PROBLEM SOLVING COURTSPROBLEM SOLVING COURTS

Moderator: Dail Moore, Moderator: Dail Moore, Director, National Director, National Technical Assistance & Training Center, OCSETechnical Assistance & Training Center, OCSE

Speakers:Speakers: Judge Judge Kristin RuthKristin Ruth, Raleigh, NC, Raleigh, NC Judge Judge Scott RosenbergScott Rosenberg, Nashville, , Nashville,

TNTN Judge Judge Allan SchmalenbergerAllan Schmalenberger, ,

Dickenson, NDDickenson, ND

Child Support Enforcement & Child Support Enforcement & Problem-Solving CourtsProblem-Solving Courts

Integrated SolutionsIntegrated Solutions

Wake County Model

The GoalsThe Goals

Increased Child Support PaymentsIncreased Child Support Paymentsandand

Reduced Jail OvercrowdingReduced Jail Overcrowding

Wake County Model

Integrated Solutions

The CycleThe Cycle Parent is ordered to pay child supportParent is ordered to pay child support Parent doesn’t payParent doesn’t pay Parent is issued a show causeParent is issued a show cause Parent is served and comes to courtParent is served and comes to court Parent is found in contemptParent is found in contempt Parent is ordered to pay a purge or go to jailParent is ordered to pay a purge or go to jail Parent pays the purge and parent is releasedParent pays the purge and parent is released Cycle repeats itself over againCycle repeats itself over again

Ruth, K. (2006) Breaking the cycle: Alternatives to incarceration lead to collections in Wake Ruth, K. (2006) Breaking the cycle: Alternatives to incarceration lead to collections in Wake Co., North Carolina. Co., North Carolina. Child Support Report, 38 (1) 2. Child Support Report, 38 (1) 2.

The Structure

Judge-Driven Hearings and

Service Integration

Vocational/

Counseling

Services

Electronic House Arrest

Custody Visitation/ Mediation

Wake County Model

Integrated Solutions

The ProcessAccountability + Opportunity + Judge = Success

Wake County Model

Integrated Solutions

Electronic House Arrest

With Field

Supervision

Vocational/ Counseling

WithVisitation Mediation

Status Hearings

With Performance

Reports

Increased Compliance> Payments< Jail Days < Failures

Procedure(s)

Wake County Model

Integrated Solutions

Show Cause

Finding of

Willful Contempt

Conditions of

JudgesOrder

Regular Reviews

If participant violates conditions, arrest warrant may be issued

Typical Conditions: Used Alone or in Combination Depending on the Specifics of Each Case

Wake County ModelIntegrated Solutions

• Electronic House Arrest: To Establish Daily Curfew

• Seek/Secure Employment

• “Working for Kids” Program

• Attend Substance Abuse Classes

• Address Mental Health Issues

• Address Educational Needs

Wake County ModelIntegrated Solutions

Impact: Contributes to Overall CSE Collections

0

5,000,000

10,000,000

15,000,000

20,000,000

25,000,000

30,000,000

35,000,000

40,000,000

Wake CSE Collections - 10 Year Annual Trendline

Wake County ModelIntegrated Solutions

Impact: Contributes to Overall CSE Purge Payments

0

200,000

400,000

600,000

800,000

1,000,000

1,200,000

1,400,000

Wake CSE "Purge" Collections - 4 Year Annual Trendline

Academic ResearchAcademic Research Meredith CollegeMeredith College

A Phase I study designed and led by A Phase I study designed and led by Dr. Rhonda Zingraff, Professor of Dr. Rhonda Zingraff, Professor of

Sociology at Meredith CollegeSociology at Meredith College

Child Support Sanctions Child Support Sanctions and Effects on Non-and Effects on Non-

custodial Parent custodial Parent ComplianceCompliance

By: Sheenagh Lopez & Jennifer McCoyBy: Sheenagh Lopez & Jennifer McCoy

Meredith CollegeMeredith College

Title IV-D of Social Security ActTitle IV-D of Social Security Act Created the Child Support Created the Child Support

Enforcement Program Enforcement Program

Provides establishment of paternity Provides establishment of paternity and the establishment, enforcement, and the establishment, enforcement, collection, and distribution of all child collection, and distribution of all child support paymentssupport payments

Ashton, J. (2006) Child support dockets benefit from uprising problem solving Ashton, J. (2006) Child support dockets benefit from uprising problem solving court principle. court principle. Juvenile and Family Justice Today, 14 (4), 19-21.Juvenile and Family Justice Today, 14 (4), 19-21.

