proclus commentary on timaeus

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THE/

COMMENTARIES OF PROCLTJS

ON THE

TIM^EUS OF PLATO,

IN FIVE BOOKS;

CONTAINING A TREASURY OF

PYTHAGORIC AM) PLATONIC PHYSIOLOGY.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK,

BY THOMAS TAYLOR.

po$ <fit\oao^f>vttart iAta"

trpni fttrrot ao^itirrat, i} ypa/i/ianffra, jratovro yrrot trrpov

owe rvr er^(Xin. /ijrc virrcpo^

wor

yennro.Apoliooius

TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. f.

LoiiUon :

PRINTED FOR AND SOLD DY THK AUTHOR, NO. 9, MANOR PLACE,

WALWORTH, SURREY,

BY A. J. V*LPT, RED LION COURT, FLEET STREET.

]820.

&

OF that golden chain of philosophers, who, having tlicmselves happily pene

trated, luminously unfolded to others the profundities of the philosophy of Plato,Proclus is indisputably the largest and most refulgent link. Bora with a genius

transcendent!y great, and accompanied through life with a fortune singularly

good, he exhibited in his own person a union of the rarest kind, in which power

concurred with will, the benefit resulting from genuine philosophy with theability

of imparting it, and in which Wisdom was inseparable from Prosperity. Theeulo-

gium therefore ofAmmonius lit rmcas,"

that Proclus possessed the power of un

folding the opinions of the ancients, and a scientific judgment of the nature of

things, in the highest perfection possible tohumanity,"

will be immediately assented

toby every one, Mho is an adept in th writings of this incomparable man.

I rejoice therefore, in the opportunity which is now afforded me of presenting

to the English reader a translation of one of the greatest productions of this Cory-

phean philosopher ; though unfortunately like most of his other works, ithasl>ceu

transmitted to us in a mutilated state. For these Commentaries scarcely explain

a third part of the Timacus ; and from a passage in Olympiodorus On the Meteors

of Aristotle,* there is every reason to believe that Proclus left no part of the

FA it TI fai iftut burrjOfiriptv nvtvc /Ktiv irrfii rqv rov fii^\iou <ra<f>r]vttay, airoyrj/inytuffarrtt rwr

r^yijarvy row Ofwvrjffi^y

c6a<rtaAoi HpoiXoi- rov x-Xarwritoir itaôôv, rov tit axpov rrji atflfiu-irrjt fvcrmi

rijr re e;y)r*r)K rur tofovvruv roct *u\aio<fivrafjiv.,

;ai ri/K tTiirrôcuijK rrji fivircwi rwx orrwr tpiatv

aaKt]<rarrot, woXA^K ay ry Xoyiji Off \apiy oôXoyijaatftty. Aruraon. de lulcrpret. p. 1.

For important particulars respecting liiis extraordinary man, see my translation of bis Commentary en

thr first book of Kuclid. lie was born about tlic \car H - of Christ.

*See thit pissagr in tli*. note to my translation of llic Mcteort of Arittotle.

ir INTRODUCTION.

TimsEus without his masterly elucidations. This is likewise more than probable,

from what Marinus says in his life of him, "that he was a man laborious to a

miracle;"

for it cannot be supposed that such a man would leave the greater

part of one of the most important dialogues of l*lato unelucidated, and particu

larly as these Commentaries were written by him"(as

the same Marinus informs

us) in the flower of his a^e, and that he preferred themb<?yond

all his other works.

Fortunately however, the most important part of this work is preserved ;or that

part in which the demiurgic, paradigmatic, and final causes of the universe are

unfolded; the corporeal nature of it is represented as fabricated with forms and

demiurgic sections, and distributed witli divine numbers ; and soid is produced

from the Demiurgns, and i filled with harmonic ratios, and di\ineand fabrica

te e symbols. The \\hole mundane animal too, is here shown to be connected, ac

cording to the united comprehension which subsists in the intelligibleworld ; and

the parts which it contains are so disposed as to harmoni/e \\itli the \\iiole, both

such as are corporeal, and such as are \ital. For partialsouls such as ours, are

introduced into its spacious receptacle, are placed about the mundane (.iods, and

become mundane through the luciform vehicles with which they are connected.

The progression of the elements likew ise from their lirst incorporeal subsistence to

their subterranean termination, and the nuture of the heavens and heavenly

bodies, are beautifully developed. And as the result of the most scientific rea

soning, it is shown that very planetis surrounded \\ith satellites/ that the fixed

stars have periodic revolutions on their axes, though the length of their duration is

toils unknown; and that the stars, \\hich at times disappear and a-ain become

visible, are the satellites of other fixed stars of a more primary dignity, behind the

splendors of which they are occasionally concealed. 1 These and many other

most interesting particulars,are unfolded in these Commentaries, with an accu

racy and perspicuitywhit h have seldom been equalled, and have never been ex

celled.

1 The late Dr. Charles Rurney, on being once asked by nif, whether he hail ever read these Com

mentaries, candidly replied,"

that they were too much for him;" at the same time exclaiming, "\\hata

giant was Hroclus compared to Longinus !" Thii confession, as the Doctor had never studied the philo

sophy ofl Ulo. displaced a decree of pood sei se, winch is seldom to he- met will) in a grammarian and

philologist,on such an occasion ;

and his candour is still more remarkable, when it is considered that

he had been a Ketkwer.

*See p. 270. Vol. 2. in which it is sain, "that in each of the pl.inetary sphere?, a number analogous

to the choir of the fi\td stars, subsists with appropriate circulations." Ste also p. 2hO and 281, of the

same volume, in wlmli tins h more fnll\ aSMftcd.

1 Sec p. -! ! Vol. 2.

INTRODUCTION. T

"When I speak however, of theperspicuity

with which these particulars are

developed, I<lo

not mean that they are delivered in such a way, as to be. obviousto every one, or that they may le apprehended as soon as read ; for this

|>ertain8

only to the fungous and frivolous productions of the present day ; lull my mean

ing is, that they are written with all the clearness, which they are naturally capa

ble of admitting, or which a genuine student of the philosophy1of 1 lato can desire.

And this leads me to make some remarks on the iniquitous opinion which, since

the ren\al of letters, has been generally entertained of the. writings of 1 rocJus and

other philosophers, who are distinguished by the appellation of the latter IMato-

Xlists, and to show the cause from which it originated.

The opinion to which I allude is this that IMotinus and his followers, or in

Other words, all the IMalonists that existed from his time, to the fall of the Roman

empire, and the destruction of the schools of the philosophers by Justinian, cor

rupted the philosophy of J lato, by filling it with jargon and rcvery, and by

ascribing dogmas to him, which are not to be found in his writings, and which

are perfectly absurd. It might naturally be supposed that the authors of this

calumny were men deeply skilled in the philosophy, the corruptors of which they

profess to ha\e detected;and that they had studied the writings of the men whom

they so grossly defame. This howe\er is very far from being the case. For

since the philosophy of 1 lato, as I ha\e elsewhere shown, is theoffspring of the

most consummate science, all the dogmas of it being deduced by a series of

geometrical reasoning, some of them ranking as prior, and others as posterior,

and the latter depending on the former, like the propositions in Euclid, certain

preparatory disciplines are requisite to the perfect comprehension of these doc

trines. Hence a legitimate student of this philosophy must be skilled in mathe

matics have been exercised in all the logical methods, and not be unacquainted

with physics. lie must also be an adept in the, writings of Aristotle, as pre

paratory to the more Kiihlime speculations of IMato. And in addition to all this, he

must possess those qualifications enumerated by Plato in the 7lh book of his Re

public; vi/. he must have naturally a good memory, learn with facility,bo magnifi

cent and orderly, and the friend and ally ofjustice, truth, fortitude, and temperance.

Since the revival of letters howevi r, this philosophy has not Ix.en studied by men,

who have had the smallest conception that these requisites were indispensably

1It is w II *ai<i by Petwin, alluding to ilni philosophy,

"

that t .irrc are certain truths acquired by

a long exercise uf reason, troth in particular,and likewise in those subjects that arc most general,

much, perhaps, out of the reach of the greatest mathematician, a* tbc (peculations of Newton arc above

the capacity of tome that are now called mathematicians."

VI INTRODUCTION.

necessary, or who have attempted the acquisitionof it, in this regular and scienti

fic method. Hmce, they have presumedto

decide on the excellence of works,with the true merits of which, as they were thus unqualified, they were wholly

unacquainted, and to calumniate what they could not understand. They appear

likewise to have been ignorant, that Plato, conformably to all the other great

philosophers of antiquity,wrote in such a way as to conceal the sublimest of

his doctrines from the vulgar, as well knowing, that they would only be profaned by

them without being understood;the eye of the multitude, as he says, not being

sufficiently strong to lx>ar the light of truth. Hence, as Proclus well observes,"

it is needless to mention, that it is unbecoming to speak of the most divine of

dogmas before the multitude, Plato himself asserting that all these are ridiculous

to the many, hut in an admirable manner are esteemed by the wise. Thus also,

the Pythagoreans said, that of discourses some are mystical, but others adapted to

b delivered openly. With the Peripatetics likewise, some are esoteric, and others

exoteric; and Pannenides himself, wrote some things conformable to truth, but

others to opinion; and Zeiio calls some assertions true, but others adapted to

the necessary purposes of life." The men then fore, who have defamed the latter

Platonists, Iwing thus unqualified, and thus ignorant of the mode of writing

adopted by the great ancients, rinding from asuperficial perusal of the most

genuine di>eiplesof Plato many dogmas which were not immediately obvious in his

writings, and which were to them incomprehensible, confidently asserted that

these dogmas were spurious, that the authors of them weie delirious, and that

they had completely corrupted and polluted the philosophy of their master. It

may also be added, as Olympiodorus justly observes, that the writings of Plato

like those of Homer, are to be considered physically, ethically, theologically, and

in short, multifariously; and that he who does not thus consider them, will in vain

attempt to unfold the latent meaning they contain, liy the latter Platonists

however, they have been explored in this way, and he who is capable of availing

himself of the elucidations of these most benevolent and most sagacious men, will

find the arduous .sublimities of Plato accessible, his mystic narrations conformable

to scientific deductions, and his apparent obscurity, the veil of conceptions, truly

1 Or t* atpcri] ra Orctrara TUV boyfiaTutv eonr, tit u.oai<f,(pOfi(ru

TUV wn\\n>v, ovbtv fn \tytif,

avTiiv I\\UTWI o fiiroiro*, u/> iraira rui>ruiarn-/f.\<i(jra pry tart roit iroXXoii, 0ui//ia<rruii

f aia rou

awfititi. UVTU. }( kat otHi/0uy<y>c<

ruiy Xuyup rout îv cfaakov -ai ^vartkovs, Tovt ft viraiOfnovi, ia vi

ti row riffHTaroK, roi/i^<f rourfpikovi, rou t tûrfptiavi, tai ai-rot Flap^trif /;t,

rn ^t TÔI aX/Ofiai-

f

pHft,

ra te wpvt tv-,ai-, t.at o Zijiu/y it rcnptv

aX>])tii CKaXri ruv \oyvv, rout ft

^/xtwicii.

Procl. MS. Comment, in Purmrnii!.



INTRODUCTION.

luminous and divine. And thus much as to the cause of theprevailing iniqui

tous opinion, respecting the writings of the latter Platonists ; for the authors of jt,

I have not been able to discover. But of this I am certain, and posterity will

confirm the decision, that whoever they were, they were no less ignorant than

arrogant, no less contemptible than obscure.

With respect to the following translation, I have only to observe, that I ha\e

endeavoured fr the utmost of my ability to unite in it faithfulness withperspicuity,

and to preserve the manner as well as the matter of the original. Independent

of the dilliculties inseparable from such an undertaking, and which arise from the

abstruseness of the subjects that are discussed in this uork, the original abounds

with errors, not of atrilling, but of the most important nature; errors, \\hich so

materially a/Iect the sense, that no one can read these Commentaries, unless he

corrects them, and yet no one can correct the greater part of them, unless he is

well acquainted with the philosophy of Plato. Of this the reader may be con

vinced by perusing the notes which accompany this translation, in which he will

find upwards of eleven hundred necessary emendations. I call themnecessary,

because they are not the oflspring of conjecture, but such as the sense indubitably

demands. Of translations too, of this work, I could not avail myself; for of the

whole of it there arc none;and a Latin translation of a part of the 3d book, by

Nicholsons Leonicus Thoirueus,1

is the only aid that has been afforded me in this

arduousundertaking. From this translation I have been able, as the learned

reader willperceive, to give many important emendations of the printed original,

and not[infrequently to add toil, not only particular words, but entire sentences

that were wanting.

And now I shall conclude with observing, that though like most others Mhohave laboured greatly for tin; good, not merely of their country, but of all man

kind, I have only met with ingratitude from the public for those labours; and that

though on this account I am not much indebted,1

yet I sincerely wish well to mynative land, and to every individual in it. That I have neither been influ

enced by the expectation of sordid emolument, nor of the honours of the multi

tude, in the prosecution of these labours, must be evident from the nature of them,to the most careless observer. The most

j>erfectconviction indeed, that a greater

good than the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle was never imparted by divinity

This (i.uisl.ilion forms the latt part of the Opuscula of Thomaeus, printed at Venice in the vear

1.525 ; which work is so scarce, that Fabricius in his account of the Life and Writings of Procluj,

(Bibliotb. Gricc. Tom. 8.) sa\, he never taw it

*

According to Plato in the 7th Book of his Republic,"

that which springs up spontaneously, should

not be forward to pay any one for iU nurture."



v jjjINTRODUCTION.

to man, and the consequent persuasion,that I could not confer a more real bene

fit on the present age and posterity than by a disseminationof it in

mynative

ton-xie, as they induced me to en-age in such a difficult undertaking, hare also

been attended with the purest deli-lit, from a conviction that I was acting rightly,

and therefore in a way pleasingto dixinity. Hence in accomplishing this Hercu

lean task, 1 have l*en sati>fcd with exploring myself,and imparting to others,

the treasures of ancient wisdom; and with endeavouring to deserve the. favourable

re-ard of that ineffable principle,whose approbation

is not only the highest honour

that either mortals or immortals can obtain, but the most durable andsubstan

tial train.



IX

NAMES OF THE PHILOSOPHERS QUOTED BY PROCLUS

IN THESE COMMENTARIES.

ADRASTUS APHRCPISIENSIS, one of the genuine Peripatetics, according to Simplirius On the

Categories of Aristotle.

AGLAOPHEMUS, one ho initiated Pythagoras in the mysteries of Orpheus.

ALHINUS, a Platonic philosopher,who flourished about the time of Galen.

ALEXANDER APHRODISIENSIS, a Peripatetic philosopher, who flourished under ibe Emperor

Severus.

AMF.LUJS, a Platonic philosopher,and a disciple of Plotinus.

AMMOMUS SACCAS, the preceptor of Plotinus.

ANAXAGORAS, the Clazomenian, flourished about the "Oth Olympiad.

ANTONINUS, a discipleof Ammonius Saccas.

ARISTOTLE, the disciple of Plato, was born in the first year of the 99th Olympiad,

ARISTOTLE, the Khodian.

ATTIC us, a Platonic philosopher,vho flourished under Marcus Antoninus.

CIIRYSIPPUS, a celebrated Stoic philosopher, diedin the

143rd Olympiad.

GRANTOR SOLF.N sis, the first interpreterof Plato, also a fellow disciple with Xenocrates of

Plato, and an auditor of Polcmo.

DEMOCRITVS, the celebrated philosopherof Abdrra, flourished about the 80th Olympiad.

EMPEDOCLES, the celebrated Pythagorean philosopher, was an auditor when a young man of

Pythagoras.

EPICURUS, was born in the lOQlh Olympiad.

EC DEM us, the Khodian, a disciple of Aristotle, and to whom Aristotle inscribed his Eudemian

Ethics.

EURYM ACHUS, the Epicurean.

GAI.EN, the physician,who was also a Platonist. He wrote 200 Volumes, most of which were

burnt in the temple of Peace, and flourished under the Emperor Adr an.

HA RPOCRATION, the Platoiiist, an Argire, and the familiar of Augustus Caesar.

Hr.RAci.iDEs PONTICUS, adisciple

of Plato and Speusippus.

HKKACI.ITVS EPIIESIUS, surnamed the obscure, flourished about the 70lh. Olympiad.

HEHMF.S TKISMEGISTUS.

JULIAN, the Theurgist, who flourished under Marcus Antoninus.

IAMHMCHI s, a Platonic philosopher, surnamcd the ditine, flourished under Uie Emperor Con-

stantine.

Tim. Plat. Vot I. A



NlCDMACHCi.the Pythagorean, was, according to Fabricius, somewhat posterior to the age of

Antoninus Pius.

NUMENIUS, a Pythagoricand Platonic philosopher,

flourished prior to Plotinus.

OCELLUS LUCANDS, an auditor of Pythagoras,and one of his most etnuxMit disciples.

ORICKN, (not a father of the Church,) a disciple of Plotinus.

PARMENIOES, the Elean, a Pythagoric philosopher,flottfished about ihc 70th Olympiad.

PHERECYUES, the Syrian, the preceptorof Pythagoras.

PHILOI.ACS, of Tarentuin, an eminent Pythagorean philosopher,and a.\ auditor of Pythagoras.

PLATO, was born in the 4th year of the 88th Olympiad, and died in the iOBlh Olympiad.

PLOT IN us, one of the most eminent of the Platonic philosophers,flourished under the Emperors

Gordian and Galieuus.

PLL TAHCH.of Cl.a-ronca, in Boeotia, the preceptorof Trajan, and the celebrated biographer.

PORPHYRY, a disciple of Plotinus, and distinguished by the appellation of the pMotopher.

POSIDONIVS, a Sloic philosopher,flourished under the reign of Julius Cx-sar.

PKAXIPIIAN ES, a disciple of Theophrastus.

PIIOCLUS MALLOTES, is mentioned by our Proclus as one of the ancient philosophers.

PYTHAGORAS,the father of

philosophy,

flourished about the (JOlh Olympiad.

SEVF.RUS, a Platoniat, but the time in which he flourished is not known.

SOCHATK.-., the celebrated pret eptor of Plato, was born m the 4th yearof the 77th Oljapiad.

SOCHATLS, tlie Platonist, was posterior in lime to Amelius.

SOLON, the Legislator, flourished about the -Unh Olympiad.

STKATO LAMPSACEM S, an auditor ar.d successor of Tlieophrastus.

SYMIANDS, ihe preceptor of Proelns. See the notes to this work.

Til ALES, was bo.n in the first year uf the 35th Olympiad, and died in the 58th Olympiad.

THF.ODORUS, Asis*i S, a disciple of Plotinus, and surnamcd the grtai.

THP.OKHRAkTUS, the celebrated discipleand successor of Aristotle.

XENAHCHUS, a IV-iipatctic phdosopher,and the friend of Augustus Ca*sar.

X KNOCRATI.S, a disciple,and successor of Plato.

XENOHIANES, the Colophonian, author of the Eleatic nu-thod of reasoning floufMhd i

the 00th Ol;:inpiail.I:or an account of this method, see the additional note, on this work.

ELEATES was an auditor of Parmenidcs, and flourished about the 8Gth Olympiad.

S B. The01>mpic games were re Kored by [,,!,ie.i., 412 years after their f.rsl inslitulion, and about 7TT

year,before Christ. From tins list institution ll.e (Jrteks Logan to reckon Dy Oljriapiadi,cMb vf which con-

tiiRd tli *f-xt of 4 )tars.A.J this contmueU vcn to lUe rtign ttt Cvmunimc.

AN EXPLANATION OF CERTAIN TERMS USED BY

PROCLUS IN THIS WORK.

T v*ywyiiwy. Ti K Ah AC oc ic. That which elevates the soul from sensible! to intelligible*.

aAXoiovi,-. AtLlATioN. Change in quality.

Tixra<7Ta:n{. Aroc ATASTASIS. Kcitjtuijon to a pristine form, or condition of being.

TO yjvfsnov^yixoy.THE GKNESIUKGIC. That which i* effective of generation,

o IcupMs AfiTTort^f. THE DEMONIACAL ARISTOTLE. This philosopherwas thus de

nominated by the ancient*, from his transcendent physiological knowledge; nature being

proximattly governed by dirmoos, or those powers that subsist between Gods and men.

yniTit. GENERATION. A How iug condition of being, or a subsistence in becoming to be.

Hence, TOyiyvfafla* signifies an extension in subsistence, or a tendency to being.

Zi^uoypyof Ty oXay. TH K DKM 1 1; tu.us OF WHOLES. The maker of the universe is thus

denominated, because he produces the universe, so far as it is a tchofe, and likewise all the

rtholet it contains, by his own immeHule energy, other subordioate powers co-operating with

him in the production of parts. Hence be produces the universe totallyand at once.

Siavoia. DIANOIA. The discursive energy of reason;or it is thai power which reasons scienti

fically, deriving the principles of its reasoning from intellect.

Sofa. OPINION. Is the last of the gnostic powers of the rational soul; and knows that

a thing is, but is ignorant of the cause of it, or why it is. For the knowledge of the son,or

Tchy atiling i., belongs to Ciavota.

TO ii5v/xisTix5 ft- fo;Tr

(J

-

4^X1 - THE EpirnvMETir PART OF THE SOD L, or that part of the

soul which is the principle of ail-various desires. But desire is well defined, by the Puhago-

rcans, to be a certain tendency, impulse, and appetiteof the soul, in order to be filled with

something, or to enjoy something present, or to be disposed according to some sensitive energy.

They add, that there is also a desire of the contraries to these, and this is desire of the evacua

tion and absence, and of having no sensible perceptionof certain things.

iixiviKcuf. ICON JCAI.L.T. A thing i.n said to subsist iconically, when it subsists after the manner

of an image.

1160X1x0;. looiilCA LLY. Adtimbratively.

fvitauTixifi,-. ENTHEASTICALLY. In a divinely-inspiredmanner.

o.aix;. UN ICAI.LY. In a way conformable to the nature of the one.

TOrrffoxiyijfoy.

TH E AL r KR-MCTi v R. That which is moved by another thing, and not by

itself.

6vuo;. ANGKR. An appetite of the soul directed to the

avcngcment

of incidental molestations..

Aoyoi. REASONS. Productive principles or powers; and they also signify forms.

i. MORPHK. Pertains to the colour, figure, and magnitude of supcrhcits.



MCLTIPOTENT. Possessing much power.

vo.pa r.,3ox|.INTELLECTUAL PIM.JKCTION. The immediate energy of intellect is thus

denominated, because it is an intuitive perception,or an immediate darting forth, as it were, to

its proper object,the intelligible.

w INTFLI.I.C T. In the human soul is the summit of dianoia, and is that power by the light

proceedingfrom which, we perceive

the truth of axioms. Hut in divine natures it is a self-

subsiiUnt, impartible,eternal c^.nce, perceiving all things at once.

cXsrr- \\noLr.NC.-s. A whole which has a perpetual subsistence, and which comprehends in

itself all the multitudeof which it is the cause.

Xi;sa>ufl(.PLE.MTf n E,

ou COM P i.ETiiN r.ss. Is a whole which gives completion to the

universe.

r vo-coy*

vtuyiXG X*TS,-. Tilt. I N T I. I.I.I C I BLE, O R INTELLECTUAL, OR PSYCHICAL

BREAimi; i. e. the extent of the progressionof the i.itelligible,

of intellect and of soul,

and of each of these according to its own order, and not according to a progression into an in

ferior order.

TO o-v5rrcv. TUP. COMPOSITE. 1 have used the word compositeinstead of compounded, because

the latter rather d, notes the mingling, than the contiguous union of one thing with another,

which the former through its derivation fiom the Latin word comp^ilns, solely denotes.

TiX. erixi] TJX*I-I " l: Tr.LEr.TlC AKT. Is tlie art

\ riainingto niNstic operations.

iXjircXaxo;. PII i i.o i-o LKM i f . Aii i-pithetof Minerva, sigmfjing that she is a luver of rear :

justas she is also called philosophic,

as being a lover of K isdorn.

v*afc

>i-

HYPAKXIS. The first principle,or nundation, ai it were, of the essence of a thing.

Hence also, it is the summit of essence.



PROCLUS

TILE TIMYEUS OF PLATO.

BOOK I.

1I1AT the design of the Platonic Tinva-ns embraces ihe uliole of physiology,

and that it pertains to the theory of the universe, discussing this from the be

ginning to the end, appeal s to me to l>e clearly evident to those who are not

entirely illiterate. For this very treatise of the Pythagoric Tima-ns Concerning

Xaturc, is written after the Pytha^oric manner; and Plato 1>eing thence impelled,

applied himself to write the Tima-us, according to Sillographns.1 On this account

we have prefixed the treatise of Tima-iis to these Commentaries, in order that we

may know what the Tima-ns of Plato says that is tin; same with what is asserted

in the treatise of TimaMis [the Ix)erian], what it adds, and in what it dissents.

And that we may investigate not in a careless manner the cause of this disagree

ment. All this dialogue, likewise, through the whole of itself, has physiology for

it* scope, surveying the same things in images and in paradigms, in wholes andin parts.

For it in filled with all the most Itoantiful boundaries* of physiology,

assuming things simple for the sake of such as are composite, partsfor the sake

of wholes, and images for the sake of paradigms, leaving none of the principal

causes of nature uninvestigated.

t i:. Timon, who was so called from writing scurrilous comicj

iu.*

/. r. Final munition*.

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. A

2 PnOCLUS ONTTIIF. [BOOK f.

But that the dialogue deservedly embraces a design of this kind, and that Plato

alone preserving the Pythagoric mode in the theory concerning nature, has pro

secuted with great subtilty the proposed doctrine, ought to le considered hy

those who are more sagacious and acute. For since, in short, physiology receives

a threefold division, and one part of it is comeisant with matter and material

causes, but another part also adds the investigation of form, and evinces that this

is the more principal cause; and again, since a third part demonstrates that these

have not the relation of causes, 1ml of concaiises, and admits that there are other

causes, which are properly so called, of things generated hy nature, vi/. the eflec-

tive, paradigmatic and final cause;

this being the case, among the multitude of

physiologists prior to Plato, that directed their attention to matter, there Avas a

di\ersity of opinion respecting the subject of things. For Anaxagoras, who

appears to ha\ e seen, while the rest were aslerp, that intellect is the first cause

of generated nature-, made no use of intellect in hi> explanation of things, hut

rather employed certain airs and a theis as the causes of things that are generated,

;IK Socrates says in the !*lia(lo. Hut of tho-e posterior to IMato, who were tho

patrons of a sect, not all, hut such of them as were more at curate than the lest,

thought tit to survey physical form in conjunction with matter, referring the prin

ciples of hodies to matter and form. For if they any where mention the pro-

du -ing cau-e, as when they say that nature is a principle of motion, they rather

take away its eflicacious and properly effective power [than allow the existence of

it] hy not ^ranting that it contains the reasons [or productive principles] of the

things ellected hv it, hut admitting that many things an- generated casually.

To which we ina\ athl, that lhe\ do not acknowledge that there is a pre-existing

producing cau-e tf, in short, all physical things, hut of those only that are home

along in generation. For of eternal natures they clearly s;y, that there is no

llectne eao-e;

in asserting which they are ignorant that they must cither give

subsistence to the \\ hole of heaven from t hunce, or c\ ince that \\hatiscasual is

itself productive of itself.

I lato howe\er alone, folio \\ in:; the I vtha^oreans, dcli\ers intleed, as the con-

caust s of natur.d ihinu;-, a uui\ersal ret ipient,and material form, which are MI!>-

Hcnicnt tt> causes properlyso called, in the generation of things. Hut prior to

these, he investigates principal causes, vi/. the producing can-", the paradigm,

and the final cause. Through these* also, he places a demiurgic intellect our

1

Vi/. VriMotlr, ,in<l \\\t folltmiTii



nooK i.] T1MJEUS OF PLATO. 3

the universe, and anintelligible cause in which tlio universe primarily subsists,

and the good, which is established prior to the producing cause, in the order ofthe desirable. For since that which is moved by another thins:, is suspended

from the power of that which moves, as it is evidently not adapted either to pro

duct 1

,or perfect,

or save itself, in all these it is in want of a producing cause, and

is conducted by it. It is i -

therefore, that, the concauses of natural things,

.should be suspended from true causes, from which they are produced, with ;i

view to \\hich they Mere fabricated by the father of all things, and for

the sake of which they were generated. Justly, therefore, are all these delivered,

and investigated with accuracy by Plato;and the remaining two, form and the

subject-matter, suspended from these. For this world is not the same with the

intelligibleor intellectual worlds, which, according to some, subsist in pure forms

;

but one thinir in it has the relation of reason and form, and another, of a subject.

But that Plato very properly delivers all these causes of the fabrication of the

world, viz. the ^on,!, the intelligible paradigm, the maker, form, and the subject

nature, is e\idenl from the following considerations. For if he had spoken con

cerning the intelligible Gods, he would have evinced that the pood alone is the

can-ie of these; for the intelligible number is from this cause. But if concerning

the intellectual Gods, he would have shown that the gond and the intelligible are,

the causes of these. For the intellectual multitude proceeds from theintelligible

unities, and the one fountain of beings. And if he had spoken concerning the

supermundaneGods, he would have

producedthem from the intellectual and

total fabrication, from theintelligible Gods, and from the cause of all things.

For this cause gives subsistence to all things of which secondary natures are

generative, but in a primary, ineffable, and inconceivable manner. But since he

discusses mundaae affairs and the whole world, he gives to it matter and form,

descending into it from the supermundane Gods, susj>endsit from the total*

fabrication, assimilates it to intelligible animal, and demonstrates it to l>e a God

by the participation of the good ; and thus he renders the whole world an intel

lectual, animated God. This, therefore, and such as this, is, as we have said, the

scope of the Timn iis.

This howeverl>eing

the case, the order of the universe is appropriately indi

cated in the beginning of the dialogue, through images; but in the middle of it,

Instead of mri roi/rwr ill lliis place, it is nfcenar} to read atria* rovrwr.

1 Fur 11X171 here, it u accessary to read oXip.



nooK i.]TIM.TXS OF 1 LATO. 5

of the universe ;also an etherial vehicle analogous to the lu-avons, and a terres

trial bouy derived from the four elements, and with which likewise it is co-ordi

nate. It" therefore, it i> necessary that the universe should be surveyed mnltifa-

rioiisly,in the intelligible, and in tin- sensible world, paradigmatic-ally, iconic-ally,

totally and partially,it \\ill be well, if the nature of man is perfectly discussed

in the theory of the universe.

Von may also say that conformably to the Tytlia^orie custom, it is necessary

to connect the discussion of that \\liich surveys with that which is surveyed. For

since we are informed \\liat the world is, it is requisiteI lliink to add also, what

that is which considers these things, and makes them the subject of rational anim-

adursi Ui. Hut that I lato directs his attention likewise to this, is evident from

what lie says near the end of the dialogue, that it is necessary that the intellect of

him who intends to obtain a happy life, should he assimilated to the object of his

intellection. For the universe is always happy ; and our soul will like.wise le

happy, when it is assimilated to the universe; for thus it will he led hack to its

cause. For as the sensilile manis

to the universe,so is the

intelligibleman to

animal itself. Hot there secondary natures alwavs adhere to such as .ire first, and

part"sulisist in unproceedini; union with their wholes, and are established in them.

Hence, when the sensible man is assimilated to the universe, he also imitates his

paradigm after an appropriate manner, In-coming a world through similitude to

the world, nnd happy through resemhlance to that hlessed -rod [the universe.]

The ends also of fabrication are snhtilely elahorated hy Plato, according to i;enus

and species, ami also what pertains to meteors, together with productions in the

earth, and in animals, such things as are preternatural,and such as are accord

ing to nature; in which part of llu Tima-us, likewise, the principles of medicine

are unfolded. I or the physiologistends at these; since he is a surveyor of

nature. For a subsistence according to nature, exists together with nature ; hut

the preternaturalis a departure from nature. It is the business, therefore, of the

physiologistto understand in how many modes this aberration subsists, and how

it becomes terminated in moderation and a natural condition. Hut it is the pro

vince of tlie medical art to unfold such particularsas are consequent to these.

And in these things especially, I lato has something in common with other

physiologists.For they were conversant with the most material, ami the ultimate

works of nature, nejjlectin:; the whole heaven, and the orders of the mundane

(iods, in couseijuence of directing their attention to matter; but they bade

farewell to forms and primary causes.



PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

It also appears to me that the demoniacal Aristotle, emulating as much as

|X>ssiblethe doctrine of Plato, thus arranges the whole of his discussion concern

ing nature, jxrceivingthat the tilings which are common to every thing that haa

a natural subsistence are, form and a subject, that from whence the principle of

motion is derived, motion, time, and place; all which are delivered by IMato in

tins dialogue, viz. interval, and time which is the image of eternity, and is con-

subsistent with the universe; the varioussj>ecies

of motion; and the concauses of

things which have a natural subsistence. But with respect to the things peculiar

to substances according to an essential division, of these Aristotle discusses in

the first place such as pertain to the heavens, in a way conformably to IMato;so

fur as he calls the hea\en unbegotten, and a fifth essence. For what dillerence is

there between calling it a fifth element, or a fifth world, and a fifth figure, as

Plato denominates it ? But in the second place, he discusses such things as are

common^ to every t jing that has a generated subsistence. And with respect to

tilings of this kind, IMato deserves t & be admired, for having surveyed with much

accuracythe essence and

powersof them, and for

having rightly preserved

their

harmony and contrarieties. And of these, such indeed as pertain to meteors,

Plato has .delivered the principles, but Aristotle has extended the doctrine

respecting theml>eyond

what is lit. But such as pertain to the theory of animals,

are distinguished by IMato according t. all final causes and concauses, but by

Aristotle are scarcely, and but in few instances, surveyed according to form.

For his discussion for the most purt stops at matter; and making his exposition

ofthings

that have anatural

subsistence fromthis,

he shows to us that

he deserts the doctrine of \\i* preceptor, find tluih much concerning these par

ticulars.

In the next place it isrequisite-

to speak of the form and character of the dia

logue, and to show what they are. It is universally acknowledged, then, that

Plato receiving the treatise of the Pythagoric Tiuueus, which was composed by

him after the Pythagoric manner, began to write his Tima-us. Again, it is also

acknowledged by those who arein

the smallest degree conversantwith the writ

ings of IMato, that his manner is Socratic, philanthropic, and demonstrative. If,

therefore, he has any when- mingled the Pythagoric and Socratic peculiarity, he

appears to have done this in the present dialogue. For there are in it from the

Pythagoric custom, elevation of conception, the intellectual, the divinely inspired,

the suspending every thing from intelligible*, the bounding wholes in numbers, the

indicating things mystically and symbolically, the anagogic, the transcending



] TIM^EUS OF PLATO.7

partial conceptions, and tlio enunciative or unfolding intolight. But from tlio

Socrntic

philanthropy,

the social.!.,the

mild,the

demonstrative, the contemplating beings through image*, the ethical, and every thing of this kind. Hence it is

a venerable dialogue; forms its conceptions supernally from the firstprinciples ;

and mingles the demonstrative with the enunciative. It also prepares us to understand physics, not only physically, hut likewise

theologically. For Nature herself

who is the leader of the universe, Ix-ing suspended from, andinspired by the

Gods, governs the corporeal-formed essence. And she neither ranks as a God

dess, nor is without a divine j>eculiarity, but is illuminated bv the truly-cxistinir

Gods.

If, likewise, it be requisite that discourses should be assimilated to the thingsof which they are the

interpreters, as Tim;eus himself says, it will be fit that this

dialogue also should have the physical, and should also have the theological ;

imitating nature, which is the object of its contemplation. Far/her still, act ordin"

to the Pythagoric doctrine, things receive a threefold division into intelligibles, \

things physical, and such as are the media between these, and which are usually &

called mathematical. But all things may beappropriately Mimyed in all. For/

such things as are media, and such as are last; presubsist in intelligible* after a

primordial manner, and both these subsist in the mathematical genera ;first natures

indeedironically, but such as rank as the third, ppradigmatlcally. In physical

entities, also, there are images of the essences prior to them. This, therefore, be in"

the case, Tima>u, when he constitute 5 the soul, very properly indicates its powers,its productive principles, nnd its elements through mathematical names. ButPlato defines its peculiarities by geonv .rical figures, and leaves the causes of all

these primordially pre-existing in the intelligible and demiurgic intellect. Andthus much concerning these things ;

since when we descend to particulars, weshall be able to know more perfectly the manner of the dialogue. But the hypothesis of it is as follows :

.Socrates having come to the Pinrus for the sake of the Bendidian festival amisolemn procession, discoursed there concerning a

polity with Polemarchus, the

son of (Vphaltis, Glauco and Adimantus, and likewise Thrasymaclius thesophist.

But on the day after this, he narrates the conference in the Pir.rus, as it is laid

down in the Republic, in thecity, to Tima?us, Hermocrates and G riteas, and to

another fourth anonymous ;>erson.I \\\\ ing, however, made this narration, he calls

upon the other associates, to feast him in return on the day after this, with the

banquetof discourse.

Theauditors

therefore and ^peakers assembled together

1 ROCLUS ON THE [HOOK i.

on this day, which was the third from the conference in the Piraeus. For in the

Republic it is said,

"

I went down yesterday to the Piranis;"*

hut in this dialogue," Of tliose who were received hy me yesterday at a haiNjuet of discourse, hut who

ought now in their turn lo repay me with a similarrepast."

Not all of them how-

e\er, were present at this audition, Imt the fourth \vas wanting through indisposi

tion. What, then-fore, you will say, are these three auditors of a discussion about

the whole world? I reply, that it is tit the father of the discussion should he con

sidered as analogous to [the Demiiirgus, or] the father of works. For the fahrica-

tion of the w<rld in words, is the image of the fabrication of it according- to intel

lect. J5ut the triad of those that receive the discussion of TilUlL Us, is analogous

to the demiurgic triad which receives the one. and total motion of th* fattier;of

which triad Socrates is the summit, through an alliance of life immediately ((in-

joining himself to Tima-us, just as the first of the paradigmatic triad is united to

the falh er, who is prior to the tiiad. These things, ho\\e\er, if the (iods please,

we .shall render more manifest through what follows. AS \\e ha\e therefore

spoken concerning the- scope and management of the dialogue, have shown howadmirahle the character of it i.-, and \\ hat is the \\ hole of the h\ pothesjs, and have

indicated the adaptation of theper>ons

to thepre>ent

discussion, it will he propel-

that, IH taking ourselves to the words of Tima-us, \\e should investigate every par

ticular to the u lino- 1 ul oil I poNVef.

Sin re, however, the \vurd intlun1

, heing dill;Tently lliuier>tood hy dillerent per

sons, di<Nturl tho.se who love to contemplate the conceptions of IMato, let us in

the fust place show what it appeared to him to \n\ and what his opinion was of

its essence. For the knowledge of what nature is,whence it proceeds, and how

far it extends to productions, will he adapted to the dialogue, which has for its

ohject the physical theory. For of the ancients, some indeed, as Anlipho, called

matter nature; hut others form, as Aristotle, in many places. Others again called

the whole of things nature, as some prior to IMato, of whom he speaks in the

J>aws. Others denominated nature things which Milist hy nature. But others

gave the appellation of nature to physical powers, such as gravity and h-vity,

rarity anddensity, as some of the Peripatetics, and still more ancient physiolo

gists. Others called things which have a natural subsistence the art of ( iod;

others soul;and others something else of this kind. IMato, however, does not

think tit to give the appellation of nature primarily, either to matter, or material

1

For on&

I if re, il is uctcsijry to read o< ^.



BOOK i.JT1MJEUS OF PLATO. ,

form, or body, or physical powers, but is averse to call it immediately soul.

Placing, however, the essence of it in. the middle of both, I mean, between soul

and corporeal powers, the latter being inferior to it, in const queuce ofl>eing

divided

about bodies, and incapable oflx>ing

converted to themselves, but nature surpass

ing things posterior to it, through containing the reasons or productive principles

of all of them, and generating and vivifying all things, he has delivered to us the

most accurate theory concerning it. For, according to common conceptions,

nature is one thing, and that which subsists according lo, and by nature, another.

Forthat which is

artificial,

is

somethingdillerent from

art,

and the intellectual

soul is one thing, and nature another. For nature, indeed, verges to bodies, and

is inseparable from them. But the intellectual soul is separate from bodies, is esta

blished in herself, and at one and the same time belongs to herself and to another.

She belongs to another, indeed, in consequence of being participated,but to herself,

through not verging to the participant ; just as the father of soul is of himself

being imparticipable, and, if you are willing, prior to him the intelligible paradigm

itself of the whole world. For these follow each other, viz. it*e!f; of itself; of \

itself and tifanottur ; of another ; another. And with respect to the last of these,^

it is evident that it is every thing sensible, in which there is interval and all-various

division. But of the next to this, [viz.that which is of another,] it is nature

which is inseparable from bodies. That which immediately precedes this[viz.

that which is both of itself and of another,] is soul which subsists in herself, and

imparts by illumination a secondary life to another thing. The next to this [or

that which JM of itself,] is the demiurgic intellect who abides [as Plato says] in

himself in hjs own accustomed manner. And tin; next to this [or itself,] is tho

intelligible cause of all things, whieh is the paradigm of the productions of tho

Demiurgus, and which Plato on this account thinks tit to call animal itself.

Nature, therefore, is the last of the causes which fabricate this corporeal-formed

and sensible essence. She is also the; boundary of the e\tnt of incorporeal

essences, and is full of reasons and powers through which she- directs and governs

mundane In-ings. And she is a Goddess indeed, in consequence oflieing deified,

but she has not immediately the subsistence of a deity. For we call divine !x>dies

Gods, as being the statues of Gods. But she governs the whole world by her

powers, containing the heavens indeed in the summit of herself, !>ut ruling over

generation through the heavens ; and every where weaving together partial natures

with whole*. Being however such, she proceeds from the vivific Goddess [liheu.]

[For according

to the Chalditan oracle]" Immense Nature is suspended from the

Tim. Plat. VOL. J. U



10 PKOCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

back of the Goddess;" from whom all life is derived, both that which is intellec

tual, und that which is inseparable from the subjects of it* government. Hence,

being suspended from thence, she jnrvades without im|>etUment through, and

inspires all things ;so that through her, the most inanimate beings participate of

a certain soul, and such things as are corruptible, remain perpetually in the world,

being held together by the causes of forms which she contains. For again the

Oracle says," Unwearied Nature rules over the worlds and works, and draws

downward, that Heaven may run an eternal course," kc. So that if some one of

those who assert that there are three deiniurgi, is willing to refer them to these

principles, viz. to the demiurgic intellect, to soul, ami to total nature [or to nature

considered as a whole,] he will speak rightly, through the causes which have

been already enumerated. But he will speak erroneously, if he supposes that

there are three other deiniurgi of the universe, beyond soul. For the Demiurgus

of wholes is one, but morepartial powers, distribute his whole fabrication into

parts. AVe must not therefore admit such an assertion, whether it be Amelius or

Theodorus [Asina-us] who wishes to make this arrangement; but we must be

careful to remain in ITatonic and Orphic hypotheses.

Moreover, those who call nature demiurgic, art, if indeed they mean the nature

which abides in the Demiurgus, they do not speak rightly ;but their assertion is

right, if they mean the nature which proceeds from him. Fur ur must conceive

thai art istriple,

one kind subsisting in the artist, in unpruceeding union ; another,

proceeding indeed, but being converted to him ; and a third being tluit which has now

proceededfrom the artist, and subsists in another thing. The art therefore, which is

in the Demiurgus, abides in him, and is himself, according to which the sensible

world is denominated the work of the artificer, and the work of the artificer of

the fiery world. But the intellectual soul is art indeed, yet art which at the same

time both abides and proceeds. And nature is art which proceeds alone; on

which account also it is said to be the organ of the Cods, not destitute of life, nor

alone niter-motive, but having in a certain respect the tself-tnotive, through the

ability

ofenergizing

from itself. For the

organsof the Gods are essentiali/ed in

^flicacious reasons, are vital, and concur with the energies of the Gods.

As we have therefore shown what nature is according to Plato, that it is an

incorporeal essence, inseparable from bodies, containing the reasons or productive

principles of them, and incapable of perceiving itself, and as it is evident from

It ipptan to mr, that the words TOV aiyQrjrov tosher, are wauling here in the origiual.

BOOKi.]

TIMyElTS OF PLATO. II

those things that the dialogue is physical, which teaches usconcer.iing the whole

mundane fabrication, it remains that we should connect what is consequent with

what has been said. For since the whole of philosophy is divided into the theory

concerning intelligible and mundane natures, and this very properly, because

there is also a twofold world, the intelligibleand the sensible, as Plato himself

says in the course of the dialogue, this beins; the case, the Parmenides compre

hends the discussion of intclligibles,but the Titna us that of mundane natures.

For the former delivers to us all the divine orders, but the latter all the progres

sions of mundane essences. But neither does the former entirely omit the theory

of the natures contained in the universe, nor the latter the theory of intelligible:*;

l>ecause sensibles are in intelligible* paradigmatically, andintelligibles

in sensible;*

iconically. But the one is exul>erant about that which is physical, and the other

about that which is theological, in a manner appropriate to the men from whom

the dialogues are denominated : to Timajus, for he wrote a treatise of this kind

about the universe; and to Pannenides, for lie wrote about truly-existing l>eings.

The divine lamhlichns, therefore, says rightly, that the whole theory of Plato is

comprehended in these two dialogues, the Tim;rus and Parmenides. For every

thing pertaining to mundane and supermundane natures, obtains its most excellent

end in these, and no order of U ings is l-ft uninvestigated. To those also who do

not carelessly inspect these dialogues, the similitude of discussion in the Timanas

to that in the Parmenides, will be apparent. For as Tima us refers the cause of

everything in the world to the first Demiurgus, so Parmenides suspends the pro

gression of all lyings from the one. And this is effected by the former, so far as

all things participate of the demiurgic providence; but by the latter, so far as

beings- participate of a uniform hyparxis, [or of an hyparxis which has the form of

the, one.] Farther still, as Timanis, prior to physiology, extends through images

the theory of mundane natures, BO Parmenides excites the investigation of imma

terial forms, prior to theology. For it is requisite after having l>een exercised in

discussions about the besi polity, to IM? led to the knowledge of the universe; and

after having contended with strenuous doubts about forms, to be sent to the mystic

theory of the unities [of Ix-ings.] Having however, said thus much, it is now time

to consider the words of Plato, and investigate their meaning to the utmost of our

ability.

"

[I see] One, two, three, but where, friend Timieus, is the fourth/

In all tlir editions of the Timarui, ij/jirfollow! after

p<Xc Ti^aic,but is wauling in ibrse Couirncn-

t.-.nci of Procliu.



!*2PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

person of those who having been received by me yesterday nt a banquet

of discussion,ought

now to

repay

me with a similar repast r"

Plato here, together with the grace andb";iuty

of the words, raises and exalts

ihe whole period. Pra\i|>li:mes ho\\e\er, the disciple of Theophrastus, blames

I lato, first because he in.ikes an enumeration of one, two, three, in a tiling which

is manifest to sense and known to .Sorrates. For what occasion had Socrates to

numerate, in order that he might know the multitude of those that assembled to

this conference? In the. second place lie blames him, because he makes a change

in usinir the word fourth, and in so doing, docs not accord with what had Ix en

said before. For the word Jour, inconsequent to one, two, thre;

but to the

Jourth, the first, second, and third are consequent. These, therefore, are the objec

tions of Praxiphanes. The philosopher Porphyry however directly replies to

him, and in answer to his second objection observes, that this is the (ireciun

custom, for the purpose of producing beauty in the diction. Homer 1

therefore:

has said

many things

of this kind :

Full t)f tho hru.vs tlrsrcndiu^ from above,

Through JIT hull ImU-s lie furious weapon drove,

Till in the feienth it li\ l.

And in a similar manner in many other places. Here also the mutation has a

cause. For to numerate the persons that *ere present, was to point them out.

For to say one, tuo, three, is indicative; but he signifies the person that was

absent (since it was in;poible to point him oul) through tin: fourth. For we use

the term the fourth, of one that is absent. Hut to the former objection Porphyry

replies,that if as many had been present as was requisite,

it would have been

superfluous to nun.crate them, but one of them In-ing absent, of whosj name we

are ignorant, the "numeration of those that are present contains a representation

of the one that is wanting, as dei-irin^ that \\hich rema Ms, and as beinu in want

of a part of the whole number. Plato therefore indicating this, represents Socrates

enumerating the persons that were present, and requiring him who was wanting.

For if he had known him, anil had been able to manifest him by nacn,he would

perhaps have said, I see Critias, and Tinui-us, and Hermocrates, but that man I

do not see. Since however, he who was absent was a stranger, and unknown to

1

Iliad, vn. . 47.



HOOK I.]TIM/EUS OF PLATO. 13

him, he only know through niunlxr that he was wanting, and manifests ta us

that so many were present. All these observations, therefore, are elegant, andsuch others of the. like kind as may be devised by some in subserviency to the

theory of the words before us. Hut it is necessary to rememl>er that the dialogue

is Pythagorean, and that it is requisite interpretations should IK; made in a way

adapted to tin philosophersof that sect.

Such ethical Pythagoric dogmas then-fore, as the following, may lx> derived

from the present text : Those men established friendship and a concordant life, as

the scope of all their philosophy. Hence Socrates prior to every thing else

adduces this, by giving Tima-us the appellation of friend. In the second place,

they thought that the compacts which they made with each other, should !>e

stably preserved by them; and for the fulfillment of these, Socrates desires the

presence of the fourth person. In the third place, they embraced communion in

the invention of dogmas, and the writings of one, were common to all of them.

This also Socrates establishes, calling on them to U come both guests and hosts,

those that fill, and those that are filled, those that teach, and those that learn.

Others, therefore, have \\ritten arts concerning disciplines through which they

think they shall improve the manners of those that are instructed by them;but

Plato delineates the forms of appropriate manners, through the. imitation of the

most excellent men, which have much greater ellicacy than those which are de

posited in mere rules alone. J or imitation disposes the lives of the auditors,

conformably to its own peculiarity. Hence, through these things it is evident

what that is about which the philosopher is especially abundant, that it is about

the hearing of discussions, and what he conceived to l>e a true feast; that it is not

such as the multitude fancy it to be; for this is of an animal and brutal nature;

but that which bamjuets in us the [true] man. Hence too, there is much in Plato

about the feast of discourse. These therefore, and such particulars as these, are

ethical.

But the physical Pythagoric dogmas are as follow : They said that every phy

sical production was held together by numbers, and that all the fabrications of

nature subsisted conformably to numlM-rs. These numliers however art* partici

pated, just as all mundane forms are participate. Very properly, therefore, does

the dialogue at its commencement proceed through numl>ers,and use numbers

as things numbered, and not those very things themselves of which they partici

pate. For the monad, duad, and triad are one thing, and one, two, three,

another. 1 or the former are simple, and each of these subsists itself by itself;

14 PROCLUS ON THE [oo* i.

but the latter participate of the former. Aristotle therefore, is not right in assert

ing, that these men considered nnrnl>ers as subsisting in sensibles. For how

could this 1)0 admitted by those who celebrate number as the father of Cods and

men, and the tetractys, as the fountain of ever-flowing iv.ttnie? But since the dia

logue is physical, it makes its commencement from participated numbers, Mich HN

anall numlN fN that nre physical, Further Mill, these men vciieniled physical

Communion, both lliat which ii ill gciid allon, uncording to which nil linn, uii<

rendered -ll d>h- and commensurate \\iili each oilier, and that \\lneh is in celchtiul

natures. I or these impart to cacli other their proper powers. Itightly therefore,

and in a way adapted to the thing proposed, does M jcrates think lit, that the same

persons should become both hosts and guests.

From these things also, you may survey such theological conceptions as the

following: These men generated all things through the first numbers, and which

also rank as rulers and leaders; and from three Cods, gave; subsistence to all

mundane natures. Ofthe.se three, the monad, duad and triad, arc indicative; so

that it is requisite to begin from these, and that he who Mincys nature inwardly

should look to these. Farther still, the concaues of natural things were also

contemplated by other philosophers, as by Auaxagoras and /eno ;but the final,

the paradigmatic, and the producing cau.se, were peculiarly investigated by IMato.

These causes then-lore are manifested through the above numbers. The final,

indeed, through the monad; for it presides over numbers in the order of the good.

But the paradigmatic through the duad ; for the dilVeivnee of beings separates the

primary causes of wholes. And besides this, the duad is the principle of the

tetractys of intelligible paradigms. But the producing cause, is signified through

the triad. For intellect is adapted to the triad, since it is the third from being

through life as the medium, or from the father through power, or from the intelli

gible through intelligence. For as the monad is to (lie; duad, so is being to life,

father to power, and the intelligible to intelligence.. But as the duad is to the

triad, so is life, antl also power and intelligence, to intellect. Again, all divine

natures are ; n all, and are united to each other, so that all of them are in one, and

each is in all, and they are connected together through divine friendship. The

sphere also which is there, comprehends the one union of Cods. Hence Socrates

who looks to dmnity, very properly U-giiiH from communion and concord, and

likewise calls the other JMTSOHS of the dialogue to this. Moreover, the words

I or ur()oi.i/- here, it i neceuary to rcail rcxr/runy.



BOOKi.] TiMJEUS OF PLATO. 15

feasting andbanquet,

arc words p.dapted to the Gods, and especially to the mundane Gods. For

they proceed togetherwith the liberated Gods to the

banquetand delicate food, as Socrates says in the Pha-drus : and the feasting on the nati

vity of Venus, was in conjunction with the great Jupiter. These things therefore,

Socrates thinks should subsist analogously with them, in their mutualparticipa

tions of divine conceptions. And it is not at all wonderful that Tima-us should

feast others, and be feasted by them. Farther still, communications and partici

pations of powers are celebrated by theologists, divine natures filling andl>eing

filled

byeach other. For thus we

hear from poets inspired by Phoebus, that theGods communicate with each other in intellectual or providential energies in the

works which they effect in the universe.

In golden cups ihe Cods each other pledge,

And \vhilc they drink, their eyes arc lix d on Troy.

Theyalso know and

intellectually perceiveeach other.

For Gods arc to each other not unknown.

But theintelligible according to the Chaldaean oracle is nutriment to that which

is intellective. From all which it is evident, that a reciprocation of banquetingsubsists

primarily in the Gods. And of men, those that are more wise, imitatingin this

respect the Grids,impart

to each other in

unenvying abundance, their ownproper intellectual

conceptions.

"TiM. A certain infirmity has befallen him, Socrates: for he would not

willingly be absent from such an association as thepresent."

The philosopher Porphyry says, that what is apposite is delineated in these

words:

that this is the one cause with wise men of relinquishing such like associa

tions, viz. infirmity of body; and that it isrequisite to think that every thing of

this kind depends on circumstances and Isinvoluntary. Another thing also is

delineated, that friends should make fit apologies for friends, when they appear tohave done any thing rightly, which is contrary to common opinion. The present

1Iliad iv. 2 ttq.

1(JPROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

words therefore, comprehend both those, indicating the manners of Tima-us, and

the necessity of one being absent ; exhibiting the former as mild and friendly to

truth,but the latter, as an impediment to the life of a lover of learning. I5ut the

divine lamblichus speaking loftilyon these words, says tint those who are exer

cised in the sur\cy of intelligible*,are nnadapted to the discussion of sensible*;

as also Socrates himself says in the Hepnblie," that those \\lin are nurtured in

pure splendor,have their eyes darkened when they descend into the cavern,

through the obscurity which is there; just us it likewise happens to those who

ascend from the cavern, through their inability to look directly to the light.

*

Throughthis cause therefore, the fourth person is wanting, as king adapted to

anoth.T nmtemplatii.n,thai of intelligible*. It is Uo necessary that this his

infirmity, should be a transcend, ncy of power, according to which he surpass

the present theory. For as the power of the wicked, is rather imput.-neythan

power, thus also imbecillity with respectto things of a secondary nature, is tran

scendency of power. According to lambliclnis therefore, the personwho is

wanting, is absent in consequence of being incommensurate to physicaldiscus

sions;but he would ha\e been willingl) piVM-nt,

if il.trlli-il-les were to ],a\e been

considered. And nearly with respect to very thing [in this dialog..,.] prior t

physiology,one of these, i.e. lorph\r\. interprets e\ery thing in a more political

manner, n-ferrmg what is said to the \iitn,-, but the other, lamblichus, in a more

physical way. For it i> necessary, that cxery thing should accord with the pro

posed scope":but the dialogui- is physical,

and not ethical. Such therefore, are

the conclusions of the philosophersabout these particulars.

For I omit to men

tion those who labour to enncr, that this fourth person wa> Thea-t.-tos, because,

lie was known to those who came out of the Kleatic school, and because we are

informed elsewhere] that he was ill. Hence he is said to ha\e been now absent

on account of illness. For tlnix Aristoclc* infer*., that the absent person was

Theielrtiis, who a little before the .!. ..lh of So. tales, brcume known to Soeiales,

and to the Klean stranger. Hut atbuiltiiig that he had been long before known

to the latter, w hat is (here in common between Tima-us and him? Tin- Platonic

Ptolomyhowever, thinks that the absent person was Clitophon : for in the dia

logue which bears his name, he is not thought desening of an answer by Socrates.

Hut DCICN Hides is of opinion that it was Plato: for he was absent through illness,

1

Set- llit bi-giiiiiiu^of tin- 7lh book of the Ilepublic.

1

For\<>truov lu-rt, il ^pjKars lo nit lo be necessary lo rend E\unkok.



BOOK i.]TIM.TUS OF PLATO. 17

when Socrates died. These, therefore, as I have said, I omit;

since it is well

observed by those prior to us, that these men neither investigate what is worthy of

investigation, nor assert any thing that can be depended on. All of them, like

wise, attempt a thing which is of a slippery nature, and which is nothing to the

purpose, even if we should discover that which is the object of their search. For

to say that it was either Theactetus or Plato, on account of illness, does not

accord with the times. For of these, the former is said to have been ill when

Socrates wasjudged,

but the latter when Socrates was dead. I3ut to

say

it was

Clitophon is perfectly absurd. For he was not present on the preceding day,

when Socrates narrates what Clitophon said the day before, during the conference

in the Piraeus ; except that thus much is rightly signified by Atticus, that the

absent person appears to have been one of those strangers [or guests] that were

with Timceus. Hence Socrates asks Timaeus where that fourth person was;and

Timacus apologizes for him, as a friend, and shows that his absence was neces

sary,and

contraryto his will.

Andthus much for what is said

bythe more

ancient interpreters.

What, however, our preceptor [Syrianus] has decided on this subject, must be

narrated by us, since it is remarkably conformable to the mind of Plato. He says,

therefore, that in proportion as the auditions are about things of a more venerable

and elevated nature, in such proportion the multitude of hearers is diminished.

But the discussion in the Tima-us becomes, as it proceeds, more mystic and

arcane. Hence in the former discussion of a polity during the conference in the

Pirn-US, thi hearers were many, nnd those who had names were nix. But in

tin 1 MTond ronl t ivnrr, which in narrated by Socrates, those who receive the nar

ration iii i1 four in mimlx r. And in the present conference, (he (mirth person IH

wanting; but tin: auditors are three. And by how much the discussion is more

pure, and more intellectual, by so much the more is the number of auditors con

tracted. For every where that which is discussed is a monad. But at one time,

it is accompanied with contention ; on which account also, the auditors have the

indefinite, and the definite is extended into multitude, in which /he odd is com

plicated with the even. At another time, however, the discussion is narrative,

yet is not liberated from opposition, and dialectic contests. Hence also, the

auditors are four in numl>er ;the tetrad through its tetragonic nature, and alliance

to the monad, possessing similitude and sameness;but through the nature of the

even, possessing difference and multitude. And at another time the discussion

1It U

necessary to supplyin this place, I be words orow &.

Tun. Plat. VOL. I. C



18 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

is exempt from all agonistic doctrine, the theory being unfolded enunciatively,

and narratively. Hence, the triad is adapted to the recipients of it, since this

number is in every respect connascent with the monad, is the first odd number,

and is perfect.For as of the virtues, some of them subsist in souls the parts of

which are in a state of hostility to each other, am! measure the hostility of these

parts ;but others separate indeed from this hostility, yet are not perfectly liberated

from it; and others are entirely separated from it; thus also of discussions,

some indeed are agonistic, others are enunciative, and others are in a certain

respect media between both. Some-, indeed, being adapted to intellectual tran

quillity, and to the intellectual energy of the soul ; but others to doxastic ener

gies ;anil others to the lives that subsist between these. Moreover, of auditors

likewise, some are commensurate to more elevated auditions, but others to such

as are of a more groveling nature. And the auditors indeed of grander subjects,

are also capable of attending to such as are subordinate; but those who are

naturally adapted to subjects of less importance, are unable to understand such

as are more venerable. Thus also with respect to the \irtues, he who has the

greater possesses likewise the less; but he \\ho is adorned with the inferior, is

not entirely a partaker also of the more perfect virtues.

Why, therefore, is it any longer wonderful, if an auditor of discussions about a

polity,should not be admitted to hear the discussion about the universe? Or

rather, is it not necessary that in more profound disquisitions,the auditors should

IK. fewer in number? Is it not likewise Pythagoric, to define different measures

of auditions? For of those who came to the homacoion [or common auditory of

the Pythagoreans] some were partakers of more profound, but others of more

superficial dogmas. Does not this also accord with Plato, who assigns infirmity

as the cause of the absence of this fourth person ? For the imbecility of the soul

witli resjH ct to more divine conceptions, separates us from more elevated con

ferences, in which case the involuntary also takes place. For every thing which

iM iietits us in a less degree, is not conformable to our will. But the falling off

from moreperfect

good is involuntary; or rather it is itself not voluntary. But

the falling off \\hich not only separates us from greater goods, but leads us to the

infinityof vice, is involuntary. Hence also Tima-us says, that this fourth person

was absent not willingly from this conference. For he was not ;.bsent in such a

way as to be perfectly abhorrent from the theory, but as unable to be initiated in

greater speculations. It is possible, therefore, for an auditor of disquisitions

about the fabrication of the world, to be also an auditor of discussions about a



BOOK i.] TIMJEL S OF PLATO. 19

polity. But it is among the nnml>er of things impossible, that one \vho is adapted

to receive political discourses, should through transcendency of power, omit to be

present at auditions about the universe. This fourth person, therefore, was

absent tin ough indigence, and not as some say, through transcendency of power.

And it must be said, that the imbecility was not the incommensuration of the

others to him, but the inferiority of him to the others. For let there be an imbe

cility both of those that descend from the intelligible, and of those that ascend

from the speculation of sensible^, such as Socrates relates in the Republic; yet

he \\ho becomes an auditor of political discussions, cannot through a tran

scendency unknown to those that are present, be absent from the theory of

pin sics. It likewise appears to me, that the words "

has befallen him," sufficiently

represent to us the difference between him and those that were present, with

respect to discussions, and not with respect to transcendency. His being anony

mous also, seems to signify, not his being exempt from and circumscrilwd by

those that were present, hut the indefiniteness andinferiority

of his habit. Plato,

therefore, is accustomed to do this in many places. Thus in the Pha-do, he do>s

not think him deserving of a name, who in that dialogue answered badly. He

also mentions indefinitely, the father of Critobulus, who was absent from the

discussion of the subjects that were then considered;and likewise very many

others. An auditor therefore of this kind would in vain1

have been present at

these discussions;since of those that were present, Critias indeed himself says

something; but Hermocrates is silently present, di tiering only from him who is

absent in a greater aptitude to hear, hut being inferior to all the rest, through his

inability to speak.

"

Soc. It is your business, therefore, O Timacus, ond that of the com

pany present, to fill up the part of this absentperson."

This also accords with what we have said. For in natures which are more

causal and divine, quantity is always contracted, and multitude diminished, but

power transcends. And this also is a dogma of the Pythagoreans, with whom

the triad is more venerable than the tetrad, the tetrad than the decad, and all the

numbers within, than those posterior to the decad. And in short, that which is

1

For apirrwi here, it it neccswry to read aopivrwt.

*Initead of o Jr| roiovroi arprnirqi, ow

ptiTijvor *a/xyrcr roil Xoyoii, it appear* to me to be D*C*-

ry to read 9 rmovrot arpoari}i ovr, ^ar ijr r. X.




nearer to the principle, has a more primordial nature. But that which is more

primordial is more powerful ;since all power is antecedently comprehended in

the principle, and from the principle is imparted to other things. If, therefore,

the principle of things was multitude, it would !x> requisite that what is more

multitudinous, should he more primordial and powerful than what is less so.

Since, however, the principle is a monad, that which is more monadic, is more

excellent and more powerful than tilings which are more separated from tlieir

cause. Hence .Socrates very properly makes a diminution of number to be a

symbol of superior perfection, which antecedently comprehends according to

power all secondary natures, and tills up their deficiency. But since, as we

have before observed, Socrates is the summit of this triad of auditors, and he

conjoins himself to the monad that disposes the conference, conformably to the

image of demiurgic Cods, it is worth uhile to observe, how he exempts Timii us

from the rest, and how he is extended to him, as to the dispensator of the whole

discussion. lie conjoins, howe\er, the other auditors to himself, asl>eing

inferior

to him in desert. For these things may be referred to divine causes, in which the

first of the

[demiurgic]triad is united to the

primary monad,and extends the

other parts of the triad to it. It also calls forth, indeed, the productive energy of

the monad, but excites the energies of the rest to fabrication. These things,

therefore, are conformable to what has l>eeii l>efore said. But according to Por

phyry, the ethical doctrine contained in these words is this, that friends ought to

endure all things for each other, both in words and deeds, and to supply their

wants, and cans them to be unindigent, by tilling up their deficiency. For

these are the peculiarities of pure and genuine friendship. lamblichus, however,having supposed that the anonymous person was superior to those that were

present, and was a lover of the contemplation of intelligible?, says, that Socrates

indicates by these words, that though generated fall short of the nature of truly-

existing beings, yet a certain similitude is divulsed from these beings. And

conformably to this, the theory which is conversant with nature, participates in a

certain respect of the science of intelligible*, and this the filling up the part of the

absent person manifests.

"TiM. Entirely so, Socrates. And we shall endeavour to the utmost

of our ability, to leave nothing l>elongingto such an employment

1

For ro t-wK here, it is necessary to read

BOOK i.]TIM^EL S OF PLATO. 21

unaccomplished. For it would not be just, that we, who were yesterday

entertained by you, in such a manner as guests ought to be received,

should not return the hospitality with readiness anddelight."

Flic manners of Thrums are indicated by these words;

for they are shown

to be superb and modest, elevated and elegant, friendly and philanthropic.

For the words "

Entirely so" indicate his promptitude respecting the absent

person, and the perfection of the science according to which he is readily dis

posed to fill up what is wanting in others; and they also indicate his genuine

sincerity. But the words," We shall endeavour to the utmost ofour ability, to leave

nothing belonging to tuc/i an employment unaccomplished" sufficiently present to our

view, his firmness in the fulfilment of his promises, and his modesty in speaking

of himself. Such, therefore, are the ethical indications that may be surveyed in

these words. But the physical indications are these, that the remuneration of

discussion, conveys an imago of the communion and compensation of powers,

through winch all tilingsare co-ordinated, and contribute to the one harmony of

the universe. Likewise, that the energies of nature are changed according to

time, different energies operating at different times on different subjects. For to

these indications the words, "return the hospitalityto you, by whom tec were yesterday

entertained in such a manner as guests ought to be received" are similar. That which

is theologically indicated is this, that the demiurgic cause proceeds through, and

fills all things, and cuts off every deficiency through his own power, and his pro

lific abundance, according to which he leaves nothing destitute of himself. For

he is characterised by the super-plenary, the sufficient, and the all-perfect.More

over, the expression, return the hospitality, is derived from the banqueting in

divine fables, according to which the (Jods pledge each other:

In golden goblets they each other pledge. Iliad IV. T. 2.

being filled with nectar from the mighty Jupiter. Nor is it simply said, to feast,

but to return the hospitality (or tofeast in return}. For a reciprocation of feasting,

1

comprehends the entire, and completely perfect plenitude of banqueting. But

this also is seen in wholes. For the visible orders of things call forth invisible

powers, through their own consummate aptitude; and the latter through tran

scendency of goodness perfect the former. All these likewise, are conjoined with

each other, and the communication of perfection, becomes the retribution of

For a^<?rtaru hre, it U ncetry to read araf n-ia<m.



42

calling forth. Farther still, to do all these things, accompanied with justice,

conveyB an image of the Justice which arranges all things in conjunction with

Jupiter.

But the becoming [orin such a manner as guests ought to be received] is

an image of the cause which illuminates wholes with demiurgic beauty. And the

term guests,is an image of the variety

which is defined according to divine pecu

liarities. For each of the divine natures possesses appropriate powers and

energies. As therefor* Socrates feasted Timanjs with the discourses of his own

philosophy,thus also each of the Gods, energizing conformably to his proper

powers, contributes to the one and transcendent providentialattention of the

Demiurgusto the whole of things. And these particulars

are vxhibited as an

exercise to the theory of things, which presentsitself to the view

1

after tin-

manner of an image, in the introduction to the dialogue.

From these things likewise, the times of the dialogues, the Republic, and the

Tima-us, are manifest ;since the one is supposed to have taken place during the

Bendidian festival in the Pira-us, but the other on the following day of the fes

tival. For that the Bendidian festival was celebrated in the Pira-us on the lUh

ofApril,

is

acknowledged by

those who have written concerning festivals, so that

the Timutus must be supposed to have taken place on the 2()tl; of the same month.

But if, as will be observed in what follows, this dialogue is supposed to have

taken place during the Panathena-an festival, it is evident that this was the les*

Panathena-a. For the greater were celebrated on the 2Wh of June, according to

the narration of those whom we have jiM mentioned.

"

Soc. Do you remember, therefore,the

magnitudeand

quality

of the

tilingswhich I proposed to you to explain r"

In the first place, it is requisite to attend to the order of the heads of what is

*aid, of which, that concerning the multitude ot those that form the conference,

is the leader. The next to this pertainsto the filling up the part of him who is

absent. And the third is that which is now added, and respects the explication

of the thin-s proposedto

bediscussed. But these are in

continuity

with each

other. And with reference to tin: order, it is requisiteto understand the accuracy

of the words. For the words " Do yuu remcmhcr" exhibit distributed knowledge

in the participationsof discourse. For in the Demiurgus the recollection of all

For t/joaifo^n a in tin* place,I read ^oaio/iOn.



HOOKi.] TIM.El S OF PLATO. 23

things is a separate, exempt, and uniform knowledge, according to the Mnemo

syne which he contains, and which is the firm establishment of divine intelligence.

And this in the secondary Gods, is a subordinate intellection;of both which the

present persons are images. Through this memory likewise, which pre-exists

in the universe, whole souls are established inintelligibles, and the demiurgic rea

sons, [or productive principles] possess an immutable and an immoveable nature;

so that such beings as are deprived ofit,

as is the case \\ith partial souls, and

the natures of things that are generated, fall ofl from their proper causes. But the

terms "

such thiti^s,

1

and "

about \chich" are indicative of the quantity and quality

of the productive principles, which proceed indeed from the total fabrication, and

also proceed from more partial Gods. And with respect to the words "

aVmVi /

proposed to you toexplain"

if they were addressed to Critias arid Hermocrates, it

is evident how they are to be referred to things, and to the principles of the fabri

cation of the world;but if also to Timnrus, they are not a symbol of transcen

dency[in Socrates], but of an evocation of the intellectual

conceptionsof Timaeus.

Besides these things, however, let us survey the answer of Timsus.

" TIM. Some things indeed, I recollect ; but such as I have forgotten,

do you recall ir.to my memory."

That which is ethical in these words, you will find to l>e this, as Porphyry say?,

tintthey are a medium between irony and arrogance. For Timscns does not

say that he recollects every thing, nor that he recollects nothing ; but that he

recollects Rome things, and not others. That which is logical in them is, that

they afford a pretext for the summary repetition of the problems: for to do this is

the province of dialectic. The physicalindication of the words is this, that phy

sical productive principles always remain, and are always refluxive, just as the

present remembrance [of Tiimrus] is partly preserved, and partly lost. For what

is said by the man must be transferred to the whole of nature. And the theologi

cal indication is, that the one fabrication [which is that of the Demiurgus] pos

sesses indeed from itself, the immutable and nndefiled in its generations ;but

through secondary and third powers, is sustained as it proceeds, and is in itself

separate ;these powers attending it as guards, and running as it were before it

repress the tumult of generated natures. Or rather, that this fabrication is such,

For pin here, it is necessary to read 0*0.

lTIM/ELS OF PLATO, & t

the form of a polity, tliis form being celestial. Here, therefore, as in on* 1

all-per-

fert animal, all things an; comprehended, \\/.. tilings first, middle, and last, ami

nil the evolution of wholes. Hut how, and through what cause is a polity nar

rated the third time? I* it because the life also of the soul istriple? The first

indeed, being that which represses and adorns the irrational part hy justice,

and governs it in a Incoming manner, lint the second being that which is con

verted to itself, and desires to perceive itself intellectually, in consequence of

subsisting according to its own justice. And the third ascending to its causes,

and establishing in them its proper energies. To which may l>e added, thai"

to

s|>eak"in a curfory manner," brings with it an image of a life conspiring to one

intellect, which comprehends all things through an intelligible essence. The

words also"

run over the whole" afford an admirable indication of an elevation to

the highest end, of perfection, and if you are willing so to sjM-ak, of a more

eternal intelligence. For this signifies to be more established, and to possess

that which is more firm and more eternal about the samethings.

" Soc. Let it be so. And to begin : the sum of what was said by me

yesterday is this, \Vhut kind of polity appeared to me to be the best, and

of what sort of men such a polity ought to consist."

Some, considering the resumption of a polity in a more ethical point of view,

say that it indicates to us, that those who apply themselves to the, theory ofwholes,

ought to be adorned in their manners, lint others think that it is placed liefore

us as an image of the orderly distribution of the universe. And others, as an indi

cation1

of the whole of theology. For it \c<tx usual rril/i the riflliagorcan.f, prior to

scientific Joclrine, to rentier manifest thejirojto.sed ohjccts & enquiry, through xiniilt-

twits and images ; anil qflcr this, to introduce through symbols the arcane indication

respecting them. For thus, after the excitation of the intellection of the soul, and

the purification of its eye, it is requisite to introduce the whole science of the

things which are the subjects of discussion. Here, therefore, the concise narra-

1 For ai T*II ^i^r)t,it i requisite to roaJ rai rt| vivxi -

*For TOV XoynK hero, we must read TOV a\eyor.

*In tl>c original 01 fr at,in\,aiv wi titnvn rrjt rou Tfu-roi ^lakoaft.^tut TpfliyiffBai riji n^tramn fc/>V>-

y.ai. Hut tliK, in the latter part, is evidently drfcelirr. After irf>o^(Tatlierefore, it ap^ar* lo mr

to l>c nettswry to add the words, <H ic w trltit.tr, agrwably to the above translation.

Tim. Plat. VOL. i.]>

2<>

PKOCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.



tion of a polity, prior to physiology, ironically places us in the fabrication of the

universe; hut (lie history of the Atlantic s accomplishes thissymbolically. For it

is usual with fables to indicate many things through symbols. No that the phy

siologic character pervades through the whole of the dialogue; hut differently in

different places, according to the diticrcnt modes of tin; doctrine which is deli

vered. And thus much coneerning thescojx>

of the proposed words.

That in the present discussion, however, the summary repetition of a polity

very properly takes place, may be multifariously inferred. For the political sci

ence subsists primarily in the Demiurgus of the universe, as we may learn in tin-

Protagoras. And true virtue shines forth in this sensible world. Hence also Ti-

iiia-iis sa\s, that the world is known and is friendly to itself through \irtue. Far

ther still, the polity of Socrates beinj; triple,and the first being referred to the total

fabrication, as we have elsewhere shown, the form of this is very properly deli

vered here contructedly, where it is proposed to survey the whole Demiurgus, gene

rating and adorning the. universe. These things, therefore, are eapable of being

still farther discussed. Ix-t us however return to the text, and the words of So-

crates. Hut in these, there is much contention among the interpreters, who op

pose each other about a certain punctuation, and w ith reference; to this differently

explain the scope of the discussion. For some, making a stop at the wordpolity,

define the scope of it to be conformable to the inscription, and adduce Plato as

a witness that it is concerning a polity. Other s again, making a stop at the words

v/u/t was suit/, evince that the scope of it is about justice ; and that Socrates has

gi\en a certain summary of what was said about justice, which is concerning a

polity. If, however, it is requisite not to trifle in asserting and contradicting, it

must he said that both concur with each other. For the discourse concerning

justice, is adisquisition

of the polity which is within the soul. For it rightly dis

poses the communion of the powers that we contain. The discourse, likewise,

about apolity,

is a discussion of the justice which subsists in multitude. IJotb,

therefore, jx-rtain to the same thing. And the same thing is indeed justice in the

foul, apolity

in a city, and gracefulness in the world. Nor is it fit to separate; from

each other,things

which are

conjoined bynature. And thus much for this

particular.

1

By au unaccountable mistake llic original haslwpar>i>-

iiutedd of toa^o* in this (dace, which l;il-

Irr 11 & vulrnlU the l.ur tta luiL -

BOOK i.j TIME S OF PLATO. 27

Longinus however and Origen contend with each other from anotherprinciple,

about wliat kind of jiolity Socrates speaks, in these words ; whether aliout the first,

or the middle polity. For in the latter, the polity is seen living physically, politi

cally, and intellectually. Longinus therefore thinks, that what is hero said per

tains to the middle polity, because Socrates calls the assistants guardians, and

says that the guardians are warriors. But Origen is of opinion that what is said

respects the first polity. For in this Socrates delivers disciplines to the guar

dians. We however say in answer to snch-like assertions, that it is not proper to

divulse the one polity ; nor to separate tin. continuity of life from itself. For the

polity is one, perfecting itsrlf, and co-augmenting itself by more perfect additions.

But the whole polity possesses the physical in the mercenaries, the warlike in the

auxiliaries, and the intellectual in the guardians. So that the discussion is about

the wholepolity. And it is not proper to contend about these tilings, but rather

to consider this, how the polity may very properly be said to be both subordinate

to, and superior to physiology.1

For so far as it has for its matter human con

cerns, and is desirous of adorning these, it has an order secondary to, and more

partial than physiology. But so far as it subsists in universal reasonings, and is

arranged incorporeally, and immaterially, it is superior to, and more total than

physiology. The world also is a certain polity, and a partial polity [with reference

to the intelligible world], because every body ispartial. In short, the polity pre

exists indeed in the intelligible, but esisls in the heavens, and subsists in the last

place in human lives. So that if it is superior to physical fabrication, it was very

properly discussed prior to the Titmcus; but if it is inferior to it, because it is an

ethical world, but the other is mundane and all-perfect, we arc very properly re

quired to recur from things subordinate to such as are of a more venerable nature.

And both are true, through the above-mentioned causes. Since, however, as we

hive said, the form of thepolity is universal, and is impressed in a partial matter,

hence also Socrates employs the words what kind for the sake of the form, but the

wordsof

what sort

ofmen on account of the matter.

"TiM. And what was said, Socrates, was in the opinion of all of us very

conformable to intellect."

A narration conformable to intellect, but neither conformable to pleasure, nor

Here also the original has erroneously OeoXoyiai inttcad of <f>v<no\vytai.

gll1MIOCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.



the decision of the vulgar, indicates the admirablej>erfection

und intellectual na

ture of the discussion [contained in it]. And prior to this, it obscurely signifies

the concordant congress of all secondary causes about one intellect, and one

united fabrication. The word ffj/ too, which is added, unfolds the transcendent

union, through which all demiurgic causes converge as to one centre, and one

paternal cause of all things.

" Soc. Did we not then, in the first place, separate husbandmen and

other artificers from the belligerent genus?

The discourse about a polity, and the conglomerated and concise repetition, in

a summary way, of the genera contained in it, contributes to the whole narration

of the mundane fabrication. For it is possible from these as images to recur to

wholes. This very thing also was in a remarkable decree adopted by the ]*\tha-

goreans, who investigated the similitudes of Ix-ings from analogies, and betook

themselves from images to paradigms ;which likewise is now in a prefatory man

ner effected by Plato, who points out to us, and gives us to survey in human lives

those things which take place in (lie universe. For tin* politiesof worthy men

are assimilated to the celestial order. It isneces.sary, therefore, that we also should

refer the. images which arc now mentioned [to their paradigms], and in the first

place, what is said about the division of the genera. For this section of genera,

imitates the demiurgic division in the world, according to which incorporeal na

tures are not able to pass into the nature of bodies, nor mortal bodies to leave their

own essence, andmigrate

i:ito an

incorporeal hvpostasis..According to

which,also, mortal natures remain mortal

;iiiniiort.il natures eternally continue to be

never-failing ;and the di. li rent orders of them have paradigmatic causes pre-sub-

sisting in wholes. For if yon are willing to arrange tin? whole city analogous to

the whole world;since it must not be said that man is a microcosm, and a

city

not; and to divide it into two parts, the upper city and the lower, and to assimilate

the former to the heavens, and the latter to generation, you will find that the ana

logy is perfectly appropriate. Likewise, according toa division

ofit into three

parts, you may assume in thecity, the mercenary, the military, and the guardian :

but in the soul, the epithxmetic part, which procures the necessities of the body;

the irascible part,whose ollice is to CX|M-|

vv hatever is injurious to the animal, and

is also ministrant to our ruling power; and the rational part,which is essentially

philosophic and has a regal authority over the whole of our life. In every nmlti-

HOOK i]

TIM,ITS or IM.ATO.2f>

tilde of souls, howe\er, there are, that w hich performs thep;irl

of a mercenary

about generation, that \\l.,h is ininistranl i the mundane providence of the

(io<]s,anrl that which is elrvated to I In- intelligible, lint in all mundane natures,

there are, in short, the trilw of mortals, the tribe of da-mons, and the. order of

the relestial (iods; for they are truly the guardians and saviours of the whole of

things. Ami airain, daemons precede as in a solemn procession the fabrication

of the celestial Gods, and suppress nil the confusion and disorder in the world.

There is likewise a certain physical providence of mortal natures, which gene

rates and comprehends them conformably to a divine intellect.

