procedure manual seventh edition major incident … major incident procedure manual... · seventh...

MAJOR INCIDENTProcedure Manual

London Emergency Services Liaison Panel

Seventh EditionM

AJO

R IN

CIDEN

TP

rocedure Manual Seventh Edition

www.tso.co.uk

4583_Maj_incident_cov_v0_6.indd 1 5/6/07 14:38:10

LESLP ManualSeventh Edition – 2007

4583_MajorIncident v0_8.indd 1 11/6/07 16:34:35

Published by TSO (The Stationery Office) and available from:

Onlinewww.tsoshop.co.uk

Mail,Telephone, Fax & E-mailTSOPO Box 29, Norwich, NR3 1GNTelephone orders/General enquiries: 0870 600 5522Fax orders: 0870 600 5533E-mail: [email protected] 0870 240 3701

TSO Shops123 Kingsway, London,WC2B 6PQ020 7242 6393 Fax 020 7242 639416 Arthur Street, Belfast BT1 4GD028 9023 8451 Fax 028 9023 540171 Lothian Road, Edinburgh EH3 9AZ0870 606 5566 Fax 0870 606 5588

TSO@Blackwell and other Accredited Agents

The contents of this Manual have been drafted in accordance with the latest agreed procedures of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), the Chief and Assistant Chief Fire Officers Association (CACFOA), the Ambulance Service Association (ASA), London boroughs and the Home Office. Extensive consultation has also been undertaken with the military, voluntary services and emergency services of surrounding county areas.

Enquiries about this document should be made to the emergency planning department of the relevant service shown below:

Metropolitan Police ServiceCO3, Emergency Preparedness Operational Command Unit, New Scotland Yard, Broadway, London SW1H 0BG

London Ambulance Service (NHS Trust)220 Waterloo Road, London SE1 8SD

City of London PolicePO Box 36451, 182 Bishopsgate, London EC2M 4WN

British Transport PoliceCentral London Police Station, 16-24 Whitfield Street, London W1T 2RA

London Fire & Emergency Planning AuthorityOperational Planning Division, LFB Headquarters, 8 Albert Embankment, London SE1 7SD

HM Coastguard, LondonThames Barrier Navigation Centre, 34 Bowater Road, Woolwich, London SE18 5TF

Port of London AuthorityBakers Hall, 7 Harp Lane, London EC3R 6LB

This Manual was first published by the Directorate of Public Affairs, Metropolitan Police Service on behalf of the London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP) in January 1993. Enquiries about further copies of this Manual should be made to the Metropolitan Police Service on 020 7230 3337 or www.leslp.gov.uk

Seventh edition

© LESLP 2007

ISBN 978-0-11-341319-5

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior written permission of the Metropolitan Police Service, acting on behalf of LESLP. transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior written permission of the Metropolitan Police Service, acting on behalf of LESLP.


�

CONTENTS

1. IntroductIon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

2. Major IncIdEntS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

2.� Definition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

2.2 Declaration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

2.3 Stages. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

3. MaIn functIonS of thE EMErgEncy SErvIcES and othEr agEncIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

3.� General. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

3.2 Police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

3.3 FireBrigade. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

3.4 AmbulanceService. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . �0

3.5 TheHealthAdvisoryTeam(HAT). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . �0

3.6 TheNationalHealthService. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . �0

3.7 Localauthority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ��

3.8 HMCoastguard. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ��

4. actIonS by fIrSt offIcErS at thE ScEnE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

4.� General. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . �2

4.2 Police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . �2

4.3 FireBrigade. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . �2

4.4 Ambulance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . �3

4.5 MedicalIncidentOfficer(MIO). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . �4

5. ScEnE ManagEMEnt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15

5.� Cordons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . �6

5.2 Innercordon. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . �6

5.3 Outercordon. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . �7

5.4 Trafficcordon. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . �7

5.5 Logisticalsupport. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . �7

5.6 Rendezvouspoint. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . �8

5.7 Marshallingarea. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . �8

5.8 Multi-AgencyMarshallingArea(MAMA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . �8

5.9 Multi-AgencyHoldingArea(MAHA). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . �8

5.�0 JointEmergencyServicesControlCentre. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . �9

5.�� Sitingofvehicles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . �9

5.�2 SceneAccessControl(SAC). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20

6. coMMand and controL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

6.� Initialcontrol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2�

6.2 Gold,SilverandBronze . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2�

6.3 Gold(strategic). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2�

6.4 Silver(tactical). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2�


2

6.5 Bronze(operational). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2�

6.6 Inter-agencyresources. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22

7. goLd and SILvEr co-ordInatIng grouPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

7.� General. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

7.2 Goldco-ordinatinggroup. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

7.3 Silverco-ordinatinggroup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25

8. coMMunIcatIonS SyStEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27

8.� General. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27

8.2 Warning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27

8.3 Terrorism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27

8.4 CityofLondonPolice(COLP). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27

8.5 MetropolitanPoliceService(MPS). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28

8.6 BritishTransportPolice(BTP)........................................................28

8.7 LondonFireBrigade(LFB). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28

8.8 LondonAmbulanceService(LAS). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29

8.9 MPSSpecialOperationsRoom(MP-SOR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30

8.�0 Inter-agencycommandchannel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30

8.�� Liaisonofficers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30

8.�2 Localauthoritycommunications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3�

8.�3 Telecomassistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3�

8.�4 Accessoverloadcontrol(ACCOLC). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3�

8.�5 RadioAmateurs’EmergencyNetwork(RAYNET) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3�

9. caSuaLty cLEarancE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32

9.� Categories. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32

9.2 Uninjured. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32

9.3 Injured. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32

9.4 Deceasedandhumanremains. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35

9.5 Evacuees. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37

9.6 Restcentre. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37

9.7 Survivorreceptioncentre(SRC). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37

9.8 Friends’andrelatives’receptioncentre. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38

9.9 CentralCasualtyBureau. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38

10. hELIcoPtErS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39

�0.� Policehelicopters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39

�0.2 Militaryhelicopters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39

�0.3 HelicopterEmergencyMedicalService(HEMS). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40

�0.4 HMCoastguardsearchandrescuehelicopters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40

�0.5 Temporaryheli-pads. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40

�0.6 Emergencyflyingrestrictions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4�


3

11. InvEStIgatIon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42

��.� Evidence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42

��.2 Policeresponsibilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42

12. SafEty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43

�2.� Healthandsafety. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43

�2.2 Factoriesandotherindustrialsites. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43

�2.3 FireBrigade‘HAZMAT’officers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43

�2.4 Railincidents–safesystemsofwork. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43

�2.5 Railwayindustry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45

13. LocaL authorIty aSSIStancE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46

�3.� Role. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46

�3.2 Notificationandimmediateresponse. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46

�3.3 LocalAuthorityLiaisonOfficer(LALO). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46

�3.4 Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46

�3.5 Recovery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

14. othEr aSSIStancE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48

�4.� Voluntaryaidsocieties(VAS). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48

�4.2 MajorIncidentMulti-faithPlan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48

�4.3 Utilitycompanies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48

15. MEdIa LIaISon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49

�5.� Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49

�5.2 Holdingstatements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49

�5.3 Liaisononscene. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49

�5.4 Otheragencies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49

�5.5 GoldandSilverco-ordinatinggroupmeetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49

�5.6 Casualtyfigures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50

�5.7 Jointpressoffice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50

�5.8 Jointpressbriefings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50

�5.9 Mediacentres. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5�

�5.�0 Pressdebrief. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5�

16. occuPIErS’ rESPonSE to an IncIdEnt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52

�6.2 Theinnercordon. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52

�6.3 Theoutercordon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52

17. dEbrIEfIng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53

18. WELfarE of rESPondErS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54


4

APPENDICES

a: chEMIcaL, bIoLogIcaL, radIoLogIcaL and nucLEar (cbrn) dEvIcES . . . . . . . . . . . . .56

A.� Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56

b: IncIdEntS on raILWayS (PoLIcE IntEr-SErvIcE co-oPEratIon) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .58

B.� Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .58

c: aIrcraft IncIdEntS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60

C.� Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60

C.2 Specificsitehazards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60

C.3 Organisationsinvolved. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60

C.4 Aircraftincidentcategories. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6�

d: rIvEr thaMES IncIdEnt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63

D.� Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63

D.2 Mainfunctionsoftheemergencyservicesandotheragencies..............................63

D.3 Scenemanagement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64

E: fLoodIng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .68

E.� Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .68

E.2 Typesofflooding..................................................................68

E.3 Floodwarnings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .68

E.4 Rolesandresponsibilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69

E.5 Planningandresponseissues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .70

f: MILItary aSSIStancE to a Major London IncIdEnt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71

F.� References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7�

F.2 Policy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7�

F.3 ThreecategoriesofMACC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7�

F.4 ThreeprinciplesguidingtheprovisionofMACC:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7�

F.5 Authoritytodeploy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7�

F.6 Reactiontoan‘immediateimpact’emergency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .72

F.7 Generalcapabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .72

F.8 Reactiontoa‘risingtide’emergency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73

F.9 Costs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73

g: gLoSSary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75

h: gLoSSary of MarInE tErMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .80


5

�.� TheLondonEmergencyServicesLiaisonPanel(LESLP)wasformedin�973andconsistsofrepresentativesfromtheMetropolitanPoliceService,CityofLondonPolice,BritishTransportPolice,theLondonFireBrigade,theLondonAmbulanceServiceandlocalauthorities.ThePortofLondonAuthority(PLA),MarineCoastguard,RAF,Militaryandvoluntarysectorarealsorepresented.LESLPhastheabilitytoinviterepresentativesfromotheragenciesintothegroupwhenrequired,dependentonthenatureandtypeofincident.ThegroupmeetsonceeverythreemonthsunderthechairoftheMetropolitanPoliceService,EmergencyPreparednessOperationalCommandUnit.

�.2 Theproceduresadoptedbyeachoftheemergencyservicesinresponsetoamajorincidentareunderstandablydevotedtotheroleoftheserviceconcerned.Thepurposeofthisdocumentistodescribetheagreedproceduresandarrangementsfortheeffectiveco-ordinationoftheirjointefforts.Inthiswaytheoverallresponseoftheemergencyserviceswillbegreaterthanthesumoftheirindividualefforts,tothebenefitofthepublic.

�.3 ThisManualprovidessummariesoftheresponsesandresponsibilitiesofeachoftheemergencyservicesatamajorincident,aswellasanoutlineofthesupportroleofferedbylocalauthorities.Wehopeitwillofferbetterunderstandingtotheindividualspecialistsinvolvedinworkingwitheachotherinaco-ordinatedway.

�.4 Therearemanyseriousandprotractedincidentswhichdonotmeetthecriteriaforamajorincidentbutwhichwouldnonethelesswarrantaco-ordinatedeffortfromtheservicesinvolved.Theseeventshaveimpactedontheemergencyservicesandlocalauthorities,andnecessitatedtheimplementationofspecialarrangementstomanagetheseincidents,andclearbenefitshavebeenachievedfromusingtherelevantaspectsfromthisManualandmaintainingthecontinuityoftheco-ordinatedapproachtheseproceduresprovide.

�.5 ThisManualhasbeenpreparedfortheinformationandguidanceoftheemergencyservicesandlocalauthoritiesbutmaybeusedbyanyotherresponsibleorganisationwhichmayhavetorespondtoamajorincident.ItmustberememberedthattheprocedureswithinthisManualaregenerallyrelatedtoactivitiesat,orancillaryto,thesceneoftheincident,andthathaveabearingonanumberoftheagenciesinvolved.Detaileddescriptionsofsingleservicefunctionsarenotincluded.TheManualincludesreferencestorolesandresponsibilitiesofsomenon-emergencyserviceorganisations.Thelistoforganisationsincludedisnotexhaustiveanditisrecognisedthatawiderangeoforganisationsislikelytobeinvolvedinsupportingtheresponseoftheemergencyservices.

�.6 LESLPrecognisesthateverymajorincidentisdifferentandhasitsownuniquefeatures.TheadvicecontainedwithinthisManualshouldberegardedonlyasguidance.Itisdesignedtoofferaframeworkwithinwhichthosewhoareresponsibleforthesuccessfulresolutionoftheincidentareabletoworktogetherwithmaximumefficiency.

1. Introduction

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6

�.7 Experiencehastaughtthattherearemanyseeminglyharmlesssetsofcircumstanceswhichcan,ifnotdealtwithspeedily,escalatetothelevelofamajorincident.Preventionisbetterthancure.No-onewillbecriticisedfortreatinganincidentasseriousinthefirstinstanceevenifeventslaterproveitnottobe.ThedefinitionsandprocedurescontainedinthisManual,dealingwithmajorincidents,applyequallytoarrangementswhichshouldbeputinplacetoensurethespeedyresolutionofseeminglyminorincidents.

�.8 ItshouldbenotedthattheproceduressetoutinthisManualwouldapplytomajorincidentsinitiatedbyterroristacts.

Introduction

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7

2.1 Definition

2.�.� Amajorincidentisanyemergencythatrequirestheimplementationofspecialarrangementsbyoneormoreoftheemergencyservicesandwillgenerallyincludetheinvolvement,eitherdirectlyorindirectly,oflargenumbersofpeople.Forexample:

therescueandtransportationofalargenumberofcasualties;

thelarge-scalecombinedresourcesofthepolice,LondonFireBrigadeandLondonAmbulanceService;

themobilisationandorganisationoftheemergencyservicesandsupportservices;forexample,localauthority,tocaterforthethreatofdeath,seriousinjuryorhomelessnesstoalargenumberofpeople;and

thehandlingofalargenumberofenquirieslikelytobegeneratedbothfromthepublicandthenewsmediausuallymadetothepolice.

Actsofterrorismincludingsuspectedinvolvementofchemical,biological,radiologicalandnucleardevicesaresubjecttoaspecificmulti-agencyresponsesupportedbyHMGovernment.ThisresponseisreinforcedbytheprinciplescontainedinthisManual(seeAppendixA).

2.2 Declaration

2.2.� Amajorincidentcanbedeclaredbyanymemberoftheemergencyserviceswhichconsidersthatanyofthecriteriaoutlinedabovehasbeensatisfied.Incertaincircumstances,suchasflooding,thelocalauthoritymaydeclareamajorincident.

2.2.2 Despitethefactthatwhatisamajorincidenttooneoftheemergencyservicesmaynotbesotoanother,eachoftheotheremergencyserviceswillattendwithanappropriatepre-determinedresponse.Thisissoeveniftheyaretobeemployedinastand-bycapacityandnotdirectlyinvolvedintheincident.

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2. Major incidents

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2.3 Stages

2.3.� Mostmajorincidentscanbeconsideredtohavefourstages:

theinitialresponse;

theconsolidationphase;

therecoveryphase;and

therestorationofnormality.

2.3.2 Aninvestigationintothecauseoftheincident,togetherwiththeattendanthearings,maybesuperimposedontothewholestructure.

Stages of a Major Incident

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Major incidents

Consolidation phase

Investigation

Restorationof normalityStand-by

Initial response Recovery phase

TIME

Res

po

nse

Hearings(trials, inquest,public enquiry)

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9

3.1 General

3.�.� Rescuewillmostfrequentlybetheprimefunctionrequiredoftheemergencyservices.ResponsibilityfortherescueofsurvivorslieswiththeLondonFireBrigade(LFB).ThecareandtransportationofcasualtiestohospitalistheresponsibilityoftheLondonAmbulanceService(LAS).Policewilleasetheseoperationsbyco-ordinatingtheemergencyservices,localauthoritiesandotheragencies.

3.2 Police

3.2.� Theprimaryareasofpoliceresponsibilityatamajorincidentare:

thesavingoflifetogetherwiththeotheremergencyservices;

theco-ordinationoftheemergencyservices,localauthoritiesandotherorganisationsactinginsupportatthesceneoftheincident;

tosecure,protectandpreservethesceneandtocontrolsightseersandtrafficthroughtheuseofcordons;

theinvestigationoftheincidentandobtainingandsecuringofevidenceinconjunctionwithotherinvestigativebodieswhereapplicable;

thecollectionanddistributionofcasualtyinformation;

theidentificationofthedeadonbehalfofHerMajesty’s(HM)Coroner;

thepreventionofcrime;

familyliaison;and

short-termmeasurestorestorenormalityafterallnecessaryactionshavebeentaken.

3.3 Fire Brigade

3.3.� TheprimaryareasofLFBresponsibilityatamajorincidentare:

life-savingthroughsearchandrescue;

firefightingandfireprevention;

renderinghumanitarianservices;

detection,identification,monitoringandmanagementofhazardousmaterialsandprotectingtheenvironment;

provisionofqualifiedscientificadviceinrelationtoHAZMATincidentsviatheirscientificadvisors;

salvageanddamagecontrol;

safetymanagementwithintheinnercordon;and

tomaintainemergencyservicecoverthroughouttheLFBareaandreturntoastateofnormalityattheearliesttime.

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3. Main functions of the emergency services and other agencies

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3.4 Ambulance Service

3.4.� TheprimaryareasofresponsibilityfortheLASatamajorincidentmaybesummarisedas:

tosavelifetogetherwiththeotheremergencyservices;

toprovidetreatment,stabilisationandcareofthoseinjuredatthescene;

toprovideappropriatetransport,medicalstaff,equipmentandresources;

toestablishaneffectivetriagesieveandtriagesortsystemtodeterminethepriorityevacuationneedsofthoseinjuredandtoestablishasafelocationforcasualtyclearing,i.e.triagesortarea;

toprovideafocalpointattheincidentforallNationalHealthService(NHS)andothermedicalresources;

toprovidecommunicationfacilitiesforNHSresourcesatthescene,withdirectradiolinkstohospitals,controlfacilitiesandanyotheragencyasrequired;

tonominateandalertthereceivinghospitalsfromtheofficiallistofhospitalstoreceivethoseinjuredandinformtheotheragencies;

toprovidetransporttotheincidentscenefortheMedicalIncidentOfficer(MIO),mobilemedical/surgicalteamsandtheirequipment;

toarrangethemostappropriatemeansoftransportingthoseinjuredtothereceivingandspecialisthospitals;

tomaintainemergencycoverthroughouttheLASareaandreturntoastateofnormalityattheearliesttime;and

toactasaportalintothewiderhealthservicesincludingtheHealthProtectionAgencyRegionalHealthEmergencyPlanningAdvisors,andintheeventofachemical,biological,radiologicalornuclearincidentadviseontheconveningoftheHealthAdvisoryTeam(HAT),whichwillbeabletoadviseandleadasfarashealthadviceisconcerned.

3.5 The Health Advisory Team (HAT)

3.5.� TheHATisastrategicgroupchairedbytheNHS,composedofrepresentativesfromarangeoforganisationsandspecialitieswhoareabletogiveco-ordinatedauthoritativeadviceonthehealthaspectsofanincidenttothepoliceIncidentCommander,theNHSandotheragencies.

3.5.2 HATisactivatedthroughtheHPAviaLASControl.

3.6 The National Health Service

3.6.� FortheNHSamajorincidentisdefinedasthefollowing:

whenthenumberortypeofcasualtiesoverwhelmsorthreatenstooverwhelmnormalservices,specialarrangementsareneededtodealwiththem;

whenanincidentmayposeathreattothehealthofthecommunity;and

theHealthServiceitselfmaysufferseriousinternaldisruption.

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Main functions of the emergency services and other agencies

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3.7 Local authority

3.7.� SeeChapter�3.

3.8 HM Coastguard

3.8.� See Appendix D.

Main functions of the emergency services and other agencies

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�2

4.1 General

4.�.� Itisimportanttostressthatamajorincidentshouldbeformallydeclaredassoonasanyofthecriteria(definedat2.�.�)aresatisfied.

4.2 Police

4.2.� TheprimarydutyofthefirstPoliceOfficeronsceneistoensurethatappropriateinformationispassedbacktotheircontrolroom.

4.2.2 Themnemonic‘SadchaLEtS’hasbeendevisedtohelp:

Survey –surveythesceneonapproach

assess –assessthesituationonarrival

disseminate –disseminatethefollowinginformation

casualties –casualties,approximatenumbersofdead,injuredanduninjured

hazards –hazardspresentandpotential

access –bestaccessroutesforemergencyvehicles

Location –theexactlocationoftheincident

Emergency –emergencyservicesandotheragenciespresentandrequired

type –typeofincidentandbriefdetailsofnumberofvehicles,buildings,etc.involved

Safety –allaspectsofhealthandsafetyandriskassessmentmustbeconsideredbyallstaffworkingatorclosetothescene.

