous so that individuals prone

corruption could be detected and kept off the force. In a similar vein, Goldstein (1970) argues that a major cause of police corruption is the

individual officer’s misuse of authority in a manner designed to gain monetary compensation for selfish ends. This individualistic explanation of police corruption also places the responsibility for the misuse of authority on the particular officer’s character. According to this school of thought. commonly known as the “rotten-apple theory,” the policeman seemingly “chooses” to involve himself in corrupt activities. But like the analogous free-will explanation of criminal behavior. this theory largely ignores the organizational social structure of police departments which may establish the norms and role expectations that permit corruption to flourish.

Until recently the “rotten-apple theory” was usually advanced by police officials as the most important explanation of police involvement in illegal activities. This theory, which obviously seeks to protect the organization from blame, suggests that the individual policemen were swayed from the path of honest law enforcement and thus the force itself is excused from responsibility. Wilson (1970:393) suggests, however, that the “rotten-apple theory” is inadequate because it does not explain the frequency of police misconduct in large cities. In fact, to entertain this theory requires the admission that police recruitment practices have been a total failure. an admission not likely forthcoming from police departments. Indeed. Burnham (1972: 14- 16) has argued that if one wants to explain police misconduct in terms of apples, then perhaps the barrel itself needs to be examined, not just the individual apples. He, like Wilson. suggests that police corruption should be .viewed as failure of the criminal justice system and not as a flaw in the character of a few wayward policemen.

Structural Explanation of Police Corruption

Roebuck and Barker (1974:425) present a structural explanation for police corruption. They claim that. .“police corruption is best understood not as the exclusive deviance of individual officers. but as group behavior guided by contradictory sets of norms linked to the organization to which the erring individuals belong, i.e., organizational deviance.” In short, Roebuck and Barker

Probable Causes for Police Corruption: Some Theories II

are alluding to the existence of a police subculture where deviant means and practices are often

considered as normative police behavior. The subculture theory of police deviancy is based on the proposition that organizational

deviance is institutionalized and accepted to some degree within almost all police departments. Stoddard (1968) found that rookie patrolmen are socialized into the police subculture and learn from the more experienced officers to become deviant in many aspects of the job. He concludes that the police subculture is self-perpetuating, and eventually all police are subject to its values to a greater or lesser degree. Reiss (197 1: 170) found that police officers are more prone to accept illegal exchanges when such activities are accepted as an institutionalized and legitimated part of the police organization and subculture. Moreover, when an officer’s commitment to justice is not confirmed by the legal system, or his moral commitments to the job are not sustained by his peers or the public. he tends to lessen his moral commitments and, at this point in his police career. subcultural norms predominate. The officer who has lessened his commitment to justice usually

finds a sympathetic peer group within the organizational subculture. This results in the reinforcement of deviant values which often lend themselves to corrupt practices.

Secrecy, claims Westley (1970: 130), is the most vital component of the police subculture. The

policeman who violates the code of secrecy could be deprived of his fellow officers’ support in time of need. A breach of the unwritten code of secrecy results in the worst sanction an officer

can receive. Reiss (197 1:2 13) expresses a similar view. He observes that testifying against a fellow patrolman is considered to be one of the most serious violations of police subcultural norms, leading. at times, to absolute exclusion from the informal network of communications and refusal

on the part of other officers to work with any officer who has violated the code of secrecy. In sum, secrecy is often perceived as a greater value among police than honesty and lawfulness within

the hierarchy of police subcultural values. This- seems to explain why corrupt activities become widespread in large city departments. The honest officer, by informing superiors in the organizational structure of peer corruption, may find his fellow officers perceiving him as untrustworthy or unreliable. Resorting to secrecy, concludes Manning (1974), often frees police from the constraints of public demands and justice and allows him to participate in criminal activities.