Farther still, according to another division, the agricultural tribe of the city i

analogous to the .Moon, which comprehends the sacred laws of nature, the cause

of generation. But theins|>ective guardian of the common marriages, is analo

gous to \ enus, who is the cause of all harmony, and of the union of the male

with the female, and of form with matter. That which providentially attends to

& levant allotments, is analogous to Hermes, on account of the lots of which the

God is the guardian, and also on account of the fraud which they contain, lint

that which is disciplinative and judicial in thecity,

is analogous to the Sun, with

whom, according to theolo^ists, the mundane Dice, the clcmtor and the si itn-foltl

reside. And that which is l>clligercnt, is analogous to the order proceeding from

.Mars, which governs all the contrarieties of the world, and the dhersity of the.

universe. That which is royal, is analogous to Jupiter, who is the supplier of

ruling prudence, and of the practical and adorning intellect. But that which is

philosophic, is analogous to Saturn, so far as he is an intellectual God, and

ascends as far as to the first cause. These tilings, therefore, may thus l>c

assumed through analogies. Plato, however, appears to have divided the city

into two parts, and to have established a.s one genus, that which is agricultural

and that which pertains to the arts, which is called demiurgic ; but that which is

belligerent, as another;

not that he now recapitulates the military polity, as

Ixmginus says,

but Ix-cause

throughthe word

belligerent,

he

comprehendsthe

auxiliaries and the guardians. For of these, the. former war with their hands, but

the latter by their counsels. Just as also among the Greeks, Ajax indeed lights,

as being the barrier of the Greeks, and Nestor likewise fights, who is the guardian

of the Greeks ;the latter as a defender, repelling the enemy by his counsels

;but

the former, by employing his hands. Unless it should be said, that Plato now

For TO fai/ior 6vXof in this place, it is neceary to read TO latftotw <f,v\ov.

* For ycwpyurjj, which occur* here by a strange mistake, it it obviously ncccssiry to read



peculiarlymakes mention of the military tribe, l>ecause lie wishes to narrate the

\\urlike actions of a polity of this kind.

"

Soc. And when we liac! assigned to every one that which is accom

modated to his nature, and had prescribed one employment only to each

of the arts,

1

we likewise assigned to the military tribe one province only."

In the first place, there is a two-fold reading of these words. For it either is

" And when we hadprescril>ed

one employment conformable to nature to each

of the citizens, in order that each might perform his proper work," or," \Yhen we

had preseriltfd to each to pursue an employment conformable to nature, \vhich is

adapted to each according to the present aptitude of his nature." In the next

place, it must be enquired through what eaiiM- Socrates makes such a division, or

on what account he says,"

that each employment is rightly pursued by Jinn vho is

naturally adaptedto it, and vho in a becoming manner engages in it? For neither

is diligent attention, when deprived of aptitude, able to accomplish with rectitude

any tiling perfect, nor can dexterity without diligent attention proceed into

energy. The end, therefore, is from both. If, however, this In- the case, it is not

poihlc for him who engages in many works, to IM- similarly adapted to all of

them, or to pay attention similarly to all; in consequence of his ardor In-ing

divided about a multitude of things. Hence in this case, the pursuits of the

citi/ens must necessarily appear to be of a viler nature. But if this is not right,

one employment should be assigned to each of the citizens, to which he to whom

it is distributed is adapted, and he .should be ordered to extend all his care and

attention to one tiling.For lie who is properly adapted to this particular life,

and pursues it in a becoming manner conformably to nature, will, it is likelv,

perform in the best way his proper work. In human polities, therefore, it is easy

to survey a division of this kind;for our nature is partible. Hut how is this true

with respect to the (Jods ? For a divine nature is all-powerful andall-perfect.

Or may we not say that with the Cods all tilings are in all of them, but that each

is all

things accordingto the

peculiarityof

himself,

andpossesses

the cause of

nil things, one after a Solar, but another after a Mercurial manner ? For pecu

liarity originating from the divine unities, proceeds through intellectual essences,

through divine souls, and through the bodies of these i-ouls. Hence of these,

The words fiutrrij Tf* are omitted in the Icxt of Proclus.

BOOKi.] TIM/El S OF PLATO. 31

some participate of demiurgic, others of prolific,others of connective, and others

of a dividing power. And after this manner they energi/e al>out generation. In

divine natures themselves therefore peculiarity pre-exists, defining the unities

according to theinfinity which is there, ami the di\ine. duad. Hut in intellects,

difference is pre-cxistent, which separates wholes and parts, and distributes

intellectual povtcrs, impacting a di Heron t peculiar order to a diili-rent intellect,

through vthich the purity of intellects is- not confounded. In souls progression

ami division pre-suhsist, according to a different life in differentsoul<, some of

them being allotted a di\ine, others an angelic, others a da-moniacal, and others

a different hyparxis. Hut in bodies, interval pre-exists, producing different powers

in different bodies. For in these, there are ultimate representations ofintelligi-

bles, according to which this particular body is effective of this thing, but another

of that. And this body has a sympathy with this thing, hut another sympathizes

with something else. A*, therefore, in this universe, each thing acts according

to nature upon that which it was arranged by the fabrication of things to act

upon ;thus also in the

city,the employments of the citi/ens are divided, and each

is arranged to perform that for which he is naturally adapted. What, therefore,

the works are of the military tribe, Tinurus clearly shows in what follows :

"

I mean that they ought to he only guardians of the city, sous to pro

tect it from the hostile incursions both of external and internal enemies ;

butyet

in such a manner as to administerjustice mildly

to thesubjects

of their government, as being naturally friends, and to behave with war

like fierceness towards their enemies in battle."

In these words Plato is willing that the guardians and auxiliaries should be

judges of those that act ill within thecity, but contenders against those that are

out of it; in one way the auxiliaries, and in another the guardians, as we have

before observed. To be only guardians, however, is not a diminution of power.For when we assert of the first cause that he is one alone, we do not by this

diminish him, and entirely enclose him within narrow bounds;since neither is

that which is only the most excellent, diminished by In-iug so. Hut on the con

trary, every addition to a thing of this kind is a diminution ;so that by asserting

not only of a thing which was such from the beginning, yon diminish its excellence.

And thus much for such-like particulars.

Again, however, it is requisite to consider how wy may survey what is now

3 .PKOCLUS ON TH1. [HOOK i.

said in wholes. For what is that which is external in the universe ? Awl how

can it !* said that the universe does not comprehend all things? May we not

reply, that evil has a two-fold subsistence in the world, vi/. in souls and in

1 todies? And it is necessary that those who exterminate confusion and disorder

from the universe, should extend justice and measure to souls, hut should \v

antagonists to the unstable nature of matter. For some souls, indeed, are

naturally adapted to the intelligible, on which account, also, they may he said to

he infernal, and to belong to the extent of the intelligible universe; hut others,

!>eing material and remote from the(iotl<,

are in a certain resjn-et aliens,

strangers, and external. Hence, those who are the accomplishes of justice,

use the former mildly, asl>eing naturally friends ;

hut are severe to those that are

home along in hodies in a confuted and disorderly manner, as twing incommen-

surate towards them, and as entirely abolishing their privation of order, and

amputating the ine.vhaustilile avidity of matter. For some things, indeed, cannot

sustain ornament of this kind, hut immediately vanish into non-entity. But

others which art 1 moved confusedly and disorderly, are repressed by the justice

which prevails in the universe, and by the invincible1

strength of the order of

guardian powers. Hence he now says, that they are si-rer? to tho.se \\lio are

hostile to the city.For they are such as cannot endure to behold them. In

short, there are elevating and cathartic powers about souls, and alsoinspective

guardians of judgment and justice. And it is evident, that some ofthe.se are

analogous to guardians, but others to auxiliaries. About bodies, too, some are

connective,but others

dissolving powers: and it is manifest that some of these

are analogous to guardians, but others to those that are Ix-lligerent. For these

pouers expand into the universe, things \\hich are no longer able to remain in

their proper series, in order that, all things may have an arrangement, and that

nothing may l-e indefinite or confused. If, likewise, you direct your attention to

the Demiurgus himself of wholes,. and to the immutable and invariable nature of

the intellects, which divine poetry calls the guards of Jupiter, you will also have

in the father [of the universe.] the pre-existent causeof these two-fold

genera.For through the demiurgic, being which he contains, he adorns all things ;

but

through the immutable guard which is established in himself, every eternal order

remains, all disorder being entirely abolished. You may also see there Justice

governing all things in conjunction with Jupiter.For Justice follows him, being

1

For utTa-fVuoTt u licie, it is necessary lo read ava*Tay*vKno.

i.]TIM.F.US OF PLATO. 33



the avenger of the divine law. At the same time too, you may perceive the

armed order with which lie

arrangesthe universe, as those assert who have

written the wars of the Titans and Giants. These things, however, we shall

hereafter discuss.

The vtords, however, external and infernal, may be understood as follows:

The confused and disordered (lux of bodies, at onetime arises from the impo

tence of the reasons, [fir productive principles participated by bodies,] and at

another, from the inexhaustible avidity of matter. Reasons, however, are fami

liar and allied to producing causes ; but matter, through the indefiniteness of itself,

and the remoteness of its diminution, is a stranger to its adorning causes. Hence,

th" imincible strength of the God-, and the immutable guard of fabrication,

ail-variously subverting its confusion, renovates the reasons of matter, and reme

dies their imbecility; but vanquishes the avarice of matter. Not that matter

resists the Gods who produced it, but that because on account of its indctinitencss

it Hies from ornament, it is vanquished by fortns through the demiurgic guard,

against which nothing is able to prevail. Hut it is necessary that all things in

the world should be ol>ediciit to it, in order that they may |>erpetually remain,

and that the Demiurgus may be the father of eternal natures.

"

Soc. Tor we asserted, I think, that the souls of the guardians should

be of such a nature, as at the same time to be both irascible and philoso

phic

in a remarkable decree ; so that they might be mild to their friends,

and severe to their enemies."

The philosophic and the irascible comprehend both the genera, viz. the

auxiliary, and that vhich is peculiarly called the guardian genus, just as the

epithymeticaccord* with the third genus, which is called the mercenary. For

l>ecause Socrates distinguishes the upper from the lower city, he manifests by

these two-fold names the differences of the orders contained in the city ; just as

if some one having divided the world into heaven and generation, should say

that in the former there are demoniacal and divine orders, and should call both

of them the guardians of generation and the universe. For the universe is

guarded by the Gods, and it is also guarded by daemons. By the former indeed

totally, unically, and exemptly ;but by the latter partially, multitudinously, and

in a manner more proximate to the natures that are guarded by them. For about

t-very

God a multitude of daemons i.s arranged, which divides his one and total

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. E




providence. The term philosophic, then-fore, pertains to the Gods, so far as they

are united to the intelligible,and so far as they are filled with being. But the

irascible pertains to da-rnons,so far as

theyexterminate all confusion from the

universe, and so far as they are the saviours of the divine laws, and of the sacred

institutions of Ad rastia. Through these causes, however, they are mild to their

familiars, aptly applying a remedy to their imbecility, as being allied to them by

nature, but severe to those that are external [i.c. to those that are strangers to

them_] as abolishing the indetinitenes* of their nature, in an exempt manner, and

according to supreme transcendency.

" Soc. But what did we assert concerning their education ? AVas it not

that they should be instructed in gymnastic exercises, in music, and all

other becoming disciplines?1"

The assertions that have been already made, are certain common types,

extending to all things, according to the deii.iurgic allotment, and divine differ

ence, defining employments adapted to even, one, and distributing powers

appropriately to the recipients.But in the present \\ords, the life of the citi/ens

is unfolded, through education, employments, communion, and the procreation

of children, proceeding in a becoming manner from the beginning to the end.

\Yhat then is education, and ho\v is it assimilated to the universe ? For in the

[Socratic] city,it is the discipline of the soul, rightly adorning the irrational part

through music and gymnastic, the former giving remission to the strength ot

anger, but the latter exciting desire, and rendering it as it were elegant and

commensurate >vith anger, in consequence of its Ik-ing vehemently remiss, and

through its descent to a material nature, filled from thence with a privationof

life. But this discipline adorns reason through the mathematical sciences, which

ha\c something of an attractive nature, are capable of exciting in us the recol

lection of true In ing, and elevate our intellectual partto that \\hicliisitsclfthe

most splendid of being. All \\liicli is evident to those \vlio are not entirely

forgetful of the arrangement* in the Socratic republic.

It is now, however, our business to investigate, what education, gymnastic and

imisic are in the universe, and what the disciplinesare of the guardians ol the

universe. IVrhaps, therefore, we shall speak rightly if we say, that education is

the perfection which fills each thing with the good pertainingto it, and causes it

to be sufficient to itself, according to intellectual perceptionsami providential

nooK i.] TIM/EUS OF PLATO. 35



energies. Hut with respect to mu>ic and gymnastic, thai the former causes the

lives in the universe to be

harmonious,and the latter renders di\inc motion

ryth-mical and elegant, so as always to preserve the same form, and the same immu

table habit of the divine vehicles. For through these thing* 1 lato elsewhere alls

diune souls Sirens, and shows that the celestial motion is harmoniously elegant;

for gymnastic is indeed in them. lint medicine is in things sublunary in conse

quence of their receiving that which is preternatural. If, therefore, we assert these

things, we shall, as I have before observed, perhaps speak rightly. For powers

proceed supcrnally from intelligibles toall

heaven, and impart to the celestial

livs by illumination the most excellent harmony, and to their vehicles undecay-

ing strength. ISut the disciplines which are in the universe, are the intellectual

perceptions of souls, and of celestial natures, according to which they run back

to the intelligible, following the mighty Jupiter, and surveying number charac-

teri/ed by unity, the truly-existing heaven, and intellectual figure. Hence you

may say, that the most true arithmetic, astronomy and geometry are in them.

For they behold swiftness itself, and slowness itself, which are the paradigms of

the celestial periods. And, in short, they survey the primordial and intellectual

circulation, diune number, and intellectual figures. You may likewise say, that

prior to these, they contain dialectic, according to which they intellectually

percehe the whole of an intelligible essence, and are united to the one cause of

nil the unities. And if it is necessary to speak by making a division, we may say,

that through such like disciplines they energi/.e about first natures ; but through

gymnastic, preside over things secondary with undeliled purity; and through

music, harmonically contain the colligation of wholes.

" Soc. We likewise established, that those who were so educated,

should neither consider gold, nor silver, nor any other possessions of a

similar kind, as their own private property."

Those things which are to be ordained in a city governed by the most equita

ble laws, have an exideiit cause, and were mentioned by Socrates in the Republic.

Hut how can we transfer them to the hcatei.s? Must it not be by surveying

through what cause men pursue the acquisitionof gold and silver, and from what

conceptions they are induced to cherish this infinite love ! It is evident that it is

because they wish to supply their wants, and desire to procure such things as

may administer to their pleasures. For on this account, they are stupidly astonished


to that

about muclirbelwed wealth. They say, therefore, conformably Cephalus,

the rich have many consolations. If, however, these things thus subsist, the

perfectionof the celestial Cods, since it is sufficient to itself, and is converted to

the beautiful and the good, is not at all in want of this adventitious and apparent

self-sufliciency, nor does it look to convenience, or regard as its scope vulgar

utility; but being established reunite from all indigence and material necessity,

and repletewith good, it has a leading and ruling order in the universe. .More

over, it does not admit partible and divided good. Hut it pursues that which is

common and impartible,and extends to wholes, and is especially characterized

accordingto this. Hence it harmoni/es with what is now said, "that those who

are so educated should neither consid^- gold,nor silver, nor ami other possessions of a

similar kind, as their wv// private property

"

If you are willing also, it may be said, that gold and silver, and each of the

metals, as likewise other things, grow in the earth, from the celestial Cods, andfrom

an ejjhuion thence derived. It is ...aid therefore, that gold pertains to the Sun,

silver to the Moon, lead to Saturn, and iron to Mars. Hence these are gene

rated from thence. But theyHil.M>t in the earth, and not in the celestial Cods

who emit the etlluxions. For they do not receive any thing from material natures.

And all things there, are indeed from all, but at the same time a different pecu

liarity has dominion in a dilleivnt <li\ inity, here, in a Satin nian, but there, in a

solar manner; to which those who love to contemplate these things directing

their attention, refer one material substance to this, but another to a dilleient

power. These things, therefore, are not the private,but the common property of

the Cods; for they an

theprogeny

of all of them. Nor dothey

subsist in them.

For as they produced them, they are not in want of them ; but the metals vhich

am here, derive their concretion from theej]hi.ri<uis of the celestial Cods. Why,

therefore, are these things earnestly pursued by men in a partiblemanner? It is

because they have a material life, and are extended to a partial nature, apostatiz

ing from the whole. For on this account there is much among them of mine and

not mine. But they abandon the union ami communion of life.

i! But that rather, after the manner of auxiliaries, they should receive

the wages of guardianship from those whom they defend and preserve ;

and that their recompense should be as much as is sufficient for tempe

rate men. That besides this, they should spend their stipend in com-

BOOK i.] TIM^EUS OF PLATO. 37



mon, and live cohabiting with each other, and neglecting oilier pursuits

should pay attention to virtue alone."

It is not at all wonderful (hat in human lives there should IK? donation and re

tribution, and a reward of beneficence. For it is well said by Socrates in the Re

public, that the mark at which lie aims is to render the whole city happy, but

not otie particular fjenus of it, such as the guardian. If, however, this l>e ri^ht,

it \\ill be requisite that some persons in the city should be the saviours of it by

their providential caro and prudence, but that others by minislraul aid and servi

tude, should supply the saviours of the polity with the necessaries of lite; just as

the nature which is in us, by fashioning and preserving the orjran, prepares milk

for the energies adapted to it. But in the world, what retribution can there I*-,

or what recompense can be made by mortals to the celestial Gods ? For may we

not say that these are the peculiarities of human imbecility, in consequence of not

possessing self-siilhciency, but that every God is suflicieiit to himself, and in con

junction with the self suflicient is superfull?1

Hence through the union of super-

plenitude with self-sulliciency, he fills all secondary natures with ôod, but re

ceives nothing from them. Or it may be said, that though divinity receives

-

nothing, as heini; sutlicient and uniudiênt, yet at the same time lie requires cer

tain remunerations from us, retributions of beneficence, the acknowledgment of

thanks, and equity, through which we are converted to him, and are tilled with

greater jrood. For beini; trood, he is desirous that all things should look to him,

. and should remember that all things are from him and on account of him. For

the preservation of the natures posterior to him, is for each of them to be suspend

ed from a divine cause. If, however, we interpret these things after this manner,

referring remunerations to conversions, and the acknowledgment of thanks, how

can it still further be inferred, that the Gods cohabit with us in common, and spend

a remuneration of this kind ? It is Iwtter, therefore, to understand remuneration

in a more physical way. For since ellluxions proceed from the heavens to the

mortal place, but exhalations ascend thither, and through these the fabrication of

the ( Mills about mortal natures receives its completion, hence Socrates calls such

like mutations and transition* of terrestrial natures, remunerations or wages from

sublunary matter,1 which are

|>crfcclcd by the heavens, in order that generation

1

it is nrrrsinry after iy nvrn/uci lirre to supply tlir word virrpwXtfptt.

*For nynfW yap or, it i* obviously requisite

la read aynfW, r. X.

loilcad of ano rqi 0X91 in ibnplace,

t read air0 rij Xî rrji

33PROCUJS ON THE [noox i.



may never fail. But it must l>e said, that the cohabiting in common, is the one

conspirationof divine fabrication, and the concordant providence of the celestial

Gods, through which every thing that undergoes a mutation from the earth is

consumed, and generation is variously changed through the harmonious dance

of the celestial divinities ;to which also Tima-ns looking says,

"

that the vhole

vorUt is friendly and knmcn to itself through virtue, and that its corruptionis the

source of its nutriment, in consequence of effectingall tilings in, and suffering nil

thingsfrom itself.

What then is the end of this one and common lift- of the citizens ? Socrates says

virtue, vi/. divine virtue. For virtue subsists first with the Gods; afterwards from

them, in the genera sui>eriorto man ;

and a certain portionof it descends also to

us. Tin- guardians of the world, therefor*, linn- conformably to this, are also

unoccupied by other pursuits.For they do not look to convenience, nor to ex

ternals ;for all things are within themselves. They likewise are the saviours of

all things, and till them with what is beautiful and good, being miiiistrant to, and

co-operatingwith the one father and D.-minrgus of wholes. Since, however, they

M\e measure to the mutations O f the earth, not in so doing departing from, but

being converted to themselves, and subsisting in themselves, on this account So

crates savs,"

u recompense xuelt us is silt/intent fur tunjnralf.men." For being tem

perateand prudent in what relates to themselves, they measure secondary na

tures, comprehending then all-v arious mutations in the simplicityot their own

life. Tim-, therefore what is said may be explained in this way. Hut in another

way

we may say, that pietyand a conversion to the Gods, especially

contain a

measure, and are occupied by the gout.This measure, however, is defined by

the Gods themselves according to divine prudence,since the Gods are able

both to save themselves and others.

" Soc. Of women too we asserted, that they should be educated in

such a manner that their natures might be aptly conformed so as to be

similar to those of men;

with

whom theyshould

perform

in common

both the duties of war, and whatever else belongs to the business ot life.

Plato very properly thought that the virtues of men and women are common,

since he evinces that both have one human form, but not the male one, and the

female another. For thingswhich have a different jK-rfe^tion according to form,

are also different in species.But things which are the same in secies, have like-

BOOK i.]TIMvF.US OF I LATO. 39

wise one and the same perfection. This, however, is denied by others, who ns-

sert that there is a diHerenre according to form between men and women, though

Plato has shown that it is both possible and advantageous for women to have the

same virtues as men. It is possible, indeed, because this, history confirms. For

ther<% have been found well-educated women, who have l>een far

sujM-rior to men.

lint it is advantageous, Iwrause it is l>etter to have double than half the number of

those who exhibit virtue in their works. AN therefore we form the male guar

dians from such a particular education, and from such particular disciplines, thus

also we form the female guardians from the same : and in a similar manner, the

female warriors from the same institutes as the male.

In order, however, that we may admire in a greater degree the conceptions of

Plato, we must In-take ourselves to wholes, and to the order of the universe, where

we may survey a wonderfulconspiration of the male and female nature. For in

the Gods, indeed, the<e are so connascent with each other, that the same divinity

is called both male and female, as is the case with the Sun and Mercury, and

certain other Gods, \\here also they are distinguished from each other, the

works of the male ;md female that are of the same order, are common, so as that -7

they primarily proceed from the male, but in an inferior degree from the female.

Hence, likewise, in mortals, nature evinces that the female is more imlwcile in all

tilings than the male. \\ li;tte\er, therefore, proceeds from the male, this the female

also can produce in a diminished degree. Hence .Juno proceeds together with

Jupiter, generating all things in conjunction with the father. Hence, too, she is

said to he equal in rank with Jupiter, as is likewise Khea with .Saturn. For this

Goddess is the bosom of all the Satumian power. Farth also is equal in dignity

with Hea\en. For Karth is the mother of all things, of which Heaven i* the fa

ther. And prior to these elements, if we direct our attention to bound and infi

nity, which rank in the order of principles, we shall find that all things whatever,

which proceed into existence, are generated from both these. You have there

fore, in the intelligible, in the intellectual, and in the

supermundaneGods, the har

monious conjunction of the male with the female. You may also see the same

in the heavens. For the whole of generation is go\erned by the Sun and Moon;

in a greater and paternal degree by the former; but secondarily, by the latter.

Hence also, the Mooti is denominated by some, a lesser Sun. And among the

male divinities in flic Sun, there are iikmitc lunar God*, and analogous order*. But

if you direct your attention to da-mons, you will every where see the providence of

these Iwo-foldgenera conjoined.

For divine femaledu-mons, unitedly

eiTect all

PROCLUS ON TIIK [BOOK i.

4U

which are divine male

things in a secondary degree, accomplislied by

primarily.Female psychical likewise, and female corporeal daemons, have to the

males the relation of mothers to fathers, and of duads to monads. For they ge

nerate all tilingswith elimination, which the males produce paternally and united-

ly.If therefore we l>efore rightly assimilated the guardians to the celestial Gods,

but the auxiliaries to du-mons their utteiidimts, and who are ministrant to their

providential energies, Plato very properlyembraces in these genera, a similar

conjunction of the male with the female, and imparts to both common virtue, and

common employments; just as IS ature hinds these genera to, and causes them to

procreate the same things in conjunction with each other. But she does not

divide the one from the other, since w hates er is generated from both is unprolitic,

when either of them is separated ; though then- is a greater difference in the phy

sical orans than in the lives of these; yetat the >ame time in these al>o, Nature

makes the work of them to U- common. Much more, therefore, does the commu

nion of them in their employments, and the whole of their life, desene to h-

honoured.

"

Soc. But what did vc establish concerning the procreationof chil

dren ? Though perhaj)s you easily remember this on account of its novel

ty. For we ordered that the marriages and children should be common;

as we were particularlycartful that none might be able to distinguish

their own children, but that all might consider all as their kindred. That

hence those of an equal age might regardthemselves as brothers and sis

ters; but that the younger might reverence the elder as their parents and

grandfathers,and the elder might esteem the younger as their children

and triandsous.O" TIM. These things indeed, as you say, arc easily remembered."

If some one should impure why that which is unusual is easily remembered,

it is not difficult to reply, that it excites our phantasy in- greater decree as Ix-ing

unexpected ;and inserts in us a clearer impression

of itself. .Moreover, it is easy

conformably to Plato, to show how what is here said of marriages and children

being common, appliesto women. For he wished, according to the intention of

1la the text of 1 roclus, aX /Gnav is erroneously i>riut<

! for imfltmx.

BOOK i.] TiM/CUS OF PLATO. 41



the rulers, that their connexion with men should take place in definite times,

accompanied with sacrifices and prayers; and that the woman that had con

nexion with a man, should not l>e the property of any one man, hut should be

separated after connexion, and dwell apart, and again at other times should l>e

copulated with that man whom the guardians might approve. But these things

are thus indicated in what is said in the Republic.

Referring, however, the theory of these particulars to nature, let us show how

they pertain to the. order of the universe. For these things by a much greater

priority exist in the Gods, on account of the union of the divinities. For all things

arc the progeny of all the Gods, though different things are characterized by a

di Herent peculiarity. All the Gods likewise are in all, and all are united to

all, in conjunction with an immingled purity adapted to all, to which Socrates di

recting his attention, embraces this communion, and this distribution of employ

ments, assigning one to each of the arts, conformably to nature. For not to know

their ownprogeny

as peculiarly their own, takes

place

with the Gods. On which

account, indeed, their intellectualjMTceptions, and also their productions are

common. Each of them, however, benefits ;ind preserves that which is generated,

as being the common offspring of all of them. .Moreover, to consider all those as

brothers and sisters that are of anecjual age, those that are elder as fathers and

grandfathers, and the younger as ehildren and grandsons, originates from the

Gods, and is transferred from thence to thispolity. For similitude of essence,

derived from the same cause,is

that which is fraternal in them. But prolific cause,is in them that which is analogous to father and grandfather. And an efilux of

essence proceeding into a second and third series, exhibits the form of offspring.

For that the same Goddess is conjoined with different Gods, or the same God

with many Goddesses, may be assumed from mystical treatises, and from what are

called Sacred Mamages in the nusteries, which Plato as much as possible imitat

ing in what he ordains about politics and marriages, calls the marriages sacred.

In physical productive powers also, we may six? that there is one and the same

recipient of different powers; and one productive power presenting itself to the

view in a multitude of recipients, and pervading through many receptacles. But

forms are analogous to males, and receptacles to females. Why therefore is

this very thing l*;held in the universe, but is paradoxical in human lives ! I say

it is because these lives arc cut off from wholes, and every human soul ispartible.

1 For rovra litre, it is necetsary lo read varro.

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. F


Hence the dogmas which embrace this communion appear to it most difficult to

IKJ admitted. If, therefore, some one should take

awaythe condition of his

present subsistence, and elevate himself to the whole of things, he would immediate

ly admit this communion, andde>pi>e

the sympathy which is divided by the mul

titude. So far, however, as each of us is extruded, and minutely distributed

about a part, and thusrelinqiii>hes

the whole and one, so far also he leaps to a

life of this kind, which is an unrestrained habitude, a disorderly arrangement, and

an indivisible division.

"

Sue. Jjut that they might from their birth acquire a natural disposi

tion as far as possible the best, we decreed that the rulers whom we placed

over the marriage rites should, through the means of certain lots, take

care that in the nuptial league, the worthy were mingled with the worthy;

that no discord may arise in this connexion, when it docs not prove

prosperous

in the end, but that all the blame

maybe referred to fortune,

and not to the guardians of such a conjunction."

Plato particularly assumes in his Itepuhlic similitude, sameness, and geometri

cal, in conjunction with arithmetical equality, in order that the similitude of it

to the heavens, as in sensible*, or to theintelligible,

as insupercelestial lives, may

heperfectly preserved. For through this cause, in marriages also, he preserves

the union of the In-st woman with the best

man,and of the le.ss excellent woman

with the less excellent man. For in the Cods likewise, primary natures are more

connascent with those of the first rank, and secondary with those of the second

rank; and together with union there is immingled purity. Hence in the second

genera after the Cods, a di>lribution of this kind conformably to the intention of

the Cods, is effected according to desert. On this account, divine female de

mons are co-arranged with divine male da-mons, psychical female with psychical

male, and material female with material male da-mons. And very where, the

analogous in order proceeds as far as to the last of things. To which we mayadd that the rulers contriving that this connexion may take place latently, suffi

ciently adumbrates to us that the cause of such a conjunction of genera sub

sists unapparently with the Cods ; being thence primarily derived, but seconda

rily from da inons,1

and from the order of each, which the lot indicates; possess-

ll i*iifi-c!s?nry

lirrr to ii.scrt the words, <iw<i rwybaifitinit.

HOOK t.J TIM.FAJS OF PLATO. 4.-J

ing the power of colligation from similitude of life, according to which each i*

co-arrangedwith the

similar,tin-

divine with the divine, the material with the

material, and that whieh has a middle subsistence, with the middle. On this

account, likewise, all sedition and dissension is removed from divine natures,

each loving that winch is allied to itself, according to its own order, perceiving

that this order is spontaneous, and not adventitious and demised ;of all which,

the citi/ens Iteinir conjoined in marriage liy lot, and not looking to elegance and

ornament in the connexion, is an image. For in natural things, also, receptacles

are distributed to forms appropriately; and each form may ascribe the cause of

its own co-ordination to material variety. At the same time, likewise, this is

effected according to causes which preside over the whole fabrication of things,

and v\hich are analogous to guardians. And thus much, therefore, has been said,

for the sake of the theory of wholes.

Lon^inns, however, doubts here, whether Plato was of opinion, that souls are

emitted together with the seed : for in order that they may become most excellent,

lie conjoins similars with similars. And Porphyry replies indeed to the doubt,

but not satisfactorily. Our preceptor, however, thinks that in the first place it

should be observed, that Plato himself adds," In order that they might acquire a

natural disposition as far as possible the best." For children recci-re aphysical

similitude from theirpftrcnls,

andparticipate of a certain dignify and excellencefrom

their begetters, according to the physical virtues. In the next place, it must be

observed, that though it is not true that souls are emitted together with the seed,

yet there is a distribution of the organs according to desert. For all souls are not

introduced into casual organs, but each into that organ which is adapted to it.

J-JXotfifv KrSAsj tlwt, X"?

32fX"/"

vl fr""* *!*

says Homer. Farther still, as an initiator into the mysteries, by placing certain symbols about statues, renders them more

adaptedto the

participation of superior powers,thus also total nature fashioning bodies, by physical productive powers, the statues of

souls, disseminates adifferent aptitude in different bodiesfor the reception of different

*

For ra ainara here, it isrequisite to read ra atria.

*Iliad, ILIV. YS. 382. i. e.

" He gave the pood [i.e. (lie brave] man, good tbings, but tbe lei* ex

cellent character, thing* of a less eiccllrnt nature. In tbe text of Protlu* it is erroneously t*Q\a ft*v

oti\a <ivrr, K. A.

44 PROCLL S ON THE [BOOK i.

the



souls, the better and the worse ; which politician likewise rightly understand

ing, pays attention to the emission of seed in thecity,

and to all physical aptitude,

in order that the most excellent souls may be generated for him in the most excel

lent natures. And thus much in answer to the doubt of Longinus. But why

does Plato conceive it is better to think that Fortune is the cause of this distribu

tion to the citizens ? Shall we say it is, because it is advantageous to us to know

the cause of tilings which we think to be good, but better to conceive the presence

of such as we apprehend to be e\il, to l>e causeless, than to accuse the cause

which distributes these

[seemingevils] for a

good purpose?

For this excites to a

contempt, or rather to a hatred of the giver; because every one avoids that which

becomes to him productive of evil.

"

Soc. Moreover, we ordered that the children of the good should be

educated, but that those of the h;ul should be secretly sent to some other

city."

These things also are established in the Republic, but by a much greater prior

itytake place in the universe. With respect, therefore, to the productions of

Gods and Daemons, some genera abide in them, pure and remote from generation,

which on this account are calh d uiideliled ;but others descend into generation,

not being able to remain in the heat ens without a downward inclination. And

some of these are the oflspring of good, but others of less excellent powers. For

the term bad is indicative of less excellent. The horses, therefore, and charioteers

of the Gods, are all of them good ;but those of partial souls an of a mixed

nature. Hence in these, there is prcponderation,a verging downward, and a

defluxion of \\ings, which the celestial Gods send into generation, and da-muns

who preside over the descent of souls. The celestial and undefiled genera of

souls, therefore, are nourished following the Gods to the banquet and delicious

food, as it is said in the I ha-drus. And those that are subservient to generation,

communicate with it, leing latently sent into it from the heavens, as Socrates

isajs, indicating by the word latent the invisible and occult cause in the Gods of

the psychical descents, and that souls which thence descend, become subject

[latently] to another providential inspection, and to other guardians who preside

over generation.

1 Tim is ifj-t?d in the Ph;rdru. See tliis explained, in the notes at the end of this Trumlation.

BOOK i.] TIM/EUS OF PLATO. 45

" Yet so that such of the adult among these as should be found to be

of a good disposition, should be recalled from exile; while, on the con

trary, those \vho were retained from the first in the city as good, but

proved afterwards bad, should be similarly banished."

In the Republic, Socrates makes a transition not only from those that were

distributed from the upper into the lowercity, but also from those of the golden

race that were born there. Here, however, the reference is made to those who

arerecalled from exile.

Dothese

things, therefore, accord with each oilier? Perhaps, indeed, it is possible to reconcile what is here said, with what is there deter

mined, if we understand the word adult,as not only pertaining to those sent from

the up|wr city, but likewise to all those that are educated in the lowercity. For,

in short, the naturaldisposition is to be considered of those adults who were born

in the lower city, or of those who were sent from theup|>er

into the lower city, and

thus those that are worthy are to be recalled from exile. But if some one is will

ing to understand the words according to our first explanation of them, it must

be said, that what Socrates now deliters is conformable to the things proposed

to IM considered. For descending [rational] souls a^ain ascend, but not such

souls as had (heir .yposta-is from the iMx^innin^ in generation, and about matter,

such as are the multitude of irrational souls. And thus much for the words

themselves. See, however, how the same things lake place in wholes, as those

which Socrates ordains in his politj. For some things always have the same

order in the heavens, remaining divine and immutable; but others are always

conversant with generation ;and others are in a certain respect the media l>etween

both; at one time, indeed, being suspended from dixine natures themselves, but

at another Ix-inu; mingled with those that embrace generation. It is not, therefore,

the daemoniacal j;enus which ascends or descends, nor is this to be asserted of

multiform lives, nor are da-mons subject to death, but partial souls, which are at

one time conversant with

generation,

and at another are transferred into a <li\ine

demoniacal allotment;which things bein^ known by Socrates in the Republic,

helegislatively

ordains that which is analogous to them. For the celestialJupiter

presides over the Gods in the heavens, over da>mons that elevatepartial souls [to

their paternal port], and also over others that lead souls into generation, in order

that the ascents and descents of souls may l>e never failing in the universe." For

though you should see this particular soul restored to its pristine perfection, yet

4 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK \.

the father send** another to be annmnerated," according to tlie divinely-inspired

indication about these



things.

" Soc. Have we, therefore, again sufficiently resumed the epitome of

the discussion of yesterday, or do we require any thing further, friend

Timneus, which has been omitted f

w

Tho resumption of the polity teaches us, through images, how the, universe is

filled with tin- most excellent productive powers. For generated naturrs in it are

separated

from each other, and each communicating with other things, energizes

according t its own peculiarity.And primary, indeed, are exempt from secon

dary natures, \et employ their energies, ;is necessary to the completion of the

universe. Hut secondary are adorned by primary natures. The most excellent,

however, of mundane beings, are coiinaseently conjoined with the most excellent,

middle with middle, and last with such as are hist. Hut the same productive

powers penade through many subjects, and the same recipients participate,ol

many productive powers. Lives, also,at different times have dillerent allotments,

according to their desert. All these particulars therefore, snflicirlitly place be

fore our \iew the order of the universe. For in definite heads, Socrates ha-, in a

becoming manner, epitomised e\ery form of the polity, recurrinir to intellectual

impartibility, in order that he might imitate the (iod who adorns tlie celestial

polity intelligibly and paternally. Hut since every where measures and perfec

tion are definitely imparted to secondary natures from [piimary] causes, on this

account also Socrates recpie.sts Tima-us to inform him, whether he has comprehended fin his epitome) e\ery form of the polity. For e\ery intellect being firmly

fixed in the deity prior to itself, defines itself by looking lo it. To which we may

add, that to speak summarily is a symbol of the first parts,and the head of the

universe being adorned by the fabricator of the heavens; which tin- Demiurgus

of the universe adorns in a more perfect manner, looking to the whole, and the

one life of the world. And thus mu h respecting the analogy of partialnatures

tO wholes.

The investigation, however, is not attended with any difficulty,whether the

words mean,"

f/aic :cc >io:r epitomized the politywhich wr (iisaiAtfd

yesterday?"or

"

JJarc u-c again epitomized to-day, the politywhich tec epitomized yesterday

T For

1i. v. According to tlie Clialdraii Oracles.

BOOKi.] TIMyEliS OF PLATO. 47

whether yesterday Socrates spoke more diffusely, hut now summarily, or hi?



spoke summarily in both, the divine lumhlichus approves of either of the read

ings, and we do not at all differ from him. Perhaps, however, the latter con-

strurtion is more consonant. For attain to discuss the polity summarily, mani

fests that it was summarily discussed yesterday. And it is not at all wonderful,

that the summary discussion which took place in the licpuhlic, should not be

brought to li^ht. For many other things which are asserted heie, as brine; said

on the former day, are not to IK- found in that dialogue. Unless it should be said

that the word again, does not refer to theepitomizing, but to resuming the (incux~

xion. For In- resumes, who narrates at p-eat length what had been I M*fore- said ;

but he again resumes, who summarily contracts the narration. But whichever of

the constructions is adopted, neither of them is attended with any difficulty.

" Soc. Hear now, then, how I am affected towards this polity which

we have discussed."

What Socrates says in the words that follow, comprehends, that I may speak

summarily, these five particulars. First, what that is which in what has been

said, he desires should take place, alter the narration of the polity. Secondly,

that he is not sufficient to effect this himself. Thirdly, that neither is any one of

the poet* sufficient. Fourthly, that it is not proper to commit a work of this

kind to the sophists. Fifthly, that the auditors alone can accomplish that which

is earnestly desired by Socrates in a becoming manner. What, therefore, is

this? For it is necessary, in the first place, to speak concerning that which

Socrates desires to see after this polity, \i/. to see, as he says, a city of this kind

in motion, cnira^in^ in contests and labors, and warlike actions, in order that

after the peaceful life which he had delivered, he mitiht have to narrate the ener

gies of the city arising from circumstances of times and places. This, therefore,

is what he wishes to see accomplished.

Some one, however, may doubt to what the desire of Socrates is directed, and

on what account he wishes this to be accomplished. Porphyn therefore dis

solves the doubt by saying, that energies perfect habits, not only those energies

that are prior to habits, but also ihose that proceed from them. For the jKTtec-

tion in habit, is in conjunction with energy, since otherwise habit will bo in

a certain respect in capacity, and at rest through remission of energy. Socrates

therefore, in order that he may survey the polity truly perfect, requires that in

4ft1 ROCLUS ON THIS [OOK i.

words it may be beheld in motion, engaged in warlike actions, and contending

with others. And it appears, says he, from hence, to be manifest that Plato does

of virtue but when is sufficient to

not admit that the habit by itself, energi/ing.

felicity. It may, however, be said,in answer to

Porphyry,

that if the end was

military, it would be requisiteto assert that war gives ]>erfection

to the polity.

But if the end of it is peace, what occasion is there to solve Platonic doubts by

introducing Peripatetic explanations?Or though the end is not military, yet

war exhibits the magnitude of \irtue in a greater degree than peace, ju-t as

mighty waves and a tem^st, show in a stronger light the skill of the pilots art.

And in short, this is etlected by circumstances, as the Stoics also are accustomed

to say,"

Cive circumstances, and take theman." For that which is not subdued

by things which enslave others, manifests a life in every respect worthy. Perhaps,

however, it is absurd to refer the cause to these things alone, though they have a

political reason, and not to look to the whole scop.-of Plato, according to which

the Cod who adorns the polityin the heavens, is willing also that generation

should be governed by the celestial Cods, and that the war of forms in matter

should always subsist; in order that the circle of generation may adumbrate the

celestial circulation. And this it is to see the city excited to war,to see

genera

tion co-arranged with the celestial regions, and the whole of it governed from

thence. It appears likewise, that this is analogous to what is shortly after said

bv the Demiurgus of the universe,"

I lmt ir/irn thegemrutin" Jtil/it-r

understood

that this "rmrtiltd rtxcMnu c[///(</// 1

"// <Yr//<// & "</ inun-J and ///, In:

vas ileiiffhhd\nth /m ,n.rL" In a similar manner, then-lore, Socraies wished

to ice his city moling and energi/ing ; just as the Cod who comprehends the

celestial polity wished to behold the natures which it contains riiergi/ing, and

adorning the n.ntnnicty produced by generation.Such an analogy, therefore,

ns this, takes place in the presentinstance.

If, however, we arranged In-fore, the lower cityas analogous to generation, hut

now as analogous to war, you must not wonder. For the same things may l*>

safely arranged among dilli-rcnt things according to dilli-rent analogies. For

generation also, according to the lives in it which an- inseparablefrom matter,

resembles the lower city; but according to its contrarieties and material tumult,

it is similar to war, and warlike dissensions. That we may, however, co-adapt

every thing to the theory of mundane wholes, priorto the consideration of cu-ry

particular,let us direct our attention to the second thing said by Socrates, ami

we how it accords with this theory.For incc Socrates is analogous to the first

BOOK1.3 TIM.i:iS OF PLATO. 4J>

of the llir.t fathers \vlio adorn the first of things, he says ho is not sufficient t>

fashion \vlial follows. For the

duimlywho ^ivrs subsistence to all things, is

different froi-i him who constitutes tilings of a middle nature;and this (od -again

is different from him who is the cause of things that rank as the third. But the

third particular is, that neither are the poets sufficient for this purpose. IS or. in

the fourth place, the sophists. The former, indeed, because they imitate the things

in which they have been nourished ; but the latter, because they are wanderers,

and not at one and the same lime, philosophers and politicians.

Again, therefore,let us see how these

thingsare conformable to what has IXHMI

before said. For it is necessary that the powers that are to preside over generu-

tion should not be separable1

from material natures, but conversant with thorn.

For these powers are analogous to poets who invent fables, and to imitators.

For these are employed about images, alone praise material and partible natures

which they only know, and are unable to ascend from matter. Xor is it fit that

these powers should be inseparable,1

and very mutable, at different times ascend

ing or descending to different orders, such as are partial souls, who arc assimi

lated to sophists ;because they also possess all-beautiful productive powers, but

at different times wander to different parts of the world. Hence it is necessary

that the powers that connectedly contain generation, which is governed by the

heavens, should at one and the same time bephilosophical and political ;

in

order that through the philosophic characteristic, they may be separate from Jhe

subjects of their government, but may energize providentially through thepolitical

peculiarity, performing the duties pertaining to their allotments according .to

intellect. For that which is physical, being productive, is inseparable from

matter; but the form of partial souls being sophistical, is abundantly wandering.

It isneceis>ary, however, prior to things which are moved, that there should be.

the invariable and perpetually-permanent providence of the Gods, and immutable

priorto mutable allotments. In the fifth place, therefore, Socrates delivers to us

who those are, that are able to effect this. For these things are to be transferred

from words to deeds ;l>ecause the Demiurgus of the universe, and the rest of the

fathers, fabricate totally and exemptly ;the second of which fathers gives subsist

ence to middle, but the third to hist natures. And to these Tima-us, (Jrilias, ami

For a^wporrovf litrt, it isnecessary lo read ^w^nrrovr, and to supply aXAo, M ** MUtrad iff evrc

a^ttpierroot ai/rwr ttrni bri, sat cr avrau rrfxt^nprrat, to read owe ^wprrovi uvrwr cirai btt, aAAa cat K. \.

*Hence for \*fnrrat io tbii place,

it is nrcesviry to read

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. <i

60 PROCLUS ON TIIK [HOOK i.

Herrnocrntps, are analogous. But of those, the first in praised in an admirable

manner, Socrates also adding,"

in my opinion;"but the Heeond, in a middle way,

conformably to his order; and the third, in the last degree, i.e. accord ing to the

testimon) of others.

" For 1 will illustrate the affair by *i similitude. Suppose then that

some one, on beholding beautiful animals, whether represented in a

picture or really alive, but in a state of rest, should desire to behold

them in motion, and engaging in some one of those contests which per

tain to bodies."1

Longinus says, that Plato here decorates and beautifies his diction, through

similitudes and the gracefulness of the words. But Longinus says this in answer

to certain Platonists, who contend, that this mode of expression is spontaneous,

and not the result of art. For Plato, he observes, pays attention to the selection

of words, and does not employ them casually. It may, however, bo said, that

Plato made rhoice of this form of words from a mode of diction which was at that

time common and usual, and that he was very attentive to what was customary.

J or the atoms of Kpicunis would more rapidly by their concurrence produce the

world, than nouns and verbs would form a correct sentence by a casual compo

sition. But some blame Plato for employing metaphors in the use of words;

though with respect to composition, all admire him. At the same time, however,

it may be inferred, not from this circumstance alone, but from such care and

industry

as are exhibited iu the

presentwords, that he

paidgreat attention to

diction. For Socrates does nut simply say, that he desires to see this accom

plished by those that were with Tima-us;but he speaks like one decorating his

words and alluring the hearer, \\lien he says:" For I "u ill illustrate the

//</// by

it similitude.Stiftjiost:

that sonic (me unbeholding beautiful animals, u liethtr repre

sented in a picture, ur really ulire," k.c. And thus much for Longinus.

Origeii, however, grants indeed, that Plato is attenthe to the grace of diction,

not asregarding

that which is

pleasing,as the end of

it,

but that heemploys

this

image for the sake of exhibiting the manner in which he was himself allected.

1 The text of I roolut lus, erroiirou*)},.ui & ru/K ro au^aat tviovt-Tuv ui i^ay fiira ri]v ayut iu>-

riOAci/rii/>,iiMltad of mi r iuv run autfiuai leKWVTW wfioainttf naru TIJV ayunai oOXovKra.

BOOKi.] TlM.Ers OF PLATO. 51

And we nay, that this similitude was written for the sake of tin- imitation of divine



natures; that the ijraee of the words presents to us an irnacje of the grace im

parted by the Deminrgus to celestial natures; and that the artifice of the dictiou,

which is mingled with the spontaneous, adumbrates divine production, which

has indeed a boundary from itself, and also a progression from IXMIISJ and

essence. If, likewise, you direct your attention to the image itself, beautiful

animals manifest those natures that are resplendent with [divine] beauty ; but /Aatr

represented in ftpicture, or really alire, indicate corporal images, and true lives

prior to these imitations. For the figures of the (Jods are resemblances of (he

animals that are in them. But those that are in a stale of rest exhibit to MM the

natures that are full of intellectual arrangement, and of an equable and continued

life; those that are in motion such as proceed info another order, and a second

fabrication; and thnxe which engage in sonic one of the contests pertaining to bodies,

are images of those that impart to more imperfect natures their own proper

ellluxions and powers, and operate by their own powers on other things. And

thus much respecting the image. But the words whetherrepresented

in apicture

orreally alive, are rightly asserted in both respects of divine bodies. For they are

depicted by the dodecahedron, and they possess efficacious and demiurgic lives.

If, however, you consider the words separately, they will signify that the before-

mentioned polity is indeed fashioned in words, and is assimilated to the heavens,

but exists, if not in human, yet in true or demoniacal lircs. Farther still, to desire t)

sec the city in motion, is analogous to the words [in another part of this dialogue-]"

as soon as the

fathersaw the universe

moving,he was

delighted,and iris/ted to assi

milate it in a still greater degree to itsparadigm"

For thus also the adorner of

the hea\ens wished to see them in motion, and through motion governing the

war of generation. But the words"engaging

in some one of the contests pertaining

to bodies" arc employed, because of contests some belong to souls, but others to

bodies;and the latter are such as running, wrestling, and gymnastic.

"

In such a manner am I also affected towards the city which we

have discussed. For I should gladly hear any one relating the contests

of our city with other cities, when it engages in a becoming manner in

war, and acts during such an engagement in a way worthy of its educa

tion and discipline, both with respect to practical achievements, and

verbal negotiations.*


We have before shown through what cause, and with reference to what para

digm, Socrates wished to t>ee his republic contending in war. Because cities,

however, employ against their enemies both works and words; words indeed in



embassies,in

compacts,in exhortations to battle, and in

every thingof this

kind;but works in the pitching of camps, in spears, and the hurling of missive weapons;

on this account Socrates wishes that a city of this kind should l>e celebrated

according to both these. In words indeed, as prudent, cautious, magnanimous,

and strenuous; but in deeds, as brave, \ehement, and well exercised. For thus,

according to both, it will imitate its paradigm, who, shining with physical and

intellectual productions, adorns all the war of generation.

"

For, indeed, O Critias and Hermocrates, I am conscious of myown inability to praise such men and Mich a city according to their

desert."

This is the second of the proposed heads, of which we have before assigned the

cause, and shall now again explore it according to another method. For now

some of the more ancient [interpreters]have said, that the encomiastic form of

writing is robust, superb, and magnificent ; but the Socratic character of diction

is slender, accurate, and dialectic. The latter, therefore, is contrary to the

former. Ilenee [say they] Socrates avoids panegyric, as knowing the power he

possessed, and the subjects to which it was naturally adapted. Those, however,

who assert this, in addition to their being directly refuted by the Mene.venus,

appear to me not to have perceived die magnificence of the diction of Socrates in

the Plurdrus. There are also those who>ay

it is lit that the artificer of Mich-like

encomiums, should lie skilled in warlike affairs. Hence many historians err in their

disposition of armies, through ignorance of tactics, lint Socrates having fought

at DeloH and Potida-a, was not unskilled in all Mich-like particulars. Others

again assert, that Socrates speaks ironically, just as he said with respect to other

things, that he was ignorant of them, so here he sa\s, that lie did not know how to

praise this city according to its desert. The irony, however, of Socrates was

employed against sophists and young men, and not against wise and scientific

men. It is better, therefore, instead of these things to say, that he guards against

becoming the third from the truth. For the works of a rightly instituted city, are

the third from the paradigm of truth [i. e. of the true or intelligible polity], Ilenee,

wishing to remain in the second from the truth, he sa\s, he is not able to bear the

BOOKi.] TIMJEUS OI PLATO. 53

tlcscont to the third species of life. And an impotency of this kind is an abund

ance of For to l>o able to abide is

power. in paradigms, effected through powor

which is transcendent. Yon may likewise see how this arcords with wh.it has

been before said by us respecting the analogy of these things to wholes. For the

second fabrication is assimilated to the first, and on this account is proximate to

it. For thr whole demiurgic series is one, possessing union together with M-par-

ation. Very proj>erly,therefore, is Socrates precedaneonsly extended to Crilias

and Hermocrates, and he rightly thinks it lit that they should weave together the

particulars that are next in order. For Tinui-ns is about to deliver these things in

a more universal and elevated manner, and not through images, in consequence of

directly preserving his analogy to the Demiurgiis of wholes, who paints the

heavens with the dodecahedron, but generation with appropriate figures.

"

Indeed, that I should be incapable of such an undertaking is not

wonderful, since the same imbecility seems to have attended poets, both of

the past am! present a<j;e. Not that I despise the poetic genus ; but it is

perfectly evident, that the imitative tribe easily and in the best manner

imitate things in which they have been educated. But that which is

foreign to the education of any one, it is difficult to imitate well in deeds,

and still more difficult in words."

This is the third of the before-mentioned heads ofdiscussion,

in

which Socratesshows that none of the poets have Ix-en adequate to the praise of men and cities

of this kind, which have casually been engaged in warlike actions. Lon rrinus

however, and Origen, doubt, whether Plato comprehends Homer among the

poets,\\hen he says, that he has not only the same opinion of the poets then

existing (for this is nothing novel), but likewise of those of former times, so that

Porphyry informs us that Origen passed three whole days exclaiming, blushing and

toiling, asserting that the hypothesis and the doubt were great, and being ambitious to show that the imitation in the poetry of Homer is sufficient for lirtuoim

actions. For who speaks moremagnificently than Homer, who, representing the

Gods as contending and fighting with each other, does not err in his imitation,

but speaks loftily conformably to the nature of things ? Porphyry, however, in

reply, says, that Homer is indeed sufficient to give magnitude and elevation to the

passions, and to excite actions to an imaginative bulk, but that he is not capable


of delivering an impassivity which is intellectual, and which energizes according to

a philosophic life. But I should wonder if Homer is not sufficient for these

things, but Critias is, or Hermocrates, and should l>e thought lit to speak about

them. It appears, therefore, to mi1

, that Plato divides poetry into the divinely-

inspired, and the artificial. And having made this division, he refers the magni

ficent diction and sublimity derived from inspiration, to the Gods. .For oracles in

a remarkable decree possess grandeur, vehemence, and magnificence of language.

But lie evinces that the poetry proceeding from human art, is not adequate to the

praise of the fortitude of this city, and of the great deeds of the men that are

educated in it. For if then? is any artificial sublimity in some one of the poets, it

has much of contrivance in it, and grandeur of diction, and makes great use

of metaphors, as is the case with Antimachus. But Socrates requires a pane

gyrist, \vlio exhibits in his praise a spontaneous sublimity, and a magnificence of

language, which is free from compulsion and pure; ju-t as actions in !n> Republic]

have magnificence, not casually, but adapted to the education and discipline of

the men. That Socrates, however, does not reject the divinely-inspired poet,

nor the w hole of poetry, but that only \\luch is artificial, he manifests, I think,

when he .says, "that he din.s notdespise tin: [xxtic genus" The portie genus,

then-fore, is di\ine, as he elsewhere says. But hr despises the imitative species of

poetry ;nor yet this simply ; but that which is nourished in depraved manners and

laws. For this, in consequence of verging to things of a less excellent nature, is

not naturally adapted to be imitative of more exalted manners. And thus much

in answer to I he doubt.

The last part, l:o\vc\er of I he word* of Socrates, being in a certain resjK-ct dif

ficult, may be rendered perspicuous as follows: But the words are,"

that :r/tic/i is

foni^n to the education oj any one, it is djjicult to imitate ;rc// in deeds, and stilt more

difficultin U crt/s* For it seems to be easy to imitate words or deeds. IS ot a

few, therefore, act suphistically, by exhibiting virtue as far as words, but in deeds

being entirely alienated from it. W ill it not, therefore, Ix? better to interpret these

words thus, viz. : To suppose the most excellent education is implied in th- words,

that which isforeign to the education of any one ; but to assume, in duds tind in

icords, as equivalent to, conformably ( deeds, and eunfurinulily (o icords ; and tu imi

tate net/, as having the same meaning with tu be :<c// unituUd ? And thus we maycollect from all these, that for that which is most excellent to be well imitated,

it is diflicull indeed according to deeds, but it is still more dillicult for it to be

well imitated according to words in a written work. For this is the thing

BOOKi.l TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 55

proposed to IK? effected in portry. And yon may see how this accords \vitli

tiling themselves. For he who in a written work narrates the deeds of the most

excellent men, composes a history, lint he who narrates the speeches of these men,

if he intenrls to preserve the manners of the speaker, assumes a disposition similar

io the speaker. For words are seen to differ according to the inward dispositions.

For thus we deride most of those, except I lato, who have written ihe Apology of

Socrates, as notpr".*<r\in^

the Socntic manner in their composition. Thoughthe narration of this \ery thinir, that Soerates was accused, made an apology, and

was sentenced to die, would not he thought worthy of laughter, hut the dissimili

tude of imitation in the composition, rvnders the imitators ridiculous. Since, also*

to say of Achilles, that he came forth armed after such a manner, and that he

performed such deeds, is not difficult; hut to narrate copiously what lie said

when detained in the river, is not easy. But this is the province of one who is

ahlc to assume the manners of the hero, and to write conformably to what he

would IKIM- said. This also is e\ident from Socrates in the Hepuhlic, very much

blaming Il-unerrespecting

the imitation of words. But as to the

Gods,it is said

tobeeasx by lanûaê to intitule the words or the deeds of the Gods. For w ho

can delineate their works according to their desert? Or it may he said that it is

the same tiling with respect to the Gods, to imitate their words or deeds. For

since their words are intellections, ;uul their intellections are productions, the

imitator of their words is also the imitator t>f their productions. So that hy how

much he fails in the one, hy so much also is he deficient in the imitation of the

other. Lonirinus, howe\er, has the following doubts with respect to the proposedwords. For if poets are not worthy imitators of the works pertaining to such a

city as this, hecause they are not educated in the manners of tin-city, neither will

Critias and his associates be ahle toe/feet this. For neither did they live perform

ing the office of magistrates in it. But if it is hecause they have not science, but

are imitators alone, why by receiving types from us, may they not he ahle to imi

tate, since they possess an imitative power? In answer to these doubts, it mav l>e

said, that the imitation of such a polity proceeds through a life concordant with

its paradigms. For he who does not live according to virtue, is incapable of

adducing words adapted lo worthy men. It is not, therefore, sufficient merely

to hear what form of life the polity possesses, in order to imitate it, as the doubt

of Lonînus says it is. B lt Porphyry adds, that as all things, such for instance

as the diurnal li;,rht, are not imitated by painters, so neither is the life of the most

excellent polity imitated by poets, inconsequence of transcending their power.

50 IMIOCLUS ON THK [BOOK i.

"

liut with respect to the tribe of sophists, though I consider them as

skilled both in the art of speaking, and in man} other beautiful arts, yet

as they have no settled abode, but wander daily a multitude of



through

cities, I am afraid, lest with respect to the institutions of philoso

phers and politicians, they should not be able to conjecture the qua-

lily and magnitude of those concerns, which wise and politic men are

engaged in \yitli individuals in warlike undertakings, both in deeds and

words."

With respect to (he sophists, some of them frequently pretended tol>e

skilled in

aMronomv, others in geometry, others in polities, and others in the art of dividing.

Hence they are now .said to l>e skilled in many beautiful arts. Since, however,

they did not possess a scientific knowledge of these, it is added, that they are

skilled in them. For skill maniff sts an irrational occupation in mere words,

unaccompanied with the knowledge of the why. Because, however, they

not only lived at different times in different cities, hut were full of deception, of

false opinion, and unscientific wandering, they arejustly called wanderers. But as

they led a disorderly and inenulile life, eiu-rgi/ing according to passion, they are

very properly said not to have a settled tilwtte ;since it is requisite

that every one

should arrange himself prior to other things. For all such particulars,as are in a

family and a city, are likewise in manners, and these prior to externals ought to

be filly governed. \Vlio then are the proper imitators of the deeds and words of

the host polity, if neither the poets nor the sophists are? They are such as are

both politicians and philosophers. For the union of both these is necessary, in

order that through the politicalcharacter they may be able to perceive

the works

of the citi/ens ;luit thrombi the philosophic, their words, in consequence of

inwardly pre-assiimiiig their life. And through the former, indeed, they com

prehend their practical wisdom, but through the latter, the intellectual energy of

the rulers. But from these images we should make a transition to demiurgic

causes. For it is necessary that these al-o should he total and intellectual, in

order that the universe may be consummately perfect, and that generation may

possess ironic ally such things as the heavens primarilycontain.

" The genus, therefore, of your habit remains, which at one and the

same time participatesof both these, by nature and by education."

BOOK i.] TIM/EUS OF PLATO. 37

Longinus, notdisdaining to survey those words, and those that precede them,

says, that in that of them with," But with to the tribe



partbeginning respect of

sophists, lam afraid, as they arc wanderers" &c. there is a difference of expression

through the desire of dignity and gravity in the diction. That in the words that

follow,"

Lest ri/Y/i raped to the institutions of philosophers amipoliticians, they

should not be able to conjecture the quality and magnitude of those concern.*" &c.

there is a distortion of phrase from what is natural. And that the third part,"

The genus therefore of your habit remains," Sec. is perfectly unusual. For it is

not at all dissimilar to thestrength of Hercules,

to ncrt i$ TeXstta^iio,

thesacred

strength &Tclcmachus,

1

and other such like expressions. But Origen admits,

that the form of expression in the proposed words, is conformable to the manner

of historians. For such like periphrases are adapted to a narration of this kind,

as well as to poetry. We, however, say, that Plato everywhere changes his

mode of diction, so as to he adapted to his subjects; and in unusual things, stu

dies mutations of expression. But we do not admit that the proposed words are a

periphrasis. For they do not manifest the same thing as the expression you, like

the strength of Hercules ; from which there would only be an ability of giving that

which is adapted to the imitation of (he best polity. For those who are both

philosophers and politicians, by encrgi/ing according to the habit which they

possess, and which differs from the poetical andsophistical habit, will be

able to effect that which Socrates desires. And thus much for the words

themselves.

Looking, however, to the conceptions which they contain, we must say, that So

crates excites Critias and llermocrates to what remains to l>e accomplished in the

polity. But he likewise calls on Tima-us to assist the undertaking. And this is

the fifth head of the things proposed for elucidation. You may also see how

magnificently Socrates celebrates the men from the very beginning, calling [the

wisdom which they possess] a habit, in order that he may exempt them from so

phistical wandering. But he says that they are partakers of the political science,

both by nature ami education, in order that you may contradistinguish it from

poetical imitation, which is nourished by less excellent laws. And hedesignates

the perfect from nature and education ; lest depriving nature of education, you thould

cause it to be lame ;* or you should think that education ought to he thrown into an

1

Od)s. u. 409.

*For \o\tff here, it it necciwry to read

X*AI>&

77m. Plat. VOL. I. II


unapt and incongruous recipient. And thus much has l>een said in common re-

s|x?cting the men. But if you wish ton|>cak, proceeding to paradigms, the demi

urgic gemiN, which is total and intellectual, remains to l>o arranged according to a

attention to wholes. Let

providential us, however, mirvey separately every parti

cular.

" For Timteus here of Locris, an Italian city, governed by the best of

laws, exclusive of his not being inferior to any of his fellow-citizens in

wealth and nobility, has obtained in his own city the greatest honours,

and the highest posts of government ; and, in my opinion, has arrived at

the summit of allphilosophy."

What testimony, therefore, can be more admirable than this, or what praise can

be greater? Does it not, in the first place, evince that TinuniB was a political

character; in the second place, that he possessed intellectual knowledge [in a

most eminent decree], by .saying, that he had arrived at the summit of all philo

sophy ;and adding, in nit/ opinion,

which places a colophon on nil the panegyrics?

What other image also than this among nun, is more ca >able of being assimilated

to the one 1)< rniurgus ? For, in the first place, by the politicaland the philosophic,

the image is Jovian. In tin- next place, by asserting that Tima-us belonged to a

ily governed by the best of la\\s, it iinit.itt * the god wlio was nurtured in the in

telligible by Adrastia. And by Tima-us excelling in nobility of birth, it adum

brates the total, intellectual, and unical nature of the god. For all these the l)e-

miurgus possesses, by participating of the fathers prior to himself. By asserting

also that Tima-us had obtained the highest posts of government, it represents to us

the royal power of the Demiurgiis, and \\hich has dominion over wholes ;his

sceptre, according to theologists, consisting of four and twenty measures. But to

add likewise that he had enjoyed the greatest honours, presents us with an image

of that transcendency which is exempt from wholes, both in dignity and power.

It is the Demiurgu*, then-fore, who also distributes honours to others. And it

may !x? said, that the assertion that Timieus had arrived at the summit of philoso

phy, assimilates him to the god, who at once perfectly contains all knowledge in

himself. So that, from all that has been said, you may apprehend, as from ima

ges, who the Dcmiurgus of the universe is; that he is an intellect comprehensive

of many intellects, and arranged among the intellectual (Jods;that he is full of




" Nor h this to be doubted of Hermocrates, since a multitude of cir

cumstances evince that he is, both by nature and education, adapted to

all such concerns."

Hermocrates was a Syracusan general,desirous of living conformably to law.

Hence also he participates,in u certain respect, of the political

science and philo

sophy. He must be referred, therefore, according to analogy, to tl e third fabri

cation*of things. For the command of an army is a power allied to the god,

who arranges the last and most disorderly parts of mundane fabrication ;and to

be testified by a multitude of circumstances, indicates an analogy to the power that

produces fabrication into all multitude, and an ultimate di\ision. We therefore

make this arrangement, iu order that the men may have an analogy to the things.

But others arrange Critias as inferior to Hermocrates; though the absent person

was neither adapted to speak nor to hear, and of those that are present [ata

conference}, he who is an auditor, indeed, but is silent, is secondary to him who

is both an auditor and a speaker, and in th s respect imitates those that are about

Socrates and Tima;us. In the next place, this ;dso must be considered, that So

crates gives the preference to Critias, in what he says, praising him immediately

after Tima-us. There are likewise those who attribute- such an order as the fol

lowing to these persons, vi/. they arrange Tima-us according to the paradigmatic

cause, Socrates according to the ellicient, and Critias according to the formal

cause; for he leads into energy those that have been rightly educated ;but Her-

mocrates according to the material cause. Hence also he is adapted indeed to

hear, butnot to

speak.For matter receives

productive powersexternally, but is

not naturally adapted to generate. And this arrangement indeed will be found

to be very reasonable, if we abandon the former conceptions [relativeto the ana

logy of the men].

Instead of fio tac *-oXiniji wi ptrtitf,in

<f>i\o<ro$iat

tvtttv o\i r. X.. il is necessary to read fio

at iroXirnijJ .rwi^iern^<

ia<

<f>t\uaiiif>tat.oryrcr uv* f. X.

Tima-us is analogous to Jupiter, the Deiuiuruus of the univrr ;but Socrates, Critias. and Her-

niocrate*, are analogous to the three ruling fathers, or druiiurgi, Jupiter, Neptune, and 1 luto, who

form the summit of the supermundane order of (iods. For, according to the arcana of the Grecian

ttieolo, there is a twofold Jupiter; one being the Deiniurgu*. and existing at the extremity of the

int. llectual order ;but the other being the first of the supermundane demiurgic triad. See. the 6 th

fV>ok of mj tramlation of Proclus on the Theology of I lato.

OOKi.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. d

" Hence when you yesterday requested me to discuss what pertains to

a I with that



polity, readily complied your request; being persuaded theremainder of the discourse could not be more conveniently explained bv

any one than by you, if you were butwilling to engage in its discussion.

For when you have properly adapted the city for warlike purposes, there

is no one in the present age but you from whom it can acquire every

thing fit for it to receive. As I have, therefore, hitherto complied with

your request, I shall now require you to comply with mine in the above-

mentioned particulars. Nor have you, indeed, refused this employment ;

but have, with common consent, determined to repay my hospitality with

the banquet of discourse. I now, therefore, stand prepared, in a deco

rous manner, to receive the promised feast."

The summary repetition of the polity appears, indeed, as Socrates now says, to

have been made for the sake of the discussion of the contests in war of a rightly

constitutedcity. .Both the concise comprehension, however, of tlie polity, and

the Atlantic war, refer us to the one fabrication of the world. For, as we have

before observe;!, it is better, prior to the whole fabrication, and all the fonn of the.

production of the world, to make a survey from parts and images. Socrates, there

fore, resuming the polity in certain forms, and, first, through this imitating the

universe, very properly establishes himself, as it were, in essence; but excites

others to the discussion, who celebrate the power of such a city, and imitate those

who arrange the universe according to the middle demiurgic form, and uniformly

comprehend the contrarieties and multiform motions which it contains. As.

therefore, Jupiter, in Homer, being seated in his citadel on the summit of Oljm-

pns, and abiding in his own accustomed unity, sends the Gods who preside over

the mundane contrariety to the Grecian war ; thus also Socrates, being purely

established in the intelligible form of apolity, prepares those after him that are

able, to celebrate the motion and power of this polity, calling forth, indeed, the

science of Timaeus, to the survey of wholestotally, but preparing the others to the

total and concise comprehension ofpartial natures. For as lie had discussed the

polity totally, after this manner also, he wishes that the power of it should lie cele

brated by the rest. Since, however, all these discourses bring with them an image

of demiurgic works, and the whole conference adumbrates the fabrication of the


world, Socrates very properly says,"

that he stands prepared, in a decorous manner*

to receive the promised feast,

nhis words being invested with modesty, as a form

adapted to virtue.



" HERM. But we, O Socrates, as Timains just now signified,shall

cheerfully engage in the execution of your desire ;for we cannot offer

any excuse sufficient tojustify neglect in this affair. For yesterday, when

we departed from hence, and went to the lodging of Critias, where we arc

accustomed to reside, both in his apartment and in the way thither, we

discoursed on this very particular."

It was requisite that Ilermocrates should say something, and not he silently

present, like the unemployed persons in a comedy. Hence also he is represented

speaking to Socrates. And this indeed is logographic [or pertaining to the art of

writing]; hut it is likewise adapted to what has been before said. Tor it repre

sents to us, as in an image, that the. histparts, of the fabrication of things, follow

the one father of wholes, and, through similitude to him, convergeto the one

providence of the world. For Ilermocrates, following Socrates, says, that no

thing sliall In- wanting, either of alacrity or power, to the accomplishment of the

narrations investigated by Socrates. For these two things become especially im

pediments to us in our mutual energies, viz. our indolence, and any external im-

|M-diment. Removing, therefore, both these, he says, that there cannot be any ex

cuse siiflicient to justify their neglect, or prevent them from accomplishing the

mandate of Socrates. Very properly, therefore, does he call upon Critias for the

narration respecting the city of the ancient Athenians, in vhich the mandate of

Socrates terminates; just as Socrates calls on Tinurus, and makes himself a par

taker of his discourse. For on the preceding day, Ilermocrates says, they dis

coursed on this very particular together with Critias, just as the third Deuiiiirgns

in the universe communicates with the production of the second. For the whole

of generation is entirely in want of returns from the subterranean world. If, how

ever, these things subsist after this manner, the Atlantic history will appear to

have had the third narration. But those numbers, the duad and the triad, are

said to IM> adapted to the middle fabrication, the former through power, and the

latter through its demiurgic providence, and which is also perfectiveof mundane

natures. So that whether you assign to this history a double or atriple

narration

BOO* i.] TIMJEUS OF PLATO. 63

you will, from cither of the numbers, be able to recur to the conception of the in

tervening medium.



" He therefore narrated to us the following particulars from ancient

rumour, which I wish, O Critias, you would now repeat to Socrates, that

he may judge whether it any way conduces to the fulfilment of his re

quest."

CRI. It is requisite to comply, if agreeable to Timzeus, the third as

sociate of our undertaking." TIM. I assent to your compliance."

You will find in these words an admirable indication, as in images, of divine

natures. For, as in them, such as are secondary call forth theprolific powers of

such as are primary, and produce them to the providential inspection of the sub

jects of their government; thus also here Ilermocrates calls on Critias to speak,

andgives completion

to what waspromised

to Socrates. And as,

amongdivine

natures, effects convert themselves to the reception of their causes, thus also here,

Ilermocrates is extended to Critias, but Critias looks to the mandate of .Socrates.

As likewise all demiurgic causes are suspended from the one father of the uni

verse, and govern all things conformably to his will; after the same manner here

also all the persons fly to Timaeus, and to his nod, or consent, or will, in order

that, being impelled from that as from a root, they may dispose their narration

agreeably to his desire. For thus what is going to be said will contribute to thediscourse about the whole fabrication of the world. Moreover, the words

"from

undent rumour" if the narration is historical, signify ancient according to time.

Hut if they arc an indication of what takes place in tin; universe, they will ob

scurely signify the reasons or productive powers which are from eternity inherent

in souls. And if, likewise, they bring with them an image of divine cause*, they

show that these demiurgic causes, being supemally filled from more ancient (jods,

impart also to secondary natures their own providential energies.

"

CRI. Hear, then, Socrates, a narration surprising indeed in the

extreme, yet in (very respect true, which was once delivered by Solon, the

wisest of the seven wise men.**


With repect tfc th whole of this narration about the Atlantics, some say, that

it is a mere history, which was the opinion of Crantor, the first interpreter of Plato,

who says, that Plato was derided by those of his time, as not Ijeing the inventor

but what the Egyptians had written on this subject;



of the Republic, transcribing

and that he so far regards what is said by these deriders as to refer to theEgyi>-

tians this history about the Athenians and Atlantics, and to believe that the Athe

nians once liu-d conformably to this polity.Crantor adds, that this is testified

by the prophetsof the Egyptians,

who assert that these particulars [which are

narrated by Plato] are written on pillarswhich are still preserved.

Others

a- aiii, sa\, that this narration is a fable, and a fictitious account of things, which

by no means had an existence, but w hich bring vv ith them an indication of natures

which are perpetual,or are generated in the world

;not attending to Plato, who

exclaims,"

that the narration is surliriwigin the extreme, yet is in every respect

true." For that which is in every respect true, is not partly true, and partlynot

true, nor is it false according to the apparent, but true according to the inward

meaning; since a thing of this kind would not IM- perfectlytrue. Others do not

deny

that these transactions took place alter thi> manner, but think that they are

now assumed as images of the contrarieties that pre-exist in the universe. Tor

war, say they, is the father of all things, as Ileraclitus also asserted. And of

these, some refer the analysis to the fixed stars and planets : so that they assume

(he Athenians as analogous to the fixed stars, but the Atlantics l the planets.

They likewise sa\, that these stars light on account of the opposition in their cir

culation, but that the fixed stars vanquish the planets on account of the one con

volution of the world. Of this opinion, therefore, is the illustrious Amelius, who

\ehementlyeonteiidsthatthismii-tbethe case, because it is clearly said in the

Critias, that the Atlantic island was divided into seven circles. But I do not

know of any other who is of the same opinion. Others, again, as Origen, refer

the analysis to the opposilon of certain da-mons, some of them being more, hut

others less, excellent. And some of them being superior in multitude, but others

in power : some of them vanquishing, but others being vanquished. But others

referit to the discord of souls, the more excellent

being

the

pupils

of Minerva,

but the inferior kind being subservient to generation; who also pertain to the

(lod that presidesover generation [i.

e. to Neptune]. And this is the interpreta

tion of Numenius. Others, mingling, as they fancy, the opinions of Origen and

Numemus together, say, that the narration refers to the opposition of souls to

da-mons, the latter drawing down, but the former being drawn down. And

BOOK i.] TIM/EL S OF PLATO. 6.5

with these men, dsrmon lias atriple suhsistence. For they say, that one kind is

that of di\ ine (hrinons; another, of ihrmons according to hahitude, to which par-

tial souls give completion, \vhen they ohtain a demoniacal allotment ; and

another i* that of depraved d;rmons, who are also noxious to soul*. Da-mons,

tlieri fore, of this la-t kind, wage tliis war against souls, in their descent into

generation. And that, say they, which ancient ideologists refer to Osiris and

Typhon, or to Bacchus and the Titans, this, I lato, from motives of piety, refers

to the Athenians and Atlanties. Before, however, souls descend into solid

hodies, those theologists and Plato, deliver the war of them with material demons

who are adapted to the west ; since the ur.?/, ax the Egyptians *<n/, is the place ofno.vious dtcmons* Of this opinion is the

philosopher Porphyry, respecting uhom,

it would he wonderful, if he asserted any thing different from the doctrine of

Nmnenius. These [philosophers] however, are in my opinion, very*

excellently

corrected hy the most dmne lamhliehus.

According to him, therefore, and also to our preceptor Syrianus, this con

trariety and opposition are not introduced for the purpose of rejecting the narra

tion, since on the contrary, this is to he admitted as an account of transactions

that actually happened ; hut, as we art* accustomed to do, vu> must refer that

which precedesthe suhject of the dialogue, to the scope itself of the dialogue.

Hence, they are of opinion, that this contrariety which is derived from human

affairs, should, according to a similar form, he extended through the whole world,

and especially through the realms of generation. That in consequence of this,

we should survey every where how things participate of contrariety, according to

the variety of powers. For since all things are from the one, and from the duad

after the one, are in a certain respect united to rach other, and have an opposite

nature; as iu the genera of IMMU^, there is a certain opposition of sameness to

difference, and of motion to permanency, hut all things participate of these ge-

ner;\ this heing the case, we must survey after what manner mundane natures

possessthe contrariety which pervades through all things.

Moreover, if we consider he polity of Plato as analogous in every respect to

the world, it is necessary that we should survey this war as existing in every

nature. For the polity is analogous to existence and essences, hut war, to the

powersof these essences, and as Plato says, to their motions. We must, like-

1 For *i I M TI NTH, hen- it is necessary to road eirri ratrj fvirn, and for aiwruor, tai-wr-iiMr.

1 InMcail of m/ii^u in (his place, it Is requisite to readKoptly.

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. J

OO PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

wise, refer tlie polity, by making it common to all things, to the whole union of

things ; but it must be said, that war is to lx> assimilated to the mundane division,

and to the empire of victory. Whether, therefore, you give a twofold division

to the universe, by separating it into the incorporeal and the corporeal ; and

again divide the incorporeal into (he more intellectual and the more material

natures, and the corporeal into heaven and generation ;and heaven, into contrary

jK-riods, but generation into opposite powers ;or in \\hatever \\ay you assume

this opposite life, whether in the mundane Cods, or in da-mons, in souls, or in

bodies, you may every \\h -re transfer the analogies from mm to things. For

o( the (Jods themselves, tit: divine Homer makes oppositions; representing

Apollo as hostile! y opposed to Neptune, Mars to Minerva, the river Xanthus to

\ ulcan, Hermes to Latoiia, and Juno to Diana. For it is requisite to survey

generation in incorporeal nature-, in bodies, and in both. // is /ikcii ixe necessary

to consider Neptune and siJulio

as the Jubricators of t/tc uliole& generation, the one

totally, but the otherpartially. But Juno mid Diana, us the suppliers of vivijication,

the former ratio)iullyt but ths latterpliysically.

Jhnerva and Mars, us the causes

f>/Iht

contrariety nhieh pervades throitgli both existence and life ; the former, if

that which is dtjined according tu intellect ; but the /titter, of that which is inure ma-

tcrial andpassive. Hermes and Latona, as presiding over the tu ofold perj\ct u>u of

suuts ; the Junner, indeed, oier the perfection :C/HC/I is obtained through the gnostic

pwcrs* and the evolution into light of productive principles ; but the latter, over (he.

smooth, spontaneous, and voluntary tlcratiun uhteh isaeijuired through the lilal

]>Ktcrs.l

r

ulcan and Xanthus, as the primary IctnUrs of the irlnde of acorp<n\ul

coit-

stiiutioH, and of the pon c>$ it contains ; the

former, of

those that uie more &

[hcacious;

but the latter if those that are ihorcpa\.\n-e.

and as it :icrc inoie mahnal. Jlut he

leaves Vei,uxInj herself, in order that she nun/ il/timinale all things mlh union and

harmony, and represents her as Jighting on tin :ior.*e ttt/e, because TDK osr. in those

that l>elo" to tins side, is less r.m/A/// than multitude. For all contrariety is sur-

\eyed in a be<-oiiiin^ manner in eonjuiiction \\itli a unity, \\luch is either prior to

it, orcoiinasccnl \\ith, or i> in a certain respect an adjunct posterior to it. And

Plato, as well as theolo^ists,rightly perceixin^

that this is thecase,

have delivered

a multitudinous contrariety prior to the one fabrication of the world, and parts

a is oiuitttd in the original, ami the omission of if, renders the htttT part of the sentence \ery

ambiguous.

Fur Arro/irwi here, il iiIIC|IIIM(I- to read i

t/<ci>fr.



70 PROCLUS ON THF. [BOOK i.

" In particular,lie informed me of one undertaking surpassing in

magnitude all tlie rest, which I now think proper to relate to you, both

that I may repay my obligations, and that by such a relation 1 may offer

my tribute of praise to the Goddess in the present solemnity, by cele



brating her divinity, as it were, with hymns, justly,and in a manner

agreeable to truth."

Longinus doubts what was the intention of Plato in the insertion of this narra

tion. Tor he does not introduce it either for the purpose of ivin^ respite to the

auditor*, or as being in want ofit.

Andhe dissolves ihe

douht,as he

thinks, by

saying, that it is assumed by Plato prior to physiology, in order to allure the

reader, and .soften the severity of that kind of writing. l>ut On^en says, that the

narration is indeed a fiction, and so far he agrees with ISumenius and his fol

lowers, hut he docs not admit \\ith Lon-inus, that it was devised for the sake of

pleasure. lie does not, however, add the cause of the fiction. \Ve, therefore,

have frequently said, that it contribute-, to the whole theory of nature; and we

likewi-e say, that iu these words, Plato calls the one and common productive

principle of the l\\ofold co-ordinations in the world, and the one contrariety

which pervade- through wholes, the greatest and most admirable of works, as

containing the other fabrication of things in infrangible bond-, tliis fabrication

eonsiMing of partic -ipationsof tlie contraries bo\uid and infmitv, as Philolaus

says, and as 4 lato also a-serts in the. Philebus. For he there says,"

that there is

much bnnnd and nittch infinity in the world, tr/licit arc things most onttnin/ toiuch other,

and give coin/i/t tton to tliix n/iircrtc." Since, however, all things that contribute to

the production of the world, are said to recompense the benefits bestowed by total

causes, Critias sa\s \cry properly, that it becomes him to repay his obligations to

Socrates, who excited both the .second and third powers. These things, there

fore, may lie immediately assumed [from the words before us.]

But will you not say, that the Minenal solemnity has an indication of demi

urgic works? For the ( loddess herself indeed, connectedly contains all the mun

dane fabrication, and possesses intellectual li\es in herself, according to which

she weaves together the. uni\crse, and unifying power.s, according to which she

governs all the mundane oppositions.The .Minerval solemnity, ho\ve\er, indi

cates the i;ifl of the (Joddess which pervades through all things, and fills all

things with herself, and likewise the union which extends through all variety.