OCSE Case DefinitionOCSE Case Definition

A parent who is now, or eventually A parent who is now, or eventually may be, obligated under law for may be, obligated under law for the support of a child or children the support of a child or children receiving services under Title IV-D receiving services under Title IV-D program.program.

Ashton, J. (2006) Child support dockets benefit from uprising problem-Ashton, J. (2006) Child support dockets benefit from uprising problem-solving court principle. solving court principle. Juvenile and Family Justice Today, 14 (4), 19-Juvenile and Family Justice Today, 14 (4), 19-21.21.

Facts about Child SupportFacts about Child Support 2004:Estimated 1.2 million child support orders 2004:Estimated 1.2 million child support orders

in the U.S.in the U.S. Child support enforcement is not cost effective; Child support enforcement is not cost effective;

Net loss of $745 million per year (1996)Net loss of $745 million per year (1996) Mothers on welfare can only expect to receive Mothers on welfare can only expect to receive

$50 a month from child support payment- $50 a month from child support payment- remaining money goes to the state to cover remaining money goes to the state to cover cost of welfare programcost of welfare program

Only 20% of welfare mothers receive any child Only 20% of welfare mothers receive any child support at all.support at all.

Hays, S. (2003) Flat broke with children: Women in the age of welfare Hays, S. (2003) Flat broke with children: Women in the age of welfare reform. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc.reform. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc.

Child Support: Scope of NeedChild Support: Scope of Need 28% of all children under 18 live in 28% of all children under 18 live in

single parent homessingle parent homes 85% live with mother85% live with mother Only 50% receive child support Only 50% receive child support

paymentspayments Only 25% get full amount of paymentOnly 25% get full amount of payment

I-Fen, L. (2000) Perceived fairness and compliance with child support I-Fen, L. (2000) Perceived fairness and compliance with child support obligations. Journal of Marriage and Family, 62(2) 388-398.obligations. Journal of Marriage and Family, 62(2) 388-398.

What do we know about child What do we know about child support payment compliance?support payment compliance?

Divorced vs. Non-MaritalDivorced vs. Non-Marital Non-marital fathers are significantly more Non-marital fathers are significantly more

likely to have 1 or more years of non-likely to have 1 or more years of non-payment than divorced fatherspayment than divorced fathers

In a given year non-marital fathers who In a given year non-marital fathers who are partial payers are significantly more are partial payers are significantly more likely to pay nothing the following year likely to pay nothing the following year than divorced fathersthan divorced fathers

Meyer, D. & Bartfeld, J. (1998) Patterns of child support compliance in Meyer, D. & Bartfeld, J. (1998) Patterns of child support compliance in Wisconsin. Journal of Marriage and Family, 60(2) 309-318.Wisconsin. Journal of Marriage and Family, 60(2) 309-318.

Variables Affecting ComplianceVariables Affecting Compliance

Father’s perception of fairness interacts with Father’s perception of fairness interacts with routine income withholding to significantly routine income withholding to significantly increase subsequent complianceincrease subsequent compliance

Income has a positive effect on complianceIncome has a positive effect on compliance Fathers are less likely to comply with orders Fathers are less likely to comply with orders

when ex-spouses are welfare recipientswhen ex-spouses are welfare recipients

I-Fen, L. (2000) Perceived fairness and compliance with child support I-Fen, L. (2000) Perceived fairness and compliance with child support obligations. Journal of Marriage and Family, 62(2) 388-398.obligations. Journal of Marriage and Family, 62(2) 388-398.