4.2.3 Theofficershouldthen:

decidewhethertodeclareamajorincident;

takeinterimchargeuntilrelievedbyamoreseniorofficer;and

maintaincontactwiththeircontrolroom.

4.2.4 Thefirstofficeronscenemustnotgetpersonallyinvolvedinrescueworkinordertofulfillthefunctionslistedabove.

4.3 Fire Brigade

4.3.� Sincetheinitialcalltoanincidentmaynotcarrysufficientinformationtoidentifythecallasamajorincident,theIncidentCommanderofthefirstattendancewillassessthesituationandreport.Thismessagewillincludethephrase,‘INITIATEMAJORINCIDENTPROCEDURE’.

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4. Actions by first officers at the scene

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�3

4.3.2 TheIncidentCommanderofthefirstattendancewilltakeallnecessarymeasuresto:

assesstheeffectivenessoffirefightingorothermeasurescarriedoutbeforehis/herarrival;

identifytherisksassociatedwiththelocation,includingthosedetailsheldontheBrigade’sCentralRisksRegister;

formaplanofactiontodealwiththedevelopingsituation;

decideonappropriateadditionalresources;

takeeffectivecommandandissueinstructionstoeffecttheplanofaction;

maintainoperationalcommandofthefirefightingandrescueoperationswithintheinnercordon;

evaluatethesituationandanypotentialfordevelopment,preparingtobriefamoreseniorofficerontheincident,andthepoliceandAmbulanceServiceofficersattending;

liaisewithotheremergencyserviceincidentofficersattheearliestopportunityandprovideasafetybriefing;and

co-ordinateajointhazardassessmentbetweenrespondingagenciesandagreeappropriatelevelsofpersonalprotectiveequipmentwithintheinnercordon.

4.4 Ambulance

4.4.� ThefirstmemberofambulancestaffwillundertakethefunctionoftheAmbulanceIncidentOfficer(AIO)priortothearrivalofanLASofficer.Thesecondambulancecrewwillalsoinitiatecontrolandcommand,parkingsystemsandatriagesieve.Thefollowingproceduresshouldbeadopted:

reportarrivalonscenetoEmergencyOperationsCentre;

confirmand/ordeclareamajorincident;

liaisewithotheremergencyserviceincidentofficers;

provideEOCwithadetailedsituationreport(useCHALETorMETHANE);and

requestambulance/medicalresourcesrequiredpendingthearrivaloftheAIO.

casualties –casualties,approximatenumbersofpriority�,2and3patients,deadanduninjured

hazards –hazardspresentandpotential

access –accessroutesandsuitableprovisionalrendezvouspoints(RVPs)

Location –theexactlocationoftheincident,withmapreferencesifpossible

Emergency –emergencyservicespresentandrequiredincludinglocalauthorities;considermedicalteam(s),specialequipmentandservices,i.e.HEMS,EmergencyPlanningManager,BASICS,ECV,ESV

type –requestnumberofLASresourcesrequired.Thetypeofincidentwithbriefdetailsoftypesandnumbersofvehicles,trains,buildings,aircraft,etc.or

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Actions by first officers at the scene

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�4

Major –majorIncidentdeclared(orhospitalstostandby)

Exact –exactlocationoftheincident,withmapreferencesifpossible

type –thetypeofincidentwithbriefdetailsoftypesandnumbersofvehicles,trains,buildings,aircraft,etc.

hazard –hazards,presentandpotential

access –accessroutesandsuitableprovisionalrendezvouspoints(RVPs)

numbers –approximatenumbersofpriority�,2and3patients,deadandinjured

Emergency –emergencyservicespresentandrequiredincludinglocalauthorities.

Considermedicalteam(s),specialequipmentandservices,i.e.HEMS,EmergencyPlanningManager,BASICS,ECV,ESV.

4.4.2 VehiclesthathavebeendesignatedamanagementfunctionbythefirstcrewortheinitialAIOmustnotgetpersonallyinvolvedinrescuework.

4.4.3 TheattendantofthefirstvehicleinattendanceshouldactasAIOuntilrelievedbythenominatedSeniorAmbulanceOfficer.

4.5 Medical Incident Officer (MIO)

4.5.� Thisroleisundertakenbyaseniorclinicianwithappropriateexperienceandtraining.TheMIOisusuallytakentothescenebyanAmbulanceServicevehicle,butisnotpartofthemobilemedicalteamandshouldnotgetpersonallyinvolvedinrescuework.

4.5.2 TheMIOhasmanagerialresponsibilityforthedeploymentofmedicalandnursingstaffatthesceneandwillliaisecloselywiththeAIOtoensureeffectivemanagementofresources.

4.5.3 MobilisationofMIOsisthesoleresponsibilityoftheAmbulanceService.TheLASmaintainsanMIOPoolandwillinvariablydeploydoctorsfromthisgroupwhentheneedforanMIOandsupportbecomesapparent.

4.5.4 Allreceivinghospitalshaveplansfortheirindividualresponsetomajorincidents.EachplanprovidesforthedesignationofanMIO.TheLASwillmobiliseMIOsfromnon-receivinghospitalsifpooldoctorsareunavailable,e.g.incasesofmultiplemajorincidents.

Actions by first officers at the scene

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�5

5. Scene management

RVP

Marshalling area

JESCC

Pedestrian zone only

SCENE ACCESS CONTROLProvides focal point for support services prior to entering area.

INNER CORDONThis secures the hazard and potential crime scene. Initially it will be cleared by police and LFB of all non-essential people.

OUTER CORDONThis forms a controlled area around the inner cordon. Only vetted people have access.

TRAFFIC CORDONPrevents unauthorised vehicle access to the area.

SCENE

CORDON ACCESS POINT

Locations to be determined by wind direction where appropriate

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�6

5.1 Cordons

5.�.� Cordonsareestablishedaroundthesceneforthefollowingreasons:

toguardthescene;

toprotectthepublic;

tocontrolsightseers;

topreventunauthorisedinterferencewiththeinvestigation;and

tofacilitatetheoperationsoftheemergencyservicesandotheragencies.

5.�.2 Itshouldbenotedthatunauthorisedaccesstothesiteofamajorincidentcouldjeopardiseboththerescueandinvestigation.AccessauthoritycanbesoughtthroughJointEmergencyServicesControlCentre(JESCC)SceneAccessControl.

5.�.3 Threecordonswillbeestablished.Thiswillbedonebythepoliceinconsultationwithotheragencies(seeDiagram5,Scenemanagement):

innercordon–providesimmediatesecurityofthehazardareaandpotentialcrimescene;

outercordon–sealsoffanextensiveareaaroundtheinnercordon;and

trafficcordon–setupatorbeyondtheoutercordontopreventunauthorisedvehicleaccesstotheareasurroundingthescene.

5.�.4 InterroristorsuspectedterroristincidentsitisacriminaloffencetocontraveneaprohibitionorrestrictionimposedundertheTerrorismAct2000.Thisincludesthecrossingofapolicecordon.

5.�.5 Forallknownorsuspectedterroristincidentsallpersonnelshouldbeawareofthepossibilityofsecondarydevices.Policewillberesponsibleforcheckingrendezvouspoints(RVPs),marshallingareas,JESCCandcordonpointsforsuspiciousobjects.

5.2 Inner cordon

5.2.� Policewillcontrolallaccessandexittotheinnercordonthroughacordoncontrolpoint.Thiswillbemanagedbybronzecordons.

5.2.2 LondonFireBrigade(LFB)isresponsibleforsafetymanagementofallpersonnelwithintheinnercordon.AtterroristincidentstheCounterTerrorismCommandscenemanagermustalsobeconsultedonsafetyissues.

5.2.3 Whencordonsareset,personswhodonothavearole,orwhoarewearinginappropriateclothing,willbedirectedtoleavethecordon.

5.2.4 Toaidwithidentificationofpersonnelauthorised,suitablyclothedandbriefedtobeintheinnercordon,theLFBinnercordoncontrollersandinnercordonrecorderswillissuearmbandsandrecordallpersonnelalreadyinorenteringtheinnercordon.

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5.2.5 ThepoliceandLondonAmbulanceService(LAS),workinginconjunctionwiththeLFB,willalsologandverifytheirownservicepersonnelenteringtheinnercordon.Inaddition,thepolicewilllogrepresentativesfromtheutilitiesandotherinvestigators.

5.2.6 TheLFBhasanemergencyevacuationsignalwhichallpersonnelworkingintheinnercordonmustbeawareofandrespondtoiftheareabecomeshazardous.TheLFBofficerwillblowrepeatedshort,sharpblastsonawhistleanddeclareasafepointtowithdrawto.

5.2.7 Non-emergencyservicepersonnelprovidingassistanceintheinnercordonwillbedirectedtotheappropriatecommandvehiclepriortogoingtotheinnercordon.

5.3 Outer cordon

5.3.� Policewillcontrolallaccessandexitpointstotheoutercordon.Non-emergencyservicepersonnelrequiringaccessthroughtheoutercordonwillbevettedattheSceneAccessControlCentre(seebelow)priortoattendingtheaccesspoint.Itdoesnotgiveaccesstotheinnercordon.

5.3.2 Thecommand/controlvehiclesoftheemergencyservicesshouldbepositionedbetweentheinnerandoutercordonsasshouldtheRVPandmarshallingarea(seebelow).

5.4 Traffic cordon

5.4.� Thetrafficcordonisestablishedtorestrictvehicleaccesstotheareasurroundingthescene.

5.4.2 Immediateactionmustbetakentoensurethefreepassageofemergencytraffictoandfromthesceneoftheincidentandtopreventcongestionatandaroundthescene.

5.4.3 Allemergency,specialistandvoluntaryservicesattendingthescenewillbedirectedasfollows:emergencyservicestotheRVPinitially;specialistandvoluntaryservicestotheSceneAccessControlCentreforvettingpriortodirectiontotheRVP.

5.5 Logistical support

5.5.� Thelevelofresponsetoamajorincidentwillbedependentonthenature,sizeandpotentialdurationoftheincident.Allocationandcommitmentofresourcesfromrespondingagencieswillthereforebescalable,dependingonrequirements.Assucharrangementsforlogisticalsupportandresourcesmanagementwillvaryaccordingly.

5.5.2 WhilstitisrecognisedthatthelocationofinitialRVPsandmarshallingareaswillbeagreedfollowingconsultationbetweenpoliceandfire‘Silvers’,thelocationofMulti-AgencyMarshallingAreasandMulti-agencyHoldingAreas(asdefinedbelow)willonlybedeterminedfollowingconsultationbetweenpoliceandfire‘Golds’.

5.5.3 Thefollowinggenericdefinitionsdescribeareas/locationsusedtosupportlogistical/resourcemanagementatmajorincidents.

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5.6 Rendezvous point

5.6.� Apointtowhichinthefirstinstanceallemergencyandspecialistservicesmaybedirectedpriortodeploymenttothesceneofoperationsortoadesignatedmarshallingarea.

5.6.2 ThiswillnormallybeestablishedwithintheoutercordonandwillbeunderthecontrolofaPoliceOfficerwearingtheappropriatereflectivetabard.

5.6.3 ThePoliceOfficerwilladvisetheappropriateservicecommandvehicleoftheresourcesarriving.Anynotimmediatelyrequiredwillbedirectedtothemarshallingarea.

5.6.4 ItmustbenotedthattheRVPplaquedisplayedatLondonUndergroundstationsisfortheuseofLondonUndergroundandLFBstaffonly.ItisnotanRVPforthepurposessetoutabove.

5.7 Marshalling area

5.7.� Amarshallingarea,controlledbypolicewiththeassistanceoftheFireservice,wearingappropriatereflectivetabards,shouldbeestablishedbetweentheRVPandthescene.Theactuallocationwillbeagreedafterconsultationbetweenthepoliceandfire‘Silvers’.TheLASwouldnotusuallybeincludedwithinamarshallingareaduetothearrivalanddepartureofambulanceresourcesthroughambulanceparkingandloadingareas.

5.7.2 Thisareaisforresourcesnotimmediatelyrequiredatthesceneorwhich,havingservedtheirpurpose,arebeingheldforfutureuse.Itshould,therefore,beanareasuitableforaccommodatinglargenumbersofvehicles.

5.7.3 Marshallingareasmayalsobeusedtoprovidebriefing/debriefingareasandrecuperationforpersonnelinvolvedinarduousworkatthescene.

5.7.4 Astheeventisscaleddown,theutilitiesandothercontractorsmayneedtomaintainthemarshallingareaforthedurationoftherecoveryphase.

5.8 Multi-Agency Marshalling Area (MAMA)

5.8.� Wherethesizeandnatureofanincidentisfargreaterthanaconventionalmajorincident,amulti-agencymarshallingareamayberequiredtoaccommodatethesignificantlevelofresourcesandlogisticalsupportrequiredtosustainoperationsattheincident.Thismayincludefeeding,restandrecuperation,firstaid,occupationalhealth,equipmentstorageandservice.

5.8.2 Multi-AgencyMarshallingAreaswillonlybeestablishedfollowingconsultationbetweenEmergencyService‘Golds’.

5.9 Multi-Agency Holding Area (MAHA)

5.9.� Thenatureanddurationofanincidentmayalsorequiretheestablishmentofaholdingareatoreserveadditionalresources(primarilyemergencyservice)priortodeploymentdirectlytothesceneofoperations,toadesignatedMAMA,ortosupportserviceprovisiontoareas

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notdirectlyeffectedbytheincident.MAHAsshouldbeareassuitableforaccommodatinglargenumbersofvehiclesandshouldprovideadditionalfacilitiesincludingfeeding/welfare,co-ordination,administrationandbriefing.

5.9.2 Multi-agencyHoldingAreaswillonlybeestablishedfollowingconsultationbetweenEmergencyService‘Golds’.

5.10 Joint Emergency Services Control Centre

5.�0.� TheLFB,policeandLAScontrol/commandvehicleswillformthefocusfromwhichthemajorincidentwillbemanaged.Thesevehicles,togetherwiththoseofthepublicutilitiesandlocalauthority,willbelocatedclosetooneanotherandbeknowncollectivelyastheJointEmergencyServicesControlCentre(JESCC).Theincidentofficers(Silvers)willjointlyexercisetheirauthorityfromthispointinaco-ordinatedmanner.

5.�0.2 Theimportanceofthisjointcontrolfunctionshouldnotbeunderestimated.Theexperienceofpreviousmajorincidentshasdemonstratedthebenefitsderivedbytheestablishmentofclosecontactbetweentheemergencyservicesandotheragenciesinvolvedinthemanagementoftheincident.

5.11 Siting of vehicles

5.��.� Theofficerinchargeofthefirstcommand/controlvehicleonsceneshouldmakeallowanceforthesitingofotheremergencyservicecommandvehicles.

5.��.2 Thesiteshould:

haveenoughspacetoaccommodateallanticipatedagencycontrols;

beawayfromthehazardsofthescene,butcloseenoughtomaintaincontroloverit;and

bechosencarefullyasrelocationmayproveextremelydifficult.

5.��.3 Ideallythesitewouldbeservedwithgoodaccess,lightingandtoilets.Realisticallythiswillbeunusualinoperationalterms.AwidethoroughfareorsurfacecarparkmaybeusedastheJESCCintheabsenceofmoresuitableaccommodation.

5.��.4 TheadviceoftheLFBonmattersoffiresafetywillbesoughtbytheotheremergencyservicesinconnectionwiththeplacementoftheJESCC.Thisadvicemaywellbechangediftheincidentsubsequentlyprovestoinvolvechemicalsorotherhazardousmaterials.Thechoiceofsitewouldthenbeinfluencedbywinddirection,strengthandgradients.Inthisevent,theLFBscientificadvisor(andifavailableonsite,safetypersonnel)willadviseonthemostsuitablelocationfortheJESCC.TheLFBgeographicinformationsystemisavailableoncommandvehiclesandmayalsobeusedtodetermineasuitablesite.

5.��.5 ThepoliceSilverwill,havingconsultedwiththeotheremergencyservices,beresponsibleforconfirmingoramendingthesitingofthecommand/controlvehiclesandwillestablishliaisonbetweenthem.

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5.��.6 TheLFBorLASwillusuallysetuptheinter-agency(Matelorfieldphonesystem)linkbetweenthecommand/controlvehicles.Althoughvehiclesshouldbepositionedcloseenoughtoensureefficientliaisonandco-ordination,theirproximitymustnotimpairgoodradiocommunications.About�0metres’separationisideal.

5.��.7 Ifaservicemobilisesmorethanonecontrol/commandvehicletothescene,onlyoneofthesewillperformthecontrolfunctionattheJESCC.

5.��.8 Toaididentification,theblue,redorgreenidentifyinglightsoneachofthemaincontrolvehiclesoftheemergencyserviceswillbeswitchedon.Theidentifyinglightsonallothervehiclesmustbeswitchedoff,exceptduringincidentsonopenmotorwaysorelsewherewheretheyarenecessarytoavoidaccidents.

5.12 Scene Access Control (SAC)

5.�2.� ASACCentremustbeestablishedoutsidetheoutercordon,ifpossibleinanareaadjacenttotheRVP.Thecentre,whichwillbeunderpolicecommand,mustbeclearlyidentifiabletothosewishingtogainentrythroughtheoutercordon.Ifnecessary,anapproachroutemustbeestablishedandsignposted.

5.�2.2 TheSACwillberesponsibleforcheckingtheauthenticityofnon-emergencyservicepersonnelwhosepresenceisrequiredwithintheoutercordonandbeyond.SuchpersonsshouldbedirectedtotheSACinthefirstinstancebytheauthorityrequestingtheirattendance.

5.�2.3 TheSACmustmaintainarecordofallpersonswhohavebeendirectedtotheminordertogainaccessandwillneedtoestablishalinkwiththeJESCCforthispurposeatanearlystage.Ifpossible,theSACwillestablishcommunicationlinkswiththeJESCCbywayoftelephone,radioandfax.

5.�2.4 OncesatisfiedastotheircredentialstheSACstaffwill,whereappropriate,escortthemtotheRVP.

5.�2.5 ItmustbeemphasisedthattheroleoftheSACistofacilitateentrythroughtheoutercordonbynon-emergencyservicepersonnelwhosepresenceisrequired.Itdoesnotreplacethearrangementsinplaceinrelationtocontrolofandentrytotheinnercordon.

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6.1 Initial control

6.�.� Itispossiblethatearlyonintheincidentmembersofoneservicewillspontaneouslycarryouttasksnormallytheresponsibilityofanother.Assoonassufficientstaffarrive,eachservicecanbeexpectedtoestablishunequivocalcommandandcontroloffunctionsforwhichitisnormallyresponsible.

6.�.2 Itshouldbeunderstoodthatthetitlesdonotconveyseniorityofserviceorrank,butdepictthefunctioncarriedoutbythatparticularperson.Fromtheoutsetitisimportantthattheseniorofficersofeachserviceatthesceneliaisewitheachother.Thiswillbethefoundationuponwhichalllatermeetingswillbebased.

6.2 Gold, Silver and Bronze

6.2.� ‘Gold’,‘Silver’and‘Bronze’aretitlesoffunctionsadoptedbyeachoftheemergencyservicesandarerole-related,notrank-related.Thesefunctionsareequivalenttothosedescribedas‘strategic’,‘tactical’and‘operational’inotherdocumentsaboutemergencyprocedures.Insummarytherolesofeachcanbedescribedasfollows.

6.3 Gold (strategic)

6.3.� Goldisthecommanderinoverallchargeofeachservice,responsibleforformulatingthestrategyfortheincident.EachGoldhasoverallcommandoftheresourcesoftheirownorganisation,butdelegatestacticaldecisionstotheirrespectiveSilver(s).

6.3.2 AttheoutsetoftheincidentGoldwilldeterminethestrategyandrecordastrategystatement.Thiswillneedtobemonitoredandsubjecttoongoingreview.

6.4 Silver (tactical)

6.4.� Silverwillattendthescene,takechargeandberesponsibleforformulatingthetacticstobeadoptedbytheirservicetoachievethestrategysetbyGold.Silvershouldnotbecomepersonallyinvolvedwithactivitiesclosetotheincident,butremaindetached.