HOOK i.] TiM/EUS OF PLATO. 71

For in solemnities, \ve especially embrace :i common and concordant life. If,

however, wo have asserted (lieso things rightly,we

mayfrom these transfer our

selves to tlie \arioiis and one life of the world, and survey the difference lctween



the Parmeiiidcs and lliis dialogue. For both lia\e tlirir hypothesis in the Pana-

thena-a; hut the tormer in the greater, and the latter in the lesser of these; solem

nities. For thry were celehrated ahout the same time with the Bcndidian festival;

and this very properly. For since the productions of Minerva are twofold, total

andpartial, supermundane and mundane, intelligible and sensible; the former of

thesesolemnities

indeed,pertains

to the

exempt productionsof the

Goddess,unfolding into liu.ht the intelligible series of the Gods, hut the latter to her sub

ordinate productions, interpreting the powers of the Gods ahout the world. And

the Bendidian festival, indeed, appears to manifest the suppression of the con

trariety externally acceding to the universe from a Barbarric temjK st, by the

Gods who are the in^pective guardians of the festival. Hence it is said to have

been celebrated in the I ir.rus as beiiv^ most adapted to the extremities, and

material parts of the unit erse. But the Panathena an festival, exhibits the esta

blished order which proceeds into the world from intellect, and the unconfiiscd

separation of mundane contrarieties. For this Goddess is at one and the same

time, a lover of wisdom, and a lo\erofwar. Another veil, therefore, was referred

to the Goddess [in (he lleudidian festival,] representing the war in which the

pii))ilsof Minerva \\ere victorious ; ju^t as the veil in the Panatheiuean solemnity,

represented the G ants\aiiifiiished by the Olympian Gods. The Goddex, how

ever, is celebrated with hymns, justly and with truth; ///A-//;/, indeed, because it is

ncce>-ar\ that every tiling which has proceeded, should be converted to its pro

per principle ; but with truth, because the hymn is assumed through things and

through beings. And because of hymns, some celebrate the essence, but others

the providence of the Gods, ami others praise the works that proceed from them,1

and a hymn of this kind is the last form of celebration; (for the praise of the

divine essence precedes all other panegyrics, as Socrates asserts in the Banquet)

this heini; the case, the words"

celebrating a.s it were," are very properly

added. For he wishes to celebrate the Goddess from the deeds performed

by the Athenians. But that the. Panathena?an followed tin: Bendidian fes

tivals, is asserted both by the commentators, and by Aristotle the Ilhodian.

For they say, that the Bendidia were celebrated in the Piraeus on the

For air UITOVher*,

it is

necessaryto read air aurwr.



i.]TIM;EUS OF PLATO. 73

images of the splendor of intellectual perceptions ; being moved in conjunction with

the

unapparcnt periods ofintellectual natures. The

great lamblichus, however,thinks that we should rather refer the variety of the words to things, and see how

in nature contraries are vanquished by the one ; how the one is varied, and how

great a mutation the same productive principles exhibit; subsisting in onewayin the intellect of the universe, in another, in soul, in another, in nature, and in

the last place, subsisting in matter. And again, unfolding about matter a most

abundant difference in conjunction with similitude. For these observations are

worthythe

conceptions of Plato, andnot a solicitous attention to

diction.

" For at that time Critias, as he himself declared, was almost ninety

years old, and I was about ten."

These three persons are assumed, as having preserved this history, or mytho

logy, Solon, the ancient Critias, and this junior Critias;because perfect causes

precede the fabrication of the World, and perfective causes are antecedent to the

subjects of their government. The elder Critias, however, heard this narration

from Solon, one from one;from the elder Critias it was heard by the junior Cri

tias and Amynamlcr; and from the junior Crilias three persons received it. For

the monad proceeds through the duad to the perfective providence of wholes.

The numbers also of the ages, have much alliance to the things themselves. Fur

the decad manifests the conversion of all mundane natures to the one ; and ninety the

restitution

againto the monad, in

conjunction

with

progression.

Rut both numbcrt

arc symbolical of the world. You may say, therefore, that Solon is analogous to

the cause of permanency; but the former Crilias, to the cause which supplies

progression ;and the present Critias to the cause which converts and conjoins

things which have proceeded, to their causes. And the first of these, indeed,

preservesthe relation of a ruling and leading cause

;the second, of the cause which

comes into contact with mundane fabrication in a liberated manner; and the

third,of that which now

paysattention to the

universe,and

governsthe ntundanr

war.

**

When, therefore, that solemnity was celebrated among us, which is

known by the name of Curcotis Apaturiorum, nothing was omitted which

Instead of wyKirov^rrai ran cicovwr ayarrrt wfptoiou, it is necessary to read, myrirov/jrraf rat*

(<*>. . X.

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. K

7 4 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

boys during that festivity are accustomed to perform. For when our

parentshad set before us the rewards proposed for the contest of singing

verses,both a multitude of verses of

manypoets were recited, and many

of us especially sung the poems of Solon, because they were at that time

entirely new.

The Apaturiawas a festival sacred to Bacchus, on account of the duel between

Melanthus and Xanthus the Bu-otian, and the victory of Melanthus through

deception; the Bu-otians and Athenians waging war with each other for

(Knoe. Butthis festival was celebrated for three

days;

of w hich the first day

Mas called ava^vnj,-, because many sacrifices were performed in it ; and the victims

were called avai^uara, because they t. ere dra:m njward, am!sacrificed.

The second

day was called o7na ; for on this day there icere splendid banquetsand much

feasting.lint the third day was called

xv^emr*.,- ; for mi this day buys,three or

four t/cnr* old, z.< r< enrol/id in t/uir trilns. On this das also, such boys as were

more sagacious than the rest, sung certain poems, and those were victorious who

retained the greater number of them in their memory. They sang,however, the

poems of the ancients. But wilhr.-peet to tin tribes, it must be observed, that

after Ion there were four families, but from Cli-lln lies ten, and that after these,

each twelve of the families was divided into three: the tribes were arranged into

the same family and company, as being allied to each other : the enrolment of the

boy.s was into tin se tribes;and this day, as we have before observed, was called

Cureotis, from the bo\s that weie enrolled. And such is the information derived

from history.

Again, however, let us direct our attention to things, and behold these in the

particularsthat have been narrated, as in images. The festival, therefore, of the

Apatmia, which had for its pretext the victory of the Athenians, pertainsto the

hypothesis according to which the Athenians conquered [the Atlantic*], and all

intellectual subdue material natures. Deception, likewise, is adapted to mundane

forms which separatethemselves from imparlible

and immaterial principles,and

become apparent, instead of truly-existing U ings. But the enrolment of the

bays, imitates the arrangements of partialwills into their proper allotments, and

their descents into different generations. The festivalis an imitation of the

eternal hilarityin the world: for if it is tilled with <iods,

it celebrates a perpetual

festival. But the cuntct .s i,f rliapsmly,are analogous to the contests which souls

sustain, weaving their own life together with the universe. And the rhapsody



76PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

cautiously praisesthe poetry of Solon, since he represents

the praise as bestowed

by a private individual, and for the sake of others, and not as given by one who

Kpokc conformablyto intellect and reason. For Plato, if any one, was a most

excellent judge of poets, as Longimw also admits. Heraclides Ponticus there

and Antimachus beina: at that time most renowned,

fore says, that Chu-rilus

Plato preferredthe poems of the latter to those of the former, and that he per

suaded Ileraclides at Colophon, to collect the poems of Antimachus. In vain,

then-fore, is it futilely observed by Callimachus and Duris, that Plato was not a

sufficient judge of ports. Hence, what is hero said manifests the judgment of the

philosopher, andit

maybe considered in a more historical

point

of view. The

investigator, however, of tilings, will think it requisiteto show how all the

causes of the orderly distribution of the universe, and also the causes that are

connective of contrariety, are extended to one principle,and how the last

adhere through media to the first of things.For thus those who receive the

narration of the ancient Critias, are extended to him, but he looks to Solon.

Ami he, indeed, admires the poetic power of Solon;but they, through Critias as

a medium, are referred to the poetry of Solon.For

gratifyingthe former

[i.

e.

Critias], they praise the poetry of the hitter. But what is it that Critias says

respecting Solon ? That he was subordinate to divinely-inspired poets, from

these two causes; because he engaged in poetryas a casual affair; and because

when he came from Egypt, he found the city of the Athenians in a state of sedi

tion, and that he was not able, his country being involved in difficulties, to com

plete the history, which he brought from thence hither. What the history there

fore was, he informs us as he proceeds.

From these tilings, however, as images, Plato manifests, that Trhat is primarily

demiurgic, and every thing effective, have other primary energies ;but that their

secondary energy is the production of secondary things. Likewise, that the con

fused, disorderly, and unstable nature of matter, frequently does not receive

ornament from more divine causes, but subsists without symmetry to thegift

which proceeds from them. Hence, second and third powers are unfolded into

liilht, which proximately adorn its formless nature. Solon, therefore, being most

ingenuous, and imitating exempt causes, did not deliver through poetry the

Atlantic war. But Critias, and those posterior to him, transmit the account of

this war to others, imitating second and third causes, who produce the variety of

1

For uAAa evfipiTpun in this place, it it necessary to read, aAY a<rv^erp.

BOOIi.] TIM/EUS OF PLATO. 77

effective principles, and the orderly distribution of things, which is harmonized

from contraries into a visible subsistence. Moreover, the assertion that Solon

was the icisctt of the seven wise men, exhibits his analogy to the first principles.

And his being most free, adumbrates the power which is exempt, and established

in itself, and which (ills all things in a liberated manner. A thing of this kind

likewise concurs with the wise man, as Ix ing immaterial, without a master, and

of itself. The ancient Critias, also, being said to be old, indicates a cause which

is intellectual, and remote from generation. For" wisdom" says Plato, "and true

opinions are most desirable things to him icho has arrived at oldage." Again, the

assertion of Critias, that he vert/ well remembers, exhibits to our view the salvation

of eternal productive powers, and the stable energy of secondary causes, about

such as are first. But Solon engaging in poetry as a casualaffair, represents to us

thatproduction.

1; into secondary natures, hare only a secondary rank among first

causes. For theirfirst energies are intellectual, according to which they are united to

the beings prior to themselves.

If, however, some one omitting the survey ofthings, should consider through

what cause Plato introduced these particulars, according to their apparent

meaning, he will very properly find that they contributed to the thing proposed.

For the design of Plato was to narrate the Atlantic war. But it was requisite

that the messenger of this history should neither deceive nor be deceived.

Hence also, Solon is said to have been most wise, and intimately acquainted

with those about Critias. For as a wise man, he was not deceived, and as being

an intimate

acquaintance,

he would not deceive. It was likewise

requisite,

that

the receiver of this history should neither have been aged, in order that the narra

tion may appear to be ancient, nor yet so young, as to be forgetful. Hence, Cri

tias is supposed to have lx>en a youth, but smTicicntly able to remember, and in

consequence of this, to have contended with others in rhapsody, in which much

memory is necessary.

Farther still, it wasrequisite, that the ancient Critias should not commit such

like narrations tovery young men,

lestthey

shouldappear

to them to be con

temptible. Hence, it is very properly said, that some one of the tribes, by enquiry

of Solon, heard the history. But it was requisite that he also should, in a certain

respect, have been familiar with Solon, in order that the old man might oppor

tunely relate all the history to him. Hence, likewise, the praises of the poetry of

For <ropiffc*Xijrf read ra


Solon precedethe history ;

the praise being given by Amynan tier in order to gra

tify Critias. And thus much concerning the disposition of what is said in the

text.

That Solon, however, vent to Kgypt, not only for the purpose of obtaining

the Atlantic history, but likewise; that the Athenians, during his absence, obeyed

his laws, which he had bound them by an oath not to violate, is e\ident. i or

during this time, also, he associated with Crojsns, and sailed to Egypt ;but on his

return, he Ix-came master of the city,which was in a tumultuous condition through

the l isi>tratida-. And thus much we have derived from history. Origen, how

ever, doubts howI lato calls Solon most

free: for this is not an encomium

adapted to a poet. And he dissohes the doubt by saying, that he is so (ailed, either

because he spent his money liberally,or because he used the greatest freedom of

speech ;and that on this account he \\as five, without any timidity in his poetical

compositions. Or lie \\as .so denominated, as being in his poetry remiss and un-

compelled. But lamblichus says, that no one of these solutions is true, but that

through this appellation, the lil>t.rated condition of the intellect of Solon, the un~

.senile nature of his \iitue, and that which was venerable in his character, andwhich transcended all other things, are signified. The same interpreter also savs,

th.it the laughter of Crilias manifests a generative progression from causes, perfect,

and rejoicing in its progeny. But the remembering ^<7/,indicates the sahation of

effective principles in the world. \\liy, therefore, was Solon anxious to deliver

the Atlantic war in verse ? Because, says he, all natural \\orks and the mundane

contrariety subsist through imitation. I or this is analogous to its effective and

primary causes; just as Critias is analogous to proximate and secondary causes.

But why was he prevented by sedition ? Because material motions and material

tumult become an impediment, as we ha\c before ubsened, to the productive

jo\\ers of mundane causes.

44III consequence of this, Amynumler enquired of Critias what that

history was. To which lie; answered, that it was concerning an a flair,

which ought most justly to he the greatest and most iciiowncd which this

city ever accomplished ; though through length of time, ami the destruc

tion of those by whom it was undertaken, the fame of its execution has

not reached the present age."

Longinus says, that something is wanting here to render the sense complete

ROOKi.] TIM/EL S OF PLATO. 79

J or tlic word considered is wanting to the words most justly to/<*,

because these

are required in what follows, 1ml not the word ovo-r^, being. Porphyry, however,

says, that Longinus did not perceive, that, in consequence of the undertaking

l>cingthe greatest, hut not yet celebrated, Plato adds,

"

ought woxt justly to be



most rcnou nal" lint we, directing our attention to things, say, that Plato calls it

the greatest uttdcrlakiti", as bringing with it an image of all contrariety, extending

itself every where. And that he denominates it most renvu:ncd, as contributing to

the visible fabrication of things. For thus, also, the works of nature are called by

Orpheus renoicncd.

Boundlesseternity, and nature s works

Ilcnmvn d, remain.

"

Relate this a flair, Critias, says Amynandcr, from the beginning,

and inform us what that transaction was, how it was accomplished, and

from whom Solon having heard it, narrated it as a fact."

I. e. llelate what this admirable deed was, how, or after what manner it

was performed, how it became known to, and by >\hom being preserved, it reach

ed the hearing of Solon. Plato appears, through this, to investigate the whole

form of contrariety, how it was effected, or may be. known, and from what causes,

to us invisible, it is suspended. Before, therefore, he recurred through relatives

to the narration of Solon;but now he investigates the superior histories of it, or,

that I may speak clearer, the principles of the fabrication of thiscontrariety. And

by directing your attention to this narration, you may survey, as in images, through

certain symbols, all the principles of this fabrication, as far as to the first causes

of it.

" There is, then, says he, a certain region of Kgypt, called Delta, about

the summit of which the streams of the Nile are divided, and in whichthere is a province called Saitical."

In the first place, it is worth while to observe how the narration always delivers

.things comprehended, proceeding from such as are more comprehensive ; from

Egypt, indeed, the river, from this Delta, from this the Saitic province, and from

tins Sa i s, sacred to Minerva. In the next place, having observed this, it will be

80 PROCLUS ON THE [BOO* i.

proper to ascent! through the analogy of these things, to the first and most com

prehensivecauses of fabrication. For you may perceive this supcrnally compre

hended by more total causes, and proceeding asfar as to the last of

tilings ;

com

prehending causes every where precedingsch as are comprehended ;

the more

such as arc more and the impartible fabrication, that which is parti



total, partial;

ble, and is (It-nominated recent ;to which also the present

words refer the father

of the narration. And this fabrication, indeed, is filled from these causes, and

particularly participatesof the undented power of Minerva. For, in short, since

we refer this war, for the sake of which tin: whole narration is excited, to the

mundane contrariety, it will be well, proceeding in the same way, to assimilate

all the knowledge of the Egyptian priests to the former [or impartible] fabrica

tion, which stably comprehends the productive powers contained in the universe ;

but the history of Solon, which is always recent, and placed in mutations, to the

more no>cl fabrication, and which administers the all-various circulations of mun

dane natures. "NYe shall also be benefited by perceiving how, in images, the dif

ference between human anil di\ine fabrication* becomes apparent; and how, in

these, Solon, indeed, calls on the priest to the developement of ancient transac

tions, but the priest knows both such events as are reckoned ancient by the

Creeks, and prior to these, such as are truly ancient. For thus also, in divine

fabrications, that which is recenf or junior, is converted to that which is more an

cient, and is perfected by it;hut the latter antecedently comprehends the causes

of the former, and is established above it, by still greater and more perfect intel

lectual perceptions and powers. And thus much concerning the w hole of the

text.

It is necessary, however, to discuss every particular.With respect to Egypt,

therefore, some call it an image of matter; others of the whole earth, as bein^c

divided analogously t( it;and others of the intelligible, and the intelligible es

sence, liut we say, that in what is here asserted, it is assimilated to the whole

invisible order, which is the principle of visible natures. With respect to Delta

also, it is produced from the Nile, being divided about the Sa itic province, so as

to make its egress from one riu ht line to the right and left, and to the sea, the

sea forming the hypothenuse of the triangle, which Plato calls the Sa itic province ;

indicating, in what he here says, that it is that about which the stream of the Nile

is diuded. It is, however, analogous to the one vivific fountain of all divine life,

and, in visible natures, to the celestial triangle which is connectivet>f

all generation,

!eing proximate to the ram, which the Egyptians particularly honor, on account

BOOK i.lTTM/EUS OF PLATO. 81

of Atntnon having the fare of a ram, and also because the ram is theprinciple of

veneration, and is moral with (fie greatest celerity, as beiutr among the constellations

established about the equinoctial. The mention, therefore, of Delta is here very

: since the as we shall learn in what follows, is the



appropriate triangle., principle

of the hypo-itasisof the mundane elements. But the Nile is to be arranged ana

logous to the y.odiac, as being situated under if, having an inclination similar to

it, and imitating, through its divisions, the obliquity of it. and its division aliout

I he equinoctial points. The Nile also is a symbol of the life which i.v pmtrcd on the

whole i or/t/. Moreover, the two sides of the ISile, \\hich run into the se;i from the

summit [of Delta], may be, in a certain resjM-ct.assimilated to tho two co-ordina

tions, which proceed from one root as far as to generation, and of which genera

tion is the recipient.So that a triangle is produced from them and their common

receptacle, into which they conjointly flow. But the Sa itic province, which forms

a great part of Delta, participates also of a great portion of the celestial regions.

Sa is, therefore, must le sacerdotally referred to the constellation called the Bear,

not because it is situated under it, nor on account of its coldness, but aspartici

pating of a certain pecidiar elllux of the (iod [who presides over that constellation].

Hence likewise Sa i s is not shaken by earthquakes, in consequence of receiving a

firm establishment on account of the place alnmt the pole.

" Of this province, the greatest city is Sais, from which also king Ama-

sis derived his

origin.

Thecity

has apresiding divinity,

whose nameis,

in the Egyptian tongue, Neith, but in the Greek Athena, or Minerva.

The inhabitants of this city were very friendly to the Athenians, to whom

also they said they were after a certain manner allied."

The word voixoc, or province, derived its appellation from the distribution of

land. For thus the Egyptians called divisions of the great parts of Egypt. But

from the city the whole province was denominated Sa itic, just as Sctannytic is

denominated from Sebennetus, and Canobic from Canobus. Amasis, however, is

now assumed analogous to Solon. Eor he paid attention to wisdom and justice

beyond all the (other Egyptian] kings. He is therefore conjoined with Solon,

and has the same relation to him, which the city has to Athens ; in order that we

may survey the cities and the men adorned by the Goddess [Minerva} as from

one monad, and secondary natures always perfected from such as are more per-

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. L

H2 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

feet. CallisthcncH, however, ami Phanodenms relate, that the Athenians were

the fathers of the Saita*. But Theopompus, on the contrary, says, that they were

a colony of them. The Platonic Atticus says, that Theopompus altered the his

tory through envy. For, according to him, some of the inhabitants of Sai s came

to renew their alliance with the Athenians. But IMato only says thus much con



cerning them,"

that the SniUe were very friendly tn the Athenians, uml after a cer

tain manner allieil to them." It is possible, ho\\e\er, that he mii;ht say this on

account of the tutelar (Joddess of the city being the same \\ith the Minerva of the

Athenians.

\Vith respect, however, to this (Joddess the guardian of the two cities, it is

requisite to know, that proceeding from intelligible and intellectual causes through

tlie supcrcelestial orders, to certain parts of the celestial regions and terrene dis

tributions, she is allotted places adapted to herself; not imparting an adventitious

government of herself, luit antecedently comprehending the essence and form of

it, and thus possessing this allotment in a manner adapted to herself. That the

government, howe\er, of this (Joddess extend* supernall)as far as to the last

of things, the (Greeks manifest liy assertinjr tliat she \\as-enerated from the head

of Jupiter. Hut the J^vplians relate, that in the ad\ turn of the (Joddess there

was this inscription, / am the things that are, thai mil In-, and that have been.

\o one has crcr laid upen the garment by -.ihich I am concealed. The Jiuit ir/nch J

brought Jorth wv/.v the *un. The (Joddess, therefor*-, ln-ini; demiur-ic, and at the

same time apparent and nnapparent, lias an allotment in the heavens, and illu

minates generation \\ith forms. J or of the tign* / the Zodiac, the ram is

ascribed to the (/W./t.j,v, and theequinoctial

circle itself,it here especially

a junccr

motive, of the universe is established. She i.s vi-ry proper!},tlu refore, c-alled by

Plato a lover of wisdom, and a lover of war, and he no\\ denominatr.s her the

leader of these allotments in tlie earth. In the first place, likewise, he honours

the (Joddess in the lani;ua^e of liis country. For tlie Athenians denominate the

tutelar (Joddess of the city .Irche^eten, or the leader, ceh hrating her surname,

and her presiding po\\cr. In tlu> next place, he indicates the uniform pre-

estahlished comprehension in herself, of tin- allotnu-nts which an 1

governed by

her. And U-sidcs this he clearly represents to us, that it is possiblefor the same

1 The furim-r part of tin-, HIMri|>tion

is to \>e fount! in IMutanh * treatise on Uis and Osiris; hut

llit latter(Kirt

of it, tiz. thrjruit ichich I brvugh! forth teat thr inn, i* only to be found in these

Coinmeiitanes of Proclus. Tlie urigiual of tins part is, nv tyu kUjixuyfrinvv t)\wi tytvtro.

>OKi.] TIM/KUS OF rLATO.

things to be signified through many words, since words are images of the

signified by them. For many statues may be formed of one thing from different

materials; so that the Egyptians preserve the analogous,1

because they call the

Goddess by a name which has the same signification with that of the Greeks.

Nor is it at all wonderful that both

should denominate her rightly, in consequenceot

establishing the name according to one science. If, therefore, there is one

tutelar Goddess of the two cities Sai s and Athens, the inhabitants of Sai s are

very properly said to be lovers of the Athenians, as being in a certain respect

allied to them : for theaflinity is not wholly perfect. For some

may participatemore and others less of the same providence. And some may participate of one,

but others of another power contained in the Goddess. For again, it ix likewise

iicccs.vary to f,nic ////*, that a variation is produced in different nationsfrom the placet

vlucli they severally inhahil, from the temperature of the air, from hal>itu<le to the

heat-ens, and still more partially from spermatic productive powers, llttt you may say,

that they especially differ according to the gregal government of the Gods, and the

dirersi tus of the tutelar

powers, fromichich

youwill

finda

differencein colour,

figure,voice, and motion, in different places. So that those who migrate into other count ricto

frequently change, I>y duelling in those countries, their colour and roice ; just as

plants are changed together with the quality of the region, when they are trans

planted in a foreign land.

"

In this country Solon, on his arrival tint her, was, as he himself

relates, very honourably received. And on his inquiring about ancientaffairs of those

priestswho possessed a knowledge, of such particulars

superior to other., lie perceived that neither himself, nor any one of the

Greeks (as he himself declared), had any knowledge of things of this

kind."

Solon, on account of hispolitical wisdom, and on account of the dignity and

worth of his city, justly appeared to be deserving of honor to the priests of Sai s.

Hut he found, with respect to memory and history, among the Greeks, that

neither himself, nor any other Grecian, had any knowledge of very ancient

transactions. The remembrance, however, of such transactions, contributes

indeed topolitical virtue, and also contributes to the theory of the mundane

*For Awmi/i niroAeycr in this place, 1 read uovtrir nraXoyor.

84 PROCLUS ON THE [IOOK i.

periods, which Solon being desirous to know, and interrogating for this purpose

the priests,found that he was perfectly deficient in knowledge of tins kind.

These things, likewise, are symbols of divine concerns. For a certain fabrication

or workmanship, is called by theologists recent. But this is particularly

honoured [as being suspended]1

from the father of wholes, and from the intelligi

ble Gods, with \\hointhere are intellectual perceptions exempt from other things,

and which have more eternal natures for their objects. But those intellectual

perceptionsare more partial

anil less excellent, \\hicli are in secondary natures.

And farther still, there is such a difference in demiurgic principles, that some of

them are comprehensive of more total, but others of more partial form*. And

some of them precede in dignity and power, but others are recent as with refe

rence to them, and possess a subordinate power.

"

Hence, when lie once desired to excite them to the relation of pris

tine transactions, he tor this purpose began to discourse about those most

ancient events which formerly happened among us. I mean the tradi

tions concerning the first Phoroneus anil Niobe ; and afterthetleluge, of

Deucalion and Pyrrha (as described by the mythologists), together with

their posterity ;at the same time paying a proper attention to the di lie-

rent ages in which these events are said to have takenplace."

Of such a nature as this are all divine causes : for they call forth more divine

powers, and through this evocation, are filled from them with more di\ine and

total intellections;Mich as is now al>o effected by Solon. For extending to the

Egyptian priests the most ancient transactions of the Greeks, he in a certain

respect leads them to the narration of their antiquities; of -^hich (lie Egyptians

participate in a remarkable degree, as thai ,w//Tri/ icltlioutii>i]>&lt ;.

dunent the celestial

bodies, through the purity of the air, anil preserve ancient n<.moriuls, inconsei/ucm-e of

not being destroyed either b\i uahr orjirc. lint the Assyrians, sayx [(tmblichus, hace

nut only preserved the memorials of &even and twenty myriad? of years, as Uifiparchun

says theyhare, but ltk;~cise

of

the vhulctipocatttttasc.

i andperiods of

the secen rulersvj

the ~uorld. So that tliis being admitted, there is still less reason to compare \\itli

these memorials the much-celebrated archa-ology of the Greeks: from which

The words witi>;//r)^m apptar to me to be wanting in ibis plate in the original.

itouk i.] TIM.-EL S Ol; PLATO. 5

likewise it is evident, that the present narration does not look to that which is

small, hut to the whole and the uiuTerse.

.Farther still, the archa-ology of the Greeks is different with different [Grecian

cities]. For with the Athenians it proceeds as far as to Erichthonius, who was a

native of Athens : but with the Arrives, as far as to i horoneus and Niol>e. For

these two are with the Greeks the most ancient. For Argos descended from

iSiohe; lint from him lasos and Pelasgos, from whom Argos was denominated

iYlasgic. Theparticulars, however, respecting Deucalion and 1 vrrha, that a

delude taking place, they were preserved in Parnassus, and how miiiratin:; from

thence, they restored the human race, are manifest, and also that antiquity with

the Tliessalians is as far as to these. But according to some, the Argolie race

Infills from Inachns, hut that of the Athenians from Cecrops, each of whom was

prior to Deucalion. Solon, therefore, relating these and such-like particulars,

causes the Egyptian priests to narrate their antiquities. We shall however see,

what one of the ancient priests said respecting the narration of Solon. Ami these

tilings, indeed, will IM- evident through what follows. Solon, however, met at

Sai s with apriest called I ateneit ;

hut atIleliopolis, with a priest called Ochlapi ;

and at Sehennytns, with one. whose name was Ethimon, as we learn from the

histories of the Egyptians. And|>erhaps

it was thepriest

of Sa i s, who says as

follows to Solon :

" But upon this, one of those more ancient priests exclaimed, O

Solon, Solon, you Greeks are always children, nor is there an aged

Greekamong you."

The Egyptian priest is ancient, in order that while he reprotes he may not l>e

intolerable, and may have a probable reason for teaching about archaeology. But

he employ* a repetition of the name of Solon, not only as striving l>eyondmeasure

in what he is about to say, but al<o for the purpose of indicating the circulation of

things from the same to the same, which the more total causes of things gene

rated in the universe,

comprehend stably

andintellectually,

through indelible

knowledge ;to which causes the

priest is analogous. lie accuses, however, the

Greeks as being always children, because they have not acquired the all- various

wisdom of the Egyptians, but bear servile hairs in their soul. Juvenility, there

fore, indicates their want of wisdom. Or this privationof wisdom arises from

the frequent destructions of them, so that before they become truly ancient, they

M PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

hocome again juvenile through destruction. Or it is because ancient deeds are

not preserved by them;but their knowledge is always confined to present events,

and such as sense apprehends. But with the F^yptians, past transactions are

always present through memory, as if they were recent. Anil the remembranceis through history. But the history is fiom

pillars, in which tiling paradoxical

and worthy of admiration, whether in actions or inventions, are inscribed. AYhy,

however, it may be said, does this priest accn.se the Greeks w ith such severity ?

J:or what is there admirable in his narration, since, as the noble Ileraclitus says,

a rtry learnedknotrledge of past transactions docs not produce intellect ? But

if that which Eudoxus says is true, that the Egyptians call a month a year,

the enumeration of many of these years, \\ill not be attended with any tiling wonderful. Il was idle, therefore, in the

Eiryptian priestto tliink highly of himself for

the knowledge of transactions in these. Or, though, -in Aristotle says, it is impossi

ble that memory and seine should beeffective of science,

y<t

at the suinc time it must be

admitted, that they contribute to the reminiscence of wholes. For by relating in manythings many similar circumstances, we produce one form of them, and finding

frequently from history concordant apocatasta-es of many tilings, we recur to the

one cause of them. For thus the observations O f t) lr aHections of the air were

framed by Calippio, and the knowledge from astmlo-y of the celestial motions.

And thus much in answer to the doubt.

Aiiain, however, let MS recur to the theory of wholes, and there survey Ihcjuiiior

fabrication, held together by .Minerva, and filled fiom more ancient andprimoije-

nial causes. For from thence this fabrication possessing stability proceeds,1

on

account of an exempt cause, and contributes to the mundanecontrariety. For

every thin , in the demiurgic profession whidi is distributed into parts and mul

tiplied, proceeds on account of thatprinciple. As, therefore, there are causes in

the world, some of which are ellcctive of the regeneration of things, but others are

guardians of the coherence o( productive powers, thepriest, indeed, must be

assumed as analogous to these latter causes, but Solon to the former. Hence,the one exhibits a transcendent remembrance of antiquity, but the other is said to

have related various mutations, vn<-ratioii, andcorruptions.

It

likewise appearsto me, that the arrangement of the eld. r prior to the younger person, is assumed

in a way adapted to the orderly distribution of the universe. For in the fabrica

tion of Jupiter, they have this order with reference to each other; just as the

Instead of T(O. TOr^iip>ifUfuf hfrc, I read, 1,1, ir/wna, tSu fo t^nifitfof utrint.

n.joic i.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 87

Klean guest [in Plato] says, that those who live in the Saturnian period, proceed

from being older to being younger ;hut those that live in the period of Jupiter,

proceed in a contrary direction. And in this dialogue, Tiina?us says, respecting

the soul, that the Drmiiirgus produced it more ancient than the body, and on this

account constituted it of a more principal nature. Now, therefore, thepriest, who

is the guardian of divine institutions, excels through antiquity, though that which is



junior proceeds from a higher order; just as Solon comes from a city, which per

tains in a greater degree to Minerva. In mundane works, however, that which

is more ancient possesses a great dignity.

"

To whom the priest : Because all your souls arc juvenile ; neither

containing any ancient opinion derived from remote tradition, nor any

discipline hoary from its existence it) former periods of time."

Jicvaiility of soul, in what is here said, is analogous to renovation of life, and to

more partial causes; but remote tradition, to stable intelligence, and to more an

cient principles. And lioanj disci/ilincis analogous to the com prehension, which

is united and always the !;unc, of the nature and composition of all that the world

contains; through which, indeed, the fir*t and most divine of mundane natures

comprehend totally and exemptly the causes of all generated beings, and eternal

ly and antecedently contain in themselves temporal natures;but comprehend

things more proximate to the universepartially and subordinate!} ,

as falling short

of the unicalintelligence of wholes. Hence to some of the (jods hairiness is

adapted, but to othersjuvenility. For hoariness is a symbol of intelligence and

an undeiiled life, and which is remote from generation ;but juvenility of more

partial knowledge, and which now comes into contact with generated natures.

" But the reason of this is the multitude and variety of destructions of

the human race, which formerly have been, and again will be : the great

est of these, indeed, arising from fire and water ; but the lesser from ten

thousand other contingencies."

In what is here said, an inquiry is made, why the Greeks are always children,

but there is no discipline with them hoary from its existence in former periods of

time ? Or, if you wish to survey the paradigms of these things, the enquiry is,


HtJ

through what cause the junior fabrication presides over variety, generated natures

always rising into existence, and such as are ancient becoming renovated ? Be

fore,"however, he discovers the cause of s.uch-like doubts, he first discusses the

|K>riodsin the universe, and points

out the variety of them ; of which the first

principlesof the Gods, indeed, have an antecedent knowledge, stably and uni

tedly; but the second principles partially,and in such a way as to come into

contact with the nature of the things which they iro\ern; for this it is always to

know what is present.But to retain in the memory things that are absent, is

analogous to the perceptionof wholes separately and stably. There are, there

fore,certain various

periods

of things in the world;but it must be admitted, that

there is always generation and alwavs corruption in the universe. Tor that which

U sensible is rising into existence, ;md tending to corruption, but ne\er trulyis.

This "em-ration, however, and destruction, must he summed in one way in the

heavens, and in another in material natures. For, in the former, a mutation of

figures, and the motion of perpetually generated bodies, pre-exist.But genera

tion, Ix-ing governed through the mutations of these bodies, evolves its ou n circle.

Inthis

circle, however,different elements have dominion at different times. Ami

wholes, inde< d, always preserve the same and a similar order according to na

ture;but the different parts of these wholes subsist at different times, either con

formably to nature, or preternaturally,in a In-coming manner. For either the

wholes and the parts alwavs subsist according to nature; or both, on a certain

time, have a preternatural subsistence; or the one has a preternatural, but the

other a natural subsistence, and this in a twofold respect. If, therefore, all tilings

[iK-r|M-tually] existed accordingto

nature,the

varietyof

generationwould \*> dis

sipated, jH-rpetualnatures would !M> the extremities of beings, and the first es

sences would IK- the. last of all things. But if all things were disposed preternatu

rally, there would be nothing stable; from which an invariable sameness of sub

sistence might be present with mutable nature*; nor would the circle of genera

tion be preserved. And it is impossible that wholes should have a preternatural,

but parts a natural, subsistence;

for parts follow wholes, and wholes are compre

hensive of parts. Hence it is impossible that the former should, at a certain time,

exist preternaturally, but the latter remain in a condition conformable to nature.

For neither is it possible, when the whole of our animal nature is moved, and its

order destroyed, that any one of its parts should still exist according to nature.

1

I up is oiuittni hrre in the original.

BOOK i.]TJMACUS OF PLATO. 89

It remains, therefore, that wholes being established in a natural subsistence, the.

parts at one time following tin- wholes, are disposed conformably to nature, but at

another time have a preternatural tendency. But as of partial animals, each is

indeed ;il ways generated and corrupted, on account of the efflux of them in the

universe; but one is more generated, and another is more corrupted than anothen

and one is more adapted to existence, but another to corruption; thus also the



several parts of the earth, receiving both a natural and preternatural subsistence,

some of the parts are more able to subsist conformably to nature, but others are

more adapted to sustain deviations into apreternatural condition of In-ing ; this,

indeed, on account of a different temperament, but afterwards on account of the

position being different of different parts, and in the next place, on account of ha

bitude to the heavens. For different parts of the earth are adapted to different

parts of the heavens, though they are preserved by other figures [or configurations].

And in addition to all that has been said, on account of the power of the inspec-

tive Gods, and of the divinities who preside over climates, and who are allotted

differentpeculiarities ; some rejoicing more in motion, but others in permanency,

seme in

sameness,but others in

difference;abundant

corruptionslikewise of

partial natures being produced in different places ;

the forms or species of the uni

verse have a never-failing subsistence. For man is always, the earth is always,

and each of the elements always is. For since corruption and generation pro

ceed from the celestial figures; but these are, imitations of divine intellections,

and the intellections are suspended from intellectual forms, but from these stabi

lityis derived

;this Ix-ing the case, continuity is produced in mundane formsi

and the visible figures are preservative of species, but corrupt ive of parts, so as to

cause things which are {reiterated in time, to be also dissolved in time, accordingO

to a circular progression. For the universe does not envy salvation to such things

as are able to exist in conjunction with it ;but that which is incapable of

l>eing

administered together with the universe, is not able to abide in it. The law of

Jupiter, however, expels from essence every tiling of this kind as disgraceful.

For it is perfectly impossible that what is disgraceful should remain in the uni

verse. But that which .is deprived of order in the universe is disgraceful. Wehave shown therefore why

*abundant and partial corruptions are produced in

different places of the earth.

* For r/i/JaXAu lierr, it is necessary to read crf3oAAci.

*For ktort in this place, read No n.

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. M

00 PR4CLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

In the next place it must l>e shown why the greatest of destructions are

through the predominance of fire and water, and not through that of the other

elements. Fire, therefore, has an efficacious and productive order in the elements,

is sufficiently able to proceed through all other things, and is naturally adapted

to divide them. But water, is indeed moved with greater facility than earth, yet



is more difficultly passive than air. And by its facility of motion, indeed, it is able

to ojR-rate;but through being passi\c with difficulty, it is not affected by violence,

nor becomes imbecile when dissipated, like air; so that it reasonably follows, that

violent, and the

greatest

destructions are effected by deluges and conflagrations.

You may also say, that the. remaining two elements are more adapted to us.

For w e are pedestrious,and allied to earth

;and as we are on all sides compre

hended by air, in which we li\e, and which were>pire,

it is e\ident that our bodies

are of a kindred nature with it. Hence these elements, as being more allied

to, are less destructive of us; but the others, which are contrary to these, bring,

with them more violent destructions. Farther still, according to another mode of

survey also,these elements earth and

air, togetherwith

sufferingthemselves, and

suffering prior to us, appear to ojH-rateon us. For air when it becomes putrid,

produces pestilence; and earth when divulsed, abundant absorptions. But pes

tilence is a passion of air, and chasms and earthquakes are passions of earth.

Fire, however, and water are able to operate onu>,

without lieing previously af

fected themselves ;the former by permeating, but the latter by external impulsion.

Hence they are capable of producing more extended destructions, as being more

vigorous and powerful than the other elements,in

consequenceof not

corrupting

through Ix-ing themselves distempered. Deludes, therefore, and conflagrations

are the greatest destructions. But famine and pestilence, earthquakes and wars,

and other such-like partial calamities, may be produced from other causes. And

of all these, the effective cause indeed is the order of the universe, and prior to

this, the junior fabrication, which always makes new effects, and at different times

produces the generation of different things. Fur this is asserted by the fables of the.

Greeks, and is indicated by the tradition of the Egyptians, which mystically says of the

sun, that he assumes differentforms in the signs of the zodiac. It is not, therefore,

at all wonderful, ifthough there are many destructions, and in jnany places, yet man

and e\ery form always exist, through the immutable progression of dhine forms.

For through these, the productive principles in the universe possess an imariable

*Jx-c lliis

t\|>l.tiin.ilfurther on, in OIH- of llic nolt s on tin- 4lli book;

HOOK i.] TIMJFAJS OF PLATO..01

sameness of subsistence, because every thing which is generated from an immovo-

able cause, is always suspended from its cause.

;

For the relationsubsisting among you, that Phaeton the

offspring of

the Sun, on a certain time attempting to drive the chariot of his father,

and not able to the track observed his burnt



being keep by parent, upthe natures belonging to tin

1

earth, and perished himself blasted by

thunder, is indeed said to have- the form of a fable."

That the first principles of beings comprehend* indeed things which are

moved, stably, things multiplied, unitedly, partial natures, totally, and such as

are divided according to time, eternally, is evident. And it is likewise well

known, that theologists refer the causes of periods, arid of the psychical ascents

and descents, and of all multiplied and divided life, to the principles that are

proximately established above the world. Hence it appears to me, that what is

now said, refers the

mythologyabout Phaeton to the Greeks, and the

knowledgeof .Solon. For .ill stirh-like corruptions and generations derive their completion

from the junior fabrication, [or the fabrication of the junior, or mundane Gods,]

from which also tbe circulation of forms, and tin: variety ofcorporeal and psychical

periods, is perfected. As, however, in divine natures, things secondary remaining,

perfection is imparted to them from such as are first; thus also, the Egyptian pre-.

serving what is related by the Greeks, teaches Solon from this concerning things

of which he had aknowledge prior to Solon. What therefore does this narration

obscurely signify ? That psychical lives, and the nature of bodies, havcstill multiform

mutations. And over these, indeed, the supermundane powers preside; but they

are connectedly comprehended by the intelligible orders of the Gods. And of

the former, indeed, the apparent meaning of the narration being historically deli

vered by the Greeks, is a symbol; but of the latter, the priest investigating the real

meaning of the history, and unfolding it into light, to Solon. And thus much

has been .said by us for the sake of the whole theory, ami in order to show that

the narration is not discordant with the things proposed to IM- discussed.

The fable respecting IMiaeton, liowe\er, requires a manifold discussion. For

in the first place, it is necessary to consider it historically; in the second place,

physically; and in the third place, philosophically. History therefore says, that

*For raft^ovoi la IT

, it i* necessary to read rtpirxpvoi.

92 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOC i.

Phaeton was the offspring of the Sun, and of Clymene the daughter of Ocean,

and that driving tlie chariot of his father, he deviated from theprojK>r

track. Tliat

Jupiter also fearingfor tin;

safetyof the

universe, destroyedhim

ly thunder;hut

lie In-inf?Masted by thunder, fell ahout Kridanus. The fire likewise proceeding

from him burnt every thiui; that was nourished by the earth: and his ulster*, the

lleliades, lamented liis fall. And such is the historical account of the fahle. It

is, however, ncct-s<ary

to admit that a conflagration took place; for the whole nar

ration is introduced for the sake of this; and, also, that the cause of it is neither an

impossibility,nor a certain tiling which may easily hap|>en.

Hut it w ill le im

possibleif

someone fancies that the Sim at one time drives his own

chariot,and

at another time Ix-in^ changed ceases to drive it, and commits his proper em

ployment to another. And it will l>e aiuonu; the number of things which may lx>

t-asily accomplished, if it is supposed that this Phaeton was a comet, which being

dissolved produced an intolerable dryness from vehement lieat. For this sup.

position is generally vulopti d. Porphyry therefore xm/t, that ctrtain signs may be

assumed from the mutton of comets. Fur when this motion is tuirards the southern

parts, it is indicative of tttnpests, foi t >.irds

the north, of dryness from excessive

heat, towards the fastt of pestift nee, and toward* the icest

t of fertility.The dis-

apjx-arance likewise of the comet, is said to be the destruction by thunder.

If, however, it ln>

re<juisiteto dissolve the fahle in a more physical way, it is

better to adopt the explanation of our associate Domninus, that sometimes .so

great a quantity of dry exhalation is collected together, as to he easily enkindled

liythe solar heat. Hut this In in- enkindled, it is not at all wonderful, that it

should burn all that p rt of the earth which is situated under it, and producesuch a conflagration as that of which the fahle speaks. In consequence, therefore,

of the inflammation being produced by the Sun, the authors of fables were

induced to call Phaeton the offspring of the Sun; denominating this offspring

a male, on account of the cflicacy of the power of fire, and because likewise it

is usual to call fire a male, in the name manner as earth a female ; and to deno

minate the one matter, but the other form. Hut because this exhalation did not

proceed in a path parallel to that of the Sun, M>thologists a>sert, that Phaetondid not drive the chariot conformably to the track of his father. The dissolution

of the cloud about the earth, was called by them, the fall of Phaeton;and the

extinction of this cloud, the thundering of Jupiter. JJut the abundance of

rain after the extinction of the cloud, (for this takes place alter great conflagra

tions) is the lamentation of the sisters, or the wet exhalations, in as much as

BOOKi.] TIM.KUS OF PLATO. 93

those that weep, pour forth moisture. And the exhalations, both the dry

and the wet, have one cause, the Sun. Hut to the latter the female jwrtains, and

to the former the male. These explanations, therefore, are more physical.

It is however possible, that the fable may indicate something more sublime;

that partial souls proceed indeed from the father of wholes, hut are disseminated

about the mundane Gods, in order that they may not only he intellectual, come

into contact with intelligible*, and recede from bodies, but also that they may



have a mundane hypostasis. As, therefore, divine and da-moniacal souls are

arranged under secondary leaders; some indeed under thedivinity of the Ivulh,

others under the Moon, and others under the Sun; some, under the government

of Jupiter, but others under that of Mars; that which is disseminated being of

divine origin, every where receives something from the nature of that in which it

is sown: just as things sown in the earth, receive something from the earth; but

those so\\n in an animal, receive something from the nature of the animal: so that

of offspring, some express thepeculiarity of places, but others the similitude of

the mother. Hence also, souls that are disseminated about.their kindred stars,

recehe a certain peculiarity of life, from their leaders; so that each is not only

soul, but a soul of a certain kind, such for instance as Martial, or Jovi.m, or

Lunar. For whether the (iod is of an immutable characteristic, or is demiurgic,

or vivific, a certain representation of the peculiarity of the allotted deity accedes

to the souls that are arranged under it. And why is this wonderful, since the

peculiarity of presiding Gods extends as far as to herbs and stones? And there

is a stone, and also a herb suspended from the solar power, whether you are

willing to call them heliotropes, or by any other name. A similar reasoning

likewise must l>e extended to the other Gods.

Of these souls therefore, those indeed that are undefiled, remain always

suspended from the Gods to whom theyare allied, and govern the universe in

conjunction with them. But others descend, yet are not filled with genesiurgic

vice [or the depravity which is offspring of the realms of generation]. And others

receive a certain defilement from the subjects of their government. 1 or this is

the last form of life. The first of these souls, therefore, are

truly

sons of the Gods,

as not proceeding out of their fathers, being, as it were, fashioned by and remain

ing within them, running before the Gods, and having the order of guards or

attendants. The souls that have the middle rank, are indeed called on of the

For i o rutvror(rn}/irra> m-rji v i \i, it & rcijuiMl* to read rvi rat vworcray^ii, *. X.

pirnocMJ.s ON THE [HOOK .

Gods, !>ut receive td*o u secondary life, und Income !ho onn of Codx nnd men.

And souls of the third rank, are also sons of the Coda, but are not called genuine

sons, as not preserving the form of their proper Cod, but verge to matter, and

become oblivious of their genuine fathers. Whether, therefore,the authors of

fables call Tityus the son of Karth, or Phaeton the offspring of the Sun. or Musa-m

the son of .the Moon, they thus denominate them alter this manner, and others

differently conformably.to the before-mentioned causes, \\ith respect toother

sons of the Cods, however, we shall elsewhere speak.

But again, Phaeton is indeed the offspring of the Sun, as U?ing of the solar

series. Hence also he has a solar name. Since ho\\e\er, abiding on high, he

revolved and governed the universe in conjunction withhis

father,he is said to

have driven the chariot of his father. For the \elncle of Phaeton U-Iongs to the

solar chariots; since that also is entirely solar form. Hut when he fell into gene

ration, for he did not rank among the first of souls, he is said to ha\e been de

stroyed by the thunder of Jupiter. For thunder li. e. lightning] is a symbol of

fabrication, proceeding through all things without contact,1

and vivifying all things;

but is not the cause of the dissolution of the spiritin which the soul is carried.

But there are many transpositions of souls into different polities, and from one

element into another; some being transferred from earth to the sphere of lire; but

others from the sphere of fire to earth; and some in order ;but others heaped

together, and accompanied with much tumult and disorderly motion, such as

Phaeton is said to have suffered. I- or being borne along on high collet lively,

and attracting empyrean vestments, he was moved through these in a disorderly

manner, when he proceeded to earth, and piodueed in certain parts of it a confla-

ralion. For souls in descending become invested with man\ garments aerial or~

aquatic; and some have empv rean vestments. Of these also, some have the

vigorous,* but others tin; vehement and the jx-rcussive,from lire. And some

indeed, when they become situated in air, lay aside these garments, and assume

others that are more gross, but others preserve them even a* far as to the earth.

1 know, therefore, that the Oia-roneari Plutarch relates, that in one of the islands

of Britain, which appears to be sacred, and on this account is considered by the

rulers of it as an asylum, the inhabitants frequently assert, when prodigious rains

or thunder and lightning take place, that some one of the more excellent nature.*

1

I or urcif.ui lulf, il ii wr-iiiil\ to lril<l nm^i/t.

*lis^liuil nl ufivf fHjf

ill tins|>I.C

-,I rc.td

ui/<uiu>.

HOOK i ] TIM.T.US 01- PLATO. 05

fails, they being accustomed to passions of this kind. But they denominate souls

that are transferred into bodies, and that relinquish a certain generation, more

excellent natures. It must not, however, be denied that Mich-like circumstances

befall souls descending into bodies, and especially those that are magnificent, and

are allotted a more demoniacal essence, such as the fable obscure!) signifies the

soul of Phaeton to have been. But it is not at all wonderful, that descendingsouls should be in a greater degree co-passive with those elements which



are analogous to their presiding (iods, and should attract and become invested

with a greater number of Mich-like elementary garments; so that Saturnian souls

should in a greater degree rejoice in humid and aqueous vestments, and solar

souls in such as are empyrean, each being desirous of obtaining a material and

ponderous body, instead of immaterial garments; the (iods also employing these

as organs, in the same manner as they use material da-mons, int heir productions

about the earth. Through these souls likewise the (iods produce conflagrations,

or pestilence, or intlict certain other calamities on those who deserve to sutler

them, and employing souls that are allied to them as ministrant to the causes of

the effects that take place in the heavens, they accomplish that which they effect.

For it is nothing wonderful, that there should be many causes of the, same things,

some producing in one, and others in another way. Phaeton therefore, being borne

along about the earth, and after a certain demoniacal manner, burning those

places to which lie approached, through the stream of lire (for partial souls

effect many things out of the body, being then the instruments of avenging

or purifying da-mons) ; he was lamented by the Ilelidilcis, who were certain

solar souls, whence also

theywere said to be the sisters of Phaeton. But

they lamented him, not as alone commiserating him on account of his

descent into generation, but providentially inspecting him, in order that they

might in an undeliled manner pay attention to things which are generated

and corrupted. For the river Eridanus, and the falling into it, indicate the

lapse of the soul into the river of generation ;in which being situated, she

requires the providential care of the genera allied to herself, and the aid of

souls that are in a permanent condition. Theologists also signify the extension of the solar providence to mortal natures through tears.

Tin- much-enduring race of men ihy tears

E\cilc.

riularch rrlalrs lln, in In- Irealitc On Iht I uilurr of tht Uiaclfi.

g0 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

So that the fable very properly manifests through tears, in a symbolical manner,

the providentialattention to Phaeton of souls that are of the solar order. Again,

therefore, this corollary may be assumed from the fable, that the descents of

souls are effected through impotency. And that not only souls, but likewise

their vehicle participateof tin: peculiarity of their leading finds

; so that from

these divinities, some of them are denominated Solar, others Martial, and

others receive an appellationfrom some other (od. It may also IK* inferred that



destructions are effected by the providence of the Gods. For Jupiter was the

cause of the conflagration, by hurling the thunder at Phaeton. And likewise,

that the descents of souls are suspended from the one fabrication of things.

Hence Tima-us teaches us not only about the essence, but also about the ascents

and descents, the lives and all-various elections of souls.

"

lint the truth is, that it indicates the mutation of the bodies re-

volvin r in the heavens about the earth ; and signifies that through long

periodsof time, a destruction of terrestrial natures ensues from the

devastations of fire."

The Ivjjyptian priest only unfolds thus much of the fable that contributes to the

proposed discussion, that abundant destructions of terrestrial natures are

produced through fin?, in consequence of the mutation of the bodies that

revolve in the heavens about the earth. Hut through mutation he signifies either

the incoinmeiisuratiou ofthings in the earth to celestial natures: for all things while

they subsist coinincnsurutcly to the celestial eflluxions, are able to remain, but

when they are incommensurate to them, are corrupted. For things which are abb;

to sustain the dividing power of Mars, are preserved; but Mich as are too im!x>cile

to endure his effective energy, are easily dissolved; just as if your eye not In-ing

able to endure the solar light, should be blinded by its effulgence, though some

other eye may be capable of looking directly to it without pain. And a similar

reasoning must be adopted with respect to the other (iods and their configurations.

For the universe is one animal, audits parts sympathizing with each other, it

preserves different things by different parts; nor is any thing which is generated

in it preternatural to the whole. For the natures which are generated in it, are

generated through it; and it is the world itself which operates, and operates on

itself. Or it may be said that this mutation is just as if a good father,

who is always benevolently disposed towards his son, should on a time

BOOK i.)TI M.T.US OF PLATO. 97

chastise him for the sake of hi* good; for in so doing lie will appear to hnve

changed his accustomed mode of treatment. Or this mutation may ho the

various configuration of the crlrstinl bodies. For those arc the bodies that revolve

in the heavens al>out (lie railh, and at dillerent limes exliiliit dilli ri-nl ligun s

through the various intellectual perceptions of their informing souls, / or the

coiiftguratioiisarc (lie letters of these souls, and certain efficacious impressions produced

them. Again, however, both these are true.. For the mutation of these



through

bodies, and the incommensnration of earthly natures, are the leading causes of

such-like destructions. But if it is necessary to call the fall of Phaeton from the

heavensto the

earth,a certain mutation of some one of the bodies that

revolvein the heavens, it is not at all wonderful. For the mutation of the celestial Gods is

one thing, since this i.s an impassive transfiguration; but another, that of the souls

that revolve together with thorn, this being a habitude to terrestrial natures, from

a life without habitude: and that of places about the earth, is different from either

of the former, since it is a certain corniptive mutation; according to which neither

souls are changed, nor much less the Gods, the leaders of souls. Such-like cor

ruptions, therefore, of terrestrial natures are effected through partial souls; but are

also effected through da-mous alone. And as through these, destructions adapted

to their series are produced, the like also takes place through souls. For the

souls that when on high are delighted to illuminate immaterially, betake themselves

to sublunary conflagrations.

Why, however, do copious destructions of the human race happen through

long periods of time;

is it because a concurrence of many things is necessary

in order that such a destruction may take place ? For it is requisite that there

should be both the peculiar and common habit of the things that suffer, and a

conspiration of the agents. For what if that which is corruptive of one tiling,

should be preservative of another? It is also necessary that there should be an apti

tude of matter, and a preparation of instruments and times. For these also take

placein

partial destructions, but more rarely in such as are common ; and this rea

sonably. For it is necessary that the progression from an incorruptible nature to

one that is easily corruptible, should be through things which are corrupted with

difficulty. If, therefore, wholes are always incorruptible, but more partial

natures are easily corrupted, the media between these may be very properly

arranged among things which are corrupted with difficulty, and which become

destroyed in long periods of time/ For wholes which remain during the

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. N


mundane period,are incomiptiMe and indestructible. For no configuration of

the stars is destructive of them, since all things are evolved in the whole period

of the universe. But partial natures and individuals receive an easy dissolution.

Copious destructions, however, of partial natures ;ire effected through long periods

of time ; but such natures are nevertheless dissolved. For there IH a life of :i

certain genus, as there is of one man, and of a city, and a nation. And as

Aristotle says, there are periods of these, of some, more, but of others, less



extended.

" Hence those who either dwell on mountains, or in lofty and dry

places, perish more abundantly than those who dwell near rivers or

the sea."

This is likely to happen in the \isihle destructions through fire : for those

who dwell near water, are defended from the devastation of fire. The phi

losopher Porphyry, however, transfers what is here said, from the pha-nomena

to souls;and says, that in these the irascible part is at one time ellervescent,

and this inflammation is the destruction of the man within us. Thus Homer

represents the eyes of Agamemnon when lie was enraged with Achilles, as

"

shining like fire." But at another time, the epithymetie. part, being deluged by

genesiurgic moisture, is enervated, and merged in the streams of matter. For, as

Heraclitus says,"

another death of intellectual souls is occasioned by moisture."

But if these things are rightly asserted, those will be inexperienced in the pertur

bations arising from anger, who have the irascible partin a relaxed condition, and

commensurate to a proper attention to secondary concerns. For this is signified

by hollow places,and such as are near to water. But those are inexperienced in the

perturbations of desire, who have the epithymetie part in a more strenuous condi

tion, and exeited from the somnolency of matter. For this is indicated by lofty

placet.For in a certain respect, the irascible part

is adapted to be easily mo\ed,

and to be etlicacious; but desire is languid and imbecile. A musician, therefore,

\sill be requisite, in order to relax the strenuous nature of anger, and gi\e inten

tion to the inertness of desire. The philosopher lamblichus, however, thinks lit

to survey these things physically, and not ethically. lie says, therefore, that when

a conflagration takes place, those perish more abundantly that dwell on lofty

mountains, as being more remote from the exhalations arising from water;for these

exhalation? are not much elevated on account of the weight of the moist -substance.

J00 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

the sake of <rood;which cause is beautifully ascribed to the Gods. But if there

are certain purificationsin wholes, there are also powers that preside over these

purifications, operatingas

purifierson wholes prior to partial natures. Then.- are

likewise divine mysteries, some powers initiating, and others IKMIIJ; initiated ;

nor will these ever desert tin- universe. The Egyptian priestlikewise knowing

this to be the case, calls the destructions through water and fire by a sacerdotal

name, purifications,but not corruptions, as he would have done if he alone phy-



sio!ogi/ed.

"On the contrary, in our region,neither then, nor at any other time,

did the water descending from on high pour with desolation on the

plains ; but, the whole of it is capable of returning from the bosom of the

earth. And hence, and through these causes, the traditions which arc

preserved here, are said to be most ancient."

Though rain may sometimes happen in Egypt, yet it does not happen in the

whole of it, but usually takes place about the lower parts. This, however, says

Aristotle, is evidently the work of the river. But the upper parts do not receive

an afllux of this kind. Whence, therefore, does the Nile return ? Porphyry indeed

says, it was an ancient opinion of (he Egyptians, that the water issued upward

from beneath, by the ascent of the Nile; on which account also they called the

Nile, the waterer of the earth;and that it returned from beneath; manifesting by

this, that what is dissolved in Egypt preserves the Nile. Not that the snow

lx in (T dissolved produces the quantity of its water; but that it is loosened from its

own fountains, and proceeds so as to l>ecome visible, being prior to this impeded

nml detained. \Ve however understand the term ilissali-fj, with reference to

doubt : for speaking Attically, the Nile is dissolved, because it liberates us from

doubt. For it is not true that from snow bein^ dissolved the Nile is increased.

I or where in southern places, Mich as tho>e through which the Nile Hows, is there

:\ collection of snow ? Nor does this river emerge from rarefied earth. For the

jaritv of the earth, does not give to the water a motion upward. But it is entirely

necessary that there should be something else, which impels it from cavities to

lofty places.And thus much with respect to the Egyptian opinion.

Others, however, say.that the Nile is increased from certain rains that are poured

into it, as is clearly asserted by Eratosthenes. Hence to returndovs not nowsig-

mfv to -print: from beneath, but for the water, being elsewhere increased, to

OOK i.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. ]01

proceed above the earth;streams of water

l>eing poured into the Nile from other

places. lint lamblirhus says, il is not requisite to investigate a thing of this kind,

but to understand in a more simple way the return of the water from IxMieath, as

equivalent to what is usually called the ascent of water;and he assigns a two-fold

cause, through which the Egyptians avoid dryness, from excessive heat, and

deluges. And this is manifest from what he says when examining the increase

from rains. For he that the lirst cause of the salvation of the is



says, Egyptians,

the will of their presiding Gods, and the boundary from the first of fabrication.

But the second cause is the temperature of the air. For the seasons there are con

trary to those in the antarctic regions, from which the Nile flows to these places;

and in them the generation ofdryness from violent heat, and of great rains, reci

procates. If, however, some one should blame this explanation, l>ecause the rains

being increased the increase is not regular, it must be said, that rain frequently

happens when there is no descent [or disappearance] of the Nile. At the same-

time, the uninterrupted succession of rain, and the magnitude of the mountains

in which the fountains of the Nile are contained, are the causes of the unceasing

increase ofthe water. For these mountains, receiving in all their sides the rain

impelled against them from the annual clouds, pour it incessantly into the foun

tains of the Nile. But these fountains becoming exuberant increase the river.

For this, says Theophrastus, is one cause of rain, viz. the pressure of clouds against

a mountain. Moreover, it is not at all wonderful, if clouds are not seen about

the cataracts. For the stream ofthe Nile is not first poured from these, but from

theLunar mountains,

which are thus denominated from their altitude.

Andthe

clouds when present being collected about the mountains, impede the cataracts

by their superior magnitude. And thus much against the Egyptian oration of

Aristides,

Eratosthenes, however, says, it is no longer requisite to investigate the cause of

the increase ofthe Nile, when we direct onr attention to certain waters and rains

that run into it, so as to corroborate what is said by Aristotle. These things, there

fore, we ha\e concisely indicated on this subject. But from these particulars the

Egyptians infer, that their land will never experience either a deluge or a confla

gration. That it should however fail from other causes, is not at all wonderful;

since, as Aristotle rightly observes, every part of the earth becomes sea in the

infinity of time, and the same place is at one time continent, and at another, sea.

For OITICVI* here, it u necessary to read arraprrunm.

10o PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

And looking to the infinity of time, it must not be denied that the water of the

Nile may fail. For what if the annual winds, blowing less vehemently, should not

impel the clouds against the mountains ? What also, if the mountains should fall,

in which there is a collection of clouds; the wind from subterranean places burst-

in" them, through which, likewise, the oracles sail, tfuit succeeding cities shall be tie-D

strayed? And the clouds not being collected, the stream always becoming less and

less, \\i\\ be absorbed by the earth which is dry.

" But the truth is, that in all places,where neither intense cold nor

immoderate heat prevails,the race of men is always preserved, though it

is sometimes more, and at other times less numerous."

The priest has spoken concerning the mundane periods, and the different

mutations fin them], and has observed that the safety of the Egyptians is .derived

from the position of the region, and the proudence of the Nile. iVow, then-fore,

he infers in common respecting places of the earth, that e\ery place which is tree

from deludes and conflagrations, lias always the race of men remaining, more or

less numerous. For the greatest destructions are throun h lire and water, as was

before asserted. Some one, however, may say, that the race of men fail in a different

way. For- at present there arc none rrho inhabit these very places of the Jftic land

[which were formerly so populous), though neither a deluge nor a conflagration has

happened, but a certain dire impiety,vhich //us tntire.li/

obliterated the race of men.1

Or it may be said that Plato now- calls climate*, place*.He says, therefore, that

every climate has men, though there should not have been a deluge <r a confla

gration, at one time more, and at another less numerous. Some however will

also IM- saved in a delude, as Deucalion, who was preserved, when the climate

of Greece was deluded. After this manner, therefore, some unfold the meaning

of the passage.

JJut iiccording to our associatef Domninus], IMato means, that every place han

always a greater or less number of men, which is not excessively cold, or immo

derately dry through heat. For mathematicians say, that there are certain places

which are uninhabitable through excess of heat or cold. K\ery place, therefore,

which is adapted to the habitation of men, and every climate, has a greater or

less number of men. And this interpretationis reasonable, and conformable to

In my ropy of I he original of llu-so Comnu ntaii<-, a certain aniintalor ob>enis in the margin,

that "Prodiii alluilr*., in what lit- Jicrt- *;i)\ ( the Chri-ti.in n-lij-iou."

HOOK i.]TLMvEUS OF PLATO. J03

the words of the text. For the words," where neither intense cold, nor immo

derate heatprevails," appear to signify, where neither of the contraries being erces-

siiv, impedesInibilntion. And, in short, since IMato had In-fore observed, that

the transactions of the Egyptians were said to be most ancient, he very properly

adds, that in reality, every climate which is commensurate to the habitation of

men, has always men more or less numerous. For not only mathematicians assert

that not climate of the earth has men, but also, who :



every Orpheus says

The Demiiirpui for th* abode of men,

A seat opart from the immortals g:ive,

Where turns the Sun s mid axil stretching wide;

Between excessive cold and lieat a mean.

And this likewise Plato now asserts, when he says,"

where neither intense cold,

nor immoderate heat prevails,the race ofmen is always preserved, though it is some

times more, and at oilier times less numerous." ^ ith other nations, however, there

is an oblivion of ancient transactions, not through the failure of men, but in con

sequence of frequent destructions taking place, certain illiterate and rustic persons

alone remain. Hut with us [says the priest] many most ancient transactions are

said to be preserved, in consequence of every tiling being committed to writing

in our temples.

" But whatever lias been transacted cither by us, or by you, or in any

other

place,

beautiful or

great,

or

containing any thing uncommon,of

which \vc have heard the report, every tiling of this kind is to be found

described in our temples, and preserved to the present day."

As the situation of the country and Us guardian Goddess impart safety to the

Egyptians, thus also the preservation of past transactions is effected by their own

care and attention, through which they apply a remedy to the oblivion produced

bytime. But

theyare assisted in this

bytheir

temples,in

whichall

great and wonderful actions are recorded, both of their own people and of others, and also para

doxical events of things. For this is the meaning of the words, "orcontaining any

thing uncommon." Thehistory, however, of these things contributes to their know

ledge of similar events; from which the reminiscence of wholes is produced, and

also to the knowledge offuturity. For through obtcrcatioiu of this kind, they dis

cover the effective pavers ofthe celestial configurations. For assuming that certain



1 TIM.EUS OF PLATO.lor>

ing of many, dissimilar, and mortal powers. But recent transaction* only beingcommitted to

writing, evinces that the existence of suchwritings and arts, is of a

more recent nature.

"And so again in accustomed years, a celestial cttluxion rushes on

them like a disease."

This also

is evident in men. For deluges destroy their race, being excited indeed

from the celestial periods, but having water for their mailer. Hence the whole of

this is called a celesijalellluxiou, ami, as

it

were, a disease, because it is eorrup-livool other things. That, however, which is corruptive, is indeed to a partial

nature evil, hut to the whole of tilings good. Hut I latosays,

"

in accusfowalyears,"

because such like destructions are accomplished conformably to certain circula

tions, which also have themselves a certain consecutive order with reference to the

whole period of a divinely generated [or perpetually circulating] nature. This also

seems to be manifested through these particulars, that such things as are alone

generated from holes are necessarilyconsummated according to mundane pei iods,

which are defined by the same number; but that such things as happen from

certain partial causes, will not entirely happen to be the same, though the

configurations of the period are the same. In the universe, however, you maysurvey the same thing, by understanding that all generated natures are corrupted,

and yield to the mundane periods, and to the circulations of the whole life [of the

world ; and that the periods are conjoined to each other, and accomplish one

continued life.

llnuv those among you who survive, are illiterate andunac<|iiainlcil

with the Muses. And thus it happens that you become juvenile again,and ignorant of the transactions of ancient times, as well of those amongus, as of those in the regions which you inhabit."

For from adeluge, Plato .says, that herdsmen and shepherds are left, but that

the inhabitants of cities are destroyed. Hence those that remain are illiterate

and without the Muses. And on account of the former, indeed, they are. unable

through writing to transmit memorials of the prc-existcnl period ; but on account

of the latter, they are not sufficiently capable of preserving in vei>e or melody the

events that happened prior to the deluge. Hence they become oblivious of all

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. O

J00 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

things. But through oblivion they return to the life of children. For an ignorant

old man, says Aristotle, does not at all differ from a child in understanding. A

thing of this kind, however, happens to souls that have recently descended into

generation. For having exchanged for the former period, which was intellectual, a

certain, secondan and genesinrgic condition of being, they become ohlivious of

intelligibles, through the deluge arising from matter. Such representations also

of intelligibles, as they once had from the vi>ion of them they lose in the progres

sions of time. Thus, therefore, every thing in the world returns to juvenility from

through regeneration heini; liorne along differently at dillerent times, in

juvenility

consequence of the form of it naturally subsisting in motion. .Moreo\er, the

assertion that mutations takingplace,

those that remain, are illiterate and unac

quainted \\ith the MUMS, indicates to those who consider il physically, that the

analysis of bodies takes place as far as to that \\hieli is formless and without

morphe ;and also that in this mill a tic MI, the destruction of the elements happens,

wjii( h is manifested through the word iliiUratc, and the dissolution of harmony,

whir h ajruin the (Jod> who are the inspeclive guardians of renovation, easily

remedy, and restoro io a condition according to nature.

* The transactions therefore, O Solon, which you relate from your

antiquities,differ very little from

j)uerile(able*.."

The Kgyptian priest compares the venerable and very ancient narrations of

Solon to the fables of children. For the fables of the w is.* are about thiii -sr5

of an eternal nature; but tho-e of children about temporal things and which

are of small consequence. And the former, indeed, contain intellectual concealed

truth : but the latter, truth of a grovelling nature, ;MM! which indicates nothiii"-O

elevated. To the latter tables therefore, the histories of Solon are analogous ;

but to the former, the histories of the Egyptians, For the one look to that which

i*. small, lint the other ha\e a most extended survey. And the one are only

histories, but the other contribute lo science. From these things, therefore, the

paradigms also of them are to b" surveyed. The ellects, indeed, of the junior

fabrication, are called the sports of the (iods, and resemble fables. For they are

the images of !ieiin:s, and participate of forms in an ultimate degree. Hut tin;

things which primarily deiive ihcir subsistence from intelligibles, are intellectual,

eternal, and stable, aiid have the essence of themselves concealed.

1 Tor i(fu liore, il is ntctsjiv to readio<^m.




Plato does not]>erliaps

mean ly the greatest destruction, the deluge of Deuca

lion, but some one of the deluges prior to it. But he rails thecity

f the Athenians

most warlike, and governed by the most equitable la\vs, as U-ing an imitation

of its guardian Goddess, whom he afterwards says, is loth philosophic and

philopolemic. For the Athenians partake of the warlike from the philopolemie,

and of eipiitahle legislation from the philosophic. By the inunt beautiful deals

he means the victory over thr Atlantics. But by the most beautiful politics

lie does not intend to signify that they changed many of them, Imt he thus speaks,

l>ecause one polity may In- called the number of many polities ; just as one world

is connective of many worlds. For if the life ofeach individual is ;i certain polity,

hut the common life is tin; communion of many partial lives, the one polity will

consist of many polities, the beauty of it depending on its union. He also adds,

the most beauty til of all that :rc Linr.c under the /leai-fn.i, because it is the first imita

tion of the politvof the world

;so (hat

>oii may say, it is the best of tho>e under

the heavens;

for the paradigm of it is in the heavens. And thus much forpar-

ticuhus.

Again, however, we should remind ourselves respecting the whole deed of the

Athenians, that it is neither called a fable, nor a mere history ;some indeed

receiving what is narrated as a history, but others, as a fable. And some assert

ing, that, in the tirt place, the developement of these, and such like narrations,

appeared to 1 lato himself to be the province of a certain laborious and not

very fortunate man; and in the secondplace, that what is delivered by

Plato is not a tiling of such an enigmatical nature, as the doctrine of

Pherecydes, but that he teaches with jMTspicuity concerning most of his dogmas.

Neither, therefore, say they, should we force him to analyse, since the man

proposes to instruct us w ithotit aiubi^uilv . They also add, in the third place, that

neither is a de\ elopement in the present instance necessary. l;or the cause of

the insertion of this narration is known In he the delight and allurement of the

reader. And in the fourth place, that if we analyse all things, we shall snller the

same as those whom aslippery manner are conversant with Homer. Others

again think that the developement of this history should be referred to physical

harmony, from v hat Plato says of the narration about Phaeton, that it has indeed

the form of a fable, but that it manifests a certain natural event;

.v///ct- the

Egyptians al,<o, :chiitas Plato

tai/.s,u ere the lathers of this relation, obscurely signified

the arcana of nature through fable. So that the developem* nt of this narration

1

I l.ilo s;i\* tin-, in ilic I li.riliui of tin- mail \vlio tlors notailil|ll

(liefx)>licalioiis

nl l.tltlts to divine

ii iiirnn, lnilinltrj>rcts

Hum|>li>

sicalK.

LOOKi.]

TIM.EUS OF PLATO., 09

will lo;i(l:i|)tf,|

to liim, who speaks in the person of the Egyptians. For as

Tima-us himself, conformably to the philosophy of tho Pythagoreans, makes liis

discussion from numbers and figures, as interpreting nature through images; thus,

also, the I jiryplian priest will teach tlie truth of things throimh symbols adaptedto himself. To which may l>e added, that I

)lato himself else\\here accuses

those who speak every tiling from what is at hand, in order, says lie, that they

may render their wisdom manifest, even to shoemakers. So that he who delivers

(me. assertions through enigmas, is not foreign from the mind of Plato. Andsuch are the of each.

arguments

We however, say, that all these particulars are a history, and also an indication

of the mundane contrariety, and the whole order of things; the history, indeed,

narrating the past transactions of men, hut symbolically comprehending in itself

those things which are comprehended in the universe, ami the mundane contra

riety. For the progression according to opposition, commencing from the first

intelligible*, divides the world hy powers that are oppositely arranged. And if

you are willing, we will divide the universe according to the divine orders, which

are m uninterrupted succession, and purvey, conformably to the Pythagoreans, the

co-ordinations that it contains. From the two principles, therefore, it is divided

into hound andinfinity, or rather into things allied to hound and the infinite.

For of things that are mixed, some pertain to the former, hut others to the latter

principle. But from that which is unfolded into li^ht as the third after these,

principles,the universe is divided into the united and the multiplied. I -"or there

multitude first subsists unitedly. From the triad that is next to this, it is divided

into things perpetual, and things corruptible.* For the measure of existence to

all things is derived from thence. From the third triad it is divided into the male

and female:1

for in this each of these primarily subsists. But from the first triad

of the next order, it is divided according to the even and the odd; for nmnl>er

characterized by unity there.4 From the second triad, it is divided into the

partialand the total. And from the third," into the straight and the circular. Again,

of the intellectual triads, it is divided, according to the first, into things that are(7

Tlii* tliinl tiling, after the two principles bound au<l

infinity,is bring ihrlf.

1This triad constitutes

intrlligiblr life, or tttrnily ilielf.

3 This triad formsintflligible inlellrcf, or [avroiuor] animal

iltrlf.4 This triad is the Miinn.it of the order which it called intelligible, and at the same lime intellectual.

The second triad of the above order is denominated Htrctn, Iy Plato in the Pha-dni*.

* Ami the third triad of this order, is called bj Plato in the Phvdrun, tkt tub-ctUttiml arcb.

110PROCLUS ON THK [HOOK i.

in themselves, ami things that are in others. According to the second, into

thin"* animated and tiling inanimate, into things stable and tliin^n \\liicli aro

moved, lint according to tin- third, into things that an- the same and things

that an* diHerent.1 And (ruin the urder of Uulers,

1

indeed, it is divided into

tilingswhich

rejoicein similitude, and things allied to dissiinililude. lint from

the liberated1

order, it receives a division into the separate and the inseparable.

These tiling, therefore, \\liich ha\e an arrangement elsewhere, ha\e now also been

as it wen; explored by us. For according to each division, tin; goodness of

better natures, desiring to fill things Mihortliir.ito, and to take away depravity,

produces war. But the desire of lc>s excellent natures, to divulse a certain

portion of bcing>, of a more excellent condition, excites the apparent opposition

of things ;

since in war, also,

those that contendagainst

e.ich other, w ish to redncv

into their own power the property of their opponents, and entirely destroy them.

These things, therefore, are evident.

\\c may, however, understand the opposition of powers in the universe, by

making a division after the following manner, into the adorning and adorned.

And, in the first place, indeed, into things super-essentialand essences. For the

genus of the ( i"ds is super-essential. In the next place, by dividing essences into

eternal lives, and those which ener^i/e according to time. Likewise,those

which

energi/.c according to time, into souls and bodies. And (todies, into such as are

celestial, and such as subsist in lieneration. These, likewise, we must divide into

wholes and parts. For the division extends as far as to these extremes. -And,

attain, we must divide, super-essential natures into the divine peculiarities, such as

the male and the female, the odd and the even, that which unites, and that which

separates,the stable and the motive, lint eternal natures must be divided into

total and partial essences. And such as are total, into the divine and angelic.

Souls are to In; divided into the divine, and the attendants on the divine. And

divine souls, into the celestial, and those that pay a providential attention to

generation. Souls, likewise, that follow the (.jods, must be divided into those that

follow them perpetually, and those that are frequently separated from them. And

the division of those that are separated from them, is into (hose that preside over

generation with nndeliled purity, and those that become defiled with vice. For

1 The iiiirlliiiu.il triail consists of Salurn, Kliej, and Jupiter.

1The urilcr & Rulers, i" the tiiprnnundunt ordtr of (i<N.

1 The liberated whidi immediately follows theM.|M>rmun<iunc

order, is i^elfimmediately follow d

hy the mundane order of God-,. See my transljtiou of Proclus on the Theology of Pljto.

BOOK i.] TIM/EUS OF PLATO. n ,

the descent is far :s to those. Moreover, the celestial bodies must l>e divided

into the inerratic and erratic. And those, into such as are moved with asimple,

and such as arc moved with a various motion. The latter, also, must lie divided

into the peculiarities of powers. And universally the dm>ion in all the above

mentioned orders, is into that which adorns, and that which is adorned, that

which fills, and that which is filled.

If, however, it he requisite, not to look to a part, hut to adhere to the intellec

tual conception of wholes, it must be admitted that this opposition subsists even

where. For it is in (.iods, and in intellects, in souls, and in bodies. For in the

first of these, there is bound and infinity ; in intellects, sameness and difference. ;

in souls, the circle of the same, and the circle of the different; and in bodies,

heaven and generation. But secondary natures are always arranged with

reference to such as are more excellent. Hence, also, we say that this narration

is useful to the whole theory of nature, as indicating to us the mundane contra

riety from energies and motions. For all the teachers of physiology lx?^in

from contraries, and make these to be principles ; which Plato also knowing,

delivers to us, through symbols and enijjmas, what the. contrariety is of the genera

in the universe, and how less are subjugated to more excellent natures, through

the intellectual energy of Mincna. Farther still, 1 iato very properly calls

the polity the work of the Athenians, because it is requisite that such an

analogy as this which the junior fabrication connects, should proceed through

all things ; but that total powers should by a much greater priority effect this,

from which al<o the junior fabrication being filled, gives subsistence to mundane

intellect-", to souls antibodiesconformably

to the

pecularityof itself.

"

Solon, therefore, on hearing tliis, said that lie was astonished, and

burning with the most ardent desire, entreated thepriests

to narrate every

thing pertaining to bis ancient fellow eitizens."

This, likewise, is the peculiarity of divine natures, viz. for such as are secon

dary, genuinely to adhere to such as are first, and to be established in their un-

defiled intellectual perceptions ; but for such as are first, to impart by illumination

iheir own plenitude to such as are secondary, through*

unenvyiiig cxulierant

1

For irpo rwr afinrni ur, it is necessary to readT/>OI

rttv n/tnrnruv.&

J lMrad of ro fc -rpvTa, vra/irwr a^Oorwr, cat ayaOorifri, rou ktvrtpon txtXafiwtiv rijrap"

cavrvr

m PRQCLUS ON THE [BOOK..

power and goodness. Wonder, therefore, precedes, because in us, also, this is the

beo-innm" of the knowledge of wholes. But in divine natures, it conjoins thatf5

t

which wonders with the object of wonder. Hence, likewise, those who are wise,

in divine concerns celebrate T/UIUI/HIS, [whose name is dcriicd from tliaiuna,

wonder,] as one of tlie

greatest

of the Gods, who through wonder inclines secon

dary to primary natures. \\\\lunlfiit ;rywo/ follows, rendering that which ought

to partake of more perfect goods, adapted to the participation of them.

" That afterwards, one of the priestssaid : Nothing of envy,

Solon, prevents us from complying with your request. lUit for your

sake and that of your city, 1 will relate the whole; and especially on

accountof the (ioddess."

Solon Ix-iit" an Athenian, lias a resemblance to the Tutelar (Joddess Minerva,o

so far as he adheres to more perfectintellectual perceptions. And the priest re-

fsembles one shaking, as it were, from a certain adytum. For he teaches what

was committed to writing in the temples ;and piv.sents

to us an imitation of

the middle orders of I he junior fabrication, and of the whole paternal cause;

which orders transmitting the gifts of a more elevated to a subordinate cause,

fill from that as from a certain fountain theduine order. All things, likewise,

are elegantly rlfected by the speaker. For Solon is perfected, the city is praised,

and the (.Joddess is celebrated. The ascent also is from Solon to the (Joddess

through the city an a medium ; imitating the comerlhe power of the (Joddchs.

And this, likewise, is indeed beneficent ; \i/. to eiicrgi/e for the sake of the

perfection of secondary natures: for it imitates providence,and the super-

plenary power of di\ine beings. Hut it is in a still greater degree beneliceiit, to

energi/e for the sake of the city: for the energy is more ample, and embraces

a greater power, liesides this, it is still more divine to extend all the nar

ration to the Goddess, and to terminate the whole energy in her; all which,

the nnenvying communication of thepriest genuinely represents to us, not

only indicating the privation of envy, but the di\ine and prompt generation

of good.

Again, however, we must not IM- ignoranlly disturbed, if now indeed the priest

as Ix-ing the dispensator of the narration, is said to adumbrate a greater and more

divine cause;but at another time, the Athenians being the ancestors of Solon,

irXifpu/aif in this place, it isiHTi">5ary

lo read ru ^ ir^wra i Ivvaptuv a^&uwr, *u uyaOorr/roi, a. X.

For iroifirm litrt, it is mcisiarv to read/n/<irai.

IKIOKi.] TIMjEUS OF PLATO. U.-l

arc more ancient than the inhabitants of Sais ;the Athenians leing arranged ac

cording to the mundane causes of the whole contrariety of tilings. Tor so far as

pertains to the narration, they have this order;but so far as pertains to physical

progression, they bring with them an ima^e of certain more elevated and divine

orders. Ami if you are willing so to speak, since all fabrication, and the mun

danecontrariety, are antecedently comprehended in the father of wholes, toother

with adorning causes, and things which are adorned, you may there also assume

according to analogy, the paradigmatic cause of the Athenians in intellectual

lives. For aur

ain, the veil [of Minerva] is the Inst irnai;e of the whole contrariety



of things. But in the universe, the true works of the Gods have a precedency,

and likewise in the productive and primary causes of them; where also it is said,

Minerva became apparent, invested with armour. Or rather, the veil is the last

work of the weaving art, containing in itself an linage of the mundane war, and

of tht; demiurgic order proceeding from the Godde.ss into the universe; which

veil she wove in conjunction with her father. A better image however of this, is

that which in the narration of Plato, and in enigmas, represents to us the whole

contrariety of things, and of tin? works of Minerva;which narration contributes

to the whole[descriptive] fabrication of the world, in the same manner as the veil

to the splendid procession of the Goddess, and the whole of the solemnity. For

the Pfi/ifil/icttrffj is (in image of I lie Mincrval fabrication in llic universe. The veil,

however, is superior to both these, which is woven in the universe, in the intellec

tual light of Minerva. For contrariety is spread under the one life of the

world, and the war is a part of the fabrication of things, which the ruling art of

Minerva arranges in a

In-coming

manner. Andprior

to all these, is the veil,

which is pre-established in paradigmatic causes and the intelligible, and is com

prehended in the one intellectual perception of Minerva. For,

In weaving, nil ill* immortals lic excels,

says Orpheus. Hence, the weaving art is there primarily, and the veil of the

essence of this Goddess, which essenc" is all things intellectually, that the uni

verse is according to a mundane characteristic. For in ruling over the war of the

universe, she does not look any where else than into herself.