onicism and Legitimization of Graft

The existence of certain norms and role expectations obviously affects a policeman’s orientation towards the law enforcement system; the evolution of a social infrastructure within police departments, according to the structural explanation, requires that the policeman adapt to expectations or be excluded from the system for all intents and purposes. But some writers have advanced the view that the nature of the policeman’s profession encourages corruption. According to Niederhoffer (1967) members of the police rank and file often develop a cynical attitude

toward their job which may result in a tendency to excuse graft. Those officers who internalize cynicism, observes Niederhoffer, perceive police work as a business and as a result of their attitude. place much value on attaining material goods - this often leads to graft. In contrast to the cynical rank and file officer who is more likely to participate in corrupt activities. the professionally oriented policeman perceives police work as a profession which upholds high standards of conduct. Niederhoffer implies that professionally oriented police are not likely to become involved in illegal exchanges with the public because of their commitment to the profession. In short, cynicism

provides the policeman who is more committed to subcultural values with a justification to exchange police authority for graft.

12 MARK POGREBIN AND BURTON ATKINS

Reiss (1971) notes that police are more prone to legitimize involvement in corrupt practices if

there is an exchange of services with those who will benefit from police not invoking the criminal process:

What may be most pertinent in the policeman’s exchange with organized crime is the legitimacy that attaches to the exchange. To deviate on one’s own is to be

criminal, but where the offense is consensual, not only is there mutual implication in the offense, and therefore minimization of risk, but the offense is also easily legitimized. For an officer to share in a payment from illegal gambling

is accepted, but for an officer to burglarize an establishment is to step beyond the bounds of what is legitimate. Deviation often is shared with fellow officers. providing open support for each (Reiss. 1971: 17 1).

The President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1967) suggests that the attitudes of police department administrators are transmitted directly to the

personal and ethical standards of those lower in the organizational structure. The commission’s viewpoint is that supervisors and executives exert great influence in establishing the department’s attitude toward corrupt police behavior. If officers perceive those in command as condoning dishonesty, then their idea of what is and what is not proper police conduct may be based on their own concept of departmental norms. As a direct consequence, those involved in corrupt exchanges will legitimize their behavior.

Wilson (1970:301) argues that corrupt activities are perceived by police to be justifiable given the weakening moral injunctions on the part of the public. Wilson observes that citizens are hypocritical when it comes to judging police integrity. Although the public will quickly denounce policemen who take graft, it is virtually expected in some areas that police will overlook certain offences for a small bribe. The ofticer is thus the object of conflicting standards because the community desires a policeman who will not take bribes yet also wants to bribe him.

An interesting explanation for the legitimization of corrupt practices has been offered by Skolnick (1966). From his observation of a west coast police department. Skolnick notes that the police distinguish among degrees of immorality involving certain victimless crimes. Bookmakers and numbers operators were viewed as businessmen by police, but narcotic users were seen as posing a serious danger to the community. By defining certain activities as more dangerous to the public than others, the police were able to perceive themselves as not being corrupt if they did not participate in illegal exchanges they felt were a threat to public safety. In short. it appears that police often justify their deviant activities by maintaining a concept of a non-deviant self that utilizes the citizens’ involvement in idiosyncratic types of crime as a rationalization for participating in graft.

Deterrence and Assuredness of Punishment

The opportunity to engage in corrupt activities over a prolonged period of time may perhaps be related directly to the occupational structure of the profession. Police are often exempt from

being policed: rarely does an officer report his peer to a higher authority. Obviously the police subculture suppresses attempts to publicize illegal police activities. But another important explanation for this lack of reported deviant occupational behavior lies in large part with the fear that reporting the misconduct of a fellow policeman may result in a counter allegation concerning the reporting officer’s conduct sometime during his career. The threat of retaliation is a very real fear of all officers simply because of the latitude of discretion used on the job.

Probable Causes for Police Corruption: Some Theories 13

Police administrators realistically admit that they are unable to eradicate all police corruption. Their real concern is maintaining a low degree of corruption in their departments (Niederhoffer, 1967). The predicament of the police executive is awesome. He becomes almost powerless in controlling the deviance of the line command. His incapability to sanction corrupt subordinates is explained by Sayre and Kaufman (1960).