6.5 Bronze (operational)

6.5.� BronzewillcontrolanddeploytheresourcesoftheirrespectiveservicewithinageographicalsectororspecificroleandimplementthetacticsdefinedbySilver.

6.5.2 AstheincidentprogressesandmoreresourcesattendtheRVP,thelevelofsupervisionwillincreaseinproportion.AsseniormanagersarrivetheywillbeassignedfunctionswithintheGold,SilverandBronzestructure.

6.5.3 Seniorofficersarrivingattheirrespectivecommand/controlvehiclesaretoestablishcontactwiththeirincidentcommandersandshouldalsomakecontactwiththepoliceSilverinordertonotifyanytransferofcommand.

6.5.4 Itisimportantthatthetitleholderwearsauniquelyidentifiabletabardandpassesitontotheirsuccessor.

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6.5.5 Byusingthisuniversalstructure,theemergencyserviceswillbeabletocommunicatewitheachotherandunderstandeachother’sfunctionsandauthority.

6.6 Inter-agency resources

6.6.� Anyservicemayrequestthetemporaryassistanceofpersonnelandequipmentofanother.Inthesecircumstances,whilethesupportingservicewillrelinquishtheimmediatecontrolofthoseresourcestotheotherserviceforthedurationofthetask,itwillneverthelesskeepoverallcommandofitspersonnelandequipmentatalltimes.

6.6.2 Personnelfromoneservicewhohelpanotherinthiswayshouldonlybegiventasksforwhichtheyaretrainedandnotsimplysupplementtheotherserviceinapotentiallydangeroussituation.Forinstance,PoliceOfficersmaybedirectedtobecomestretcher-bearerstoreleasefirefightersforrescuework.Theyshouldnotundertakehazardousrescueworkthemselves.

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7.1 General

7.�.� TheformationofbothaGoldandSilverco-ordinatinggrouphasbeenofgreatvalueatallmajorincidents.Thesupervisingofficersofeachoftheserviceswillinitiallybefullyoccupiedwiththeirownsphereofactivityandtherewill,inevitably,besomedelayinaco-ordinatinggroupbeingsetup,butthisshouldbekepttoaminimum.

7.�.2 Itisessentialthatthefirstsupervisingofficersonscenefromeachoftheemergencyservicesliaisecloselywitheachotherattheearliestopportunity.

7.�.3 TheseofficersmaybeinvitedtothefirstSilverco-ordinatinggroupmeetingtodescribetheirinitialdecisionsortheywillbrieftheirrepresentativeonthegroupbeforethemeeting.

7.�.4 Itisimportant,whenagenciessendarepresentativetoeitheraGoldorSilvercoordinatinggroupmeeting,thatthepersonhassufficientauthoritytoguaranteethatthefacilitiestheyofferonbehalfoftheirservicewillbedelivered.

7.�.5 Ontheotherhand,itisusefulifonlyonepersonfromeachserviceattendssothatthemeetingsarenotundulylong.

7.�.6 Minutes,oranoteofdecisionstaken,mustbekeptofallmeetingsoftheco-ordinatinggroups.Itisalsoessentialthatindividualmembersofthegroupmaketheirownnotesofmeetings.

7.�.7 Minutes,oranoteofdecisionstakenandpersonalnotes,shouldprovideanaide-mémoire ofthecontinuingoverallprogressoftheoperation.Theywillprovideaperspectiveagainstwhichdecisionsorprioritiescanbemade.

7.�.8 Amajorincidentwillnecessarilyinvolveaninvestigationastoitscauseandquitepossiblyaformalinquest,inquiryorcriminaltrial.Theactionsoftheseniorofficersoftheemergencyserviceswillbeofconsiderableinterest.Thereforenoteswillbeinvaluableandwill,insofarastheyarerelevant,bedisclosable;thatis,madeavailableinsubsequentproceedings.

7.2 Gold co-ordinating group

7.2.� Inresponsetoa‘majorincident’theinitialGoldCo-ordinatingGroupwillconsistprimarilyofthe‘bluelight’emergencyservices.AdditionalGoldlevelrepresentationfromotheragencieswillbedependentupontherequirementsoftheincident(e.g.nature,scaleanddynamics).TheLondonResilienceTeam(LRT)willbenotifiedofallformallydeclaredmajorincidentsthatmeettheLESLPdefinition.

7.2.2 Wherethesizeandnatureoftheincidentisfargreaterthanaconventionalmajorincident,itmaybeappropriatetoconveneimmediateandfullstrategicrepresentationfromtheLondonresiliencepartnership(theregionaltier).Thiswouldbeconsideredappropriatewhere,fromtheoutset,itisapparentthatthereistherequirementforprolongedandsignificantinputfromallpartneragencies.Thislevelofstrategicco-ordinationwillbeaccommodatedthroughtheopeningofaStrategicCo-ordinationCentre.

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7.2.3 representatives

Police(whowillchairthemeeting)

overallincidentcommander(PoliceGold);

minutetaker;

senioridentificationmanager/seniorinvestigatingofficerwhereapplicable;

safetyadvisor;and

pressadvisor.

fire

overallIncidentCommander(FireGold).

ambulance

overallIncidentCommander(GoldMedic).

Local authority

ChiefExecutive(orappointedrepresentative)oftheaffectedborough.

7.2.4 Location of meetings

TheGoldgroupwillnormallymeetatalocationcompletelydetachedfromthescenewithsuitablecommunicationsandmeetingfacilities.

7.2.5 frequency of meetings

IngeneralthenatureanddifficultiesoftheincidentwillgovernthefrequencyofGoldmeetings.

7.2.6 tasks

TheagendafortheGoldco-ordinatinggroupmeetingswillbedecidedbythegroupatthetimeandwilldependuponthetypeandscaleoftheincident.AttheoutsettheGoldgroupwilldeterminethestrategicissuesrelevanttotheincident.Inaddition,thegroupmayprovideliaisonwithcentralgovernmentandotherbodies,ensurethatsufficientsupportandresourcesareavailableattheincidentandmaintainastrategicoverview.CoupledwiththiswillbevisitsmadebyVIPstothesceneandtoinjuredsurvivors.Thesevisitsplaceadditionalstrainontheoperationintermsofsecurity,publicorder,increasedmediaattentionandinterruptiontonormalrescuefunctions.PoliceGoldwillundertaketheplanningandliaisonroleforthesevisits.

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7.3 Silver co-ordinating group

7.3.1 representatives

Police(whowillchairthemeeting)

IncidentOfficer(PoliceSilver);

Senioridentificationmanager/seniorinvestigatingofficer/sceneevidencerecoverymanager,whereapplicable;

Minutetaker;

Safetyadvisor;and

Pressadvisor.

fire

IncidentCommander(FireSilver);

LFBinter-agencyliaisonofficer;

Scientificadvisor,whereapplicable;and

Pressadvisor.

ambulance

Incidentofficer(SilverMedic);

MedicalIncidentOfficer;

Pressadvisor;and

EmergencyPlanningManagerorCBRNTacticalSupportOfficerwhereapplicable.

Local authority

LocalAuthorityLiaisonOfficer.

other

TheSilvergroupshouldconsideraformalagendatomonitortheprogressofactionsfortheSilvermeetings;

Additionalrepresentationwilldependuponthescaleoftheincident.Itmaybenecessarytohaveaninnercoreofpermanentmembersandanoutergroupofadvisors,specialistsandotherswhocouldbecalledupontoattendasnecessary;and

Dependentonthenatureoftheincidentandindustryaffected,considerationshouldbegiventothespecialistknowledgeandexpertiseavailabletoassistthegroup.Individualsareavailablefromindustrywhomaybeabletomakeimportantcontributionstoaidaco-ordinatedandeffectiveresponsetotheincidentandtothetacticaldecision-makingprocess.

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7.3.2 Location of meetings

ForconveniencetheSilverco-ordinatinggroupshouldinitiallymeetclosetothescene;itmaybemovedtopremiseswhicharebetterserved,althoughfurtherfromthescene,asoperationsprogress.

7.3.3 frequency of meetings

ThepoliceIncidentOfficerwillcallaninitialmeetingoftheSilverco-ordinatinggroupattheearliestreasonableopportunity.SubsequentmeetingsofthisgroupcanbearrangedatthisfirstmeetingormaybecalledbythePoliceIncidentOfficerattherequestofanothermemberofthegroup.

7.3.4 Safety

Atincidentsconcernedwithfire,thedangeroffire,orinvolvingrescue,theLFBwillprovidetheSilvergroupwithprofessionaladviceonmattersofsafety.WhilsttheLFBwillgiveprofessionaladviceonsafety,overallresponsibilityforhealthandsafetyrestswitheachemergencyservice.Considerationshouldalsobegiventotheadviceandexpertisethatmaybeavailablefromindustriesdirectlyinvolvedinthedisaster.Also,theHealthandSafetyExecutive,aswellasbeinganinvestigativebody,isabletogiveadviceonsafetymatters.

7.3.5 Situation reports

Eachserviceshouldbrieflydescribethesituationasitaffectsitsownoperationsand,ifnecessary,mentionthosemattersforwhichitrequirestheassistanceorco-operationofothers.

7.3.6 Priorities

Prioritiesareessentialtocreateacohesivejointstrategy.Thiswillindicatehowtheresourcesavailablecanbedeployedinthemosteffectiveandefficientmanner.Eachservicewillhaveobjectivestomeetwithinitsownareaofresponsibility.Itisimportanttoestablishwhichoftheseshouldhavepriorityattheparticularstagetheincidenthasreached.Inthatway,inter-servicedifficultiesmaybeavoidedandeachmayconcentrateuponthoseactionswhichcontributemosttothesuccessoftheoperation.

7.3.7 future developments

Thisgroupshouldgiveconsiderationtotherequirementsoflaterphasesoftheoperation,includingtheidentificationofactionsthatneedtobetakeninadvance.


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8.1 General

8.�.� AllpartiesareintroducingTETRA-basedradioswithjointcommunicationsinteroperability.Theintentionistoworktowardsitsfullimplementation.Itis,however,usefultobeawareofthevarioustypesofcommunicationsemployedbyeachconstituentmemberthatcurrentlyremaininplace.

8.2 Warning

8.2.� Nocommunicationssystemissecurefromeavesdroppers.RadioscannerscapableofreceivingPolice,FireBrigade,Ambulanceandlocalauthorityradiotransmissionsarereadilyavailable.Similarly,faxscannerscanbequicklybroughttothescenetointerceptinformationtransmittedbetweentheservicesandagencies.Thisshouldbeborneinmindwhenwordinganytransmission,includingcellulartelephoneconversations,whichmaycontainsensitiveinformation.

8.3 Terrorism

8.3.� Atknownorsuspectedterroristincidentsradiosshouldbekepton.Theobviousbenefitsinbeingabletocommunicateatamajorincidentfaroutweightheremoteriskofactivatingadevicethroughradiotransmission.Whenasuspectexplosivedevicehasbeenlocatedpersonnelshouldwithdrawtoasafedistanceofatleast�5metresfromthedevicebeforetransmittingonpersonalradios.Thisdistanceshouldbeincreasedto50metreswhenvehicle-basedradiosareused.

8.3.2 ItshouldbeborneinmindthatGSMdigitaltelephonesandsometrunkradiosystemspermanentlytransmitaspartoftheirnormaloperatingprocedure.Whenadeviceisdiscoveredtheseitemsshouldbedisconnectedandnotactivateduntiltheyareoutsidethe50-metrezonementionedabove.

8.4 City of London Police (COLP)

8.4.� TheCOLPhasamajorincidentvehicleequippedwith:

COLPmulti-channelUHFset;

MetropolitanPoliceService(MPS)multi-channelUHFset;

publicaddresssystem;

cellphones;and

loudhailers.

8.4.2 TheCOLPforcecontrolroomhasallthecomputerhardwarecommontomanycomputer-aideddespatchsystemsfoundinallserviceheadquarters.ThisisassistedbythemonitoringofeventsonstrategicallyplacedcameraswithincentralLondonandrelayedtoscreenswithinthecontrolroom.

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8.5 Metropolitan Police Service (MPS)

8.5.� TheMPScommunicationsystemcomprisestheMetcallOperationCommandUnitbasedatthreelocations.ThishastheabilitytocommunicatewiththeIntegratedBoroughOperationsrooms,MPSvehiclesandfootpatrolofficers.TheMPScomputeraideddispatchsystemiscompatiblewiththatoftheCityofLondonPolice.MetcallhasthecapabilitytoreceivecameracoverageofalmosttheentireinnerLondontrafficnetwork,whichhasnowbeenenhancedsothattheMPScanalsoreceiveimagesfromeachofthelocalauthorityCCTVsystems.TheMPShelicoptercanprovideliveandrecordedvideosofanincidentanywhereinLondonwhichcanbedownloadedtocertain‘remote’siteswhenapplicable.

8.5.2 Thereisacentrallybasedmobilecommunicationsvehicle(MCV)thatisfittedwithradiosandcellphonesandthatcanbespeedilydeployedtoascenestaffedbyCentralCommunicationsCentrestaff.

8.5.3 Therearealsomajorincident(Silvercontrol)vehicles,eachsituatedatstrategiclocationsaroundLondon.TheyareequippedsimilarlytotheCOLPvehicleandcanaccommodateasmallbriefinggroup.Areaofficerswillstaffthem.Inaddition,thereareBronzecommandvehiclesthroughoutLondon.

8.5.4 IntheMPSTETRA-basedradioisfittedtovehiclesandissuedtoindividualofficers.Differingtalkgroupsareusedforlocalboroughoperationalcommandunitsandpan-Londonunits,butallcancommunicatewitheachotherifrequired.WhilstMPSradiosdonotoperateundergroundthereisafacilitytoprovidecross-agencyinteroperability.

8.6 British Transport Police (BTP)

8.6.� TheBTPcontrolroomhasitsowncommandandcontrolsystem.InadditiontheBTPalsohasdirectaccesstoMPSCADandisCAD-live.ThereisCCTVcapacityavailablewithintheMICC.

8.6.2 BTPusesTETRA-basedradiothroughoutthecountry.Whenofficersare‘belowground’ontheundergroundsystemtheyuseChannel2radiostocommunicatewithMICC.

8.6.3 AfullTETRA-basedradiocommunicationssystemisnotbeingimplementedindeeptubestationsuntil2008.TheDutyOfficerMICChasdetailsofcall-outprocedures(viaMPS)shouldairwaveberequiredintheeventofanemergencyunderground.Thiscapabilityandprocedurefordeployingisknownas‘OperationTunnelSound’.

8.6.4 TwoincidentcommandvehiclesareavailableintheLondonareaandadditionalcommandandcontrolcapacitycanbebroughtinfromoutsideLondonifrequired.

8.7 London Fire Brigade (LFB)

8.7.� AllLFBfront-lineappliancesareequippedwithVHFradiosandhavetheabilitytocommunicatewiththecontrolfromanywhereintheGreaterLondonarea.TheLFBhashand-heldUHFradiosavailableonallitsfront-lineappliancestogetherwithanadditional

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supplyoncommandvehiclesforcommandpurposes.Theseradiosarecompatiblewith‘leaky-feeder’systemscurrentlybeinginstalledinLUsub-surfacerailwaystationsandcertainotherundergroundlocations.

8.7.2 AswellasmainVHFradio,LFBcommandvehiclesalsocarrythefollowingcommunicationfacilities:

TETRAradiocommunications;

‘Matel’fieldtelephones,whicharecompatiblewiththoseintheotheremergencyservicecontrolvehicles.Theseareavailableforuseatmajorincidentsforliaisonpurposesandforestablishingcommunicationswithcontrolvehicles;

amobileleaky-feedcablecapableofbeinglaidintoareasofbadVHFreception;

cellphones,whichareavailableforalternativecommunicationpurposes;

cellularfaxes;and

downlinkimagereceivers(helicopter).

8.7.3 AllcommandvehiclesareequippedwithcomputersandarestaffedbypersonneltrainedintheuseoftheCommandPlanningSystem(CPS)software.TheCPSisaninteractivesoftwarepackagebasedonOSmapsthatisdesignedtoassistincidentmanagement.

8.7.4 AllmajorincidentsandincidentsofnotearemonitoredintheBrigadeCommandSupportCentre(CSC),whichalsodealswithliaisonandotherissuesspecifictomajorincidents.CSCpersonnelareabletoviewtheCPSandinputinformationtosupportincidentcommandersonthecommandvehicles,whilstalsobeingabletooverviewtheCPSincidentmanagement.

8.8 London Ambulance Service (LAS)

8.8.� LASemergencyambulances,responsecarsandothervehiclesarefittedwithcellphones,VHFradios,GlobalPositioningSystems(GPS)andanAutomaticVehicleLocationSystem(AVLS)throughmobiledataterminalsoneachvehicle.AllLASresourcesarefittedwithVHFradioschanneledintotheEmergencyOperationsCentreattheAmbulanceHeadquartersatWaterloo.TheLAShaveaduplicatefallbackcontrolroomatBow.

8.8.2 Thedutyofficervehiclesarefittedwithcellphones,VHFradiosandhand-heldUHFradiosforusebyLASBronzeofficersatthescene.

8.8.3 TheLAShavetwoemergencycontrolvehicles.ThesevehiclesarepaintedwhiteandbeartheLondonAmbulanceServicemarkings.Theyaresurmountedbyblueflashinglightsandagreenandwhitechequered,illuminateddome.Agreenandwhitechequeredstripisdisplayedaroundthevehicle.Eachvehiclehasmulti-channelradiosetsnettedtoallambulancefrequencies,handportables,amobileleaky-feedcablecapableofprovidingUHFcommunicationsinbadareasofreception,mapsandothersourcesofinformation.Theyalsohavethefacilitytosetupadirectlinetelephonelinkbetweentheemergencyservicesatthesceneofanincident.TheyalsohaveafacilitytolinkintoBritishTelecomphonelines.Amobilephoneandfaxisfittedineachvehicle.EachvehiclealsohasaUHFradiosetwithMulti-AgencyCommandchannel69/70forusebySilverOfficersatmajorincidents.

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8.8.4 LASIncidentControlisthecontrolroomsituatedwithintheEOCcomplexforuseduringseriousandmajorincidents.Itisresponsibleforcontrollingtheincident,communicationwithhospitals,primaryloggingduties,paginginstructionproceduresandthestrategicoverviewoftheincident.

8.9 MPS Special Operations Room (MP-SOR)

8.9.� TheSpecialOperationsRoom(SORcallsign‘GT’)hasprovidedcommandandcontrolfornumerousmajorincidentsthathaveoccurredinLondonwithinrecentyears.ItispartoftheMetcallOperationalCommandUnit.

8.9.2 SOR(GT)providescommandandcontrolformajorincidents,terroristincidents,disorderanddemonstrations.TheroomhasconsolesthataresetasidefortheLAS,LFB,BTP,COLPandadditionalagencies(forexamplearmedforces).Itisfromherethatthevariousserviceliaisonofficerswork.TheyhaveaccesstoalltheradioandCADcommunicationschannelledthroughtheroomandcan,forexample,relayrequestsforassistancetotheirowncontrolrooms.

8.9.3 SOR(GT)doesnotcontroltheincident.ItsfunctionistoprovideasupportstructuretotheIncidentCommand,toassistinthemanagementoftheincident.Itcannotbeover-emphasisedthatthebestoperationalcommunicationswillalwaysbeconductedverballybetweenservicerepresentativesonsite.

8.9.4 WithinCentralCommandComplextherearealsofacilitiesforcommunicatingwithallotherpoliceforcesintheUnitedKingdom,membersofInterpolandcentralgovernment.

8.10 Inter-agency command channel

8.�0.� TheMPS,LASandLFBcommandvehiclesthatattendthesceneareeachequippedwithanumberofhand-heldmulti-channelUHFradios.Thesewilloperateontheinter-agencycommandchannelusingChannels69and70(NationalChannelPlan).TheseradiosareintendedforcommanduseonlybytherespectiveserviceSilversforliaisonpurposesandnotforgeneralinter-serviceuse.Policeareresponsibleforissuingtheradiostotheotherservicesatthescene.

8.11 Liaison officers

8.��.� EachagencywillonrequestprovideliaisonofficerstotheGoldco-ordinatinggroup.