That we may however recur to the thing proposed to be considered, the Egyptian priest directly imitates the unenvying providence of the Deiniurgus, about

which Plato a little farther on says," He u as good, but envy ticccr subsists in him

U hoisgood, about anything.11

For the orders which exist proximately with him,

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. P

114 PROCLUS ON THE [IOOK r.

have from him, and on account of him, an unenvying participation of good. And

through this privation of envy, the pnest fills indeed the mind of Solon, but

praises the city, and celebrates the tutelar Goddess; conjoining partial and

total1

natures, uniting things contained to the things that contain them, and sus

pending all things from the Goddess, according to one bond and one series.

"

"Who is allotted the guardianship both of your city and ours, and by

whom they have been nourished and educated."

The Egyptian, after a certain admirable manner, converts all things to the God

dess, and produces them from, and again converts them to her. For recurring

from a citi/en through the city to the power who presides over it, he makes this conversion. But again proceeding from the Goddess to the natures that primarily,

and also to those that secondarily participate of her, he imitates the progression of

things from her dhinity. Again also asserting that the participants are nourished

and disciplined by the Goddess, he likewise converts these to her. How is it

possible, therefore, that these particulars.should not in an admirable manner imi

tate demiurgic powers, which are established in natures prior to themselves, and

generate those posterior to, anil corner! them to the causes of themselves ? Andthus much concerning these particulars.

What, howe\er, is the meaning of this allotment * And how are the Gods said

to be distributed into the universe 7 Of allotments therefore, some are those of

partial souls, and others, of the nndeliled genera. Some are demoniacal, others

angelic, and others, of the Gods themselves. For if the father of the universe was

one alone, and there was only one providence and one law, there would be no

need of allotments, nor of divine distribution. Since, however, after the one Hither

there is a triad, after the uniform a multiform providence, and after one law a

multitude of fatal laws, it is also necessary that there should be a division of the

subjects of government, and another pro\ idence and order about other thin rs.

Through this canst theirfore the universe is duu/cdl>y demiurgic numbers, vi~. In/ the

ilnad, triad, ttfrad./>entdd, thdumad, and dodecud. For after the one fabrication, the

section ofthe universe into two, hea\en and generation, constitutes two-told allot

ments, the celestial and genesinrgic. After this, the triad divides the unircr.se,

about which Neptune in Homer* says,

To iiiclij

loi belong* llir lioarv ilerp,

Tin-spaciuii* litaven to Jute, to l lut, 1 !.nf i <bik.

For iVjio licir, it is uccesiary to read iA.u.

Iliad iv. \t. lyo, Ac.



BOOM.] TIMJZUS OF PLATO. 117

plaro, they remain always invariably tin* same, according to the whole parts of

generation. The allotments of the God* then-fore do not change, nor subsist

dilierently at different times. For they have not proxim. itely their hypostasis in

that which is changed. Mow, therefore, do the illuminations of the Gods take

place in these ! How are the dissolutions of sacred rites effected? And how is the

same place, at different times occupied by diflerentspirits

? May we not say, that

the Gods possessing perpetual allotments, and dividing the earth according to

divine nntnbers, similarly to the sections of the heavens, these divisions of the

earth also are illuminated, so far as they possess aptitude? But the circulation of

the celestial orbs produces indeed this aptitude, through certain configurations;

divine illumination,1

at the same time, imparting a power more excellent than tle

then existing nature. Total nature likewise [or nature considered as a whole]

produces this aptitude, inserting divine impressions in each of the things illumi

nated, through which these spontaneously participate of the Gods. For she inserts

dillen nt images of the divinities in dilli-rent illuminatedparts, in consequence

of these parts hem;; suspended from the Gods. Times also effect something,

according to which the conditions of other things are tjoverncd. The ^ood

temperament of the air too co-operates. And, in short, every tiling about us

contributes to the increase and diminution of this aptitude. \Vhen, therefore,

according to a concurrence of these many causes, aptitude to the participation of

the Ciods is in-generated in some one of the things naturally disposed to be

changed, then di\ inily is unfolded into lij;ht, even in these mutable natures, he

bein^ before concealed through the inaptitude of the recipients; possessing indeed

eternally his proper allotment, and always extending theparticipation of himself,

but not bein^ always received by the^e terrestrial places, on account of their

inaptitude. But in the same manner as of partial souls, which choose diflerent

lives at diflerent tunes, some choose such as are adapted to their proper Gods, but

others such as are foreign, through an oblivion of the divinities to whom they are

allied; thus, also, of sacred places, some are adapted to the power that ha< there

his allotment, but others are suspended from another order. And on this account,

says the Athenian truest, some are accustomed to be more prosperous, but others

more unfortunate. \\ hether, therefore, thetelestjc or legislative art dedicates this

particular city to the divinity who, according to an eternal allotment from the

le;jinnin;r, received lhi< jKirlion [of the earth], the life [of the inhabitants] is through

this in a greater decree assimilated to the tutelar deity, and the works of him [who

!l.ij>|n,ir-<

lo me liiat llir wor.l* Ottmt rX.\/i vrm arc wanting in ilmjil.u

.

118 1MIOCLUS ON TIIR [BOOK i.

looks to this divinity in effecting them] are rendered more correctly great anil

admirable than those of the man who is not impelled to action from a principle

of this kind. And he who chooses a life conformable to that of the allotted

deity, acts with greater rectitude than he docs who transfers himself to another

order.

Conformably to this mode therefore, the Egyptian says, that Minerva is allotted

the city which is named after her, and also his own city Sais; inferring this per

haps from the great similitude of the life of the citizens to the Goddess; and per

haps also|>erceiving

that there was an allotment of tins kind, from the telestic art,

and sacerdotal works. For as of the other Cods, so likewise of Minerva, there

is an allotment proceeding snjM-rnally from intellectual causes to the place of the

earth. Her allotment therefore is fust in her father; but in the ruling Gods accord

ing to a second order. In the twelve liberated Gods, it make-, a third progres

sion; but after this, it unfolds itself into light in the heaveu^, with unrestrained

authority. In one way indeed, in the inerratic sphere. For there a certain allot

ment of this Goddess is expanded, whether it lw the place about the Ham, or that

about the Virgin, or whether it be some one of the northern stars, as some say it

is the Electra, which is there. But in another way, it is unfolded into light in the

Sun. For there, according to theologists, an admiiable power, and a Mincrval

order, govern wholes in conjunction with the Sun. And again, in another way

in the Moon: for Minerva is the monad of the triad1

which is there. 15ut in

another way in the earth, according to the similitude of the allotments of the eai th

to the celestial distributions. And la-tly,about the earth differently in diflerent

places, according to the peculiaritiesof providence. It is not therefore at all

wonderful, if one divinity should be said to be allotted both Athens and Sa is.

For the same thing must not he supposed to take place about the Gods, as about

partial souls, which are not adapted to dwell in two bodies at the same time,

l>ecanse they exert a providential energy in conjunction with habitude; but there

is indeed a participationof the same power in dillereiit place*; and in the one

power there is also multitude. This power likevvUe i^ dillerciilly participated by

different places. And in some, sameness is more abundantly participated; but in

others, difference.

These things therefore are truly asserted, and the allotments ol the Gods are

|x>rpetnallyestablished in the universe. These likevv is.; existing, there are dillerent

This Iriail coruistj of .Minerva, l iorr|iiu*,and Diana.

HOUR i.l T1.NUJUS OF PLATO.j \Q

temporal evolution* of them into light, according Jo different places. Ancient

theology U!HO manifests the|>erpetual

essence of the allotmentx; as when it it* Haiti

in Homer,

To nip in ocean * honry ikrpi lo dwell,

Alrcnin, [ty lotl)clongn.

For the word ahcaijs is significant of perpetuity. And in short, since it is necessary

that prior to things which sun<c(iifics,there should be natures which akrayx, parti

cipate of the Gods, it is likewise necessary that perpetual allotments should exist

prior to such as are temporal. For as daemons prior to partial souls follow the

Gods, thusalso there are

perpetualallotments

suspendedfrom the

Gods, prior to

partial illuminations. And the mundane Gods comprehend these allotments;

the terrestrial Gods, such as are terrestrial; the aquatic, such as are aquatic; and

the aerial, such as|>ertain

to the air. These Gods likewise, prior to visible

bodies, ride in ethereal \ehicles, conformably to the Gods in the heavens. But

whether it mu*t be admitted, that there are other sublunary allotments, proceeding

from on high in conjunction with divine light, must be elsewhere considered: for

what hasl>een said, is sufficient for the present.

" Yours indeed, by a priorityto ours of a thousand years, receiving

the seed of your race from Vulcan and the Earth."

Withres[>ect

to the fabrication of Vulcan, how may some one decide, so as not

perfectly to fail in his conceptions of the power of the God ? For the assertions of

the multitude concerning him, lx*longto

things which must be entirely rejected.

Cut that which is said by those whose notions are more intellectual* is indeed

true, but requires no small decree of confirmation. We shall therefore introduce

to our discussion fromtheologists, credibility concerning this divinity. That

Vulcan then is of the demiurgic, but not of the vivific, or connective, or any

other series, is manifested by theologists, when they represent him as fashioning

tiling from brass, employing thel>ello\vs, and, in short, when they call him the

artificer. But thath> is the fabricator of sensible, and not of psychical, or

intellectual works, is also manifested by them. For the formation of a mirror,

1Iliad xv. v. 1<)O.

Imlrad of o< rfwrrpor in llin pUcr, il;i|<|MMn

to me to be iicrovirv to read c rvrpwrtpor.

120 PKOCLUS ON Till- [DOOK i.

the exercise of the brazier s art, lamenes*, and every tiling of this kind, are symbols

of hia productive energy about a sensible nature. Moreover, that lie is the maker

of all sensible*, is ev ident from the same theolo;ists, ubo say that he was hurled

from Olympus as far as to the earth, and who make all the receptacles of the

mundane Gods, to have !>een elaborated by Vulcan. If, therefore, Me admit that

these things are true, this (iod it-ill be thefabricator totally ofaw/ corporeal-formed

substance ; preparingJor the doits their visible seats, rendering all things subservient

to the out harmony of the world; jilting all fabrications in/// corporeal life ; and

adorning and connecting with forms the resisting and ^russ nature of matter. On

this account also he is said by theolo^ists to fashion things from brass, as beinsr

the artificer of resisting solids. And because the heavens an; [said to be] bra/en,

asIn/ill^

an imitation of the intelligible, the maker of the heavens is likewise

[fabled to IH-] a bra/ier. But he is lame in both hi-, fret,1

as beinj; the fabric. itor

of tilings that are last in the progressions ol bein^; for siicli aie bodies; and also

as beint; no longer able to proceed into another order. Likewise, because, he i>

the maker of the universe, which, as Tnna-us says, i> without lei^s. And he was

Imrled from onhifji

to earth, as extending his fabi iealion

through thejvliole

of

a sensible essence. Whether, therefore, then: are said to he certain physical

productive principlesin the universe, or whether there are spermatic principles,

the rause of all these must be referred to this (Jod. I or that which nature cllects

bv \eriiini; to bodies, this (iod fashions divinely and exemptly, exciting nature,

and nsini; her as an instrument to her own fabrication. 1 or innate In at is

Vulcanian, Ix-inij generated by \ id<-an as Mibservient to corporeal production.

The productivecause therefore of

generatednatures is

referred,in what I lato

says, to this (jod.

Since however matter is neceary to things that are generated; for the (iodw

in the heavens borrow parts from the universe, as things which will be a^ain

returned, for the generation of mortal animals; iln- also I lato delivers to us, in a

v-ry admiiahle manner, throiiyh earth. I or in seed i

^-|f, there are productive

powers, and a subject. And the former are derived !.,;:i l!ie art o| N ulcaii; but

tin- latter from earth. I or by earth, we miM now understand every material

cause; not that the Athenians spuing from the earth; but because it i> usual to

It nnii! tir tan-fulls olis-rril, that ffi/fflt wln-n ;it iil<fl to <li\inc- naluri j udiiinlir.ilc lninn-fi;Jin.

cie$: jut a tliu-e \\lnne e>t-s ur<- tiili-tl willi ilic solar li-lit. arc -.uitl to lie incafuUe ofperceiving

mumluiifoli|tft>;

for thijiitrai>atiti/

in<itliiii<:

IIIOK- ili.m lranc*iclem \ of vision. In liU- inauucr,

the lunicue> of \ulcan, iyuibolicjllj indiralCH his rnin|i!i<in

froru anv defective|>rogresiun.

BOOKi.] TIM/EUS OF PLATO. 121

call all generation earth, and every tiling material, earthly. Fire, therefore, is a

Vnlcanian instrument; but earth is matter, which is excited and vivified through

fire, since it is of itself lifeless. Hence also, in consequence of this being filled,

the material order is now assumed in conjunction with Vulcan. And on thi*

account it is said that the seed of Vulcan, together with earth, gave subsistence to

the generation of the Athenians. For according to the fable also, Vulcan being

in love with Minerva, emitted his seed on the earth, and from thence the race of

the Athenians blossomed forth. In short, therefore, Vulcan is always in love

with Minerva, imitating her intellectual nature, in the fabrication1

of sensible;*.

But Minenal to this of receive

souls, according eneriry Vulcan, especially

vehicles from him, and are introduced into bodies from the productive powers

of Vulcan, and the hypostasis* of earth; the productive powers receiving

Minerval impressions. For this God, prior to nature, is the perfecter of bodies,

inserting in different bodies, different symbols of the divinities.

What however are the thousand years, according to which the Athenians are

prior to the inhabitants of Sais ? This, therefore, may be said historically. But

it seems also to signify the temporal priority of the life of the Athenian?, and in

short, that it is necessary their life should be more elevated than that of the Sa itans.

For as in the invisible orders of things, many genera are suspended from the same

leader, some indeed more proximately, but others more subordmately ;after the

same manner also, of Minerval souls descending into generation, some are assi

milated to Minerva, according to the highest degree of excellence; but others

subsist proximately after these. A thousand years, therefore, .signify this excellence.

Forthey

arc the measureof

aperfect gencxiurgic period,

& account(>f

a thousand

being a cubic number. Hence this number is very properly adapted to a life

superior according to generation, and which is in a greater degree assimilated to

the [tutelar Goddess. If also you wish to transfer these things to the universe,

you may there behold all the visible fabrication which is Vulcanian, and adorning

causes and adorned effects ; some of which are more total, but others more partial.

And somel>eing analogous to the Athenians, but others to the SaVtans. For

Instead of TO mrpnv avn\i TH* amOrjuy fjifiovfiaoi ill this place, wiiidi is evidently defective, 1 rrad

r rorpov oi/rijs tvry liiftti inyitf rur airOifrwr fitfjuv/iryrn.

1For rrj yijt vrvirraatv rwr Aoywr, nOijiaun & Orj^nra Xa/3nrwr, it SCCDI* nfCfSSary to read rijt yiji

W9fTttattft, ruf Xoywr aftijra/in, c. X.

Tim. Plat. Vou I. Q

, 2.2

PKOCLUS ON THE[<"

nothing hinders, but tliat the same things may be sun eyed analogously, in

demiurgic causes, in the universe, and in an historical narration.

The divine lamhlichus however doubts, how the gods are said to be allotted

certain places, according to definite times ; as for instance, Minerva was first

allotted Athens, and afterwards Sa is. For if, their allotment commences from

a certain time, it will aUo at a certain time cease. I or whatever is measured

by time, is a thin- of this kind. Farther .s tJU, with respect to the place which

they are allotted at a certain time, was it without a ruler, w lieu it fell to their lot,

or was it under the dominion of other Gods ? For if, indeed, it was withuut a

ruler, how is it possiblethat any thini; hclon-m^ to the universe can be perfectly

destitute of divinity7 How, in short, can any place remain without the -uardian

protectionof more e\c. -llent natures ? Or how, if it is sutlicient to the pr-ser\a-

tion of itself, can it afterwards become the allotment of some one of the Gods f

But if it is under the dominion of another leader, it will also fall to the allotment

of another God, and thus an absurdity will ensue. For the second God does not

divul-ethe prefectureand allotment of the former divinity. Nor do the. God*

alternately receive the places of each other; nor do da-mons chan-e their allot

ments, lamblichus bavin- thus doubted, dissolves the doubts by say in-, that

tin-allotments of the Gods are perpetually cMulili-shed, but that the participants

of them, at one time derive advantage from the miardialiship of the rulers, and

at another time reap no benefit from it. He adds, that tln*c urc flit/Mirtii-i/ialioHJi

u hicli tire tm-asund>v

d>"^<""/ u-huh s tacJ instiimiinis fra/ua.tlii

full the tnrth-

J ti/sH/ llicduth. It has however been observed by us, that this resembles that

which happens about souls. For every soul has entirely a tutelar God. And

certain soul- choose lives adapted to other Gods. Tims, therefore, every place is

the allotment of a certain God, and there is a time when it becomes the allotment

of some other dh inity,who renders it adapted throu-h a certain period, or through

certain im-tic rites established by men. I or allotment is twofold, the one bem-j;

essential, but the other subsi>tin^ according to habitude. Hut let us direct our

attention to what follows.

"

Hut an account of the transactions of this our city, during the space

of e hdit thousand years, is preserved in our sacredwritings."f -

The priest assigns to the Athenians the number nine thousand, receiving this

BOOK i.] TINLEUS OF PLATO.j.^3

also from history ; but to the Sailans the number eight thousand; measuring the

lives of (lie citizens by the chiliad, conformably to the writings in the temples.

For by thin number, as the philosopher Porphyry says, damons also nicaxure t tine.

Farther still, the priest makes this narration from the sacred \vritin irs; which

manifests, as lamblichus would say, the stable guard of the mundane divine

guardians. These numbers, however, happen to lives according to a probable

reason. For ei^ht thousand is a cube on a cube;

but nine thousand is a letrugonic

superficies on a cube. Hence the one1

gives depth to asuperficies, and this

through the indefinite duad;but the other preserves the

superficies, itself in itself,

in similitude and perfection from the triad.4 But it is the of a better life, to



symbol

remain in itself, and to adorn secondary natures. And it is an indication of a

more imperfect life, to descend to secondary natures, to be assimilated to them,

and to be filled with a certain indefmitencss. Since however even a secondary

nature is not entirely deprived of similitude todivinity, the descent is through a

cube, in which there is a tetradic similitude. But it is better to imitate more

excellent nature through a more simple life, than through a life which is more

compounded. And a square is more simple than a cube. If howeveryoushould say, that the number nine thousand is adapted to those that have their

hypostasis from Earth and Vulcan; for a thousand is terrestrial, as being a

cube, but nine pertains to Vulcan,

With them 1 many artificial forms

For nine ycart fjsliiuu d - -

says Vulcan [in Homer,6

]in thus speaking, you will not wander from the

truth. But, in short, a cube is adapted to the terrestrial allotments of Minerva;

since the decad is attributed to the heavens, and the last progression of the decad

gives subsistence to the solid number one thousand. For the Gods make their

progression from the celestial allotments to the terrestrial, as the last. This

then-fore must be said by us.

The philosopher Porphyry however, in interpreting these tilings, supposes

For lc(> is a cube, and so likewise is 8.

*For 9 is a square, anil IOOO is a cube.

1 800O givesdrrtth to the

superficies 20. For 20x20x20-8000. and thin is through the

duad, because C0= 2x 10.

4 For ynoo is llic cube of 30.

i. c. The descent is through >OOO,in which there is a tetradic similitude, because u Procliu

had before observed, it is a Mjuate superficies ou a cube.

* Iliad. 1. 18. vs. iOO.

124 1 ROCIAJS ON THE [BOOK i.

Vulcan to be the intellect that presides over art, hut earth to be the lunar sphere. For

thit is called by the Egyptiant ethereal earth. lie says therefore that HOU!S which

derive their subsistence from divinity,hut participate of the artificial [or Vulcanic]

intellect, are disseminated in the

bodyof the moon; souls that give themselves

to the arts, dwelling there; and that they ha\e bodies which are etlluxions of the

ethereal bodies. That nine thousand years, also, are adapted to the-e souls, after

the following manner. A myriad of years is, toys he, the period of the souh

which ascends and descends through the five stars, in order that each may have

two chiliads, yet not successive. Time indeed is successive according to concep

tion ; for it is not without continuity. Hence all the stars have nine lives;which

is nine thousand !\mths also are

obscurely Minified through years. performedto the dead. And in a similar manner, some mve names to ihosc that are horn,

in the ninth year ; employing as symbols the periods of generation and production.

The priest, however, does not now assume a mviiad of years, but the number oi

nine thousand, in order that those of whom he is speaking may still IK* terrene, but

approximating to the period of a myriad of years. All tins interpretation, however,

the divine lainblichus rejects, and says that the discussion here is not about lives,

but about the different measures of .Minerval

participation.

It is absurd, therefore,

to make mention of the periods spoken of in the Plia-drus. But if it be requisite

to narrate what follows from the conception of Porphyry, it must be said, that

the soul lives indeed intellectually and Saturnally on hi^h, but descends first to

the conception of a political life, which is Jovian. Afterwards, she excites anger,

and lives ambitiously. But anger is .Martial. In the next place,she proceeds

in her descent to desire, and venereal lives; and at last, exerts physical reason*

[orproductive

powers].

But all reasons are Ilermaie. And Hermes is the

insjK-ctive guardian of physical reasons. Through the<e, however, she is bound to

body. Anil again, receiving a body, .she first lives physically, being the supplier

of nutriment and increase to the body. Afterwards, she lives epithymetieally,

exciting genesinrgic powers. In {he next place, she. Hi eg under the influence of

anger, rising against her former habits, but entering into an ambitious life. After

wards, she livespolitically, moderating the passions. And in the last place, she

lives

intellectually.

If therefore she is restored to herpristine

state, her life is

intellectual, and the myriad is terminated. But in generation, though she is

conversant with it in the best manner, she lives according to a deficiency by the

chiliad. And of this the number nine thousand is a symbol, being adapted to the

!*-stpolity of the Athenians.

BOOKi.j TIM.EUS OF PLATO. j^

"

I will therefore briefly unfold to yon the laws, and the most beautiful

of the deeds of those citizens that existed nine thousand years ago. For

when we arc more at leisure, we shall accurately discuss every particular,

receiving for this purpose the sacred writings themselves."

If you wi*h to refer what is here said to the whole order of tilings, the number

nine thousand will manifest the total progression as far as to a cube, and terrestrial

works, and likewise the life which pervades through all things. Hut through the

word briefly, the union of many productive powers, and the comprehension of

them according to intellect, are indicated. For the synoptical is an image ofintellectual impartiality; but that which departs into multitude, of

prolific

power; multiplying, producing, and dividing forms into minute parts, through

diversity. The la:is are images of the divided fabrication, which is united accord

ing to intellect. But the most beautiful work is an adumbration of the orderlydistribution of things which is extended to one 1 autiful end. For beauty

subsisting according to the united, proceeds from intelligible^ to the visible fabri

cation. And the resumption ofthe sacred writings, indicates the recurrence to the

paradigms of them, from which also the priest being filled, delivers these things

to Solon. The narration, therefore, will be concerning.the divided and multiplied

fabrication, which is connected by intellect, and extends as far as to terrestrial

works, as may IK? inferred from all that has l>ecn said.

"

In the first place then, consider the laws of these people, and compare

them with ours. For you will now find licre many paradigms ofthings

which then subsisted in your city."

As Socrates summarily discussed his own polity, thus also the priest briefly

discusses the laws of the ancient Athenians, in order that the latter may have dimi

nution w ith reference to the former, and also a similitude to it. And this very pro

perly. For the one is more universal, but the other more partial. And the one is

the work ufdianour, but the other of the phantasy. This diminution indeed may be

sun eyed, so far as Socrates has described apolity,

but the priest laics. Apolity, hwc-

evcr, is the union and conmon bond ofthe life of citizens ;but

legislation is orderpro

ceeding into multitude and division. A nd the former is more analogous to the providen

tial cause, but the latter to fate. But there is a similitude between Socrates and the

Instead of v<*-<m- t^y ravra iai cccira, it wfnm necttMfy lo rrd v^tmi- t^y ravra MM rpot mra.



BOOK i]

TIM.TX S (>r PLATO. 127

learnt from tlio multitude ami quality of the irenera in tin-city. For in the polity

of Socrates, there were three genera, (lit1

guardian, the auxiliary, and the merce.

nary. For the triad is allied to the demiurgic monad, lint here then- are the double

of those, the sacerdotal, and the military ; the demiurgic, [or pertaining to

artificers! and the pastoral ;the venatic and the agricultural. For the middle

fabrication has at one and the same time the dnadic, and the triadic; and both

these numl>crs are adapted to Minerva. Hut one of these indeed, viz. the triad,

is immediately adapted to the Goddess; but the other according to generation.

For the hexad is a triangle from the triad. By the trigonir therefore, and ly the

lievad from the triad, the diminution and at the same time alliance to the (jJoddcss



are manifested. For though every fabrication participates of .Minerva, yet the

first and supreme parts of the universe, and the first fabrication, and the first

father, are filled from her in a more abundant decree. Thus therefore, if

yon alone select these genera, you will find the number adapted to the (ioddess.

But if yon add, the presiding over wisdom, yon will entirely find the heptad,

which is of a Minerva! characteristic. And this is one of the things that are of

great notoriety. The feminine nature likewise of the heptad is celebrated, and

that it is produced from the monad alone. The monad also, flic triad, ami theliep-

tfid, fire xtud to />c

c\/>ccia//t( images & Minerva; the first, indeed, nx being intellectual ;

the wontl, m converting the mound in it.tilf;nn.l the third, as proceeding from the

fntlur alone. Aller this manner, therefore, you may infer from numbers.

Il is necessary howe\er, from the quality of the genera, to survey the diminution

and transcendency of these. For the .sacerdotal is subordinate to the guardian

genus, which ascends as far as to the first cause.*

For Plato himselfin the I oliti-

cns arranges the priests under the politician, and does not impart to them political

power. The military also is subordinate to the auxiliary genus. For the latter

arranges in a Incoming manner, and sufficiently disciplinen the inhabitants of the

city.lint the former pursues war alone, and things pertaining to it, and partici

pates of this study alone. And the mercenary tribe is divided into the remaining

penera. The polity of Socrates therefore surpasses* that of thepriest,

as l>ein

more c-omprehensive, ami after a mannerco-adapted

to the

generaprior to it.

So that both from number andcpialily,

it become* evident to us that the polity

1

For 6 i* a triangular nun.bcr, anil U the ilouMr of .

PlMi ! rt tiiijof tlrgiiar>lian,

in tm I r|iublic.


second after it. We establish, however, the analogies of the polity of Socrates

to the universe, to be as follows. The genus of guardians we arrange as analo

gous to the celestial Cods. The auxiliary genus to those more excellent natures,

the attendants on the celestial Gods, and the defenders of the universe. And the

mercenary genus, to those powers that connect a material nature withpartial

souls. The first of these also, is analogous to the fixed stars, the second to the

planets, and the third to material natures. \\\> may likewise assume in the celen-

tial Cods themselves, all these according to analogy.

Here, however, it is worth while to simey how, ami after what manner, these

genera ^enumerated by the priest] are to hi* assumed in the universe.. For the

philosopher Porphyry arranges them as follows: That (hepriests

are analogous



to the archangels in the hea\eus, who are converted to the Cods, of whom

they are the messengers. Jiut the soldiers are analogous to souls descend

ing into bodies. Again, the shepherds are analogous to tin- powers that are arranged

over the herds of animals ; rhic/i in arcane narrations are said to be touts that

are frustrated of the human intellect, but have a propensity towards animals. For

there is also a certain curator of the herd of men. And there are likewise certain

partial curators; some being the inspectors of nations; others of cities; and

others of individuals. Hut the hunters are analogous to those powers that

hunt after souls, and inclose them in bodies. There are likewise powers who

delight in the hunting of animals, such as Diana is said tol>e,

and another mul

titude together with her of venatic daemons. And the husbandmen ure analogous

to those powers that preside over fruits. All this administration therefore of

sublunary daemons is said by Plato to receive many demiurgic distributions, in

consequence of looking to the effect which now is, or is becoming lobe. The

divine lamblichus, however, reprehends these assertions, as neither Platonic nor

true. For archangels are not any where mentioned by Plato, nor does the mi

litary genus pertain to souls verging to bodies. For it is not proper to oppose

these to gods or da-mons. For we should act absurdly, in arranging these in

the middle genus, but Cods and da-mons among the last artificers. j\or must

it l>e admitted, that those are shepherds, who are frustrated of human intellect,

but have a certain sympathy to animals. For the existence of da-mons who

govern the mortal nature, is not derived from men; nor are those powers hunters,

who inclose the soul in body, as in a net; since the soul is not thus conjoined to

which is now delivered, is subordinate to that of Socrates, and will rank as the



HO IMtOCLUS ON THE [BOOK f.

ministers the psychical allotments, l!iat which governs the geneiurgic forms of

life, every thing \vhirli fabricates and gives form to material natures, and that

which arranges the last order ofspirits. That, however, which pays attention to

wisdom, and that which is contemplative, must he considered as different from all

these genera, and which the Egyptian also celebrates above all the rest, making

mention in the first place, as bring aprit st, of the sacerdotal genus. All the

genera, tlierefore, are seven, and the monad is exempt from the liexad. And

(he monad, indeed, is analogous to the one intellect which connects all the. fabri

cation of generated natures ; but the hexad is analogous to the more partial orders

under this intellect, \i/. to the anagogic, guardian, formali/.ing, and vivifying

order*, and also to those that are the loaders of the herds of a tame life, and to

tho-e that rule over the brutal nature, \\hich orders in the universe, likewise are

separated from the fixed stars. Moreover, he says, that these orders may be seen

among men, in the first place, among the Athenians, but in the second place,

among the Saitans, according to the division of genera, each accomplishing its

proper work in a definite manner. For he manifests this by saung,.v<y//

<;/c fruni

others, in order that we may understand the unmingled purity of the genera,

proceeding siipernally through diminution, as far as to the last of things.

" The artificers, also, exercised their arts in such a manner, that each

was en ra (red in his own employment without iniiiiding with that of otherO O -*

~ ~

artists. The same method was likewise adopted by shepherds, hunters,

and husbandmen."

The whole of this telractys has, indeed, the third order, according to a section

of the genera into three, hut is now enumerated by IMato as the second ; in

order that through this, what is said may imitate the universe, in which the la->t

is the middle, comprehended on all sides by more div me natures. For that which

is most material and gross, is enclosed by fabrication in the middle. For thus

alone1

can it be preserved, being adorned and guarded according to the vt hole of

itself by id I the comprehending natures [in the universe]. Hut again, it is here

added, that the fabricati\e art was not mingled with the other arts, nor in a simi

lar manner any one of the others with the rest, but that each remained by itself,

and in its oun purity. For this not only produces accuracy and rectitude in

1

For //o\ii IHTC, it i ucej?>itr> to n-.ul/jow>.

T.OOK i.lTIM/HI S (>F PLATO. J31

appropriate work-, but likewise cHects tin- sympathy of the citizens. For all will

thus be in want of all, in consequence of cadi nut exorcising many arts. For the

builder will ! in want of the husbandman, the husbandman of the shepherd, the

shepherd of (lie hunter, and Iho hunter of the builder;and thus each

l>eingin

want of the rest, will not bo nnminglcd with them; honor, there is sameness in

conjunction with difference, and separation accompanied with union.

"The warlike genus too, you will find was separated from all the other

genera, and was ordered by law to engage in nothing but what pertained

to war."



Every whore indeed, but especially in the warlike genus, the unmingled and

the separate are appropriate. For they have an alliance to the highest order,

which cuts oft" every thing material, and obliterates that which is disorderly and

confused. Very properly therefore does this genus pay attention to the concerns

of war. For on account of this, the city remains free from external and injurious

incursions ; and this invests it with a -juard from itself, imitating the guardian

order. For as a guardian deity is present with the first, so likewise with the mid

dle of the demiurgi. This, therefore, may bo assumed from theology, lint by

law in the universe, we must understand the divine institutions proceeding from

the one demiurgic intellection. For prior to mundane natures is the demiurgic

law, which is seated by Jupiter, and distributes together with him in an orderly

manner all the providential inspection which exists in the universe.

" A similar armour too, such as that of shields and darts was employed

by each. These we first used in Asia; the Goddess in those

places, as

likewise happened to you, first pointing them out to our use."

The narration extends the energy of Minerva supernally from paradigms,

as far as to the last genera. For there are things connascent with this energy,

participating of nndefiled powers, more total and more partial, and which arrange

the mundane genera from the middle fabrication. Analogously also to this, they

comprehend and are comprehended, are vanquished by the Minerval energies,

and remain perpetually undefiled with invariable sameness through it, in the uni

verse. It is requisite, therefore, to know these things in common about ail these

|34 PROCLL S ON THE [BOOK i.

particulars.We must however show what the armour, the shields, ami the

spears, are, and how these are antoedently comprehended in the Goddess.

Porphyry, indeed, calling the body the shield, assumes anger for the spear.

Hut these pertain to souls fallinginto

gem-rationand to material

things,

and

are not the instruments of immutable t^Mv, but of a geneiurgic life, corrupting

the purity of intellect, and destroying the life \\hirh subsists according to

reason. The divine lambliclms, however, explainsthese in a di\ inely inspired

manner. Tor since it is requisitethat every thing divine should operate and

not sutler, in order that by operating it may not have the ineflicacious, which

is assimilated to matter, and that by not suffering it may not have an eflicacious

power resembling that of material natures, which act in conjunction with passion;



in order that both these may l>e accomplished,he sa\s, that shields are powers

through which a di\ine nature remains impassive and undeliled, snrroimding itself

with an infiangible guard. Huts|>ears

art- the powers according to which it pro

ceeds through all things without contact, ami operates on all things, cutting oft

that which is material, and giving aid to every genesiurgir form. These powers,

however, are first seen about .Minerva. Ileuce in the statues of her she is repre

sented with a spear and shield. For she vanquishes all things, and according to

theoloiiists remains without declination, and with undeliled purity,in her father-

Hut these have a secondary subsistence, in both the total and partial Minerval

jtowers.For as the Jovian and demiurgic multitude, imitates its monad, and as

the prophetic and Apolloniacal multitude participatesof the Apolloniacal pecu

liarity ; thus, also, the Minerval number, adumbrates the undeliled and unmingled

nature of Minerva. This also, takes place in an ultimate degree in Minerval souls.

For in these, likewise, the shield is the untamed and uninclining power of reason;

but the spear is that power which amputates matter and liberates the stud from

da-moniacal or fatal pas ions ;of which powers the Athenians participate

in a

purer manner, but the Sa itans in a secondary degree, iecei\ing these through the

measure of alliance to the (Joddess.

" You

mayperceive, too, what great attention was paid immediately

from the beginning by the laws to prudence and modesty, and besides

these, to divination and medicine, as subservient to the preservation of

health. And Irom these, which arc divine goods,the laws, proceeding

1

For uKui^wk here, il is necessary to read ou^r/k.

nooKi.] TIM/F.US OF PLATO. 133

to the invention of such as are merely human, procured all uch other

disciplines as follow from those we have just enumerated."

Alittle

farther on, ho calls the Goddess both a lover of wisdom and a lover ofwar, in order that tlie arrangement of the polity of the Athenians and Saitans

might he produced conformalily

to IHT as a paradigm. And what indeed pertains

to the exerri.se of war, issufficiently indicated from what has been said ; but that

which pertains to wisdom, he exhibits to us in the present words ; in order that

by the one, the philopolemic, and by the other, the. philosophic nature of

Minerva might l>c adumbrated. What then is this prudence? The theory of

wholes and of supermundane natures, from which, after the first of goods which

are perfective of souls, a certain facility is obtained in the concerns of human life,

proceeding in conjunction with divination and medicine. And in one way, indeed,

this prudence is the source ofdisciplines in invisible causes, in another way, about

the world, and in the last place, about human aHairs. For since the Goddess her

self is immaterial and separate wisdom, on this account, to (lie natures that are

allied to her, she unfolds into light all the parts of divine and human prudence.

For with respect to divination, also, one kind must he admitted to exist in the

intellectual, and another in the mundane Cods. And of the latter, one kind

proceeds from the Gods, another from daemons, and another from the discur

sive energy of the human soul, existing rather as something artificial and con

jectural. In a similar manner also with respect to medicine, one kind indeed

exists in the Gods themselves, and this is of a I a-onian nature ; but another kind,

in daemons, being ministrant and subservient to the Gods, from whom likewise

matter and instruments are procured for the advents of the Gods. For as there

are many da-mons about Ixne, thus also about Esculapius, some are allotted

the order of attendants, but others that of forerunners of the God. And ano

ther kind exists in human lives, being that which is imparted from theorems

and experience, according to which some are adapted in a greater, and others

in a less degree to divine medicine, lint there is also a mixture of these two

kinds of prudence, \\/,. the prophetic and the medicinal, with the Egyptians;

because the causes of these are antecedently comprehended in onedivinity, and

from one fountain many streams are distributed about the world. And thus

much has been said in common about the prudence which is now mentioned.

In order, however, to unfold each particular more fully, we must say, that laze,

indeed, is the order proceeding from the one intellect of Minerva ;but

134 PHOCLUS OX THE [BOOK i.

the providence pervading from whole* as far as to material natures ;and immedi

atelyfrom tkt beginning,the natural aptitude of Minerxal souls to pruilence. For

that which is neither adventitious nor foreiirn, appears to lie signified liythese

words. Hut if some one should ivfer what is *aid to the mundane order,

Wause the distrihution of things does not proceed from the imperfect to the

iH-rfect, hut is always arranged and accompanied in its progression with tliat

which is excellent, it appears to me that this is manifested hy the words inimedi-

nttli/ fnnn th<:bi nnniig. The \\ords, however, mu-t be referred to the order of the.

whole world, because there are invisible eaiiscsof tin- natures ihut arearran^ed in the

world, \\hich perfect priidenee [i.e. \\ i-dom] priu\arily contemplates. F-r the

form of

prudence

is not, as Porphvry says it is, artil icial, or adapted to the arts.

Tor as lamhliehus oltserves, is the -it t of Vulcan, hut not of .Minerxa. IJut

this,

uttcntii-n uY/.v nL ilirniutinn mill iiiulidiH ,

hecau>e it is lit, in the first place,

to contemplate the other powers of the mundane (iods, and thus afterwards, their

propheticand >anative production;

since we are allotted I he government ot a

tolerated hody, and to u> wlio are enclo>ed in hody, futurity is immanifi-st.

1 or a material life exhihits much of the contingent, ; -rid of an hyparxis dilli-rcntly

moved at dillerent times. Hut

hy

suck otlur ili^ipiincsa.s /.//A-u /mm t/icsc, he

donhtle>s means geometry, astronomy, logistic, arithmetic, and tlu; sciences

allied to these; all wliich the law ha\ in- e>tahh-hed, led the Athenians and Saitans

to the possession of an admirable prudence. And thus much concerning these

particulars.

Porphyry, howexer, stays,that medicine very properly proceeds from Minerva,

liccauseJ->enlapins

is the lunar intellect, in the same manner as Apollo is the

solarintellect, lint the divine lamhliehus blames this assertion, us confounding

the essence* of the (iods, and as not alvxav* ri.uhtlv distrihulin^ according to pre-

NMit circumstances the intellects and souU of the mundane (iods. l;

<r it must

he admitted that Ksmlapin* exi.sls in the MIII, and that he proceeds from that

luminary ahout the ireiierated place ;in order that as the heavens, so likewise

generation may he connected hy this divinity, according to a second participation,

and may he lilli-d from it vuth s\mnietry, and jjood temperament.

*

According to all tliis orderly i!is>trilmtion therefore, and co-arrange

ment, the Cioddess iii^t established and adurnctl your city."

The word all manifests the united comprehension in the Goddess of all tlio

natures that are adorned by her, and that neither is any thins: pretei milled by

HOOKi.]

TIM.TiUS OF PLATO. 135

her, nor the inultitudc in her snflered to exist in a divided staff. But the word

oiaxiT/o;Tj, indicates the orderly distribution of the Miner* al providence. And

the word co-arrangcmcnt signifies tlie union of tliese, and their alliance to one

world. Farther still, the word^-xxoT/ijj ri^ signifies the progression of wholes

from the (Joddess; but cu arrange/in nl, the conversion of them to herself. Since,

however, of the natures in the universe, some are total, but others arepartial, and

some are analogous to monads, lnt others to numhers, and lioth participate of the

iMinerval providence, hut primarily such as are total and monadic, on this ac

count what is at present said, attributes the more ancient ami leading order to

the Athenians, but that which is secondary and diminished to the Saitans.

"

Choosing for tliis purpose the place in which you were born ; as she

foresaw, that from the excellent temperature of the seasons it would

produce the most sagacious men."

Prior to this the (ioddess was said to have been #////<</tho Attic region ;but it

is now said that she clime it. Both, however, concur, and neither is the bein^ allot

ted contrary to her w ill. nor is her choice disorderly, as is the ca-c w itli apartial

soul. For divine necessity concurs with divine will, choice with allotment,

and to chti i.n with to be alltl ctl. \Vhat this place, however, is has IM-CII before

shown by us, \i/. that it is interval, and that which is truly place. For the divi

sions of divine allotments, are divisions of these, in order that they may IM- esta

blished with invariable sameness prior to things which subsist according to time.

lint it must now be added, that the soul of the universe possessing tho productive

principles of all divine [mundane] natures, and IHMII^ suspended from the essences

prior to herself, inserts in di Hi-rent parts of the interval an alliance to dilli-rent

powers, and certain symbols of the divine orders in the (iods. For this interval

is proximately suspended from her, and is an instrument connasecnt with her.

AH she is, therefore, a rational and psychical world, she also renders this [sensible]

world endued with interval, and vital through divine impressions. Hence the.

interval itself, though it i< said to IM, continued and iminoveable,yet

is not

entirely without dillcrence with reference to itself; since neither is the. soul of the

universe perfectlywithout dinvrcnco in itself towards itself, but one part [as it

were] of it, is the circle of tlicsamc, and another, the circle of the tiij/trcnf. And

why do I assert this of the soul? for neither is much celebrated intellect without

dillerence in itself, though all things in it are, as it were, of the same colour. For

13fl PROCLITS ON THE [BOOK i.

all things do not possess an equal power in intellect, lint some are more total, and

others more partial. ISor is tliis wonderful. For the Demiurgus himself contain*

in himself, first, middle, and last orders. Whence, also, I think Orpheus, indicating

the order of his powers, says,"

that his head is the refulgent heaven, hut his eyes

are the sun, and the opposing moon." Though, therefore, this interval should have

one essence, unattended with dillerence, jet the power of soul, and the allot

ted orders ofdiunons, and piiorto thc.-e. the (Jods, dividing it, according to the

demiurgic order, and the allotment-* ofjiMicc, demonstrate that there in much

dillerenee in the parts of it. llenccii mu>t In- admitted, that the choice liecomeN

internal, and from the es>eiiee of the<iod>,

and that it is not such as \ve see in

partial souls. For the former i* essential;hut the latter i aloue detined accord

ing to the present life. And the former i> eternal, hut the latter temporal.



JJy jilucc,therefon 1

,\i e must not understand the earth or this air, hut prior to

these, the hnmovcahlc interval, which is always ilhnninnted alter the same man

ner by the (Jods, and divided by the allotments of justice. For these material

natures are at one time adapted, and at another unadapted, to the participation

of the (jods. And it is nec ssary that prir to things \\ Inch sometimes participate,

there should be those \\hichare alvvavs suspended alter the same manner from

the (jlods. Ami thus much may sutlice respecting these particulars.

M ith respect, ho\>e\er, to the excellent temperature of the seasons, which is

productive of sagacious men, I an.etius, and certain other IMatonists, understand

the words according to their apparent meaning, vi/. that the Attic region, on

account of the excellent temperature of the seasons of the year, is adapted to the

production of sagacious men. lint Ixm^inus douhts the truth of their assertion.

For the contrary is seen to l>e the case, since about this place, there is a great

n ant of symmetry in dry ness from excessive heat, and cold tempestuous weather.

Nor if the place was of this kind, would they yet Ix- aide to preserve the immor

tality of souls, if sagacity was implanted in them through the excellent tempera

ture of the seasons. But he says, that thin excellent temperature is not lobe

referred to tin 1 condition of the air, but that it is a certain nameless peculiarity of

the region contributing to sagacity. For as certain waters are prophetic, and

certain places are productive of disease, and are pestilential, thus, also, it is not

at all wonderful that a certain peculiarity of country should contribute In prudence

and sagacity. Origen, however, refers this excellent temperature to the circula

tion of the heaven*;

for from thence the fertilityand sterility of soids are derived,

as Socrates says, in the Republic, lie, however, apprehends the truth in a more

HOOK i.l TIM.-Kl. S 01 IM.ATO, :{7

partial manner. But Longimis is ignorant thai he makes the peculiarity to le corpo

real, and that lie is entangled in the doubts which Porphyry proposes to him. For

how can onepeculiarity of air render men adapted to different pursuits ? And in the

next place,a similar

peculiarity still remaining, how conies it to pass that there

is no\v no longer the same natural excellence in the genius of the inhabitants ?

But if the peculiarity is corruptible, it must he shown what it is that is corruptive

of it. It is however belter to say, that the Gods having divided the whole of

space conformably to the demiurgic order, each portion of place receives souls

adapted to it ;that portion indeed which is Martial, receiving souls of a more

animated and irascible nature ;that which is Apolloniacal, prophetic souls; that

which is Esculapian, medical; and that which is Minerva), prudent and



sagacious souls. But this is effected through a certain quality, or rather each

portion of place possesses a power of this kind from its allotted divinity; and

Plato calls this adaptation, excellence of temperature; since there are many

physical, psychical, diernoniacal, and angelical powers in each portion of place,

but each unity of the allotted divinity unites and mingles all these in an unminglcd

manner. Since however the Seasons are allotted from the Father, the

guardianship of these portions of place and allotments, to whose can-, as Homer says,"

tlie mighty Heaven and Olympus are committed," and according to which, the

co-adaptations of souls similiar to places is effected;hence Plato suspends this

excellent temperature from the Seasons, the whole of it deriving from thence its

subsistence.

The Goddess therefore perceiving that the [Attic] portion of interval which is

always guarded bythe

Seasons,is

adapted to the reception of sagacious souls,selected it for this purpose; not that this place was once deprived of Minerva,

but at another time was under her allotted guardianship ; for the text demonstrates

the contrary ; but because there are also in the interval itself, different aptitudes

to the reception of divine illuminations, according to different parts ;which

aptitudes were inserted by the whole Demiurgus, who uniformly comprehends

the powers of all the Gods posterior to himself. These powers, however, are

corroborated and perfected by, or rather proceed from, the presiding Gods. As,

therefore, with respect to the elections of lives, the soul that chooses itsproj>er life,

act* with rectitude; after the same manner, also, the oul which is arranged in a

iii^cl. V. T. 750.

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. S

138 PROC1AJS ON THE [BOOK i.

pluce conformable to the choice of its life, energizes in a greater degree than tin?

soul which is disseminated in a foreign place. But to this arrangement, the one

circulation of the heavens contribute*, \\hich introduces afertility

and sterility of

Minis. In fertile periods, then-Ion-, there is a greater, but in barren periods, a less

ir.imbcr ofsagacious

men. I fence, us when a husbandman chooses good land

for the efficacious gro\\th of the seed, knowing that \\lien the season is fertile,

i:c shall reap greater benefit, but \\heii it is barren less, on account of the power

of the earth; thus also the text s.ivs, that the Goddess chose this place, as pro

ductive, of sagacious men, in order that when tlie period is fertile it may have

more; aud when the period is barren, may have less1

of prudent and

sagacious men, in consequence ol falling oil from a life adapted to the place.

We must not however wonder,if Plato

praisesthe excellent

temperatureof

the visible Seasons. For then- is one excellent temperature with reference

to tin- health of bodies, and another contributing to the reception of sagacious

souls, such as is that of the Attic region. For though there is not always the

same sagacity in those that inhabit this region, yet there is always a certain

greater abundance of it through thejx-culiarity

of the place, and the aptitude of

the Seasons. Such, therefore, is our opinion resjR cting these particulars.

The divine lamblichus, however, does not understand by place, one corporeal-

formed condition, but an incorporeal cause pervading through the earth, sus

taining bodies b\ life, and comprehendum all interval. For in api.

ice of this

kind, lie i*avs the Goddess fashions truly good men, and causes them to inhabit.

I5ut whether he accords with the words of Plato, may !>o surveyed from what

has been said. If, however, it berequisite, desisting from these things, to con

template wholes according to the analogous, it miM IM- said that this Goddess

fabricating and weaving the universe in conjunction with her father, every where

distributes to wholes, and to things of the Ix-tter co-ordination, a more perfect

allotment. Hut these are more replete with wisdom than their opposite*,and are

more adapted to the Goddess. We shall show, therefore, from the following

words of Plato, how that which excels in prudence is of a more Minerval

characteristic.

"

The Goddess, therefore, being a lover both of war and wisdom, first

-elected this place tor the habitation of men most similar to herself."

luMeaH V f "" "*">iui Xror, ry fXurroi a-rowtvrnv ri)i ara rov TOXUV <rirqciut WF/ (,

ill tills place.

It Is ntifssarj to re^d, xn aoop/ai r^rrtit, TU uwnwifTtif, i. X.

HOOK i.] T1M/EUS Ol- PLATO. J.^Q

In what is here said, Pinto delivers to us the most accurate conception respecting

this greatest divinity, unfolding to those who aresufficiently able to perceive his

meaning, the indications of thcologists. Differentinterpreters however betake

them*el\es todifli rent

arrangementsof the Goddess

;

some indeed narrating their

opinion more enigmatically, hut others more clearly, yet not continuing what they

assert. I- or Porphyry, placing Minerva in the Moon, says that souls descend

from thence, which possess nt one and (lie same timeiniseilility and mildness

; and

Unit on this account, the niystagogueg in I.lcuxis arc lovers of wisdom and Invert of: ; since it it said that the race of those irho arc leaders of the mysteries in

Klenxis, is derived from Mnsaus, the of/spring of the. Moon ; and aLo that the

Hermes there subsistsabout

theMoon, from which a/so (he race & the Crucrs is

dfi-irul. The di\ine lamhlichus, however, blame* fheM- assertions, as not well

preserving the analogy. For heinterprets rrrtr as that which entirely subverts

the whole of a disorderly, confused, and material nature; but u-isdvin as immate

rial and separate intelligence. He also says, that this (goddess is the cause

of hoth these; which likewise the Athenians imitate through a prudent and

warlike life. He adds, that the Athenian region is well adapted to the re

ception of sueh-like souls.

If, however, it IM: requisite that the conceptions of these men should Ix-come

manifest, and prior to these, that what is delivered by Plato should be shown

to accord in the highest degree withtheologists, we must a<sert as follows :

deriving what we say from a supernal origin. In the Deniiurgus and father of

the whole world, many orders of Ciods that have the form of the one, present

themselves to the view. Ami these an of a guardian, or demiurgic, or dela

ting,&

connective, or perfective characteristic. Hut the nndefiled and untamed deity Miurna, is one of the first intellectual unities subsistiui; in the

DeuiiurgUH, nccording to which he himself reinniiiH firm und immutable, and all

thing* proceeding from him pariicipate of inflexible power; and through \\hirh,

he intellectually per<eiven every thing, and is separate in an exempt manner from

all beings. All theologists, then-fore, call this divinity Minerva, asl>eing

brought forth indeed from the summit of her father, and abiding in him ; being

a demiurgic, separate, and immaterial intelligence.

Hence Socrates, in the Cratylus, celebrates her as thfonoe [^eovor,] or deijic intel

lection. But theologihts, also, consider her as in conjunction with other divinities

1

Instead of r>- Otuv here, it i necessary to read n)r Hror.

HO PHOCLIJS ON TIIK [ROOK i.

sustaining all things in the one Demiurgus, und arranging wholes together with

her father. Hence through the first of these, they denominate her philosophic,

but through the secondphilopoleinic. For she, who according to the form of the

one, connectedly contains all the paternal wisdom, is i\ philosopher. And she, who

invariablyrules over all

contrariety, maybe

properlycalled a lour

ofrt ttr.

Hence Orpheus speaking of her birth says, that Jupiter generated her from

h> head,

\\ ilh armour vhiiung like a biaicn flowtr.

Since, however, it was necessary that she should proceed into second and third

orders, she appears in the order to which Proserpine belongs, according to the

iindcHled hcptad ;but she generates every virtue from herself, and elevating

powers; and illuminates secondary natures with intellect, and an undeliled life.

Hence she is called Cure Tnto^encs. She likewise appears among the liberated

(Jods, uniting the lunar order with intellectual and demiurgic light, causing the

productions of those divinities to be unth tiled, and demonstrating the one unity

of them to be immingled with their depending powers. She also appears in the

heavens and the sublunary region; and according to the united gift of herself,

imparts the cause both of the philosophic and the philopolemic power. For

her inflexibility is intellectual, and her separate w isdom is pure and immingled

with secondary natures; and the one characteristic peculiarityof .Minerval

providence, extends as far as to the last orders. For since wherever there are

partial souls that resemble her divinity, they exert an admirable prudence, and

exhibit an unconquerable strength, what ought we to say of her attendant choirs

1

of da inons, or divine,

mundane, liberated,and

rulingorders? For all these

receive as from a fountain the twofold peculiarity of this (Joddess. Hence also,

the divine poet [Homer] indicating both these powers of Miners a, in conjunction

with fabulous devices savs,

I lie radiant veil her sacred fingers wove

I loan in rich waves, ami spreads the court of Jove.

Her father * \\ailike robe her limbs invest.*

*

1 Tor\<p<v;,*>

in tins place, il isneci-s-.ary to rlacl

\i>f>*>v

TM.*

Iliad, viii.

uuok i.J TIM.-11US OF PLATO. 141

In which verses ly the veil which slip wove, and to which she gave subsistence

by her intellections, her intellectual wisdom is signified. But ly the warlike rol*>

of Jupiter, we must understand her demiurgic providence, which immutably

takes rare of mundane natures, and prepares more divine bein::s always to have

dominion in the world. Hence, also, I think Homer represents her as an asso

ciate in battle with the Greeks against the Barbarians; just as Plato here relates

that she was an associate with the (ireeks against the inhabitants of the Atlantic

island;

in Order that every where more intellectual and divine natures mayrule over such as are more irrational .and vile. For Mars, also, is a friend to

war and contrarieties, hut with a separation and division more adapted to the

things themselves. Minerva, however, connects contrariety, and illuminates the

subjects of her government with union. Hence, likewise, she is Maid to he



philopolemic. For,

Strife, fighting, war, sh always love*.

And she is a friend to war, indeed, !>e.causc she is allotted the summit of se

paration ; but she is a lover of contrarieties, because these are in a certain respect

congregated through this goddess, in consequence of better natures havin fr

dominion. On this account, likewise, the ancients co-ai ranged Victory with

Minerva.

If, therefore, these things arc rightly asserted, she isphilosophic indeed, as

being demiurgic intelligence, and as separate and immaterial wisdom. Hence,

also,* she is called Metis by the (iods. IJul she isp/rilopolcmic,

as con

necting the contrarieties in wholes, and as an untamed and inflexible deity.

On this account, likewise, she preserves Bacchus undctilcd, but vanquishes the

giants in conjunction with her lather. She too alone shakes the/.rgis, without

waiting for the mandate of Jupiter. She also hurls the javelin ;

Shook |j\- licr arm, tlie tnisvjavelin bcruM ;

llu;;e, ponderous, strong! that \\lini her fury burn*,

U hole ranki of heroes tames and overturns.

Again, she isPhosphorot, as every way extending intellectual light ; the Sa-

,as establishing every partial intellect in the total intellections of her father ;

1

Hind. viii.



HOOK i.]TIM/KUS OF IM.ATO. 143

their subsistence and are perfected, or rather they are always perfect, through the

fabrication of the Gods, and the undcfiled production of Minerva. Every tiling,

therefore, which is suspended and originates from the Gods, and is converted to

them, exhibits transcendent \irtue. 15ut this, also, is in wholes;since it must be

admitted that there is divine virtue in the universe. And it is likewise in human

lives, accord ins; to a similitude to wholes. Hence what is now said is applied to

the Athenians. lint making the life of the Athenians to be one and continued,

il conjoins .Solon to the ancient inhabitants of Athens. For it says, they"

inhabited this region." For the paradigm of them is one, and in continuity

with itself; since the whole of the Minerva! series l iug one, extends as far as

lo the last of things, and originates supernally from the supermundane orders.

"

deeds, of are recorded in our

Mainland mighty therefore, your city

temples, and are the subject of admiration ; yet there is one which

surpasses all of them in magnitude find virtue."

The priest having promised summarily to relate the laws and deeds of the

Athenians, he delivered, ind<vd, their laws according to a division of genera;

and it, therefore, remained for him to celebrate their deeds, through which an

encomium is passed on the city, and the tutelar Goddess is praised. Since, how

ever, of deeds there is a ntnnlcr, and there is also one unity comprehensive of

them, according to which the whole form of the polityis exhibited, he announces

that he shall narrate the greatest deed, and which surpassesall the rest in virtue;

this deed not being one of the many, but one prior In the many. For .such a

method of narration subsists

appropriatelywith reference to the universe, in which

wholes accompl sh, and connectedly contain one life, and collect many con

trarieties, into one union with the Goddess. Hence, as there were many and

great deeds of thecity,

the priest very properly relates one deed which was

recorded in the temples. For there is, also, an intellectual paradigm of it, so far

as it is surveyed in the world, and which transcends in magnitude, and

virtue; transcendency according to ma^nltmlc presenting to our view that

whichis

///, but according to virtue that whichis intellectual. For wholes

and the more divine of mundane natures have many energies of the great

est magnitude,1

and accomplish one life and polity, conformably to which

fighting under Minerva, they vanquish all Hihordinntc beings. After this

For ftrptt.nilicif

,it i* wrtfjry lo read fit-ytarai.

!44 PROCLUS ON TIIK [BOOK i.

manner, (hercfore, we must explain what i* said. Porphyry, however, by

gn-at and admirable deeds, understand* such as an; accomplished l>y

.souls

against matter, and material modes. But he rails damions tmitcrial tmnlt-x. For,

according to him, there are two species of da-mons, of which the one consists of

souls, but the other ot intxlt s : and these art- material powers*, wliich are noxious

to the soul. For these dogmas, however, he is corrected by the interpreter that

came afler him.1

" Tor these writings relate-, wliat a mighty power your city once

turned, which rushing from the Atlantic sea, spread itself with hostile

fury

over all

Europe

and Asia."

Plato in what is here said, neither omits any tiling of encomiastic ungment, if

the. war of the Athenians against the Atlantics is considered as a mere history ;nor

fails in theological accuracy in conjunction with caution, if any one is willing to

pa >s from partial natures to wholes, and to proceed from images to paradigms.

As it is usual, then-fore, in Panathena ic orations to celebrate most amply the Per

sian expedition, and the victories of the Athenians both by land and sea, with

which more recent orators fill their orations; Plato in praising the Athenians,

neither delivers the Persian invasion nor any other similar deed, but introducing

the Atlantic war against the parts inhabited by us, and which rushed from the

e\ternal sea with a force capable of entirely destroying these- parts, he informs us

that the Athenians wen \ietorioiis, and that they subdued this mighty power.

.Since, however, the Persian expedition came from the east against the (i reeks, and

particularlyagainst the Athenians, Plato introduces the Atlantic war from the

west, in order that \ oil may survey the citv of the Athenians as from a centre,

castigating a Barbaric multitude pouring against it on each side in a disorderly

manner. To which ma\ be added, that in the institutes delivered by the ancestors

of the Athenians, and also in the mysteries, the ( ligantic war i> celebrated, and

the \ictory of Minerva over the Giants, because in conjunction with her father

she vanquished these and the Titans. Plato, however, does not think it safe im

mediatelyto introduce war

againstthe-

(iods;for this is the

very thing which heblames in the ancient poets; and it would be absurd that Critias orTima-us, who wen;

auditors of what Socrates said against the poets on the preceding day, should

i. r !;\ iln diviiif laiublu liu>.

BOOKi.] TINM.US OF PLATO. lift

again ascribe wars and seditions to the finds. Hut through the analogy <f lininaa

to divine concerns lie delivers (his Atlantic wnr prior to the fabrication of the

world, assuming the Athenians instead of Minerva and the Olympian Gods, and

the Atlantics instead of tho Titans and Giants. For it is possible to survey the

same things in images as in wholes. And that 1 may remind you of the analogy,

through thename of the Athenians/he refers his readers to the Olympian co-ordina

tion which fought under tlie command of .Minerva; but through that of the Allan-

tics, to the Titanic Gods. For the mighty Atlas was one of the Titans. T/ico-

fagixts also after the laceration of ttacchns, irhieh manifests the divisible progression

into the universe under Jupiter from the impartible fabrication, say that the other

Titans had diUcrcnt allotments, but that Atlas was established in the western

parts, sustaining the heavens.

15y strong ncccs.sityllic

\\idc-Jprrad lirav n

In o;ntir> extreme, by Atl;n \\;n Mi-l.cinM.

Farther still, the victories of Minerva, are celebrated by the Athenians, and there

is a festival sacred to the Goddess, in consequence of her having vanquished Nep

tune, and from the genesinrgic bring subdued by the intellectual order, and those

that inhabit this region betaking themselves to a life according to intellect, after

the procurement of necessaries. For \cptunc presides over generation ; but

Minerva is the inspeetivc guardian of an intellectuallife.

The. things proposed

therefore will contribute in the greatest degree to these analogies. For the Athe

nians bearing the name of the Goddess, arc- analogous to her; and the Atlantics

through inhabiting an island, and through being called the progeny of Neptune,

preserve an analogy to this God ; so that it is evident from these things that the

At/antic :<(]/ indicates the middle fabrication, according to which the second

father [Neptune] being filled by Minerva, and the other invisible causes, governs

diviner natures in a more powerful manner, and subjects all such things as have

a multiplied, divisible, and more material hyposlasis, to intellectual natures. For

the Gods themselves, indeed, are eternally united;but the In-ings which are go

verned by them, are filled with this kind of division. After this manner, therefore,

these things must be separately understood.

In order however that we may pro-assume certain definite forms of the pro

posed analysis, it must be admitted, that the habitations within thepillars

of Hcr-

For rovrovs IK re, it is necessary to rrH rvirovi.

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. T

14 PUOCLUSONTHE [BOOK i.

rules, are analogous to the whole of the more excellent, but those external to them,

to the whoje of the inferior co-ordination, and that of this, there is one continued,

and variously proceeding life. Whether, therefore, Inhuming from the Gods, you

speak of the Olympian and Titanic divinities;or

l>eginningfrom intellect, of per-

manencv and motion, or sameness and difference; or from souls, you speak ot the

rational and irrational;or from bodies, of heaven and generation ;

or in whatever

other way you may divide essences, according to all divisions, all the genus of

those within the pillars of Hercules will be analogous to the better, but of those

without to the less excellent co-ordination of tilings.For the true sea of dissimi

litude, and the whole of a material life which proceeds into interval and multitude

from I/it; one, are there. Hence, whether

you

are willing Orphically to arrange

the Olympian and Titanic genera in opposition to each other, and to celebrate

the former a* Mibduing the latter; or 1 v thagorically, to perceive the two co-ordi



nations proceeding from on high, as far as to the last of things, and the better

adorning the subordinate rank;or Platonically, to survey much of infinity

and much of bound in the universe, as we learn in the Philebus, and the whole

of infinity in conjunction with the meaMires of bound, producing generation,

which extendsthrough

all mundane nahires, from all these,

you mayassume

one thing, that the whole composition of the world is co-harmonized from this con

trariety. And if the illustrious Heraclitus looking to this said, that r/v/r is thc

father of all things, he did not speak absurdly.

Porphyry, therefore, here refers the theory to daemons and souls, and makes

mention of the fabulous Titanic war, adducing some things to what is proposed

to be considered, with probability, but others, without it. The divine larnbli-

chus however, againstthose

who adoptamore partial a^ignatiou

of the cause of

the analysis, is of opinion after a certain wonderful manner, that what is said is

only to be understood according to the apparent meaning, though in the pre

face he himself delivers to us auxiliaries for the solution of such-like narrations.

May that divine man however, who has instructed us in many other particulars,

and also in these, be propitious to us. Betaking ourselves, therefore, to the inter

pretation of the words of Plato, we think it fit to remind ourselves, of the before-

mentioned foims of analysis ; and that we must arrange the Atlantics accord

ing to all the total natures of the inferior co-ordination. For in these, also,

some things are wholes, but others parts.But we must arrange their insolent

injustice, according to progression, a division through diminution, and a proximity

tu matter. For matter is truly infinity and baseness. Hence through nearness

n""* .i TINM;I;S or PLATO.

117

to, and lieinir in a certain respect in it, they are said to have, actedinjuriously from

insolence. Tor the paradigm of them is manifested by the theologist, throughthese names, v\hen he says of them, "that their mind is

replete with r\il rounsrls,

and their heart is insolent." And we must arrange, the rushing from t.itcnutl

pnrtx according to a defection and separation remote from the Gods, and tiling

of a diviner nature in the universe. For the external does not indicate comprehension of powers, hut an hypostasis departing from every thing stable, im

material, pure, and united. But the Atlantic sea must he arranged according to

matter itself, whether yon call it the abyss, or the sea of dissimilitude, or in whatever

other way you may IM* willing to denominate it. For matter receives the appella

tions of the inferior co-ordination, l>eingcalled infinity and darkness, irrationality

and immoderation, the principle of diversity and the duad ; just as from the



Atlantic sea, the Atlantic island is denominated. For thus receding the analogiesin order, we shall understand that the whole of the inferior co-ordination, and the

more total and partial genera in if, are characterised by progression and division,

and a conversion to matter, and that thus it proceeds through all things, presenting

itself to the view appropriately in each, and appearing analogously in each nature,

viz. the dhinc and intellectual, the psychical and corporeal. Being however

such, it is adorned and arranged by the better order, which you may proj>erly

say is IVlinerval, as being undefined, and subduing through its power things of a

subordinate nature. But the inferior co-ordination becoming adorned, ceases

from its abundant division andinfinity; the genus of the Titans being connected

by the Olympian Gods; but difference being united by sameness, motion by

permanency, irrational by rational souls, generationby

the heavens, and in a

similar manner in all things. It must not however be supposed from this, that

two-fold divided principles of things are to be admitted. For we say that these

two co-ordinations are of a kindred nature. But the one precedes all contrariety,

as the Pythagoreans also say. Since, however, after the one cause of all, a

duad of principles is unfolded into light, and in these the monad is more excel

lent than the duad, or, if you wish to speak Orphically, irther than chaos, the

divisions are

accomplishedafter this manner in the Gods

priorto the

world,and

also in the mundane Gods, as far as to the extremity of things. For among the

sujx-rmundane Gods the demiurgic and connective orders are under the monad,

but the vivific and the generative orders are under the duad. But among the

mundane Gods the Olympian genus is under the monad, but the Titanic under

the duad. And sameness, permanency, reason and form, arc under the more

148PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK

ancient, hut difference, motion, irrationality,and matter, are under the other of

these principles.For as far as to these the diminution of the two principles

procet-ds.Since however the one is beyond the first duad, tilings which appear

to be contraries are collected together, and are co-arranged with a view to one

orderly distribution of things. For in the universe there are these two-fold

"enera of Mods, the oppositelydivided genera of being, the various genera of

souls, and the contrary genera of bodies. But tin subordinate are vanquished by

the more divine, and the world is ivndered one, being harmonised from contraries,

since it subsists according to Philolaus from things that bound, and from

tilings that are infinite. And according to the infinite, indeed, which it contains,

it derives its subsistence from the indefinite duad, or the nature of the infinite;

but according to the things that bound, from the intelligible monad, or the nature

of bound. And according to a subsistence from all these, it becomes one whole



and all-perfectform from the one. For it is Ciod, as Socrates says in the Philebus,

who gives subsistence to that which is mixed.

" For at that time the Atlantic sen was navigable, and had an island

before that moutli whichis called

by youthe Pillars of Hercules. Uut

this island was greaterthan both Libya and Asia together, and aflbrdcd

an easy passage to other neighbouring islands ;as it was likewise easy to

pass from those islands to all the opposite continent which surrounded

that true sea."

That such and HO great an island once existed, is evident from what in said

by certain historiansres|>ecting what pertains to the external sea. For according

to them, there were M-VCU islands in that sea, in their times, sacred to Proserpine,

and aluo three others* of an immense extent, one of which was sacred to Pluto,

another to Ammon, and the middle [or second] of these to Neptune, the magni

tude of which was :i thousand stadia. They also add, that the inhabitants of it

preservedthe remembrance from their ancestors, of the Atlantic island which

existed thrre, and was truly prodigiously great; which for many periods had

dominion over all the islands in the Atlantic sea, and was itself likewise sacred

to Neptune. These things, therefore, JMarceltus writes in his lithivpic History.If

however this be the ra*e, and such an island once existed, it is possible-to receive,

what is said about it as a history, ami also as an image of a certain nature among

BOOK i.] TIM/FAJS OF PLATO,I4>

wholes. Unfolding likewise the similitude of this, we may gradually accustom

those who survey things of this kind, to the whole theory of mundane natures.

For it is possible to behold the same analogies in a morepartial, and in a more

comprehensive way.Hut it is

necessarythat doctrine

proceeding from universal*to the subtle elaboration of particulars, should thus give respite to theory. You

must not. therefore wonder, if before we. assumed this analogy more generally, but

now after another manner, and that we explore the same tiling with an accuracy

adapted to the things themselves. For since, as we have said, there is a two-fold

coordination in the universe, which originates from the (Jods, and is terminated

in matter and material form ; and since each possesses things more total, and

things more partial, [for this we have Ix fore said] ; but other things are the middlesof both these co-ordinations ; tor the divine genera are comprehensive of all things,

and the last elements arc the vilest of all things; and the intellectual and



psychical genera subsist between these; this being the case, we think tit in the

first place to divide in a three-fold manner the inferior co-ordination, and to

assume in it some things as most total genera, others as middle, and others as

last genera. And to some things, we shall arrange the Atlantics as analogous, to

others the other islands, and to others all the opposite continent. But we shall

consider the deep, and the Atlantic sea, as analogous to matter. For all the

inferior co-ordination is material, and proceeds into multitude and division. But

it also has, with resjx Ct to itself, transcendency and deficiency. Hence Plato

says that the Atlantics spread themselves externally, as being more remote from

the one and nearer to matter; but that they inhabited an island larger than both

Libya and A*ia, as proceeding into bulk and interval. For all things that are

more remote from the one, are diminished according to power, hut transcend

according to cpiantity; just as such as are nearer to the one, are contracted in

quantity, but possess an admirable power. Here, therefore, magnitude is sig

nificant of diminution, and of progression and extension to every thing. But the

sea was then navigable, since more total natures proceed as far as to the last of

things, and adorn matter, but having arrived at the end of the order, they stop,

and that which remains U-yond it is infinite. For that which in no respect has

a subsistence is successive to the boundaries ofl>eing.

But the addition of those,

has an indication that total causes proceed withoutimi>ediment through matter,

and adorn it, but that we do not always subdue it, but are merged in an infinite

1For f\^nrra/ityn h*n, it is

ntcestary to read r

150 I UnCl.l S ON Till. IIM..K i.

and indefinite rialurc. Since however the progression of things it* continued, and

no vacuum1

any where intervenes, but a well-ordered diminution is surveyed from

more total to middle natures ,which comprehend and are comprehended ;

nnd

from middle* to the last and vilest natures, on this account he says, there was a

passage fromthe Atlantic island to the other island.*, and from these to the

opposite continent. And that the Atlantic was one, but the other Mauds many,

and the continent was the greatest. For the monad is adapted to the first genus

in every thing ;but number and multitude to the second. For multitude subsists

together vvith the duad. And magnitude is adapted to the third genus, on

account of the progressionof magnitude to the triad. Since, ho we\cr, the extremities

of the worse co-ordination are most material, he manifest* through the term

opposite, that they areat the

greatest possibledistance from more excellent natures.

Am! he does not alone use (lie term e.rter/ial, as he does of the Atlantic s, and

which evinces that they belong to the other part,but he also adds the word



opposite,that he may indie ale the most extreme diminution. Hut he signifies by

the words about that true sea, the Inpostasis of them about matter, and the last of

mundane natures. For the true sea is analogous to that which is truly false,

and truly matter, which in the I oliticus he calls the sea of dissimilitude. More

over, because it is necessary that thesetwo-fold co-ordinations .should be

sepa

rated from each other without confusion, and guarded by demiurgic boundaries, on

this account he says, that the I illars of Hercules separated the internal from tho

external habitable part. for he denoininalm llouriahing demiurgic production,

(in:l the divine separation ofgenera in the iiinicr.^; the latter oj illicit always remains

itablu and strenuously the same, the l*illarx/>/

Hcreulcs. This Hercules therefore

is Jovian ;hut the one prior

to this, and who is di\ ine, is allotted the guardian

order of the generative series. Hence fromboth the

demiurgic division,which

niards these two separate partsof the universe, must IM- assumed.

" For the waters which are beheld within the mouth we havejust

now mentioned, have the form of a portwith a narrow entrance; but

the mouth itself is a true sea. Ami the land which surrounds it may

be in every respect truly denominated the continent."

The waters within the mouth indicate the genera of the letter co-ordination,

for puo* in this place,llic M-IHC requires w* should read MOV.

mm* i.J TlM.V.r.S OF 1 I.Alo. 1.11

as being converted to ihcmscUes itnd rcjoiriny: in a stable and uniting power.

For tin- innntli symbolically manife.stn the cause which defines and separates the

two portions of mundane nature*, lint the port with a narrow enlr.mce,

signifies the convolved, M-lf-converging, arranged, and immaterial h\ parxis of

these mundane portions. Tor through ihc w/r/vw entrance it is signified that

interval and extension proceed from the worse co-ordination. But through the

port an hyparxis is indicated, exempt from the confused and disorderly motion of

material natures. For such are ports affording u protection from the tumults in

the sea. If, however, some one should say, that an elevation to the more Intel-,

lectual and divine natures in the universe becomes a port to souls, he will not l>o

far from the truth.

"

In this Atlantic island there was a combination of kings, who with



great and admirable power subdued the whole island, together with

many other islands and parts of the continent ; and besides this sub

jected to their dominion all Libya as Car as to Egypt, and Europe as

far as to the Tyrrhene sea.

In what is here said it is requisite to recollect the Platonic hypotheses about

the earth, that IMato does not measure the magnitude, of it conformably to ma

thematicians; but apprehends the interval of it to be greater than they admit it

tol>e,

as Socrates says in the Plr.rdo; and that he supposes there are many

habitable parts similar to the part which we inhabit. Jlcnee he relates that there

is an island and a continent of so great a magnitude in the external sea. For

in short, if the earth is naturally spherical.it is necessary that it should be so

according to the greater part of it. That portion of it, however, which is inha

bited by us, exhibits great inequality by its cavities and prominencies. Hence

there is elsewhere an expanded plane of the earth, and an interval extended on

high. For, according to Heraclilns, he who passes through a region very difficult

of access, will arrive at the Atlantic, mountain, the magnitude of which is said to

be so great by the Kthiopic historians, that it reaches to the a-thcr, and sends forth

a shadow as far as to live thousand stadia. For tin- sun is concealed by it from

the ninth hour of the day till it entirely sets. Nor is this at all wonderful. For.

Athos, a Macedonian mountain, emits a shadow as fur as to Lcmnos, which is

distant from it seven hundred stadia. And Marcellus, who wrote the Ethiopic

history, not only relates that the Atlantic mountain was of such a great height,

152 IMIOCLI. S OX TllK ("HOOK ,.

lint Ptolemy nlso say* that the Lunar mountains are immensely high, and Aristo

tle informs us tl.at Caucasus is illuminated by the solar rays during the third

partof the night after the setting, and also for the third part In-fore the rising, of

the sun. And he who looks to the whole magnitude of the earth, hounded l.y

its elevated parts,will infer that it is truly immense, according to the assertion of

Plato. So that we are not now ill want of certain mathematical methods to the

development of what is said aho.U the earth, nor do we attempt to reeur to them.

For thi*c methods measure the earth according to the surface iJiiJi n inhabitedl>y

;

but Plato says that ire tlu fll hi a uintii, and that then holt earth in derated, which

aho the sacred rumor of the F.gyllimi* asserts. And thus much concerning what

i> related of tin; magnitude or the Atlantic island, in order to show that it is not

proper to disbelie\e what is said l.y Plato, though it should he rccciu-d as a men-

history.Jtnt with respect to the power of this island, that tin-re \\ere ten kin-- in

it wl.o" live male twins, and that it ruled o\er the other islands, certain parts

brgat

ef the continent, and some parts within the Pillars of Hercules, all these par

ticulars are clearly related in the Critias.

Now liowe\rr, for it is proposedIn make an analvsis of the particulars,

tin-

power is -aid to he great and admirable, according to a reference to the universe,

hecan-eit proeci (Mo every thinir, and comprehends totally the whole of the

M-eond co-ordination, For it is held toother by ten kings, because the dccad

comprehendsthe rulers of the t o co-ordinations ;

since the Pjthngoreans also

say, that all opposites are comprehended in the decad. Ii.it they were twins, so

that there are li\e dnads, twins bein- live times iM-gotteii from Neptune and

Clite-,; because according to the mca-nre.s of jn-tice,there is likewise an orderly

distribution of this co-ordination, of which the pentad is an image. The pro

gressionof it !ioweu-r is through the duad, just as that of the better co-ordination

i s through the monad. Moreover, all of them are the descendants of Neptune,

because all the connexion of contraries, and the mundane war, belong to the

middle fabrication. For as this (Jod presides over the contrariety which every

where exists, lie likewise rul.s oxer generation and corruption,and all-various

motion. Hut tin-so kings subdued the Atlantic island as comprehendingall the

first and most total genera of the worse co-ordination. And they subdued the

other islands, as likewise comprehending middles thronuh the wholeness of them.

]5ut they also \an<mished parts of the continent, as adorning us Pinch as possible

the last of things. And they had dominion over certain parts of the internal

habitable region, because the la*t parts of the better me subservient to thefirst parts

BOOK i.] TIM/EUS OF PLATO.1W

of the worse co-ordination. Nor is this at all wonderful ; since certain d<ewnn.i

are in subjectionto certain heroes, and partial souls which belong to the intf/ii-

giblc portion of things are frequently slaves to fate. Such also is the Titanic

order with the Gods lo which Atlas belongs. And the first of these ten kings

was called Alias, and as it is said in the Atlauticiis gave the name to ilio

island. The summits, therefore, of the second co-ordination, are adorned

indeed by the Olympian Gods, of whom Minerva is the leader;

but they

snhdue the whole of the essence which is subordinate to the Gods, but ter

minates in the worse co-ordination; such as the essence of irrational souls,

of material masses, and of matter itself. Plato also appears to have called

the power of the Atlantics great and admirable, because Thaumas and

Bias are said by ancient thcologists to have belonged to this order. Per

haps too, he so denominated it, because the whole of the second co-or



dination is the progeny of infinity, which we say is the first [power1

], just

as the better co-ordination is the offspring of bound. On this account he

celebrates the power of the Atlantics, just as lie does the virtue of the

Athenians, which belongs to*

bound : for it is the measure of those that possess it.

After this manner therefore, I think we may be able to make the analysis

according to the Pythagorean principles.

The words of Plato likewise, have a great augment, in order to exhibit the

work of the victors in a greater and more splendid point of view. For he says

SVVX/AIV re, through the union of the particle rt augmenting ?rjva[jnv power. And he

also adds, great, and admirable. But each of these is different from the other.

For power may be great though it is nothing else, but it is said to be admirable

from other things. And by how much the more admirable that is which is van

quished, by so much greater is the victor demonstrated to be. Besides this

also, indicating through divisions the multitude subdued by this power, he

evinces that it is multitudinous and transcendent.

" But then all this power being collected into one, endeavoured to

enslave our region and yours, and likewise every place situated withinthe mouth of the Atlantic sea."

AVXI/IIK if omitted in the original.

*Instead of wpo rot> xtparoi in this place, it is neceuary to read mpot rev wrpare*.

J For TO rovrp here, read rovevry.

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. U

154PROCLUS ON TIIK [BOOK i.

Plato does not say that there was once sedition among divine natures, or that

subordinate subdued more excellent beings. Hut let these things indeed be true

in human a flairs : the present narration ho\ve\er, indicates, that the most total

of the genera in the second co-ordination of things in the universe proceed

through all things. For there are both in the heavens and everywhere, a sepa

rating and uniting power, and nothing is destitute of these. In more excellent

natures however, these powers do not subsist with division, nor multitudinously,

but collected into one, and with one impulse; but this is, unitedly, and ac

cording to one and a continued life. For as in the worse co-ordination

the one is multiplied,thus also in the better, multitude is united. Hence mul

titude is every where, and is \ anguished through union. Of these things

the Atlantic* wishing to subdue every place within the mouth of the Atlan

tic sea, all their powers being collected into one, but at the same time being

\anciuishcd the Athenians, are an image. For multitude and separation,

!>

lhou"h they may be suneyed in the better co-onliiiation, yet they will be

seen to subsist there unitedly; multitude not In-ing there \ictorions, but

sameness, and in short, the better genera.

" Then it was, O Solon, that the power of your city was conspicuous

to all men for its virtue andstrength."

"Plato opposes to the power of the Atlantic*;, the power of the Athenians;

preferringthis appellation,

as being adapted to the middle fabrication. And

he celebrates the more excellent power for its \irtue and strength ;in order that

throu- h virtue, he may indicate its alliance, to the philosophic nature of

Miner\a; (for another theology, and not the Orphic only, calls her\irtue,)

but through strength its alliance to her phllopolemic nature. Hut lie calls

the power conspicuous,because it is mundane, and contributes to the fabri

cation of sensible* : and to the Atlantic s indeed, he alone attributes power,

and this continually, becau-e they are arranged underinfinity. Unt he

>aysthat the Athenians \aiujuished this power, throuuh virtue. For as they

In-long to the co-ordination of bound; they are characterized by \irttie,

which measures the passions, and uses powers in a becoming manner.

1i. c. The Chaldtan theology.