Problem-solving CourtProblem-solving Court Problem-solving courts: dockets that bring Problem-solving courts: dockets that bring

together community resources to address a together community resources to address a specific problem specific problem

2004: the Conference of Chief Justices and 2004: the Conference of Chief Justices and Conference of State Court Administrators passed Conference of State Court Administrators passed Resolution 22 which supports the use of problem-Resolution 22 which supports the use of problem-solving court principles and methods in all courtssolving court principles and methods in all courts

Partnerships between courts, public agencies and Partnerships between courts, public agencies and community-based organizations facilitate the community-based organizations facilitate the delivery of servicesdelivery of services

Ashton, J. (2006) Child support dockets benefit from uprising problem-solving Ashton, J. (2006) Child support dockets benefit from uprising problem-solving court principle. court principle. Juvenile and Family Justice Today, 14 (4), 19-21.Juvenile and Family Justice Today, 14 (4), 19-21.

Wake County ModelWake County Model Judge Kristin H. Ruth has implemented Judge Kristin H. Ruth has implemented

the the problem solving courtproblem solving court model in model in application to child support enforcement application to child support enforcement with the use of:with the use of:- Electronic House Arrest- Electronic House Arrest-“Working for Kids”-“Working for Kids”- Jail Incarceration- Jail Incarceration

Ruth, K. (2006) Breaking the cycle: Alternatives to incarceration lead to Ruth, K. (2006) Breaking the cycle: Alternatives to incarceration lead to collections in Wake County, North Carolina. collections in Wake County, North Carolina. Child Support Report, 38 (1) 2. Child Support Report, 38 (1) 2.

AbstractAbstract The sanctions this research focuses on is the use of The sanctions this research focuses on is the use of

Electronic House ArrestElectronic House Arrest and and Working For KidsWorking For Kids programs programs in increasing child support payment compliance. in increasing child support payment compliance.

The analysis of compliance focuses on payment The analysis of compliance focuses on payment histories of non-custodial parents placed in the histories of non-custodial parents placed in the programs six months prior and six months after the programs six months prior and six months after the sanction was implemented. sanction was implemented.

The data is examined to see if the child support The data is examined to see if the child support payment compliance sanctions have a significant effect payment compliance sanctions have a significant effect on compliance of non-custodial parents versus the on compliance of non-custodial parents versus the traditional use of jail incarceration as the primary or sole traditional use of jail incarceration as the primary or sole sanction. sanction.

These findings will form a foundation for further These findings will form a foundation for further research that can later be used to examine and research that can later be used to examine and compare the validity of sanctions ordered by Wake compare the validity of sanctions ordered by Wake County Child Support Enforcement. County Child Support Enforcement.

Comparisons of Payment Compliance Before & After Comparisons of Payment Compliance Before & After EHAEHA

Paired Samples Statistics

3.1637 226 1.93097 .128451.1460 226 1.41135 .09388

AllaftpayAllpriorpay

Pair1

Mean N Std. DeviationStd. Error

Mean

Paired Samples Test

2.01770 2.09754 .13953 1.74275 2.29264 14.461 225 .000Allaftpay - AllpriorpayPair 1Mean Std. Deviation

Std. ErrorMean Lower Upper

95% ConfidenceInterval of the

Difference

Paired Differences

t df Sig. (2-tailed)

Paired Samples Statistics

7.6711 225 5.22685 .348462.3867 225 2.91345 .19423

AllaftlevelAllpriorlevel

Pair1

Mean N Std. DeviationStd. Error

Mean

Paired Samples Test

5.28444 5.49829 .36655 4.56211 6.00678 14.417 224 .000Allaftlevel - AllpriorlevelPair 1Mean Std. Deviation

Std. ErrorMean Lower Upper

95% ConfidenceInterval of the

Difference

Paired Differences

t df Sig. (2-tailed)

Comparisons of Payment Compliance Before & After WFKComparisons of Payment Compliance Before & After WFK

Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean

Pair 1 allaftwkypay 3.0952 63 1.94865 .24551

allprtwkypay 2.0794 63 1.86912 .23549

Paired Differences

t df Sig. (2-tailed)MeanStd.