8.��.2 InadditiontheLFBhasacadreofdedicatedtrainedandqualifiedinter-agencyliaisonofficerswhocanadviseandsupportincidentcommanders,police,medical,militaryandothergovernmentagenciesontheLFB’soperationalcapacityandcapabilitytoreduceriskandsafelyresolveincidentsatwhichabrigadeattendancemayberequired.TheLAShasasimilarsystem,withagroupofemergencyplanningmanagersandCBRNtacticalsupportofficerswhocanprovideadviceandsupporttotheAmbulanceIncidentOfficersandothersonmattersrelatingtoemergencyplanningandotherambulanceserviceorNHSrequirements.


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8.12 Local authority communications

8.�2.� Manylocalauthoritiesareprovidedwiththeirownintegralradiocommunicationssystems;however,thesemaynotbecompatiblebetweenboroughsorwiththeemergencyservices.Londonlocalauthoritiesareundertakingtoprocurecommoncommunicationssystems,includingAirwave,toensurecompatibilitywiththeemergencyservices.Alllocalauthoritieshaveemergencysatellitephones.

8.13 Telecom assistance

8.�3.� Telecommunicationutilitycompanieshavearangeofalternativecommunicationsystemsforusebytheemergencyservices.Chargesmaybeincurred.

8.14 Access overload control (ACCOLC)

8.�4.� Thisistheauthorisedschemewherebythemobiletelephonyserviceproviderscan,intheeventofamajorincident,limitaccesstotheirrespectivenetworksandpermitemergencyservices,localauthoritiesandotheruserswithsuitablyenabledmobiletelephonestohaveexclusiveaccesstoavailablechannels.

8.�4.2 Thisfacilityisexpensivetoimplementandcancauseinconveniencetootherresponders,suchasTransportforLondon.ItshouldonlybeinitiatedaftercarefulconsiderationandontheauthorityofpoliceGold.InanextremeorurgentsituationpoliceSilvermayrequesttheimplementationofACCOLC.

8.�4.3 ThesystemworksbyusingACCOLC-enabledSIMcards.TheSIMcardsaresuppliedbytherespectiveserviceproviders.IndividualemergencyserviceorganisationsshouldconsulttheirownpolicyinrelationtothenumbersofACCOLC-enabledtelephonestheycanobtain.AsaguideeachorganisationshouldtakeintoconsiderationkeypoststobesuppliedwithACCOLC-enabledSIMcards.

8.�4.4 ItshouldbenotedthattheCabinetOfficeistheauthorisingbodyforACCOLCregistrationandthenumberallowedontheschemeisstrictlylimitedtopreserveitsoperationalbenefits.

8.15 Radio Amateurs’ Emergency Network (RAYNET)

8.�5.� RAYNETisanationwidevoluntarygroupofUnitedKingdomgovernment-licensedradiooperatorswhoareabletoprovideemergencyradiocommunicationstotheemergencyservices,localauthoritiesandcentralgovernmentdepartments.Theirradiocommunicationsequipmentisspecificallydesignatedforuseinemergencies.

8.�5.2 GreaterLondonRAYNETcanprovidespecialistVHF/UHFradiocommunicationsassistanceacrossLondonandbeyondintoneighbouringcounties.Nationalandinternationalradiocommunicationscanalsobeprovidedifrequested.

8.�5.3 TheassistanceofRAYNETshouldbesoughtfromtheappropriateservicecontrol.


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9.1 Categories

9.�.� Thecareandidentificationofcasualtiesisaprimaryresponsibilityoftheemergencyservicesatamajorincident.

9.�.2 Casualtiesfallintooneoffourcategories:

uninjured;

injured;

dead;or

evacuees.

9.�.2 Theymaybewitnesses/victimsorevensuspectsandcarryevidenceorhazardsontheirclothing,particularlyinterroristincidents.

9.2 Uninjured

9.2.� Theuninjuredwillhavebeeninvolvedintheincident,butwillnotnecessarilywantorrequiremedicalattention.TheymustberemovedfromthehazardbytheLondonFireBrigade(LFB).OncethesepeoplehavebeenremovedfromanyhazardsandprocessedthroughatriagesievebytheLAStheymustbehandedovertothepoliceforcollationofdetailsandwitnessstatements.

9.2.2 Theywillallbepotentialwitnesses.Thepolicewillneedtocollatetheirdetailsforthebenefitofthecasualtybureauaswellastheinvestigation.Thiscanbedoneatsuitablepremisesnearby,calledthesurvivorreceptioncentre(see9.7).

9.3 Injured

9.3.� Theinjuredneedtoberescuedfromthesceneandcaredforasquicklyandsafelyaspossiblebytherescuers,whomustbemindfuloftherequirementoftheambulanceandmedicalteamsonsite.Ambulanceparamedicsandtechniciansthenneedtobeabletoadministertheappropriatepre-hospitaltreatmentbeforethepatientsaretakentothereceivinghospitals.

9.3.2 TheLAS’saimatanymultiplecasualtyincidentistoproducethelargestnumberofsurvivors.Theywillneedtodelivertherightpatienttotherightplaceattherighttimesothattheyreceivetheoptimumtreatment.Triageisadynamiccontinuousprocess.TheLAShasaresponsibilitytoensurethatateverystageoftheincidentpatientsarecontinuallyassessedtoensurethatchangesintheconditionofthepatientarereflectedinthepatient’striagecategory.

9.3.3 Thetriagesystemisa‘physiologicalsystem’whichreliesonchangesinvitalsignsasaresultofaninjuryorillnessratherthanan‘anatomicalsystem’thatreliesondecisionsbeingmadeonwhatinjuriescanbeseen.Whereanexperiencedclinicianisusingthetriagesystem,knowledgeoftheclinicalconditionthatisbasedonananatomicalinjurymaybeusedtoupgradeatriagecategory.

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9.3.4 DuringanincidenttheLASwillusetwolevelsoftriage–thesearereferredtoas‘triagesieve’and‘triagesort’.Bothtriagesystemsusealgorithmstodeterminewhichprioritygroupapatientfallsinto.Theprioritygroupsareasfollows:

PriorityDescriptionColour

ImmediateRed

UrgentYellow

DelayedGreen

ExpectantBlue

DeadorDeceasedWhiteorBlack

triage sieve

9.3.5 Thistriagesievequicklysortsoutcasualtiesintoprioritygroups.UsingthealgorithmcardtheLASwillsystematicallyworkthroughthepatients,triagingandlabellingthem.TheLASwillnotgetinvolvedinsubstantivepatienttreatmentduringatriagesieve.

triage sort

9.3.6 Onthearrivaloffurtherresourcespatientsaremovedtoaplaceofsafety,usuallythecasualtyclearingstation.Atthislocationtheycanbere-triagedusingatriagesortprocess.Thisprocessisamorethoroughclinicaltriagethanthesieve.

9.3.7 Thesametriagecardisusedthroughoutthesieveandsortprocessupdatingapatient’striagecategorybyrefoldingthecardasnecessary.

Paediatric triage

9.3.8 DuringmostmajorincidentstheLAStriagespaediatricsusingtheadulttriagesieve–thisover-prioritisesbutisasafeoption.DuringamultiplecasualtyincidentinvolvingmainlypaediatricpatientstheLASwillinstigatetheuseofthepaediatrictriageprocess.Thesystemusessimilaralgorithmstothatoftheadulttriagetape.

Expectant category

9.3.9 TheexpectantcategoryisonlyusedwiththeauthorityofGoldMedicandGoldDoctorwithadvicefromtheEmergencyPlanningManagers.ThissituationwouldarisewhentherearesuchlargenumbersofpatientsthattheabilityoftheLAStorespondtotheclinicalneedsofeveryindividualandpotentiallyunsurvivableinjurieswouldbetothedetrimentofotherpatients.

9.3.�0 Expectantpatientsmustbetriagelabelledas‘immediatepriority�’,whichisred,thoughwithablueflashcornerfoldedbackfromtherearoftheimmediatepriority�card.

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casualty clearing station and ambulance loading point

9.3.�� Thecasualtyclearingstationisaplaceofrelativesafetytowhichcasualtiesareconveyedfromtheincidentsite.Triagesort,assessment,treatmentandstabilisationiscarriedoutbyLASstafftogetherwithanymobilemedicalteamsonsceneatthestation.Thecasualtyclearingstationisco-ordinatedbytheLASBronzeClearingofficerandaseniordoctor(secondarytriageofficer),callsignBronzeDoctor.

9.3.�2 Asuitableareaorbuildingbetweentheinnerandoutercordonsneartothesiteshouldbeidentifiedforuseasthecasualtyclearingstation.

9.3.�3 Onceenoughresourceshavearrivedonsceneitisvitalthatpatientdocumentationstartswithinthecasualtyclearingstation.

hospital

9.3.�4 Oncethepatientarrivesatthehospitalthepatientwillbere-triagedbyhospitalstaff.TheambulancecrewmustensurethattheyreporttheirarrivalwithbothCACandtheAmbulanceLiaisonOfficer(ALO)atthehospital.TheALOhasaresponsibilitytoretrieveeverypatient’sLAStriagecardandpassdetailstothepolicedocumentationteams.

Labelling and documentation

9.3.�5 Documentationofpatientsmuststartassoonaspossible.Triagelabelsmustbeattachedtopatientsintheinitialstagesoftheincidentevenifthereisnoopportunitytocollectpersonaldetails.Detailsofeachpatientshouldbecollectedassoonastheyenterthecasualtyclearingstation/area.

9.3.�6 Itmaynotalwaysbepossibleforambulancecrewstorecordtheusualdetailsofpatientscarriedonthepatientreportforms.Ambulancesshouldnotbedelayedatthesceneinordertoobtainpersonaldetailsofindividualcasualties,whichwillbeobtainedbythepoliceatthereceivinghospitals.Inallcircumstancesthetriagelabelmustbecompleted.

9.3.�7 Policeserviceinstructionsrefertotheattachingofnationallyandrecommendedidentificationlabelstodeceasedpersons.AmbulanceservicepersonnelshouldnotethattheseidentityandevidentiallabelsareNOTtobeusedinplaceofthemedicaltriagelabels.

9.3.�8 PoliceshouldliaisewiththeLAStomaintainacountofallpersonsprocessedwithdetailsofhospitalstowhichtheyhavebeentaken.

9.3.�9 Policeofficerswillbedeployedtothecasualtydepartmentsofthesehospitalstoprovidedocumentationteams,assistwithforensicissuesandprovidesecurityadvice.

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9.4 Deceased and human remains

9.4.� TheCoroner

AnHMCoronerwillbeappointedappropriateto‘wherethebodylies’,anditistheCoronerwhohastheultimateresponsibilityforestablishingidentityandthecauseandtimeofdeath.ItisimportantthattheCoronerorhis/herOfficerbekeptinformedatalltime.TheCoronermaywishtoviewthedeceasedorhumanremainsin situpriortorecovery.Inamulti-sceneincident,wherethedeceasedlieinanumberofdifferentCoroners’areas,considerationshouldbegiventotheappointmentofa‘LeadCoroner’byrecordedagreement.

9.4.2 the Pathologist

AHomeOfficePathologistwillbeappointedtoprovidepost-morteminformationrelatingtothecauseofdeathandtheidentityofthedeceased.Forensicspecialistswillassistthepathologist.

ThePathologistmaywishtoviewthedeceasedandhumanremainsin situpriortorecovery.CoronersareassistedintheireffortsbyHomeOfficepathologistsandforensicscientistsofmanydisciplines.PoliceOfficerswillmakeenquiriesontheirbehalf.

9.4.3 Senior Identification Manager (SIM)

PoliceGoldwillappointaSIM.TheSIM,inconsultationwiththeSeniorInvestigationOfficer(SIO),willdeterminetermsofreferencetobeagreedbyGold,andwillnormallyassumeresponsibilityforthekeyareasoftheidentificationprocess,whichincludethecasualtybureau,familyliaison,disastervictimrecoveryandidentificationteamsandmortuaryteams.

9.4.4 Scene Evidence recovery Manager (SErM)

EstablishedtoprovideasinglepointofcontactatthesceneresponsibletotheSIMfortherecoveryofthedeceasedandhumanremains,andtotheSIOforcrimescenetechnicalandphysicalinvestigationevidence.Partofthisrolewillbetochair,andtoprovideminutes,oftheSERMGroupmeetings.

9.4.5 SErM group

Relevantmulti-agencyandspecialistadvisorswhowillassistintherecoveryprogramme.Someofthesewillhavestatutorypowerstoconductinvestigations(e.g.AAIBandRAIB);otherswillprovidetechnicalassistanceandadvice(e.g.heavygearliftingoperatorsordeconstructionengineers)aswellasrepresentativesfromtheprivateindustry-nominatedpersons(e.g.transportationoperators,siteownersorthelike).ConsiderationshouldbegiventotheneedsoftheinvestigationandconsultationwiththeSIOasthesepersonsmayhaveaconflictofinterest.Thedeceasedandhumanremainsshouldnotbemovedunlessessentialinthelife-savingprocess.

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9.4.6 disaster victim recovery and Identification officers

DisasterVictimRecoveryandIdentificationTeams(DVRITs)aredrawnfromaselectlistofspeciallytrainedofficers.TheyaredeployedbytheSIMinconsultationwiththeCoronerandPathologisttorecoverthedeceasedandhumanremainsinarespectfulanddignifiedmannerappropriatetotherequirementsoftheinvestigationasdirectedbytheSERM.ThedeceasedandhumanremainswillberecoveredtoanationallyagreedstandardandrecordedusingtheACPOvictimlabelbookletwhichprovidesforcontinuityofevidencerelatingtothemovementandstorageofthoserecoveredfromthescene.Property,unless‘withthebody’,willnotbedealtwithbytheDVRITbutwillbecollectedunderaseparateprocess.

9.4.7 holding audit area

TheDVRITleaderwillberesponsibleforestablishinga‘HoldingAuditArea’withintheinnercordonclosetotherecoveryareawhereallaspectsoftherecoveryprocesswillbeco-ordinated.HoldingAuditAreaofficerswillprovideadirectlinktotheSERMinrespectofinformationrelatingtotherecoveryandcontinuityprocessincludingonwardtransportationtothemortuary.Policewilldeploycontinuityofficerstovehiclesusedinthetransportation.

9.4.8 Property

Propertywhichmaybeevidence,orothermaterialwhichmayberelevanttoboththeinvestigationandtheidentificationprocedures,shouldberecoveredinasystematicandorganisedmanner,appropriatelylogged,recordedandstored.

TheSERMwillberesponsibleforappointingapropertyrecoveryteamleaderdrawnfrompolicespecialistsearchteams.Exhibitstorageshouldbeestablishedon-site,managedbydedicatedexhibitsofficers/teams.

9.4.9 designated mortuaries/emergency (demountable structure) mortuaries

Localauthoritieshaveadutytoprovidemortuaryfacilities,thesecanbedividedintotwomaintypes:

designated,existinglocalmortuaryfacilities

emergency(demountablestructure)mortuaries.

9.4.�0 ShoulddesignatedmortuariesbeoverrunorunabletoadequatelycopewiththeincidentthentheCoroner,PathologistandSIMmayrequestthelocalauthoritytoprovideadditionalemergencymortuaryfacilities.TheHomeOfficeNationalEmergencyMortuaryPlanandtheLondonMassFatalityPlanexisttohelpdrivethatdecision-makingprocessandtheimplementationofsuchadecision.

9.4.�� SitesfortheconstructionofanemergencymortuaryhavebeenidentifiedwithintheLondonMassFatalityPlan.DVRITsandexhibitsofficerswillbedeployedtothemortuarytoassistintheidentificationproceduresandwillreporttothepoliceMortuaryOperationsManager.

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9.5 Evacuees

9.5.� Someemergenciesmayrequiretheevacuationofalargesurroundingareabecauseofthedangertolifefromenvironmentalorstructuralhazards.Caremustbetakentoensurethatevacuationdoesnotplacethoseconcernedingreaterdanger.

9.5.2 EvacuationisusuallyundertakenontheadviceoftheFireSilver.Insomecircumstances,personnelfromallservicesmayhavetoassistincarryingitout.

9.5.3 Asuitableevacuationassemblypointwillneedtobeestablishedandrestcentressetupbythelocalauthority.

9.5.4 Personnelfromthelocalauthorityandfromvoluntaryagencieswillstaffrestcentres.Thecentreswillprovidesecurity,welfare,communication,cateringandmedicalfacilities.

9.5.5 Evacueesshouldbedocumentedandbasicdetailspassedtothecasualtybureau.

9.6 Rest centre

9.6.� Theselectionofasuitablerestcentreshouldalwaysbemadeinconjunctionwiththelocalauthoritywherepracticable,astheremayalreadybepre-definedfacilitiesintheareaaffected.

9.6.2 Arestcentreisafacilitywherepersonsdisplacedbyamajorincidentofanysizecanfindshelter,supportandsustenanceasappropriate.

9.6.3 Personnelfromthelocalauthority,primarycaretrustandvoluntaryagencieswillstaffrestcentresasappropriate.Therestcentreswillprovidesecurity,welfare,communication,cateringandmedicalfacilities.

9.6.4 Facilitieswithaspecificreceptionroleforsurvivorsandorfriendsandrelativesaredetailedbelow.

9.6.5 Inadditiontoprovidingfacilitiesforthedocumentationteams,thecentrealsoneedstoprovideshelter,first-aidtreatment,welfaresupportandcommunications.Thevoluntaryaidsocietiesmayalsobepresenttosupplycomfortandcounselling.

9.7 Survivor reception centre (SRC)

9.7.� Intheearlystagesofanincident,wherethoseinvolvedareleavingthescene,itmaynotbepracticabletoestablishanSRCbecauseofothermorepressingprimaryresponsibilities,e.g.life-saving.

9.7.2 Thosewhohavebeeninvolvedintheincidentmaybeabletoprovideimportantinformation/evidenceinrelationtotheevent.Wherepracticable,survivorsandwitnessesshouldbedirectedtotheSRC.Hereinvestigatorscanbegintointerviewwitnessesand

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forensicmanagerscanassistwiththecollectionofevidence.Policewillsupplyadocumentationteam,whowillpassondetailstotheCentralCasualtyBureau.Apolicesecurityteamwillalsobedeployedatthecentre.

9.7.3 Theimportanceoftheabovecommentscannotbeover-emphasized.

9.8 Friends’ and relatives’ reception centre

9.8.� Wheredemandwarrantsit,considerationshouldbegiventoestablishingasecure,comfortableareawherefriendsandrelativesofcasualtiesandmissingpersonscanbedirectedforinformation.

9.8.2 Thesizeandscaleoftheincident,numberoffatalitiesandpossiblytheareaofdestructionwillaffectanydecisionsmade.Withintheareatobesetasideforthefriends’andrelatives’receptioncentre,considerationshouldbegiventolocatingtherelevantagencieswhoseadviceandassistancemaybecalledupon.

9.8.3 Therewillbeaneedtoensurethattheresourcesofallthoseworkingtowardstheneedsoffamilyandfriendsareco-ordinatedandthatthereareregularbriefingstoensureacohesiveapproachisestablished.

9.9 Central Casualty Bureau

9.9.� Policemayestablishacasualtybureauwheredetailsofalldead,casualties,survivorsandevacueeswillbecollated.Thiscentrewillalsotaketelephoneenquiriesfromthefriendsandrelativesofpeoplewhoarebelievedtobeinvolvedintheincident.

9.9.2 Casualtybureaustaffwillthenmatchdetailsofpersonsinvolvedwithenquiries.

9.9.3 Whereamatchismade,appropriatecontactwiththeenquirerwillbemade.

9.9.4 Thecasualtybureauwillnotcloseuntilallthecasualtieshavebeenidentified,allnext-of-kinhavebeeninformedandtelephoneenquirieshavediminishedtoalevelwheretheycanbedealtwithbythelocalpolicearea.

9.9.5 Toavoiddiscrepanciesincasualtyfiguresallinformationmustberoutedthroughthecasualtybureau,whichwillbethesolesourceofcasualtyinformation.CasualtyfiguresmustonlybereleasedfollowingconsultationwithPoliceGoldortheirpressofficers.

9.9.6 Whereinjuriesarefatalorserious,contactshouldbemadewiththefamilyliaisonofficerco-ordinatortodiscusswhetheritisappropriatetoappointafamilyliaisonofficeratthisstage.