HOOK i.j TIM;F.I;S or I>L.\T<>. )lW

" For as its armies surpassed all others, both in magnanimity ami

military arts, so with respect to its contests, whether it was assisted

by the rest of the Greeks, over whom it sometime.* presided in

warlike aflairs,

or whether it was desertedby them through the

/ \

incursions of the enemies, and thus was in extreme danger, yet still

it remained triumphant. In the mean time, those \vho were not

yet enslaved, it liberated from danger ; and procured the most ample

liberty for all those of us who dwell within the Pillars of Her

cules."

As wo have triply divided the inferior co-ordination, into first, middle, and

last boundaries, thus also wo mu-4 divide the superior, into the most total,

and the most partial genera, and those that subsist letween these. And



haunn made this dni*ion, we shall arrange the Athenians as analogous to

the iirst genera; hut the other Greeks who were not yet enslaved, to the

middle; and those who were now slaves, to the last genera. For according to

this

arrangement,

those that In-long to the Minenal series,

vanquish

those that

belong to the scries of Neptune; those that rank as Iirst, subduing those that

rank as >econd, the monadic, the dyadie, and in short, the better vanquishing

the worse. But the middle genera eternally preserve their own order, and are

not vanquished by the worse co-ordination, on account of the, union of them

selves, and the stable genus of power. They likewise liberate from slavery those

that are enslaved, recalling them to union and permanency. For some things

indeed,are

alwaysin

matter,others are

always separated from it, and others,sometimes become situated under the material genera, and sometimes have an

arrangement in a separate life. Just as in the drnma pertaining to us;at one

time we are arranged under the Titanic, and at another, under the Olympian

order; ami at one time our course terminates in generation, but at another, in the

heavens. This however happens to partial souls, through the invariably |crinn-

nent providence of the Gods, which leads back nouls to their pristine felicity.

For as in consequence of there being genesiurgic Gods, souls descend, in sub

serviency to their will, thus also, through theprior

subsistence of anagogic cause*,

the ascent of our soul* from the realms of generation is ellectcd. And thus much

1For

r,>*Tuf here, it sccius necessary to read ttvrfpvr.

1JtJPROCLUS ON THE [BOO* i.

concerning the whole meaning of the words before us. L^t us however, concisely

discuss each particular.

The words therefore, surpassed all others, manifest the total comprehension of

the first genera of the more dmne part.But the words in magnanimity, and

military arts, have the same meaning as Miner\ ally. For through magnanimity, they

imitate the philosophic characteristic of the Goddess, but through warlike arts,

her philopolemiccharacteristic. And the words, whether it was assisted by the

rest of the Greeks, over whom it sometimes presided in warlike affairs,or whether it

was deserted by them through the incursions of the enemies, signify that first and

total causes, produce some tilings in conjunction \\ith second and middle causes,

but others by themselves, beyond the production of these, and being alone in their

energy. For the genus of the Cods, and that \\hich is posterior to the Gods, do

not produce equally, but the effective power of the Gods proceeds to a greater

extent; since every where more dnine causes energize prior to, together with,



and posteriorto their effects. Credibility therefore o( this may In- multifariously

produced. But the extreme danger manifests the last production of the first

genera. And the traphus signify that the second co-ordination is perfected

under the first, being adorned by it;that it is in a certain respect converted by

the power of it; and that there are in the last of things invariably permanent

indications of the conversion of less excellent natures, proceeding from the first of

things. For whatever is arranged in the worse co-ordination, and invested with

form, material causes receding, affords a sullicient indication of the inspectivo

care of the better order, which is especially the peculiarity of trophies.But the

most ample liberty, is an indication of the divine and liberated order, proceeding

from onhigh

to all

things;vthich

liberty

the- Athenians

imparted

to the Greeks,

by vanquishing the Atlantics; or rather the Olympic, by subduing the Titanic

genera. For thus the demiurgic will is accomplished, and the worse is vanquish

ed by the better co-ordination; inpartial

natures indeed the Atlantics by the

Athenians, but in wholes, the Titans by the Olympian Gods."

Though they are

robust, and oppose the better order, through pernicious pride, and insolent impro

bity," says the theologist ;whom Plato emulating, asserts that the Atlantics inso

lently proceeded against the Athenians.

"

JUit in succeeding times prodigious earthquakes and deluges taking

For tvivrpaTtat here, it ii nccejsary to read txirraaiaf.

i.] TIM;EUS OF PLATO. 157

place,and bringing with .them desolation, in the space of one dreadful

day and ni^ht, all that warlike race of Athenians was at once mergedo

under the earth ; and the Atlantic island itself, being absorbed in the sea,

entirely disappeared. And hence that sea is at present innavigable, fromthe impeding mud uhich the subsiding island produced.

"

That what is hrrc said has a physical deduction, is evident to those who nre

not entirely ignor. nt of the physical theory. For it is not wonderful that there

should have l>een an earthquake so great, as to have destroyed such n laru;e island;

since an earthquake that happened a little l>efore our time, shook both Egypt and

Bithynia, and it is not at all paradoxical, that a deluge should follow an earth

quake. For this usually happens in great earthquakes, as Aristotle relates, who

at the same time adds the cause. For where a deluge takes place together with

earthquakes, the waves are thetause of this passion. For when the spirit which

produces the earthquake, does not yet flow towards the earth, and is not aMe to

drive backward the sea which is impelled by a certain contrary spirit, urging it in

a contrary direction, through the wind which propels it, but nevertheless stops

the sea by hindering its progression, it is the pause of much sea which is impelled

by the spirit contrary to this, becoming collected together. Then however, the

sea thus collected (Urn ing most abundantly, the spirit impelling it in a, contrary

direction, enters under the earth and produces an earthquake. Hut the sea deluges

the place. For after this manner also about Aehaia, then 1 was an earthquake accom

panied with an ingress of the waves of the sea, which deluged the maritime cities,

JBouras and Helice;Jso that neither will any physiologist reject this narration, who

considers the affairrightly. Moreover, that the same place may become pervious

andimpervious, continent and sea, is among the things admitted by physiologists,

according to Aristotle, and which history demonstrates. Aristotle also relates,

[inhis Meteors,] that there was mud in the external sea, after the mouth ot it, and

that the place there was marshy ;so that if TO mjXoy xapra. &p<*x.s>>s

s-^1 ifIPS marshy,

it is not wonderful. For even now rocks concealed under the sea, and having

water on their surface, are called breakers.

Whytherefore should any one con

tending for the truth of these things be disturbed?

That these particulars however, have reference to the admirable and orderly

distribution of the universe, we shall be convinced by recollecting what is said by

The text of Plato in this place is in the Commentarie* of Proclus very erroneous, ms the learned

reader will immediately perceive by comparing it with any of the editions of the Timaruf .

15B PROCLUS ON THE [,OOK i.

Orplieus about tlie hurling into Tartarus near the end of the fabrication of things.

For lie delivering the demiurgic opposition lietvveen the Olympian and Titanic

(Jod-,1

terminates the whole onKily distribution in the extremities of tlu1

universe,

and imparts to these also the undeiiled providence of the (.iods. IMato, therefore,

knowing this, and delivering to ns wholes in images, extends and leads into the

invisible, these twofold genera, and through thisdisappearing,

imitates the Orphic

precipitationinto Tartarus. For in order that the last of things may be adorned,

and participateof divine providence, it is requisite that both the superior and infe

rior co-ordination, should extend their production from on high as far as lo the

mundane extremity. Each however, elli-cts this in a manner adapted to itself;

the one

beingshaken, and entering under the earth, \\ hieh is the same as proceed

ing stably and solidly ;but the other disappearing,

\\hichistliesame as becom

ing material, disorderly, and formless;under the earth, being a symbol of the

firm and the .stable; but//; the sai, of that wliich is very mutable, disorderly and

flowing. For in the last ofthings, permanency and generation are from the better;

but corruption, mutation, and disonli ily motion are from the worse co-ordina

tion. Since however these things are adorned, both the invisible and visible fabri

cationreceiving

their

completion,on this account Plato

says, they happenedin

one dreadful day and night, night indicating the invisible causes, but tuiy the visi

ble, and the dreuilfulness, signifying opposing power, the indexible, and that which

proceeds through all things. Hut because all these are accomplished according

to demiurgic powers, earthquakes and deluges took place,which are adapted to

the middle fabrication. For if he wished to signi y Jovian powers or energies, he

would have said, thunders and lightnings happened. Hut since he delivers Nep

tunian demiurgic energies,he assimilates them to

earthquakesor

deluges. Forit is usual to call this (iod turth-shukcr, and the source nj iinirinc irultr

(xvav&^jTvjv).

And because time signifies a progression in order, and a well-arranged diminu

tion, he says that all these events took place //; succeeding time. It is not there

fore proper to say, that he who destroys an argument, takes away also the sub

jects, as Homer says of the Pha-accaus, and of the wall which the (ireeks raised;

since the things w hich are now asserted are not fictitious, but true. For many

parts of the earth are deluged by the sea; and whathe

says happenedis not at

all impossible. Nor again, does he relate it as a mere history ; but he introduces

it for the purpose of indicating the providence which proceeds through alltilings,

and extends even to the last of things.

1

luMeail of TT)V TUV OXtyjviwp Ofuiv, tat TIJV Firunnjy waputuvt ttjmuvfiyttriviiiriljtau in this

|>!.uf,

1 read;<i*

Tiny OXi /jiriuv 6eu,

nut rtjt ruv liroxxwr, K. X.

IIOOK i.]TINLi:US OF PLATO. ^

In short, it is necessary to assert, since tin1 whole orderly distribution of things

receives its completion from the visible and invisible fabrication, that for the

purpose of gi\iu:r pei lection to the demiurgic productions of the? second father,

the gifls both of the belter and the worst; co-ordination, proceed as far as to the

last ofl>eiiigs;

the former vanquishing the subjects [of its power] through the

warlike "(/IKS, and illuminating a stable1

power, through entering under the curtly

[i. e. through proceeding firmly and solidly ;] but the latter producing ultimate

diuMon, and connecting the most material and indefinite motion of Tartarus.

Uut these things being adorned, it reasonably follows that what remains is an

impervious*

and uninvestigable place of the sea. For there is no other passage and

progression of the adorning genera of the universe, but this is that which is truly

mud ;and \\hich is mentioned by Socrates in the 1 ha-do, when he is teaching us

concerning; the subterranean places. For the place under the earth obscurely

retains the forms of which it possesses through the inferior co-ordina



corporeity,

tion subsiding, and proceeding to the end of the orderly distribution of things.

For the Titanic order being driven by Jupiter as far as to Tartarus, fills what is

there contained with dciform guards.

" And this, O Socrates, is the sum of what the elder Critias repeated

from the narration of Solon. But when yesterday you were speaking

about a polity and its citi/cns, I was surprised on recollecting the present

history. For I perceived how divinely 1 roni a certain fortune, and not

wandering from the mark, you collected many things agreeing with the

narration of Solon.

That the war of the Atlantics and Athenians contributes to [the theory of] the

whole fabrication of the world, and that the mundane contrariety is connected by

the middle fabrication proceeding from on high, from the first to the last of things,

the Minerval series adorning all tilings stably, and in a ruling and victorious

manner, expanding indeed the natures which are detained in matter, but pre

serving those undeliled that are separated from matter;and also, that the other

fabrication imparts appropriately,* motion, division, and difference, to the things

fabricated, and proceeds su;>ernaUyto the end

;all this has been sufficiently

1

For yuii/t In IP, it is necessary to read /JOX/IOK.

1For nipoi hcrr, it is necessary to rrad artywi.

JInstead of cm \~purfitvn rcd

4For

wpo*ij*ti>*i tread

1CO PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

shown and recalled to the memory by us, in what we have before Haid. Since

however, he by whom this narration is made, is analogous to the God who

connects this contrariety, he, in a certain resect imitates him. And through a

recurrence to the fathers of the narration, through what was heard by Critias and

Solon, he ascends to the Egyptians; conformably to what pre-exists in the

paradigm, which is tilled from first causes, and fills things posterior to itself, with

demiurgic power. Farther still, since In 1

brings with him an image of the second,

which proceeds from another fabrication, hence he says, that lie recollected the

history through the discourse of Socrates. For the recollection itself, is not a

transition from images to paradigms, but from universal conceptions to more

partial actions. Hence, also it is adapted to the progression of the whole

fabrication of things. For since all things are- inintelligibles, every demiurgic

cause distributes total productions according to its proper order.

Again, if you consider what is said after another manner, yon will find that

the Athenians are in an admirable manner, and that the of Socrates



praised polity

is fitly celebrated. For that it is possible Jor tinspolity to e.iist, is demonstrated

through thelife of the [(indent} Athenians, and also that it is productive of the great

est good to those ITho belong to it ; which also Socrates thinks fit to demonstrate inO C*

his Republic. But he is likewise of opinion that those who live according to the

best form of a polity, should be shown to deserve the greatest admiration. For

those who are fashioned according to the first paradigm are truly admirable;

since of mundane natures also, the more divine which transcemlently receive the

whole form of their paradigms, are said to lie, and are monadic; but material

natures which have the same form in many subjects, possess the last order. This

therefore, which in the fabrication of things, belongs to the Gods, \i/. to partake

transcendently of their proper paradigm, the city of the Athenians also exhibits,

by applying itself in the mo>t excellent manner to the best measure of life.

Moreover, the circle of benefits, imitates the mundane circle. For the Egyptians are benefited by the Athenians, through warlike works; and the Athe

nians are benefited by the Egyptians through sacerdotal narrations. For the

communication of an unwritten action, was a return of favour. lint in addition

to this, the doctrinal narration of the deeds of their ancestors, exhibits a multi

plied retribution. The mention also of fortune and divinity, and the excitation

of our reasoning powers, are worthy of the theory of Plato. For fortune and her

1

For TOeyicfci/jiof here, it ii necessary to rear! TQV c yro0yiior.

BOOKi.]

TIM.EUS OF PLATO. lg|

gifts are not irilhot t ascope,

orindefinite ; but she is a power collective of many dis

persed causes, adorning things that are without arrangement, and giving completion to

what is allotted to each individual from the universe. Why then did Socrates

collect many things which agree with the narration of Solon? I answer, on

account of the cause which collects many dispersed causes, and on account of

the one divinity who connects the common intellect of .Socrates and Solon. For,

l>eingf a Minerval characteristic, they are excited as it were from one fountain,

tlu ir tutelar Goddess, to similar conceptions.L ?

*

Yet I was unwilling to disclose these particulars immediately, as,

from thegreat

interval of time since I first receivedthem, my remem- ^

brance of them was not sufficiently accurate for the purpose ofrepetition.

] consider it therefore necessary, that I should fir>t diligently revolve the

whole in my mind."

These things may also he surveyed in the universe;

viz. that the demiurgic

rause of beings which are generated according to time, gives subsistence to hi>

own progeny prior to that of partial natures. And that the hypostatic causeof things generated, first intellectually perceiving himself, and seeing in himself

the causes of his productions, thus gives also to other things a progression from

himself; in order that he, being sufficient and perfect, may impart his own power

to secondary natures. Conception therefore and resumption, and every thing of

this kind, manifest the comprehension of demiurgic productive principles in one.

" And on this

account,I

yesterday immediately compliedwith

yourdemands; for I perceived that we should not want the ability of pre

senting a discourse accommodated to your wishes, which in things of

this kind is of principal importance. In consequence of this, as Her-

inocratcs has informed you, as soon as we departed from hence, by com

municating these particulars with my friends here present, for the purpose

For fitav Otuv in this place, read fiiav Otuv.

1The crroneouM>e of the punctuation here, pcrvrrU the meaning of Procln. For the original i,

rnvro ni rr ry irarri Orarroy, wpo rw firpixw. TOf>i)fiinvnyitov

dinar rwryiyrr>jurw

Kara \poruv

V^IOT/JITIrn tnvrov

yfy> rj/tnra. Kilt the punctuation ought to be >1 follows: rur rni <r ry rarri

6tartv> . rpn rwf ^irfiitwK, robrjfjiovp-ytfov airinf, *. X.

1 Instead of rpo rwv io thi* plarr, it uiwcc>Mry

to read vpwror.

Tim. fiat. VOL. I. X



BOOK i.]TIJLEUS OF PLATO. KM

distant from the present. Thus, as to the history which I have just now

related, I received it from the old man with great pleasure and delight ;

who on his part very readily complied with my request, and frequently

gratified me with a repetition ofit.

And hence, as the marks of letters

deeply burnt in, remain indelible, so all these particulars became firmly

established in my memory."

That children remember letter than mon is soon in works, and has many

probable causes. One indeed, as Porphyry says, because the souls of children

hare not an experience of human evils. Hence, as they are neither distracted nor

disturbedby externals,

theirimagination js

void ofimpressions ;

but their

reasoning

power is more sluggish. For experience renders this power more acute. But

another cause is this, that the rational life in children is in a greater decree min

gled with the phantasy. As therefore, in consequence of the soul being co-passive,

and co-mingled with the body, the body becomes stronger and more vital;

after

the same manner also, the phantasy is strengthened through the habitude of

reason. Andl>oiiig strengthened, it has more stable impressions, from receiving

through its own power reason in a greater degree ; just as the body is morepowerful, in consequence of

l>eingmore vital, through a more abundant commu

nion with the soul. A third cause in addition to these is, that the same things

appear to IH greater to the imaginations of children. Hence they are in a

greater degree admired by them, so that they are more co- passive with them, and

on this account ospoeially remember them. 1 or we deposit in the memory thing*

which vehemently pain, or vehemently delight us. They therefore operate on us

inn greater degree. Hence as that which suffers in a greater degree from fire,

preserves for a longer time, the heat imparted to it;after the same manner, that

whioh suffers more from the external object of the phantasy, retains the impression

in a greater degree. Moreover the imagination of children sutlers more, on ac-

rount of the same things appearing to us to be greater during our childhood.

Hence children in a greater degree retain the impression, as suliering in d greater

degree from the same things. And it appears to me that (, ritias indicates tin*

when he says, that he heard this history from the old man with great delight, andthat on this account it became firmly established in his memory, like the marks

of letters deeply burnt in. But as Socrates in the recapitulation of his polity

asserts, that the cause of memory to us is the unusualness of the things which

For aXrjQnur hfJT. it U Ofrcsiirj to K*d a^nar.

j<*4PROCMJS ON Tllli [BOOK i.

tve hear, thus Critias, in what is here said, ascribes this cause to tlie age of children.

For every tilingthat occurs to children at first, appears to be unusual. And

perhaps this brings with it an indication, that theprolific fabrication of Gods of

the second rank i.s suspended from the stable sameness of those of the first order ;

just as the memory of a boy i> the cause of memory to the associates of Critias.

If someone however, in addition to these solutions, should adhere to the whole

ihoorv of things, let him hear laiublichus asserting, that the memory of children

indicates the ever new, flourishing, and stable production of reasons; the

indelibility of the letters, the perpetually-flowing ;md never-failing fabrication;and

the alacrity of the teacher, the unenvying and abundant supply afforded by more

ancient causes to secondary natures. Fur the>e things also have a place in con

junction with the before-mentioned solutions.

" In consequence of this, as soon as it was day, I repeated the nana

tion to ni v friends, that together with myself they might be better pre

pared tor the purposesof the present association, lint now with respect

to that for which tin s narration was undertaken, I am prepared, () Socra

tes, to speaknot

only summarily,but so as to descend to the

particulars

of cvcrv thing which I heard. We shall transfer, however, to reality the

citizens and city which you fashioned yesterday as in a fable; consider

ing that city which von established as no other than this Athenian5 *

city, and the citixens which you conceived, as no other than those ances

tors of ours described by the Egyptian priest.And indeed the a Hair

will harmonize in every respect ; nor will it be foreign from the purpose

to assert, that your citizens are those very people who existed at that

time. Hence, distributing the atlair in common among us, we will en

deavour, to the utmost of our ability, to accomplish in a becoming man

ner the employment which you have assigned us. It is requisite there

fore to consider, O Socrates, whether this discourse is reasonable, or whe

ther we should lay it aside, and seek after another."

Before, Crilias made his associates partakers of his narration;but now, he calls

on them to accomplish in conjunction with him, the employment assigned them.

Because in the paradigms all things indeed are- united on high, and fill each

other with intellectual powers ;but in the demiurgic world for in the world

in Ihc intellect of the Demiurgus,] they subset with each other, according to

a certain dnine and total conspiration ; conformably to which, and through

P. .OK i.JTIMJ-US OF PLATO.

j<j.5

which, nil things are every where appropriately in each. Hence in tin 1

heavens (lie paradigms of generated natures pre-exist, and in generation tliere

:ire images of celestial natures. Since, however, \\ holeness every where pre

cedes parts, this also may be seen in the second fabrication. On this account

Critias lir>t summarily discusses the war;but afterwards he endeavours to

explain more copiously every particular, narrating all the polity of the At-

luntics, and the principle of their generation ;how they turned to injustice,

how the Athenians proceeded to war; from what apparatus, from what le

gations, through what ways, with whom they were co-arranged, and such

tilingsas are consequent to the>e. The genuine polity, therefore, [of Socrates]

is an imitation of the first fabrication. Hence indicating the mystic nature

of it, and its pre-existence in pure reason, he says, that it wtia faxhmned ax

it were in a fable. But the hypothesis of the Athenians has an indication,

as in images,1

of the second fabrication; in which that which is more

partial presents itself to the view; and \\hat remains consists of contrariety and

motion, and that which is circumscribed in place. Since, however, the

second is suspended from the first fabrication, and is in continuity with

it, hencehe

says,

"

that thetil/air

wilt harmonize, in

aery reaped, andthai it v ill not be foreign to the purpose to ancrt, that the citizens in the Jie-

public of Socrates arc I fie rcry people icho existed at that time."

"

Socit ATI-.S. Hut what other, O Critias, should we receive in prefer

ence to this ? For your discourse, through a certainaffinity, is particularly

adapted to the present sacrifice to the Goddess. And hesidrs this,

we should consider, as a thing of the greatest moment, that your ;</</-

lion is not a mere fable, but a true history of tranxcentlenlniagnifittfc.

It is impossible, therefore, to say how and from whence, neglecting

your narration, we should find another more convenient.

Socrates approves the narration of Critias, in the first place as adapted

to the festivalof the

Athenians;for the

[Atlantic] waris an

image of mundanewars

;and as a hymn accommodated to the sacrifice to Minerva. For if

speech is of any advantage to men, it .\hould be, employed in hymnx. And besides

this, since the Goddess is the cause of both theory and action; throrgli

1

For wi crdi-wf CI-TUV in thisplace,

it is nerrssary to read wi m.mv 01 TV*.

I6flPROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

sacrifice, indeed, we imitate her practical energy, but through the hymn her

theoretic energy. But, in the second place, Socrates approves the narration

as bearing witness to the possibilityof his polity. For thin, in his discourse

about it, he thought worthy of demonstration. For it WAS sufficient for him

that this scheme of a polityexisted in the heavens, and in one man; since all

thing* that have an external, have an internal uubsistence, and that which

is truly law, logins from the internal lift; itself. If also he shows, that this

polityonce prevailed among the Athenians, he certainly demonstrates the

possibilityof it. This, therefore, has such-like causes as these. Again how

ever it may l>e assumed from these things, that the narration about the At-

lantics is not a fiction, as some have

supposed

it to be;but a history

indeed, yet having an affinity to the whole fabrication of the world. So

that such things as Plato discusses about the magnitude of the Atlantic island,

must not be rejected as fabulous and fictitious on account of those who en

close the earth in a very narrow space.



" Hence it is requisite that you should speak with good Fortune,

but that I on account of my discourse yesterday, should now rest

from speaking, and be attentive to what you have tosay."

Plato does not, like the Stoics, assert, that the worthy man has no need of

Fortune; but he is of opinion that our dianoetic energies,since they are com

plicatedwith corporeal energies, according to external progression, should l>e

inspired by good Fortune, in order that they may proceed fortunately, and

that their effect upon others may be friendly to divinity. And as Nemesis is the

inspector of light words, thus also good Fortune directs the words both of

those that receive and of him that utters them, to a good purpose, in order

that the former may receive benevolently and sympathetically,but the latter

may impart in a divinely inspired manner, that which is adapted to every one.

Thus, therefore, in partial natures. But in wholes, good Fortune signifies a

divine allotment, according to which each thing is allotted an order adapted

to it, from the one father, and the whole fabrication. Moreover, for So

crates to rest from speaking, and to be attentive to what may be said, has

indeed an appropriate retribution. For the other persons of the dialogue did

this, when he narrated his polity. But this shows from analogy, how all

demiurgic causes being united to each other, have at the same time separate

BOOKI.]

T1M&US OF PLATO.I(j7

productions. For to hear is indicative of receiving through each other. And

for the others to rest, when one speaks, signifies the unraingled purity ac

cording to which each demiurgic cause produces and generates secondary natures

from its own peculiarity.

"

GRIT. But nour consider, Socrates, the manner of our disposing the

mutual banquet of discussion. For it seems proper to us that Timacus,

who is the most astronomical of us all, and is eminently knowing in the

nature of the universe, should speak the first; commencing his discourse

from the generation of the world, and ending in the nature of men. But

that I after

him, receivingthe men which he has

mentally produced,but

which have been excellently educated by you, and introducing them to

you according to the narration and law of Solon, as to proper judges,

should render them members of this city; as being in reality no other

than those Athenians which were described as unknown to us, in the

report of the sacred writings. And that in future we shall discourse

concerning them, as about citizens and Athenians."

The intention of this arrangement is to make Timanis a summit, and at the same

time a middle. Forhespeaks after Socrates and Critias, and prior to Critias and Iler-

mocratcs. And thus, indeed, heis a middle; hut in anotherrcsjM. ctJie is a summit,

according to science, andbrcausehegenerates the men, whom .Socrates indeed edu

cates, hut Critias arms. This, however, is also a manifest symbol of total fabrication,

which is at one and the same time a summit and a middle. For it is

exemptfrom all mundane natures, and is equally present to all. The summits likewise,

and the middle of the universe, belong to the Demiurgus, according to the doctrine

of the Pythagoreans. For the tower of Jupiter is, as they say, situated there.

But Critias, who spoke as the middle after Socrates, now again sunu.iarily speaks

prior to Hermocr.ites. For the ditadic pertains to the middle fabrication, and also

the whole in conjunction with parts ; juit as the ifhole,\_prior

to parts] belongs to the

Jirst, but parts to thelast

fabrication. Hence Socrates summarily delivered his

polity,and Hermocrates contributed to the parts of the history which was about

to be narrated by Critias. And thus much concerning the whole arrangement.

Some one, however, may doubt, what will be left for Hermocrates to accomplish

after Tuna-us has delivered the generation of the men, Socrates their education,

ltW PKOCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

and Critias their actions. For to these things there is nothing successive. May

it not !>e said that Hennocrates is the adjutor of Critias in his narration ;for the

relation of the history was a mixture of deeds and words. And Critias himself

promised to make a discussion of the actions, but calls on Ilermocrates to assist

him in the words. For the imitation of these is difficult, as was before observed.

Hence in the Atlanticus, Critias having assembled the Gods, as consulting about

the punishment of the Atlanties, he says"

Jupiter thus addressed them? And he

thus terminates the dialogue, as delivering to Hennocrates the imitation of the

words. 15ut there is no absurdity in his not discussing [inthe Atlanticusj the

remainder of the deeds. For, in short, having assembled the Gods, for the purpose

of chastising the insolence of the Atlantic-, he has every thing consequent to thi.-

comprehended in the. Gods being thus collected, \i/.. the preparation of the

Athenians, their egress, and their victory. Tima us, therefore, generates the men,

Socrates educates them, <>itias leads them fortli to actions, and Hennocrates to

words;the first of these, imitating the paternal cause; the second, the supplier of



stable intelligence; the third, the supplier of motion and progressionto secondary

natures; and the fourth, imitating the cause which converts the last of things to

their

principles

through the imitation of reasons[i.

e. of productive powers]. Thus,

therefore, these particulars may be symbolically understood, and, perhaps, in no

very superfluousmanner.

Some one, also, may doubt why the Tima-us had not an arrangement priorto

the Republic, since in the former dialogue the generation of the world, and also

i. f tlie human race, is delivered. For it is necessary, as Timtuus says, that men

should be generated ; and also, that they should be educated, which Socrates

effects in theRepublic ;

and thatthey

shouldenergi/e

in a mannerworthy

of

their education, which in a certain respect the Atlanticus exhibits. And if, indeed,

Plato beginning from the end proceeded to the Tirruvus, which is first by nature,

it will be asserting, what is usual to say, that for the sake of doctrine, things that

are first to us, though posterior by nature, are first delivered ;but that now he

appears to have arranged the middle as the first, and the first a* the middle.

And if, indeed, this arrangement had been adopted by those who are studious of

ornament, it would have been less wonderful; but now Platohimself

appearsto

have acted in this manner. Here, therefore, there is a recapitulation of the polity,

as having been already summarily narrated in the shortest manner. In answer

to this doubt it must \tc said, that if all hypotheses were assumed from the nature

of things now in existence, or which were formerly, it would be necessary that the

BOOKi.] TIM/F.US OF PLATO.

J6f)

doubt should l>e valid, and that the Tima us is not rightly ranked in the second

place. If also, all the narrations were devised from hypothesis, it thus would l>e

requisite that such things as are first according to nature, should be iir>t assumed.

But since the hypothesis of Socrates subsists in words alone, and surveying; the

universal,applies

itself to the nurture andeducation of men, but the hypothesis

consequent to this discusses beings and things in generation, the>c are very

properly conjoined to each other; while the hypothesis of Socrates, as only

subsisting in words, and being on this account accurate, has an arrangement priorto the rest. Perhaps, likewise, Plato wished to indicate this to us, that such things

as divine [human] souls, and which are ascending to the intelligible, produce, these

are some time or other effected on the earth, according to certain prosperous

vicissitudes of circulations. As Critias therefore asserts this, bearing testimonyto Socrates, we must say that those true ancestors of ours of which the priest

spoke, perfectly accord with those citizens which Socrates mentally conceived,

and our opinion is not to be rejected that they were those who existed at that

time. If however the Republic is inferior to the Tima-us, because it is conversant



with that which is partial, and to discuss mortal affairs is to dwell on an image,

yet the universal prevails in it. For the fameform of life exhibits indeed in the soul

justice, but in a city a polity, and in the world, fabrication.

Farther still, the deliberate choice of virtue is free, but the energy which is di

rected to externals, requires the mundane order, and hence the Atlanticus is pos

terior to the Tima-uR. But the habit of the citizens shows that virtue is without a

master. Plato also manifests through the>e things, that the soul when she is of

herself [and does not depend on another] issuperior to irtry physical hypostasis, and

runs above Fate ; but when flic n-rcs to actions, iscuni/uishcd b\i physical laws, and

is in subjection to Fate. In addition also to what has been said, it is requisite to

know this, that from the order of human life delivered in the Republic, the con

nexion of these dialogues, maybe obtained. For in that dialogue the men arc

first educated and instructed through disciplines. Afterwards, they ascend to

the contemplation of [true] beings ; and in the third place, descend from thence

to a providentialattention to the

city. Conformably to this congruity, the Re

publichas an arrangement prior to the Tim.eus; and the Timacus to the Atlanti

cus. For the men leing instructed by the Republic, and elevated according to

theory by the Tim&us, will, living happily, wisely |erform such actions, as the

For filial here, I read r/j^porwi.

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. Y

170 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK I.

Atlanticus narrates. After this manner therefore, we dissolve the doubt. The

philosopher Porphyry however, not directly for the sake of this doubt, but dis

cussing something1

else, affords us the following aid in its solution; that those who

Mish1

to apprehend the whole theory genuinely, ought first to-be instructed in the

form of it, in order that being similar to the object of intellection, they may be in

a becoming manner co-adapted to the knowledge of the truth. This therefore,

the order itself of the dialogues demonstrates. For the auditors of the Tirna-us

ought first to have !>een benefited by the Republic, and having been adorned

through it, to attend afterwards to the dogmas concerning the world, evincing

themselves to be most .similar through erudition to the excellent order of the uni

verse. And thus much in answer to this doubt.

Each particular however of the text must be considered. Tinv.rus therefore,

is now said to be most astronomical, not as directing his attention to the rapidity

of the celestial motions, nor as collecting the measures of the courses of the

sun,* nor as heiiiij conversant with the works of J ate, but as a.strotiomi/ing above

the heavens, conformably to the con pha-us in the Thea-tetus, and contemplating

the invisible causes which are properly stars. Hence Socrates does not exhibit

the visible man, but the man th.it is

purely

cssentiali/ed in reason;and he

does this as imitating the \\hole deiniurgus, in whom the heavens and all

the stars sub-ist, as the theologist says, intellectually. Tiiiurus begins however,

from the generation of the world, and ends in man;

In-cause man is a mi

crocosm, possessing all things partially, which the uni\er>e does totally, as

Socrates demonstrates in the I hilcbiis. Hut there are certain persons educated

by Socrates in the most excellent manner, who al.so educates the whole city,

and these an- the

guardiansand auxiliaries. J or in the universe, that which

transcendently participates of intellect is heaven, which also imitates intellect

through its motion. The men however, are introduced by Critias, conformably

to the law and conceptions of Solon, because Solon narrates, that the Athenians

were once thus governed, and establi>hed laws how children oii^ht to le intro

duced into the polity, and into the tribes, and how they ouijit to Iw registered;

For jiooiMit ill tinsjilace,

ita|i|irar>

to MIC lit l< IK crii.in to li-jil 0, \,;i rcu.

* Profliu here .illiuli - tu tin- following C lmMir in or.u Ir :

&

Direct not your attention In the immense

measures of the earth;

for the|>!.mt

of truth ii not in tin- earth. Nor mra-iire the diiiK-i^i.ni of the

MIII by meaiii of i ollei-ted rules; for it re\olvci hv thr t l.-rnal will of the father, unit not for jour suktf.

Dismiiis the sounding course of the moon;

for it perpetually TUUS through llie cxertionu of neceiiily.

The advauciug {irucession of thp [liietl] star*, was not generated for your sake," <.\c. See my collectiou

ofthtjt Oraclis, iu No. \\V1I. of tlie Classical Journal.

BOOK i.]TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 171

nnd likewise, by what kind ofjudges, they should be tried, in one place from the

tribes, but in another, from other appropriates persons. As Critias there fore admiLv

that the-men educated by Socrates were Athenians, he follows the conceptions

and the law of Solon, conformably to which certain persons are introduced into

thepolity.

Soc."

I seem to behold a perfect and splendid banquet of discussion1

set before me. It belongs therefore, now to you, O Timajus, to begin the

discourse; having first of all, as is fit, invoked the Gods according to

Inw.

The perfection and the splendor of the narration indicate the supernatural production of tilings on account of their paradigms, and which takes place universally.

And to these the words of Socrates refer. Thebanquet of discussion indicates

the perfect plenitude of demiurgic forms ; but thecalling on Tinuvus^ the conversion

of partial causes to the whole, and an evocation of the goods thence derived ;

and the inrocafion of (he (iods, the fabrication supernally suspended from intel

ligible*. For the expression according tol<i:i\

is not such as many of the Italic

or Attic interpreters suppose it to be, but it has the same meaning as the words

usually employed by the Pythagoreans, "Honor in the first place, the immortal

(iods, as they are disposed by law." For law manifesls the di\ine order, accord

ing to which secondary are always suspended from prior causes, and are. filled

from them. But law thus beginning frominlelligibles, extends to the demiurgic

cause, ami from this proceeds, and is divided about the universe. At the same

time, however, Socrates indicates through these things, that the I vlh.i^oric doc

trine requires that physiology should commence from a divine cause, and that it

should not be such as that which he reprobates in the 1 ha-do, which blinds the

eye of the soul, by assigning airs and aethers as causes, conformably to Anaxa-

goras. For it is necessary that true physiology should be suspended from theo

logy, in the same manner as nature is suspended from the Gods, atid is divided

according to the total orders of them ;so that words may be imitators of the things

of which they are significant. Formythologists also narrates that Vulcan who

presides over nature was in love with Minerva, who weaves the order of intellec

tual forms, and is I he supplier of intelligence to all mundane essences. As far as

to this therefore, the preface of the Tima-us receives its completion; of which

Severus, indeed, did not think fit to give any interpretation; but Longinus does

not nay that the whole is superfluous, but only such particulars as are introduced

|72 PROCLUS ON THE TIM^FAJS OF PLATO. [BOOK i

about the Atlantics, and tlie narration of the Egyptian ; so that ho is accustomed

to conjoin with the request of .Socrates, the promise of Critias. I mean, he con

nects with the words," / now therefore standprepared to receive thepromisedfeast,"

the words,"

Rutno~u<

consider, Socrates, the manner of our disposing the mutual ban

quet of discussion." But Porphyry and lamblichus hhow that this preface accords

with the whole design of tlie dialogue, tlie one indeed more partially,but the

other with more profound intuition;so that we also shall here finish the book in

conformity to Plato, having adopted their order.



17.1

HOOK II.

Tin: preface of the Tinvrus consists of two heads; a recapitulation of the polity

of Socrates, and a concise narration of the war of the Athenians against the

Atlantic*, and the which obtained over them. Kach of how



victory they tliese,

ever, contributes in tin- greatest decree to the consummation of the whole theory of

the world. For the form of the

[Socratic] polity,considered

by it.self,is

primarilyadapted to the orderly distribution of the heavens. IJut the narration of the

war and thevictory, Incomes a symbol to (is of the mundane contrariety. And the

former describes in images the first fabrication, bm the latter the second. Or, if

you are willing, the former describes the formal, but the latter the material cause.

For all physiologists make principles to be contraries, and constitute the world

from the harmonious conjunction of contraries. And harmony indeed, and

order are derived fromform, which

in therecapitulation

is

shown to proceed fromthe polity in common, and to extend in an orderly progression to every multitude.

For it is one tiling to deliver thepolity which is in the soul, another, that which is

in men, and another, that which is mundane. But the recapitulation of Socrates,

describing the form itself of every polity separately, exhibits to ns primarily the

polity in the universe, to which also itentirely hastens to refer [the polities that

rank as] parts.

Farther still, if also you are willing to consider the affair after another manner,the polity may l>c arranged as analogous to the heavens, but the war to genera

tion. For the polity extends as far as to the last of things ;since all

things are

arranged conformably to the series which proceeds from the demiurgus as far as to

mundane natures.Contrariety also pre-exists after a mariner in the heavens;

174PROCLUS ON TI1F. [BOOK n.

cither according to the two-fold circulation* of the cehwtia! bodies, viz. to tho

ri"ht hand, and to the loft; or according to (lie two-fold circles of nonls, tho.

circle of sameness, and the circle of dillerence; or according to the genera of

being, jx-nnnnency and motion ;or according to the divine peculiarities,

tho male

and the female; or accordingto

anyother snch-like division. The

polity

there

fore, is more allied to the heavens, but the war to generation. Hence the former

is Jovian, but tho latter pertainsto the allotment of Neptune. Alter however

the theory of parts,it is necessary through images to he extended to the know

ledge of the whole. And after the survey of images themselves, it is requisite to

adhere to their paradigms,from small beinu initiated in greater [objects of con

templation!. For the former have the relation of things preparatory !o initiation,

and of small mysteries, excitingthe eve of the M>U| to the

comprehensionof the

whole ami the univer>e,and to the contemplation of the one cause, and the one

progressionof all mundane natures. For every thing is from tin- one, and the.

universe with having in dilVerent parts of it, more partial presiding powers,

proceeds vice versa to the one cause of its suh-i^tenoe.

to on the whole discussion, converts himself to



Tima-us however, prior entering

the invocations of, and prayers to the Gods, imitating in this the maker of the

universe, who prior to the whole fabricationof

tilings,is said to have

approachedto the oracle of night, to have been there filled with divine intellectual concep

tions, to have received the principlesof fabrication, and thereto dissolve, if it be

lawful so to speak, all his doubts. To night also, who calls on the father, [Jupiter]

to en-age in the fabrication of the universe, Jupiter is rejiTesented by the theolo-

gistas saving,

Maia, Mipirme of alll!ic

puutrstin

me,

Immortal Niglii!liw \\iili

uiicoiifjutr d mh)J

Miikl I the source of llic iinniottult Its ?

And he receives this answer from her,

All tilingsreceive inclus il on cv ry siJe,

In sttlur s wide ineffalile embrace;

1 hen in tlie innKt of xlher place tlie lieav n.

1

For evtnaaif here, it is necessary (o read arativ.

*For cvpatu here, it is nece^ary to real oi/paOK.

iiftoK n.] TIM.IX S OF PLATO. !75

And he is instructed by her in all the consequent fabrication of the world. But

again to Saturn, after the bonds, Jupiter a 1 but praying says,

Damon, most t.tmM,our progeny direct.

And in all that follows, he calls forth the benevolence* of his father. For how

could he otherwise fill all things with Gods and assimilate the sensible world to

animalitself, [or the intelligible paradigm] than by extending himself to the invisible

causes of whole*, from which being himself filled,

lie truni lin [acrd] heart may godlike works

Again produre.

It is necessary therefore, prior to all other ftings, that we should know some-

-

thing manifest concerning prayer, what its essence js,and what its

perfection,

and whence it is imparted to souls. For the philosopher Porphyry indeed, de

those the ancients that admitted and those that did



scribing among prayer, not,

leads us from one opinion to another, and says in short, that neither those who

are diseased according to the first kind ofimpiety, derive any benefit from prayer,

since they do not admit that there are Gods, nor those who labour under the

second kind, and entirely subvert providence, granting indeed that there are

Gods, but denying their providential energies. Nor are they benefited by it,

who admit indeed the providence of the Gods, but assert that all things are

produced by them from necessity. For there is no longer any advantage to be

derived from prayer, if things of a contingent nature hare not1

any existence.

But such as assert that the Gods providentially attend to all things, and that

many things that are generated art; contingent and may subsist otherwise, these

very properly admit the necessity of prayers, and acknowledge that they correct

our life. Porphyry also adds, that prayer especially pertains to worthy men,

because it is a contact with divinity. But the similar loves to IK? conjoined to the

similar : and the worthy man is most similar to the Gods. Because likewise

those who embrace \irtue are in custody, and are inclosed in the body as in a

prison, they ought to request the Gods that they may migrate from hence.

Besides, since we arc as children lorn from our parents, it is fit we should pray

For oXXwi yirtoOat o> r> here, it is necessary to read, a\\vi yntvOat ^ errvr.

17flPROCLUSONTI1E [BOOK n.

that we may return to our true parents the Gods. Those also resemble such as

are deprived of their fathers and mothers, who do not think it requisite to pray

and l>e converted to tin; Gods. All nations likewise, that have excelled in

wisdom, have diligently applied themselves t prayer; among the Indians the

Ilrachmans, among the l&

ersians the Magi, and of tin- Greeks the laost theolo

gical, who instituted initiatory rites and mysteries. Hut the Chaldeans venerate

every othrr divinity, and likewise the \irtne itself of the Gods, which they deno

minate a Goddess;

so far are they from despising sacred worship, on account

of the possession of virtue. And in addition to all this, as \ve are parts of the

universe it is lit that we should he in want of the universe. Tor a conversion to

the whole imparts salvation to every thing. If therefore yon possess virtue., yon

should invoke that whichantecedently comprehends

all virtue. For that

which is all-good, will also he the cause to you uf appropriate good. Or if you

explore a certain corporeal good, there is a power in the world which compre

hends all body. It is necessary therefore that perfection should from thence be

derived to the parts. And this is the sum of what is said by Porphyry on this

subject.



The divine Iarnblichiii> however, does not think that a history of this kind

pertainsto what is here

proposedto !>e

considered.I or Plato is not now

speakingabout atheistical men, but about such as niv wise, and able to converse with the;

Gods, ^ior does he speak of such as are dubious about the works of piety; but

io such as wish to be saved by those tr/ia arc the saviours of u-holes, lie delivers the

inkier of pni i/er, ami its mimirable. iitid aiijicrmilnral perfection which transcends all

expectation.

It is lit however, thattransferring what he says to what is more usual and more

known tothe

reader, we should render his meaning clear, and assign argumentsconcerning prayer which accord with the doctrine of Plato. From hence there

fore we must beg in : All beings aie the progeny of the Gods, by whom they are

produced without a medium, and in whom they are firmly established. For the

progression of things which per|etnally subsist, and cohere from permanent causes,

is not alone perfected by a certain continuation, but immediately subsists from

the Gods, from whence all things are generated, however distant they may bo

from the divinities. And ihis is no less true, even though asserted of matter itself.

For a divine nature is not ah>ent from anything, but is equally present to all

1

! in !:, U t in ilui|il.u i-, it ii it i|iniiic tu icail ()..

.] TIMvEUS OF PLATO. 177

things. Hence though,you should assume tin; last of lyings, in these also you

will find divinity. For t/ic one is every where; and in consequence of its absolute

dominion, every tiling receives its nature and coherence from the Gods. As all

things however proceed, so likewise, they are not separated from the (iods, luit

radically abide in them, as the causes and sustainers of their existence. For where

can they recede, since the Gods primarily comprehend all things in their embrace ?

For whatever is placed as separate from the Gods has not any kind of suln

sistence. But all brings are contained by the Gods and reside in their natures, after

the manner ofa circular comprehension. Hence, by a wonderful mode ofsubsistence,

all things proceed, and yet are not, nor indeed can lie separated from the Gods;

because allofl>pring when torn from their parents, immediately recur to the

immense vastness of non-entity. Uut in a certain respect they are established in

them; and in short, proceed in themselves, but abide in the (iods. Since how

ever, having proceeded, it is requisite that they should be converted and return,

imitating the evolution into light, and conversion of the Gods to their cause, in



order that these being arranged conformably to the perfective triad, may a^ain

be contained by the Gods anil the first unities, hence they receive from them a

certain secondary perfection, by which they may be able to convert themselves to

the goodness of the divinities, in order that Ix ing at first rooted in, they may

again through conversion be established in them, forming a certain circle, which

originates from and terminates in "the Gods.

All things therefore, both abide in, and convert themselves to the Gods, receiv

ing this power from the dhinities, together with two-fold impressions according

to essence ; the one, that they may abide there, but the other that, having

proceeded, they may convert themselves [to their causes]. And these things we.

may survey not only in souls, but also in inanimate natures. For what else

ingenerates in these a sympathy with other powers, but thesyml>ols

which they

are allotted by nature, some of which are allied to this, but others to that series

of (iods? For nature l>eing sujienially susj>endedfrom the Gods, and distributed

from their orders, inserts also in bodies impressions of their alliance; to the

divinities. In someindeed, inserting solar,

but in others lunarimpression*, ami

in

others again, the symbol of some other (iod. And these indeed, convert them

selves to the Gods; some, as to the Gods simply, but others as to particular

Gods; nature thus perfecting her progeny according to different peculiarities of

For wnp COTI here, read ra^ari.

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. Z

1781MIOCLUS ON THE [BOOK iv.

the divinities. The Dominions of the universe therefore, by a much greater

priority, impressed these symbols in souls, by which they might Iw able to abide

in themselves, and again convert themsehes to the sources of their being. And

through the symbol of unity indeed he conferred on them stability ; but through

intellect, he imparted to them the power of conversion.

15ut to this conversion praver is of the greatest utility.For it attracts to itself

the beneficence of the (Jods, throut;h those incllable symbols which the father of

souls has dominated in them. It likewise unites those who pray with those to

whom prayer is addressed ; conjoins the intellect of the (Jods with the words of

those who pray ;excites the will of those who

jM-rfectly comprehend good to the.

abundant communication of it; is the fabricator of divine persuasion ; and esta

blishes in the (Jods all that we possess.

To a perfectand true prayer however, there is required in the first place, a

knowledge of all the divine orders to winch he who prays approaches. For no

one will accede to the (Jods in a proper manner, unless, he has ;i knowledge of

also the oracle admonishes, that a

their peculiarities.Hence Jire-lieitted Conception

Jiasthe first order in sacred u orship.]5ul in the second place,

there isre<piired

a

conformation of our life with that which is divine; and this accompanied with all

purity, chastity, discipline,and order, through which our concerns being intro

duced to the (Jods, we shall attract their beneficence, and our souls will become,

subject to them, f In the third place,contact is necessary, according to which we

touch the divine essence with the .summit of our soul, and verge to a union with

it. ) lint there is vet farther required,an approximating adhesion: lor thus the

<racle calls it, when it says, the mortalti] pn>.ti>nati)i

to fire u /////t/XHWn li htJ ruin

I lie Gads. For this- imparts to usa greater communion w ith, and a more mani

fest participationof the light of the (Jods. In the last place,

union .succeeds

establishing ttir. one of the soul in the UHC of the (Jods, and causing our energy to

iMTome one with divine energv ; according to which we are no longer ourselves,

but are absorbed as it were IH the (Jods, abiding in divine light,and circularly

comprehended by it. And this is the best end of tine prayer, in order that the

conversion of the soul may beYonjoined with its permanency, and that every thing

which pro eeds from the one of the (Jods, may again be established in the via; and

the litrht which is in us may be comprehended in tin- light ot the (Jods.

Praver therefore, j^ no small part of the whole ascent of souls. i\or is he who

possessesvirtue .superior

to the want of the good which proceeds from prayer ;

but on the contrary the ascent of the soul is clUcled through it, and together with

this, piety to the Clods, which is the summit of virtue. \ur in short, ought any

*OOK i..]TiM.lil S or IM.ATO. 17f)

other to\n~a\j

than he \chn istrartscendcnlly "dod,

r/v the Athenian guest [hi Plain]

sniis. For (n gue/t aonc, ccmccrsc with the (iods becomes nioft efficacious to the attain

ment ofa linjip f life, Hut the contrary is naturally adapti d to befal the vicious.

For it is not lawful for the pure to he touchedl>y

the impure. Hence, it is neces

sary that lie who generously enters on the exercise of prayer, should render the

Gods propitiousto him, and should excite in himself conceptions full of intellec

tual linht. I;or the favor and benignity of more exalted beings, is the most effec

tual incentive to their communication with our natures. And it isrequisite to

continue without intermission in the worship of divinity. For [according to the

oracle] the rapid (iods perfect the mortal constantly employed in prayer. It

is also necessary to observe a stable order in the performance of divine works;

to exert those virtues which purify and elevate the soul from generation, together,

with faith, truth, and love ; to preserve this triad and hope ofgood, this immutable

reception of divine light, and segregation from every other pursuit, that thus be

coming fl/ow, we may associate with folilan/ deity, and not*endeavour to conjoin

ourselves with multitude lotficonc. I or he who attempts this, edicts the very

contrary, and separates himself from the Gods. For as it is not lawful in con

junction with non-entity to associate with being ;so neither is it possible with multi

tude to be conjoined with thconc. Such therefore are the particularswhich ought

first to be known concerning prayer ;viz. that the essence of it congregates and

binds souls to the Gods, or rather, that it unites all secondary to primary natures.

For as the great Theodorus sa)s, all things pray except the first.

The perfection however of prayer, beginning from more common goods, ends

in divine union, andgradually

accustoms the soul to divine liijit. Hut its effica

cious energy both replenishes us with irood, and causes our concerns to IK* com

mon with those of the (iods. \\ iliirespect to the causes of praver too, we may

infer, that so far as they areeffective, they are the efficacious powers of the Gods

converting and calling upwards the soul to the (iods themselves. But that so far

as they areJinnl or perfective, they are the immaculate u;oods of the soul, which

they derive as the fruits of being established in the (iods. That so far also as

they am paradigmatica/, they are the primordial causes of beings, which proceedfrom t/icgnod, and are united to it, according to one ineffable union. lut that so

far as they are formal, they assimilate souls to the Gods, and give perfection to

the whole of their life. And that so far as they are material, they are the inipres-

i. c. The intrlligiMc (itxU.

1For KM-

IIITH r\tj<hvi lirrr, it i n*r rosary li rcal iai/it/ /irrn :r.\q<A;.

1 For toiAnrrfMtfr in thisjiliirr,

it it rojtmitc to read kotrorrpwr.

I |M ,PKOCU S ON THK

|

noon n.

toions or Kymholi* insertedl>y

the Demiurgus in theescnec* of soul*, in order that

(hey may be excited to a reminiscence of the fouls who produced them, and

whatever else exists.

Moreo\er, we

may

likewise ill line tin- modes of prayer which HIV va

rious, accord in- to tlie genera and species of the (JoiN. For prayer i* either

.lemiunjir, or cathartic, or \i\itic. And ilu- t/ci/uiin. ic is Mich as that which

is offered for tin- sake of shoner.s and winds. For tin- tlciniur^i are the

CUIIMS of tli; ^.-nrration of thrw. And tin- pra\i-rsof tin- Athenians for

winds procuring srn-nity -of \\rathrr an- addn-sscd to thrs.- (Jods. lint tin-

catlnirlic prayer is that \\liicli i oMi-rcd for tin- pnrpoM- ol a\.Hui . diseases

originating

frompestilence,

and other contagious distempers ;sueli as M-C

lia^e \Nrilteu in our temples. And the tiV///c prajer is that with uhich \>-

\\orship the (iods, who are the causes of vmlication, on account of the

origin and maturity of fruits. Hence prayersare of a peil

ccthe nature,

because they ele\ate us to these orders of the (iods. And he \\ ho considers

Mich prayersin a dihYrent manner, fails in properly apprehending the nature

to the for which we

and etlicacy of prayer. lint a-ain, with reference things

pray;tho-e

prayers,

which re-ard the sal\ati>n of the soul, obtain tin; first

place; tlm-e which pertain to the pood temperament of the body, the second;

and tho>e rank in the third place,which are ollered lor the sake of ex

ternal CMiicerns. And lastly,with

n>|Hct to the dinsion of the times in

which we <.ller up prayers,it is either accord in-/ to the seasons of the year,

or the centers of the solar revolution; or we establish multiform prayersac-

conlinir to other snch-like conceptions.

TIM."

But, O Socrates, all such as participatebut in the least

decree of temperance, [i. e. wisdom] in the impulse to every un

dertaking, whether small or ,reat, always invoke divinity."

Do yon see what kind .-fan hypothesisPlato refers to the Tinncus ;

what kind of

mi auditor of it he introduces \i/. Socrates;and what a beginning of the discus

sion lie has d.scrihed ? For the hj potht-is in<leed,

re fers to the whole fabrication of

things ; but the auditor is prepared to be led to it conformably to the one intellect

"and one-theory of wholes. Hence also he excites Tima-us to prayer.Hut the be^in-

ninirofthediscnssioii, beim: impelled from the invocation of the <jods, thus imitates

tinproj:re:s>ioiu>fbemjis,

w hich tir>( abiding in the ( Jods, arethns allotted a generation

from them. Since howe\er, it is said, that"

allnlto in (lie Icdst degreeparticipate of

HOOK ii.] TIM.WJS OF PLATO. 181

temperance afa ays inrnkc divinity in the. impulse to cccrt/ undertaking, irhclher

il l>c small or^rcat,"

let us set1 from what kind of conception they make this

invocation of the Gods in every tiling in which they engage. I or it is not pro

bable that those who are temperate will not make real In-ing the scope to

which they tend. And those who establish a pure intellect as the leader of their

theory; who deposit, the l>eautiful and the good in the prerogatives of the soul,

and not in human afi .iirs, noi in external fortunes; and who perceive the power

of providence extending through all beings, and harmonizing all things to

the universe, so that both th< whole and the parts may subsist mostl>eaulifullv,

and that nothing may lie destitute of the providence which proceeds from

deity to all things ;these will genuinely apprehend the science concerning the

Gods. But again, perceiving this to l>e the case, they will vtrv properly in each

action, and according to each energy, call on divinity as the co-ad jutor of their im

pulse, introducing their productions to the universe in conjunction with wholes,

and establishing themselves in the goodness of the Gods. For things which appear

to he small, enjoy the providence of (he Gods, and are great so far as the}- are sus

pended from them; just again, as things which are great in their own nature, when

they separate themselves from di\ inity, areseen to l>e perfectly small, and of no worth.

These things therefore, temperance imparts to souls, not being a certain human

habit, nor approaching to what is called continence, but a divinely inspired

energy of the soul, converting herself to herself and to divinity, perceiving the

causes of all tilings in the Gods, and from thence surveying both other things,

and sue!) as proceed into a visible subsistence], through which as auxiliaries,*

we also may be able to recur to the Gods, by means of the gifts which they insert

in us. Tli" MMI! also, when thus converted to herself, finds symbols of the

Gods in each even of the smallest things, and through these renders every

thing familiar and allied to the Gods. Since however, the Gods produced the

whole of our essence and gave us a self-motive nature in order to the choice

of good, their producing power is particularly manifested in our external ener

gies ; though when we consult, vre

require

their

providential

attention;

(whichthe Athenians manifest by honoring Jupiter the Counsellor) nnd when we

choose, we are in want of their assistance; in order that by consulting, we niny

discover what is advantageous; and that in choosing, we may not through

passion verge, to that which is worse; but rather, that both when acting, and when

I or iVKi-iofTi here, rcnl KI( -own.

1For u -.n,.^fii

MI llni place, il u npcr^an to read ui

182 PKOCLL S ON THE [BOOK u.

impelled,we may j>erceive

that the self-motive nature possesses the smallest

power,and tliat the whole of it is suspended from the providence of the (iods.

Hence Tiuurus also says, that tliose who are temperate always invoke the (iods,

in thei////w/ff

to every undertaking. For in our elections indeed, we are more

able to separate providence from that \\liirh i- ill om power; but we are inca

pable of ihmK lliM ill our impulse**because in theM- we have less of the self-

motivc cn ruy.For that which is in our po\\er

is not NO extended IIH the pro-

vi<h nee of the (iods ;!nl as we lia\e fre|iieiiily said, superior energize prior to

secondary natures, itnd together \\illi andpo>l

i ir to lliem, and on all sides

comprehend the energies of subordinate beings. But, sav* the Epicurean Eur-

iraachus, how can we avoid proceeding to inlinity,

l

if in the impulse to every

small thin-, we require prayer: for though we should pray, we shall he in

want of another prayer,and we. ?hall no where, stop ? And I orphyry ili-sol\es

the donlit a- follows: that it is not >aid it i-^ necessary to pray on account of

every thin-, lint in the impulse to every tiling. We are impelled therefore to

things, lint we are not impelled to impulses,so that there is not a progression to

inlinity. Or does not the doiiht still remain f For \\e are impelletl to prayer, so

that in this \ve shall aâin reijuire pra\er,and an impulse to this anaiu to

inlinity.

Hence it is Letter to say, that he \vho prays respectiii , any tiling, prior to this f

acknowledges to the (Jods, that he is allotted a power from them of conversion

to them, and that to other things indeed ôod is imparted through prayer, hut to

prayer tlirou^h itself. It does not therefore require another prayer, since it com

prehends ood in itself, and procures communion with a divine nature.

"

It is necessary tlim-lore, that wo sliouhl do this, who are about to

speak in a certain respect conceinin^ the universe, whether it was gene

rated, or is without generation,unless we are perfectly

unwise."

Timsvus evinces, how very admirable the hypothesis is, but elegantly preserves

himself in the order of a prudent man, pursuing the medium between irony and

arrogance. For h:\vin4 before said, that those who in the smallest decree partici

pate of temperance, invoke divinity in the impulse to every yreat or small under-

1

Instead of?iaipivu<iic

oiro rov r^ i)fitv alwnrovfttv, fjr ^f TUV

op/jut>, fin).\ov IvnifitOa ill tlii* place, it iswcfs>;iry

ID trail, tmîfat -/up ciri/jf

ruv<ifiaiuf, njv

poo arv rot/tifi iiptv /la.VXor

?i/<i/<fO(i,

tri ft Tuif vpfiur,a^w aroi

/ifv.

1For avitpvv here, read *f ipor.

HOOK ii.] TIM/KUS OF PLATO. 183

taking, lie very much exalts his proposed subject of discussion, ly opposing a

discourse. about (lie itnircrsc to a small thing. But hecautiously says, not that

lie has himself arrived at the summit of temperance [i. e. of wisdom]; for this is

(lie contrary, to the participation of temperance in the smallest dearer; Imt that

he is iv. ( perfectly unwise. And this he says from the hypothesis, in order that

he may ha\e to show, (hat the po\\er and science which he possesses, are from

the work itself, hut not from his own discussions. His theory therefore, will be

concerning the universe, so far as it is produced by the (iods. For the world

may be multifariously surveyed ;either according to its corporeal-formed nature,

or so far as it is full ofpartial

and total

souls;

1

or so far as it

participates ofintellect. Tinurns however, considers the nature of the universe, not according

to these modes only, but particularly according to its progression from the Demi-

nrgus ;where also physiology appears to bo a certain theology; because things

which have a natural subsistence, have in a certain respect a divine hyparxis, so

far as they are. generated from the f.ods. And thus this must be determined.

It is usual however to doubt, why Plato here adds / /; a certainrespect

: for lie

says,u

Tliose H hn are a!>ut to speak in a certain rented concerning the universe." Andthe more superficial indeed of the interpreters say, that the uni\erse is in a certain

respect nnhegotten, and / // a certain respect generated. Hence the discussion

of it is very properly in a certain respect, as of that which is unbegotten, and

in a certain respect as of that which is generated. Though Plato does not co-

arrange*

TOTTY;

in a certain respect,w it Ii the w ords

unbegotten and generated, but with

the words alxnit to speak. Hut the div ine laniblic.lms says that the discussion is in a

certain respect about the universe, and in a Certain respect not; tor matter, as being

indefinite in the world, may be variously considered. To this interpretation

however, it may be said, thatTTT;

is co-arranged with something else, and not with

the universe. Will it not therefore, be better to say with our preceptor, that words

are multifariously enunciated. For the demiurgic words proceeding from intellect

are of one kind, such as th^ Demiurgus utters to the junior.Gods : for Plato says,"

that the soul speaks, being moved (oitself."

Those words which are surveyed in

science, are of another kind. And those are of another kind which are allotted

the third hypostasis from intellect, and which proceed externally for the sake of

discipline and communication with others. Hence Timacns knowing that those

1

Instead \\tf OTOI- rX.yoft cirri yvyrwr rt xat oXivwr in this jiUcr, ilis nrcfiir> to read, tff *ov

<.u\ rt *ai

For ui rt y o UXnrwi- <v TV nytMt hfrc, it it rfi[uisitc to rrad n rot y o ILXarwr pi tv, *. X.

184 PKOCLUS ON THE [BOOH n.

are demiurgic words which the Demiurgus employs, but tlint those arc scientific

which he is now about to generate, but which he pro-assumes in himself, and that

lie makes use of external words for the sake of Socrates alone, on this account he

says that he shall employ words in a certain respect about the universe. For it is

one thin^ to use them intellectually, another scientifically, and another, for the sake

ofdiscipline; and jnj indicates

these dillerence.s of words.

Attain then-fore, with respect to the words,"

it fut/ier it was generated, or is uith-

vut generation," those inlerprrtersread the former with an

aspirate-, tint the latter

with a soft breathing, who saN thai IMato speaks about the unm-rse, so far as it

was generated from a cau>e, or i

un!>egotieii, in ordi-r that surveying it a ^-lie-

rated, we may perceive the nature which it cont.tins. Ami the IMatonic Albiiiuri

think*., that according to Plato the world bein^ perjM tual, ha* a beginning; of

generation, by which also it is more redundant than l inu, ;since this indeed

always is, but the world in addition to existing always, ha> a beginning of gene

ration, in order that it may exist alwajs, and be generated. ,\ot that it is

generated after such a manner as to be so according to time;

for in this case it

would not always exist;but in short, it has the relation of generation, on account



of its composition from things many and dissimilar. And it is necessary to refer

itsliyposta>is

to another cause more ancient than itself, through which always

existing primarily, the world is in a certain reject, and always is, and is not only

generated, but is also unbegotlen. [This then fore is asserted by Albinusj,

tlioiigh Plato no where in what follows says, that the universe is in a certain

respect generated, and in a certain ropcct unbegotten. Others again, read both

the parts with an aspirate, in order that Tima-us may say, he if about to speak Con

cerning

the unicerse so

faras it is

generated,

anJ so

far

as U is

nn/ngutten; erriiii; in

the same way as tho>e prior to them;unless indeed they as>ert that the uni\erse

was generated according to form, but unbegotten according tt is nur>e [matter].

For thus also Tima-us>ays,

that its nurse is nnl>egotten, but that the world was

gem-rated, as receiving form from dhinity. JUit Porphyry and lamblichus read

both the parts >viMi a soft breathing, in order that what is said may be whither the

universe was generated or is unbegut tin. For this is to be considered, prior to all

otherthings;

since it contributes in thehighest degree

to the consummation of

the whole of physiology, rightly to admit that the world was generated or is un-

Ix-gotlen. For from this hypothesis we shall be able to see what the nature is of

1

Fur aytyr/rov hero, I flild uiNi>> .

BOOK ii.] TIMJEUS Oh PLATO., 8a

its essence and powers, as will l>o manifest to us shortly after. The discussion

therefore, concerning the universe, will be for the sake of discipline, and will pro

ceed from thisprinciple, whether the world was generated, or is without genera

tion; and from this, other things must be woven together in a consequent order.

"

It is necessary, therefore, that invoking all the Gods and Goddesses,

we should pray that what we assert may especially be agreeable to their

divinities, and that in the ensuing discourse we may be consistent with

ourselves."

The division of male and female comprehends in itself all the plenitudes of the

divine orders. For the cause of stable power and sameness, the supplier ofl>eing.

and that which :s the first principle of conversion to all things, are comprehendedin the male. But that which emits from itself all-various progressions and sepa

rations, measures of life andprolific powers, is contained in the female. Hence,

Tim;rus, elevating himself to all the Gods, very properly comprehends the whole

orders of them, in a division into these

genera.

Such a division, likewise, is most

adapted to the proposed theory. For this universe is full of these twofold divine

genera. For heaven has to earth (that we may assume the extremes) the order of

the male to the female; l>ecause the motion of heaven imparts productive princi

ples and powers to every thing [sublunary] ;and earth receding the eflluxions

thence proceeding, is parturient with and generates all-various animals and plants.

Of the Gods also in the heavens, some are distinguished according to the male,

but othersaccording

to the female.

And of those powers that govern generationin an unbogotten manner, some are of the former, but others of the latter co-or

dination. In short, the demiurgic choir is abundant in the universe, and there

are many rivers of life, some of which exhibit the form of the male, but others of

the female characteristic. And what occasion is there to say much on this sub

ject ? For from the liberated unities,1

both masculine, and feminine, various

orders proceed into the universe. Hence, he who is entering on the discussion

of the universe, very properly invokes the Gods and Goddesses, from both whichthe universe receives its completion, and hcsivrhes them that what he asserts maybe consistent, and particularly that it may be agreeable to their divinities. For

this is the sublimcst end of theory, to run upward to a divine intellect; and a* all

1For rawy here, it i nrcr*ary to read >ia<

vk.

Tim. Plat. VOL. J. 2 A

, atj1MIOCLUS ON THE [loon n.

are uuiforinly comprehended in it, to arrange the discussion of things agree

ably to this causal comprehension. But that which is the second end, and is con-

i-ejuent to tins is,- for the whole theory to receive its completion conformably to

human intellect and the light of science. For the whole, the perfect, and the

uniform, pre-exist in a divine intellect; but that which is partial ami falls short

of divine simplicity,subsists about a mortal intellect.

^ hy however, does Tim.i-us say, that it is necessary to pray, and magnifi

cently proclaim that the Cods and Goddesses should be iimiked, yet does not

pray, though an opportunity for so doing presents itself, but immediately converts

hirnst-lf to the proposed discussion? \\creply, it is because some limits have

their end comprehended in the very will itself; hut others, distribute another

energy after the will, and through action accomplish that whu h was the object

of the will. And a life indeed, conformable to philosophy, depends on our will,

and a deficiency in it, is contrary to the will. [Uut the consequences resulting

from a life conversant with external actions, are not dependent on our will;] for

the end of them is not placed in us. We may justly, therefore, rank prayer among

the number of things w hich have all their perfiction in the w ill. For the wish to

is a desire of conversion to the (Jods. And this desire it.-elf conducts the

pray,

desiring soul, and conjoins it to dixinity, which is the first work of prayer.*

Hence it is not proper fust to wish, and afterwards to pray, but he that wishes to

pray, will at the same time have prayer as the. measure- ot his wish, one person

indeed ill a greater, but another in a less de-Tee. Farther still, this also is the

\xork of a true prayer, for those things for which \\e pray to be common to the

Cod*, both according to power* and energies, and for us to eflect them in con

junction with the Cods. "-Thus if some one should pray to the powers that ampu

tate matter, and obliterate the stains arising from generation, but should himself

particularlyendeavour to ellect tln\ through the cathartic virtues; such a one in

conjunction with the Coils, would entirely accomplish a dissolution of his mate

rial bonds. This therefore Tima-us here effects. For those things which he prays

to the (iods to accomplish, he himself completes, disposing the whole discourse

accordin" to human intellect, but so as to be in conformity to the intellect of ther?

( jods.

" And such is mv prayer to the Gods with reference to myself; but as

1

for airo<i. in itm plate, 11111*1 read uror/uf.

1For Cf\ J

)err&

& * wbvioiisN ncccMarv ii nail ^xs l

BOOK ii.J

TIM.T.US OI: PLATO. I7

to \vhat respects you, it is requisite to pray that you may easily learn,

and that I may be able to exhibit what I scientifically conceive, in the

clearest manner about the proposed subjects of discussion. [According to

my opinion therefore, the following division must first be made.]"

The exhortation of the auditors, is a thirty consequent to the prayers* [of

Tim;rus]. For it is necessary that the replenishing source being suspended from

its proper causes, should previously exeite itsrecipients,

and convert them to

itself, prior to the plenitude which it confers;in order that becoming more

adapted, they may happily receive the intellectual conceptions which it imparts.

For thus the participation will Income more perfect to them,4 and the

gift will be

rendered more easy to the giver. Moreover, this very circumstance offacility,

is adapted to those that imitate the whole fabrication;from which abiding and

rejoicing in itself, all things proceed to the effects which it excites. Farther still,

to produce one series, through (lie contact of secondary with prior natures, adum

brates the demiurgic series, which proceeds as far as to the last of things. For

if the auditors receive what is said

conformably

to the intellect of Tinurus, but

Tim:rns disposes the whole discussion conformably to the intellect of the Gods,

it will happen that the whole conference will in reality In- referred to one intellect,

and one intellectual conception. Besides this also, the self-motive nature of souls

is sufficiently indicated, thatl>eing

moved by the (ods, ihcy also move them Ivcs,

and produce from themselves sciences. For the words,"

what Iscicnti/icaly con-

dive," exhibit the energy which is impelled from a life whose power is free.

Accordingto

my opinion therefore,these

thingsare first to be

considered;that Tiiirjrus

l>cinga Pythagorean, and preserving the form of l*\ thagoric dis

cussions, is immediately exhibited to us as such, 1rom the very be"inniri" .r J

For Socrates does not enur.ciatively declare his opinions to -others, but having

dialectically purified their conceptions, unfolds truth into light; who also said

to them, that he knew nothing except to make an assertion [or give a reason]

and receive one. But Timacu<, as also addressing his discourse to men, savs

that he shall enunciate his

own dogmas, notat all

busying himself with foreign opi-

1 The original of the words within the brarkrt* belongs to the text, hut is not to be found in Ihc

commentaries of Froclus, though ai the reader nrty MT, lie comment* on thetewordi.

* ForCi-x"

! litre also, it is i.ecrjsarv lo read n ^mi.

InMrail of vftoi rr; T.\TJOWT- in this place, we mut read wpo rij

* For royo/> aiTou, read rnn

; np nvrixi .

188PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK n.

nions, but pursuingone patli

of science. Moreover, the word i8oo, i.e. / am

of opinion,is assumed here very aptly, and appropriately

to what has been before

suid. For of the whole rational soul, one part is intellect, another is dianoia, and a third

is opinion.And thefirst of these indeed, is conjoined to the (Jods, the second produces the

sciences, and the third imparts them toothers. This man therefore, knowing these

thin"*, through prayer adapts his own intellect to the intellect of the Goiis. For

this is manifestedl>y

the words,"

that what we assert may especiallybe agreeable to

their divinities, and that in the ensuing discourse we may be consistent nidi ourselves."

But through exhortations, he excites the dianoetic partof the souls of his auditors.

For the words, what I scientifically conceive, have an indication of this kind. The

doxastic parttherefore remains, which receiving a scientific division from dianoia,

delivers the streams of it to others. This however is not ambiguous, nor divided

about sensihles, nor does the formal distinction of it consist in hypolepsis*

alone;

but it is fdled from intellect and dianoia, surveys the demiurgic reason, and

distinguishes the nature of things. These particulars also, are sulliciently assimi

lated to the paradigm of the speaker. For there, a royal intellect precedes,

according lo which the paradigm is united to inU-lligihles ;a dianoia, containing

the of forms; and the first and uniform cause of opinion.

in itself plenitudes

Hence, the paradigm contains intJii^iblcsin intellect, but introduces xense to the worlds,

us the Oracle says ;or as Plato,

"

such ideas thenfure, as intellect perceivedto be

inherent in animal itself,so many lie dianoetically taw this universe ou^ltt to

possess."

Moieo\er, the distinction between lyings and things generated, is consentaneous

to what has l>een before said. For after the (Joels and Goddesses, and the

ineffable peculiaritywhich is in them, the separation of thesetwo genera, i. e. of being

and "eneration, takes place.For being is allied to the more excellent order of divine

natures ,which is always established in invariable sameness, and is intelligible.

But ircm-ratum is allied to the inferior order, from which, infinite progression, and

all-various mutation, derive their subsistence. What then is this division, and after

what manner \\as it produced1 Was it made as if it were the section of a certain

whole into parts,or as genus is divided into species,

or as the division of one

word into many significations,or as that of essence into accidents, or vice versa,

1

This <-rd is n<.t to be found in an\ edition of llie Timseua of I lato; but from thii comment ot

t rotlu>, it appears that it originally belongedto it.

\iz. In tin- apprehensionof each of I he terms of whkh a s^llo-jiiw

ton-,i>(.

j. c. To Jupiter the Dcmiurgus of the woiM.

BOOK ii.] T1M/EUS OF PLATO. j89

that of accident into essences; for those are the species of division which some

persons are accustomed to applaud. It is ridiculous therefore, to divide being

and generation, either as accident into essences, or as essence into accidents.

For accident by no means pertains to j)erpetual being. Nor again must theyl>e

divided as a word into its significations. For what word is there which Plato

assuming as common, divides intoperpetual being, and that which is generated ;

unless some one should say that TJ, i. e. a certain thing, is thus divided by him ? This

division however, is not Platonic, but is derived from the Stoic custom. Is the

division therefore, as that of a whole into parts? But what is that whole which

consists of perpetual being, and that which is generated? Or how can paradigm

and image give completion to one composition ? How likewise can perpetual

l>eingbe a part of a certain thing, since it is impartible, united, and simple ? For

the impartible is not a part of any thing which does not consist of all impartible*.

But that which is generated is not impartible. Hence there is not a common

genus of perpetual l>emg,and that which is generated. For perpetual being

precedes according to cause that which is generated ; and the former is when the

latter is not. But not which it is not lawful to

perpetual being existing, suppose,

generation also would vanish. How likewise, is there one genus of the first, and

the last of things ? For the division of genera into species, takes place in the

middle psychical reasons [i. e. productive powers]. But tilings prior to soul, subsist

in more excellent genera; and things posterior to soul, have their essence in

co-ordinate natures. How therefore, can being itself and that which is generated,

be arranged under one genus ? \Vhat also will this genus be ? For it is not being,

lest that which is generated, and which never [truly] is, should be arranged in

being. Nor will being itself be the one. Because, every genus is divided by its

proper differences, and antecedently assumes the differences, either in capacity, or

in energy. But it is not lawful that the one should have differences either in capa

city, lest it should l>e more imperfectthan secondary natures

;or in energy,

lest it should have multitude, But as it i* in short demonstrated to besuj>erior

both to power and energy, it cannot in any way whatever ha\e differences; o

that neither will there in short, be a division of the one.

What then shall we say ? Must it not IM- this, that Plato does not now make

any division whatever, but that he proposes to define separately what each of

these two, perpetual being, and that which is generated, is ? For it appears to me

that the wordaioti^irfoy has the same signification with

<5iax/s*r,rio.For since he

discourses about the world, the Demiurgus, and the paradigm of the world, he

1JXIPROCLUS ON THE [BOOKII.

wishes separatelyto define

j>erpetual heing, ami separately that whidi is generated,

in order that through the given definitions we may know where the world, where

the Demiurgu.s, and where the paradigm are to he arranged ;and that we may

not confound the orders of things, hutma> separate them from each other, so far

as they are severally adapted tol>e

separated. lie likewise dors the very same

thin" in the 1 hilehns. For imiuiring concerning intellect, pleasure and the mixed

life, which is the hest of these, he assumes the genera of them, \ \l. hound, infinity,

and that which is mingled from hound and the infinite. For thus the order of

each will Income apparent, and he will manifest the peculiarityof them from their

genera. There however, hound and infinity heginnint; from the (lods, proceed

through all beings of whatever kind they may l>e. For these also were in intelli-iliVs

according to the stahle and generative cause of intelligihles. They were likewise

in the intellectual order according to the paternal and material principle of the

intellectual (ods. And they were in the supermundane order, according to the

d"miurjiic monad and \ivifu: dnad, and in the last place, according to effective

and prolific powers. Here however, heing and that which is generated, do not

hegin from the (Jodr*;

for the unities, of (lie (iods are Miperior to heinir, and prior

to these the one itselfis e\em|)t from all beings, hecanse the first (iod is one,

1

hut

the other (iod.s are unities. -\or are heing and that which is generated things

which are participated hy the (lods, in the same manner as the unities which are

posterior to the Ciods, are said to he and are participated hy heinir. IN or do they

extend as far as to the last of things. For n itlu r i> it possil.leto say that matter

is perpetual heing, since we are n< enstomcd to call it non-heing ;nor that which

is generated, which is not ahle even to sulli-r heing, lest perishing hy so doing, it

should entirely vanish. This therefore, will again he asserted hy us. It ishow-

e\er, [evident] that the division is not of one certain thing, and that the proposed

theory has necessarily, prior to other things the definition of these two-fold genera,

in order that the discussion proceeding as if from geometrical hypotheses to the

investigation of things ronse<|ient, may discover the nature- of the universe, and

"the paternaland paradigmatic cause of it. For if the universe was generated, it

was geneiated hy a cause. There is therefore a demiurgic cause of the universe.

If there i> a Demiurgus, there is also a paradigm of the world, with reference to

which he who constituted the universe fahricated. And thus in a consequent

For o liprr, ilia ol\iouily noce>ar> to read fr.

1

<p.<nrjri

ii iiinittc-il in llic original.

BOOK ii.] TIM/EDS OF PLATO.IP!

order tlie discussion about these things is introduced, and the physical theory

beautifully terminates for us in theology.

What that is which is always being, but is without generation, and

what that is which is generated indeed, [or consists inbecoming to be]

but is never [real] being."

According to some, alll>eiugs whatever, whether they subsist paradigmatically

or iconically, are comprehended in this distinction;hut not all beings according

to others. And the interpreters contradict each otherrespecting this, not a little.

\Ve however, cannot know which of these assertions it is fit to adopt, unless we

examine each of them by itself. Let us then consider from the l>eginning, what

power each of the words [of Plato] possesses in itself.

In the first place, therefore, TO TI, or the what is definitive. For we are accus

tomed to rive TI an antecedent arrangement in definitions. But it is not a genus,

as the Platonic Seterus thought it was, who says that TO n is the genus of bein"

and that which is generated ;and that the alt is signified by it. I

-

or thus that

which is generated, and likewise perpetual being, will be all. It was also doubted



by some that preceded us, why Plato did not demonstrate that there is such a

thing as perpetual being, prior to the inquiry what it is. For whence is the

subsistence of perpetual bein^ evident ? And it is the law in demonstrative dis

cussions, to consider// a thing is previous to the investigation, what it is. In

answer to this doubt it may be said, that perhaps Tima-us did not think this was

requisite to his purpose; as the day before, it was shown by .Socrates in what he

said about the soul, that the soul is unlicgotten and incorruptible, and that it

philosophises through its alliance to real beings, with which it comes into contact.

And likewise, as it was shown by him, that what is perfectly being, and truly

the object of science, is one tiling; that what is partly being, and partly non-

being, is another, and on this account is of a doxastic nature; and that what in

no respectis

l>eing,and is entirely unknown, is another. This was also granted

to Tima-us by Socrates, when he divides a line into four parts, the intelligible, the

dianoetie, the sensible, and the conjectural; where likewise speaking about the

rood he says, that it reigns in the intelligible place, in the same manner as the sun

in the visible region.1 And farther still, the introduction of prayer previous to the

discussion, is a demonstration of the existence of being which always in. For if

Sre the litter rnd of i he >ili book of 1 1n H public,w In rf all this is



nuuic ii.] TIM/EUS 01- PLATO. jf3

proceed ? But if it is tlio paradigm, how comes it to pass that the Deminrjns i-

not jxirpetnal being, if the paradigm is one tiling, and the Dominions another?

And if it is the Demiurgus, whence is it that the paradigm is not a thing of this

kind ? That the paradigmatic cause, therefore, is tal>c arranged in perpetual Ix.-in^,

i.s clearly evident from Plato when he says,"

According to which of(litparadigms did

theartificer fabricate

the world? /( as it according to that which subsist* -jitk

invariable sameness, or according to that which wasgenerated?"

And he immediately

decides hy saying,"

If the world indeed is beautiful, and the Demiurgus it good, it

is evident that he looked to an eternal paradigm. Hut if the. world is not beautiful,

and tlic Demiurgus is not good, which it is not lawful to assert, then he looked to a

generated paradigm."Jf therefore it is not lawful to assert this, the paradigm of

the universe is perpetual being. But that this is also true of the Demiurgus, is evi

dent from this;that Plato calls the soul, which the Demiurgns constitutes, the

first of generated natures, and delivers the generation of it. The Demiiir^ns, how

ever, is prior to soul, so that he belongs to eternal beings. Hence also Plato says

concerning him,"

After this manner therefore was there truly an eternal reasoning

of the God" And how is it possible that being a divine intellect he should not

rank among eternal beings ? Is therefore every intelligible world perpetual ln-in^ ?

The di>ine lamhlichns, however, strenuously contends on this subject, evincing

that eternal being is superior both to the genera and the species ofbein^; and

establishes it at the summit of the intelligible essence, as that which primarily parti

cipates of ///f inic. But what is written in the Parmenides concerning the one

Iwin^ [or being characterized by the one], and also in the .Sophista,bears testimony

to these things. I- or then 1 Plato arranges the one beintj j)riorto whole, and prior

to the inli lligihlc all ; though the whole and the all are intelligible. Here, however,

IMato clearly calls the paradigm perpetual being, and a whole, and all-perfect.

For he denominates it all-perfect animal ;and a whole, when he says,

"

of i-hich

other animals art parts according to one, and according to genera." So that if the

paradigm is a whole and all-perfect, but that which is primarily lcing is above

whole and all, the paradigm and that being will not be the same.