DeviationStd. Error

Mean

95% Confidence Interval of the

Difference

Lower Upper

Pair 1

allaftwkypay - allprtwkypay 1.01587 2.07514 .26144 .49326 1.53849 3.886 62 .000

Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean

Pair 1 Allaftlevel 6.4118 17 4.66448 1.13130

Allpriorlevel 3.1176 17 3.14011 .76159

Paired Differences

t df Sig. (2-tailed)MeanStd.

DeviationStd. Error

Mean

95% Confidence Interval of the

Difference

Lower Upper

Pair 1

Allaftlevel - Allpriorlevel 3.29412 3.93327 .95396 1.27182 5.31642 3.453 16 .003

Paired Samples Statistics

Paired Samples Test

Paired Samples Test

Paired Samples Statistics

Comparisons of Payment Compliance Before & After Comparisons of Payment Compliance Before & After JAILJAIL

Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean

Pair 1 allaftjpay 2.6963 349 2.00417 .10728

allprijpay 1.3037 349 1.56635 .08384

Paired Differences t df Sig. (2-tailed)  

Mean Std. DeviationStd. Error

Mean

95% Confidence Interval of the

Difference Mean Std. DeviationStd. Error

Mean

Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper 

Pair 1

allaftjpay - allprijpay 1.39255 1.92475 .10303 1.18991 1.59519 13.516 348 .000  

Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean

Pair 1 allaftjlevel 6.5235 340 5.11254 .27727

allprijlevel 2.7824 340 3.42552 .18578

Paired Differences t df Sig. (2-tailed)  

Mean Std. DeviationStd. Error

Mean

95% Confidence Interval of the

Difference Mean Std. DeviationStd. Error

Mean

Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper 

Pair 1

allaftjlevel - allprijlevel 3.74118 5.04763 .27375 3.20272 4.27963 13.667 339 .000  

Paired Samples Test

Paired Samples Statistics

Paired Samples Test

Paired Samples Statistics

Significance of Significance of change in payment compliancechange in payment compliance before and after before and after EHAEHA

Chart 1: EHA Summary Data

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

6th 5th 4th 3rd 2nd 1st On EHA 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th

Months Pre- and Post-EHA

Paym

ent C

ompl

ianc

e

Any Pay Over 50% 100% Above 100%

Significance of Significance of change in payment compliancechange in payment compliance before and after before and after Working For KidsWorking For Kids

Chart 2: Working for Kids Summary Data

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

6th 5th 4th 3rd 2nd 1st BeginWFK

1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th

Months Pre- and Post-WFK

Paym

ent C

ompl

ianc

e

Any Pay Over 50% 100% Above 100%

Significance of Significance of change in payment compliancechange in payment compliance before and after before and after JAILJAIL

Chart 3: Jail Sentence Summary Data

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

6th 5th 4th 3rd 2nd 1st Enter Jail 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th

Months Pre- and Post-Jail Time

Paym

ent C

ompl

ianc

e

Any Pay Over 50% 100% Above 100%

Conclusions of StudyConclusions of Study

Problem-solving court sanctions explored do Problem-solving court sanctions explored do impact payment compliance in terms of both impact payment compliance in terms of both consistency of making a payment and the level consistency of making a payment and the level of payment made.of payment made.

Decidedly low average payment compliance Decidedly low average payment compliance rises to medium levels with use of the rises to medium levels with use of the community sanctions.community sanctions.

The importance of employment, albeit not The importance of employment, albeit not surprising, is empirically confirmed, and the surprising, is empirically confirmed, and the capacity of these community sanctions to capacity of these community sanctions to modestly encourage employment is revealed.modestly encourage employment is revealed.

Conclusions of StudyConclusions of Study

Gains in payment compliance accomplished by Gains in payment compliance accomplished by court orders involving community sanctions (EHA court orders involving community sanctions (EHA and WFK) compare favorably to the gains and WFK) compare favorably to the gains observed following the Jail sanction. observed following the Jail sanction.