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10.1 Police helicopters

�0.�.� TheMetropolitanPoliceService(MPS),CityofLondonPolice(COLP)operatehelicoptersoverthewholeoftheGreaterLondonarea.

Theiraircrafthavethefollowingequipment:

comprehensiveradiocommunications,includingairtrafficcontrolwavebandtoeasecommunicationswithotheremergencyresponseaircraft;

visualandthermalimagingequipment,effectivedayandnight;

asearchlight(‘Nitesun’)capableofilluminatingawideareaandforimmediaterescueneeds,operatingat800feetforminimalgrounddisturbance;

apublicaddresssystem(‘Skyshout’)capableofbroadcastingmessagesataloweroperatingheight;

videotransmissionequipmenttoground-basedreceivingstationswhichincludebothMPSandLondonFireBrigade(LFB)commandvehicles.Mobilereceiversarealsoavailablewhichincertaincircumstancescanbedeliveredclosetothescenebytheaircraftorcollectedfromthebase;and

digitalandwet-filmstillscameras.

�0.�.2 Helicopterscanprovidethefollowingsupportfacilities:

immediateoverviewofscene,includingthesizeoftheaffectedarea,ancillaryfactorsandsoon;

casualtysearch/assessmentofnumbers;

identificationofpresentorpotentialhazards;

weatherconditions,includingwinddirectionatscene;

areacontainment,includingcordondeployment/infringement;

trafficmanagement/routeplanningschemes;and

evidentialimageryofscene,includingphotographs,video,thermalimaginganddetailedtargetanalysis.

10.2 Military helicopters

�0.2.� RAFSearchandRescue(SAR)helicoptersareavailabletorespondtocivilincidentsandcould,forexample,assistinthetransferofurgentcasualtiestohospitalsoutsideLondonifthiswerenecessary.Thesehelicoptersareequippedtowinchsurvivorsfromtheseaorriverandcancarryseveralstretchercases.Theycanconductsearchesvisuallyandbyusingradarandinfra-redequipment.

�0.2.2 ThenearestRAFSARhelicopterbasetoLondonisatWattishaminSuffolk,about40–45minutes’reactionandflyingtimefromcentralLondon.Thepresenceofsuitablelandingsitesadjacenttotheincidentisaprerequisiteforcasualtyevacuation.

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�0.2.3 RAFSARhelicoptersarealertedbytheAeronauticalRescueCo-ordinationCentre(ARCC),locatedatRAFKinlossinScotland.

�0.2.4 NoMilitaryAidtotheCivilAuthority(MACA)processisrequiredfortheemergencycalloutofSARhelicopters.

�0.2.5 Inaddition,RAFsupporthelicopters(fromRAFOdihaminHampshireandRAFBensoninOxfordshire)couldbeusedfortheevacuationoflargernumbersofseriouscasualties.TheuseofsupporthelicopterswouldbesubjecttoMACAproceduresandwoulddependontheavailabilityofthesehelicopters.

10.3 Helicopter Emergency Medical Service (HEMS)

�0.3.� Whereanincidentoccurswhichinvolvesaveryhighnumberofcasualtiesitmaybenecessaryforsomeofthemtobetakentoahospitalsomedistancefromthescene.InsuchcasestheambulancecontrolwillliaisewithHEMSand,incertaincircumstances,themilitary.

�0.3.2 HEMSmayalsobemobilisedtoanycasualtyrequiringadvancedtraumalifesupportfromtheon-boarddoctorandparamedic(s).

�0.3.3 HEMSisavailabletolandatapredeterminedlocationandprovideatleastonedoctorandtrainedparamedictothescene.Thehelicoptercanalsobeusedtoferryadditionaldoctorsandresourcesaswellasevacuatesinglecasualties.

�0.3.4 TheemergencyserviceswillconsultpriortoHEMSdeployment.

10.4 HM Coastguard search and rescue helicopters

�0.4.� HMCoastguardSARhelicoptersmayalsobecalledupontoassistinmarineorlandrescueincidentsintheLondonarea.Coastguardhelicoptersareequippedtowinchpeoplefromthewaterorfromvesselsandcancarryseatedandstretchercasualties.Theyarefittedwithinfraredequipmenttoassistlocationofcasualtiesinthewaterinpoorvisibilityandatnight.

�0.4.2 HMCoastguardhelicoptersarealertedthroughLCGformarineincidentsandbytheMPSthroughtheARCCatRAFKinlossforlandincidents.

10.5 Temporary heli-pads

�0.5.� Temporaryheli-padsmightneedtobeidentifiedwithconsiderationfor:

safetyofcrewandaircraftfromobstructionssuchaswires,unitmastsandunsuitableterrain;

safetyfromharmfulchemicalrelease,fire/smoke;

accesstovehicle;and

disturbanceofdebris/evidenceordisruptionbyexcessivenoise.

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10.6 Emergency flying restrictions

�0.6.� Policehavethefacility,throughtheCivilAviationAuthority(CAA),torequesttheimpositionoftemporaryemergencyflyingrestrictionsoverthesceneofanincidentundercertaincircumstances.Themostlikelyreasonwouldbethesafetyofthoseintheairorontheground.RequestsfortemporaryemergencyflyingrestrictionsshouldbemadethroughthePoliceSilver,whowillreviewthenecessityforsuchrestrictionsatregularintervals.

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11.1 Evidence

��.�.� Mostmajorincidentswillbethesubjectofaninvestigation/inquiry,whetherforHMCoroner,apublicinquiry,orcivilorcriminalcourtproceedings,thereforeevidencecollectedshouldbeofthebestpossiblequality.

��.�.2 Inordertogathersuchevidencethescenemustbesecuredassoonaspossibleandanythingwhichcanbereasonablyanticipatedtoberequiredasevidenceshouldbepreservedandnotdamaged,movedordisposedofwithoutreferencetotheleadinginvestigator.

��.�.3 Dependinguponthenatureoftheincidentseveraldifferentagenciesmaycarryoutindependentinvestigation.Protocolsandaframeworkforeffectiveliaisonhavebeenagreedwiththefollowingbodies:

AirAccidentInvestigationBranch;

MarineAccidentInvestigationBranch;

RailAccidentInvestigationBranch;and

HealthandSafetyExecutive.

NB: They require the early notification of an incident in order to co-ordinate its response. Thelistofagenciesisnotexhaustiveandthetypeofincidentwilldictatethoseagenciesthatmaywellhaveaninvestigationinput.

��.�.4 Aerialphotography,bothvideoandstills,canhelpthroughouttheincidentinrecordingthesceneforevidentialpurposes,aswillanyotherphotographicevidenceavailable.

11.2 Police responsibilities

��.2.� Inallsuspectedterrorist-relatedincidentsTheMPSCounterTerrorismCommandSO�5willlead.

��.2.2 BritishTransportPolice(BTP)willleadinrailwayincidentsotherthanthoserelatingtomurderorterrorism.Wheretheincidentisofsuchascaleortherearespecialreasons,ajointteamofBTPandlocalpolicemaybeformed,followingdiscussionsbetweenseniorofficersofbothservices.

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12.1 Health and safety

�2.�.� Anappropriatehealthandsafetymanagementstructurewillbeenforced.Theresponsibilityforhealthandsafetyofstaffatamajorincidentrestswitheachagency.TheLondonFireBrigade(LFB)isresponsibleforsafetymanagementwithintheinnercordonandadvicegivenmustbeactedonbyallemergencyservices.

�2.�.2 RespondingagenciesmaywishtohaveahealthandsafetyprofessionalonthesceneassoonaspossibletoadvisetheirrespectiveSilversandcarryouton-siteriskassessmentsandidentifycontrolmeasuresandsafesystemsofwork.

12.2 Factories and other industrial sites

�2.2.� Theselocationshavearangeofpotentialhazardsincludingsubstancesthatareflammable,reactive,explosiveortoxic.Sometimesthehazardsaremultiple(forexampleflammableandtoxic)andmayinvolvecorrosiveorradioactivematerials.ForsomesitestherearespecificemergencyplansmadeundertheControlofMajorAccidentHazards(COMAH)Regulations�999.

�2.2.2 InthecontextofCOMAHincidents,theterm‘majoraccident’isusedbythoseagenciesinvolvedandshouldnotbeconfusedwiththeterm‘majorincident’.AmajoraccidentnecessarilyentailstheinvokingoftheCOMAHplan. ‘Major accident’ means an occurrence (including in particular, a major emission, fire or explosion) resulting from uncontrolled developments in the course of the operation of any establishment and leading to serious danger to human health or the environment, immediate or delayed, inside or outside the establishment, and involving one or more dangerous substances.

�2.2.3 Enforcingauthorities,includingtheHealthandSafetyExecutive,willneedaccesstosuchlocationsfollowingmajoraccidentsandmayneedtogatherevidence.

12.3 Fire Brigade ‘HAZMAT’ officers

�2.3.� CertainfireofficerswhohavecompletedtheHazardousMaterialandEnvironmentalProtectionCourseattheFireServiceCollegewillbenominatedashazardousmaterials‘HAZMAT’officers.

�2.3.2 ‘HAZMAT’officersarenowmobilisedtoallconfirmedchemicalincidents.TheywillliaisewiththeLondonFireBrigade(LFB)scientificadvisor.AtradiationincidentsHAZMATofficerswillcarryouttheroleofradiationprotectionsupervisorsandtheLFBscientificadvisorwillcarryouttheroleofradiationprotectionadvisorinaccordancewiththeIonisingRadiationRegulations�985.

12.4 Rail incidents – safe systems of work

�2.4.� Thesafetyofpersonnelisparamountwhenworkingonornearthetrack.

�2.4.2 Withrailaccidentstherailinfrastructurecontrollerhasakeyresponsibilityintermsofsitesafety.Theyshouldinteractwiththeemergencyservices.

12. Safety

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�2.4.3 Personnelmustalwayswearhigh-visibilityclothingwhenworkingonornearthetrack.Thenumberofpersonnelworkingatthesceneshouldbekepttoaminimum.

�2.4.4 Therearemanypotentialdangerswhenworkinginarailenvironment.Emergencyservicepersonnelshouldnotgoonornearthelineexceptinanemergency.Servicesshouldfollowexistingagreementswithrailwayoperators.

�2.4.5 Arequestfor‘poweroff’shouldalsoinclude‘trainsstopped’andstatetheareathatthisisrequestedfor.‘Poweroff’avertsthedangerofelectrocution,butitmustberealisedthatmerelyhavingthepowerswitchedoffmaynothavetheeffectofstoppingtrains:

assoonasthepoweristurnedofftrainsoperatedbyelectricitywillcoasttotheneareststation,shouldthesignallingallow;and

diesel-poweredtrains,forexample,arenotdependentonelectricpowerandoftenrunonthesametrackaselectrifiedtrains.

�2.4.6 Arequestfortrainsstoppedand/orpoweroffshouldbepassedthroughtheappropriaterailinfrastructurecontrolviatheemergencyservices’controlroomsortherailincidentofficer(RIO)onsite.Thissamecontrolwillconfirmthattherequesthasbeencarriedout.

�2.4.7 Thereisaneedtobeclearwhichrailorganisationcontrolsthetrackinvolved.NetworkRailcontrolsthelargestamountofrailway,soonNetworkRail-controlledinfrastructureNetworkRailwillbetheleadauthorityfortherailindustryatrailincidentsandwillprotectthesceneinconsultationwiththeemergencyservices.TherailrepresentativeonsiteistheRIO.

�2.4.8 Generally,one,orall,ofthefollowingthreelevelsofcontrolcanbeintroducedasprotectionforthesite:

levelI–slowingtrainsbyrunningthematcaution;

levelII–stoppingtrainsbyuseofsignals;and

levelIII–switchingoffelectricitysupply.

�2.4.9 WithinLondonthereareseveralrailwayoperatingsystems:

NetworkRail/trainoperatingcompanies;(includingtheChannelTunnelRailLink)

LondonUnderground;

DocklandsLightRailway;and

othersystems,e.g.CroydonTramlink.

Itisthereforeessentialthatthoseattendingincidentsareawarewhichofthesystemstheyareattending.

�2.4.�0 Itisobviouslydangeroustogointothevicinityoftherailwaybecauseoftherailwayequipment,electrifiedlines,overheadpowerandthemovementoftrains.

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Safety

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�2.4.�� Automatictrainoperationmaybeoperating,asinthecaseofDocklandsLightRailwayintheareaoftheincident;thereforeitisessentialthattherelevantserviceproceduresarecompliedwith.

12.5 Railway industry

�2.5.� Toensureaneffectiveresponsetoanincidentontherailnetworktheindustrycanprovideinputon:

safetyofpersonnel;

generalsitesafety;

specialistinformationonrollingstockandinfrastructure(tunnels,services,etc.);

specialistinputtoinvestigation;and

recoveryequipmenteitherownedorundercontract.

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Safety

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13.1 Role

�3.�.� Localauthoritieshaveastatutorydutytohavearrangementsinplacetorespondeffectivelytoanemergency.Thiswillinclude:

providingsupportfortheemergencyservices;

providingsupportandcareforthelocalandwidercommunity;

usingresourcestomitigatetheeffectsofanemergency;and

leadingtherecoverystage.

�3.�.2 Duringamajorincidentlocalauthoritieswillmaintaintheirnormalday-to-dayservicestothelocalcommunity.

�3.�.3 Alllocalauthoritiesemployemergencyplanningofficerswhoareabletoplanforandco-ordinatethelocalauthorityresponsetosuchevents.

13.2 Notification and immediate response

�3.2.� Localauthoritieshavepre-identified24-hourcontactnumberstoinitiateresponses.Localauthoritiestaketimetomobiliseandthereforeearlynotificationisrequired.Constantliaisonwithlocalauthoritieswillbenecessaryastheincidentprogresses.

�3.2.2 LocalauthoritieswillprovidethepersonneltooperateGold,SilverandBronzecommandlevelsasnecessaryandtheirresponsewillnormallyincludetheestablishmentofaBoroughEmergencyControlCentre(BECC),fromwhichthelocalauthorityresponsewillbeco-ordinated.

13.3 Local Authority Liaison Officer (LALO)

�3.3.� TheLALOistherepresentativeoftheaffectedborough,isabletoreacttorequestsforlocalauthorityassistanceandistheon-sceneSilverliaisonpointtothelocalauthorityemergencycontrolcentre.

�3.3.2 TheLALOis:

requiredtoattendSilvermeetingsortheJESCCifestablished,torepresentthelocalauthority;

thelinkbetweentheincidentandtheBECC;and

inpossessionofeffectivecommunicationswithseniorlevelsofthelocalauthority.

13.4 Functions

�3.4.� Itisinthelaterstagesofamajorincident(therecoveryperiodandreturntonormality)thatthelocalauthority’sinvolvementmaybeprolongedandextensive.Theservicesandstaffthelocalauthoritymaybeabletoprovidearebaseduponawiderangeofskillsandresourcesdrawnfromitsday-to-dayoperationssuchas:

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Professional

technicalandengineeringadvice;

buildingcontrol;

highwaysservices;and

publichealthandenvironmentalissues.

Physical resources

provisionofreceptioncentres;

rehousingandaccommodationneeds;and

transport.

caring

socialservices;

psychosocialsupport;

helplines;and

welfareandfinancialneeds.

13.5 Recovery

�3.5.� Astheincidentprogressestowardstherecoveryphase,theemergencyserviceswillneedtoconsideraformalhandovertothelocalauthorityinordertofacilitatetheauthority’sleadingroleinthereturntonormality,therehabilitationofthecommunityandrestorationoftheenvironmentinaccordancewithnon-statutoryguidancetotheCivilContingenciesAct2004(EmergencyResponseandRecovery).

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14.1 Voluntary aid societies (VAS)

�4.�.� TherearenumerousVASwhichcancontributetowardsthesuccessfuloutcomeofanincident.Theirsupportataneventcanoftenalleviatesomepressureonthestatutorybodiesbyprovidinghumanitarianservices.Thisisespeciallysoduringtheconsolidationandrecoveryphaseswhenfire,policeandambulancepersonnelarefullydeployedelsewhere.

�4.�.2 Listedbelowaresomeofthemoreregularlyusedsocietiesundertheemergencyservicethatinitiatesthem.

London fire brigade

SalvationArmy.

London ambulance Service

BritishAssociationofImmediateCare(BASICS);

BritishRedCrossSociety;

StJohnAmbulance;and

SalvationArmy.

Police

Women’sRoyalVoluntaryService(WRVS);and

FirstAidNursingYeomanry(FANY).

OnarrivaltheVASshouldreporttotheSceneAccessControlpriortogoingtotherendezvouspoint.

14.2 Major Incident Multi-faith Plan

�4.2.� TheMajorIncidentMulti-faithPlanhasbeendrawnupinconsultationwiththeLondonEmergencyServicestoenableclergyandrepresentativesofLondoncommunitiestomakeaquickandeffectiveresponseinanymajorincident.Thisplanmustberegardedasaflexibleblueprintandbeadaptedtothedemandsofeachincident.Theplanallowsforfaithcommunitiestoministerandcareforthoseinjuredatthesceneoftheincidentandtooffercareandcomforttofriends,familyandotherscaughtupinthedisaster.

14.3 Utility companies

�4.3.� Theutilitycompaniescanbemobilisedbyanyoftheemergencyservicesandwillnormallybeco-ordinatedbypoliceinthefirstinstance.

�4.3.2 Theyareabletocontrolgas,waterandelectricalsupplies.Theycanalsoprovidecommunicationsfacilities.

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15.1 Introduction

�5.�.� Amajorincidentinvolvingthejointworkoftheemergencyservicesinthecapitalwillinevitablyattractsignificantandsustainedinterestfrombothnationalandinternationalmedia.

�5.�.2 Itisimportantthatindealingwiththedemandsofthemedia,pressofficersfromtheemergencyservicesliaiseandconsulteffectivelywitheachotherwhilstrespectingthedifferingrolesoftheirindividualservices.

�5.�.3 Themediacanbeausefulmechanismtocommunicateessentialadvicetothepublicabouthowtheincidentcouldaffectthemandwhatactionstheycantake.

15.2 Holding statements

�5.2.� Onceamajorincidenthasbeendeclaredalltheemergencyservicesinvolvedwillbeunderpressuretoprovideanimmediatestatement.Attheearliestopportunityaholdingstatementwillbeagreedanddisseminatedbythepolicepressofficer.

�5.2.2 Policepressstaffwillthencontacttheircounterpartsintheotheremergencyservices’pressofficestomakethemawareofthestatementandinturnbeinformedoftheinformationpressofficers/staffarereleasingtothemedia.Careshouldbetakenthatthestatementsarenotcontradictoryanddonotimpingeuponorunderminetheactionsoftheotherservices.

�5.2.3 NoinformationshouldbeprovidedtothenewsmediainrelationtoaterroristincidentwithoutauthorityoftheCounterTerrorismCommand.

15.3 Liaison on scene

�5.3.� Pressofficersattendingthesceneoftheincidentshouldseekouttheircounterpartsattheearliestopportunityandestablishregularliaisonsothatcontentiousorconflictinginformationcanbeclarifiedbeforereleasetothemedia.Thisinformationshouldthenbepassedtotheirindividualpressoffices.

15.4 Other agencies

�5.4.� Ifthelocalauthorityisinvolvedindealingwiththeincidentandsendsapressofficertothescene,heorsheshouldbeincorporatedintothepressofficerliaisonprocess.Alternativelypressofficersfromlocalauthoritiescanliaisebytelephonetobeinformedofanymediastatements,whichhaveadirectbearingontheirorganisation.Similarly,anddependingonthenatureofthemajorincident,policepressofficerswillconsultwiththeircounterpartsatotheragencies.

15.5 Gold and Silver co-ordinating group meetings

�5.5.� Ideally,apolicepressofficerwillattendbothGoldandSilverco-ordinatinggroupmeetings.Likewise,itmayalsobenecessaryforseniorpublicaffairsormediaandcommunicationspersonnelfromtheotheremergencyservicestoattendtheGoldgroupmeetings.ItislikelythatLondonAmbulanceService(LAS)andLondonFireBrigade(LFB)pressofficerswillalsoattendtheSilverco-ordinatinggroupmeetings.