NN ill it not, therefore, be better to say, that there is indeed sued an order of

b^ing,;is that divine man

[lamhliehus]]hns

delivered,and such as Plato else

where surveys; but that now Plato thus denominates every eternal world?

ISor is this at all wonderful. For, at one lime, theintelligible

is asserted ofcrcri/ /><.;-.

Actual and invisible nature* as when it is said that the soul also i.sintelligible,

as b\

Socrates in the Phrrdo. But at another time it in asserted of the natures that

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. 2 1 1

, 94 1 ROCLUS ON THE [BOOK n.

are more excellent than every psychical essence, an the division in theRrpnl>-

lic manifest*. Ami at another time, it is asserted of the first triads of beinjr,

as is evident from what Tima;us a little after says of them. After the same

manner, therefore, beinp in the Sophista, indeed, manifests the order of the one

bein ; Itut here it signifies the whole eternal world. Tor it is evident that U inj;

which i* primarily beiny;,is the summit of the

intelligiblebreadth, ami the

monad of all bein-s. For every where, that which is primarilybeiii in its

own series, has the hi-hest order; since if it ranked as the second, it would not

have the same form ;fur it would no longer Iw primarily

that which it is. As

therefore, virtue itself possesses the highest place in the series of the v irtues, as

the equal itself in ei|u;ds,and animal itself in animals, thus also being itself

which is primarily bein-, is the summit of all brings, and from it all lein*

proceed.

1

Uut every intelligibleanil intellectual hcinu;, and whatever ap-

jK-arsto exist, has the appellation of bein^, yet be

in.:,and perpetual heiii

are not the same. For the one be ini; is bcvmid eternity.For eternity par

ticipatesof bein-. Hence all such things as participate

of eternity,have aNo

a certain portionof bciii, but not all such things as participate

of In inir, par

ticipatelikewise of eternity. The natures therefore that exist in time, participate

also of bein:;, so that what is primarily bein^ is bev oml the order of eternity,

is eternal. Hence the n-asonin-; demon>trates the very

liul periH tual bemx(ontrary, that every tiling is rather I., be assumed from perpetual beiiip:, than

the one bem^. I;or this latter is bed. T than l/ic inT, as subsisting l>etvveen //if

&

>it- and -ternily,and prior to Hernity b< iti- denominated one bein-.

If, therefore, it be reipiisilethat I should sav what appears to me to be the

truth, ritiln //;< /<(/</ luonsly

u.\*mtu:iti</j/

//////:, :. //a / is iitrittilli/ bring;

beginning, imUalJiom the mitnre"/

uniimil itvlf. / </ this is/niii.arily

elirnul ;

but entliiisf in purtml intdltclf. I .nt the one bein-, he peihaps omits, in ron-

M-quenceof its existm- as the monad of tluse, and as U-in- inellable, and

ronioined to the one. Hence Plato will now speak in realityof every intelligible,

if that intelligibleis not assumed which is o< cult, is the highest, and does nut

depart (n>m*hcwu. H.>N therefor.-, sho.tlv after this, that animal itself is the

mo>t beautiful of intelli-ibU-s, inc(.nse<|uemx-

of the natures prior to this, bcin-

In UK- or.-m.il wu ? 1,101. n. ruvr,,v>;

o ^wr, rn o, ., l(f^ /"-

& r &ffr " """ r & & "" & &

,,, rru. Alter UT uir.u llu-r.-lorr, llif WOM!> iru^rn ra .ri ihM>t !"

) I

!" 1 -

1

yn i uui.lin^ lirrt in tlir orij,iu.il.

T(ir /joia lien,read ^oa.

HOOK i..] TIMJEUS OF PLATO. H,5

through excess of union, superior to a subsistence as objects of intellect. Unless

lie says that animal itself is the most l>cautiful of all the objects of intellect, both

animal itself and (he one being existing as objects of intellect also, the latter as

\w\tt causally ever, eternity asbeing so accord ing to fn/par.vis,and animal itself or 1 1 if;

eternal, as existing always, according to participation. Hence, if these things are

admitted, in that which always exists, eternity, animal itself, and the Demiur-

gus will be comprehended, and likewise the onel>eing itself, which possesses the.

occult canst- of eternity. So that it is evident from this, that perpetual being

comprehends every nature prior to souls, whether it be intelligible, or intellec

tual; be^innin^: indeed from being itself, but ending in a partial intellect, and that

it does not alone comprehend, as lamblichus says it does, the summit of all

brings, such as the beins is which is characterized by (lie one, or the one Iwing,

through which all beings are said to l>e beings, and to which the one itself alone,

and the principles of being [bound and infinity] are superior. The one, therefore,

is better than that which is self-subsistent. For it is necessary that it should l>e

exempt from all multitude. Perpetual being, however, is self-subsistent indeed,

but possesses the power of being so through the one. But that which is posterior

to it, such as is our nature, is self-subsistent, and at the same time derives its



subsistence from another producing cause. And the last of things proceed

indeed into existence from a more excellent cause, but are not self-suhsistent.

It is not however yet time for these observations.

But with respect to perpetual being, it must not be supposed, that it is partly

being, and partly rion-l>eing ; for if it were, it would be a composite, and consist

ing of things of this kind, it would l>e

dissimilarly a composite. Nor is it at one

time being, and at another non-being ;for it is said to be always being. But it is

simply and eternally being, and is iintningled with even thing whatever it may

be, that is of a contrary nature. For it appears to me that the addition of the

words,"

/;/// not having generation? indicates the unmingled and undeliled purity

of perpetual being, according to which it is exempt from every hypostasis which is

borne along in the images of beunr, and is changed by time. IS ot as some assert,

that perpetual l>eingis said, for the sake of perspicuity, to be. without generation ;

nor according to others, that Plato was willing to sjK-ak of it both affirmatively

and negatively ; but that it is necessary perpetual being should le intellectually

perceived subsisting by itself, remote from al! temporal mutation. For soul

For rapiisi in llii place, it in requisite to read v^turt.

19rt 1 HOCLUS ON THE r.ooic n.

participates offline, anl the heavens are allotted a life which is evolved acced

ing to time; but the intelligible nature alone is, according to the whole of itself,

eternal. Hence, some of the ancients call the intelligible breadth truly existing

being ;the psychical truly enisling and at the same time not truly existing

being; the sensible not truly t.rifting being ; and matter, truly non-being. After

what manner, however, they madethis

arrangement, weshall

elsewhere iines-

tiirate. But that the addition of"

nut haring generation, is for the sake of indi

cating the separate essence of|K?rj>ehial Ix-inij, is I think evident from what

has l>een said.

In the next place, with respect to that which /.v generated, whether does it sig

nify the whole world, or a material and jwrfectly nuitahle composition? For

some of the ancients explain this in one way, and other* in another. Hut we un

derstand by it every corporealfanned nature, and not the soul of the universe; so

far as this nature is of ilself indeed unadorned, but is always or at a certain

time, arranged by another. For the soul of the universe is, in a certain respect,

)MT|H iual beinir. -Much less is intellect tlmt -fhieh is generated : for tins is im

mediately perpetual Ix-inic- Hut body alone is that which is generated, and is

truly never real bein-j;. J or body is always in want of the world-producing

cause, and is always deriving from it the representation of existence. Whyit

then may be said, did not IMato add, always, and tltal which is generated,

in the same manner as ln imf, or tit a icrtain time, in order that he might

have what is generated entirely opposed tojitrjietnal being? May we not say

that Plato devised this mode of expression, looking to the various nature of

that which is generated, and taking away from eternal being the existence

at a certain time, and theperpetuity of a generated nature? Forthe if/idles of auch a

nature are generated akeaiis, bin the parts at & c< flam tiuic. And after another man

ner [of considering the allair] with re<pect to forms, some are inseparable from

matter, and are alw ays generated from (hat \v ln< h is (nil v alw ay s ; but others are in

time, and depart from matter. J- orcvr/torit /;/, indent, is n!.i fti/s generated fti/d is alua^x

aiuitt matter;but tin form o/ /ire, or of <nr,

enters iutouiid;!ef>nrfs

from matter, bieoin-

iiiififjKirntcdfroinit a>nl jnrnhiiig, through the domination of a contrary nature. Hut

it the Merprluitv which detains matter is alwavs eenerali d, it never therefore /.v ;

and if the existence at a certain time is gmcfiited, it is never being. livery thing

Aflrr r.iffc< po c-f t.i(\(.iioif ru ui;n.r irXaroi, illilf.ul of , ,;i ykt/i, it ii iHi f*-

>sr\ lon.nl <rwi tin o/.a i/v>. ntrwt or.

nnox ii.]TIM/EUS 01- PLATO.

1 97

however, which is generated, is either ahcnt/s generated, or at a cerlain time..

Hence, every thing which is generated, is never [real] l>eing.

These things, therefore, having l>oeii said, let us, recurring; to tlie discussion from

the beginning, show whether perpetual being in this place is asserted of all beings,

or not of all. For if, indeed, we admit that j>erpctual being indicates an eternal

nature alone, having the eternal according to the whole of itself, it is not asserted

of all beings. For neither the In-ing prior to eternity, nor the order ofeternity,

nor again, such things as have indeed an eternal essence, but produce energies

according to time, can be arranged under this being. JJut if we assume every

thing whatever that is eternal, and which always is, either according to the whole

of itself, or partially, then soul also ranks among eternal natures, and also that

which contains in itself the causes of all things, unically, as it is said, and univer-

Hfilly.For the case is as follows : one thing fi. e. being itselfj is sujHT-etermd ;

[another thing is eternity;1

]another is simply eternal, and another is in a certain

respect eternal. With respect, however, to each of these perpetual l>eings,the

first is as the power and fountain of the crcr ; the second, as that vthich is prima

rily always being, and the crcritself,

and not according to participation ; but the

third is always, as participating of the ere r, and as primarily wholly eternal; and

fourth, is as that in certain a this

the which a respect participates of peculiarity of

kind. For each thing subsists triply, either according to cause, or according to

hyparxis, or according to participation. And the one being, indeed, is being alone

according to hyparxis, but is perpetual being according to cause. Kternity is per

petualI dng according to hyparxis, but being according to partieipalion. And

the eternal is perpetual being according to participation, but according to h\-

parvis is a certain other intelligible, or intelligible and intellectual, or intellectual

[only]. And if the last of these, it is either total or partial ; and if this, it is either

supermundane or mundane,;and if this, it is either divine, or if* posterior to (he

(Jods and is each of these either according to existence alone, or according to

power and energy, and as far as to thejM rpetual being of thinirs which are in a

certain respect eternal.

Again therefore, with respect to that which is generated, if we as.-ume the uni

versal, we must assume generation ail-variously changed ; but if every thing gene

rated, in whatever way it may be, we shall find that the heavens also are gene

rated, so far as they partake of motion and mutation, ami that soul is the first of

generated natures, so far as it lives in time, and time is connascent with its ener-

Tlic words TO ^ ciiwr, are wauling in \ht original, bul nititl necvssaiiU tic5<i[>j>lic<l.

jp8 HROCLUS ONTHE

[BOOK

u.

gies. And thus ascending from l>eneath, we shall end in soul as the first of things

that are generated ;and descending from above, we shall again terminate our pro-

gressionin soul, as the last of eternal natures. For though a certain person

1

rightly says that the heavens always exist, yet their being is always generated by

something else;but soul possesses its own essence from itself. Hence also,

Socrates in the Pluedrus says, that it is unbegotten, and at the same time self-

moved, as being indeed the principle of all generation, but generating and vivify-

in" itself. If therefore we say, that it is both unbegotten and generated, eternal

and not eternal, we shall speak rightly. Hence too the Athenian guest1

thinks

fit to call the soul indestructible, but not eternal, because it is in a certain respect

oniy eternal, and not according to the whole of itself, in the same manner as

truly existing luring. For it is one thing to be always, and another to be generated

always. Andthe heavens, indeed, are generated always ;

for th_ y do not possess

being from themselves. But soul in always ;for it possesses being from itself. And

every thing priorto soul is not generated from a cause, but is from a cause. For

generation is alone in things which derive their subsistence from others. Through

these things therefore it will be manifest after what manner there is a comprehen

sion of all beings in the before-mentioned portionsof division, and after what

manner all beings are not comprehended in them. There is not a comprehension

ofall

beings,because that which is eternal

only,

and that which is generated

only, are assumed;one of which is prior to, but the other is posterior to soul.

And there is a comprehension of all beings, !M< ause the extremes being assumed,

it is possible from these to find the middle, which is at one and the same time

both being and that which is generated.

That these distinctions, however, of that which always is, and of that which is

generated,. arc necessarily made priorto all other axioms, it is easy to learn; by

observing that thisis

thefirst

ofthe

problemswhich it is

requisite

to consider

about the universe in the beginning, i. e. nhttlier it always wa* t having no beginning

of generation,or u-iicther it was generated. For if this is the first of the tilings to

be investigated,then what that is which is generated,

and what that is which is

eternal, have very properly the first order in the axioms. For the other axioms

follow these, just as the remaining problems follow the problem respecting the

generation of the world. And if it be requisitethat resuming the discussion about

the hypotheses, I should more fully explain what appear*,to me on the

biibjtct.

i. e. Aruiollf.

3

III Ihr 10th hook of the Laws.

UOOK .,.]TIM/EUS OF PLATO. U,p

Pinto in tlu* same manner as geometricians, employs definitions and hypotheses

priorto demonstrations, through which he frames his demonstrations, and ante

cedently assumes the principles of the whole of physiology. For as the principles

of music an- different from the principles of medicine, and in a similar manner

there are different principlesof arithmetic and mechanics; thus also there are

certain principles of the whole of physiology, which Plato now delivers to us;

[and these are as follow:] Truly existing being in that which may be. comprehended

by intelligence in conjunction with reason. That which ii generated is to be apprehended

by opinion in conjunction w ith irrational sense. Every thing generated, is generated

by a cause. That which docs not derive its subsistencefrom a cause, is not generated.

That of which the paradigm it eternal being, is necessarily beautiful. That, of which

the

paradigm

is generated, is not beautiful. Let the universe be called heaven or the

world. For from these principleshe produces all that follows. And it appears \

to me, that on this account he shows what perpetual being is, and also u-hat that

is which is {rein-rated, hut does not show us that each of them is. For the geo- ,

metrician informs us what a point is, and what a line is, prior to his demonstra

tions, hut he by no means teaches us that each of these is. For how can lie he a

geometrician, if he discusses his own principles ? After the same manner also,

thephysiologist says

whatperpetual being is,

for the sake of thedemonstrations

he is ahout tou>ake, hut he hy no means shows that it is

;for in so doing, he

would go beyond physiology. But since, as we have before observed, Timanis

does not resemble other physiologists, being a Pythagorean physiologist, and

Plato exhibits in this dialogue the highest science, hence he afterwards very

divinely proves that truly existing being is. For his present purpose, however,

it is sufficient for him to admit that it is, preserving the boundaries of physiology,

lie appears also to investigate the definition of perpetual being and of that whichis generated, in order that he may discover the causes which give completion to

the universe, vi/. form and matter : lor that which is generated is in want of these.

He assumes, however, the third hypothesis, in order that he may discover the

producing cause; but the fourth, that he may le able to infer that the universe was

generated according to a paradigmatic cause; and the fifth, which i* concerning

the name of the universe, in order that he may investigate the participation of

the good and the ineffable by the world, as will be shown in what follows.

It appears also to me, that Aristotle in his Physics, imitating Plato, assumes one

For *<

(v\i-//m amor htrr, read Tyxi? ciy/iancor airier.

200 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK n.

hypothesis,when he says, it it supposed by us rcith respect to t/tingt tc/tich hart a

natural subsistence, that either all or some of them are moved. For it is entirely

necessary that there should he motion, if the discussion of the physical theory is

to proceed with success;since nature is a principle of motion. But in his trea

tise On the Heavens, prior to every tiling else, he assumes tlio.se hypotheses con

cerning

which Plotiuiis says, that Aristotle will find no difficulty in his discussion

if his hypotheses ahout the fifth hotly are admitted, meaning these five; that the

motion is simple ofa simple body ; that a simple body has a certain simple motion accord

ing to nature ; that there are trt n simple motions ; that one motion is contrary to

one ; and that the thing which has tint a contrary, ha* not that which can corrupt it.

From which hypotheses, he frames his demonstrations concerning the fifth body.

Aristotle, however, shows that the universe is unbegotU.n, from the hypotheses;

hut Plato that it is iM-nerated. Whethertherefore, they

are discordant or not,

will shortly after be manifest to us. And this, indeed, Mill again be considered.

Why, however, does Plato, who is accustomed to employ, when speaking of

intelligible*, the terms auro itftlf,and

(,-rr-pthat it hit h, now assume neither of these,

but rather prefers the term an aia ays,as connasccnt with being. For this also is

attended with a doubt, through what cause he employ s the third of these terms, i. e.

always, as better adapted to signify the nature of truly existing being. In answer

to this it may be said, that the term itself mnni/estji the simplicity of inttttigibles, a



subsistence according toInipar.iis,

and an e.n^ttiue -ahich is primary, which

is asserted conformably to the peculiarity ^ accordingto which

intelligibles are

primarily that zt liic/i they are, and Jill secondary natures uith theparticipation oj

themselwi. But the term that which it, indicates purity, the unmingled, and

the not iH ing filled with a contrary nature. And the tar manifests the eternal,

the immutable, and the invariable, according to hypostasis. Thus for instance,

when we say the bea itiful itself, and the just itself, we survey Ix-auty which is

not bo by the participation of the beautiful, and justice which is not so by the par

ticipationof the just ;

but that which is primarily l>eautiful, and that which is

primarily just. But when we sny thit which is bt -autiful we mean that which is

not mingled with deformity, nor contaminated by its contiury, such as is material

beauty, which is situated in deformity, and is itself repletewith its subject nature.

And when we use the term eier or always we indicate beauty which is not at one

time beautiful, and at another not, but which is eternally beautiful. So that the1

first of these terms manifests the simplicity of intelligible*,and the supplying all

other things from themselves. For such is the beautifulitsc/f, by which

202 PKOCLUS ON THE [BOOK n.

count of itself,lest it should IH? imperfect.

Cut that winch is generated is sus

pended from another thing, and has its progressionfrom other causes ; and such

is every corporeal-formed nature. After what manner however, is that which is

generated never being, concerning which Plato speaks clearly in the Sophista?

Not that it is non-being, but that it is never truly luring. Now, liowe\cr, it is

said to be never (it ant/ (imc being, because being has a prior arrangement in an eter

nal nature;but that which is generated, is never that t.V//V/< alicnys if. If, therefore,

existence, so far as it is being, is nnrereptiveof non-existence, it is evident that

what is generated, since it lias the being \\hich is in it, of whatever kind it may be,

mingled with non-beint;, is never at any time being, so as to be genuinely being;

and being which subsists b\ itself, since this pertainsto real existence alone, which

has not in a certain r. -sped non-existence in conjunction with existence, atone

and the same time being and not being.

" The former of these, indeed, is comprehended by intelligence in con-

junction with reason, since it always subsists with invariable sameness.

But the latter is perceived by opinion, in conjunctionwith irrational sense,

since it is generated and corrupted, and never truly i s."

*** To theseit happens, that they err in many other respects, and that they com

prehend in tin: definitions the things defined. For what perpetual being is, which

the first definition assumes is explained,and is said to be that which always sul>-

sists with invariable sameness; and this (he second definition assumes, saying

it is that which is generated and corrupted, but ne\er truly is.Thi<, however,

is to accuse both themselves and Plato of unskilfuluess in dialectic. Jiut others

dividing the sentence, show that in each of (he colons thereare definition, and

the thing defined. For in the former colon, the words,"

that \Jiich is com

prehended by intelligence in Conjunction *t:t/i 7 cY/v-y/,"are a definition ;but the

words, sinct it alirays subsists \ritli invariable sameness, are the thing defined.

And in the second colon, the words "

is perceived !>y opinionin conjunction uith

irrational sense" are given as a definition ;but the remaining part of the sentence,

is the thing defined. To these men it will lie found our preceptorlas well

replied.

For by a little transposition of the words, the whole will be immediately apparent as

follows: Tltc.t u-liic/i ahi-in/s iubA i*ts uttlt it.i-uriablc, sameness, is- comprehended

by intelligencein conjunction

-u -ith reason: but that icliich is generated and cor-

1 For c

!"y

.n re/.f

i -.1 irrn,in llii-,

|ii;cf,it i , ri .r ii-,itc l> read ci ^ on ro

/iijuv larif.

Tin Ltfiniiing ol lhU cuiiiiiitnl.trv, is unfurUiiutfly Hauling.

B OK ii.] I IM/El S OF I l.ATO. 203

rupled,and never truly is, is perceived Inj opinion, in conjunction with irrational

sense. For these things nro consequent to w liat was before said,"

what is that whichis ah ays being but is without generation ;"

;in<l "what is that which is generated,but is never

[real] being ;"that which

always subsists with invariable sameness,

signifyingthe same

thing as,that which is

without generation ; and that which is

generated, hut is never [real], being, having the same signification as, ///<// irA/cA

never truly is. tlioujrli they are moreobscurely announced. And through the

addition of /;///// Plato indicates that so far indeed as it is generated, it is not; but

that so far as it brings with it an image of being, so far it is not generated. Forin the definitions, he renders the things defined more elear through the additions.

Thus, one of the definitions says,"

Khich i.t always bein^,"in order that by the

term always we may not understand temporal |er|)etuity, but the eternal. Forthis i all at once, and subsists with irnariable sameness. Hut temporal per

petuity, is co-extended wilh theinfinity of time. Thus, too, the other definition

has."

tl,<il n-hieli isgenerated," and together with it also says,

" and iscorrupted,"

ill order that wemr.y not understand by -reiterations simply progressions, which

are also ascribed (o the (Jods who are beyond being, but progressions which are

CO-ordinate \\itli de>truetion. The assigned definitions, therefore, are such as

follow: 1 t-rpetual being, is that which is comprehended by intelligence in conjunction

wilh reason. That which is generated is perceived by opinion in conjunction with,

irrational sense.

For tliese definitions, however, it is usual to accuse Plato, in the first place,

indeed, that he does not assume genus, as the rules of definitions require. In the

next place, that he does not manifest what the nature is of the things defined, but

distinguishes them by our kno\\ledi;e. It is necessary, however, prior to this

habitude. In consider things themsehes by themselves. But [in defence of Plato]

we shall demonstrate the very contrary, vi/. that those who are accustomed thus

to doubtperfectly err. For what kind of i;enus has a place in lein.ir, which

comprehends every intelligible essence ? For if essence has no genus prior to itself,

nor definition, since it is most generic, what can you say respecting being which

is comprehensive of every essence, and of all powers and energies? IS either, there-\

fore, is being the genus of eternal being: for if it was, it would not be simply

being, but a certain being. \or isnon-lK>ing

the genus of eternal being lest we /

should ignorantly make eternal non-being. For every where genera arc predicated

ofsj>ecies. Hence, there is not a genus of being. Besides, is not a definition

derived from knowledge adapted to theory, anil to the proposed definitions? For if,

204PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK u.

as we said before, Plato wished to use these axioms and hypotheses in the demon

strations which he intended to make, it was necessary that they should !K> known

and manifest to us. If, indeed, he hud exhorted us to investigate the nature of

things, itself in itself, he would have ignorantlyfilled the whole of hi* doctrine de

finitions with obscurity. But as he wished to make known through definitions

being and that which is generated, he produced the demonstrations through things

that are known, and clearly represents to us the peculiarityof them, in order that

bein-r excited and perfected,we may more manifestly survey what each of them

is. For since every thing "nustic,is either the thing known itself,

or pereeiies,

or possessesthe thing know ; fur intellect, indeed, is the intelligible,

hut sense JH retires

uhat is sensible, and duinoia possessesin itself the duinoetic vb/ect ;

and as we are not

naturally adapted to become tin: intelligible,but know it through the power in us

which is conjoined with it;

this being the case, we require this power, and through

this the nature of being is known to us. After this manner, therefore, we answer

the doubts.

It is requisite, however, to observe how Plato pioposing to himself the problems,

renders each of them manifest, both affirmatively and negatively. Hut giving an

answer to each, in perpetual being, indeed, he assumes the allirmative alone, but

in that which is crenerated, the negative, adding to it also," and ~<chich is

destroyed"m

He, also, explains the words,"

but iJtich is /mrbeing" through the assumption



of,"

never truly is." For since beinjj; is characterized by existence alone, but that

which is generated by non-existence, he -assumes the one, alone defining it, and

says, subsisting invariably the same; but he assumes the other together with

negation, yet not with negation alone, because definitions respect aflirmations,

and signify that which in each thing is inherent. It is not, however, wonderful,

if he notonly says

"

which is

gentrtited,"

but also," and

corruptttl"For as he.

adds to being, the words,"

subsisting with invariable sameness" and not only

says, it is akmys ;so likewise to that it Inch is generated he adds,

"

ami corrupt

ed" For tlii so far as it is generated, is diflerent from perpetual l--ing; but so

far as it is corrupted, it differs from that which is invariably the same. I or that

which is generated, so far as it is generated and corrupted,is incapable ot con

necting itself; since if it were, it would also be able to produce itself. Assuming

therefore each by itself,i. e.

beingand that which is

generated,

he assumes the

former as that which is above generation, but the latter, as that which is not

indestructible. So that when the representationof being accedes to that which is

generated, it is able after a certain manner to abide in A condition of always

becoming to be.

UOOK n.J TIMAIUS OF PLATO. 205

Jx>t us however, consider each of tlio words by itself, through which he com

poses the propositions ; and in the first place,let us see in how many -ways intelli

gence subsists, and collect by a reasoning process tlic other progressions of it.

The first intelligence therefore, is the intelligible, which passes into tlie same with

the intelligible, and is not any tiling different from it. This also is essentjal

intelligence, and essence itself, because every thing in the intelligible subsists

after this manner, viz. essentially and intelligibly.The second intelligence is that

whiclAfonjoins intellect with the intelligible, possessing a peculiarity wliich is con

nective and collective of the extremes, and existing as life and power, filling

indeed intellect from the intelligible, but establishing it in theintelligible. The

third is tliGJ

:ronjoined intelligence in a divine intellect itself, being the energy

of intellect, through which it comprehends the intelligible it contains, and accord

ing to which it intellectually perceives, and is what it is. For this intelligence is

energy, and intelligence itself, but is not intelligible intelligence. Nor does it

exist^s power, but (as we have said), as energy, and intellectual intelligence.

The^fntelligence of partial intellects has the fourth order- For ench of these

possesses this*

and entirely contains in itself a certain conjoined intelligible and

intelligence. Or rather each has all tln H i

partially,

viz. intellect, intelligence,

and the intelligible, through which also it is conjoined to total intellects, intellec



tually perceives each of these, and likewise the whole intelligible world. The fifth

intelligence is that of the rational soul. For as lit? rational soul ix mf/nl intellect,

thus ahn tin- kiinn-lcilgt of it is niklligince, ami transitive inttlligcHie,

and has time

. onndfccnt :///// /At . //.But the sixth intelligence, if you are willing also to con-

numerate this, is phantastic knowledge, or the knowledge of the imagination, which

by someis

denominated intelligence; and the phantasyis

called by them passive

intellect, because it knows suchthing>

as it does know, inwardly, and accompanied with resemblances and figures. For / / is common to all

intelligence to /ttrcc the,

djectx l its knowledge in-card. For in this also intelligence tiifters from sense.

In one order however, intelligence is the thing known itself. In another it ranks

as the second, but sees that which is first totally. In another it is partially the

ll. ing known, but sees w holes also through that which is partial.In another it

sees indeed wholes, but at the same time partially and not at once. And in

1

la the origin I. rpirq it q tvnvrif Oriy avSv-/>>f foijiru. But it H iicco.siry afler Ornf lo Juj |>lj ly.

For rovrof here, it is requisite lu read rawij*-.1 The jilunUsv is UIHJ called by Aristotle.

20G PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK n.

another, the vision is accompanied with passion.So many therefore, are the

differences of intelligence.

Now, however, phantastic intelligence must not lw> assumed; since this is not

naturally adapted to know truly existing being. For it is indefinite, because it

knows the object of its perception accompanied with figure and inorphe. But

j>er|Htnal being is unfigured. And in short, no irrational knowledge is able to

survey being itself, since neither is adapted to perceive that which is universal.

iS or must the intelligence in the rational soul be assumed. For it does not

possess tlie at-once-collected, and that which is co-ordinate with eternal natures;

but it proceeds according to time. IS or must we assume total intellections;

for

these- are. exempt from our knowledge. Hut Tinueus co-arranges intelligence

witli reason. The intelligence, therefore, of a partial intellect, must now bo

assumed. For it is in conjunction with thU, that we some tim -M- other perceive

real Ix-intr. For as sense is in the second duad below I he. ration; I soul, so intelli

gence is in the duad abo\e it. For a partial intellect ispro.viniate y established above

our essence, elevating and perfecting it, to U /m7/ :f arc comerted v//t/J purified

through philosophy, and ~ihcn TIC- conjoin our o~cn intellectual pir^er leith the intelli

gence oj this intellect. But -chat this partial intcllici is, anil that it is nut as one to one

rationalsoul,

but is

participated throughsouls *hich

always energize accordingto if,

through -Jiich al.\u partial son.s sometimes participate of intcl ectual light, ice have

elsewhere uistinctli/ and copious,^ ditcuttcd. A oa,//outrt /, tliua i/.ucli mutt be assumed,

that it is participated indeed In/ ait other jiro.iimatc dd inoniacal soul*, Init illuminates

ours, r.7/f/j "ie coinerI ourselves to it, and render the reason i\. hiehis in us intellectual. And

as in the Pha drus Plato calls this t/ic governor oj the soul, and tays that it alone intel

lectually perceives real being, l/ut lliat the soul perceives it together with this intellect,

when she i$ nourishedby

intellect and science;

thus al^o it must be said that this intel

ligence is prior to .soul, and is truly that intelligence [mentioned by IMato] but

that it is participated by soul when reason eiiergi/es intellectually. Hence IMato

bays in the following part of this dialogue, that intellect is indeed in the Gods, but

that a certain small genus \<Jmen] participates of it. And it seems that in what he

sa\s unfolding the knowledge of perpetual bein^, he first calls it intelligence;

but that we may not apprehend it to be that alone, he adds to intelligence

reason, distinguishing bya transitive

energy thelatter from the former. So

that \ihcu rut&unintellectually Jh reeires

/ler/ietual being, as reason indeed, it

energise* transitneli/, but r/v peredring intellectually, -nit It simplicity ; timlirstaml-

ing carft thing as simple at once, yet not all things at once, but passingfrom sotne to

JUM.Kii.]

TIM/KLS Oi I LATO.

others, ft transith fly hMcciw perceives intellectually n~cry thing nhich it jterccivcs

,is one thing, anda* Dimple.

After t!ir definition of intelligence however, let us set- what reason is, and how

it is connascent with intelligence. In the Theactetus therefore, Xoyoj;, reason, is

said to have a three-fold subsistence;

for it is cither enunciative, or a discursive

procession through the elements [of speech]; or that which exhibits the differences

of each tiling with respect to others. All these significations however, arc conver

sant with compositions and divisions, and arc nnadapted to the comprehension

of eternal being. For the similar is naturally adapted to he apprehended liythe

similar. 15ut eternal being is simple and indivisible, and is exempt from every

tiling which is contrary to these. A^ain, after another manner, one kind of

reason is said to be doxastic, another scientific, and another intellectual.

For since there are in us opinion, dianoia, and intellect; but I call inlelkct here,

the summitiif

dianoia ; and since the v hole of our essence is reason, in each of

ihese reason must bedillerently surveyed. Opinion however, is not naturally

adapted to be united to the intelligence of intellect in energy : for on the contrary

it is conjoined to irrational knowledge*. IVoris di.moia, so far as it proceeds into

multitude and division, able to recur to intellect; but on the contrary through the

variety of its discursive energies,it

is separated from intellectual impartiality.It remains, therefore, that the summit of the soul, and that in it which has most

the form of llic one, is e>tabli.-hed in the intelligence of a partial intellect, being

through alliance united to it. Hence this is the reason which intellectually per

ceives the intelligible* co-ordinate to our nature, and the energy of which1

Socra

tes in the Republic says is intelligence; just as dianoia is (he knowledge of things

tchich subsist between intelligible* und the objects of opinion. If, however, intelli-

gence is the energy of this n-asoii, it \\ill be a certain intellect. Plato in the ful-

lowing^art of this dialogue says, that this rctiS w in the same manner (isACI>HCC,

is

iiigciicidtcd in the

ft>i<(,irhrn it is moved about the

intelligible,lint that science has

a more various energy, apprehending some things through others, and intellect a

more simple energy, intuiti\ely surveying being* [themselves. This highest there

fore, and most impartible portion of our nature, Pialo no a. dent minutes reason, as

unfolding to us intcl ccttand an

intelligible nature. J:or when the soul abandons

phantasy and opinion, and \arious and indefinite knowledge, but recurs to its own

impartiality, according to which it is rooted in a partial intellect, and hating run

back to this, conjoins the energy of itself with the intelligence of that intellect, then

1

Instead of ri of o rrirnXirdp SwvyMirft, t<ii\mrnre r/r frrpyciar iu llii.-* |)lacc,

it i UCfeaiarj t

i ad ecu oJ o f voXirtiy iw^.arij or;<r<-cue rijK ftt^ /tntr.


it intellectually perceives eternal being together with it, its energy being both one,

and twofold, and both sameness and separation l>einginherent in its intellections.

For then the intelligence of the soul becomes more collected, and nearer to eternal

things, in order that it may apprehend the intelligible together with intellect, and

that the reason which is in us may like a Irsslight, energise in conjunction with

one that is

greater.

For our reason in

conjunctionwith

intelligence,sees the

intelligible; but the intelligence of intellect always sees it, and always is;and

\conjoins reason to it, when reason acquires the form of intellect.

After what manner however, is truly existing being comprehended by a partial

intellect, or by reason ? For this is still more admirable. May we not say, that

though the intelligibleitself cannot be comprehended by intellect and reason,

because it is superior to all comprehension, and comprehends all things exemptly,

yet intellect possessing its own intelligible, isal.>o

on this account saidto

compre-heml the whole [of an intelligible nature]. But reason through the intellect which

is co-ordinate to itself, receding the conceptions of real beings, is thus through

these said to comprehend Ix ing. Perhaps also it signifies, that reason running

round the intelligible, and energizing and being moved as about a centre, thus

surveys it; intelligence indeed knowing it intransitively and impartibly,but

^reason dancing ns it were round the essence of it in a circle, and evolving the

united hyposlasis in it of all things.

In the next place, let us direct our attention to opinion, and consider \\hat it is.

That it is therefore the boundary of the whole rational life, and that it is conjoined

to the summit of the. irrational life, is frequently acknowledged. But we shall

now unfiild such things as are the peculiaritiesof the Platonic doctrine; and

which are as follow : That the doxastic part comprehends the reasons [or pro

ductive principles] of sensibles;that it this is also which knows the essences of

them ; and that it knows the on, or ///<// a thing is, but is ignorant of the cause of

it. For since dianoia knows at one and the same time both the essences and tin.1

causes of sensible**, but sense knows neither of these; for it is clearly shown in

the Thea-telus that sense does not know the essence of a thing, and that it is

perfectly ignorant of the cause of the objects of its knowledge; it is necessary

that opinion being arranged between sense and dianoiii, should know the essence*

1 These reason* iu a divine ioul, subsist both gnostically anil fubricalivvly, ami m the human soul al>o,

liieytlnii kiiboist, when il revolves on In^li

in conjunction vsith the Gods : but during I lie union of the

oul *ith I hia ontw.ird body, they subsist in it gnostically only.

noox ii.] TIM/F.US Or PLATO. 20i)

of sensibles, through the reasons which it contains, but should l>e ignorant of the

causes of them. For thusright opinion will differ from science in this, that it

alone kno\\s//m/ a tiling is, science being able to survey likewise the cause of it.

But sense adheres to opinion, being also itself a medium between the instrument

of sense andopinion.

For the instrument of senseapprehends

sensibles accom

panied with passion. Hence also it is corrupted through the excess of sensibles.

But Opinion possesses knowledge undefiled with passion. Sense however partici

pates in a certain respect of passion, but has also something gnostic, so far as it is

established in the doxastic. part, is illuminated by it, and partakes of the form of

reason, since it is in itself irrational. In this, therefore, the series of gnostic powers

is terminated, of which indeed intelligenceis the leader, which is above reason,

and is without transition. But reason has the second order which is the intelli

gence of our soul, transitively coming into contact with real beings. Opinion

has the third order, being a knowledge of sensibles conformable to reason. And

sense has the fourth order, being an irrational knowledge of sensibles. For

dianoia, being a medium between intelligence and opinion, is gnostic of middle

forms, which require a more obscure apprehension than that of intelligence, but a

clearer perception than that of opinion ;as Socrates said on the preceding day,

when he defined the dillerent kinds of knowledge by the objects of knowledge.It must be said, therefore, that opinion is according to reason, because it



possesses gnostic reasons of the essences of things, but that it is otherwise irrational.

as being ignorant of causes. For Socrates in the Banquet, speaking of it says"

since it is an irrnfional thing, hoir can it be science ? But it must In- admitted

that sense is entirely irrational. For in short, since each of the senses knows the

passion produced about the animal by the object of sense, hence intelligence is

an intransitive, but dianoia and reason a transitive knowledge; opinion a know

ledge in conjunction with reason but without the assignation of cause ; sense an

irrational knowledge of passions; and the instrument of sense passion only.

Thus, for instance, when an apple is presented to us, the wight indeed knows that it

is red from the passion about the eye, the smell that it is fragrant from the pas

sion about the nostrils, the taste that it is sweet, and the touch that it is smooth.

What then is it which says that the thing presented to us is an apple ? For it is

not any one of the partial senses ; since each of these knows one certain thing

only about the apple, and not the whole of it; nor does even the common .sense

know this. For this alone distinguishesthe differences of the passions; but it

does not know that the thing which possesses an essence of such a kind is the

Tim. l>lat. VOL. I. 2 D

210 PROCLUS ON THE f800 * "

whole thin?. Hence, it is evident that there is a certain power superior to the

Censes, which knowing the whole priorto the things which are as it were parts,

an. I surveying the form of it, is impartiMyconnective of these many powers.

Tliis power, therefore, Plato calls opinion,and on this account, he denominates

ihatwhich is sensible doxastic.

Farther still, since the senses frequently announce various passions,and not

Midi as things of this kind are in themselves, what is it in us which judges and

says, that the sight is deceived when it asserts that the sim is hut a foot in

diameter, and that the taste which pronounces honey to !e hitter, is the taste of

those that are diseased ? For it is entirely evident that in these, and all siich-hke

particulars,the senses announce indeed their own passions,

and are not perfectly

deceived. Forthey say

what the

passion

is aliout the in-truments of sense, and

it is a thin^ of such a kind as they assert it to lie; hut that which says what the

cause is of the passion, and forms a judgment of it, i> something dillerent from

sense. Hence, there U a certain power of the soul superiorto sense, which no

longer knows sensible* through an instrument hut through itself, and corrects the

Crossness of sensible information. And this power indeed which is reason as

with reference to sense, is irrational as with reference to the knowledge of truly

existing U-ings. But senseis

simplyirrational. On this account, LMato in the

Republic calling this power opinion, shows that it is a medium between

knowledge and ignorance: for it is indeed a rational knowledge, but it is

mingled with irrationality, knowing sensible* in conjunction with sense. I ut

sense is alone irrational, as Tima-us also denominates it; in the first place,

because it is also inherent in irrational animals, and is characteristic of every

irrational life; for by these things, what is said in the Thea-tetus distinguishes

it from science. In the second place, because in contradistinctionto all the

parts

of the irrational soul, it is disobedient to reason. For the irascible and epithy-

metie parts,are obedient to reason and its mandates, and receive from it erudi

tion. But sense though it should hear reason ten thousand times asserting that

the Mill is greater than the earth, \et would still see it to be a foot in diameter,

and would not otherwise announce it to us. In tin; third place,because neither

does it [accurate! v] know that which it knows. For it is not naturally adapted

to see the essence of it. For it does not know what a white thing is, but it knows

tlirough passion that it is white. It likewise is not separatedfrom the instrument

of sense,1

and is therefore on this account irrational. For thus in the Georgia*,

1Instead of

*.amy>iruiJf TO

ataO>jT>,fnrin this place,

it isn>ce$iar)

to read ov tiakttptrai tt row

HOOK ii.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 211

irrational knowledge is defined to he not scientific, i)iit conjectural, fn the fourth

place,sense is alone irrational, because it is the boundary ofthe whole series of

knowledge, pos<

sses an essence most remote; from reason and intellect, pertains

to externals, and effects its apprehension of things through body. For all these

particularsdemonstrate its irrationality.

Every thing gem-rated then-fore is apprehended by opinion in conjunction with

sense; the latter announcing passions, but the former producing from itself the rea

sons of them, and knowing the essences of sensibles. And as reason when in con

tact with intelligence sees theintelligible, thus also opinion co-arranged with sense,

knows that which is generated. For since the soul is of a middle essence it gives

completion to a subsistence between intellect andirrationality. For by its sum

mit it is present with intellect, but by its ultimate part it verges to sense. Hence

also Tuna-us in the former conjunction, arranges intelligence prior to reason, as

being more excellent ;but in the sucond he places opinion before sense. For

there indeed, reason is posterior to intelligence, as being a less intellect; but here

opinion is priorto sense, as being rational sense. Opinion however, and reason

circumscribe the whole breadth of the rational essence. JJut intellect is our king,

and sene our messenger, says the great IMotinus. Heason indeed, together^

with intellect, sees the intelligible; but by itself it surveys reasons or forms that

have a middle subsistence. And opinion in conjunction with sense, sees that

which is generated ;but by itself it contemplates all the forms it contains, con

cerning which we have elsewhere spoken, have shown how these formssubsi>t,

how the. place of them is the doxastic part of the soul, and that the intelligible

is apprehended by reason, but by opinion, the intelligible is seen as a doxastic

object. For the object of its knowledge is external to, and not within it, as the

intelligible is within reason. Hence the object is not comprehended by it, but

is called opinable and not sensible;

l>ecause opinion knows indeed the essences

of things, hut sense does not. Hence too, it receives the appellation of a clearer

knowledge, which knows what a thing is, but not alone that it is, which latter we

say is the employment of sense ; and in consequence of this Tiniitus very pro-/

j>erlycalls that which is generated the. object of opinion. For this is I ylhagoric ;

since Parmenides also considered the discussion of sensibles, a.s a discussion

according

to

opinion; sensibles

beingin their own nature

perceptible bythis

1 Instead of cr |lacr, it is DCCCary

to read crri citi o llapfunbii, rqr rrpc rvr ai90r)rwr rpuy^iurf ia>.

oio PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK 11.

power of thr srud. Hence it is notpro|>er

to call that which is generated sensi

ble alone, localise sense is not gnostic of any essence, nor the object of opinion,

without the addition of sense.

Here however, Aristotle particularly blames the second assertion of Timicus.

For where is it

[universally]

true that \\hat is

perceived by opinionin

conjunctionwith sense is generated and corrupted ? For heaven is u.ihegotten and indes

tructible, though it is perceived by opinion in conjunction with sense. And

Tima-ns in the couise of this dialogue, inquires whether the whole heaven was

generated. At present, therefore, it must be said by us, that generation and cor

ruption subsist according to analogy in the hea\ens, not only according to the

motions and mutations of figures,but also because a celestial body is not prtn

duced by itself, but alone subsists from another cause. Hence it is generatedas having the cause of its subsistence suspended from another tiling [diflerent

from itself. Since, however, it not only subsets from, lint is connected by another,

not lieing able to connect itself, and is corrupted according to its own proper

reason, on this account it assumes generation co-ordinately \\itli corruption. For

truly existing and eternal beings generate themselves, and are connected-toy

themselves, whence also they are said to be in their own nature iiiibegottcn and

indestructible. If, however, truly existing being is nnbegotten, and therefore sub-

Msts from itself, that which does not subsist from itself will not be truly unbe-



gottcn. And if that \\hich is truly indestructible is naturally adapted to connect

itself, that which is not naturally adapted to connect itself \\ill not be truly

indestructible. Heaven, however, but I mean by hea\en the corporeal-formed

nature of it alone, is neither adapted to produce nor to connect itself. For every

tiling of this kind which produces and connects itself, is impartible. Hence, it is

neither truly nnbegotten nor trulj indestructible, but so far as pertains to its

corporeal nature, it is generated and made. Farther still, as Aristotle himself

says, and clearly and generously demonstrates, no finite body possesses an inli-

nitepouer. But the celestial body is Unite, and therefore does not possess an

infinite power. The indestructible, howe\er, so far as indestructible, possesses an

infinite power. Hence body, so far as body, is not indestructible. So that from

the reasoning of Aristotle it is demonstrated to be a thing of this kind. But alter

what manner the heaven is unbegotten and j>erpetual,will be manifest to us

1lii-trail of on apa OT yeKijrw tonv in lliij place, it is olmouil) necessary to read ovc apa on-wi

BOOK ii.] TLM.LUS OF PLATO. 213

shortly after. i\o\v, however, this alone is evident from what has hern said, that

every tiling corporeal, is of itself, or in its own nature generated and corrupted,

hut never truly is, as Plato also says in the Politicus. For he there observes"

thai to subsist always invariably the same, alone pertains to the most divine of ail

tilings. But the nature of body is not of this order. That, howci-er, which we de

nominate heaven or the world, possesses indeed many and blessed prerogatives fmmits generator ; but, as it partakes of body, it is impossible that it should be.

entirely fire from mutation? We have shown, therefore, how the heaven falls

under the above-mentioned distinctions.

If however, the da moniaeal Aristotle, should again doubt respecting what is

said of eternal being, not enduring to say that every thing which always is, is

comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason; since the most divine

of visible objects always exist; we think it fit, that he should not confound the

eternal, and that which subsists through the whole; of time. For In; also distin

guishes eternity from time; and attributes the former indeed to intellect, but the

latter to lumen, and the motion of heaven. That always-existing being, there

fore, the eternal, is a thing of such a kind as Tiniit iis defines it to be. The

most divine, however, of visible objects, are after another manner perpetual, and

not according to an eternal

permanency.But

theyare

producedin the whole of

time from their causes, and the whole of their existence is in bceomin^ to be.O

This also is said by Aristotle, that eternity is connascent with

intelligible^, pos

sessing and comprehending in itself infinite time;and therefore the eternal is truly

intelligible.

1

If, however, that which always is, signifies the eternal, why is it ne

cessary to refer the nature of heaven to thisperpetual heiiij;, and why should we

not say that it is always generated, or becoming tol>e,

as beingco-extended with

theperpetuity

of time ?

Sothat we shall thus dissolve

the objections from his ar

guments, which he urges against these definitions. Since, however, we have

replied to this inquiry, we shall dismiss it;

for it will be spoken of hereafter.

But, in short, the opinion of Plato concerning criteria, may from these things

be assumed. For dilferent persons admitting a different criterion, some asserting

that it is sense, as the Protagorcans, others opinion, as he who said,

Opinion i in all

tilings

Irjm d;

1

It is necessary litre, to supply tire word aec.

Instead of TO qtwrtof roijror orrot vrny in this place, it appears to me that we should read rai

TO aiwnor apa roip-oc CITWI c?nr.

.214PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK n.

others that itjs reason, and others that it is intellect; Plato divides the essence of

the criteria conformably to things themselves, attributing intellect to intelligibles,

dianoia to dianoetic objects, opinion to doxastie objects, and sense to sen-

sibles. You must not however fancy that the criteria are on this account di-

vulsed according to him from each other. For the soul is both one and a mul

titude. If, therefore, the soul which judges is both one and a multitude, the judicial

power will also b>- both uniform and multiform. Some one therefore may say,

what is this one power?We reply, reason. For this, when it proceeds to the

survey of intelligibles,uses both itself and intelligence; not that intelligence in

deed "is the instrument, and reason that which uses it, as the Platonic Severus

thou"ht, considering intelligenceas inferior to reason, but that intelligence

is tlie

,li<jlit of rtaAOit, perfecting

and titrating it, and illuminating its gnostic power.

Hut when it forms a judgment of middle reasons, it alone uses dianoia and

itself, and through this is converted to itself. When also it decides on objects

of opinion,it moves opinion ;

but in judging of objects of imagination, it excites

the phantasy,and in judging of sensibles, sense. For when it considers the

sensible essence of forms, such as is every sensible object, it uses opinion as the

cu-adjutor of its speculation.For in this the reasons of sensibles subsist. But

when it directs its attention to the positionor figure of a certain thing, as for in

stance, to the manner in which the earth is posited,which has in its summit a

habitude to the heavens, it then excites the phantasy, in order that it may



survey the object of its inquiry accompanied with interval and morphe, as it is.

And when it considers an eclipse, it employs sense as an adjutor in its obser

vations. At one time also, it admits the judgments of the second powers; but

at another, it blames the errors which they frequently happen to commit on ac

count of the instruments.

Concerning

the criteria therefore, thus much may

sullice for the present ;for we have discussed these things more copiously in our

Commentaries on the Theajtetus. From what has been said, however, the great

accuracy of the before-mentioned definitions is evident.

But if you are willing, we will also survey the same thing according to another

method. I say, therefore, that the nature which is primarily perpetual being, is

that which is eternal according to all things, vi/. according to essence, power,

and energy. And that thenature which is

simply generated,

is that which re-

reives all its essence, power and energy in time. For it is necessary that the

1

II isrequisite here to supply the word tr.

*For xaauiv here, read -ruaar.

BO K "]

TIM/F.US OF PLATO. OJ5

former should IH> wholly eternal, but the latter wholly temporal. And that the

former should be at onco every thin- in a self-subsisterit manner, l.ut that the

latter should have its hypostasis suspended elsewhere than from itself, and con

sisting in an extension of existence. Since these, however, are the extreme*,tlie media are, ihin-s \\hirh in a certain

respect participate of a portion of king,and in a certain

respect communicate with generation. Hut again, there are twonatures which participate of neither of these, one in consequence of being su-

]MTior, hut the other through being inferior to them. For matter is neitherbe-in"-,

nor that which is generated. For it is neither comprehended by intelligence, urn-

is sensible. And this also is true of the one, as Parmenides demonstrates of both

these, of the latter in the first, ami of the former in the fifth hypothevis.

Perpetual being, therefore, is the whole of theintelligible, and the whole of the

intellectual genus, every supermundane intellect, every intellect participated hydivine souls, ami every intellect which is called

partial, and isparticipated bv an-

ri-ls, and da-mons;and by partial souls, through angels and dirmons as media.

And as far as to this, perpetual being extends. For every intellect energizes

eternally, and is measured in the whole of itself by eternity. Jiut that which is

generated, is every thing which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner, andwhich in conception is surveyed prior to the production of the world

; likewise

e\ery thin- which is properly generated and corrupted, heaven, and all these

sensible and visible natures. Tiur.eus also defines that which is simply generated,

and that which is



simply perpetual bein-, to be these. ]Jut the intermediate

natures are those which communicate with both these; and on each side of them

are th;? natures which participate of neither of these. Hence TimuMis proposesboth of them afiirmalively and negatively, as for instance, perpetual being, and

without generation, and again, that ic/iic/i is generated, and ix nercr real being, in

order that through the admirations he may separate them from things which

are the recipients of neither, but that through the negations they may be distin

guished from things which in a certain respect participate of both.

As these, therefore, are the extremes, vi/. every intelligible and intellectual

essence, and every sensible essence, let us direct our attention to the intermediate

nature. For TimaMis calls both time and the soul generated. And it is evident

that these, as not being sensible, are in a certain respect lyings, and in a certain

resect generated, but]>erfectly

neither of these. Porphyry, therefore, rightly

observes, that Plato now defines the extremes, vi/,. that which isprimarily

Fur xnpaTrnffd litre, rend waparaati.

2I6 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK n.

and that which is alone generated, and that he omits the media ;such for instance

as, that which is at one and the same time being and a generated nature, or that which

is both generated and being ;of which being and generated are adapted to the nature

of souls, but vice versa that which is gnu-ratal and being,are allied to the summit

of generated natures. Such as this, however, is the nature of the universe which

vivifies the universe. For this n;.ture so far as it is divisible about bodies, is

uenerated, but so far as it is entirely incorporeal, is unhejjotten. But it is absurd

to say that matter is both generated and luinif. For thus it would be sii|erior to

generated sensible natures, since these are irenerated alone, but matter would also

participateof beint;. And if you are willing separately

to assume that which is alone

perpetual bem-, and that which is alone generated, by taking away from one of

the definitions intellect, and from the other sense; you will produce the definition

of the medium. For this is known by reason and opinion. For reason knows

both itself and opinion, and opinion knows itself an.Treason ;the former indeed

both in conjunction with cause; but the latter both, without cause. For in this

reason and opinion dill er from each other. Opinion also is known by reason, and

reason by opinion. And the whole [rational] soul subsists through both these

which are media. Thus too, by assuming the worse of the two upward terms,

vi/. reason, and making it to be spurious reason, and of the two downward terms

sense, and making it to be insensible sense, you will then have the manner in which

Plato thought matter may be known, vi/. by spurious reason, and insensible sense.

Assuming likewise analogously in each, that which is the better of the two, and

making it to be spurious according to that which is more excellent, you will

Lave the manner in which the one is known, viz. by a spurious intellect, and

spurious opinion. Hence it is not properly simple, and is not known from cause.

It is known then-fore by a spurious knowledge, l*ecause it is known in a superior

manner according to each. For opinion does not know from cause, and the one

is not known from cause, but from not having a cause. And intellect knows that

which is simple; but a spurious intellect knows the one, because it is superior to

intellectual perception. The superior therefore, here, is spuriousas with reference

to intellect, as the une also is more excellent than that which is simple, such as

that is which is intelligible to truly existing intellect, and to which intellect is

allied and i> not spurious. It perceives therefore, the one, by that in itself which is not

intellect. But this is the out in it, according to which also it is a Cod.

1

For <iri here, it U iiecei ary to read n.fitu. For 1 iocluj ii ipeAing of the ro ft.

BOOK n.l TIM/KUS OI- PLATO.<J17

"

Every tiling however, which is generated, is from necessity generated

by a certain cause. For it is perfectly impossible that it should have

generation without a cause."

TimaMis, in a manner truly conformable to tlio geometric method, aAcr the

definitions assumes these axioms. For having said what being and what that which

is generated are, he adds these other common conceptions ;that the

tiling which

is generated, is entirely generated hy a cause; hut that thetiling which is not

generated by a cause, cannot have generation. From these axioms also it is

evident that TO o<oui.roj/, does not Dignity the dividing method, Imt that the

hypotheses are to he defined. For the assertion that every thing which is generat

ed, is necessarily generated by a certain cause, and that it is impossible for it to

have generation without a cause, and also the following axiom, that what w

generated according to an eternal paradigm is rendered heautiful, all these being

axioms, are to IK- considered as belonging to the term oo^crrtov, and not to l>e

parts of division. Since however one of the present axioms is more clear, hut the

other is less known and clear, hence Timicus places the one as the middle term,

hut the other as the conclusion. For the axiom, every thing which is generated,

is necessarily generated by a certain cause, is the conclusion. But the axiom,

it i.s entirely impossible that it should have generation without a cause, is the

middle, in order that the syllogism may be categoric, and may l>c in the first



figure, as follows : It is impossible for that which is generated to [tc generated

without a cause. But this is necessarily generated by a certain cause. Every

thing therefore which is generated, is from necessity generated by a certain cause.

For it is letter to collect what is said after this manner, as the diune lamblichus

also thinks we ought, than to make, as some other persons do, the syllogism to

be hypothetical. But how is the middle more known than the conclusion ? For

it is evident that a thing must necessarily be, which it is impossible should not be,

and that it is impossible a thing should not be, which necessarily is. Or in a

certain respect each of these is the same. But frequently it is not known that a

thing necessarily is, but that it is impossible for it not to be, is known. Thus for

instance, the physician says [tohis patient} it is necessary you should l>e

nourished, and he will in a less

degree persuadethe sick man. But if he

says,it

is impossible to live withoutl>cing nourished, this will now comjH-1 the patient [to

take nutriment]. And again, death is neccHsary through a certain cause : for it

is impossible not to die[i.

e. to avoid death]. And, it is necessary to give money

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. 2 E

. FKOCLUS ON THE [BOOK 11.

that i owing to a tyrant : for it is impossible not to give it. And in a great

variety of other instance*, you may in a similar manner see, that one of these is

more obscure, but the other more known, though both may appear to signify the

same thing.

How, therefore, in the words l>efore us, is the one clearer than the other? For

what if in some things this should be true, but in others not? May we not say,

that hero also it is easy to learn how that which is generated, when it is separated

from its cause, is powerless and imbecile? For notl>eing

able to preserve itself,

neither is it connected by itself, liut as it derives from its cause alone its preser

vation and connexion, if it is M-p.ir.ttedfrom its cause, it is eudent that it becomes

of itself powerless,and

l>cing dissipated, departsinto non-entity, which also

demonstrates that what is generated, cai.not 1,.- generated without a cause. For

if it U generated, it is generated by si ce.L in maker. Hence it is rightly said in

the Philebus, that what is generate.! is miulr, but that which make* is the cause to

that which is made1

[of its being made]. If, however, this be the rase, it is either

{reiterated by itself, or by another. Hut if by itsrlf, itpa>srs

into the MUIIU with

|>erpetnal l*-ing ;and thus that which is gem -rated, and that which always is, will

l>e the same, and a generated nature will rank among things that have an eternal

subsistence. Hut if it is not generated by itself, it is entneK generated by another.

For il is necessary that what is generated, should be gnu-rated by something, if

it is that which is generated, and not [real] being. Fur not connecting itself, nor

itself in it will sutler this from something else. And being itself



making energy,

by itself imbecile, it will derive power from another. Farther still, though the

same thins: should both act and suller, so far indeed as it is that which Milli-rs, it

suiters from another, anil so far as it is cliective it operateson another. That also

which is generated,so far as it is generated suffers. Hut if it sutlers, it suffers

from something rise : for it is not naturally adapted to generate itself. For it

would IK.- before it is generated, and would be in energy priorto subsisting in

e-ipacity.For il is necessary that what ojx-i-ates

should operate in energy on

that which is in capacity. Plato, therefore, conjoining that which is generated to

cause, which he does in the conclusion, very pvoj>erlyuses the termfrom necessity.

For firmness and stability accompanied by JHrsuasion accede to that which is

generated, from its cause : just as he says in the I oliticus, that a renovated immor

ality is imparted to the world from its father. Hut separating that which is

1

I or ry yiyi-f/irry here, it is requisiteto rta.l ry in.tv/^iy.

:.,,OK ii.]TIM^US OF PLATO.

21}>

generated from its cause, which he does in the middle, he uses the termimpossible.

For that which is generated, surveyed by itself, is inefficacious and imperfect.

Moreover, in employing the word cause, he indicates the uniform power of the

demiurgic principle ; calling the demiurgic cause, not simply that which give*

subsistence to another thing ;for Socrates says that the good is the cause of intelli-

gibles, but it is not the demiurgic cause of them. For the demiurgic is attributed

to generation as Plato says in the Philebus,"

that the demiurgic refers to that

"rhick isgenerated." Hence, prior to the world, there are different causes of

different things, but there are not demiurgic causes of generated natures. I

therefore, there are many demiurgic causes, there is also one such cause [prior to

the many]. For in short, if that which is generated is one, union must accede to

it from its cause, and therefore it is much more necessary that its cause should be

uniform and connective of multitude, in order that what is generated may become

one conformably to the union pre-existing in its cause. And thus much con

cerning these particulars.

It is here, however, usual to enumerate all the causes, and the differences of

causes according to Aristotle;nor is this done unmethodically. For it is requi

site- to say that every cause is either essential or accidental, [and this proximately

or remotely,] and that these subsist in a two-fold respect, either simple or complex.

All these, likewise, have a two-fold subsistence;as they are either in capacity, or

in energy. For thus the multitude of them may be surveyed. For on account of

the essential and accidental, there are two modes of the explication of causes.

But on account of these being attributed in a two-fold respect, either proximately

or remotely, there are four modes. And again, on account of all these subsisting

in ft two-fold respect, either as simple or complicated with each other, there are

eightmodes.

Throughthese also

l>eing two-fold,either in

energy,

or in

capacity,there are sixteen modes. But on account of causes being predicated in a four-fold

respect according to Aristotle, but according to Plato, causes subsisting in a three

fold,1

and con-causes also, though in a different way, in a three-fold respect, hence

according to the former, there will be sixty-four modes of causes ; [but according

to the latter there will be forty-eight modes of causes,] and the same number of

con-causes. For thus the assumption will Incomej>erfectly

methodical ; though

that of Plato is usually omitted by the interpreters, who having enumerated causes

1Tbete causes are, iho producing, \\\t paradigmatic, and \\\vjinnl:

and llir con-caur are, matter,

mattrial cautu, mnrl form.

220PUOCLUSONTHK

[BOOIC-II.

according to Aristotle, enquire how it is said that every tiling which is generated,

is gemTated by a certain cause. NVe, however, omitting all this superfluous discu*-

tion, say that Timaeus is here Awaking about the efli-ctive cause. Hence he uses the

words, by a certain cause. For the term Ay rr/m//, is adapted to that which IN

eflective. .But he adds a certain cause. For the intellect of the universe, soul

and nature, are said to !M> producing causes, and prior to these, other causes have

this dignity, yet a,s many things are generated, and there are many causes, though

not of each particular, the word certain is very projw-rly added. For each par

ticular is generated hy a certain cause, and not hy all cause-. These thingH

therefore are manifest.

This axiom, however, is entirely derided by the Fpieurcans, who make the

whole world, and the most divine of \isjhle natures to be the work of chanee.

lint by the Aristotelians, for the name alone it is thought worthy of revrrcncr.

For they say indred, that what is generated, is entirely generate<l liya certain

rause, but they undesigned I y make the cause to be causeless, when they enumerate

chance with causes. I or chance is this very thing, (lie O/N.U/O*. Hut Plato alone,

following the Pythagorean?!, rightly nays that every thing which is generated, JK

generated by a cause, and places over generated natures, Fate and (iod. I or

though generated natuies are many, and separated from each other, and which

also on this account are generated from many causes, producing in a different

manner, yet there is one cause collective and connective of the makers, in

order that there may be nothing in vain, or adventitious in the universe. For it

is not that should !>e I>l then-, however, be one



proper beings gou-rned badly.

nder, one cause of all things, one providence, and one chain of beings; let there he,

also together with the monad an appropriate multitude, many kings, various

causes, a multiform providence, and a different order; yet every where multitude

has a co- arrangement about the monad, things various about that \vhich is simple,

thin & s multiform about that which is uniform, and things different about thatt7

which is common, in order that a truly golden chain may have dominion over all

things, and that all things may be constituted in a In-coming manner. For if, as

Aristotle says, all things are co-arranged with a view to form, it is necessary that

there should be a cause of the co-ordination, and that nothing which is in vain

should have a place in the universe, but that what appears to be in vain to apart,

should IK-

advantageous

to ;he whole. These ob>crvations, however, have been

made elsewhere.

1J hoe art the wonh of Arislollr, in the l. tli book ofhu

Mtl.i|>li\!>ii-s.

B,,OK ii.] TIM.EL S OF PLATO. 221

lint what is said in the Philebus appears to be more universal than this axiom,

vi/. that every tiling which is mixed, subsists from a rertain cause of the mixture.

For if things \vhieli are mingled, are not to be mingled casually, it is necessary there

should ! one cause collective of the separated natures, ami imparting union to

the mingled form. This cause, however, is in one mixture God, in another intel

lect,in another

soul,in another

nature,and in another a certain

art,imitatin"-

Onature. Indeed, every thing which is generated, is mingled, but not every thing

which is mingled is generated. For the first of beings, bound andinfinity, subsist

mingled with each other. From these, therefore, Plato says other things, and also

bodies derive their subsistence. All that is said here therefore, is analogous to all

that is said in the Philebus, viz. the Demiurgns to the one, form to bound, matter

to the infinite, and that which is generated to that which is mixed. Jiut the latter

are more universal than the former ; because the latter [viz. the one, bound, the

infinite, and that which is mixed,] are beheld in all things, but the former [vi/. the

Demiurgus, form, matter, and that which is generated] are seen in mundane natures

only. For intellect is mixed, as being knowledge, and as possessing infinite

power, and also soul, as being at one and the same time impartible and partible.

J fence, a certain cause, is the cause of that which is generated, just as that which

is generated is a ctrtain mixture, and not every mixture; by which also it is evi

dent that the J)emiurgns is sulordiiiatc to the one, since he produces indeed a

mixture, but a mixture which is generated. For since the causes of the world

are these, the final, the paradigmatic, the eflective, the organic,1

the formal, and



ihe material, Tima-us indeed points out to us afterwards, from reason and demon

stration, the final cause, but delivers the organic, the formal, and the material

cause, from the former before-mentioned axioms. For if the uniu rse is not [real]

being, but that which is generated, it is a form participated by matter, and by

the organic, formal, and material causes is proximately moved. But Tima-us

unfolds to us the eJlective cause from what is now said. For if the universe is

generated, there is an effective cause of it. And he unfolds the paradigmatic cause

in what will be said afterwards. For if the world is beautiful it was generated

according to an eternal paradigm. So that through these axioms investigating

for us the causes of the universe, he delivers all things in order. And the hypo

theses aflord him this utility.

" When therefore, an artificer looking to that which possesses an inva

riable sameness of subsistence, and always employing* a certain paradigm1 There i an omiHon lirre, in Ibc original, of TO opyonroK.*For wpoir^nfufoi iu this plate, it isnctessary lo read

222 1 ROCLUS ON THE [BOOK it.

of this kind, expresses in his work the idea and power of it, then it is

necessary that the whole should be a beautiful effect; but when he looks

to that which is generated, employing a generated paradigm, then his

work will not be beautiful."

This also is in continuity with what has been said. For the paradigmatic is

investigated after the effective cause; except that the before-mentioned axioms

contribute to our discovering that there is a demiurgic cause of the universe, hut

the present axiom* do not contribute to the discovery that there is a paradigma

tic cause of the world, but to the knowledge of what kind of a paradigm it is,

whether eternal or generated. For from there being an elective cause, it follows

that there is aKo a paradigm, eitherpre-existing in the maker himself, or external

to him, and either superior, or inferior to, or of the same rank with him. For

universally, that which makes, living extended to a certain form, makes that

which it wishes to insert in the thing made. This therefore follows. It is neces

sary however to find that which is next in order, vi/,. whether the mundane para

digm is eternal, or generated. Hut to this the proposed axioms contribute : and

the whole of what is said, will In- truly consentaneous to itself. If the universe is

generated, there is a IVmiurgus of it;

if there is a Demiurgus of the universe, there

is also a paradigm. And if indeed that which is generated is beautiful, it was gene

rated on account of an eternal paradigm. But if it was not, that which is generated

is not beautiful. So that a continuedsyllogi>m

such as the following is produced.

The world was generated. livery thing generated, has a demiurgic cause. Every

tiling having a demiurgic, has also a paradigmatic cause. The world, therefore, has

both a demiurgicand paradigmatic cause. And as in the first axioms then* weretwo

hypotheses, what perpetual being is, and what that is which is generated, and

two other in the second axioms, viz. every thing which is generated has a cause,

that which has not a cause, is not generated ;thus also in these, then- are two

common conceptions, that which is generated on account of an intelligible para

digm is beautiful, that which is generated on account of a generated paradigm is

not beautiful.

Kach also of these isperfectly true. For he who makes on account of the intel

ligible, either similarly, or dissimilarly, imitates it. And if indeed similarly, he

makes the imitation l>eautiful : for there, that which is primarily l>eaiitifiil,sul>-

sists. Hutifdissimilarly, he does not make on account of the

intelligible: for on the

contrary, he falls oll from the similitude. And he who makes any thing on account

HOOK ii.] TIM^US OF PLATO. 223

of that which is generated, if he truly directs his attention to it, evidently docs

not make that which is beautiful. For this very thing is full of dissimilitude, and

is not that which is primarily beautiful; whence that which is generated on

account of it, is much more separated from beauty. Hence Phidias also, who

made the [celebrated] statue of Jupiter,would not have arrived at the conception

of the Jupiter iu Homer, if he had looked at a generated resemblance of the God.And if he had been able to extend himself to the intellectual Jupiter, it is evident

that he would have rendered his work still more iH-autiful. For from the para

digm indeed, beauty or the want ofl>eauty

accedes to the image ;but from the

maker, similitude or dissimilitude to the archetyjK? is derived. With reference to-

both however, the image is said to be the image of the paradigm, but the work

an ellect of the maker. On this account also Timvrus, when he speaks of the

paradigm, conjoins with it its image: for he says,"

Tints therefore ~a e must speak

concerning t/ic paradigm an<l itsii/nigc."

But when he speaks of the Demiurgus,

he conjoins \\ilh him his work : for he then says,"

Of whom I am the Demiurgus

andfather of works."

Since however paradigms are triple ;for there is either an eternal paradigm of

an eternal thinu, ,or an eternal paradigm of a generated tiling, or a generated pa

radigm of a generated tiling; hence when there is ;.n eternal paradigm of aa

eternal thing, that which is entirely eternal is the paradigm of that which is so in

a certain respect,as intellect of soul. But when there is an eternal paradigm of

a generated nature, this paradigm also is in a certain respect eternal, i.e. according



to infinite time. And when there is an entirely generated paradigm of a generated

nature, this (alls oil from eternity. For it is not possible that what is essentially

generated, should be productive of eternal natures. The former, therefore, par

ticipate from their paradigms of In-auty and order, as being imitations of a stable

nature; but the latter, as deriving their subsistence from things mutable and in

motion, are not beautiful, and yet are not entirely deformed, but are alone mani

fested through the negation of beauty. Such things, therefore, as are the beautiful

progeny of art, are not beautiful when compared with the beauty which ac

cedes from an eternal paradigm to sensible paradigms.1

And perhaps on this

account also, Tinurus docs not say that what derives its subsistence according to

a

generated paradigm,is

entirelydeformed, but

only

that it is not beautiful. For

that which is constituted according to artificial reason, does not bubsist confonn-

For orofiuai here, it teem* ncccs^aiy to raH, rop

2-24 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK u.

ably to an eternal form, since there are not in intellect paradigms of tiling*

artificial. Hence, they are not simply beautiful, nor yet are they deformed,

l>ecause in short, they derive their subsistence according to reason, [or that pro

ductive principle which is in the mind, of the artist.] That these axioms there

fore are true, we may through these observations be reminded.

Some however doubt, how Plato assumes asathing acknowledged, that there

is a Demiurgus of the universe who looks to a paradigm : for there is not a De-

miurgus of it say they who directs his attention to that which is invariably the

same. And many of the ancients indeed are the patrons of this assertion; among

whom are the Epicureans, who entirely deny the existence of that which is per

fectly eternal. The Stoics admit that there is .1 Demiurgus, but assert that he

is inseparable from matter. And thePeripatetics grant indeed, that there is some

thing which is separate from matter, yet do not allow that it is a producing, but

that it is a final cause. Hence they also take away paradigms, and place over

the whole of things an intellect void of multitude. Plato however and the

Pythagoreans celebrate a separate and exempt Demiurgus of the universe, a pro

ducing cause of all things, and a providence that is attentive to the welfare of

wholes; and this with the greatest propriety; for if the world, as Aristotle says,

aspires after intellect, and is moved towards it, whence does it derive this di-sire I

.For since the world is not the first of things, it is necessary that it .should pooses.s

this tendency, from a cause which excites it to desire. For he also says that the

appetible is motive of that which is appetitive. But if this is true, and the world



by its very lx-ing and according to nature is appetitiveof intellect, it is evident

that the whole of its existence is from thence, whence also its being appetitive

is derived. Whence likewise is the world, since it is finite, moved ad infmitunl ?

For every body possesses, as he says, a finite power. Whence therefore does the

universe derive this infinite power, since it is not from chance, as Epicurus says

it is? In short, if intellect is the cause of a motion which is infinite, uninterrupted,

and one, there is something which is productive of the eternal. But if this Iw

the case, what should hinder the world from being perp -tual, and deriving its

subsistence from a paternal cause;

for as it receives an infinite power of being

moved, from the appctible, through which it is moved ad intinitiim, thus also it

will entirely receive from thence an infinitive power of existing, through the pro

position which says, that in a finite body there is not at any time an infinite

power. Either therefore, it has not a power through which it is connected, and

HOOK i..]TIM.r.US OF PLATO. 225

how ia this possible ? For every thing partible, lias something impartible which

connects it, us Aristotle himself somewhere says, and the universe also is an

animal. He therefore says that God is an eternal animal, but every animal is

connected by the life which is in it. Or the universe has, indeed, a power which

connects it, but this power is finite. This, however, is impossible: for if it is finite,

it will fail. Or it possessesan infinite power. And again, it will not have this

from itself. Something else, therefore, imparts to it the power of existing, and

imparts not the whole at once. For it is notreceptive of the whole at one time.

Hence it imparts this power by influx, and the influx is perpetual, and always as

much as the world is able to receive. .So that the world is always becoming to be,

and never is.

Hut if intellect is the Demiurgus of the world, whether does it make that which

it makes, by a reasoning process, or by its very bring ? If indeed by consulting,

an absurdity follows. For there will be a mutation about it, and the passions of

a partial soul. It will not therefore consult. And if it should consult, it

must entirely antecedently assume in itself the work about which it consults;

just as every one does who consults In-fore he energizes. But if it makes by

its very being, it makes that which is similar to itself. And if it does this,

it willcontain

the-

paradigms ofthe

things thatan;

generated. And again,we must investigate, whether these paradigms subsist primarily in it, or not, and

whence it derives this paradigmatic cause of wholes. Farther still, after what

manner do we see artificers that an; here produce? Is it not by possessing the

reasons cr productive principlesof their effects ? This, therefore, the demoniacal

Aristotle will also grant. But if art imitates nature, it isnece>sary

that natrire,

much priorto art, should contain the reasons of the things which she generates.

And if nature does this, we must inquire whence she is moved, and whence she is

perfected ? For she is irrational;and thus ascending, we must say that the causes

of all things arc in intellect. In opposition to Aristotle, indeed, much has

been said by many ;but our business, at present, is to explore what Plato says.

In the first place, then-fore, let us investigate from what cause he introduces to

generated natures the beautiful and the not beautiful, from the paradigm, and not

from tin- producing cause. It might then have been said, that there are two-fold

demiurgic causes, vi/. the generated and the intelligible, the latterl>eing

effective

of beautiful things, but the former of things that are not beautiful. But I lato

does -not speak after this manner, but says thatintelligible paradigms arc the

paradigms of Ijcaiitiful cflects, but generated paradigms, of HUC!I as are uot beau*

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. 2 F

&

2.29 PROCLUSONTHE [HOOK n.

liful. It tnav however be said, that what is here asserted contributes to enulition,

exhorting- us not to reject beautiful actions. For if lie had said that what is gene

rated, is not eflective of beauty, perhaps he might have rendered us more sluggish

with respect to beautiful actions. But it will be better and more physical, if we

>.iv that it is possiblefor the same eflective cause to look to two-fold paradigms,

and to make a certain thing beautiful, and a certain thin-; not beautiful. For

soul looking to intellect, generate* truth and science, but looking to generation,

she procreates imaginations, and passive appetites,lint it is impossible for the

same paradigm to be the cause of beautiful and noi beautiful ellects. Very properly

therefore is it asserted, that from this cause beauty and deformity accede to lie-

rated natures. AS the paradigm however of this universe is beautiful, it i> evident

tliut it is intelligible, and always sub-.i>ts inv ariaMy the >ame : to which al>o the

Demiurgus looking, adonis tin- universe. If, therefore, it is the supplier of beauty,

it h;ts the highest order among eteini l brings :d belongs to the first intelligible*.

Hence the cause effective of beauty is then-, through which all (hum.- an- beautiful,

intellect, soul, and the nature of body. Ag.iiu, then-lore, the Denmirgus, indeed, is

the cause of form, but the paradigm of beauty, and///<.&"<</

of union. And the last

of these, supplies all things at once, but the paradigm is the supplier of beauty and

form, and the demiurgic cause, -o far as it is inti-llectual, of form and essence.

Moreover, the demim-ic cause looking to the intelligible is multiform. For

the nhoic Deniiurgus fabiic.it. & in one nay looking to it. He, therefore, is united

to it according to supreme transcendency. Hut the demiurgic triad labru ate.s m

the Mist e. f-ihricatcs uniformly ;

another way. And of this triad indeed, [i. Jupiter]

the second [i.e. Neptune] generatively, and the last [i.e. PlutoJ conv. rtively.

And in one way in the ruling, in another in the liberated and in another, in the

mundane order. But after this triad, we must survey fabrication proceeding after

a diflerent manner to the many demiurgic (iods, who from these receive and are

allotted paternal powers. After these, also, it proceed* in one way to demiurgic

an-els, but in another to demiurgic da-mons, the attendants of this order.

Farther still, we must likewise survey the undeiiled forms of life, which contribute

to the demiurgic scries, and the genera of partial souls, which follow the demi

urgic choir. For the peculiarityand the mode of production,

and of looking

to the intelligible, extend diligently to diSlerent natures, as far as to these. It is also

necessary to admue this in IMato, that he does not say that what is generated on

1 ur <A\u lure, it is mtis-ai) lo u.ul ii.\Xu(.

BOOK ii.]I IMPELS OF PLATO. 227

account of an eternal paradigm is l^nutiful, but that what is generated by the

Demiurgus who looks to it. is most beautiful; since tbat \\liich is confused and

disordered is general -1, for it is visible and sensible. Hut every tiling of this

kind is and was generated, as he says further on, receiving from the intelligible

certain vestiges of forms prior to fabrication, and is not most beautiful, though h.

is in a certain respect beautiful, as with reference to the formless nature of matter.

Hence that which is geneiated OH account of an eternal paradigm, such for

instance as that disorderly and confused nature, is not simply beautiful, but that

which was generated by the Derniurgus looking to it. For from that confused

nature the Demiurgus was absent; but theintelligible prior to the Demiurgus,

illuminated that disorderly essence. So far, however, as it was generated by the

Demiurgus,it was also

generated bythe eternal

paradigm, energizingon it

throughtin" Demiurgus as a medium. And so far indeed as it wa.s generated by the

paradigm, it was invested \\ith form, but so far as by the Demiurgus, it was

arranged. For the Dcmiurgux ix the cmtsc(>/

order ; hut the paradigm is simply the

cause offnrtn to it.t participants.

Farther still, from the paradigm itself the difference of demiurgic powers maybe assumed. For some of these powers, indeed, looking to the whole of intelli-

giltles, produce according to the whole of them; but others produce partially. And

some, indeed, survey the whole of intelligible*) through union;.but others through

intelligence. Some, again, do not produce according to the whole of the intelli

gible; but some are divided according to the four primary causes; others proceed



into a greater number; and others make the 1 last forms the paradigms of their

productions. Hence ihrouuli these, there is one shepherd of men, but another of

horses, as Plato snis in the Polilicus, and in a similar manner in other forms.

As the demiurgic series therefore is various, and there are different paradigms of

dillerent things, some of which are more total, but others more partial, Timxus

very properly does not say, th.it he who uses this intelligible paradigm, makes that

which is generated to be beautiful, bnt he who uses a paradigm of I hi* kind. In

the intelligible paradigms therefore, the part is in a certain respect the whole, on

account of the union of intelligibles ;and the multitude is most similar to the

monad, through the domination of sameness. Since also the vrhole Demiurgus

looks indeed to the intelligible and all-perfect animal, but employs the paradigm

which is in himself, possessing intellectually the intelligible ;which paradigm also

1 For fiaiu\tir in this place, we mint read wpot aiwnor.

220 PUOCLUS ON TIIK [BOOK u.

is such as the intelligible through siniilitutle to it, but is of a more partial nature;

hence Tinueus adds the words a certain to a thing of this kind. For these Intel-

liable* participate of the eternal paradigm, and are more partial than all-perfect

animal. Hence, too, he calls idea, TI, it certain tiling, assimilating that which is

generated to the paradigm. But fabrication imparts essences and powers to the

things that are generated. Why, however, of eternal being does he say

"

employing

a paradigm of this kind,"but of that which is generated, he no longer adds the ex

pression"

of this hind" but instead of this, adduces the term generated? Is it

not In-cause the intelligible has something similar to itself, as having the highest

rank, but that which is generated being the last of things, has nothing else

similar to itself? For that which is produced on account of it, is generated, and

to this the dissimilar is appropriate; but to the intelligible, the similar, (lie same,

and every thing of this kind, is allied. And thus much concerning these parti-

eulars. But the term a/irdi/s must be conjoined to a t>iihsistcncc according to

sameness, in order that there may be that whuh looks to a nature always possess

ing a sameness of subsistence, For thus the philosopher I orphjry properly

decides. For TiiiKeus does not say that the Demiurgus in fabricating all things,

nhrays bchvlds, as Atticus thought, but that the intelligible always subsists after tlir.

*aic inantur. I nless it should IM: said, that on this account he assumes the

beholding alwajs, lest by seeing at one time, but at another not, he should

latently introduce into his production, that \\hichis not beautiful. The Demi

urgus, therefore, looks to that which is eternal, in order that he may produce that

which is similar to it, and beautiful.

"

Let therefore tins universe be denominated by us, all heaven, or

tlit for/*/, or whatever other appellation it may be especially adapted

to receive."

This is the last of the axioms, giv ing a name to the subject [of discussion] con

formably to geometricians, when they speak about tin; gnomon in parallelograms.

For they say any one thing consisting of two complements is to be called a gno

mon. For since IMato intends to call the same thing both heaven and the

world, in order that you may not think he disturbs the doctrine, by employing

at different times different unmet*, h previously determine!* something about the

1

I or & yafi \irtr, rtit<l TI>/>.

ttooKii.] T1M/CUS OF PLATO. 229

names. For it must IK> observed tliat these names had great ambiguity with the

ancients; some of them calling the sublunary region alone the world, but the

region aboveit, heaven ;

but others denominating heaven a part of the world.

And some defined it to extend as far as to the moon;but others called the sum

mits of generation heaven:

The wide-spread heav n in xthcr and the clouds

Fell to the lot of Jove.

Heuee Plato very properly determines concerning these names, prior to the whole

theory, calling the universe heaven and the world, and saying all heaven, that you

may not fancy he says, a divine body alone is denominated by us the world, or

by whatever other name it may rejoice to be called. And it seems, indeed, that he

calls the universe heaven, conformably to the. opinion of all men, but the world,

according to his own opinion. For he says, let it be called by us heaven and

the world. For the name oi u orld is adapted to it as a certain fabrication; though

it is also possible to call it both heaven and the world : heaven, indeed, as behold

ing the things above,1

as surveying the intelligible, and as participating of an

intellectual essence;but the world, as being always tilled and adorned by truly

existing beings. It may also be called heaven, as being converted to its prin-

ple],but the world as proceeding from it. J or it is generated by, and is convert

ed to real being. But as of statues established by the telestic art, some things

pertaining to them are manifest, but others are inwardly concealed, being

symbolical*of the presence of the Gods, and which arc only known to the mystic

artists themselves;after the same manner, the world being a statue of the

intelligi

ble, and perfected by the father, has indeed some things which are visible indi

cations of its divinity ;but others, which are the invisible impressions of the par

ticipation of being received by it from the father who gave it perfection, in order

thai*

through these it may be eternally rooted in real being. Heaven, indeed,

1Iliad, xv. vs.