The EHA cases resemble the Jail cases in terms of The EHA cases resemble the Jail cases in terms of initial impact, but they exhibit a more stable initial impact, but they exhibit a more stable pattern of compliance over time and they tend to pattern of compliance over time and they tend to show greater gains in consistency and show greater gains in consistency and effectiveness as well.effectiveness as well.

Cases ordered to EHA or to Jail tend to be less Cases ordered to EHA or to Jail tend to be less compliant to begin with than those ordered to compliant to begin with than those ordered to WFK, suggesting distinctions most likely WFK, suggesting distinctions most likely recognized by Judge Ruth.recognized by Judge Ruth.

Conclusions of StudyConclusions of Study

WFK cases, while looking better on the front end, WFK cases, while looking better on the front end, do not display changes as immediately as those do not display changes as immediately as those facing more coercive controls. However, gradual facing more coercive controls. However, gradual changes achieved over time by WFK cases are changes achieved over time by WFK cases are consistently upward and notable in terms of consistently upward and notable in terms of payment consistency. payment consistency.

In contrast, the cases sentenced to Jail are In contrast, the cases sentenced to Jail are characterized by a dramatic two-month jump in characterized by a dramatic two-month jump in payment activity, followed by erratic and payment activity, followed by erratic and declining compliance thereafter.declining compliance thereafter.

Gains in employment are predictive of improve-Gains in employment are predictive of improve-ments in payment compliance; community-based ments in payment compliance; community-based sanctions seem to favor employment gains more sanctions seem to favor employment gains more than the threat and/or experience of than the threat and/or experience of incarceration.incarceration.

Implementing a Problem Implementing a Problem Solving CourtSolving Court

One Court’s ApproachOne Court’s Approach

Implementing a Problem Solving CourtImplementing a Problem Solving Court

Establishing the ProgramEstablishing the Program

Identifying the CasesIdentifying the Cases Setting up the StaffSetting up the Staff Identifying the PartnersIdentifying the Partners Source for CasesSource for Cases Developing the DocketDeveloping the Docket

Implementing a Problem Solving CourtImplementing a Problem Solving CourtIdentifying the CasesIdentifying the Cases

Case ProfilingCase Profiling

Wants to pay – can payWants to pay – can pay Doesn’t want to pay – can payDoesn’t want to pay – can pay Doesn’t want to pay – can’t payDoesn’t want to pay – can’t pay Wants to pay – can’t payWants to pay – can’t pay

Implementing a Problem Solving CourtImplementing a Problem Solving Court Identifying the Cases Identifying the Cases

Wants to pay – can’t payWants to pay – can’t payIdentify the barriers.Identify the barriers.

No employment history / lack of skillsNo employment history / lack of skills Criminal BackgroundCriminal Background Underemployed / need higher paying Underemployed / need higher paying

jobjob DisabilityDisability

Implementing a Problem Solving CourtImplementing a Problem Solving Court Setting up the StaffSetting up the Staff

Probation / Intensive Enforcement Probation / Intensive Enforcement OfficerOfficer

Monitor the casesMonitor the cases File actions when necessaryFile actions when necessary Liaison between Court and Partner Liaison between Court and Partner

ProvidersProviders

Implementing a Problem Solving CourtImplementing a Problem Solving Court Identifying the PartnersIdentifying the Partners

Identified SourcesIdentified Sources Workforce Investment BoardWorkforce Investment Board Local AgenciesLocal Agencies

GoodwillGoodwill Center for Independent LivingCenter for Independent Living

Project ReturnProject Return Mental Health CooperativeMental Health CooperativeStill SeekingStill Seeking Clinic to identify real disabilitiesClinic to identify real disabilities

Implementing a Problem Solving CourtImplementing a Problem Solving CourtSource for CasesSource for Cases