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�5.5.2 Thepolicepressofficer–inconsultationwithPoliceGoldorSilver–willtaketheleadonthecontentofsubsequentmediastatementsabouttheincidentasawhole.However,itisimportantthateachemergencyservicehastheopportunitytoensurethatthemediaareawareoftheirfront-linestaff’sactivities.

15.6 Casualty figures

�5.6.� ConfirmedcasualtyfiguresmaybereleasedonlyafterconsultationwithPoliceGoldviahisorherpressofficerorthepressbureau.Itisimportantthatonlyonesetofcasualtyfiguresshouldbereleasedatonetime.Ifthenumberofcasualtiesinvolvedinanincidentrisesoveraperiodoftimethenalltheservices’pressofficersshouldrefrainfromgivingupdatedfiguresuntiltheyhavebeenclearedbyPoliceGold.

�5.6.2 LASpressofficersmayconfirmthegeneralnatureoftypesofinjuries–unlesspolicespecificallyrequestthemnotto–andthehospitalstowhichtheyaretaken,butthenumbersoffatalitiesandthoseseriouslyinjuredshouldonlybegivenwhenclearedbyPoliceGold.

�5.6.3 TheremaybecircumstanceswhenpolicespecificallyrequestLASnottoreleasethenameandlocationofthehospital(s)towhichcasualtieshavebeentaken.Althoughunusual,thiscouldariseinrelationtoallegedcriminals/suspectsandpotentialwitnesses.

15.7 Joint press office

�5.7.� Iftheincidentisofasufficientlyseriousnature,i.e.involvingahighnumberofcasualtiesand/orcontinuingrescueoperationsanditislikelytorunbeyond�2hours,thenconsiderationwillbegiventosettingupajointpressoffice.

15.8 Joint press briefings

�5.8.� IftheemergencyservicesconsideritbeneficialtoholdajointpressbriefingtheseniorpolicepressofficeratthescenewillliaisewiththerelevantSilversandtheirpressofficerstoagreeasuitableformatandidentifyanycontentiousissuesandhowtheycanbedealtwith.

�5.8.2 Thefollowingdivisionofareasofresponsibilityissuggestedforthebriefing.

�5.8.3 Police*–Overallresponsetotheincident;thenumberofcasualties;howtheemergencyservicescoped/arecoping;casualtybureautelephonenumber(ifissued);anycriminalinvestigations(exceptincidentsontherailway);localdisruption(pastandcontinuing);praiseforlocalpeoplewhomayhaveassistedinrescueoperations;heroicactionsbypoliceofficers.

*The City of London Police has mechanisms in place with the MPS, in the event of either a cross-border incident or where assistance is requested from either police service, in relation to staffing casualty bureau or providing operational help. In the event of a major incident there would be full co-operation and assistance to and from the City of London Police.

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5�

�5.8.4 LFB–Therescueoperation;howmanypeopleweretrappedandinwhatcircumstances;thelevelintermsofappliancesandpersonnel;whatequipmentwasneededtofreepeopleand(whererelevant)specificinformationrelatedtoflooding,firesorchemicalincidents;heroicactionsbyfireofficers.

�5.8.5 LAS–Thelevelandseriousnessofinjuries;wherecasualtiesweretaken;howmanyambulancesandmedicalstaffwereinvolved;whetherHEMS(airambulance)wasused;heroicactionsbyambulancepersonnel.

�5.8.6 BritishTransportPolice(BTP)(incidentsonrailwayonly)–Detailsofanycriminalinvestigation;disruptiontotherailway;detailsaboutpotentialpublicinquiries;heroicactionsbyBTPandrailwaystaff.

15.9 Media centres

�5.9.� Iftheincidentisonalargescaleandislikelytoattractasignificantmediapresencefordaysorevenweeks,pressofficersshouldconsiderwhetheritwouldbebeneficialtoestablishamediacentrenearthescene.

�5.9.2 Suchacentregivesjournalistsabasetooperatefrom,shelterfromtheelementsand(ideally)providestoiletandrefreshmentfacilities.Theadvantagestotheemergencyservicesincludeimprovedcommunicationsandspeedyorganisationofbriefingsandinterviews.

�5.9.3 Localauthoritieskeeplistsofavailablebuildingsintheirareasandwillassistinidentifyingasuitablevenuesuchasaschoolorchurchhall,preferablywithalargeexteriorareawhereheavyequipmentsuchasoutsidebroadcastingunitscanbeparked.

15.10 Press debrief

�5.�0.� Headsoftheemergencyservices’mediadepartmentswilldecideiftheincidentwarrantsapost-incidentdebriefwiththerelevantpressofficerswhowereinvolved.Ifsuchadebriefisheld,representativesfromthevariouspressofficesshouldconsiderproducingabriefingnotefortheircolleagues,evaluatingmediacoverageandidentifyingbestpracticeandanylessonsthathavebeenlearnedwhichcouldassistpressofficersattendingsimilarincidentsinthefuture.

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�6.�.� Itistobeexpectedthatanyoccupierofpremiseswithinacordonedarea,betheyresidentialorbusinessoccupiers,wouldwanttogainaccesstotheirpremisesassoonaspossible.Itshouldbenotedthattheterm‘premises’couldbeextendedtoincludeextensivesitesandindustrialareaswhereamajorincidentmayhaveoccurredandaffecteddailybusiness,e.g.railnetworks,chemicalsites,airports.

�6.�.2 Respondingagencieswillwishtorestoreasmuchnormalityaspossibleasquicklyastheycan.

�6.�.3 Theareaaroundamajorincidentisapotentialcrimesceneandthepoliceandotherinvestigatorsneedtocarryoutapainstakingenquirytogainmaterialevidence.Thiscouldtakesometimeand,duringthatperiod,peoplewillbeexcludedfromtheareasothatvitalevidenceisnotlost.

�6.�.4 Damagecausedbytheincidentmaymaketheareaunsafetoenter.ThelocalauthoritywouldexerciseitspowersundertheBuildingActtoremovethoseimminentdangersthatrepresentamajorsafetyhazard.Itmaybeconsideredunsafetoallowownerstomoveinandattempttodealwiththeirpropertiessimultaneously.Insuchcases,intheinterestofpublicsafety,thelocalauthoritymayengageapprovedcontractorstoboardupandcommencerepairwork.

16.2 The inner cordon

�6.2.� Aninnercordonmaywellbeinplaceforaprolongedperiod.However,theboundariescouldberedrawnoncethesearchforevidencehasbeencompleted,buttheimmediateareamaybeoutofboundsfordaysor,insomeinstances,weeks.

�6.2.2 TheLondonFireBrigade(LFB)isresponsibleforsafetywithintheinnercordon.SubjecttoLFBandallrelevantsafetyadvice,policemayallowalimitednumberofpeopletoentertheirpremisestoundertakedamageassessmentorretrievalofsomeitemsforafewminutesorhours.

16.3 The outer cordon

�6.3.� Thepolicewillaimtokeepdrawingintheoutercordonsothat,atanytime,onlyareasthathaveyettobeclearedforsafetyarewithinit.Aspremisesareprogressivelyfreedfromthecordon,occupierswillneedtobeonhandtosecuretheirpremisesassoonastheyarereleased.

�6.3.2 Thepolice,assistedbythelocalauthority,willensurethatoccupierslikelytobeaffectedaregivensufficientadvancenoticeofthemovementofthecordonboundaries.

�6.3.3 during a prolonged incident the redefining of cordon areas will be continually reassessed.

16. Occupiers’ response to an incident

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53

�7.3.� Atsomestage,whentheincidenthasended,eachoftheservicesandagenciesinvolvedintheincidentwillholdaseriesofoperationaldebriefs.Initiallythesewillbeconfinedtoeachparticularservice,butlateramulti-agencydebriefwillbeheldandlessonslearnedwillbeincorporatedintothisManualandotherservicemanuals,asappropriate.

�7.3.2 Multi-agencydebriefsshouldconsiderthecontributionprovidedbyother,non-emergencyserviceagenciestoexpandtheknowledgeandlearningprocessthatdebriefsshouldcollate.Thisisnotwithstandingthepotentialconflictofinterestthatmayresultinlaterinvestigations.Thisaspectshouldbeconsideredwheninvitingagenciesotherthanemergencyservicestothedebrief.

�7.3.3 Operationaldebriefsshouldnotbeconfusedwithdiffusingwelfaresessionsforstaff,whichshouldformpartofthetraumasupportprogrammesarrangedbyindividualorganisations.

�7.3.4 Thethrustofanysuchdebriefswouldbetoidentifyareasforimprovementinprocedures,equipmentandsystems.Theyshouldnotbeforumsforcriticisingtheperformanceofothers.

�7.3.5 Debriefsshouldnotinterferewithorcommentoninvestigationsintotheincidentcarriedoutbyinvestigativeorjudicialauthorities.

�7.3.6 Itisimportanttorealisethatsuchdebriefsandrelateddocumentswouldbedisclosabletoindividualsinvolvedinlegalproceedings.

17. Debriefing

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�8.�.� Recentincidentshaveshownthatwelfareandtraumasupportshouldbemadeavailabletostaffoforganisationsdeployedinmajorincidentscenarios.Thissupportshouldbeavailablefromtheveryoutsetandearlystagesoftheincidentwhererequired,andifrequestedbyindividualorganisations.Theresponsibilityforidentifyingtheneedforwelfaresupportrestsjointlywiththeindividuals,theirmanagersandthedepartmentwithineachorganisationwithresponsibilityforstaffwelfare.

�8.�.2 Thosewhoareparticularlytraumatisedwillrequireskilledprofessionalhelpandthisisnowprovidedbyalltheservicesinvolved.Arrangementsforthismustbemadeinawaythatensuresconfidentialityandovercomestheculturalresistanceintheemergencyservicestosuchastep.Thesefacilitiesshouldalsobemadeavailabletosupportstaff,eveniftheyarenotdirectlyinvolvedatthescene,e.g.administrationstaff,driversandcommunicationsstaff.

18. Welfare of responders

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Contents

a: chEMIcaL, bIoLogIcaL, radIoLogIcaL and nucLEar (cbrn) dEvIcES . . . . . . . . . . . . .56

A.� Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56

b: IncIdEntS on raILWayS (PoLIcE IntEr-SErvIcE co-oPEratIon) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .58

B.� Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .58

c: aIrcraft IncIdEntS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60

C.� Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60

C.2 Specificsitehazards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60

C.3 Organisationsinvolved. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60

C.4 Aircraftincidentcategories. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6�

d: rIvEr thaMES IncIdEnt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63

D.� Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63

D.2 Mainfunctionsoftheemergencyservicesandotheragencies..............................63

D.3 Scenemanagement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64

E: fLoodIng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .68

E.� Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .68

E.2 Typesofflooding..................................................................68

E.3 Floodwarnings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .68

E.4 Rolesandresponsibilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69

E.5 Planningandresponseissues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .70

f: MILItary aSSIStancE to a Major London IncIdEnt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71

F.� References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7�

F.2 Policy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7�

F.3 ThreecategoriesofMACC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7�

F.4 ThreeprinciplesguidingtheprovisionofMACC:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7�

F.5 Authoritytodeploy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7�

F.6 Reactiontoan‘immediateimpact’emergency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .72

F.7 Generalcapabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .72

F.8 Reactiontoa‘risingtide’emergency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73

F.9 Costs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73

g: gLoSSary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75

h: gLoSSary of MarInE tErMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .80

APPENDICES


56

A.1 Introduction

A.�.� InrecentyearstherehasbeenanincreasedawarenessofthethreatposedbyaCBRNterroristattack.Itisanticipatedthattheterroristmayuseadevicetoreleasehazardousmaterials.Thethreatfromsuchadeviceissignificant,notonlyasaresultofitsactivationbutalsointhefearandpanicthatitwouldcreatewithinsociety.

A.�.2 ThefollowingarebriefdescriptionsofCBRNdevices:

c – chemical.Thesedeviceswillcontainsomeformofchemicalagent,theeffectsofwhichrangefromcausingwateryeyes,blisteringtotheskinthrough,intheworst-casescenario,toinstantaneousdeath.ExamplesareCS,SarinandMustardGas.

b – biological.Thesedevicescontainsomeformofbiologicalagent.Theeffectsofthistypeofdevicearenotimmediatelyapparentasthebiologicalagentmaytakeanumberofdaysorevenweekstoincubateinaninfectedvictim.However,theresultofexposureandsubsequentinfectioncanrangefromflu-likesymptomsthrough,inextremecases,todeath.Examplesareanthrax,choleraandebola.

r – radiological.Thesedevicesmaycontainaquantityofradioactivematerialasapartofaconventionalexplosivedevice.Ondetonationtheradioactivematerialisspreadoverlargedistances,makingtheareaunsafetohumansuntilithasbeenclearedup.Exposedindividualsarelikelytobeexternallyandinternallycontaminatedwithradioactivematerial.Dependingonthereceiveddosetheremaybeshort-term(e.g.radiationsickness)andlong-term(e.g.cancer)effectsfromsuchanexposure.

n – nuclear.Thesedevicestakeconsiderablescientificexpertisetocreateandthemostlikelysourceofsuchadeviceistheexistingnuclearstockpileacrosstheworld.

A.�.3 Thepresenceofaradiologicalornucleardevicecaneasilybedetectedbyequipmentthatmeasuresradiationlevels,evenbeforethedevicehasdetonated.Surveymetersandelectronicpersonaldosemetersareexamplesofsuchequipment.

A.�.4 Thepresenceofchemicalorbiologicalagentsishardertodetectpriortorelease.However,onceactivated,theeffectsofachemicaldevicearelikelytocreateanimmediatereactionfromthevictims.Inthecaseofabiologicaldevicetheeffectswillnotbeimmediatelyvisibleafteractivation.

A.�.5 AnLESLPresponseinlinewiththeprocedurelaidoutinthisManualwillberequiredforbothpre-andpost-activationofasuspectedCBRNdevice.Allthreeemergencyserviceshavepersonnelwhohavebeentrainedandequippedtodealwiththespecialistresponsethatisrequiredforsuchanincident.

A.�.6 ThemainfunctionsoftheemergencyservicesandotheragenciesataCBRNincidentarethesameasthoselaidoutinSection3ofthisManual.However,boththeLondonAmbulanceService(LAS)andLondonFireBrigade(LFB)haveadditionalresponsibilitiesspecifictothedecontaminationprocess.

Appendix A: Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) devices

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a.1.7 definition of decontamination

decontamination istheprocedureemployedtoremovehazardousmaterialsfrompeopleandequipment.

clinical decontamination isthemedicalproceduretotreatpatientsaffectedbyorcontaminatedwithhazardousmaterials.TheprioritisationofcasualtiespriortodecontaminationrequirestheinputofspecialistNationalHealthService(NHS)staff.

Emergency decontamination isaprocedurecarriedoutwhentimedoesnotallowforthedeploymentofspecialistNHSresourcesanditisjudgedasimperativethatdecontaminationofpeopleiscarriedoutassoonaspossible.Improvisedequipmentmaybeusedinlieuofdedicatedfacilitieswhereitisimperativetoremovehazardousmaterialassoonaspossible.Itisrecognisedbyallagenciesthattheimplementationofemergencydecontaminationmaycarryriskstocertaingroups,forexample,theelderly,theinfirmandtheinjured.Irrespectiveofwhichagencycommencesdecontamination,theprocessshouldfallundertheclinicalcontroloftheNHSassoonaspracticabletoensurethesafemanagementofcasualties.

Mass decontamination istheproceduretodecontaminatepeoplewhentheNHS,ortheLASonitsbehalf,hasidentifiedtotheLFBthatthenumberrequiringdecontaminationhasoverwhelmed,orthreatenstooverwhelm,theHealthService’scapacity.ItmaybefortheLFBtoinitiatemassdecontaminationprocedurespriortothearrivaloftheNHSorincircumstanceswherespecialistNHSresourcesarenotimmediatelyavailable.Thismaybecarriedoutbyimprovisingwithavailableequipmentandfacilitiesuntildedicatedsupportingfacilitiescanberesourced.Itwillbeimportanttoestablishbasictriagearrangements,involvingbothLASandLFBpersonnel,assoonaspossible.

Appendix A: Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) devices

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B.1 Introduction

B.�.� ThefollowingsectionoutlinesanagreementthathasbeenreachednationallybetweenBritishTransportPolice(BTP)andallHomeOfficeforces.Itrepeatsprinciplesofresponsibilitywhichhaveworkedwellinthepast,butwhichshouldbeconsideredflexibleascircumstancesdemand.

B.�.2 Allofficersarrivingatthescenewillreporttotheseniorofficerpresent.Thatofficer,whetherfromBTP,MetropolitanPoliceService(MPS)orCityofLondonPolice(COLP)willperformthefunctionofPoliceSilver.WherethefirstsupervisortoarriveisfromtheMPSorCOLP,itisrecommendedthatthefirstBTPofficertoarrivebeappointedasliaisonofficer,wheretheirspecialistknowledgewillproveuseful.

B.�.3 ItisessentialthatthepoliceresponsebythelocalforceandBTPisco-ordinatedsothattherearenowastedresourcesorduplicationofroles.

B.�.4 ThefirstofficerofInspectorrankorabovefromeitherforcewillassumetheroleofSilver,takingresponsibilityfortheinitialco-ordinationanddeploymentofresourcesfromeachforce.

B.�.5 Onthearrivaloftheircounterpartfromtheotherforcetheywillworktogetherformingateamthatensurestheresources,equipmentandcommunicationsofbothforcesareusedinthemosteffectiveway.

B.�.6 Inbroadterms,theresponsibilityofeachforceis:

BTPon-site,

MPSor

COLPoff-site.

Thespecificresponsibilitiesbelowaresuggestedasaguideanditisemphasisedthatjustaseachincidentandtheresourcesavailablewillbedifferentineachcasesoflexibility,discussionandmutualco-operationareessentialtoensuretheco-ordinatedresponsediscussedearlier.

B.�.7 TheLFBhasaccesstoChannel5communicationsonallsub-surfacerailwaynetworks,whichcanbemadeavailableforusebyotheremergencyservices.

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Appendix B: Incidents on railways (police inter-service co-operation)

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Police responsibilities: Incidents on railways

responsibility force

OverallIncidentCommander(Gold) HomeOfficeforcewithBTPseniorofficerworkinginconjunctionadvisingonBTP/railwaymattersandpresentatco-ordinatinggroupmeetings

Investigation Exceptinthecaseofterrorismormurder,BTPwillberesponsibleforinvestigatingtheincident.Whereanincidentisofsuchmagnitudeortherearespecialreasonswherebyajointteamshouldbeformed,thiswillbedoneafterdiscussionsbetweenseniorofficersofbothforces

Innercordonandmattersonrailwayproperty BTP

Outercordon MPS/COLP

Removalofbodies Theremovalofallbodiesfromthescenemustbeco-ordinatedbyMPSorCOLP,whicheverserviceeffectstheremoval

Mortuary MPS/COLP

Casualtybureauandidentification MPS/COLP–BTPliaison

Propertyofdeceased MPS/COLP

Propertyfromscene BTP

Press/media Jointresponsethroughco-ordinatinggroup

Traffic(road) MPS/COLP

Hospitaldocumentation MPS/COLPwithBTPassistanceifnecessary

Appendix B: Incidents on railways (police inter-service co-operation)

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C.1 Introduction

C.�.� Amajorairincidentisbyitsverynatureanextremelysuddenandcatastrophicevent,placingalltheorganisationsconcernedwiththeresponseunderintensepressure.Thescaleofsucheventsmeanstheireffectsoftencrossadministrativeboundariesandinvolveamassiveandlengthyrecoveryoperation.

C.�.2 MajorincidentsinvolvingaircraftthatoccurwithinairfieldboundarieswillinvolvealocalresponsebaseduponCivilAviationAuthoritydirections.

C.2 Specific site hazards

C.2.� Amajorairaccidentwillproduceatoxicenvironmentatthesceneandallservicesrespondingshouldbeawareoftheneedforextraattentiontotheidentificationofpotentialhazardsandtheprotectionoftheirstaff.Acrashedaircraftshouldbeapproachedfromanupwinddirectionwhetherthereisafireornot,duetothepotentialspreadoftoxicsubstances.