The Police Commissioner must expend a great part of his energies in attempts at policing the police. His problems are concentrated in police corruption. However aggressively the commissioner pursues the goal of police integrity by the use of special squads to investigate the force, by shake-ups and transfers of command, by swift suspensions and other forms of discipline. he accepts ultimately that

police corruption is endemic to his organization, and that he is fortunate if he can prevent its reaching epidemic proportions. He lacks the resources to do more

(p. 289).

Police executives have further organizational problems in attempting to discipline sub- ordinates for illegal behavior. Most urban departments come under the municipal civil service

regulations which tend to restrict reform efforts of modern police commanders (President’s Commission. 1967:210). In the past few years local police organizations have proved very

successful in coming to the defense of police who have been accused of corrupt activities thus preventing punitive action toward those officers who should be sanctioned by the command.

In short. very few police expect repercussions from their involvement in corrupt exchanges. They are not deterred by the law enforcement apparatus of which they are a part, nor do they fear departmental sanctions for their illegal behavior. The assuredness of punishment either on the part of the district attorney or another outside investigative body is usually lacking, therefore permitting corrupt activities on the part of police to endure. Internal control appears to prove insignificant and external control has proven to be successfully challenged by local Police Benevolent Associations.

Victimless Crimes, Public Consensus and Political Authority

Manning (1974: 195) presents the viewpoint that “any well organized consensual, secretive organization can resist the efforts of an unorganized public. . .as long as there remains a lack of consensus on the enforcement of our moralistic laws, police corruption and selective law enforcement will continue.” A similar point of view is shared by Chambliss and Seidman (1971) who note that those persons who provide illegal services to the community are usually in a financial position to pay off the police for the exchange of tolerance for their unlawful enterprises. Though the entire enterprise is surreptitious, a trade-off is performed in which certain community services are tolerated by the police in exchange for personal compensation. Because of the ambiguity concerning the activity, graft is justified by the benefits alleged to flow to the community:

The law enforcement system is placed in the middle of two conflicting demands. On the one hand, it is their job to enforce the law, albeit with discretion; on the other hand, there is considerable disagreement as to whether or not certain particular activities should be declared criminal. Faced with such a dilemma. the police are likely to do what any well managed organization would do under

14 MARK POGREBIN AND BURTON ATKINS

similar circumstances: follow the line of least resistance. They resolve the problem by establishing procedures which minimize organizational strains and provide the greatest of rewards for the organization and the individuals involved. Typically what this means is that law enforcers adopt a tolerance policy toward the vices and selectively enforce those laws when it is to their advantage to do so (Chambliss and Seidman. 197 1:490).

Victimless crimes were found to be a type of enforcement activity in which the police often received monetary compensation for participating in illegal exchanges. The Knapp Commission’s (1974) findings in New York City clearly illustrated the extent of police corruption’s relationship to victimless crimes. The commission found that plainclothes detectives divided payoff money which they received as a result of their unlawful involvement in gambling. narcotics. extortion. prostitution, construction pay-offs, pay-offs from unlicensed bars, and sabbath law violations.

A real concern of police in the enforcement of moral laws (victimless crimes) is the extent to which organized crime corrupts police. Some claim that corruption is the major obstacle in preventing control of organized crime (Ruth, 1967). The pressures felt by the police from political leaders, businessmen and the public lead to inaction by all but the most courageous police commanders. It is doubtful, argues Hills (1969) that organized crime could profit and be so successful in this country without the cooperation of some of our police and political machinery. It is obvious that the responsibility for the maintenance of social order in the United States is decentralized and that police are subordinate to the immediate’ control of local political office

holders.

Many factors pattern this enforcement but they all reflect the political organization of society. The distribution of power and authority, rather than the striving for justice, or equal treatment under the law, can have a direct bearing on enforcement (Manning, 1974: 103).