1.9>.

*This is asserted in theCratylui.

1 For a^fo-i) here, it is necessary to read<^arq.

4 InMiMii ofi7i>/^)oXtKi)t

TUV Oivwapovyiat

in thisplace,

it is

nrcevtaryto

read, rv/j/3oXi*a r^trwr

Q(W irnpot imii.

1 Instead of rij rovorwffitro\ijt

in ibis place, it is necessary to read rrji rovorrnr fierc^t.

6 In the woivisotifiij

it arrvr tppi$*ptroi p^icuwriwi iv ry orri, it is obvious that pi ought to be

expunged.

PROCLUS ON THR [BOOK H.

and tlx u-orld. are names significantof the powers in the universe; the latter so

far as it proceedsfrom the intelligible,

hut the former so far as it is converted to it.

It is however necessary to know that the divine name of its abiding power, and

which H a symbol of the impressionof the Demiurgus, according to which it does

not proceedout of being, is ineffable and arcane, and known only to the Cods

themselves. For tin-re are names adapted to every order of things ;those; indeed

that are adapted to divine natures being divine, to the objects of dianoia, U-ing

dianoetic, and to the objects of opinion,doxastic. This aUo Plato says in the

Cratylus, where he embraces what i* asserted by Homer on this subject, \v ho ad

mits that names of tlie same things with the Cods, are different from those that

subsist in the opinionsof men,

Xantlius by God*, by men Scaiuanrlcr call d.

\Vhicli the Uods Clialcb, mn Ctiiiindif ctll.*

And in a similar manner in many other names. Tor as the knowledge of tin-

Gods is different from that of partial *onLs, thus al>o the names of the one are

different from those of the other; .since divine names unfold the whole e>sence of

the things named, but those of men only paitiallycome into contact with them.

Plato therefore

knowingthat this

pre-exists

in the world, omit* the divine and

ineffable name itself, which is dillerent from the apparent name, and with the

greatest caution introduces it as a symbol of the divine impression whichthe world

contains. For the words,"

or whutcw oilier,//.///<//;<,/;,"

and"

it may rectire"

as and allotted a divine es

are a latent hymn of the mundane name, ineffable,

sence; in order that it may be co-ordinate to what is signified by it. Hence, also,

divine mundane names are delivered by Theurgists ;some of which are called by

them ineffable, but others effible ;

and somebeing significant

of the invisible

powers in the world, but others of the visible elements from which it derives its

completion. Through these things, therefore, as hypotheses,the mundane form,

the demiurgic cause and paradigm, and the apparentand nnappamit name of

the world, are delivered. And tin: former name indeed is duadic, but the latter

monadic. For the words"

uhatci cr other are significant of oneness. You may

also consider tht imtfable name of the universe, [as significant1

] of its abiding m

Iliad xx. vs. 7-i

1Iliad xi*. vs. ?91-

1lu ibe original HI this place, ofj/jmruoy is omiltfd.

m.)K it.)TIM.I:US or PLATO. 231

the father ;hut the name

:<</<!,as indicative of it* progression ; and heaven, of its

conversion. N"l through tin- three, you have the fhinl cause, on account of which

it is full of -;oo(l; abiding inellahly, proceeding perfectly, andconverting itself to

the good as tin1 antecedent object of desire. It is fit, however, to engage in the

discussion of the rest of the theory, terminating what follows

hy

the

principles.

"

In the first placo, therefore, that as an hypothesis, must be considered

respecting it, which ought in thel>cginning

to be surveyed about every

thing."

After (he prayer, the exhortation to the auditors, ami the delivery of the

hypotheses,nothing else remains than to

disposethe whole, discussion conforma

bly t( the hypotheses them selves. Of this, however, that head is the leader, whe

ther the world was generated, or is tmhegotten, having no hcginiiing of generation.

For in what was asserted prior to the hypotheses, Tinr.ms said,"

// is tuccxxarif

thai we who are about to speak concerning the universe, ichet/icr it icas generated or

is nnbentten, *fiou/d invoke the (ioih mid Goddesses* as from hence commencing the

theory. And in the hypotheses,"

ll hat tlint is rrfiic/i is akrat/s bei>t, but is without

"cncrtitinn,find ir/i (it

thati.v

which is generated, butis

never Tn<il~\ ban","

werethe

c L. -J i

thinirs which were first assumed. This therefore must first lx? considered, as it

was the lir-t thin;; supposed in theprinciples.

It is necessary, however, as Socra

tes says in the Pha-drns, respecting every tiling, to consider in the first place what



it is. But this is the form of the object of investigation. And the generated and

the unhejjolten j{ive distinction to the mundane form. 80 that this is very pro

perly thought to he the first tiling that deserves an appropriate consideration, to

which also Tima-ns immediately after this directs his attention. Hut since mostof the I latonists understand hy the words TJSJ rravroc, that Plato means alut

d crij thin*, conformahly to what is said in the Pha-dms, hut l*or|)hyry understand*

the words aspi>rnifying

ad/tut the universe, it hein^ lit to sj)eak /list concerning

the universe, aixl to show whether it is naturally imheirotten or generated, it is

rcfpiMte to know thaf the former interpretation has in a greater degree the spon

taneous. For to assume ro Taxroc for TO --^ rvt ^- xfTOj:, is a forced assumption.

That, howexcr, tiiese limits are sini|!y to IM.- investigated concerning every thing,

we may previously assume from common conceptions, and the first hypotheses. The

addition also of"

whether the unrcertc uticiiyx "u-tix, having no beginning ofgenerationt

.// whether it wasgenerated"

shows that what is said is asserted more generally of

the universe. For with reference to the world, it is demonstrated that it iia> a



BOOK ii.] TIMJEUS OF PLATO. 033

universe, being the nunil>er of the motion of the universe; so that the former time

was priorto the fabrication of the world, being the number of a disorderly motion.

But the interpreters of Plato that follow Grantor, say that the world is said to be

exonerated, as being produced by another cause, and not Ix ing self-liegotten, nor

self-subsistent. And Plotinus, and the philosophers after Plotinus, >iz. Porphyry

and lamhlichns, say that the composite nature is hen; called that which is

generated, and that with this,1

generation from another cause is eon-subsi>tent.

We however say, that all these assertions are most true;and that the world is

generated,both an a

composite,and as being indigent of other causes to its existence.

For every thing which has interval is a tiling of this kind, and that which in

sensible, is allotted such a nature as this. We think it fit however, that these

philosophersshould look to other generated natures, I mean time and soul,

survey what is common in them, and extend it to these significations, and say,

that [real] l>eingindeed is that, \\hich eternally possesses a stable essence, power

and eneriry. But that which is simply, or absolutely generated, is that which

receives all these according to time. And that which is in a certain respect

generated, possesses its energy in motion and extension. For it has been before

observed by us, that Plato defined the extremes to be, that which is simply

perpetual bei-n^, and that which is simply generated. But in what is here said,

he comprehends the media. Hence, that which does not possess at once, the \chole

tf its essence, or energy established in unity,is denominated generated. A

tiling of

this kind also, entirely subsists through generation, and its existence is generated,

or becoming to be, but is not [real] being. This sensible world likewise, time



among things that are moved, and the transitive intelligence of souls, are things

of this kind. But it is manifest that all motion subsists according to a part, and

that the whole of it is not at once.

If, however, the essence of the world lias generation, and the perpetuity of it

subsists according to temporal infinity, some one by considering this may syllo-

gi/e as follows : First, that it is necessary l>etween things that are eternally per

petual, and things which arc generated in a part of time, the medium should be an

hypostasis which is generated infinitely. And that this should l>e two-fold, either

having the wholei>erpetual, through the whole of time, but the parts in the parts

oftime,

as is the case with theseelements,

orhaving

both the whole and thepart*

co-extended with the perpetuity ofthe whole oftime, as is the case with the celestial

For rovro here, it it necessary lo read rwp.

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. 2 G

234PROCLUS OX THE [BOOI n.

bodies. For tliere is not the same perpetuity according to eternity and the whole

of time ;since neither is there the same infinity of time and eternity, because eter

nity and time are not the same. In the second place, that what is measured by

eternity, and exists in eternity, is necessarily impartible. For how can that which

is partiblebe fixed, and have its essence established in the impartible? In the

third place, that soul energizes according to time, and that hotly subsists entirely in

lime. For the energy of soul is nearer to eternal natures, than the essence of body.

What is it then, by which we may infer that the essence of the celestial bodies

is thus perpetual according to time? It is this, that it cannot be separated from the

cause that adorns it. For this makes it evident that it is allotted a renovated per

petuity,and is always generate;!

from a source external to itself. For if it received

the whole of its properessence from itself, it would be sufficient to itself, separ

/rate from that which makes it, and imparts to it essence. The intention indeed

jofTIatoisto show, that the world is simply generated, as having its essence,

power, and energy, and also its perpetuityco-extended with the whole of time.

But he inquires from the first, whether it is eternal being, or belongs to things

which are jK-rfected by time. For the expression alu-ays was, signifieswith Plato

tin- intelligible,as we have before observed. If, however, he says further on, that

/the term uas is not adapted to eternal natures, but the term is, we must not be

disturlx-d. For priorto a distinct evolution, he follows the accustomed mode of

speaking. Hence also, when celebrating the Demiurgus he says, "he teasgood,"

though the Demiurgus ranks among eternal natures. And shaking of the

paradigm, he collects both these together at once : for he says," The nature of

animal itself thereforewas being eternal

;" together with atwvtog oura being eternal,

assuming TO tr^xavt zt as - ^ nc* in "M 1 " to al1 tn:it nas **>onsai<1>

l)t cause tne

power of every finite body is not infinite, as Aristotle has demonstrated, but eter

nityis an infinite

power,

hence every finite body is incapable of receiving eternity.

It is necessary therefore that it should not always be, but should always be gene

rated, or becoming to be, receiving as much as possible a flowing existence.

Being, therefore, as I have said, and perpetual being, manifest the eternal.

But "that u Inch wasgenerated" signifies the being allotted an hypostasis, mea

sured by time, such as is a sensible nature, which also is apprehemUd by opinion

in conjunction with sense. It has however been already said by us, that the intel

ligible is self subsistent and eternal;but that the sensible nature is

producedby

something different from itself, and is cou-subsistent with time. For the eternal in

number is one thing, and the temporal another. And the former is in number,

UOOK ii.l TIMT.US OF PLATO. 035

hul the latter i*generated

In number. For to the former eternity is conjoined, hut

to the latter time. That which is generated likewise, though it is said to be jwr-

petual, has an hypostasis co-extended with all time, and which is always gene

rated, and always adorned by its producing cause. If therefore, perpetual being

manifests the eternal, but that which has a principle of generation signifies that

which is produced by another cause ; for such is that which is always generated ;

but Plato always inquires, whether the world always was, or has the principle of

a certain generation; this being the case, an inquiry of this kind will Ixfthe

same as an investigation, whether the worldl>elongs

to eternal natures, or to

things which are generated according to the whole of time;and whether it

belongs to self-subsistent natures, or tothings which are adorned by another

cause.

Farther still, that which is generated belongs to things which are multifariously

predicated.For this very thing which has a temporal beginning, and is so much

spoken of, is called generated, whether it arrives at being through generation, or

without generation, as Aristotle says. Every thing likewise which proceeds from

a cause, is called generated, that also which is essentially a composite, and that

which has a generable nature [or which is naturally capable of being generated]

though it should not have been generated ;such as is that which has a visible nature,

though it should not be seen. That which is generated therefore, being predicated

multifariously, that which is generated according to time, has all the generations.

For it proceeds from a cause, is a composite, and has a generable nature. It doen

not, however, entirely follow that what is generated after another manner, has all

the generations. [If therefore Plato had inquired whether the universe lias all the

generations,] or not all,1 we should say that he investigated whether it is generated

accordingto

time,or has not a

temporal principle of generation. Since, however,this is not the case, but he asks whether it has no principle whatever of generation,

or has a certain principle ofit,

he renders it manifest to those who have the smal

lest degree of intelligence, that he does not doubt about its temporal beginning,

but whether the universe, since there are many generations, has a certain princi

ple of generation. For if it has no principle whatever of generation, it belongs

to eternal and self-subsistent natures, in which there is not generation, because

neither is Uiere time. For though we sometimes speak of the generations of the

It arenas that th following worth are wanting in this place in the original : n roirvr r<r>jr4

rXarwr rorrpor r* ar rural yci rat ycycrrii.

23QPROCLUS ON T!!E

[BOOK

it.

Gods, yetwe say this indicating their ineffable progression, and the difference of

wcomlary natures with reference to the causes of them. Theologists, hovrever,

previously subverting all such douhts, in order that tin; generations of the Godn

mav !>e rationally devised by them, call the first principle of things Time, because

it is fit that where there is generation, time should precede, according to which

and on account of which generation subsists. AVith these, therefore, cause and

time are the same; since also with them progression is the same as generation.

That however which is truly gent-rated,is that which does not generate itself, hut

is {jenerated by another, becomes the image of another thing, is composed of

manv dissimilar things, ami always receives a renovated hypo.-tasis ;with which

also time is conjoined. It likewise has a never-failing generation, co-extended

with the infinityof time, and is -always becoming to be one and the same in num-

)KT, but is not one accordingto an eternal subsistence. 15ut that which is thus

generated you may say proceeds from non-being. For that which is self-subsis-

lent, U-ini; generated by itself, does not proceed from non-being. For though

y.u may dnide it by conception into cause and effect, yet it proceeds from being.

For the maker and that which i.s made- are one, so that it proceeds from the being

of itself. Hence also it is eternal, never at any time deserting itself. But that

which is alone from another thing, subsists from non-being, because it no

longer is \\hen separated from its cause; and the cause is different from the effect.

Thus, therefore, the physicalaxiom may be adapted according to analogy to

this generated nature : and that which is always generated and illuminated by

being, to that which is always in time. Hut this i.s e\ident;for if you take away

the the universe is immediately imperfect ;which is likewise the case with



maker,

every thing that is still generated.At one and the same time, however, the

universe is generated and perfect,and is always generated. Hence also its pej-

.petuity and its perfection, are according to the whole of time. For time was

generated together with the heaven [or the universe], not apart of time, but all

time : t>o that the heaven is generated in an infinite time, and is never-failing

both with respect to beginning and end, in the same manner as time. Thus, there

fore, it is also said to have a principleof generation, and to originate from a cer

tain other principle.And in the first place, indeed, it originates

as he hays from

the most proper principle,the final. For from this, the generating cause com

mences the generation of the world. In the next place, the generation of the

1

i. t. That the cause is different from the effect.

BOOK ii.] TIM/EUS OF PLATO. 037

world subsists with rofcrence to tJie finalprinciple, and as the world is always

Incoming to bo, it is beginning to 1x3 generated, and possesses the end of it,

through generation in the whole of time. For with respect to the world, it teas

generated, is not one thing, and it is generated another; as neither is thelx?gin-

ning of it one thing, and the end another. That, therefore, which is generated

in a part of time, begins at one time, and is perfected at another ;but that u-hich

is generated in the whale of lime is ahcays beginning, and is always pcrject-

And it has indeed, a certain principle of generation, which is perfected by some

thing d lift-rent from itself, but it has not a certain principle, as not having the be

ginning of a certain partial time. For since generation is multifarious, the prin

ciple also of it is multifarious. So that the generation which subsists through the

whole of time is a certain generation, and this principle is the principle of a

certain,and not of all

generation."What therefore is this

generation?

Thatwhich has both the beginning

*and the end contracted together [so as to be si

multaneous]. Because therefore the world is a body, it is generated, and has a

principle orl>eginning

of generation. But because intellect is the maker of it, it

was generated, and has an end of generation. Through both, however, it is

rising into existence, and is perfect according to generation, was generated, is

always becoming to be, and is generated. For these do not*

subsist at one and

the same time, in things which are generated in a part of time. Thus for instance

the motion of the heavens, not being generated in a part of time, is always, as

Aristotle says, in the end;but this is not the case with motions on the earth.

"

It was generated. For it is visible and and has a body.

tangible,

But all sucli things are sensible. And sensibles are apprehended by

opinion in conjunction with sense, and appear to be things which are

becoming to be, and aregenerated."

As the Demiurgus of wholes looking to himself, and always abiding in his own

accustomed manner, produces the whole world, totally and at once collectively,

and with eternally invariable sameness;for he does not make at one time, and

at another not. lest he should depart from eternity ; after the same manner also

r 1

ypovov is omitted in the original.*

<\r\nalso is omitted in this place in the original.

1It is necfSMry to supply er\ here.

238 PROCLUS ON THE[BOOK n.

Timaeus, being couvcrted to himself, delivers the whole theory, recurring to in

tellect from dianoia, and proceeding into a reasoning process from intellect;

doubting, therefore, and interrogating himself, he energizes according to the self-

motive nature of soul;hut iit answering he imitates the projecting enertry of in

tellect. For he first comprehends the dogma in one word ytywt, it vtis gcneratcil,

and proclaims the conclusion prior to the demonstration, directly after the

manner of those who energi/e enthusiastically. For these set the whole collec

tively,and contract in intellect the end prior to the egress, jx?rceiving all

tilings at

once. But syllogi/ing, he descends from intellect to logical progressions, and

the investigation through demonstration of the nature of the world. Hence,

in a manner perfectly divine, he shows from the hypotheses the whole form of the

universe. For if the world is visible and tangible, and has a hotly, hut that

which is visible and tangible, and has a body, is sensible, and that which is sen

sible is apprehended by opinion in conjunction with sense, and is generated, the

world therefore is generated. Hence he .shows this demonstratively from the de

finition, according to a conversion of the definition;since geometricians also use

demonstrations of this kind.* And thus much concerning the form of the words.

Since, however, as we have said, he asks whether the universe is eternal, or

has a certain principle of generation, he answers, // r/ as generated. From this,

therefore, it is evident that he gives a certain generation to the world : for this was

the other part of tin- before-mentioned opposition. If, however, this IM; the case,

he establishes the universe remote from temporal generation ;for if the world has

a certain, and not crcry principle of generation, but that which is generated in

time has the principle of every generation, the world was not generated in

time. Farther still, let us also consider the wonderful hypotheses of Atticus,

who says that what was moved in a confused and disorderly manner is

unbegotten, but that the world wasgenerated

in time, and let us

speakconcerning this assertion,

"

// wasgenerated." Since, therefore, Atticus

admits that there is a cause of generation, let us see what the nature of

this cause is according to him; for the world is visible and tangible.

Whether, therefore, was every thing sensible generated in time, or not every

thing? If indeed every thing, then that which was moved in a confused

and disorderly manner will be generated in time : for he says that this also

1 For eirirpoTijK here, it is necessary to read

1See this explained farther on.

3

r<>ois omitted here in the original.

DOOK ,i.l TlM.r.l S 01- PLATO. 239

was visible. Cut it" not every tiling, then the reasoning of Atticus is unsyllo-

gisticand conclusive of nothing. Unless lie should say, indeed, that the world is

visible and tangible, but that what was moved in a confused and disorderly man

ner, is not now visible, but was so prior to the fabrication of the world; since

Plato also speaks in this manner when he says,"

every such thing as was risible,

andii-as mo-ccd in a

confusedand

disorderlymanner." But in the words before us he

says, "forit i? visible and tangible, and has a

body"He shows therefore that every

tilingwhich is visible and tangible, was generated, but not that which was visible and

tangible. Though, therefore, these things should be asserted by Atticus;for the

man is skilful in defending what he advances ;it must be said in answer to him,

that there is nothing of this kind in the definition of that which is generated, but it

is simply said, that every thing generated is the object of opinion in conjunction

with irrational sense. So that if there is any thing which is entirely sensible, such

thing will be generated. But everything visible is sensible; and therefore that

which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner, is generated. In addition

to which we may also say that Plato calls this very disorderly thing itself

generated. For he says that prior to the generation of the world, there were

three things, being, place and generation, subsisting in the vestiges of forms.

Hence that disorderly nature was generated, as well as that which is visible. It ^

is not proper therefore to s;iy that it was unlx-gotten according to time, and that

the universe was generated ;but either both were generated according to Plato,

or both were unbegotten. For both are similarly said bv him to be visible and~|^generated. If however both were generated, the world prior to being gene

rated such as it now is was changed into the confused : for to a contrary, the

generation is entirely from a contrary. And if he who made the world is

good, how is it possible he should not adapt it in a beautiful manner, or that

having beautifully adapted it, he should corrupt it? But if he is not good,

how not being good, did he make it to be arranged and adorned ? For it is

the province of a good being to adorn and arrange other things. If, however,7

being visible and generated, it is not generated according to time, it is not neces

sary immediately to make the universe to be generated in time, because it is

visible and generated. And thus much against Atticus.

But let vis recur to ourprinciples, and discuss the affair as follows : Whether

is the world perpetual being, in the same manner as the eternal, or is it not

For ?/i hrrr, h is ntccmry to rrad fM/ur.

540PROCLUSONTHE [BOOK u.

eternal, but consubsistent with time? And whether is it self-subsistent, or

produced by another ? Such then is the inquiry. But the answer is, that it

is produced by another, mul is consubsistent with time. A thing; of this kind

however, is n>nerated. For if it lias a composite form, it has a generation

according to the composition.And if it alone subsists from another cause,

it is generated,as not being itself productive of itself. If likewise it is not*

eternal.it has the whole of its hypostasis according to time. Forit is fabricated on

account of another, and is gem-rated as a flowing imago of being. Hence, as

that which is composite is to that which is simple, and us time is to eternity, so

is generation to essence. If, therefore, a simple and uniform essence is eternal,

the essence which is composite, multiform, and conjoined with time, is generation.

For it is divinely said by Plato, that the world originated from it certain principle,

Forthrt which is generated in a portion of time began from a temporal, from a

producing, from a final, from a material, and from a formal cause. For since

principle,is multifariously predicated that which was once generated has a begin

ning of generation according to all these causes. The world however originated

from a certain, and not from crcry principle.Vi hat therefore is this principle

?

You must not say it is a temporal principle.For that which originates from thin

is also allotted theprincipl"

of generation from all the rest. But it originated

from that principle, in which he afterwards instructs us, I mean the most proper,

or the final principle. For it was generated on account of I liep><>d

; and this

is the principle from which its generation originated, lie says therefore that this

is the most proper principle,so that this may be called the principle

of the genera.

tion of the world. Hence in the first placehe shown that the. world is generated

from its composition; forit is visible and tangible. These, therefore.are theextremes

of the universe. For heaven is visible, but earth is tangible. And visibilityis in

enrth so far as it participatesof light ;

and tangibility in heaven, so far as a terres

trial nature is antecedently comprehended in it according to cause, lint the

world is simply [visible nnd tangible],and has a body in order that you may

also assume the middle plenitudes which it contains. And this again is asserted

by IMato conformably to the oracle, which says: // is an imitation of intellect, but

that u-hich is fabricated has sonttlhing of body.So far, thorvforc, as the universe

1 For rayo/m-or here, xatl wafiayo^ituv.

1

For fur line, it i

mpiiMtc to read ^.The wonl ofjurof *a. awrov

u|t|>cjrto me to be utuilted IJ tint plate,

BOOK ii.] TIM.T.US CM PLATO. 04 1

lias something corporeal, it is generated ; for according to this it is visible and

tangible. But every tiling vi<ible and tangible, is sensible; for sense is touching and

seeing. Tint however which is sensible is (lie object of opinion, as being mingled

from sensible*, and not able to preserve tlie purity of intelligible forms. But every

tiling of this kind is -jenerated, as having a composite essence.

I hito. therefore, does not subvert the perpetuity of the universe, as some who

follow the Aristotelian hypotheses fancy he does. And that this is true we may

easily learn from hence.|JIe says that time was generated together with the

heaven oV universe. If therefore time is perpetual, the universe also is perpetual.

But if the universe* had a temporal beginning, then time also had a temporal

ho^innin^, which is of all things the most impossible.1

They say, however, that

time is twofold, the one disorderly, hut the other

proceedingaccording to number.

For motion is twofold, the one kind disorderly and confused, but the other

orderly and elegant. But there is a time*

co-ordinate to each of these motions.

That a body, however, may be moved equably or anomalously is possible;

but it is impossible to conceive an equable and anomalous time. For thus the .

essence of time will be a composite. And why do I say this? For when the

motion is anomalous, time is equable. There are now, therefore, many motions;

aixl some areswifter,

but othersslower,

and one is moreequable

thananother;

but there is one continued time -of all these, and which proceeds according to

number. Hence it i* not ri-^ht, thus to make a twofold time. If, however, time

is one and continued; if indeed it is nnbegotten, the universe also is unbegotten,

which is consubsistenl with time. But if it was generated, an absurdity will

be l>e

follow ; since time, in onh r that it may generated, will in want of time, and

this, though it does not yet exist. For when time was generated, time was

not yet.

Farther still, Plato conjoins the soul of the universe immediately on its lein<.r

generated, with body, and does not uive to it life priorto the corporeal-formed

nature, but as soon as it is constituted incloses it. in body. Moreover, he .a}s

that soul ranks among beings that always exist. If, therefore, he makes body and

soul to be consnbsistent, but soul always exists, according to him body also is

[>erpclual.For that which is at once consnbsistent with the perp -tual, is unl>c-

Ifiitc.id ol fi ifiii^tji- x r|

ônriirqr,ac o ofpavtif opx r

&

r*rlXP""

l n * plf

necessaryto

rca<l,ci t

fiv^tat-ot ojîji t\n xftonKijt;uni o x/oroi ap\tv rtt ôrurijr.

1For x/wny here, it is requisite tw read xpo-oi.

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. 2 II

242

HKOLLt S ON Till:

[nook

11.

gotten. Ajâin, TimaniH here says, that tin? soul was generated ;hut Socrates in

the Pluedrus says, it istiiiltegotteii. Hence, ho after another manner falls that

ijeuerated, \vliicli is clearly nnlieôtteil according to linn*. Farther still, he sayt

that the world is incorruptible,which is also granted by those who oppose him.

But in the Uepublic lie clearly asserts, or rather the !\!u?es, that e\ery tiling ge

nerated is necessarily corrupted, assuming in this place generation according to

time. From these things, therefore, jou may understand what I say : for tin-

world is thus demonstrated to hi- nnbegotten. For if tin- world isincorruptible,

but nothing which is generated according to time isincorruptible,

the world is

not generated according to time. What occasion is there, however, for these

syllogisms ? For I lato in the l,;i\\s clearly s,i\s, that tune is infinite according to

thep.i-t,

ami thai in thisinfinity

I In re h.t\e been myriads on u:\riads o! b.irren

anil fertile periods of men. For investigating the heînniim of ap<ility,

from

which cities change into \irtue and \ice, he adds : Jittt you ^ itl *tn;, fnn ir/icticc S

I indeed tliinkfrom t/ic length anil /////////// / time, (tint tin- nmtdiioii.f ;7//f. / tiiLc place

in a thing of this kind." &

>r rather that ue may arûe from what is in our hands, a

little prior to this, we may hear him >a\ in:; ,that

"

irlm c there i* init/tt rc.ttrt inc lunf

urcold, there the nice vf men<//;<-.///.y

f.//v/.v i/iurc ur . .vj tiu/tn nuts." Hut if the race

of men always exists, the tiniver.-c al>o is nec<s-.arily jHipetnal.

Again,therefore, it the

Demiiir^ns

ranks amoiiL? eternal beings, lie does not at

one time fabricate, and at another not. For if he did, he would not ha\e an in

variable saint-ness of siih-istnice, and immutability. But if healw i\s fabricates,

i that which is fabricated by him aluavs exist-. For why, bein^ v\illin_:lv at rest

for an infinite time, did he at length convert himself to fabrication ! \\ as it

lecansc he apprehended it to be better? But was he, prior to tlii-, ignorant that

it was IM tier or not ? For it is absurd, beinij intellect, that he should be ignorant ;

wince there w ill he about him bothignorance

andknowledge.

But if he knewthis,

why did lie not before heniu to ireiieiale ami produce the world ! And if it

was Ix-tter, why did he not persevere in ihis enei ;v, if it lie laul ul so to speak ?

J or it is not holy to conceive (hat, heiiiLj intellect and a <iod, he would pursue

that which IN less instead of thai which is moiv beautiful. It is nece-sar\ ,how-

ever, to admit these things, if the world is ;ei;era!ed according to time, ai;d is not

consubsistent with theinlinity of time. Tho-e a!.-o appear to me to sin against

1 tii5li-.nl ill iiXXurj) urniiiif TOI/

ixififinuei t

i\- rtri. . in \\\\^

|i!,icc,It i tli Cl ^M.lV lo r;ul \\n

/n) ty

nrtifny rov \pvHjv fft/HfK>Tuii.

noiiK I..]TIM.KL S 01 I l.ATO. -JJU

the Demiur<tus of the \\orhl, in another way, who say that the world once was

not. For if it once \vas not, there was a time in which the Demiunrns did not

make it. For (hat which is made, and that which makes, subsist together. IJiit

iftliere w as a time in which lie did not make, lie was then a maker in capacity.

And if lie was in capacity, he Mas imperfect,and afterward* perfect when ho

made. If, however, there is prior and posterior ahont him, it is evident that lie

doe- not belong to natures which energize eternally; hut that he passes from not

making according t time, to making. iNIoieover, he produces time. Howtherefore having an energy which is in want of time, does he product

1it through

this energy ? For lie once produced time, of which he is indigent, in order

that by his elUcthc energy In* may product; time. This, therefore, cannot be

otherwise.

Afl< r this opinion, however, let us duvet our attention to Severus, who says

that tin world simply considered is indeed perpetual, but that this which now

exists and is thus nuned, was generated. For there are twofold circulations,

a*; lli- F.lran ^ii -st has shown; one of which is that which the universe now cir-

cmmol\es, but the- other the contrary to it. The world therefore is generated,

and originated from a certain principle, w Inch is the cause of this circulation.

Hul simply con-idered it is not generated. This interpretation, however, we shall

oj)pose, by ohscmii, that it is not proper to transfer fabulous enigmas to phy

siology. For liow is itpo^-ihl:

1 that the soul which moves the unherse, sliould

be weary, and change the ancient circulation ! How also is the universe perfect,

and sufficient to it-elf, il it doires mutation ? I lowcan there he an alternate change

of circulations, w hen both that w hich i> mo\ed, and that which motes, preserve their

proper habit ? .And how doe< Tinui iis say. that tiie circulation of the nature whicli is

characterized by sameness, is moved to the rii:ht hand,according

to the demiurgic

will, but that which is characterized by diili-rence, to the left hand ? For if it is neces

sary that lhe works of the Den.iui trns -honld remain invariably the same, and be

perpetual,it is likewise necessary that the circulations sliould be always thn same;

and that the period characterized by sameness should be moved to the ri^lit hand,

but that which is characterized by diilerence, to the left. For they proceeded at

one and the same time from the Deminrûs, and were allotted this circulation.

Faither still, isit

not necessary, iltat ineijiiahihty must thus be introduced to the

1 Tltc\\onl>rij

^fOttrtpov t* apirrtpn, ;irc oniillttl in (lie original, Iml evidcally ought lo be intcrlcd

in llii^pl.icc.

J44 1 HOCLIS ON Til1

.

1

. [BOOK n.

motion of the universe! For every thirty which is about to erase from its former

motion, ami to pass on to another, hastens to the contrary, i. e. to rest, and causes

the precedaneous motion to waste away. For if it continued ti\ed in the same

energy, what is the cause of the second circulation ! By no means, then-Ion*, are

these interpretations which are not physical to lr admitted. IS or aâin, must

such explanationsbe adopted, though they are more rational, as those which

aseriln* generation to the world, in conception only. For thus we may al>o infer

according to conception, and not according to truth, that there is a Deminrûs of

the universe. For from admitting that the world \\as generated, if is demonstrated

that there is a producing .md demiurgic can-e of it. Or it may he said, that the

nnnerse is admitted to he generated*for the sake of perspicuity, and the doctrinal

method, in order that we ma) learn what the numerous ^nods arc, of which it

participates, from the demiurgic prox ideiice. I or tins is nuleeij in a certain roped

true, yet is not sufficient to the theory of 1 lato. For the perspicuous, says

lamhlichus, is \eiierahlc, when it is adapted to science. For admitting also ihat

the uniuTse is|>erpetiial,

it is po-iMe top<int

out the ôods imparted to it by

the Cods. And thus much in opposition to these interpretations.

Aiiain, ho\\c\er, let us show from thebejfinnini;, alter \\hat manner the universe

is said to he generated. For it is neither so according to tii ie, through tiie hefore

mentionedarguments,

norsimply

because it

proceeds

from a cause;since it is not

Miflicient to say this. Fur intellect aUo i> from the lir-t cau^c, and all tilings

afler l/ic unc are from a cause, \

are yenerated For the one is prior toeternity.

After what manner therefore, it may he said, is the unnerve generated ! As that

which now is always becoming to he, and at the sani" time always was hecomin^

to be, or rising into existence. For it is not that which ispartial. IJody there-

fore, [i. e. partial body] is not only trenerated, but there is also a time when it \v:s

generated, lint the whole world alone suhsi-ts in becoming to/

and is not at

the same time that which wti.i generated. It is also according to Aristotle always

in the end, the (t lrtiyx hemi^ temporal, uccordiilt; to t-mp(ral inliiiiiy. I- or ;is

the solar-form liiiht proceecls from its proper fountain, thus also the world is

always generated, and always produced, and is always becoming to be, and at the

1I cni i i>ii:itii & in lhi>

|)!.nc;and the smlriue uu^ht \ In inlfn^,ili\c. llriur in>lc;i.| i,f

i TI r(; <urr;t taruii <py

m, ri Kiriu ri/v&

v

-i/Tpu afiuv>..\i/0FWf, we Illll^t ri !l tin ~/"f> ri/i <IIT/>

inru*

nfpytiai i.X. with j m>te of intrrrounliuii .tl ilii-t-ntl.

After vTrtdi-rtTt, -n: lit-ri,(In- \\ord -

tti,

:;ir mini !>c

iijijiliiil.

TIM/L:US or PLATO. o45

L "

-/"

rune, time always was so. Asa composite likewise ills ^cnerated. For all.

composition is gniicratmn. But if is always compos!, it u as always bcomin &

-&

lo be, with whirh to he ;;eneraied concurs. And it .appears to ni" tint l*lato\W<

knowing this, says // & et/v//(Y/ instead of it is generated, just as of [real] lx-in &

he says it uas, insi ad of it is : for Ins words are" wiictln-r it -iLraifs .,-n.t For as

in the intelligible, the was and is are the same; for all limits are there accord

ing to sameness, since all things are in l/tc n<rj\ which is more impartih!e lhan

the now which is according to time;thus also ii i\ "fin-rated and / / r/v.v generated

proceed lo (lie same tiling in every seiisihle nalnr. . For it was .generated, as that

which always was hecomin.: to he, and as generated, it is. But that a thin"

iieneraled, when it is assumed according to a certain time, does not indicate

I hat \\hicli is simply a composite, is evident from its opposite. For to this

Plato opposes perpetual beinur . If. therefore, perpetual beini; manifests that which

is simple, we must say that what is alone a composite is generated. B ll if eternal

hem-;-signified that which is always according to time, that which isoriginating

from a certain thinir, would he said to Ix- becoming to le. For that which is \

genera led is not opposed to the eternal, so far as it is generated, hut so far as it \

participates of lime; on which account also it is generated. Thatper|>ctiiai

/

lieiiiir, however, [or that which always is,] manilests the eternal, is evident ; since

llie Dnuiiir^us also who produces time, is called perpetual Ueini;, and the para-

diliin likewise is llnis denominated. Hence, it signifies an eternal hypostasis,

and not that whichparticipates of temporal perpetuity

Some one, however, who acknowle.lijes this may nevertheless donht, why we

have hefore said that the world is generated, from having a hody ? l <tr as then-

nre in it a hody, which is alone generated, a divine soul, which always is, and a

divine intellect prior to this, \vliydo we say that it is generated on account of its

hody, and not denominate it iniliegolten, on account of its soul, or its intellect

It is said, therefore, that the whole world is every where characterized from form

and not from the subject nature. For do we not call Socrates mortal, though he

has an immortal soul, Ix-cause the animal which is in him is mortal ? If, however,

you say that we now consider I he. corporeal-formed nature of the universe, not

yet co-arranged with MII|, yon will speak rightly.But when you see it animated

and endued w ilh intellect,

you maycall it a Cod. For thus Plalo iti the

Uepnb-lir calls it a dirinc generated tiling. But in this dialogue, he thinks lit lo denomi

nate the world, a blessed (joil. In the very words also In-fore us, he in a

reater decree celebrates the universe. For as he is about to call that which w

24({PROCLUS ON THK [BOOK n

imbejrotten [viz. soul] generated, though he attributes an nnbegotten subsistence

to eternal natures, thus also he calls the world generated. For it is not when

denominated generated, diminished by a juxtaposition with the eternal. He

likewise conjoins the becoming to be of it, with // ;/.v generated ; in order thnt

as all or the universe, he may evince that it is perfect and being, but as ha\ ing

its essence in lime, that it is gem-rated. He likewise assigns to it the principle

of a certain and not of all generation. And according toils corporeal-formed

nature, he calls it, generation, omitting the di\ine po\\er.sin it, through \\hich it

is happy, and is call* d a <od.

Moreover, the- demonstration is worthy of admiration, \i/. how seientifn ally

itproc-<-ds

from t lie definition. Hence also, lie invei N the order. For in the

hypotheses indeed, he defined that which is generated to In- the object of opinion ;

but to the demonstration of that which is generated, h.- assumes the converse, in

onler that he may make the definition to he th.- middle term, as in d<-mo:i>tra-

tions is perfectly requisite. I or this will cause \\hat i> said to he truly a demon

stration. For opinion through pos,es>ingthe reasons ol generated natures,

introduces the order of cause* with reference to them. Hence it appears to me

that Plato is not satisfied with the term sensible in order to demonstrate that the

world is generated, but adds also that what is sensible is the object of opinion ;

since sense indeed knows theenergy

of seiisibles, in

consequenceof

sidli/ring

by them, but opinion knows also their essences. Fur it antecedently compre

hends the reasons of (hem. In order, therefore, that he might e\ ince the essence

of seiisibles to lie generated, he forms his demonstration from that which is the

object of opinion. Farther still, his not adding ifnit tclitclt is ikxtnu titilc to tluit

:i IHC/I /.v iv/<. ;//, shows his re\erential conceptions of the world; though it is

in a certainre>pect

true that the world is destructible, as we ha\e before said.

At the same time, this exhibits tons the caution and reverence of Plato: for

liaxint; that which is consequent [to the being generated], yet he does not ;u!d

it; which he ou^ht to admire who thinks that the world was generated according

to Plato in time. For this generated nature which he calls the olject of opinion,

is at the same time dt stiuclible ;but the world is not destructible at the same

lime that it is generated. Hence the world is both destructible andincorruptible,

yet the philosopher does not call it both tlu-M- according to the same; fur this

\ would be ridii nlous ; but lit call* it incorruptible, in the same manner as unbe

gotten, according to time. For if that which is generated according to time,

1

Instead ofij ynp <V;

TH rtivt\<i;

ort xfl &r<1" yi &

Tut >n*

|Jl c * iu

-i I

NS.irylo rt .ul

& îip

N ,,a rtt roi k Xd-;oi.i i. X.

I.....K ii.] TIM.i:i S 01- PLATO. 217

is corruptible, as it is said lo he in (he U-public, that which is

incorruptible is

lining Urn. Hut t/ic voi fd is dt sti HC(i/ifi\ n\ w.l >n / //- at>& in connect it.\,lf. For

;is ui.it which i. corporeal s> f.ir as p Tlaiu-< to itself H alter motive, or moved by

another, thus a!-o so f.ir as pertains to itself it is destructible, in constvpimce of

Ji. inj; connected by something rise. For nolto<ly

is either ênerative or connec

tive of iNelf; since every tiling \\liirli generates makes; l.ul every tlii:i- which

makes is incorporeal. For though it should l>c a fxx/i/, t/itit makcx

hi/ incui-pnrcnl

jiiiccrx. K\ery lliin^;, therefore, \\hicli generates i-; incorporeal; and every tiling

which connects, is cHvclur of a certain tiling, viz. it is elli-ctive of union, and tin;

undii|iated. IJiit e\ery tiling which is eilective is impartible. Hvery tiling tliere-

fore connective isiinpartilile. Hence it is impossible for that which connects

itself to be a body. For it is not the province of body to connect; since so far

as it is body, il is partible, as it is said in the Sophista against those who assert

lint all tilings are bodies Tml that whirli connect^ iîmpartible. 1C. however,

that which is connected is body, but that which connects is incorporeal, body

is not its.-lf connective of itself. Hence that which is connected by ilse!f is neces-

suily impartible. As therefore body has in its own nature a finite power, so

likewise it i> in it< own nature destructible, not as bein^ adapted to corruption,

but as not naturally capable of preserving itself, nor as corruptible in capacity,

that ye-u may aUo investigate the corruptible iu energy, but as incapable of im

parting, incorruptibilityto itself.

^ hence, therefore, has it the perpetual, and whence does it receive inlinite,

power? N\ ereply, from its producing cause. For as it is moved from thence, so

likewise il is ijenerated from thence, and is always trenerated. For every thin &



which is generated from an immoveable cause, is allotted a never-failing nature, as

also the da.moniacal Aristotle

says;so that

accordingto this

reaMinin^ likewise,the world will have tiie perpetual proceeding from the immoveable [i. e. from the

intellectual] fabrication. Since, however, according to its own proper nature it is

generated, it is alwa\s generated from the father. But since the world bein^ all

and a whole, is not imperfect, in addition to beinjj generated, or becoming t () j^

it always was jyencrated, since, likewise, the motion of it is always in the end, as

Aristotle savs. Much more, therefore, is the essential p-ner. tioa of it always in

I

he i.-nd, imitating; the perfection of its maker. So that it is tikcays generated, and

always uus generated ; nut receiving*at once tlic wlmlc

itijinity of tfie

It i% oeccsarv \\trt lo supply /irj ^cyn/icroi.

248 1 ROCLUS ON THE [BOOK u.

power of its Maker, but always according to the now possessing the ability ofc.risting

from tins paver,and receiving something from it, according to tht instantaneous

participation of infinity.And it receives the same infinity, indeed, on iircnunt of

that which is imparted, hut on its own account is not aide to receive the same at

once. After tliis manner, therefore, the perpetuityofthe world remains, and the

generation of it takes place ; andin this

resjwctthe In-fore mentioned men

[\. e.

Plato and Aristotle] .ire not at variance. At the same time, however, they differ,

because IMato says, that the essence of the tmi\er>e is co-extended with all time,

hut Aristotle supposes that it simply always exists, infers this to he necessary

through many arguments, and ascribes to it temporal infinity, asserting at tin-

same time that eternity i* stable infinite power. He likewise demonstrates that

no infinite powf r whatever can he presentwith a fmile hotly. Hence it follows,

that the world Ix-ing rorpoival always receive*, inlinile power,hut never has the

whole of it, because it is finite. It is therefore alone true to say, that from infinite

power it is ptm-ratcil,hut is not, iufmitely. lint if it is generated, it receives

infmitv on account of inlinile time. For It, /u infinite pertainsalone to that which

is eternal;hut a ^m ratul infinite belongs to that w hich is temporal ;

for generation

is conjoined with time. Hence Aristotle himself is romp* lied to acknowledge that

the world is in a cerlainre>pect generated.

lioth likewise assert that it is the same in numher, hut Plato conformably to

principles, .says that it is generated. l;or he established prior to the universe a

producing cause, from which he gives subsistence to the universe. But Aristotle

does not admit that any eternal nature is an efl ec live cause. And the former,

indeed, generates time togetherw ilh the essence of the universe, hut the hitler

together with motion: for time according to him i* that which is numbered.



Aristotle, however, is accustomed to do this in his other Treatises. For such

things as IMato asserts of /7/c one, Aristotle ascnhes to intellect,

1

vi/. the non-

possess.onof multitude, the d.sirahle, the ha\ ing no intellectual pe,ce| .(ion of

secondary natures. Hut Mich things as IMato attril.utes to the demiurgic intellect,

Aristotle asciiU-s to the heavens, and the celestial (iods : for according to him,

fabrication and providence are from these. Such things also as IMato ascribes

to the essence of the heavens, Aristotle attributes to their circular motion ; departing

indeed from theological principles,but dwelling more than is lit on physical

Aristotle in his luttjj.livskJdiscuions aiccmls uo liiplu-r

than intelligible intellect, which ^ will,

him the first caue. And perlup* this wa in coiiM-qtiri.ccof knowing that all brjoiul tin* intilli-tl is

truly inetfjlde.

BOOK ii.] TIM^EUS O* PLATO. 349

productive powers. Since, however, the daemoniacal Aristotle is very copious in

discussing the reciprocations of the generated with reference to the corruptible, and

of the unbegotten with reference to the incorruptible, he must be reminded, that

Plato much prior to him assents to these axioms; in the Republic indeed asserting

that corruption follows every thing which is generated; but in the Phacdrus, that the

unbegottenis

also incorruptible. How isit

possible, therefore,since

Plato gives

generation to the universe, that he should not also introduce corruption to it ;

or that corrupting that which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner, he

should not give generation to it prior to corruption ! The generation of the

universe, therefore, was devised by him after a manner different [from its apparent

meaning].

"

But we say that whatever is generated, is necessarily generated by acertain cause."

The discussion accords with the hypotheses, or rather with the order of the

things from which the hypotheses are assumed. For as every where form is

suspended from the effective cause, so likewise, the first hypotheses are in conti

nuity with the second, and afford a principle to the demonstrations which are

consequent to them. For since it was demonstrated according to the first hypothesis, tiiat the world was generated, through the object of opinion as a medium,

afterwards that which is consequent to this is demonstrated according to the

second hypothesis, viz. that it was generated by a cause. For if the world is a

thing generated, or becoming to bo, but every thing generated is generated by a

certain cause, hence the world was necessarily generated by a certain cause.



What therefore is the producing cause of the universe ? That from which the

being generated is present to the world. For it is necessary to investigate this

immediately after the present demonstration. And we shall sec as we proceed,

what kind of arguments Plato uses on this subject.

Now, however, let us briefly recall to our memory, [the reasoning by which it

is shown] that every tiling which is generated, is necessarily generated by a cer

tain cause. Every thing generated, therefore, is in its own nature imperfect. But

being imperfect, it is not naturally adapted to perfect itself; since neither is any

other imperfect tiling. For every thing which is perfected, is perfected from that

1 Thn it because be discussed metaphysics physically, justas Plato discussed phj sirs metaphysically.

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. 2 I

IMIOCLUS ON THE [BOOK n.

which i iu energy. But that which in in energy in perfect; HO that every thing

which jMifccU another IH ulwayi* when it perfect*

in energy according to thai form

lo which it give* perfection].That however, which in generated, so far as it in

generated, i* imperfect. Hence that which is generated, HO far as it is generated

i* riot naturally adapted to perfectanother thing. But if it cannot perfect

another

thing, much more i* it incapableof pcilectmg iUelf. The latter, therefore, is a

greater undertaking than the former. Torthat which

perfectsitself, is also

per

fective of another thing.1

But if it is not perfected by itself, it is evident that it is

perfected by another. For how will it U- generated, unless it is perfected&

Again, therefore, it must be said, the world is generated. But every thing

which is generated being imperfect, is either perfected by another thing, or by

itself. Hence every thing which i> generated, is either perfected by another, or

by itself. But it is not perfected by itself. I1

, is therefore perfected by another,

so that it is generated by a certain cause. Farther still,the world is a

composite,

and has its hypostasis from dissimilars. But if it is a composite, it is either com

posed by itself, or by another. For it is necessary that composition should l>e

from a cause, unless we intend to make it an accidental thing, and from chance.

If therefore it is composed by itself, again it will perfect itself, and give Mibsis-

tence to itself, and we shall ignorantly tiansfer it to an incorporeal essence. For

how will it compose itself? Will it be from the parts arranging themselves ? But

thus we shall make bodies tol>e

self-motive. Or will it be from im|>clling

each

other? And what in this case is that which primarilymoves them. And how is

it holy to commit the whole world to such like impulsions and contrivances?

How likewise will there be order from things deprived of order, and ornament

from things unadorned? For every where that which makes is better than its

effect, and that which generates, than the thing generated. And if indeed the

parts are the material causes of the composition of the world, what is it which

made them? For this is what we investigate. But if they are the cllieiciit causes,

how is it possible that things unadorned can be effective of things that are adorned,

and disonh rly natures, of such as have order and arrangement ? If however the

world is not composed by itself, it is evident that it has this composition from

another. Hence if the world is a composite, hut that which is a composite is

1

Instead of ui n <TT. in Iliis pl.uf,\r iltoultl doulillo* r.ad <ii

ifp><ia

tan.

1Inxirad f TO -,op i Ul.T, T-rXtiu.rnoj- <rr,r, wliali is evidently dc-fi-tlixc, it i-ffins rt|uiilr to read

ro-fti/t

taiiTo rt.Xuricr, iai aXXcr ri Xjiu/rino- un .

1

it >OtrK it onntud in (lie <>n,iu,i!.


composed by a certain cause, the world therefore has its generation from a cause.

Hence too, from these things it is manifest, that what is generated, is generated

by a certain cause.

It is not however wonderful, if Plato calls the cause of every thing "enerated,

a certain cause. For the cause of all things, issimply cause, and not a certain

cause;

concerning which he also says, that it is the cause of all beautiful things.

For it is simply God. But every divinity posterior to it is a certain God, as for

instance, demiurgic or vivific. The cause therefore of generated natures is a cer

tain cause, as differing from the cause of all. Hence, he says, that what is ^one-

rated, is generated by a certain cause. It is also well that Plato says one cause

precedes the whole of generation. For multitude is co-arranged about one prin

ciple, and the many unities about the one. But with respect to other physiologists,

some rank cause with con-causes; others recur to physical powers; others to

dispersed infinite principles; others to nature; and others to soul. Plato, how

over, dismisses indeed theso causes, but supposes that there is one cause which

is the first of all causes. For with this cause, the psychical order indeed co-ope

rates, but nature is ministrant to it, and all con-causes are subservient to it, and

are moved conformably to its will. Because, therefore, the demiurgic monad pre

cedes multitude, he denominates this monad a cause : for this is significant of

unity. Because, however, it has not the first order among causes, nor is impar-

ticipahlo,* he adds the word certain. So that the words "

by a certain cause"

have the same signification as, by one cause indeed, yet not thefirst cause. Hence,

neither is it reasonable immediately to produce that which is generated, but that

which is eternal, from (lie one ; in order that from the one, which is prior toeternity,

every eternal nature may proceed ; but from an eternal nature, that which is gene

rated and temporal. And that solf-subsislont natures likewise may proceed from

that which is superior to beings that produce themselves; but from these, those

that are generated by others. For the series and order of things which proceed

from the one, is continued; and things nearer to the principle, give subsistence

to such as are more remote from it.

"

It is difficult, therefore, to discover the maker and father of this uni

verse, and when found, it is impossible to speak of him to all men."

For MI here, it is requisite to read r n.

*Tlio demiurgic monad, (i. e.

Jtipitrr or the Demiurgu*,) i* not imr>articir*Me lxrne it immedi

ately illuminate*, or i con-*ubiMent with, intellectual intellect. See the 6th Book of my Transition

of Proclui on the theology of Plato.

PKOCLUS ON THE [BOOK 11.

It ha* been rightlyobserved by some prior to UH, thut Plato having shown that

the world was generated by n cause, immediately after ascends to the God who is

the DemiurgiiH of it, in a manner worthy of his iiiU-llectir.il conceptions. For it

seems that the artificial nature of the progeny, introduces a rational and divine

cause, and not accident or chance, which are neither causes, nor have an hypo-

static power, nor in short, sustain the well-ordered progression of beings. It is

requisite, however, that we should first examine the words themselves, and after

wards thus recur to the whole theory.

Father and maker therefore, differ from each other, KO far as the former is the

cause of matter, 1 hut the latter of tin- world and order, and in short, of the formal

cause; and so f.ir indeed as the l orm< r is (lie supplier of being and union, but

the latter of pow-rs and a multiform essence;and so far an the one stably contains

all tilings in himself, but the other is the cause of progression and generation ;nml

so far as the former signifies ineflalile and divine providence, but the latter an

abundant communication of productive principles. Porphvry however says,

that father is lie who generates the universe from himself, but maker he who

receives the matter of it from another. Hence Aristo indeed, is said to be the/u//ur

of Plato, but the builder of a house is the maker or fabricator of it, us not him

self generating the matter of which it consists. If however, this is true, there

was no occasion to call the Oeinimgus father, because, according to Tiin.i-ns, he

does not give subsistence to matter. Is not the demiurgus therefore, rather the

maker as producing form ? For we call all those makers who produce any thing

from a non-existent state into existence. Hut KO far UH the Demiurgus produces

that which he produces, in conjunction with life, he is father. For fathers are

the causes of animals, and of certain living beings, and impart seed together with

life. And thus much concerning this particular.

But"

thin universe" signifies indeed, the corporeal masses, and the whole

spheres [of which it consists] and the plenitudesof each. It also signifies the

vital and intellectual powers, which ride as it were in the corporeal masses. It

also comprehends all the mundane causes l and the whole divinity of the world,

about which the number of the mundane Cods proceeds ; likewise, the one di

vinity,the divine soul, and the whole bulk of the world, together with the divine,

1

For G\IJ Here, it is necessary l read\<n,

because nutter according to Plato proceed* Irtun the

Uttier Ph-iues, or animal itrlf, :uid in>t from the Demiurgus.

*

For avTovt, it is necessary to read airmi.

noon u.] TIMJEL S OF PLATO. 253

intellectual, psychical, and corporeal-formed number that is conjoined with the

world. For every monad has a multitude co-ordinate to itself. All these there

fore must be assumed for the unirtrsc ; since it signifies all these. Perhaps like

wise the addition of (he pronoun this, is significant of the universel>eing

in a

certainre<pect

sensible and partial. For the intelligible universe is not this, be

cause it is comprehensive of all intellectualforms. But the term this is adapted to

the \isible universe which is allotted a sensible and material nature. It is difficult

therefore, as Plato says, to discover the Deiniurgus of this uni \erse. For since

with respect to discovery one kind proceeds scientifically from such things as are

fust,1

but another journeys on from things of a secondary nature, according to

reminiscence ;the discovery from such things as are first may l>e said to be

difficult, because the invention of the intermediate powers, pertains to the high

est theory. But the discovery from such things as are secondary, is nearly more

difficult than the former. For if we intend from these to survey the essence of

the Deiniurgus, and his other powers, it is necessary that we should have beheld

all the nature of the things generated by him, all the visible parts of the world,

and the unapparent natural powers which it contain*, according to which the

sympathy and antipathy of the parts in the world subsist. Prior to these also,

we must have surveyed the stable physical reasons, and natures themselves,

both the more total and the more partial,1 and auain, the immaterial and material,

the divine and dDemoniacal, and the natures of mortal animals. And farther still,

the genera which are under life, the perpetual and the mortal, the undefdcd and

he material, such as are wholes, and such as are parts, the rational and the irra

tional, and the prerogatives which are superior to ours, through which every thing

between the (Jods and the mortal nature are bound together. We must likewise

have beheld the all-various souls, the different numbers of Gods according to the

different parts of the universe, and the ineffable and eflable impressions of the

world through which it is conjoined with the father. For he who without having

seen these is impelled to the survey of the Demiurgus, is more imperfect than is

requisite to the intellectual perception of the father. I5ut it is not lawful for any

thing imperfect to be conjoined with that which isall-perfect.

Moreover, it i.s necessary, that the soul becoming an intellectual world, and

being assimilated as much as possible to the whole intelligible world, should in-

vis. From axioms and definitions.

*

M<pir*rrr/xifis omitted in the original.

*For 1

1| here, it if requisiteto read k.


troflhce herself to the maker of the universe; and from this introduction, should

in a certain respectIjecome familiar \vit!i him through a continued intellectual

energy. For uninterrupted energy ahout any thing, calls forth and resuscitates

our [dormant] ideas. But through this familiarity, becoming stationed at the

door of the father, it is necessary that we should be united to him. For dis

covery is this, to meet with him, to be united to him, to associate alone with the

alone, and to see him himself, the soul hastily withdrawing herself from every other

energy to him. For being presentwith her father, she then considers scientific

discussions to l>e but words,1

banquets together with him on the truth of real be

ing, and in pure splendor is purelyinitiated in entire and stable visions. Such

therefore is the discovery of the father, not that which is doxastic;

for this is du

bious, and not very remote from the irrational life. Neither is it scientific ;for

this is syllogisticand composite-, and does not come into contact with the intel

lectual essence of the intellectual

Demiurgus.

Hut it is that \\hich subsists

according to intellectual vision itself, a contact with the intelligible, and a union

with the demiurgic intellect. For this may properly be denominated diflicult,

either as hard to obtain, presenting itself to souls after every evolution of life; or

a.sthe true labour of souls. For after the wandering about generation, after pu

rification, and the lightof science, intellectual energy and the intellect winch is

in us shine forth, placing the soul in the father as in a port, purely establishing

her in demiurgic intellections, and conjoining lightwith

light,not such as that of

science, but more beautiful, more intellectual, and partaking more of the nature

of the o/ttthan this. For this is the paternal port,* and the discovery of the father,

viz. an undefiled union with him.

1This is in consequence of a union with the Demiurgus beiug so much buperior to scientific per

ception.

Proclu* litre allude* to the fabulous wandering of tlyf.e

in lh- Ody^cy. Fur Momorl<y

then*

ocullly indicate* the lift- of a man who|>af>scs

in a regular manm-r from i miblc to an intellectual

life, aud who In-in;- ihrou-hly purified by the evi re ise of ihe cathartic virtues, is at lenytli able to

energi/e according to the intuitive perception of intellect, and thui after becoming re-uiiiied to Penelope

or Philosophy, nicett with and embraces his falli.r. This appears also to h.oe b.-en tin- opinion & the

Pythagorean Nuincnius, a we are informed by Porphyry in his trrali-e De AntroNyui|>haruiii.

"

1 <.r

he thought th.it the person of Ulysses in the Odyssey represented to us a man who passe* in a repul.r

manner over the dark and stormy sea of generation ;and thus at length arrives at (hat region (i. t. t e

intellectual legion")where

teiiijHsl.s and seas are unknown, and finds a nation

Who ne er kntw salt, or heard ihe billows roar.&

See more onlhis subject in nay Restoration of the Platonic Theology, p.JOt.

nooKi,.] TIM/EUS OF PLATO. 255

But to sty"

that when found it isimpossible to speak of him to all men,

1 quot;

perhaps

indicates the cuslom of the Pythagoreans, who had arrant- assertions about divine

natures, and did nof divulge tin in to all men. For as the Elean uuest says, the

eyes of the multitude arc not strong enough to look to truth. Perhaps also this

may ho said which is much more venerable, that it is impossible for him who has

discovered the maker and father of the universe to speak of him to certain persons

such as he, has seen him. For the discovery was not made by the soul speaking,

but closing her eyes, and being converted/ to the divine light. Nor was it made

by her b^ing moved with her own proper motion, but through being silent with

a silence which leads the way [to union]. For since the essence of other things

is not naturallyadapted to be spoken of, either through a name, or through definition,

or through science, but is seen through in t el lection alone, as Plato say sin hisEpistles,

in what ether way can it be possible to discover the essence of the Demiurgus, than

by intellectual energy ? And how when having thus found it, is it possible to tell

what is seen, and explain it to others, through nouns and verbs? For the evolu

tion which is conversant with composition, cannot exhibit a uniform and simple

nature. \\ hat then, some one may say, do we not assert many things about the

Demiurgus, and about the other Gods, and even of the one itself? To this we

reply, wespeak

indeed about them, but we do not

speak of

each

of

th<.m itself.

And we are able indeed to speak scienlijicaifyof them, but not

intellectually.For

this, as we have before observed, is to discover them. But if the discovery is a

silence of the soul, how can speech flowing through the mouth, be sufficient lo

lead that which is discovered into light.

After thesetilings, therefore, let us, following the light of science, survey who the

Demiurgus is, and to what order of beings he belongs. For different philosophers



amongthe ancients were led to different

opinionson this

subject.For IS

umenius,indeed, celebrating three Cods, calls the first father, but the second maker, and

the third that which is made. For the world according to him is the third God.

So that with him the Demiurgus is two-fold, viz. the first and the second God,

and that which is fabricated is the third God. For it is better to aay this, than1

to say as he does speaking tragically, grandfather, offspring, nephew. He how-

1

For /irj.

vc t

vpovra fi/raraJi/iaroc

eo-a \tyuvit is

necessarjto

r*ad, fttfc rvporrnCM

crrii i nrur, . . X.

For n-rrrrTpn^jiit rjt, it it Itqilisite to readfwtfrpafifitt rjt.

*it is

necessary here lo supplj &

25 PROCLUS ON THK [BOOK n.

ever, who assorts these things, in the first place does notrightly con-numerate the

good with these other causes. For it is not naturally adapted to be conjoined

with certain things, nor lias it an order secondary to another. But father with

Plato [inthe text] is arranged as the second to maker. Farther still, Numenius

co-arranges that which is exempt, from all habitude, with the natures that are

under and posterior to it. It is necessary, however, to refer these indeed to the

first, butto

take awayfrom it all habitude. Neither

therefore,is the

paternalnature of the maker

1

adapted to the first. For these things are apparent in the

orders of Gods posterior to it. In the third place; it is not right to divide father

and maker, since Plato celebrates one and the same Cod by both these names.

For one divine fabrication, and one maker and father, are every where delivered

by Plato. And by following names, to divulse the one cause [ofthe \\orld,] i*

just as if some one, !ecau.se Plato calls the universe both heaven and the world,

should .say there are tvo fabrications, the one heaven, and the other the world;

juntas here, Numenius says there is a two-fold demiurgic Cod, the one father, Itut

the other maker.

With respect to Ilarpocration, it would l>e wonderful, if he were consistent

with himself, in determining things of this kind about the Demiurgus. For this

man is inconsistent in what he says according to the doctrine of three Gods and

so far as he makes the Demiurgus to be two-fold. For he calls the first God,

Heaven and Saturn, the second, Dia and Zena, and the third, Heaven and the

World. But again changing the order he calls the first Cod Dia, and the king

of the intelligible ;hut he denominates the second Cod, the ruler, and the same

divinity, is with him Jupiter, Saturn, and Heaven. The first God therefore, is

all these;from whom Parmenides takes away all things, every name, all lan

guage, and all habitude. And we, indeed, cannot endure to call the first God

even father;but he denominates him father, and oflspring,

and the offspring



of an offspring.

But Atticus, the preceptor of Ilarpocration, immediately makes the Demiurgus

to be the same with the good, though the Demiurgus is called good by Plato, but

not the good. He is also denominated by him intellect, but he says that the good

*For fffjprrj^oo* in thii place,

it it requisite to read ef^pij^oof.*

Instead of TOJTOI here, the sense evidently requires that we should read onjrow.

1

Father aud tinker are first apparent in the intelligible and intellectual, and afterward* iu the other

orderi of Gods.

BOOK ii.] TIMJEUS OF PLATO. 2.57

is the ransc of all essence, and is beyond being, as we may learn in the Republic.

\Vhat then will Atticus say concerning the paradigm? For it is either prior to the.

Demiurgus, and in this case, there will he something more ancient and honorable

than thcgvnd; or it is in the Demiurgus, and the first (Jod will l>e many things ;

or it is posterior to the Demiurgus, and thus the good, which it is not lawful to

assert,will he converted to

things posteriorto

itself, and will intellectually

perceive them.

After these men, Plotinus the philosopher, asserts that there is a twofold

Demiurgus, one in the intelligihle world, hut the other the leader and ruler of the

universe. And he says rightly. For the mundane intellect is in a certain

respect the Demiurgns of the universe. And Aristotle .shows that this is the first

God, denominates it Fate, and calls it by the name of Jupiter. But again, there

is an exempt father and maker, which Plotinus places in the intelligible, calling

every thing between the otic and the world, the intelligible. For there, accord

ing to him, the true heaven, the king of Saturn, and the Jovian intellect

subsist. Just as if some one should say, that the spheres of Saturn, Jupiter, and

Mars, are in the heavens. For the whole intelligible is one many, and is one

intellect comprehensive of many intclligibles.Plotinus therefore

philosophizing

asserts these things.

Amelius, however, makes a threefold Demiurgus, three intellects, and three

kings, one being him that exists, another him that possesses, and the third him

that sees. But these differ, because the first intellect, indeed, is tru/y that which

it is. The second, is theintelligible which is in it, but has the intelligible prior

to itself, participates entirely of it, and on this account is the second intellect.

But the third, is also the intelligible which it contains ; for every intellect is the

same with its conjoined intelligible; but it the which is in

possesses intelligible

the second, and sees the first intellect. For by how much greater the interval

is, by so much the more obscure is that which is possessed. He supposes, there

fore, that there arc these three intellects and Demiurgi, and says that with Plato

there are three kings, and with Orpheus also three, Phanes, Heaven, and .Saturn.

And he who, according to him, is especially the Demiurgus, is Phanes. It is

worth while, therefore, to observe to him, that every where Plato is accustomed

to recur from multitude to the unities, from which the order in the many proceeds.

Or rather, prior to Plato, unity always precedes multitude according to the

arrangement itself of things. And every divine order originates from a monad.

For it is necessary, indeed, that divine number should proceed from the triad;

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. 2 K

PROCLU3 ON THE OOOK ti.

but the monad is priorlo the triad. Where, therefore, id the demiurgic monad, in

order that the triad may proceed from it ? How likewise is the world one, unless

it was fabricated by one cause ? For it is by a much greater priority necessary

that the cause itselfshould be united, and be monadic, in order that the world may

become only begotten.Let there then IMJ three Demiurgi ;

but \vlio is the one

Demiurgus prior to the three? For no one of the divine orders originates from

multitude. Farther still, if the paradigm is one, and the worldis

one, howis

it possiblethat there should not also be one Demiurgus prior

to the many, who

looks indeed to the one paradigm, but makes the world to be only begotten?

Hence, it is not proper that the demiurgic number should originate from a triad,

but from a monad.

After Amelius, Porphyry thinking to accord with Plotimis, calls (he super-

mundane soul the Uemiurgus, but tlio intellect of it to which it is converted,

animal itself, so as to be according to him the paradigm of the Demiurgus; whomit is worth while to ask, in which of his writings Plotinus makes soul to be the

Demiur-us. How, likewise, is this conformable to Plato, who continually deno

minates the Demiurgus a God and intellect, but never calls him soul ? How also

does he call the world a Cod ? How does the Demiurgus proceed through all

mundane natures? For all things do not participateof soul, but all things

partakeof the demiurgic providence. And divine production, indeed, is able to

generate intellect and duds, but soul is not naturally adapted to produce any thing

above the psychicalorder. I omit to say that this very thing itself requires much

confirmation, whether Plato knew that there is a certain imparticipable soul.

In the next place, therefore, the divine lamblichuH has written much against

the opinion of Porphyry, and has subverted it as being Plotinian;but delivering

his own theology, he calls the whole intelligibleworld the Demiurgus; so that

from what has been baid, it is evident that h<; asserts the same thing as Plotinus.



He says, therefore, in his Commentaries,"

Thus we call that which i truly cause,

and the principleof generated natures, and the intelligible paradigms of the

world, the intelligible world. Such causes, likewise, as we admit to have an

existence priorto all things in nature, these, the demiurgic dod, whom we now

investigate, comprehending in one, possessesin himself." If, therefore, in what

is here said, he intends to signifythat in the Demiurgus all things subsist demiur-

1 i. e. A Boul which is nol comutuisteut wilh body.

BOOK ii.]TIM/EUS OF PLATO. 259

gically, and being itself, and the intelligible world, lie speaks conformably both

to himself, and to Orpheus who says :

For in Jove s ample dwelling all things lie,

Ami in Jove s belly they together flow.

And all such like assertions. Nor is it at all

wonderful,that each of the

Godsshould bo the universe, but. after a different manner, one

demiurgically, another

connectivity, another immutably, another convertivcly,1 and another in some other

way according to a divine peculiarity.But if he says that the whole extent

between the world and the one, is the Demiurgus, this deserves to become the

subject of doubt; and we may urge against this assertion the arguments which

we derive from him. For where are the kings that are prior to Jupiter, and are

the fathers of Jupiter ? Where are the kings, according to Plato, whomhe thinks fit to arrange above the world next to I fie one ? How likewise can we

say that perpetual being itself is the first being, if we also say that the Demi

urgus is the whole intelligible order, who is himself perpetual being, as is likewise

animal itself? For shall we not thus l>e compelled to say, that the Demiurgus is

not an eternal being? Unless the Demiurgus likewise is comprehended together with

other eternal beings. That lambliclms himself, however, though he here celebrates

the demiurgic order in a more confused manner, yet speaks of it more accurately

elsewhere, may be from thence assumed. For writing concerning the fabrication

of Jupifer in the Tima-us, after the intelligible triads, and the three trh.ds of the

intelligible and at the same time intellectual1

Gods, he attributes the third order

in the intellectual hebdomad to the Demiurgus. For he says that th \se three

Gods are celebrated by the Pythagoreans, who assert that the first of them is an

intellect comprehending in itself whole monads, the simple, the indivisible, the



boniform, that which abides and is united in itself, and who deliver such like

indications of its transcendency. But they say that the second is collective of the

perfection of things of this kind, and that the most beautiful indications of it are

divine fecundity, that which is collective of the three Gods, that which gives

completion to energy, that which is generative of divine life, that which proceeds

1Instead of ru* fn rpt-rruf, it is necessary to read rov t frifTpcrrirvt.

* It is here necessary to supply u wcpwr. For the three triads of the intelligible and at the same

time intellectual Gods, immediately follow th intelligible triads, and the intellectual bebdouud follows

as the third in order.

PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK m

every where, and that which is beneficent. And they teach us that of the third

who fabricates wholes, the most beautiful signatures are, prolific progressions,

the productionsand connections of total causes, together with total causes defined

liy forms, all proceeding fabrications and oilier things similar to these. It is

worth while, therefore, to form a judgment of the lambliehean theology from these

things, and to determine what tin- nature of it is respecting the Demiurgus of

\i holes. For how can the Demiurgusbe the whole of

perpetual being,

if indeed

jH-rpetual l>emghas bet n already deliued by Plato

;but he now says that it is

difficult to find the Dciniurgus, and when found, impossible to speak of him to all

men ? And how can these things be \erilied of that which is definitively delivered,

and unfolded into light to all those that were present .

After latnbliclms, therefore, Theodorns, following Amelius, says that there are

three Demiurgi. lie arranges them, however, not immediately after the one,

but at the extremity of the intelligible and at the same timeintellectual Gods.

He also calls the first an essential intellect, the second, an intellectual essence, and

the third, the fountain of souls, lie likewise says, that the first is indivisible, but

the second, divided into wholes, and the third receives a division into particulars.

Again, therefore, the same things must be said to him as were >aid to the illustrious

Amelius; viz. that we indeed acknowledge that there are three Cods, or (lods

analogous to these, yet we do not admit that there are three Demiurgi, but that

the first is the intelligible of the Demiurgus, the second, his generative power,

and that the third is truly the demiurgic intellect. It is likewise requisiteto con

sider whether the fountain of souls is to be arranged as the third : for power

pertainsto the middle, as he somewhere says; and thus it must be denominated

partially,ami not called the universal fountain of life. For the fountain of souls,

is one of the fountains contained in this mi. Idle [or generative power of the De

miurgus.] For life is not in souls only, nor in animated K.itures alone, but there

is also a di\ine, and an intellectual, prior to the psychical life, which is said to

proceed diversely from thence, from divided ri\ers. And such, in short, are the

dogmas of the ancient interpreters concerning the Demiurgus.

1st us, however, concisely relate the opinion of our preceptor [Syrianus]on this

Hibjecl, as we think that it especiallyaccords with the conceptions of Plato.

For o\vr here, it is necessary to reail o\o.

* lntra<l of T. ru It TUV y^rvr re *a. wf>* 0-, I retl tw t^aray rv roijrwx. X.

1 For ioy/iarw* Lere, it is necessary to read io-y^aro.

1*00 K

noTIM;EUS or PLATO.

20 i

The one Demiurgus, therefore, according to him,1

subsists at the extremity of the

intellectual divine monads, and the fountains of life. But he emits from himself

the total fabrication, and presides over the more partial fathers of wholes. Bein<r,

however, himself immoveahle, he is eternally established on the summit of Olym

pus,* and rules over the twofold worlds, the supereclestial and the celestial, com

prehending also the beginning, middles, and ends of wholes. For of the1

whole

demiurgic order, one part is a distribution of wholestotally, another of wholes

partially, another of parts totally*, and another of parts partially. Fabrication,

therefore, l>eing fourfold, the demiurgic monad binds to itself the total providence

of wholes; but a demiurgic triad, is suspended from it, which rules over parts

totally, and over the divided power of the monad. Just again, as in the other,

or the partial fabrication, a monad is the leader of a triad, which orderly distri

butes wholes partially, and parts partially. Hut all the multitude of the triad

dances fas it were] round the monad, and being divided about it, distributes its

productions, and is filled from it. Of the many Demiurgi, therefore, there is

one Demiurgus [who is the monad of the rest], in order that all things may l>e

consequent to each other, viz. the one, the paradigm inintelligibles, the one intelli

gible Demiurgus, the one only-begotten world. If, however, these things are rightly

asserted, the Demiurgus of wholes is the boundary of intellectuals, established

indeed in theintelligible,

butbeing

full ofpower, according

to which heproduces

wholes, and converting all things to himself. On this account also Tima-us calls

him intellect, and the best of causes, and says that he looks to the intelligible

paradigm ;ir> order that by this he may separate him from the first intelligible

Gods. But by calling him intellect, he distinguishes him from theintelligible and

at the same time intellectual Gods. And by denominating him the best of

causes, he establishes him above all the other supermundane Demiurgi. For he

the causes l>efore

"

denominates demiurgic, ay also he had said, Every thing generated is generated by a cause? and adds,

"

ll hen therefore anartificer,

c."

Hence the Demiurgus is an intellectual God, exempt from all the Demiurgi. If,

For avri)i>in this place, it is obviously requisite Jo read ai/ror.

1i. e. He dwells

eternally in the highest intellectual splendor.1

Instead of wwt yap ir/^(oi^y<rtjt

. X., here, it u requisite to read rift yap . A.

*Afitr TO lr ruf oXwr

/irpitwi, it is necessary to supply the word*, ro t* rwr /*rpwr oXwwc, ia order

to render the division complete.

For rpia&oi here, we must read porao.

PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK 11.

however, he was the first among the intellectual Gods, lie would alone abide in his

own accustomed manner : for this is the illustrious property of the first. If he was

the second, he would be particularlythe cause of life. But now, when he

generates soul, he energizes with the Crater [i.e. with Juno], but when he gene

rates intellect, he energizes by himself. Hence he is no other than the third of

the intellectual fathers. For his illustrious and principalwork is to produce in

tellect, and nut to fabricate body. Fur he produces body not alone, but together

with necessity ;but he produces intellect through himself. Nor does his prin

cipalwork consist in producing

soul : for he generates soul together with the

Crater. But he alone by himself gives subsistence to intellect, and causes it to

presideover the universe.

Existing, therefore, as the producer of intellect, he very properly has an intellec

tual order. Hence also he is said by Plato to be both maker and father, and

neither father alone, nor maker alone, nor again father and maker. For the

extremes indeed, are father and maker; the former possessing the summit of

intelligibles,and Ixjing prior to the royal series [i. e. to Plumes, Night, Heaven,

Saturn, Jupiter,and Bacchus]; but the latter possessing

the end of the [intellec

tual] order. And the former being the monad of paternal deity; but the latter

lieing allotted a producing power in the universe. Between both these, however,

are father and at the same time maker, and maker and at the same time father.

For each of these is not the same; but in one order the paternal, and in another

the eflective has dominion. The paternal, however, is more excellent than the

t furtive. Hence in the media, though both are in each, yet the former1

is more

father than maker. For it is the boundary of the paternal depth,* and the foun

tain of intellectuals. But the second is more maker than father. For it is the

monad, of total fabrication. Hence I think the former is called Metis, but the

latter Metictct. And the former indeed is seen, but the latter sees. The former

also is absorbed, but the latter is replete with the power of the former. And

what the former is in intelligibles, that the latter is in intellectuals. For the former

is the boundary of the intelligible, but the latter of the intellectual Gods. Con

cerning the former likewise, Orpheus says,

In a d*ik caveru these the father made.

1

Vii. f-ttlu-r and at the same lime maker. This God also i Phanej or animal itself, and lubsiiti

at llie eilrtiuil> ofthe

intelligibleorder.

*For

/3o<rovin this jilace,

we uiubt rea

BOOK ii.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 263

But concerning the latter Plato says,"

Of whom I am the, Dcmiurgus and father

(if n-orks" In the Politicus likewise, he makes mention of the doctrine of the

Demiurgus and father; because with the former [i. e. with Phanes] tlie paternal

is more predominant, hut with the latter [i. e. with Jupiter] the demiurgic. Each

ot the Gods however is denominated from his peculiarity, though each is comprehensive of all tilings. And he indeed who is alone maker, is the cause of mun

dane natures, lie who is maker and father, is the cause of supermundane and

mundane natures. He who is father and maker, is the cause of intellectual,

supermundane, and mundane natures. But he who is alone father, is the cause

of intelligibles,of intellectuals, of supermundane and mundane natures.

Plato, therefore, admitting a Demiurgus of this kind, suffers him to IK? ineffable

and without a name, as having an arrangement prior to wholes in the portion of

the good.

*

For in every order of the Gods, there is that which is analogous to

the one. Such therefore is the monad in each world. But Oqihetis gives a name

to the Demiurgus, in consequence ofIn-ing moved

[i.e. inspired] from thence

;

whom Plato himself likewise elsewhere follows. For the Jupiter with him, who

is prior to the three sons of Saturn, is the Demiurgus of wholes. After the

absorption therefore of Phanes, the ideas of nil things shone forth in him, as the

theologist says :

Hence with tlie universe great Jove contain!,

Extended xlhcr, heav n s cialtcd plains;

Tiic barren restless deep, and earth renown d,

Ocean immense, and Tartarus profound;

Fountains and rivers, and the boundless main,

A\ ith all that nature s ample realms contain&

And Gods and Goddesses of each decree;

All that is past, and all that e er shall be.



Occultly, and in fair connection lies,

in Jove s wide bellv,1ruler of the skies.*

i. c. Vulcan.

*vii. The Demiurgus has an arrangement analogous to tft e good. For as the good is the exempt

monad of the intrlli^iltlc order, so the Derniurgtis is the exempt monad of the tupermundane order.

1Celestial and sublunar) cause* and effects, are very properly said by Orpheus to ubut in tl*

belly of Jupiter, IMT.UIV- tlifso have a middle Rubnistence between supermundane and Tartarean

natures, just as the belly is in the middle of the body.4 These verses are very defective in the original ; but the learned reader will find them in correct

late in the Orpheus of Herman.


Jupiter however, being full of ideas, through these comprehends in himself

wholes: which the theologist also indicating adds:

Jove it the first,and last, high-thundering king,

Middle and head, from Jove all beings spring.

Jove the foundation of the earth contains,

And the deep splendorof the starry plains.

Jove is a ling by no restraint cuiifinM,

And all thingsflow from Jove s prolific

mind.

One mighty principlewhich never fails,

One power, one daemon, over all prevails.

Tor in Jove s royal body all thing* lie,

Fire, night and day, earth, water, and the sky.

Jupiter

therefore, comprehending in himself wholes, produces in conjunction with

Night all things monadically and intellectually, according to her oracles, and

likewise all mundane natures, Cods, and the partsof the universe. Night

therefore says to him asking, how all things will be a certain one, and yet each

be separateand apart

from the rest:

All things receive inclosed on ev ry side,

In aulhtr s wide ineffable, embrace :

Then in the midst of u-lher place the heav n ;

In winch let earth of infinite extent,

The sea, and stars, the crown of heav n, be fixt.

But after she has laid down rules respecting all other productions,she adds :

And when your power around the whole has ipread

strong coercive achain

A bond, golden

Suspend from a j ther.

This bond which is derived from nature, soul and intellect, being perfectly strong

and indissoluble. For Plato also says, that animals were generated, bound

with animated bonds. Orpheus, likewise, Homerically calls the divine orders

1

For &<vt>

herr,it is

neceisary

to rrtd 0eo.

BOOK ii.j

TINLKUS OF IM.ATO.yc,.

,

which are above the world, a golden chain ; which Plato emulating says,"

That

the Dcmittrgus placing intellect in smil, l>nl soul inbody, fabricated the universe

;"

and that he gave subsistence to the junior Gods, through whom also lie adorns

the parts of the universe. If therefore, it is Jupiter who possesses the one power,

who absorbs Phanes, in whom the intelligible causes of wholes first subsist, who

produces all things, according to the counsels of Night, and who gives authority

both to the other Gods, and to the three sons of Saturn, he is the one and whole

Demiurgus of all the world, and has the fifth order among the kitrjs, [i. e. amongthe Gods of the royal series,] as it is divinely demonstrated by our preceptor in his

Orphic Conferences. Jupiter likewise,, is co-ordinate with Heaven and Phanes

and on this account he is both maker and father, and each of these totally.

That Plato, however, had these conceptions respecting the mighty Jupiter, is

manifested by him in the Cratylus from names : for lie .here shows that he is the

cause and supplier of life to all things. For he says,"

That ire denominate Inm

Dia and Zcna, through ic/umti/c is present In nil things. But in the Gorgias h^

co-arranges, and at the same time exempts him from the sons of Saturn, in order

that he may be prior to the three, and participated by them. He also makes Law

to be his assessor, in the same manner as Orpheus. For with him also I,aw is

placed by the side of Jupiter, according to the counsels of Night. Farther still,

I lato in theLaw.

s

represents total Justice tobe the attendant of

Jupiter,in the

same manner as the ideologist. But in the Plulcbus he shows, that a royal soul

and a royal intellect pre-exist in Jupiter according to the reason of cause. And

conformably to this he now represents him as giving subsistence to intellect and

soul, unfolding the laws of Fate, and producing all the orders of the mundane

(iods, and constituting all animals as far as to the last of things; some things

being generated by him alone, but others through the celestial (iods as media.

also add, that in the Politicks calls Jupiter the

To which we may he Demiurgusand father of the universe, ju.st

as in the present dialogue he says concerning him,"

Ofwhom I am (he I)< niiurgus, andf(ither of works." He likewise says in the Poli-

ticus, that the present order of the world is Jovian, and that the world is moved

according to Fate. The world therefore living a Jovian life, has Jupiter for the

Demiurgus and father of its life. If, likewise, he represents the Demiurgus deli

vering a speech,1

this too is in reality Jovian. For in the Meno, he on thw

InMcJil of TUI Onvr*y>a<wr

vwo TV tfnirpiur 111 tintplacr,

il i nrrfnvary to read rwt 0nwr rus

Wtfi r*f ry t r/iiwr.