C.2.2 InadditiontotheLondonFireBrigade,boththeAirAccidentsInvestigationBranch(AAIB)andRAF/RNareabletoadviseonpotentialhazardsfromcrashedaircraftandthematerialspresentinspecificaircrafttypes.TheRAFAircraftRecoveryandTransportationFlight(ARTF)atRAFStAthan,Wales,canprovidetherelevantinformationformilitaryfixedwingaircraft,whiletheRNMobileAircraftSupportUnitatRNAYFleetlands,Gosport,canprovidesimilarinformationformilitaryhelicopters.ThisinformationcanalsobeobtainedviatheAeronauticalRescueCoordinationCentreatRAFKinloss.Theycanfaxhazardinformationtoanyemergencyserviceonrequest.

C.3 Organisations involved

air accidents Investigation branch

C.3.� TheAAIBinvestigatesallcivilaircraftaccidentsthatoccurintheUKandhelpsintheinvestigationofmilitaryaccidentsattherequestoftheMinistryofDefence.ThereareanumberofstatutorypowersassociatedwiththisrolethroughtheCivilAviation(InvestigationofAccidents)Regulations�989.TheseregulationsgavetheAAIBpowersofinvestigationrelatingtothemanagementofthescene.CloseliaisonbetweentheAAIBinvestigatorsandtheemergencyservicesatthesceneisessentialattheearliestpossibleopportunity.

C.3.2 ThepolicewillberesponsibleforcontactingtheAAIBonbeinginformedofanincident.TheinitialAAIBresponsetoamajorairaccidentwillconsistofasmallteamofpilotsandengineerswhowillworkwithRAFpathologists,wherenecessary.Thepoliceinvestigationwillbecarriedoutincloseco-operationwiththeAAIB.

british airways’ Emergency Procedures Information centre (EPIc)

C.3.3 EPICactsasacentralairlineinformationco-ordinatingpoint.Itcollatesinformationfromairlineservicesworldwide,includingdetailsofallpassengers,crewandbaggage.MostairlinesoperatingthroughtheUKsubscribetoEPIC,whichissituatedatHeathrow.

Appendix C: Aircraft incidents

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C.3.4 EPICactsasaninformationcentrefollowinganincidentandhandlesalargenumberoftelephonecallsthatmightotherwisebedirectedtothePoliceCasualtyBureau.EPICdocumentationisidenticaltotheNationalCasualtyBureaupaperworktoeaseenquiries.

royal air force

C.3.5 TheRAFwilldealwithpost-crashrecoveryforallmilitaryfixed-wingaircraftaccidentsandhasthecapabilitytohelpwithcivilianincidents,whererequested,particularlywithwreckageremovalinlinewithAAIBguidance.TheunitinvolvedistheARTF,basedatRAFStAthaninWales.RAFsearchandrescue(SAR)resourcesmaybealertedbycallingtheAirRescueCo-ordinationCentre(Kinloss)dutyofficer.

royal navy

C.3.6 TheRNwilldealwithallmilitaryrotary-wingaircraftcrashes.TheunitistheMobileAircraftSupportUnitbasedatRNAYFleetlands,Gosport,Hants.

C.4 Aircraft incident categories

C.4.� Inorderfortheemergencyservicesandaerodromeauthoritiestounderstandthenatureofanemergency,theyhavedefinedthefollowingcategoriesforuseduringaprescribedincident.Slightlocalvariationsbetweenaerodromesmayexist,thoughthebroadoutlineofthedefinitionremainsthesame.AirTrafficControl(ATC)willusuallymaketheinitialdecisiononthecategoryofemergency.Subjecttothreatassessmentbythepoliceandaerodromeauthoritytheremaybeoccasionswhenaresponsetoabombwarningisrequiredtoanaircrafteitherintheair,onthegroundorontheaerodromepremises.

full emergency

C.4.2 WhenATCknowsorsuspectsthatanaircraftinflightisindifficultywhich,ifaggravated,couldresultinanaccident.

aircraft ground incident

C.4.3 WhenATCbecomesawareorsuspectsthatanaircraftonthegroundisinvolvedinanincidentofalessernaturethananaircraftaccident.Theincidentmayhavecausedaircraftdamage,orhavethepotentialtoresultinaircraftdamageorputthepassengersandcrewatrisk.

aircraft accident imminent

C.4.4 WhenATCconsidersanaircraftaccidentisinevitable,eitheronorinthevicinityoftheairport.

aircraft accident

C.4.5 WhenATCbecomesawarethatanaircraftaccidenthasoccurredontheairportorwithintheairportboundary.


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aircraft accident off-airport

C.4.6 WhenATCbecomesawarethatanaircraftaccidenthasoccurredbeyondtheairfieldboundary.

full emergency hijack

C.4.7 WhereATCbecomesawarethatapersononanaircraft,bytheuseofforceorthreatofanykind,intendstoseizetheaircraftorexercisescontrolofit.

act of aggression

C.4.8 Anactofterrorism,armedattack,bombattack,hostagesituation(otherthanhijackonanaircraft)orothersimilaractsofterrorismistakingorhastakenplaceonoradjacenttotheaerodromeboundary.


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D.1 Introduction

D.�.� ThereareseveraluniquefeaturesrelatingtothemanagementofanincidentontheriverThames,thereforespecialproceduresapplytomajorincidentsonthetidalriverThames,itscreeksandtributaries.

D.�.2 ThePortofLondonAuthority(PLA)isthestatutoryharbourauthorityforthetidalThamesandisresponsiblefor,inter-alia,facilitatingnavigationalsafetythroughtheregulationofmarineoperationsandtheprovisionofnavigationalinformationandadvice.

D.�.3 TherearesixteenriparianLondonboroughsplustheCityofLondonCorporation(detailsoflocalauthorityassistancearecontainedwithinSection�3).

D.�.4 AcentrelinealongtheriverThamesactsasanadministrativeboundarybetweenadjacentboroughsonthenorthandsouthbanks.AnyincidentoccurringontheriveristhereforelikelytoaffecttwoormoreLondonboroughsand/ortheCityofLondon.

D.2 Main functions of the emergency services and other agencies

d.2.1 hM coastguard

D.2.�.� LondonCoastguard(LCG)willberesponsiblefortheco-ordinationofSearchandRescue(SAR)ontheriverThamesbetweenTeddingtonandCanveyIsland.ThisincludestheactivationanddeploymentofcivilSARresponsetovesselsorpersonsinneedofassistance.

D.2.�.2 ThroughouttheinitialphaseofanincidentHMCoastguardwillmaketacticaldecisionsinrelationtoSAR.

D.2.�.3 ThiswillincludeidentifyingwhichCasualtyLandingPoints(CLP)aremostappropriate.TheywillberesponsibleforcommunicatingCLPlocationstootheragencies.

d.2.2 royal national Lifeboat Institution (rnLI)

D.2.2.� TheRNLI’sprimaryareaofresponsibilityistherescueofpersonsindistress.TheyhavepermanentlystaffedstationsontheriverThames,atGravesend,WaterlooPierandChiswick,eachhavingonefullycrewedlifeboatonstand-by24hoursaday.InadditionafourthstationatTeddingtoniscrewedbyvolunteerswhoareavailable24hoursaday.Theyareco-ordinatedbyLCG.

d.2.3 Metropolitan Police – Marine Support unit (MSu)

D.2.3.� MSUoperatesa24-hourresponsefromitsbaseatWapping,althoughitcanbeassigneddirectfromInformationRoom(IR)intheeventofariverincident.InaSARsituationitandotherrescuecraftareco-ordinatedbyLCG.

D.2.3.2 TheMSUwill,duringtheearlystagesofanyincident,alsoberesponsibleforliaisonbetweenLCGandtheMPSSpecialOperationsRoom(SOR/GT).

D.2.3.3 Land-basedpolice:see3.2.

Appendix D: River Thames incident

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d.2.4 London fire brigade

D.2.4.� TheLFBhastworapidresponsevessels,whichoperate24hours.DuringaSARincidenttheyareco-ordinatedbyLCG.

D.2.4.2 Land-basedfireresponse:see3.3.

d.2.5 London ambulance Service

D.2.5.� Land-basedLondonAmbulanceService:see3.4.

D.2.5.2 InadditionarepresentativefromtheLASwillliaisewithpoliceinrelationtoissuesconnectedwithCLPsandcasualtyclearance.

d.2.6 Port of London authority

D.2.6.� PLAHarbourServicecraftoperateonthetidalriverThamesfromthelowerreachesinKentandEssextoTeddingtonandhavea24-hourcapabilitybelowPutney.Salvage,divingandhydrographicresourcesarebasedatGravesend.

D.2.6.2 TheHarbourMasterhasextensivestatutorypowerstoregulaterivertrafficandtheuseoftheriverbythepublicinanemergencysituation,andwillberesponsiblefortheco-ordinationofallnon-SARincidentswithinPortLimits.

D.2.6.3 LondonVesselTrafficService(LondonVTS),operatedbythePLA,willmaintainthesafetyofnavigationoutsideandaroundtheareaofamajorincident,ifnecessaryimplementingariverclosureoranexclusionzone.LondonVTSprovidesfacilitiesforLCGatWoolwich.

d.2.7 Environment agency

D.2.7.� UpstreamofTeddingtonLocktheriverisnon-tidalandtheEnvironmentAgencyisthenavigationauthority.ThisappendixonlydetailsSOPsforthetidalriverThames,downstreamofTeddington.

d.2.8 assistance of other vessels

D2.8.� Thereisastatutorydutyonthemasterofavesseltogototheassistanceofanothervesselorpersonindistress.Publicinvolvementmaythusplayagreaterrolethanwouldotherwisebeexpectedinaland-basedincident.LCGwouldco-ordinateanysuchassistance.

D.3 Scene management

d.3.1 cordons

D.3.�.� PLA,inconsultationwiththeMSUandLCG,willimplementariverclosureorexclusionzoneandmaintainsafetyofnavigationaroundtheincident.MSU(BronzeRiver)willberesponsibleforpolicingtheincident/crimesceneafterlife-savingissuesarecompleted.

D.3.�.2 Duetothenatureofthetidetheincident/crimescenemaymove.


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D.3.�.3 Landsidecordonswillbeimplementedbypoliceandshouldreflectanymovementofrivercordons.Theywillbeunderthecontroloftherespectiveland-basedsectorBronze.

d.3.2 rendezvous points (rvP)

D.3.2.� RVPsinrelationtoincidentsontheriverwillbedesignatedbypoliceoncethelocationofCLPsareestablished.

D.3.2.2 ConsiderationshouldbegiventoutilisingoneRVPoneachbankoftheriver.

d.3.3 casualty Landing Points

D.3.3.� AccesstotheriverThamesislimited,particularlyatlowtide,andconsequentlyCLPshavebeenidentified.Thesepointsarelistedandcopiessuppliedtoallemergencyservices,riveragenciesandriparianboroughs.Theyhavebeenselectedsothatanycasualty,nomatterhowserioushis/herinjury,canbelandedatanystateofthetide.CLPsareaccessiblebyroadandaregenerallypiers.

D.3.3.2 WhenaSARincidentoccursontheriver,LCGwillidentifythelocationanddesignatesuitableCLPs,consultingifnecessarywiththeotheremergencyservicesandthePLA.TheCLPsmustbeprotectedbyland-basedpoliceresources.

D.3.3.3 AnambulanceofficerwillattendaCLPinordertokeepambulancecontrolup-to-datewiththenumberandconditionofcasualties.

D.3.3.4 ConsiderationmaybegiventoutilisingCLPsonbothsidesoftheriver.

d.3.4 joint Emergency Services control centre (jEScc)

D.3.4.� Duetotidaleffectstheincidentscenemaymove.Itmaybenecessaryinaprotractedincidenttoaltercordonsandaccesspointsastimepasses.ThereforethepositioningofJESCCmustbeselectedwithcare,asitwillnotbepracticaltomoveitoncesetup.

D.3.4.2 TheofficerofeachservicenominatedtoperformthefunctionofSilverwillnormallyoperatefromtheland-basedJESCC,althoughitmaybeconsideredusefulforthemtoboardoneofthevesselstoobtainafirst-handviewofthescene.Theco-ordinatinggroupvisitingthescenecollectivelymaybestachievethis.

D.3.4.3 Duetotheabove-mentioneddifficulties,considerationshouldbegiventoestablishingtheJESCCattheMPSSOR(currentlyreferredtoasGT),oratLondonVTSEmergencyResponseCentre.

D.3.4.4 Intheeventofamajorincidentontheriver,thePLAandHMCoastguardwouldeachsendaliaisonofficertotheJESCC.


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d.3.5 ‘on-scene’ co-ordinator

D.3.5.� Onevessel,aswellasassistingwiththeincident,wouldnormallyundertakethefunctionof‘on-sceneco-ordinator’,reportingbacktoLCGforSARco-ordination.EachvesselwillmaintaincontactwithLCGonthededicatedMarineSARchannelandwithitsownservicecontrol.

D.3.5.2 Theon-sceneco-ordinatingvesselandtheouterrivercordonvesselshould,ideally,beclearlydistinguishablefromothervesselsbyusingblueflashinglights;othervesselswithintheexclusionzoneshouldnotusebluelights.

d.3.6 Scene access control

D.3.6.� River-basedunitsdeployedwithintheexclusionzonewillbeloggedbyLCG.OtherrivertrafficwillbeexcludedbybothLondonVTSandvesselsenforcingriverclosures.

D.3.6.2 Land-basedpoliceareresponsibleformaintainingland-basedcordonsandconsideringthechangingnatureoftheforeshoreduetotidalflow.

d.4.1 additional command and control issues

D.4.�.� BronzewillcontrolanddeploytheresourcesofitsrespectiveservicewithinageographicalsectororspecificroleandimplementthetacticsdefinedbySilver.ThereforeconsiderationshouldbegiventoutilisingtheBronzestructurementionedbelowandwherenecessaryutilisingsupplementaryBronzes.

D.4.�.2 BronzeRiver–willberesponsibleforthedeploymentoftheirrespectiveresourceswithintheriversector.

D.4.�.3 BronzeNorth/South–Itislikelythatland-basedresourceswillattendtheincidentsfrombothsidesoftheriverandthereforeeachservicerespondingtoariver-basedincidentshouldconsiderutilisingaBronzeforbothnorthandsouthbanksoftheriverThames.

d.5.1 communications

D.5.�.� LCGOperationsRoomisco-locatedwithLondonVTSattheThamesBarrierNavigationCentre,WoolwichwithPLAVTSoperations.ItshouldbenotedthatLCGisasingle-personoperatorstation,andintheeventofamajorincidenttheywill,intheinitialstages,concentrateonthetacticaldeploymentofrescuecraft.ImmediatesupportviaalinkisavailabletoLCGfromThamesCoastguardatWaltonontheNaze.

D.5.�.2 Rescuevesselswillbedeployedandco-ordinateddirectfromLCGatLondonVTSusingdedicatedMarineBandVHFradioonChannelZero.ThischannelisfittedtoalldeclaredsearchandrescuecraftincludingMetropolitanPoliceService,MSUandLondonFireBrigade(LFB)vessels.


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D.5.�.3 LCGradiocontactwithland-basedpoliceunitscanbeenabledviatheMETRADIO‘RoyalNationalLifeboatInstitution’channel,whichislinkedviaInformationRoomorGT.ThelinkcanbeopenedwithanyMetropolitanPoliceTalkGrouponrequest.

D.5.�.4 ThePLAcommunications(LondonVTS)areMarineVHFradio,andincludeChannel�4fornavigationalpurposes,andtheinternationaldistressfrequencyChannel�6.

D.5.�.5 LondonVTSbroadcastsnavigationalinformationtoallrivercraft,andintheeventofamajorincidentinstructionsandinformationwouldbetransmittedbythismeans.

D.5.�.6 InformationRoomorGT,LondonAmbulanceServiceControl,LFBControlandMSUWappingallhavedirectlinetelephonelinkswithLCG.LCGisequippedwithMETphonefacilities.


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E.1 Introduction

E.�.� Theeffectsofclimatechangemeanthatfloodingislikelytobecomeanincreasinglycommonevent,whichcouldaffectbothurbanandruralpartsofLondon.FloodingmaybelocalisedbutoccursimultaneouslyacrossLondon,amountingtoaseriesofmajorincidents,whichmaybeshorttermorprotracted.RiversareclassifiedbytheEnvironmentAgencyasmainriversandordinarywatercourses.TheEnvironmentAgencyisresponsibleforthefloodpreventionmeasuresonmainrivers.Ordinarywatercoursesaretheresponsibilityofvariousbodiessuchaslocalauthoritiesandotherlandowners.

E.2 Types of flooding

E.2.� Therearefourtypesofflooding,theresponsestowhicharesimilar:

fluvial;

tidal;

flashfloods;and

burstwatermains.

E.3 Flood warnings

E.3.� TheEnvironmentAgencyisonlyresponsiblefortheissueoffloodwarningsinrespectofmainrivers.Thesewarningsarecategorisedas:

Floodwatch;

Floodwarning;

Severefloodwarning;and

Allclear.

E.3.2 Thesewarningsaresentbyfaxtotheemergencyservices,localauthoritiesandotherprofessionalpartners.ThedefinitionsandactionsrequireduponreceiptofsuchwarningsaretobefoundintheLocalFloodWarningplanandthestrategydocument.Warningsarealsosentbyvariousmeanstopeopleinthelikelyaffectedarea.FurtherinformationcanbeobtainedonFloodLine0845 988 1188.

E.3.3 TheMetOfficeissueswarningsofsevereweather,whichgivewarningofthepossibilityoffloodingfromothersources.

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Appendix E: Flooding

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E.4 Roles and responsibilities

E.4.� ThefollowingareinadditiontotherolesandresponsibilitiesmentionedthroughoutthisManual.

Police

Intheeventoftheagreedproceduresforwarningandinformingcommunitiesatrisknotbeingeffective,then,wherepracticable,assistancewillbegiven.

fire brigade

Givesassistancewithpumpingoperations,dependingonthesituationprevailingatthetime,prioritybeinggiventocallswherefloodinginvolvesarisktolife,offireorexplosionandtocallsfromhospitals,residentialhomesfortheelderly,publicutilitiesandfoodstoragedepots.Toassistotherrelevantagencies,particularlythelocalauthority,tominimisetheeffectsofmajorfloodingonthecommunity.

ambulance

TheLondonAmbulanceService(LAS)maybecomeinvolvedintheevacuationofvulnerablepersonsandsupportingthelocalauthority.ItshouldbenotedthattheLASdoesnotpossessanywaterborneresponsecapability.

Local authority

ProvisionofgeneraladviceandinformationinsupportoftheEnvironmentAgencytothepubliconfloodpreventionmeasuresandenvironmentalhealthissues.

LondonBoroughsmayalsoprovidefurtherassistancetothepublicifresourcespermit,i.e.drying-outfacilities,provision,fillingorplacingofsandbagswheredangerisforeseen.

Jointagencyco-ordinationofnon-lifethreateningfloodsandoftherecoveryphasefollowingafloodingincident.


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E.5 Planning and response issues

E.5.� Inrespondingtothefloodingincidentsthefollowingshouldbeconsidered,particularlyintheplanningstages:

riskassessment;

dangerfromflowingwater(speed,force,currents,undertow)andsubmergedhazards;

localauthorityliaisonofficersforresponseandmonitoringpurposes;

equipmentandtraininginitsuse(e.g.accesstoboatsforsuitablytrained personnelfootwear,buoyancyaids,safetylines,flood-plainmaps,localknowledgeoffloodeffects);

trafficdiversionplanwithsignlocations(see Section 67, Road Traffic Regulation Act, 1984);

PoliceMarineSupportUnit,PortofLondonAuthority,RNLI;

militaryassistance(e.g.sandbagging,specialistvehicles,etc.,seeAppendixF);

vulnerablepersons(e.g.children,disabled,etc.);

vulnerablepremises(e.g.occupiedbasements,electricalinstallations,sub-levelcarparks,etc.);

contaminatedwater(hazardtorescueservicesaswellasthepublic);

suppliesofdrinkingwater;

guidanceandhealthadviceleaflets,newsletter,helpline,etc.;

earlyappointmentofafloodrecoverygroup;and

restcentres–establishmentandtransport.

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F.1 References

Operations in the UK: The Defence Contribution to Resilience – IJDP 02.