Gardiner (1970:8) argues that decentralized local government encourages corruption by

dispersing authority and control. He claims that “. .the best thing for the existence of illegal activities is a political system which is so decentralized that no political force is powerful enough to challenge any individual officials who have been corrupted.” Along similar lines Goldstein (1975: 14) sees a strong relationship between the extent of police corruption and the moral climate of the community. That is, where one finds government and business affairs operating with a high degree of integrity and honesty, one will usually find a police department that also operates with a high level of integrity. Goldstein concludes that to expect police to adhere to honesty and profess a high degree of integrity in a community where governmental officials are corrupt is unrealistic. However, he suggests that even the most astute and honest government official is still political. and thus opportunities will always be available for corrupt practices to affect decisions relating to law enforcement (Goldstein, 1975:24). On the basis of Goldstein’s findings it may be surmised that

the amount of police corruption in a community may be directly associated with the amount of corruption that is tolerated by local governmental officials. Moreover. it would follow from both Gardiner’s and Goldstein’s analyses that police corruption would probably be but one element within a corrupt political system. Obviously, to the extent that one seeks to explain police corruption by reference to the political system in which the police department operates, attemtping to sort out possible relationships becomes enormously complex. In light of this it is useful to underscore several questions posed by Gardiner and Olson (1974: 130). answers to which might yield valuable data concerning the linkage between police departments and their respective

Probable Causes for Police Corruption: Some Theories 15

political systems: (1) What factors affect the likelihood that a particular type of government

activity will involve corruption? (2) How do corrupt relationships become established? (3) What are the relationships between the involved parties? (4) What are the consequences of corruption both for the parties involved and for others? and (5) What changes might reduce the likelihood

that corruption will occur in the future?

Effects of Police Corruption

Much of this research of course presumes that police corruption has detrimental effects upon law enforcement activities in general. Corruption, claims Wilson, (1963: 189) tends to demoralize the individual officer who does not share in the rewards of corruption. fosters disrespect for

criminal law, provides incentive to participate in corrupt exchanges, and encourages the individual policeman to perceive the community as cynical and hypocritical. But the effects of police corruption go beyond the departments themselves. Police corruption, claims the National Council on Crime and Delinquency (1974: 19), erodes public confidence in law enforcement as well as

creates disrespect for the law itself. One extremely important result of corrupt police activities may thus be the public’s unwillingness to report crimes. “Increased trust in the police improves the

reporting of information and raises the level of citizen cooperation.” A recent survey published by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (U.S. Dept. of Justice 1974) indeed indicates that the actual incidence of crime is much higher than reported. This is not to say that distrust of police on the part of the public is the only cause for the high percentage of unreported crimes. However, wide-scale police corruption does seem to cause a loss of public confidence in law enforcement that could account in part for the lack of public willingness to report crimes to the police.

Conclusions

The causes and consequences of police corruption probed in this review suggest that considerable research is needed before adequate explanations of official misconduct can be

offered. The relationship between governmental processes and police corruption needs further investigation. The research discussed in this paper has shown that courts, prosecutors, elected officials, and administrative appointees all affect the degree of corruption that exists in local police departments. It is necessary to investigate the extent and type of interrelationships that local governmental agencies and elected officials have in communities that have a corruption problem. Also. the conditions that cause the public to have a high degree of tolerance for corrupt activities both in the police organization, as well as other units of local government, need further study. Further research is needed in public perceptions of police, especially in communities alleged to

have corrupt police departments. This, in turn, suggests that research designs should be formulated that would compare not only political structures among cities with and without police corruption, but also would analyze public perception of police. Finally, comparisons are needed of public perceptions of police and other officials in both corrupt and noncorrupt cities. Certainly it is necessary to understand better the conditions which appear to permit corruption.to flourish. By studying the interrelationships between the police, government and the public we may acquire the knowledge of structural variables which may provide an explanation for corruption that can be applied to prevent police and other units of government from unlawful abuses of authority.

16 MARK POGREBIN AND BURTON ATKINS

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