Identify cases on regular docketsIdentify cases on regular dockets Child Support Agency direct referralsChild Support Agency direct referrals Referral from Partner AgenciesReferral from Partner Agencies

Implementing a Problem Solving CourtImplementing a Problem Solving Court Developing the DocketDeveloping the Docket

Finding the available docket timeFinding the available docket time How to conduct the docketHow to conduct the docket Different dockets for different issuesDifferent dockets for different issues How often to scheduleHow often to schedule

How long will this last?How long will this last? Identifying general timeframes with Identifying general timeframes with

partnerspartners 1,2,3 strikes you’re out1,2,3 strikes you’re out

““Graduate Level” programs?Graduate Level” programs?

NORTH DAKOTA PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY INITIATIVE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF EMPLOYMENT

A COLLABORATIVE PROJECT AMONG THE NORTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,

JOB SERVICE NORTH DAKOTA, SOUTHWEST DISTRICT COURT, NORTHEAST DISTRICT COURT,

AND NORTHEAST CENTRAL DISTRICT COURT

PRIDE

GOALS•Improving support for children by securing employment for noncustodial parents.•Offering an additional option to the court when facing recalcitrant payers.

•Decreasing reliance on Economic Assistance programs.

SUCCESS WOULD BE MEASURED BY•Improved payments/reduction in nonpayment of child support.•Changes in court enforcement actions.•Decreased usage of Economic Assistance programs.

MISSING LINKMonitoring compliance?

PROGRAM CASE MANAGER Secret to success Shelia

PRIDE ORDER

FAILURE TO COMPLY Immediate Order to Show Cause

PRIDEPARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY INITIATIVE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF EMPLOYMENT

QUICK FACTS

Combined Dickinson Region IV

Referrals 147 76 71

Customers Employed 109 52 57

Average PRIDE Months Before Employment 1.8 1.2 2.5

Median Hourly Wage After PRIDE Referral $8.00 $7.50 $8.75

Increase in Monthly Child Support Payment Per Customer 88.2% 88.9% 90.2%

Decrease in Contempt Hearings Per Month 3.1 4.9 1.4

Estimated Cost Avoidance in Food Stamp, TANF, and Medicaid $122,787 $31,789 $90,998

Total Project Costs (including staff) $199,584 $125,945 $73,639

Average Supportive Service Cost Per Customer $309 $362 $275

Combined Dickinson Region IV

18

109

20

11

52

13

7

57

7

0

50

100

150

200

Employed at Referral Newly Hired Pending Employment

EMPLOYMENT147 Customers Enrolled in PRIDE

ASSISTANCE PROGRAMSFOOD STAMPS

Number of Food Stamp Benefit Case Months Prior to and After Referral to PRIDE

443 423309 286

866

595

0

200

400

600

800

1000

Combined Dickinson Region IV

Prior to PRIDE After PRIDE

31.3% Decrease

30.2% Decrease 32.4% Decrease

190

77

113128

5276

0

50

100

150

200

250

Combined Dickinson Region IV

Prior to PRIDE After PRIDE

32.6% Decrease

32.5% Decrease

32.7% Decrease

ASSISTANCE PROGRAMSTANF

Number of TANF Benefit Case Months Prior toand After Referral to PRIDE

JUDICIARY IMPACT HEARINGS

5.7

2.6

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Prior to PRIDE After PRIDE

Average Monthly Contempt Hearings

CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS

$68 $72 $61

$128 $136$116

$0

$50

$100

$150

$200

Combined Dickinson Region IV

Prior to PRIDE After PRIDE

88.2% Increase

90.2% Increase

88.9% Increase

Average Child Support Payment Prior to andAfter Referral to PRIDE

NONPAYMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT

32.6% 30.2%35.9%

14.1% 17.0%10.3%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

Combined Dickinson Region IV

Prior to PRIDE After PRIDE

18.5% Decrease 13.2% Decrease

25.6% Decrease

Child Support Nonpayment Rates Prior to andFollowing Referral to PRIDE

IT WORKS!

Special ThanksMike Schwindt

North Dakota IV-D Director