OpSEQUESTERI&II–Edition3–Jul2006:HQ LONDIST contingency plan for General Duties Military Support to the Civil Authorities in London.

LondonCommandandControlProtocol–May2006.

F.2 Policy

F.2.� MilitaryAidtotheCivilAuthorities(MACA)withintheUKissubdividedinto:

Military Aid to other Government Departments(MAGD).Forexample,FireStrike2002/3,andFootandMouthDisease200�

Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP).Forexample,DeploymentoftroopstoHeathrow2002andNorthernIreland�969-

Military Aid to the Civil Community(MACC).Flooding2000.Foramajorimmediateimpactevent,themostlikelyassistanceisunarmedmilitarymanpowerforgeneraldutiestasks.

F.3 Three categories of MACC

F.3.� CatA–EmergencyAssistancetotheCivilAuthoritiesintimeofemergencysuchasnaturaldisastersormajoremergencies.ThismightinvolvethemilitarycontingencyplancalledOpSEQUESTERtodeploytroopsatshortnotice.

F.3.2 CatB&C–RoutineAssistanceandAttachmentofVolunteersarenotapplicableinamajorincidentinLondon.

F.4 Three principles guiding the provision of MACC:

Militaryassistanceshouldalwaysbethelastresort.Itmusthavebeendemonstratedthattheuseofmutualaid,otherorganisationsandtheprivatesectorareimpossibleorunsuitable.

TheCivilAuthoritieslacktherequiredlevelofcapabilityanditisunreasonabletoexpectthemtodevelopone.

TheCivilAuthorityhasthecapability,buttheneedtoactisurgentandthereisanimmediatelackofCivilResourcesavailable.

F.5 Authority to deploy

F.5.� Militaryresourcesarenotspecificallysetasideforassistinginanemergency,soanyassistancewilldependonwhatassetsareavailableatthetime.Involvementbythemilitarychain-of-commandandDefenceMinisterialapprovalisnecessaryforassetstobedeployed.

F.5.2 ArmedForcessupportmustalwaysbeatthespecificrequestoftheCivilAuthoritiesandinalmostallcircumstancesrequiresthespecificauthorisationofDefenceMinisters.IntheeventofaMACCCatAevent–emergencyassistance,theGeneralOfficerCommanding

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Appendix F: Military assistance to a major London incident

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LondonDistricthastheauthoritytodeploypersonnelunderhiscommandimmediatelywithoutreferencetohighercommandiftheycanbeimmediatelyhelpfulinalleviatingdistressandsavinglivesandproperty.

F.6 Reaction to an ‘immediate impact’ emergency

F.6.� Foran‘immediateimpact’event,HQLondonDistrictwillappointaJoint(tri-Service)MilitaryLiaisonOfficer(JRLO)whowillattendtheStrategicCo-ordinationCentre(SCC),ifformed,andwillprovideasinglepointofcontactforMilitaryAidrequests(exceptSpecialForces).AllrequestsshouldbemadethroughtheChairoftheGoldCo-ordinatingGroup(GCG)forconsiderationbyHQLondonDistrictOperationsCentreandtheMilitarychain-of-command.

F.6.2 Somenichecapabilities,suchasengineers,aviationandbombdisposal,arealreadyusedandtheirtaskingandcapabilitiesarewellunderstoodbytheMPS.

F.7 General capabilities

F.7.� Abletoprovidethemilitarycommand,controlandcommunicationsbasedonHQLONDISTenablinga24/7capability,inordertosuperviseandcarryouttasksinsupportofandinco-ordinationwiththeemergencyservicesandlocalauthorities.

F.7.2 Abletobelogisticallyself-supporting.

F.7.3 Abletobeflexibleandresponsive,butoperateonlywithinowncapabilities.

F.7.4 ManpowerforunarmedgeneraldutiesmightbemadethroughOpSEQUESTERforthecrisisandconsequencemanagementphasesofamajor‘immediateimpact’emergency.Thesetasksmightinclude:

Reconnaissance.Deploymentofsmallcommandteamstoassisttheemergencyservicesindeterminingtheextentof,andmonitoringanincident.

Publiccontrol.AssistancetoMPSincontrollingaccessandcrowdmanagement,butshortofinvolvementinmaintenanceof‘publicorder’whichremainsapoliceresponsibility.

Evacuation.Assistthepoliceinthecontrolorchannellingoflargenumbersofpublicintheincidentarea.

Routeguidance.Identificationandsecuringofsaferoutesaroundtheincidentarea.

Cordons.Provisionofmanpowerforcordons.Apolicepresencewouldbeexpectedperhapsonaratioof�:5soldiers.

Accesscontrol.AssistingpolicecontrolatRV/accesspoints.ProvidemarshalstocontrolorchannellargenumbersofpeopleinparticularatRVsandaccesspoints.

Mediahandling.Assistinhandlingthemediaandothernon-governmentalagencies.

StoresprotectionandDistribution.Assistinprotectingandtransportingstoresandsuppliesincludingmedicines.

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Keyinstallations.Supportingthepolicetopreventlootingandtheft,particularlyifkeyinstallationsaredirectlyaffectedbytheincident.

Masscasualties.Personnelmayberequiredtogivelimitedemergencyfirstaid,stretcherevacuation,aidtowalkingwounded,locating,securingandmarkingbodiesorbodyparts,andsupporttothemedicalservicestoenableaccessandevacuation.

Engineeringtasks.ThecivilandlocalauthoritieswillretaintheleadonanycivilengineeringtasksbutmaybesupportedbyRoyalEngineerassetsifavailable.Troopsmaybetaskedtoprovideassistancewithsitesearchandsafetychecks,provisionoffloodorwaterdefencesandtheuseofboats,assistancewiththeremovalofdebrisfromareaswherepeoplemightbetrappedorwherekeyfacilitiesareburied.

Temporaryaccommodation.Secure,organise,andcontrolemergencyortemporaryaccommodation.

Waterandfeedingpoints.Inadditiontointegralcateringandwater,supporttroopsmaybeaskedtomanandcontrolfeedingpointsandwaterpointsatthesiteandassistwiththesupplyoffoodtoareasoftheincident.

Restcentres.Assistlocalauthoritiesinmanagingpremisesdesignatedfortemporaryaccommodationforrefugees.

F.7.5 Troopswillalwaysdeployasaself-containedformedbodyundercommandofanOfficerorNon-Commissioned-Officer(NCO)throughouttheperiodofmilitaryinvolvement.Theywillinitiallyreporttoandworkunderthedirectionoftheemergencyservices’Bronzecommander.ALiaisonOfficerwillalsodeployasthemilitarypointofcontactatGold,SilverandBronze.

F.7.6 Aftertheimmediateresponsetoanincident,itislesslikelythatthemilitarywouldbemadeavailableduringtheConsequenceandRecoveryphaseofanemergency.However,thesamecaveatswouldapplyshouldtheRCCCseeksupport.

F.8 Reaction to a ‘rising tide’ emergency

F.8.� ThisismorelikelytobeaMAGDengagement.Ontheoutsetofa‘risingtide’emergency,militaryadviceshouldbesoughtfromHQLondonDistrictatHorseGuards,Whitehall,throughtheOperationsOfficerortheJRLOs.Whileinformaldiscussionandcontingencyplanningmaytakeplaceatalocallevel,theCivilAuthoritymustsubmitaformalrequest,throughtheHomeOfficetotheMODformilitaryaidbeforethechain-of-commandwilltakeaction.

F.8.2 RequestsforMACAsupportshouldbesubmittedingoodtimeandshouldarticulateclearlynotonlytheeffectrequired,butalsowhymilitaryresourcesareneededtoachieveit.

F.9 Costs

F.9.� DefenceFundsaregrantedforDefencePurposes.WhereworkisdonebytheArmedForcesforotherpurposes,theMODisrequiredby‘TreasuryRules’tosecurereimbursementforthecostsincurred.MACAactivityis,withfewspecificexceptions,suchastheniche

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capabilitiesmentionedabove,notfundedwithintheMODvoteandisconductedonarepaymentbasis.ThisisnormalpractisewithinGovernmentDepartments.Therearethreecharginglevels:

F.9.2 ‘Nocost’–costswouldbewaivedwherelifeisatriskorinotherexceptionalcircumstances.ThedecisionwouldnormallybetakencentrallybutasstatedinparagraphF.5.2Commandersareempoweredtorespondimmediatelytosavelifeandwaivecosts.Inamajor‘immediateimpact’situationa‘no-cost’basisislikelyuntiltheRecoveryphasewhenthemilitarywillseektowithdraworcostsmayatleaststartbeingassessed.

F.9.3 ‘Nolosscosts’–RecoverthecoststhatwouldnototherwisehavebeenincurredbytheMOD.ThisisappliedwhenataskisundertakenonbehalfofthecivilauthoritiesoranotherGovernmentdepartmentfor‘risingtide’eventssuchasforFireServicestrikeandfootandmouthdisease.

F.9.4 ‘Fullcosts’–Allcosts,directandindirect,incurredimprovisingassistance,includingbasicpay,andallowancesofpersonnel.


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ambulance loading point Anarea,preferablyhard-standing,incloseproximitytothecasualtyclearingstation,whereambulancescanmanoeuvreandloadpatients.

body collection point Apointclosetothescenewherethedeadcanbekepttemporarilyuntiltransfertothemortuary.Ideallythepremisesshouldbesecure,dry,coolandhaveampledrainage.

brigade control TheFireBrigadeCommandandMobilisingCentreatGreenwichViewPlace.

casualty Apersondirectlyinvolvedinoraffectedbytheincident(injured,uninjured,deceasedorevacuee).

casualty bureau Centralcontactandinformationpointforallrecordsanddatarelatingtocasualties.

casualty clearing station Anareasetupatamajorincidentbytheambulanceserviceinliaisonwiththemedicalincidentofficertoassess,treatandtriagesortcasualtiesanddirecttheirevacuation(see Triage).

cbrn Chemical,biological,radiological,nuclear–materialthathaspotentialtobeadaptedforuseinaterroristincident.

ccc-Ir CentralCommandComplex–InformationRoomatNewScotlandYard.

ccc-Sor SpecialOperationsRoomatNewScotlandYard.

controlled area heareacontainedbytheoutercordonthatmaybedividedintogeographicalsectors.

cordon Theperimeterofanarea,forexample,therescuezoneorasector.Maybephysicalorimprovised.

Emergency Medical technician AqualifiedNHSambulancepersonwhohasobtainedtheInstituteof(EMt) HealthCareDevelopmentCertificateinAmbulanceAidTraining. Theymayalsobepermittedtoadministerspecifieddrugs.

Eoc LASEmergencyOperationsCentre.

EPIc BritishAirways’EmergencyProceduresInformationCentre.

EPM AtrainedEmergencyPlanningManagerwhocanprovideadviceandsupporttotheAmbulanceIncidentOfficersandothersonmattersrelatingtoemergencyplanningandotherambulanceserviceorNHSrequirements.

Appendix G: Glossary

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Evacuees’ assembly point Alocationofsafety,nearthescene,whereevacueescanbedirectedinitiallyforassemblybeforebeingtransportedtorestcentres.

fbc TheLASFallbackControlfacilityatBow.

forward control/command point Acontrolpoint/forwardcommandpostdealingdirectlywithactivityatthesceneandtherespectiveemergencyserviceresourcesatthescene.

friends and relatives Secureareasetasideforusebyfriendsandrelativesarrivingandforreception centre interviewswiththem.Thiswillusuallybemaintainedandoperatedby

thepolice.

health advisory team (hat) TheHATisastrategicgroupchairedbytheNHScomposedofrepresentativesfromarangeoforganisationsandspecialitieswhoareabletogiveco-ordinatedauthoritativeadviceonthehealthaspectsofanincidenttothepoliceIncidentCommander,theNHSandotheragencies.

humanitarian assistance centre Asophisticatedfacilitywherebereavedfamilies,survivorsandanyoneelsedirectlyaffectedbyanincidentcanreceiveinformationandappropriatesupportfromalltherelevantagencies,withouttheneedforimmediatereferralelsewhere.

hospitals, receiving ThehospitalstobealertedbytheLondonAmbulanceService(LAS)toreceivecasualtiesintheeventofamajorincident.TheLASmaintainsamedicalincidentofficer(MIO)poolandwillinvariablyemploydoctorsfromthisgroupwhentheneedforanMIOandsupportbecomesapparent.Receivinghospitalsmustbeadequatelyequippedtoreceivecasualtiesona24-hourbasisandabletoprovide,whenrequired,themedicalincidentofficerandamobilemedical/nursingteam.

IcP IncidentControlPoint.

joint Emergency Services Themainpolice,LondonFireBrigadeandLondonAmbulanceControlCentre(JESCC)ServiceControl/CommandUnits,togetherwiththepublicutilitiesandlocalauthoritywhichshouldbelocatedclosetooneanotherandformthefocuspointfromwhichtheincidentwillbemanaged.

LaLo Localauthorityliaisonofficer.

London fire brigade inter-agency Atrainedandqualifiedofficerwhocanadviseandsupportincidentliaison officer (ILo) commanders,police,medical,militaryandotherGovernmentagencies

onthebrigade’soperationalcapacityandcapability,toreduceriskandsafelyresolveincidentsatwhichabrigadeattendancemaybe


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required.Thiswillincludemajorincidents,complexorprotractedmulti-agencyincidents,terrorist-relatedincidents,publicorder,domesticoranyothersituationthatwouldbenefitfromattendanceoftheILO.

Lhac TheLondonHumanitarianAssistanceCentreisafacilitywherebereavedfamilies,survivorsandanyoneelsedirectlyaffectedbytheincidentcanreceiveinformationandappropriatesupportfromallrelevantagencies–withouttheneedforimmediatereferralelsewhere.

Lrt LondonResilienceTeam.

LuL LondonUndergroundLimited.

Maca MilitaryAidtotheCivilAuthority.

Macc MilitaryAidtotheCivilCommunity.

Marshalling area Areatowhichresourcesandpersonnelfromallservicescanbedirectedtostandby.FireBrigadereliefsmaybedirectedtheretobebriefedbeforefinaldeploymentbySilverFire.

Marshalling officer Servicerepresentativeatmarshallingarea.

Mca MaritimeandCoastguardAgency.

Media centre Centralcontactpointformediaenquiries,providingcommunicationsandconferencefacilitiesandstaffedbypressofficersfromallorganisations.

officer of the day (ood) AfirebrigadedivisionalofficerrosteredtoperformthisdutyattheCommandSupportCentre(CSC)atBrigadeHeadquarters.

overall commander (gold) Designatedprincipalofficerofeachservicewhoassumestheco-ordinatingfunctionfortheoperationasawholeonbehalfoftheirservice.

Paramedic AqualifiedstateregisteredNHSambulancepersonwhohasobtainedtheInstituteofHealthCareDevelopmentCertificateinExtendedAmbulanceAidTraining.Theymayalsobepermittedtoadministerspecifieddrugs.

PLa PortofLondonAuthority.


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Police incident officer (PIo) Silverorgroundcommander,responsiblefordecisionsata tacticallevel.

Police media representative Seniorpoliceappointeechosenbytheoverallincidentcommandertoberesponsibleforthereleaseofinformationonbehalfofthepolice.

Press liaison officer (scene) Representativesofeachorganisationresponsiblefortheinitialreleaseofinformationfromthesceneoftheincidentreflectingco-ordinatinggrouppolicy.

Press liaison point (PLP) Premisesatoradjacenttothescenedesignatedforexclusiveusebyaccreditedmediarepresentativesandthroughwhichofficialpressreleaseswillbeissued.

rail incident commander (rIc) ForincidentsoninfrastructurecontrolledbyNetworkRailanincidentcommanderwillbeappointed.ThisindividualwilloperateatGoldlevelandwillberemotefromthescene.

rail incident officer (rIo) OnNetworkRailcontrolledinfrastructuretherailindustryresponsetoanincidentwillbeled,onsite,bytheRIO.TheRIOwillactasapointofcontactfortheemergencyservices.Representativesofthetrainoperatingcompanies(TOCs)andcontractorswillreporttotheRIO.

rendezvous point (rvP) Apointselectedbytheemergencyservicesasthelocationforallpersonnelandvehiclestoreporttobeforeattendingthemajorincident.Itissituatedwithintheoutercordon.

rendezvous point officer PoliceofficerresponsibleforsupervisionoftheRVP.

rescue zone Theareawithintheinnercordon.

resilience mortuary Apredesignatedlocation,whichcanbeusedasamortuaryifthescaleoftheincidentrendersexistingfacilitiesinappropriate.Suchlocationsrequiredetailedpreplanningandwillbeusedatacentrefortheexaminationandidentificationofthedeceased.

rest centre Premisesdesignatedforthetemporaryaccommodationofevacuees.

resource Management centre LFBSuiteatGreenwichViewPlacethatactsasthespecial(rMc) commandfacilityforGoldFireduringamajorincident.

rnLI RoyalNationalLifeboatInstitution.

Scientific advisor TheFireBrigade’squalifiedscientificandtechnicaladvisoratincidentsinvolvinghazardousand/orradioactivesubstances.


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Sector commander (bronze) Theofficerincommandofanoperationalareaandhavingfunctionalresponsibilitywithinthecontrolledareaforfire/rescuepurposes.

Senior investigating officer (SIo) PoliceseniordetectiveofficerappointedbyGoldtoassumeresponsibilityforallaspectsofthepoliceinvestigation.

Silver fire/Medic/Police TheserviceIncidentCommanderonthescene.

Senior identification manager Thisofficerwillhaveoverallresponsibilityfortheidentificationprocess(SIM) andsitontheidentificationcommission.Theirresponsibilitywould

includebodyrecovery,casualtybureau,familyliaisonandthepost/ante-mortemteams.

Survivor reception centre Secureareatowhichuninjuredsurvivorscanbetakenforshelter,firstaid,interviewanddocumentation.

tbnc ThamesBarrierNavigationCentreatWoolwich.

tEtra TerrestrialTrunkedRadioAccess.

triage sieve Theprimarytriagesystemthatquicklysortsoutcasualtiesintoprioritygroups.

triage sort Thesecondarytriagesystemthatiscarriedoutonthearrivaloffurtherresourcesusuallytakingplaceinthecasualtyclearingstation.

vaS VoluntaryAidSocieties.

vtS VesselTrafficServiceatTBNCatWoolwich(PLA).


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above (a point) Referstotheriverupstreamofareferencepoint,notverticallyaboveit.

below (a point) Referstotheriverdownstreamofareferencepoint,notphysicallyunderneathit.

downstream (of) Thatportionoftheriverwhichisclosertotheestuarythanthereferencepoint,forexample,‘downstreamofTowerBridge’.

air draft Theheightofavesselfromthewaterlinetothetopofitshigheststructure(mastorsuperstructureasappropriate).

bridge clearance Thedistancefromanynominatedpointontheundersideofabridgetothewaterlevel,atanygivenstateofthetide.

Ebb tide Atidewhichflowsfromtheriver’ssourcetowardsitsestuary(downstream).

fairway Thenavigationalchannel.

flood tide Atidewhichflowsfromtheriver’sestuarytowardsitssource(upstream).

foreshore Thatportionoftheriverclosesttotheembankmentwhichiscoveredbywaterexceptatlowtide.

non-tidal thames AboveTeddingtonLocktheriverisnon-tidalandthewaterlevelremainsconstantexceptasitisaffectedbywaterenteringtheriverfromitstributaries.

reach Acontinuousstretchofariverthatcanbelookedalongbetweentwobends.

Slack water Whenthetidalstreamisnotmoving.

tidal thames Thatlengthoftheriverwherethewaterlevelrisesandfallsduetotidalaction.ItextendsfromtheestuarytoTeddingtonLock.

upstream (of) Thatportionoftheriverwhichisclosertotheriver’ssourcethanthereferencepoint,forexample,‘upstreamofTowerBridge’.

Theaboveexpressionsremovetheneedtousecompasspointstolocateapointthatisdifficultwhenthemeanderingnatureoftheriveristakenintoaccount.

Tidalflowisatitsfastestandstrongestmid-tide;thatis,half-waybetweenhighandlowwater.Tidalflowincreasesanddecreasesproportionallyabouttheperiodofmaximumflow.

Appendix H: Glossary of marine terms

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Notes


MAJOR INCIDENTProcedure Manual

London Emergency Services Liaison Panel

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