For ^ij/jioi-pyoDira hfrr, it u nrceturj to read ^^iryyovtra.

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. 2 L

26$ PROCLUS ON THE [oo* n.

account calls him a sophist, as filling the Gods posterior to him with all-

various reasons. This also the divine poet [Homer]] manifests, who repre

sents him thus speaking from the summit of Olympus.

Hear, all }e Gods and Goddesses, my words.

And converting the two-fold co-ordinations to himself. Through the whole of

his poetry, likewise, he praises him as the supreme of rulers, and the father of menand Gods, and celebrates him with all demiurgic conceptions. As, therefore, we

have shown that all the Grecian theology attributes the total fabrication of things

to Jui>iter,what ought we to conceive of these words of Plato? Is it not, that the

same God king Jupiter, is with him maker and father, and is neither father alone,

nor father and maker. For father is the monad, as the Pythagoreans say, but

the decad is the demiurgic* order of divine nature*,"

to which divine number

arrives from the secret recesses of the monad, which decad is the venerable uni

versal recipient, surrounding all things with bound, is immutable and unwearied,

and is called the sacred decad." Hence, after the paternal monad, and the

paternal and at the same time effective tetrad, the demiurgic decad proceeds.

And it is indeed immutable, because an immutable deity .subsists together with it.

Hut it surrounds all things with bound, as supplying with order things that are

disorderly, and with ornament things that are unadorned. It likewise illuminates

souls with intellect, as being intellect totally, and body with Mail, as possessing

and comprehending the cause of soul, and gem-rates things which are truly gene

rated, both such as are middles, and such as are last, in consequence of compre

hending in itself demiurgic being. From what is written also in the Protagoras,

we may collect what the demiurgic order is. For Jupiter there becomes the cause

of the whole political science, and of the reasons essentially disseminated in souls.

This, however, is to bind the whole fabrication of things, and to connect all things

by his own immutable powers. For as the theologist establishes about him the

Curetic order, thus also Plato says, that he is surrounded with terrible guards.

And as the former establishes him on the summit of Olympus, so the latter assigns

to him a tower, in which being eternally seated, he adoins all things through the

middle orders. \Vho the Demiurgus therefore is, and that he is a divine intellect,

the cause of total fabrication, is evident from what has been said;and likewise

that

Jupiter

himself is celebrated as the

Demiurgusboth

by Orpheusand Plato.

1

Here also it is requisite to make the &arue emendation at above.

1

Afyiicvpyici} is omitted in the original.


Whether, however, we must say that he is a fontal or a ruling God, or belongs

to some other order of the demiurgic series, deserves not to be passed over ia

silence. It appears, therefore, that such things as thetheurgist [Julian]] ascril>e8

to the third divinity of the rulers, these Plato assigns to the Demiurgiis ; such as

to fabricate the heavens, inclosing them in a convex figure; to establish the nu

merous multitude of inerratic stars;to give subsistence to the heptad of planetary

animals ; and to place earth in the middle, but water in the bosoms of the earth,

and air above these. If, however, we accurately consider the affair, we shall

find that the third of the mundane rulers divides the universe into parts; that the

second divides it into wholes, and is celebrated as the demiurgic cause of motion;

and that the first by his will alone disposes all things, and constitutes the whole

world according to union. But the God who is said by Timonis to be the De

miurgus, produces all things by his will, imparts to the universe a division

into wholes, and also into parts, which give completion to all the wholenesses

[rag oXirTjTa? 7ra<raj].For he not only makes the universe to be a whole of

wholes, but he also produces the multitude of each wholeness. On all these

accounts therefore, we think it proper to assert that the Demiurgus is beyond the

triad of ruling fathers;that he is one fontal cause, and that the Oracles represent

him eradicating the multitude of ideas in the fontal soul, and constituting the

world from intellect, soul andbody,

andproducing

our souls, and sending them

into generation. The Oracles likewise assert the same things of him as Timrrus.

For they say," The father of Gods and men placed our intellect in soul, but soul

in sluggish body."

1 But this is the admirable thing celebrated by the Greeks, con

cerning him uho is according to them the Demiurgus. If however these things

are asserted conformably* both to Timacus and the Oracles, those who are incited

by the divinely delivered theology [of the Chaldeans] will say that this Demiurgus

is

fontal;that he fabricates the whole world

conformablyto

ideas,considered as



1

It appears to be necessary here to rend ry Iq/ncvpyy instead of ry totrfjy.

1Tli Greek in this place is very faulty. For it is rarfOrro yap rov fitr er ^X7 tftpari i ifnm

tytsartOijft iranjp arbp+iv rt Orvt- re. Instead of which it ought to br,

Now* fttvft vi"XP> ^Xl* & & O*IIOTI "P*ff

\\fjfuf eytarfOfjM variy>ai Ipvv re Orwr rt.

JFor wap avrqi here, it is necessary to read wop vrou.

*For o^v^vXtM in this place read



HOOK ii.]TiM.ia S OF PLATO. 26.0

cither assumes tlic paradigm of the things which he fabricates, externally, or

himself produces them from the paradigm in himself. Just as of human artificers,

some are able to imitate oilier things accurately ; but others possess themselves a

power capable of fashioning admirable and useful works. Thus he who first made

a ship formed in his imagination the paradigm of it. Farther still, this also must

be observed, that every thing which makes in an orderly manner, has the scope

and measure of that \\hicli is made. For if it has not, it will err in making, andwill not know whether it has arrived at the end when it has. For whence will it

know that this is the end, since something may l>e deficient or redundant, and it

may 1>c necessary to take something away, or to add something? For on tliis

account bodies make irrationally andstupidly, because they ha\e. no measure,

nor cause of the thin^ that is made. For it is necessary that the medicine should

be heated to a certain degree ;but if art and the medical intellect are not present,

defining the measure of energy to the fire, it uill operate too abundantly and

destroy the whole, though it was intended to contribute, to the production of the

remedy. For it has not the form of the thing produced. Every thing, therefore,

which makes ought to have the reason of the thing that is made, if it intends

to make in an orderly manner. Hence Plato perceiving this, at the same time

that he admits the effective cause, introduces the paradigm of the universe; just

as Aristotle also by subverting the paradigm, co-subverts likewise the maker.

Plato therefore, taking it for granted that there is a paradigm, investigates through

these tilings \\ hat the nature of it is, and employing the before-mentioned defini

tions, discovers the object of hisinquiry, through the three former hypotheses.

IUit in what manner he makes the discovery, and through what kind of demon

stration, we shall shortly after survey.

In the first place, howeuT, this very thing must be shown by us, that the world

was generated according to a certain paradigm. And in the next place, we must

investigate what this paradigm is, and in what order of beings it subsists. If



indeed the fabrication of wholes is indefinite and without design, then: is not a

paradigmaticcause of the universe

;but if it is not lawful to conceive this to be

the case, and the Demiurgus knows what he produces, and knowing thus

produces the fabrication of the \\orld, the causes of the things generated are

contained in him, and it is necessary either that he should primarily possess these

causes, or that they should l>e. imparted to him by more ancient principles. But

whichever of these we admit, there is a paradigmatic cause prior to the world.

Farther still, since the Demiurgus is intellect, if he produces by his very being,


he produces that which is most similar to himself. But this is to produce an

image of himself. If, however, he produces from deliberation, this is entirely

and in every respect unworthy of the demiurgic cause. And if some one should

admit this to be the case, yet it will follow that the form of the demiurgic work

pre-exists in him. For every one who deliberates and consults, antecedently

assumes in himself the paradigm of that about which he deliberates. This there

fore, may be demonstrated through many other arguments, that it is necessary the

paradigm of the world should have an existence prior to the world, andesjx?rially

when the demiurgic cause is pre-supposed. For it is necessary that the Derni-

urgus being intellectual, should either be ignorant of the order of what is fabricated,

or that he should know it. But if he is ignorant of this, how can he providentially

attend to it? And how can he give arrangement to the universe? If, therefore,

he knows it, how is it possible he should not comprehend that which is generated

by the intellection of it, according to one cause?

In the next place, it must l>e considered what this paradigm is, and in what

order of beings it ranks. For there is a difference of opinion respecting this among

the more ancient interpreters. Thus according to the divine lamblichus, that which

is being itself, and which is comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with

reason, is the paradigm of the universe. For he admits that the one isl>eyond

the

paradigm, but shows that what is being itself concuis with it, and denominates

each that which is comprehended by intelligence. But the philosopher Porphyry

suppose*, as we have before observed, that imparticipable soul is the DemiurjTUR,

but that intellect is the paradigm, thus beholding in subordinate, natures which

exist in more ancient and venerable orders. For Plato having said that the

Demiurgus is intellect, denominates the paradigm intelligible. But this inter

preter assuming soul for the Demiurgus, calls the paradigm intellect. In the

third place, the admirable Theodorus dividing the demiurgic triad, and perceiving

that in each monad of it there is a first, middle and last, calls the last1

in each



animal itself, and thus says that intellect looks to animal itself; for according to

him, intellect is proximately suspended from essential animal. Hence, either the

essential Demiurgus does not fabricate looking to animal itself, or the paradigmatic

causes are not many, or not every Demiurgus efleets his proper production

according to a certain paradigm, lest the maker should make looking to things

posterior to himself, and thus should ignorantly sustain the passion of a partial

soul.

For eooro>- her*, it is ntceisanr to rd ta^aref.

BOOK n.J TiMyEUS OF PLATO. 271

Our preceptor, however, according to his divine intellectual conceptions, has

thought fit to give this subject an appropriate examination. For of the ancients,

some have made; the Demiurgus himself to possess the paradigms of wholes, as

Plotinus ; others, not the Demiurgus, hut have asserted that the paradigm is prior

to him, as Porphyry ;and others, as Longinus, that it is posterior to him, whom

our preceptor asks, whether the Demiurgus is immediately posterior to the one,

or then: are also other intelligible orders, between the Demiurgus and the one.

For if the Demiurgus subsists immediately after the one, it is absurd that all the

multitude ofintelligible* should be immediately posterior to that which is without

multitude. For through numbers proximate to the one, the progression is to the

whole of number, and the whole of multitude. But if there arc other orders

between the one and the Demiurgus, it must be investigated whether the paradigm

of the universe is in the Demiurgus primarily, or posterior to, or prior to him.

For if it is primarily in him, we must admit that he contains every intelligible

multitude. For the paradigm is the most beautiful of intelligibles, so that again

he will be intelligible,and not what we a little before demonstrated him to be,

intellectual, though the paradigm has four ideas alone, but the Demiurgus has

those w Inch are more partial than these, viz. the ideas of the sun and moon, and

each of the natures that have a perpetual subsistence. But if the paradigm is

posterior to him, he will be converted to that which is less excellent, and less

honorable, which it is not lawful to admit of any divine nature. So that the

paradigm is prior to the Demiurgus. If, however, it is prior to the Demiurgus,

whether is it seen by him, or not seen by him ? To say, therefore, that it is not seen

by him, does not accord with Plato and the nature of things. For it is absurd

that our soul should see it, and speak about it, but that it should not be seen by

intellect, and by a total intellect. But if the Demiurgus sees the intelligible,

whetherbeing

converted to himself does he see it, or does he aloneperceive

it

external to himself? If, however, he alone sees it external to himself, he sees the



image ofl>oing,

and possesses sense instead of intelligence. But if converted to

himself, the object of his intellectual jKrception will be in himself. No that the

paradigm is prior to, and in the Demiurgus ; intelligibly indeed prior to him,

but intellectually in him.

The words of Plato also appear at one time to make the paradigm different

from, and at another the same with the Demiurgus. For when he says,

"

Suchand to many idem therefore, as intellect saw in that which is animal

itself,so many

he conceived\>\f

a dianoetic energy this universe also shouldpossess"

he asserts that

.272 PROCLU8 ON THK [BOOK u.

the Demiurgus, as being different from the paradigm, is extended to animal itself.

And again,when he says,

"

Let us consider after the similitude of what animal the

composing artificer constituted (he world. Indeed, ire must by no mean? think that

hefashioned it similar to such anwuils us subsist in the form of a part ; but ice must

admit that it is the most similar of all things to that animal, of which other animals,

Loth considered individually,and according to their genera, are nothing- more than

parts;"

in these words also lie

separateshim who constituted the universe

fromthe paradigm. But when again he clearly says, lie was good ; but in that which

is good, enry can ne-cer be inherent about anything ichatci i-r : being therefore void

oj this, he was willing (hat all things should be as much aspossible similar to himself ;"

here, the sameness of the Demiurgus with the paradigm, appears to le manifest.

So that in some places Plato >a\s that the Demiurgus is the same, and in others,

that he is di/Keren t from the paradigm, and \ery properly makes rath of these a^ser-

tions. Forthe

ideas,or four

monads of ideas, prior to the fabrication of things subsist

intelligibly; but the order of forms proceeds into the Demiurgus ;and the whole

number of ideas is one of the monads which he contains. Orpheus also indicating

these things says, that the intelligible God [Plumes] "as ahsorl>ed by the Demi-

nrgus of wholes. And IMato asserts that the Demiurgus looks to the paradi in,-* or*ndicating through sight intellectual perception. According to the theologist,

however, the Demiurgus leaps as it were to the intelligible God, and as the fable

says, absorbs him. For if it be requisite clearly to unfold the doctrine of our

preceptor, the God who is called Protogonus by Orpheus, and who is established

at the end of intelligibles, is animalit>elf, with Plato. Jlence it is eternal, and

the most beautiful of intelligibles, and is in intelligibles that which Jupiter is in

intellectuals. Each however is the boundary of these orders.1

And the former

indeed, is the first of paradigmatic causes; but tin; latter is the most monadic

of demiurgic causes. Hence Jupiter is united to the paradigm through IS ight as

the medium, and being filled from thence, becomes an intelligible world, as in



intellectuals.

Then of Protogonus the mighty itrength

Was seen; for in his Lflly he cntainVi

Forry airowy here,

read ro nirnzuo*.

*i. e. Protogonu* it th

boundary of theintelligible, and Jupiter of trie intellectual order.

BOOK ii.] TIM/EUS OF PLATO.273

The whole oftiling?,

and mingled where twas fit,

The force and powerful vigour of the God.

Hence, willi the universe gnat Jove contains, &.c.

Very properly, therefore, does Plato now say that the Derniurgus looked to the

paradigm, in order that becoming all things through the intellectual perception

of it, he may give subsistence to the sensible world. For the

paradigm

was the

universeintelligibly,

but the Demiurgus intellectually, and the world sensibly.

Hence also the Ideologist says :

For in his sacred heart he these conccal d,

And into jo) ful light again reveal d.

That the world therefore, was generated according to a paradigm, what this pa

radigm is, after what manner it is above, and how it is in, the demiurgic intel-

lect, is manifest through what has been said.

.Some however doubt why Plato inquires whether the world was fabricated

according to that which is generated, or according to that which isintelligible ;

for there is not any other generated nature iti order that the universe might be fa

bricated with relation to it. If therefore the inquiry had been concerning So

crates, or any other partial nature, the question, say they, would have Ix-en rea

sonable. Hut as the, inquiry is concerning the universe, is it not impossible it

should have been constituted with relation to that which is generated ? For what

other generated nature is there besides the universe ? We may dissolve this doubt

howe\er, by recollecting what has him frequently said, that Plato calls soul

generated, so far as it participates of tune. But the inquiry here is, what is the

paradigm of the iHii verse, whether it is soul, or intellect, or the intelligible? For

these are the only things that are eternal. And on this account he asks, whether

the world was generated with relation to a generated or to an eternal nature.

After this manner, as it has appeared to some, the doubt may In; solved. Mayit not, however be possible to solve it, by another more perfect method, through

which it will also be evident that the confused and disorderly nature prior to the

1In the original ruv rnrr^i- tt

<Vpa,the word tr/iaf or body obviously signifying uhalr. In this

-rn,-al>,

the WOK! ovfin, \\liuli 11 likow ic bctly, i u^rd by Aristotle in Lib. 2. Cap. C. of bis

Meteors. For he there say, that the *fa it Ihr principle and body of all tralrr, afr^Tirtiftn & e*ft*

rnv irntTot vbarnt ij^ frr. Tin* principle loo, he afterwards calls ijOponr/jerot oyxot, a collrrtrd bulk or

matt. So tli.ittrftai with Orpheus, and

attfiawith Aristotle, have in these place* Uie tame meaning as

d\orit or tcholrnru with the PiatonivN.

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. 2 M

374PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK it.

world, must not be said, as Atticus and Plutarch thought it must, to be unbe-

gotten?For if nothing; was generated prior to the universe, it was ridiculous to

inquirewhether the world was generated with n-lation to

i>erpetual being, or to

that which is generated.This however, is now imestigated. Prior to the world

therefore, there was a certain generated nature. And since it was neither]>er-

petual being, nor place ;for threethings [as Plato says] were prior to the "one-

ration of the univcrso, viz. being, place, and gnu-ration; it is evident that the

so-much celebrated confused and disorderly nature was a thing of this kind.

Hence not the universe only, but that which was moved in u confused and dis

orderly manner, was generated, as we have said, and li.nl a prior subsistence.

The world therefore, possessingthis confused nature as matter, but the intelligible

pre-oxistins;as more excellent, whether was the mmerse assimilated to the ma

terial nature which it contains, or to that which is essentially more di\ine? For

being a medium between the two, it is necessarily assimilated to one of the

extremes. For it is supposed that the Deiniurgus assumed that disorderly nature,

and perceivesanimal itself; so that Plato very pro^-rly inquires to which of

these the Demiurgus assimilates the universe, \\hether to that which he assumes,

or to that which he sees. To these things therefore, that which follows is con

formable;

viz. that the world being beautiful, it was assimilated to the intelligible,

and not to that which was moved in a confused and disorderly manner. For that

which is assimilated to this is deformed.

Some of the interpreters however say,that Plato does not inquire concerning

the Demiurgus, according to which of the paradigms he made the world, but

that he asks as with reference to us who know that there are twofold paradigms,

with relation to which of these the universe was generated. Ami this assertion is

after a certain manner reasonable. For we are those who look to both these pa

radigms, and not the Demiurgus. For it is not lawful for him to look to that

which is less excellent ;but we perceiving the natures which an- prior, and also

in which of them it is tit



those which are posteriorto him, interrogate ou.sehcs,

to place the paradigm. But others say that Plalo adduces that which is gene

rated, for the sake of a perfect division, in order that lie may not appear to

prevent the object of investigation,whether the mundane paradigm is eternal.

For supposing the paradigm to be generated, he shows that a certain absurdity

will follow. Others again say,that since of sensible*, some are preternatural,

but others according to nature ;and of these, some have the images of certain

generated natures, but others an- the similitudes of them;

hence Plato wishing

HOOK ir.] TIMJlit S OF PLATO.27.-,

to demonstrate that tlte world was ijcnerated with relation to an eternal paradigm,

makes a subversion of the others, on account of the universe being most beautiful.

For that which is most beautiful, is neither preternatural, nor is derived from a

generated paradigmatic essence; since that which is derived from this is not most

beautiful. Hut because, in short, the universe is beautiful, it is not preternatural.

Such therefore, is the solution of the doubt.

It is worth while however concisely to survey the accuracy of the words. For

the words "

a^ahi* and " must be considered" indicate the. order of the problem ;

viz. that it is in continuity with the things which precede it, and that this imme

diately follows those speculations. But the words, "respecting hint," collect all

the investigations, and refer them to the one theory about the world. For what

is said about the Demiurgus and the paradigm, is assumed for the sake of the

theory of the universe. The words, "accordingto which nf the

paradigms" sepa

rate as extremes, and as different from each other, theintelligible, and that which

is generated ;the former existing among the first, but the latter among the last of

l>eings.But the word

artificerexhibits the production of form by its cause, and

demiurgic art proceeding into the world. For as the theologist says, the first

manual artificers gave to Jupiter the demiurgic powers of all the mundane

production. And,

\\ 1m thunder, and ilic lightning formed for Jove.

Vulcan and IVill.it the first artists, taught

Jove all thr i,rd:il arts, the world contain*.

I lato therefore follow ing what the theologist here asserts, continually uses the

words rrxr.,vmiv">^and irrxrv.mri, which signify fahrieative energy, when speak

ing of the demiurgic production. 15nt the words,"

according to that which sub

sist* with invariable .www.v.v," indicate the eternal paradigm of the universe, whichis the first of eternal natures, and is established at the end of the first

intelligibles.

And again,"

that u hic/t was gcneralciT signifies, that which was moved in a con

fused and disorderly manner. For this is a composite, is much mingled, and

altcr-motive, or moved by another; all which are the elements of a generated

nature. He does not therefore say that this disorderly nature is unbegotten and

incorruptible,and that the world is generated and corruptible ; but that the

former of those was generated, as being alter-motive and co-mingled. For Plato

clearly say, that prior to the generation of the universe there were these three

J76 PROCLUS ON THE [goox u.

things, place, generation, and being. And it is evident that by generation he

means the confused and disorderly nature. Generation then-fore is this ; and

the world isunl>egotten according to temporal generation. Hence these things

are more concordant with Plato, and with our unperverted opinions about the

universe.

"

Indeed, if this world is beautiful, and the Derniurgus of it is good, it is

evident that he looked to an eternal paradigm ; but if he is not good,o ~

which it is not lawful for any one to assort, he looked to that which was

generated."

In the first place, it is requisite that we should understand the logical method

of Plato, in order that we may see how demonstratively it proceeds. For from

the hypotheses! he had these twofold axioms, that what is generated according

to an eternal paradigm is beautiful ;but that what is generated according to a gene

rated paradigm is not beautiful. The converse however to these are, that what is

l>eautiful was generated according to an eternal paradigm, but what is not beautiful

\?as not generated according to an eternal paradigm. For if to the opposite of

that which precedes, the opposite of that which is consequent folbws, then these

reciprocate with each other, and that which was proposed from the beginning

is demonstrated, through a deduction to animpossibility. For if that which is

beautiful was generated according to a generated paradigm, but that which is

so generated is not beautiful, through one of the axioms, then it will follow that

what is not !>cautiful is beautiful. \\\iy then fore, did not Plato immediately in

the hypotheses assume these axioms, \i/.. that what is beautiful wa* generated

according to an eternal paradigm, what is not beautiful was not so generated ;

hut those to which these are the converse, though he intended to use the former,

and not the latter in his demonstration? In answer tolhi<,

it must be said, that

the latter which commence from causes, are more adapted to hypotheses, but

the former which are derived from tilings caused, are more allied to things

posterior to hypotheses. For when he says,"

7 /nit which was generated according

to an eternal juiradi^m is l

dutiful,"he begins from cause-, but ciuls in (hat which

is caused. But when iiceuT*a, he sa\s," That /.v beautiful which was generated

according to an eternalparadigm,"

he makes the beautiful to be preeedaiieous, but

the cause consequent. He employs therefore, the former of these, in order that

noon ii.] TIMJEUS OF PLATO. 277

he may assume tilings adapted toprinciples and causes in the hypotheses, but

he employs (he latter, which is the converse, of the former, in the demonstrations,

selecting that which is appropriate to the things demonstrated. Hence laying

down these four axioms, lie very pn>|eily enquires concerning the universe,

whether it is l>eaii!ifiil, or is not beautiful. Tint if indeed the world is Ix-aiiliful,

it Mas generated according to an eternal paradigm ;hut if it is not heautiful,

according to a generated paradigm. That the world however is l< aiititn!, is

evident fnun sense. It was therefore generated according to an eternal paradigm.

Since howe\er beauty is imparted to the world from the paradigm, through

the demiurgic cause as a medium, in the proposition which precedes, for the

purpose of showing that the world is beautiful, he assumes that the Demiurcrus

is good. For every artificer, who is a good artist, has dominion over his proper

matter, and superinduces the form which he wishes, on the subjects of his art.

And thi< is accomplished in a much greater decree hy the whole Derniiir^tis, who

also gives subsistence to nature, the [universal] snhject of things, as other

assertions evince; and who produced it, that it might co-operate with him, in

receiving the world und fabrication from him. Since however, he had added

this in the second proposition, he passes over the opposite in silence. For the

defamation of the world is atrocious, since it is most beautiful, and a blessed

(od, but the defamation of the Demiurgus is still more so. Hence i lato employs

Themis* as a guard to what he says, who collects the Gods themselves to the

Demiurgiis, and does not suffer them to be divulsed from the goodness of the

father. And he does this, in order that through Themis, he may not ascrilx: any

tiling disorderly or defamatory to the Derniurgus. The propositions therefore,

being such, and receiving their U-ginning from the dividing art, let us see what

Plato afterwards adds.

"

It is however, manliest to every one, that he looked to an eternal



paradigm ;tor the worUl indeed is the most beautiful of generated

natures, and the Dcmiurgus is the best of causes. But being thus gene

rated, it is fabricated according to that which may be apprehended by

reason and intelligence,and which subsists invariably the same."

Instead of atpym litTO, it it requisite to read vunpyct.

For I lato uses the word Or/in, or Icw/vl, in tbis place.


Through what is here said, in the first place, he antecedently assumes the con

clusion, as lie is accustomed to do, deriving the principles of his demonstrations

from intellect. In the next place, he introduces the recollection of the assumiv-

tion, and afterwards adds the rest.1 For the words,

"

// is hun erer manifest to

every one, that he looked to tin eternalparadigm,"

are the conclusion. But the

words," For the U orld indeed is the most bcantijul of generated natures, and the

Demiurgus is the best of causes," are a narration of the assumption, as the causal

conjunction pi* indeed manifests. And the rest is the conclusion of all that is

said. Such therefore is the logical arrangement of the words. But again, be

taking ourselves to the theory of the things, let us in the first place see

through what cause he transfers the word beautiful to the word most beautiful, and

good to the bcxt. In the next place, let us survey how thr.se things are true, and

what kind of order they have with reference to each other.

That a beautiful fabrication therefore, was fabricated according to an eternal

paradigm is evident, and was before asserted. For whence could it obtain the

beautiful, except from the imitation of this paradigm? If however, this is most

beautiful, the fabrication was not simply made according to an eternal paradigm,

but if it be requisiteto say so, it was assimilated to the most eternal of eternal

natures. For every image which more clearly participatesof form, is the image

of a purer paradigm. And ax of the statue* produced by the telcstic art, some par

taking of the presence of a divine nature more obscurely, enjuy the second and third

pou-ers of the divinity,but others participating of it more clearly, partake also of the

frst and highest power* of the God /after the same manner likevv ise, the (Jod who

gives |>erfectionto the world, has rendered it most beautiful, as an image of the

first of eternal natures. For that which is most beautiful is derived to the world

from thence, and is extended to a similitude towards it, through its own beauty.

Again therefore, if the demiurgic cause is good, he looked to that which is eternal,

and not to that which is generated; lest by looking to what is less excellent,

which it is not lawful to assert, he should fall off from goodness. If, however,



this be the case, not only a good cause, but tin best among causes, looked to the

most eternal of paradigms. For by how much the percciveris more divine, by so

much the more elevated is the object of perception. For the same thing will not

be surveyed by the better and the less excellent nature. Plato therefore, indica

ting

these

things,

andthrough

these latently assisting the position that the para-

1

Instead of ro Xi/y&f here, it is necc.ssarjto read TO \oiwov.

COOK ii.] T1M.EUS OF PLATO, 279

digm of the universe does not rank among the multitude of eternal natures, but

is the most eternal of all of thorn, and primarily eternal, calls the world indeed

most l>eautiful,hut the Demiurgus most excellent. For that which is most beau

tiful \vas generated according to the most divine paradigm, and that which is

most excellent necessarily looks to that which is supreme. For ifthat which is most

beautiful was not derived from the first paradigm, this first paradigm will either be

the paradigm of nothing, or of something less excellent. But it is not lawful for

superior natures to make that which is less excellent in secondary natures. Andunless that which is best looked to that which is first [either it will not make that

which is most beautiful1

]or not looking to that which is first it will make it. How

likewise, will that which is the first paradigm, rank as a paradigm, unless1

that

which is best intellectually perceives it? And how can that which is intelligible to

a less excellent nature, be incomprehensible through transcendency by tl;at which

is more excellent ? Hence it is necessary that what is most beautiful should have

been generated according to that which is most divine, and that what is most excel

lent should look to that which is most eternal. Farther still, it is necessary that what

is most U autiful should be fabricated by that which is best. For of u hat is that

which is best the cause, unless of that which is the most beautiful of generated

natures? For if it is not the cause of the most beautiful effect, it is the cause of

something less excellent. If, therefore, that which is best is the cause of that

which is less excellent, that which is not best will be entirely the cause of that

which is most beautiful, and thus the order of things will be radically subverted.

It must be admitted therefore, that these three things are, as it is said, demonstrated

by geometrical necessities; and through these we are reminded after what manner

names are assumed by IMato. Porphyry however adds, that if the Demiurgu.s

is most excellent, it follows that he looks to an eternal nature, or 1 that he will not

fabricate what is beautiful. And in the next place,* it is necessary that he who

fabricates whnt is

[truly] beautiful,should look to

that.which is

eternal,or 5 he will

not make what is beautiful as the l>est of fabricators, but he will make it casually.

Hence also, I lato asserts that the fabricators of mortal natures are daemons.

And if indeed, they arc simply most excellent, nothing will prevent the artificer*

and framers of mortal natures froml>eing

likewise most excellent, and on thin

The words q ov woi TO tu\\tvT<iv, arc omitted in theorigin*!, but evidcntlj ought to l>e inserted.

*Instead of

&

in this place, it i requisite In r ;ul nftij.

Inslr.id of & here, read r\.* For ore read nra.

5 The same emendation is also requisite here a* above.


account the fabricators of beautiful images. Such therefore are the observations

of Porphyry.

We may easily however learn, that it is rightlysaid the world is most Ix-autiful,

and the Demiurgus the best of causes. In the first place, indeed, the beauty of

the heavens, the order of the periods, the measures of the seasons, the harmony

of the elements, and lie analogy which pervades through all things, demonstrate

to those who are notentirely

Mind, that the universe is most beautiful. In the

next place,does not the order of the invisible powers it contains, according

to which the partsof the world are connected, and the gift of the intellectual

essence, evince that it is the most beautiful of generated natures? For there are

in it the harmonious choir of souls, the participationof intellect, the supply of a

divine life, the progressionof ineffable deity, and the numlK-r of henads or uni

ties, from which the whole becomes full of beauty. Since also, the [partial]soul

which is assimilatedto the

universe, becoming elegantlyadorned, exhibits iu her-

helf an admirable beauty, how is it possible that the universe should not possess

l>eautyin a still greater degree ? hence theoloijists conjoining Venus with Vulcan,

say that he thus fabricated the universe. And again, from Vulcan and Aglaia,

they generate Eucleia and Eusthenia, Eupheme and IMiilophrosune,who render

the corporeal-formed nature decorated with In-auty. Neither therefore, do those

who revile the Demiurgus, dare to say that the woi Id is not mo^t beautiful, but

on the contrary they say that throughthe

beautyof it souls are allured and

ensnared.

But how are we to adn.it that the Demiurgus is the best of eternal natures?

For some think that we must understand by this word best, the best of the causes

of generated natures, in order that he may not le absolutely the best of causes.

For this would IK; false, but that he may be the best of the causes of things that

are generated ;since the natures that are above him are not the causes oi these.

I however, should be ashamed of myself, if 1 were in want of such an artifice as

this, forgetting what was a little In-fore said, in which the Demiurgus now

and monad of

delivered to us by Plato, was shown to be the fountain every

demiurgic order. On account of this therefore, lie is the Ix-st of causes, because

he is allotted the first order among the demiur-i of the uni\erse; Pluto here,

directly emulating Homer, who c. ills the Demiurgu* the father of wholes, and the

supreme of rulers;and he thus denonu.iat. s him though he mentions the (Jods

1It appears to me that the word ir^Wui must be supplied in this pUce.

noonii.]

JiM;i:US or PLATO. o8 l

prior to liiin, as far as lo the (joddess iSiiiht. Because therefore Jupiter is tin"

most anrient and venerable of dcmiurî, In; is celebrated by Homer as the

supreme of rulers, hut by Plato as the host1

of causes. Others however by no

means dare to accuse the Demiurgu*, but blame this universe, and pervert the

assertions of the ancients, \\lio call it a ca\ern and a den. And others, as Hera-

cliliis, say, that the Dcmiurgus spurted in fabricating the world.

To these objections howexer it is easy to reply. For though the world is, a<

Plato says, most beautiful, and a blessed God, yet when compared with the

intelligible, and the place which is there, it is deservedly called a cavern and a

den. .And it is especiallyso to partial

souls who verê to bodies and matter.

But with respect to the Demiurûs, though lie is the best of causes, yet the whole

of his pro\ idential energies about the recent fabrications, may be called,\porl,

when compared with the energies \\hieh are exempt from sensibles. For these

reasons therefore, the Demiurûs is thus celebrated in the pre-ent words, by

Plato. It is requisite also to understand how the coordination of the most

beautiful \\ilh the most xcelient. is suspended from the first principles. For as

in them beauty is suspended from I lie good, and the beautifying cause, from the

fountain of all iôod, thus also here, the world is said to lx> most beautiful, but the

Demiur^ns most excellent, and the most beautiful is suspended from that which

is host. In the next place it is requisite to understand how what is said about

the fabrication itself [of limits] imitates this fabrication. For as the world itself

was led from contusion to. order, and a similitude to the intelligible, |\ fabrica

tion, th.is also the discussion of it first employed abhorrent appellations, calling

it generated and destructible, but now the most \enerable names, denominating

it the best of generated natures, the offspringof the most excellent father, and

the imaê of the most divine paradigm. Ami shortly after, he reminds us of it

by the most sacred of names.

" But again, tiicsctilings [thus] subsisting, there is every necessity that

the world should be the image of u certaintiling."

To those who are more simple, what is here said may appear to be the same

Vvith what was before asserted. For some one who does not survey tilings accu

rately may ask what dnTerence there is hctwtvn saying, that the world was fabricat-

For ainoi Iirre, it is ntccsmjr to read apteroi.

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. a N

OQO PROCLUS ONTill:

[DOCKn.

ed according lo a paradigm, and that it is tin- linage of a certain thing, In reality

however, each of these is separatedfrom the other. Tor Mice it is possible for an

rlilin-r to make confonnalily to a paradi-m,but tin- thin?; fabricated may not

become the imam; of the pa-adi-m in consequence of not U-in- vanquished by

the fabricating: cause;

in order that von may not fancy that this is also the ease

Mithtin-

world,I lato lias shown that tin- Demiiinriii* indeed looked to a para

digm, and that In-ini; most excellent he looked to the most divine paradi-m, from

what he said respectm- the nniverse hem- faliru-atrd j-oiiforiiially to the intelli-

jrihle.lint that the universe aUo is

\aiH|m>hed hy form, and truly imitates its

paradigm,lie manifests from what is now sni.l. 1-or if the world i^ an ima-e,

the nni\er>e is assimilated to the intelli-zihle. l;or that which is not dissimilar

lint >imilar and ronsentane<Mi>,is an im.ue. Ym !nne therefore, the sensible

iini\erse, the mostbeautiful o(

images,the intellectual imiscise, the best of causes,

and the intelligible nni\ r>e,the most divine of paradi-in^. J- ach of t .iese also is

t-v cry where. For the sensible universe participate*of intellect and beini: ;

the

intellectual universe possessessensible* uniformly, but intelligible*

1

secondarily ;

and the intelligible universe antecedently comprehends, primordiallyand united

ly,intellectuals and seiisibles. The universe however, subsists appropriately in

each order. And the sensible universe indeed, is placedbt fore ns as a fabrica

tion ; but the eternal is two-fold,the one

beinâs demiur-ic, but the other as

paradigmatic; though the paradigmaticis aUo m the deminr-ic. l- or the

l)emim-ns makes looking to himself; since every intellect sees itself, and is the

same with the intelligible it contains. And a-ain the detninr-ic is in the paradig

matic ;since it maki s that which is generated. I or it is not a paradigm like a

form impressed in wax, nor as the imaê ol Socrates is the imaê ot another

imaê; but the paradigmatic cause by its very iM-in^ inak<-s secondary natures

similar to its lf. At the same time however,to fabricate

paradigmatic-ally,and

lo be a paradi-m demiurgically (i.e. fabritatively] diller. / -r the Jot -iiitr is to

t^cntni/li/ ; Intt the /alter ix t

tiu\>urtts^tur energetically.

And the

energize

former is to perceive intellectually, intelligibly; but the tailor is to be intelli

gible intellectnally. l ur tin-jnruli<tritii \ I lie /KinuJiîn

is to uuiLc li/

its niy

icing ;hut of t lie Dciniiti^n.i, to make Ay & r^r.uig.

l;or il is not the same thin-

to make by existing, and to know und en< rî/.e through know led-c;since soul

ulto products lijc Inj e.ti<itin

r

, but malax tirtijtcuiHj/ tlirvitgli knowledge. Andit

1

For ovrok licrc, road i & run.

*

I or rn uioUtiTii hcrt1

,it is ncccary lo rrad r lor/ra.

n.)Kii.] TI MAIL S OF PLATO. ^3

possesses indeed, ilit> foninT essentially, hut tin- latter according to ener/v. And

why is ifrequisite Jo Implicit these observations philosophically ? For the throlo-

pist lup-j before, celebrates the demiurgic cans.- in Phancs. J vr Ihcrc, tix hesays,

the sin ! lii diniuii, or dli-scchiz Jv/iifo , wax, awl antecedentlycjri&led j in order that

lie nti^ it lia\e as it were (lie fountains of (lie t\\o|old fabrication of things. Hoalso ei-li hratos (I H .

paradiîual ie cause in Jupiter. For aâin, he likewise is, as

lie sa\s. Metis ili. first generator, and much-pleasing Love, lie is also continual

ly denominated|>y

hint. Dioiivsius, and I haiies, and FiicapaMis. All the causes

then ion 1

parlieio ile of each other, and are iti earh oilier; so that he \\lio s.ivs as

the dnine lani diehiis, that the Deiniurtrus coinprelienils in himself the paradigm,and lie v. h" rs-nee-, ;i- the illustrious Ann hits, (hat the paradigm is the Deiniur-

H us. in a eeriain respect speak riL.r litl\. I or the latter >a\v the deiniinxic peculiaritv

pre-e\iiinLi in the paradigm ; for there the lir-t .Jupiter exists, and on this account

he makes IMianes to he the Deiniiirirus ; hnt the former sa\v the paradigm in the

1>( niiinuu^. I or .Metis also was in the Demmr^ns, |( in^ ahsorU dliy him.

And on this account he considered the paradigmatic to he the same \vith the

lemimîc cause. And thus much concerning these particulars.

M & mi-hl not however, to \vonder if Plato calls the world an iniaijo. l;or

though it is most leaulifiil. \et it is the imaire of intelliîldr heauty. Through

this similitude also, it exhihits such things as adorn and heautifv generation,

and receives as a \\ hole the form of the paradigm. Thus the philosopher calls

Hie world theimaije of the intelligible, as licini; assimilated to its paradigm. The

addition likewi-c of nt*.\i/i/, shows that the similitude of the former to the latter

is admirable and inellahle. Afterwards also, he testifies this by a demonstration

indubitable and firm. For it proceeds from the hypotheses themscUcs.

"

Bui in every tinni:, to begin from a principle according to nature, is

the greatestof

undertakings."

Some read what is here said by stopping at the word TTO.VTOS, cccn/ thing, AC-

corclin^1

to \\hoin the words indicate, that it is the greatest of all things, to make

that beuinuin; tf the discussion which is according to nature. But others, stop

ping at the \>ord/xy<rrov,

nv//t A/, conjoin the word Tavroy with what follows; so

that \vith them the colon signifies that it is the greatest undertaking, to begin

For f-xtrpwrtvcvTa here, I read eiriirptiro^ro.

004PIlOCUJS ON Till. [HOOK n.

the. tli*cii-*iou of tho universe, from ii principle which i* according to nature,

Others again say lliat these words are introduced for tho *aku of the thing* pre

viously UKaimiod, these Ix-ing rightlyconcluded through the h\ potheses which

were necessary. Nut according to others, they -.in- introduced for the sake of

what is directly after asserted, it I.. -inir requisite,if we intend to make a pioper

lieginning,to delme pn-viously

what kind of discourses ..u-lit to IM-ad..,, tod

court-ruin- s-ii*il!rs. And otlu-rs say, llu-yan- introduc.-d for tlic>ako of uhat

will aflT\vards lu; dc-liu-r.-d roiuvrnin- tin- final (MUM.-. For this is th,> -ivatest

principl* ,and according to nat.nv, \\liirh it is

m|iii>itf especiallyto survey, and

from which coninu-iu-init is lit to dUm^ what follows, lint that pn-vions to

tho ili^iuisiliouof this, he infoi ins us uhat tho mode will IIP. g

-

physicaldis

cussions.

To me however, thi.s axiom a[prars to lie rightly assurtod of all things. 1 or it

is universal, and is adapted to what lias lieen lieforc saiil, to what immediately

follows, an<l to what will be again said. Or ratlu-r, it is not adapted to these

alone, hut to all fabrication. For beginning from n piineiple according to nature

as from a root, Plato delivers afterward* explanations of cause homologous to this

principle.And science itself, from proper h\potheses,

collects appropriate

conclusions. Science therefore follows the order of thm-s; but doctrinal dis

quisitionfollows science. And this i> the greatest undertaking. In the first

place,

because it imitates wholes, and the progressionof beings. In the next

place,because if the smallest particular

is overlooked in the principle,it becomes

multiplied as we proceed.And in the third place, the principle

or beginning, is

said to be the half of the whole. If however, this be the case, it possesses the

greatest power. If, too, as some say, the principleis something more than the

whole, it is in an admirable manner said lo be the greatest thing. The truth qf

ihis is also testified by poetswho say,

k that every thing which receives a good

beginning usuallyends well." And moreover, on this account the Athenian

guest calls the principlea (Jod, if it obtains that which is fit. For he says,

"

Principle UiHZ established in men us a (,</, /irutlticcs

(til things rightly if it obtains



a congruous jwrtion [or the part ichkh is adapted toit}."

But what is the meaning of the words "

(tcconiinx to nature?" Is it the re

ceiving every thing which ought to be received, or is it that which first proceeds

from things which subsist essentially ? For that which is last is a principleas

with reference to us, but not withreference to nature. The

principle

therefore

BOOKii.] TIM.EUS OF

PLATO. 28/i

according to nature, of til*- universe indeed, is the final cause, hut of demonstra

tions the hypotheses, and of discussions the definition respecting the form of the

doctrine, whether it is to l>e received as firm, immutable and accurate, or as

that which is merely probable, and is not indeed truth, but credible, and assimi

lated to (ruth.

"

After this manner therefore, \vo must decide about the image, and

the paradigm of it."

These threeparticulars are connascently consequent to each other, the things,

the conceptions, and the words. According to the things and the conceptions

therefore, IMalo assumes the first hypothesis; but according to the words he

makes this definition. For when he separates that which is generated from being,

lie adheres to the theory of the things. Hut when he defines our knowledge

according to the objects of it, lie adheres to the theory of the conceptions.1

Andnow distributing the words according to the diversity in the knowledge of them,

he demonstrates tons their definite nature. Hence, these are consentaneous to

each other;

vi/. twofold things, being and that which is generated ; twofold

knowledges, intelligence and opinion; and twofold words, the stable anil the

probable. For whence are knowledges derived,except

from the objects of know

ledge ? And whence is the difference of words derived, except from knowledges ?

Some therefore say, that it is the logographic art to define previously what the

mode is of the diction, and what kind of person the auditor of it ought to l>e;

and that Aristotle emulated this, and also many others more recent.

1 however should say that the.discussion imitates the fabrication itself of tilings.

For as that unfolds into light the invisible lives of the world, but gives subsistence

to that which is

apparent,

amiimparts

a

boundaryto it

prior

to the wholeworld,

thus also Tima iis adheres indeed to the theory of the things; but also makes

the form of the words to be adapted to the things; and antecedently assumes,

and previously defines the mode of the whole theory of the discussion, in order

that he may dispose the whole of the doctrine conformably to this definition. Whytherefore docs he do this now and not before? Because, after the demonstra-

1 In tllC original, orr ?r rat n/irrfpni yiuernt tuipiStt,rrri rent *payftaaiv roiirw*-

rnr)//>irwr,which if ftj-

itcntly defective, but may be restored to it genuine meaning by reading, ere ft rot tyirrrpai yrwrm

jVpt &

& roil vpay/jarir, rijt arci\f ro Otwptai rwr wij^nrwr.

28 <;

PUOCLUS ON THI [BOOK n.

tion, that it is requisite the world should bo gem-rated, he necessarily defines

what the nature of the discussion about sensible things ouht ty IH-, but not prior

to this, tlir nature of the universe U-ing unknown, lint when lie calls the world

an image, an image of such a kind is not to be assumed, as we corn-cite that

of inanimate*

natures to be, as neither is the paradigm un prolific and iliellicaci-

ous, but an assimilation must be gi\en to this world to the intelligible. In the

first place indeed, according to the prolilie power of the paradigm; for by its

very Iwin^r it produces the imaire from it-elf. In the second place, according to

the demiurgic cause, which renders the universe most similar to the intelligible,

by the energic* extended to it. And in the third place. accordm; ;

to the con

version of the world it-elf to the forming power and participation of intelligible*.

For "

it as.similates it> If, as the ( )racle says, hastening to be in\e>ted with the im-

prc.ssjon of the images which the intelligible(Jods extend to it.

" As words therefore arc allied to the tilingsthemselves of which they

arc the interpreters.

As the progression of beings is from the otic which is prior to the many, and

mundane natures proceed from a monad to their proper number, thu,-> also the.

discourse of Tim.ens, bein 4 assimilated, as he says, to beings, commences

from one axiom, and the unher.sal, and thus afterwards introduces dUision to his

words. What therefore is the one common axiom, in the words before u> ? That

it is necessary language should be allied to the things, of w hich it is the interpreter.

And it seems that the I latonisls Albiims and (iaius, and their followers, took

occasion from hence to define in how many ways Plato dogmati/es ;and that he

does this in a twofold respect, either scientific.illy, or from probability, and not

according to one mode, nor as if all discus>ion> had one accuracy, whether they

are concerning beings, or things which subsist through generation ; but such as

is the nature of things, such also is that of the words which are divided in con

junction with things. Hence they subsist in such a way with respect to accuracy

and clearness about the things which are their subjects, that some words assert

the accuracy of the dogmas, but others theirprobability. For it is necessary that

()u is uinittrtl ill I lie oii-m.il.

1 For 4 V\UV here ,s necessary to read a\fV%uv,

3

Wf>nis omitted in tlic original.

ii.] TiM.EUs or ri~vro. 207

lan<4uao;eshould be similar to things ; since it could not otherwise interpret their

nature, tlmn by being allied to them. For it is requisite that what the thing is

contracted ly,that lanûaê should lie evolvedly ; in order that it may unfold the

thing into litrht, and may be subordinate to the nature of it. Ilenre, the

divine ranges of lanûaê untold ol lrr this manner the; essences of tin- natures

priorto

them,and are connascent with them. /// I he. Ciods

therefore,the

angelor

j>!c<\< i/^cr of Jupiter [i. c. j/i-rmcs], who lias the relation of logos to the intellect of his

father, announces the icill of Jupiter to .secondary natures. Hut in essences, soul which,

is I l/c Jo^ns of hilclliziblcsi unfolds the united came of wholes which is in them, she

rciciiing from them herliyposlasis.*

And in the gemra superior to us, the angelic order

has the relation of logos to the (.rods. Very properly therefore, is it here said, that

language is allied to the things of which it is the interpreter. This therefore,

must he said to be tin; one common axiom, prior to the divided particulars. AndTiinaMis in what follows, distributes different modes of words in conjunction wilh

the quality of the things.

-"

Hence, respecting tliat wliicli is permanent and stable, and intellec

tually apparent, it is requisite,that the words should be as much as

possible permanent, without lapse, irreprehensible and immutable. JJut

in this [stability] the paradigm is in no respect deficient."

Prior to this, TiinaMis called the paradigm perpetual being, subsisting invariably

the same, and apprehended by intelligence; but now he calls it permanent and

stable; the former indeed, instead of perpetual be in;;, and which is apparent in

conjunction with intelli-ct, but the latter, instead of that which is apprehended by

intelligence. He also denominate)) the words respecting it permanent, indeed, in

order that through the sameness of the name, he may indicate the similitude of

them to tiling ;but without

Iti/txc,in order that they might adumbrate the firm

ness of the thing. And irnprchcnsibleîn order that they may imitate that which



is comprehended by intelligence, and may scientifically accede. J or it is

necessary that words, in order that they may be adapted to intelligiblos, .should

have accuracy and firmness, as being employed about things of this kind. .For

as the knowledge of eternal natures is without lapse,so likewise is the discourse

ForT>tv

vjroOtoif licrc, it i* necessary to rrad rt/r virooramr.

*Er is omitted in the original, but evidently ought to b inserted.

i>88

PKOCLUS ON THE [BOOK n.

about them. For it is an evolved knowledge. Since, however, it proceeds into

multitude, and is allotted a composite nature, and on this account falls short of

the union and impartibilityof the thinir, he denominates the thing itself in the

singular nnmU-r|>ermanent

and stable, r.nd intellectually apparent ;but the

discourse about it in the plural numl>cr, calling it stable icorJs, ichich are without a

hpse, and are in f/nJietmiblc. And since in language there is a certain simi

litude to the paradigm, but there is also a certain dissimilitude, and this abundant,

he assumes one word in common the permanent, but the others diHerent. Since

aUo a scientific discourse is irrepreheiisible,as with reference to our knowledge;

for there is not any thing in us belter than science; but is confuted by the thing.

it>elf,as not beini; able to comprehend the nature of it,

such as it really is, and

as falling oil1 from its impartiality,

on this account he adds,"

as nincli as

]n>ssii>lf."

For science itself, as subsisting in souls, is indeed irrepreheiisible,but

is reprehended by intellect, for evolving that which is impartible,and apprehend

ing thai which is simple in a comport,- manner. For the phantasy also repre

hends sense, because its knowledge is in conjunction with passion, according to

a commixture, from which the phantasy is purified.Nut opinion reprehends

the phantasy be( -ause it-, knowledge is alleiided with t\pe and morplie, from

which opinion is free. Science reprehends opinion,because its knowledge is

without the explanation of cause, by which science is especiallybound. And

intellect as wo have said, reprehends science, localise it transitivelydi\ ides the

object of knowledge, but intellect knows at one.- the whole in conjunction with

eoence. Hence intellect is alone unconquerable,but science, and scientific

diM ourse, are \anquishod by intellect, according to the knowledge of being.

"

It is necessary however, that words respectingthat which is assimi

lated to the permanent and stable, but which is the image of bcin g

should

possessprobability [alone]."

That the discussion of generated natures, is a discussion about an image, and

that on this account it is to be called prubabk,is evident. Perhaps however,



some one may inquire what words remain to be assignedto things which are not

assimilated to the intelligible,but yet at the same lime exist in the universe, such

1

For a-rcfirfot here, I ri ail airoar^oa^fOt.

Forfx>

r r itrrjrur in this place,t is obviousl\ necf^an. to read wtpt r*v yoirvr.

BOOK it.] TIM/EUS OF PLATO.2}{f)

as we assort conjectural and artificial things to bo. May we not say, that words

of a conjectural nature are adapted to those, which words are different from

those that aro assimilative! For to conjecture is one tiling; since this is more

>bscurc than scuso; and to assimilate another. For assimilation pertains to

theinterpreters of the images of being. Artificial, therefore, and conjectural

things arc unfolded through conjectural words. Unless other such like words

are adapted to things which are truly conjectural ;hut with respect to artificial

things, assimilative or prohahle words, are adapted to those that are the first from

forms, hut to those which have a secondary hypostasis, and are the third from

truth, such words are adapted as pertain to things conjectural by nature. For

conjectural things are the images of sensihles, in the same manner as sensible*,

are the images of intelligible*. Thus the painted bed is the image of that which

is made by the carpenter.

Farther still, this also must l>e considered, that Plato is nowshaking

about

physical images, and that on this account he gives a twofold division to words.

For things which are assimilated to the intelligible, subsist by nature or naturally ;

but this is not the case with things artificial. For the arti>t does not make that

which he makes, according to certain ideas, though Socrates appears to say

this in the Republic. There, however, what is said, is asserted for the sake of the

paradigm, and is not concerning ideas themselves. For he says that God is the

maker and

Dcminrgns

of things artificial, but he is not the

Dominrgusof ideas.

But in the Protagoras, it is cleaily shown by Plato that we do not contain the

reasons or productive principles of the arts, and much less of things artificial,

See tin 10th hook of llie Republic, w lif re lie speaks of the idea* of a !>cd and a t;il>lr. Pl.ito,

however, did not intend to signify, in what lie theres;i>s,

llut there is an idea of each of these in ilie

intellect of the DcniinrgMS of llie universe; or, in short, that (hero are ideas of thin;;* arlihcul; but

he call* b\ the name of idea, the reason or productive ami forming principle which soloists in the

dianoctic power of the artificer. This reason also lie says, is the offspring of deity, because lie

conceived, that tint very artiliri.ilprinciple itself, is imparted to souU from divinity,

I roclu*, in the

I arnicnide*, well observe*, that an argument of (he truth of this may !>e derived from h nee, that

1 liilii calls apcx-l

the third from, or with repvct to, the truth, placing him analogous to a painter, who

docs not make a bed, but the image of it. The form of her), therefore, in the dianoctic|>*rt

of the

artificer, ranks as first with respect to truth; the bed which he rnakei as second; and that which is

piloted as the third. Rut if there was an idea of bed in the intellect ofdivinity, the painter

would be the fourth, and not the third from truth.

1i. e.

The soul does not ttitxtially contain the reasons of thosearts

which are solely ministrant to

the purposes of the moral life.

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. 2 O

2j)0 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK u.

and that neither are the paradigms of them established in the Gods. These

therefore were not generated according to theintelligible. Plato, however, now

divides words into those which pertain to the discussion of the intelligible, and

(hose which are concerning the linage of the intelligible. Hence indicating this he

says, that words respectingthat ichich is assimilated to t/ie permanent und t,tuule^ but

which is the image of being, should possess probability [alone]. But the works of

nature are assimilated to the intelligible,and not the works of art; so that

neither have particulars this assimilation definitely, but the universal* \\hich are

in them. \\ e have, however, spoken concerning these things elsewhere.

" The latter words having the same relation to the former [as that

of an image to its paradigm]. For what essence is to generation, that

trulh is to faith."

Prior to this, Tima-us made two things antecedent, the intelligible and the

generated, or the paradigm and the image, and assumed two things as analogous

to these, science and probability,or truth and faith : so that as truth is to the

intelligible paradigm, so is faith to the generated image. Hut nowalternately he

says, as truth is to faith, so is the intelligibleto that which is generated. And

this perfectly \\i-ll. For he makes the intelligible and truth to be antecedent, but

at the saint- time lx-gins from that which is generated and faith, that he maymingle that which has a reference to us with the order which is according; to

nature, and that he may preserve the proper worth of the things, and may argue

Irum what is known to us. Plato, there fore, clearlydivides language and know

ledge conformably to the objects of knowledge ;and Parmenides though obscure

<>n account of his writings being poetical, yet at the same time indicating these

things, he says,"

that truth is full of splendor and immutable, but that the

opinions of mortals have no real credibility." And a^ain,"

that there are two paths,

one of which has a real existence, so that it is not possible for it not to exist.

But thi> is the path of Persuasion, and is attended by Truth. The oilier, necessarily



has no true existence. The former of these paths, however, though repletewith

the most perfect (MTSUUsion,is unpleasant. And again,

"

Neither can you have

any knowledge of non-being; for it is not attainable; nor can you make it

the subject of discourse." The philosopher therefore says, that there are two.

Owing to theobscurity uf the original,

1 have only jjivfn the substance of th* MTSCS ofParnKuidcs

BOOK ii.]TiM.KUS Or PLATO.

-j.,!

fold knowledges, of twofold tilings ; truth which ho calls [full of splendor, ;is

liming with intellectual liiilit ;and faith, from which ho takes away stable

knowledge. The faith, however, which Plato now mentions appears to ho

different from that spoken of him in the Republic, in the section of a line. For

there the faith is an irrational knowledge ;whence also it is di\ided from conjeo

ture, hut is arranged according to sense. The faith however of which he now

speaks is rational, hut is mingled with irrational knowledge, as it employs sense

and conjecture. Hence it is filled with much of the nnstahlo. For receiving from

sense or conjecture the on, or that a thing is, it thus explains causes. But these

kinds of knowledge, have much of the confused and unstable. Hence Socrates

in the Pica-do reprehends sense in many respects, l>ocausc we neither hear nor see

any thing accurately.

How, therefore, can the knowledge which originates from sense possess the ac

curate and the irreprehensihle ? For the powers which use science alone, compre

hend the whole of the thing known with accuracy; but those that energize with

sense, are deceived, and deviate from accuracy, on account of sense, and because

the object of knowledge is unstable. For with respect to that which is material,

what can any one say of it, since it i* always changing and (lowing, and is not

naturally adapted to abide for a moment. But that which is celestial, in conse

quence of being remote from us, is not easily known, nor to be apprehended by

science, but we must be satisfied in the theory of it, with an approximation to the

truth, and with probability [instead of certainty]. For every thing which is in

place, requires the being situated there, in order to aperfect

know ledge of ite

nature. The intelligible, however, is not a thing of this kind ; since it is not

apprehended by us in place. For wherever any one establishes his dianoetic

energy, there, truth being every where present,he comes into contact with it.

But if it is possible to assert any thing firm and stable about that which is celestial,

this also is

possible

so far as it

participatesof

being,

and so far as it can In-

apprehended by intelligence. For if any thing necessary can be collected

concerning it, it is alone through geometrical demonstrations which are universal.

But so far as it is sensible, it is difficult to be apprehended, and difficult to be



surveyed. And thus much concerning there particulars.

Some one, however, may doubt, how it can be any longer said to be ditlicult to

discover the Demiurgus, and impossible when found to speak of him to all men,

since we are able to employ stable, immutable,and

irreprehensible languagealtout

the paradigm? Or is not that which is said about the Deraiurgns, in a much

292 PROCLUSONTHE [BOOK M.

greater degree adapted to the paradigm itself? For it is much more difficult to

discover the latter than the former, and when found to speak of it to all men.

Neither, however, does Plato deny that scientific language may be employed about

the Demiurgus, nor about any other of the natures that subsist always invariably

the same. For in what does Plato differ from other physiologists, except in ex

hibiting the science {Retaining to divine natures? But if he particularly reminds

us of this in the

Demiurgiccause, that it is difficult to find it, \ve ought not to

wonder. For he knew, as it appears to me, that other physiologists tri-.nsfer the

effective cause to physical powers. Hence that we may not be affected in the

same way as they were, he shows that the Demiurgic principle is difficult to be

found, and difficult to be known. And this much in answer to the doubt.

Plato however in many places admits the truth of beings, conformably to

theologists. For uniform truth [or truth characterized by unity] is of one kind,

and is thelight proceeding

from the

good, which,

ns lie

says

in the Philebus,

imparts purity, and as he says in (he Republic, union tointelligibles.

The truth

proceeding from intelligibles, is of another kind, and illuminates the intellectual

orders, which the r.ssence that is without figure, without colour, and without

contact primarily receives, where, also, as it is written in the Pha-drus, the plain

of truth is situated. Another kind of truth is that which is connar cent with souls,

which comes into contact with ln-ing through intelligence, and is conjoined

throughscience with the

objectsof science. For the

psychical light, maylie

said to !M> as in the extension of breadth the third from the intelligible ;the

intellectual breadth being lilled from the intelligible,but the psychical from the

intellectual. This truth, therefore, which is in souls, is that, which must now

IK* assumed, since we likewise assume this faith, and not that which is irrational,

and separated from all rational animadversion. The one also must he conjoined

to intelligibles, but the other to sensible*.

** You must not wonder, therefore, O Socrates, if asserting many

tilings about many concerning the Gods, and the generation of the

universe, I should not be able to employ language in every respect



accurate and consistent with itself."

Tima-us first exhibits the hypotheses of the whole of physiology, and collects

the lemmas pertaining to the theory of it; the latter being three, but the former

five. In the second place, he defines the mode of the discussion. And in the

HOOK ii.]TIM/FUS OF PLATO. 293

third place, ho prepares the auditor to receive in a proper manner the discourse

which he is about to make. For it is necessary that he should not expert to

hear perfectlyAccurate arguments in physical discussions, nor such as are truly

scientific, Imt such as are assimilated to (hem. It is besides thisrei]iii>ite

he

slionld know, that as the \vorld is mingled from physical powers and an intel

lectual and divine essence; for"

physical works, as the Oracle says, eo-suhsist

with the intellectual li-j;ht of the father;" thus also the discussion of it, makes a

commixture of faith and truth. For things which are assumed from sense par

ticipate largely of conjectural discussion; hut things which commence from intel

ligibles possess that which is irrcprehensible, and cannot he confuted. For

when we say of the Demiurgns himself, that he consults, that he energizes diano-

etically, and that he makes these things prior to those, we relinquish the truth

of things. So that if when sjwaking of eternal beings, and showing how they

provide

for the universe, we are compelled to divide that which is

impartible,and to make that which is eternal temporal, much more will the assertions re

specting sensihles themselves IKI deficient in accuracy [and truth]. M hat then,

someone may say, do we not sjvak accurately concerningthe heavens when we say,

that the circles in them bisect each other ? Hut do we not fall off from accuracy, when

we are satisfied, not with the accurate, but with an approximation to it, in con*

sequence of our imbecility, and not on account of the nature of the tiling? Or,

also, whenwe receive

indeed, principles from sense, yetis it

not from uni\ersalreasons! The assertions therefore, respecting the heavens, as in intelligible*, ex

hibit the irreprehensihle;but as in objects of belief, they also are reprehended

through immaterial forms. Consider then this very tiling which is now asserted,

that the greatest circles in the iica\ens bisect each other. Is it not necessary that

the section should be according to points! Hut a point is impartible. What,

then-fore, is there of this kind in apartible,

nature ? What is there without inter

val in a nature distended with interval ? For every tiling which subsists in a physical body, is co-divided with its subject. What, then, is there not likewise a

physical point ? This however relinquishes that which is truly impartible, and is

a indeed, in substances, but is not a So that what

point physical simply point.

is said of a point, is not accurately adapted to a thing of this kind. In short, as

the assertions concerning intelligibles, are not adapted to dianoetic objects, so

neither is what is said of scientific objects adapted to sensibles. For intelligibles

are the paradigms of dianoetic natures, and dianoetic natures of sensibles. For

201 PROCIA S ON THK [BOOK if.

it is soul winch adorns the mighty heaven, and adorns it in conjunction with the

father. So that when we speak of circles in the heavens, of contact*, bisections,

and equalities,we sjM-ak accurately, as not speaking about sensible*. Since

therefore things of this kind may he asserted of all material natures, the ohjection

is trilling.

If, however, some one should ask us, is not that which is truly equal impartihle,

and that uhichis

truly a circle,without interval? For each is a universal

;hut

universal is an impartihle reason and form. But the natures in the heavens are

partible,and not indivisible, and are in a subject. Here again, we do not say

that either circles, or equalities or any tiling else of this kind are in sensible* ;

and thus we are consistent with ourselves. \Vcsummarily, say, therefore, that

Plato at one time defines science, l>uan explanation of causes alone ; at another time,

by the subjects of it, possessingan essence, perfectly stable", together with an explanation

of cause; and at another, by t/ic principles not being hypotheses. And according

to this last form, indeed, he asserts that there is one science[i.

e. dialectic] which

ascends as far as to the principle of being. For this science pre-establishes the

principle which is truly principle, to In unhvpolhelical. It also has for its subject

truly exisiling being, and produces its reasoning* fiom cause. Hut according

to the second form, he also calls dianoetic knowledge science. And according

to the first alone, he allows the appellationof science to be given to physiology.

Now therefore looking to the first form he thinks tit to call it conj ctural know

ledge. And thus much in answer to the doubt, the whole of what is here said

being attended with difficulty on account of the construction of the words, which

may thus be corrected with a small addition."//".<> Sucrtite*, as\crting main/

tilings about ninny"afterwards showing what these many things are, he adds,

"

concerning the Gods, anil the generation of the universe. .And these- are the

many IK; alludes to."

// therefore, he sa\s, main/ things being nx^rled about

many, concerning the generation of the universe, and the Ci oJx it contains, each of tluse

being many, r/r should not be aide to employ accurate language, you mutt not wonder.

He says this, however, because it is not wonderful, to be occupied in things of a

necessary nature. But it is necessary that a discussion should not be accurate in

a twofold respect, \iz. v>n account of the tiling known, nut being stable and clear,

and on account of our nature being human. So great therefore is the caution

1

It ii etiilmllyno<

cssary iiiblcitl of ^i-rr/jor fi^in llii>

\>\.ce,

to rt:jil

ir^ruvtit\,. 1 or duiloc-

1 c knowledge is l>v llo IIH.IIH conjectural.

HOOK ii.]TIM/T.US OF PLATO. 095

which Plato employs in what lie says. This however is not the case with others.

Hut Heraelitus, by asserting of himself that he knew all things, makes all other

men to be destitute of science. AndEmj>edocles

announces that he imparts

truth herself, and that, in vt hat he writes.

To Wisdom * summitrapidly lie leaps.

For these assertions are not conformable to philosophic caution. But the Stoics

say that there is the same virtue of fiods and men, luring; very far from emulating

the piety of Plato, and the modesty of Socrates.

*If therefore we shall afford arguments no less probable than others,

it is proper to be satisfied, calling to mind that I who speak, and that

you who are my judges, have the human nature [in common]. So that

if you receive a probable narration concerning these things, it is fit to

seek for nothing farther than this."

Thrums reminds us in a twofold respect of the privation of stability and accu

racy in physical discussions; tir.-t, from the essence of the things. For from im

material natures becoming material, from impartible partible, from separate

natures, such as are situated in a foreign seat, and from universal, becoming indi

vidual and partial natures, they do not receive the definition of things scientific

and irreprehensible,which is adapted to immaterial and impartible forms. But

in the second respect, from the imbecility ot that by which physical objects are

surveyed. For if it be requisite to know any tiling concerning them, it is also

requisite to embrace a knowledge co-ordinate to them. But this is sense. And

if indeed we were in the heavens, we should perhaps be less deceived ; but here

dwelling in the last part of the universe, and beini; most remote from them, \ve

employ sense in a gross and erroneous manner. For we are allotted the human

nature. But the human nature brings with it a life which is material and dark

ened by the body, and which is partible, and in want of irrational knowledge.1



The Gods, however, know that which is generated, in a way perfectly remote

from generation, that which is temporal, eternally, and that which is contingent,

necessarily. For by intellectually perceiving they generate allthings, so that they

1 Tbt word yiytwvkotvir it wanting in (he original.

PKOCLUS ON THE [BOOK n.

intellectually perceive them after the above-mentioned manner. For we must not

fancy that knowledge is characterized by the natures of the things known, or that

what is not stable is also not stable with the (Jods, as the philosopher Porphyry

savs; for this is asserted by him which it would have been better not to ha\esaid ;

but we must admit that the mode of know ledge \arieswiththedi\ersitiesofgnos-

tic natures. For the same thing is known by diunity indeed unitedly, by intel

lect totally, by reason universally, by the phantasy morphotically,1

and hr- sense

passively.Nor does it follow, that because the thing known is one, the knowledge

also is one. Farther still, if knowledges are essential in the (Jods, and their intel

ligence is not adventitious, such as they arc, .such also is their knowledge. Hut

they are immaterial, eternal, united, and midefiled; and, therefore, they know

immaterially, eternally, unitedly, and with imcoiitaminated purity.Hence they

antecedently comprehend that w hich is material, immaterially ; dispersed multitude,

uniformly; that which is changed according to time, stably and eternally; and

every thing preternatural,dark and impure, in a manner [transcendently lumi

nous and] pure.Would it not therefore be superfluous to add any further confir

mation of this truth ?

Again however this 1

may be assumed from what has been said, that the want of

accuracy in the theory of the images of being, arises from our imbecility For to

the knowledge of them we require phantasy, sense, and many other organs. But

the (Jods contractedly comprehend these in their unity, and di\ine intellection.

For in sublunary natures, we are satisfied in apprehending that which for the most

parttakes place,

on account of the instabilityof their subject matter. Hut again,

in celestial nature-, we are tilled with much of the conjectural, through employing

sense, and material instruments. On this account, we must be satisfied with

proximityin tin- apprehension of them, since we dwell remotely, at the bottom,

as it is said, of the universe. This also is evident from those that are conversant

with them, who collect the same things respecting them from dilleient hypotheses;

home things, indeed, tluou Ji eccentrics, others through epicycles, and others

through evolvents, [in all these] preserving the phenomena.What then, some

one may say, are we to be satisfied with Plato in physiologi/iug,ami in affording

HN arguments no less probable than others? .May we not reply,that it especially



becomes prudent men thus to speak about things of this kind, and to pursue the

TIu- ord moryhr, as we have rlx-u lirn- olm-rvcil, pi-rUinsto iho rulour. figure,

and inaK iiiHide

ofsu|K-itic

ies. llencr, the

pluntasy |*neivesmorphotically, because its sight is Ajlgurrd inception.

For rou here, it MTIUIS uecvsiary to redd roiro.

BO..K n.] TIM/I:rs OF PLATO. 297

medium between dissimulation and arrogance; for the latter is to say more. but

(In- former loss, than all others, ;md the medium is to say what is in no respect

less. In the next place, the words no Icxs, may not only be said of men in former

times, and speculators of nature, lut also of the conjectural things themselves.

As if he had said,"

If therefore, t.r shall afford arguments no lessprbtmltle than the

things thcmxetvcx, and shall not dc.iert the nature of Iheobject* nf kno;rla/c, we tmixf

he satisfied" The Gods indeed know these things in a more excellent manner,

lut we mast he satisfied with an approximating knowledge of tliem. For we are

men, are placed in body, and exert a partial form of life, and are filled with much1

oi a conjectural nature. Hence, our discourses, may be very properly said to

resemble fables. For our language, which the word jau^y /A/e [used here byJ latoj indicates, is replete with crassitude and

irrationality, and it is necessary to

pardon human nature.

" You speak most excellently, O Titmrus, and we shall receive what

you say, in every respect as you advise. Your preface indeed we won

derfully approve. Proceed therefore, and bring to a conclusion the sub

sequent melody.1 "

In the Hepuhlie, where Socrates

disposes

the discourse. Tima-us wassilently

present, not exhibiting his own judgment about what was said. Hut here

Socrates, after a certain admirable manner, receives what Tima-us says.

For in the things al>o,of which the persons are images, while secondary

natures ener-i/e, those that are first are established in themselves, and do not

depart from themselves, nor^ver^e to inferior natures. Hut when more divine

beings enerjri/e, then more subordinate natures are elevated to theparticipa

tion of them,through

the love of all-various wonder. HenceSocrates,

in what

is here said, very properly surrounds Timseus with all possible praise. For

through wonder itself, lie is in a greater decree united to him. Moreover,

the word "nw.\t excellent" indicates indeed, theperfect, intellectual, and scientific-



nature of the doctrine of Timacus. And it also indicates his analogy to the Demi-

ur^us. For as he. is the best of causes in works, thr.s also Timanis is the lx?st in

discourses. The words likew ise," we shall receive what you say in every reffuct

Tor vrj\ov lirir, it ii nccc.s.ary

to read wn\v.

1In the It ll of I rorlus, Aoyor in rrrnrouly printed for t .por.

Tun. Plat. VOL. I. 2 I

PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK n.

us you advise,* indicate what kind of jx.>rson he ought to l>e, who rightly receives

discussions concerning divine natures. That he ought assiduously to adhere to

the teacher; to perform with all his might that which is orderedl>y

him ;and to

persuade himself, that it is right to be|>ert?uaded by what tlie teacher says.

Farther still the word "

preface"indicates the comprehension of total concep

tions in the hypotheses. All tiling therefore, are in tin; preface itself.1

For in

this preface,it is shown what the form

1

is of the object of inquiry, on what

hypotheses,1 and things previously demonstrated from them it depends, and also

what the nature is of the discussion, and what are the requisite qualifications of

the auditor. But the word vopof mtlotly,is assumed from modulations adapted to

the harp. These then-fore, are certain melodies, some of \\hich are Minervnl,

nut others Martial. And some indeed, are enthcastic, but others are defamatory

of manner*. Prior, however, to these melodies, it is usual to arrange the preludes,

\\hichalso on this account are, railed firecontrd.-(titiunx.From thence therefore,

they are assumed. Hut the word tm ludy contributes to the tiling proposed to be

considered, because all the visible partible4order of things, being harmonious,

eternally remains, on account of the goodness of its producing causes. And

Iwcause likewise, it proceeds from, and subsists according to intellect, and pos

sesses total powers separated from each other, ami arranged in a manner adapted

to each. For melodies are culledvo/xovf

lti:cstbecause they remain immutable, and

1 it-cause such things as are tit are distributed from each.

" Let us narrate then on account of what certain cause, the composing

artificer constituted generation, ami this universe."

All that has been Ix-fore said delivers to us preparatives for the whole of physio

logy. Ami of these, some through images and symbols, exhibit the theory of the

world. Apreface

also of the whole discussion is prefixed, and of the demonstra

tion through images or symbols ;one part of which unfolds the union, but

another the separation of mundane natures. Of the prefatory parts also, some are

hypotheses,but others are as it were lemmas demonstrated through the hypo-



1 For iara r rt here, it seems requisite to rfad iaru rouro.

1Instead of n Ttiu {tt uui in this plat*,

it is necessary to read rt TV ti?n.

For tai votw vwirilcocuv rrad *a ct iroiwy vvvtifoiuy.

*

Th word fjrpionj is omitted in the original.

BOOKii.] T1NLEUS Or PLATO. 299

theses. For the particulars respecting the mode of diseussion, may l>e placed

among the things demonstrated. For to the demonstration that the world is

generated, the assertion that the discussion of it iseikotolo;;y [or speaking from

probability],is consequent. .Hut again, these things having received an appro

priate end. Tima-us commencing the fabrication of the universe, begins from the

good, conceiving that the discovery of tlie linal cause will lx> to him the most

beautiful incitation. For as the good is the cause of all beings, so likewise it is

fit that the generation of the world should proceed from this as the first prin

ciple. For all things are from the good. And of such tilings indeed, as the demi

urgic intellect is not the cause, as for instance of matter, of these the good is the

cause. And of such things as the paradigm is not hypostatic, these also derive

their subsistence from the good. For all things are for the sake of it, and it is the

cause of all beautiful things, as it is said in theEpistles. Hence Timanis refers

the other causes to this one cause. For having found the form of the world

through the hypotheses, and also the paradigmatic, and e/1eclive cause, he now

wishes to assign the most principal, most venerable, and most ancient of causes,

the final, which he particularly desires in the fabrication of things. For since the

man who lives according to intellect performs every thing for the sake of good, will

not intellect itself, and a divine intellect, in a much greater degree fabricate all

things for the sake of the final cau^e ? For though the worthy manfrequently

appears to perform something for the sake of the body, yet this is not the end

to him of the thing, nor does he principally regard the good of the subordinate

nature ; but he does this also for the sake of a similitude to divinity, and makes

that to Ix1 his most intentional end. How much more therefore, must the Demi-

urgus of the uniterse fabricate for the sake of good, and the final cause? For lie-

does not energi/e without design, nor indefinitely. Hence also, as it appears to

me, Plato does not investigate in the beginning, if there is a final cause of the

composition of the world, but as if this was acknowledged by all men, lie inquires

what the final cause is. For the Demiurgus is supposed to be intellect and a

God, and not chance, as some say. But if intellect is the maker, there iscertainly

that for the sake of x hich in the fabrication of things. For as the soul when it is

in an upright condition, performs all things according to intellect, so intellect in

fabricating, gives subsistei ce to all things conformably to divinity. But this is

the same as

conformablyto the

food.

For ov*v/ir

r emr airioi here, it it neceary to read OOMVpr\ tartr airoi.

300 I ROCLUS ON THK [LOOK n.

\Vhether therefore, it he requisite to follow the Aristotelian prohlems, after n-lnit

the universe is, and what kind of a t/iiii" it is, it is necessary to in\ estimate on rrhut

account it is. For it has heen said tlr.it it is unit-rated indeed, hut is the linage of

heintj. And it is also requisite hesides this to consider, for the sake of \vliat it

was Generated. (.)r it it he necessary to adopt tlic Platonic causes, it is lit alter the

demiurgic cause and the paradigm, to discover the linal cause of tlie fahricntiou

ol tlie \vorld. For again, all other causes are suspended from this, ;md likewise

the di\iiiity

of \\w paradigm, the goodness of the maker, and tlie perfection of

that which is generated. And as lar a> to this is the ascent to those who love

to contemplate liuth. It is usual however, to call the linal cause 010, nil ticcount of

which ; the paradigmatic cause rriGT ,, uilh rtUttic-n lu tc/tic/t, the demiurgic cause

JY c-j, by \ihich ; ihe instrumental cau^-e o/ c,j, tln uugh which ; form X JL J o, accord*

in<fIn u/nt/t ; and matter ^ vj, or

ivi,tr<>>n n/nc/i, or/;j irhtch. These causes also

received the sameaj)])ellaliol)s

from IMato hiniM-lf. For now investigating the

final cause he s:\\ s, en iicct<niit of ichnt cau*c. liH|niring concerning the paradig

matic cause, he says, rr//// rdaii n to i, Inch of the paradigms. But concerning

the demiurgic cause, he says, that \vhich is generated, i> from necessity gene

rated////

a certain cansi*. .And as we proceed, \\e shall point out the rest from

(he words theniM-l\< s of IMato ; except that at])ie>eiit

aUo it mu.-t he said, that

theseappellations are adapted to the discriminating science of the philosopher.

\\hat ho\\e\er is

genciation,

and what is the universe? Some indeed h\

generation understanding tlie siihhmary place,call the universe the whole \\orld.

Uut these entirelyw and-r liom t!i< meaning of IMato. For the 1 )emiiii -us is

not representedas separately fashioning material natures, and separatt ly

the

whole ivorld. And in the next place, gem ration itself is a part of the universe.

jl however, it should he -aid that IMato calls the heav en the universe, heca .ise it

i> the greatest pailof the woild, lor the rest is small

;or heciMise it is the most

ilivim- and principal part, and as it were the summit of the universe ; for thf headalso is called the whole, as,

and IMato also says, that the world was surrounded with the remaining hulk of

hody for the sake of this; yet at the same time, the philosopher is accustomed

to call this likewise generation. Others again call matter generation, hut that

IIliad, viii. v

ii.] TIM.1-:US OF PLATO.r>oi

which is adorned from matter[as the

subject], they denominate the universe, bywhom main tilings written

l>yPlato, must necessarily be rejected. For lie savs

that every thin- generated, and all generation, is sensible, or tangible, and visible]

Farther still, lie i;i\es a division to generation opposite to that of matter, as \vhen

he says, llinv were these things subsistingscj);ir;>tely, being, place, and generation,

Iroin \\liich the universe was constituted.

Ourpreceptor however says,

thatthe fabrication of the world is to be under

stood in a twofold respect. For one part ol it consists in the formation of bodies,

but the other, in adapting bodies to the completion of one world. For it is one

thiiig to fashimi bodies themselves, through figures, but another to harmoni/e them

when fashioned, to the universe, (ieneratiem f! re/on; must be said to be the forma-(ion of badie.

& bfin^ a motion [or tendency] t> the Wholeness and perfection of the

universe. / & tluit icltnh is composed /row jmrtx has a prc-cotiah-tdproduction of(lie

parts. Ifence the formation

*

ic/iic/i taken place bedm n matter, the u-hule orderly

distribution& things, and the one

conipletitm of the n/iirerse, must be called t iteration,

in order ///.// // may be apatli to (tie vliolc in :t hich the parts are comprehended. For

tin s is the universe, bein^ constituted perfect from perfect parts, according to the

one harmony of \\holes. Since howe\er, this uhole i- sensible, and not the in-

tellable all, or universe; for this was the paradigm ;nor the intellectual all; for

this \\as deiiiinr-ie; on this account IMato adds tb,

particle ////., manifesting by

it that which is sensible and partial. For every thin-j corporeal, though it shouldbe a \\hole, is

partial. IJut the most principal \\lmle i^ that which is immaterial

ami without interval, and that is truly all \\lntherit be intellectual or intelli

gible. And Ihiis much concerning this particular.

IJut what tihall >\e say is meant by composition? Ierhaps it indicates that

the world is composed from many things, and that the -< neration of it is from

dissimilars. Perhaps also, it si-nilies that union andstability accede to it from

the total fabrication. For the collocation of <r;v, w/V/i, [in the wordis significant of union, and .fthe

^inspiration of all things to one. But

pcnuaiu-Hci/, manifests tlie firm:,e^s andstability of the fabrication of the world.

Farther still, with respect to the words irvwrr^- and f<rrr(T-<ro

[i.e. he r 7io



co;///o.v( y/ and //i

i-..//.v//V///f,/]emph.\ed here by Plato, the former copulates the

present and past times, and the latter indicates the perfection and the,|>er|X

-

luity of the fabrication. For the former of the.se words manifests continual pro-

For Trnitnv lirrf, it isuercssary to read irXai-.

302 PROCLUS OX THE[B00 n.

duction, and which is always consummately effected with invariable sameness ;

but the latter a wholeness which is allotted an existence in fulness. The signi

fying likewise, both the past and the present time through the same names, in

dicates that the divine fabrication proceeds through sameness and similitude.

For such as is the nature of that which is effective, such also is the energy which

it possesses. And as it is, so it fabricates;because it produces by its very bein"-,

and from1

its ownproper

essence.

" He was good, but in him who is good, no envy is ever ingenerated

about any thing."

Thofe \xho call the Demiurgus the good, areentirely ridiculous. For the good

ami one who is good are not the name. For the former i>

imparticipable itself

by list If, and is exempt from all things; but the latter is good through participa

tion of the former. And the one rules oxer all intelligibles ;but the other, if

indeed it is the same with the paradigm, is intelligibles themselves, but is not

the soxereign ruler of intelligibles ;and if it is subordinate to the paradigm is

in a much greater degree inferior to the king of all intelligible*. And in .short,

every certain God is a certain good, one being a demiurgic, another a xixific, and

another a perfective good. Hut the gumlis not a certain good, but is nmply good.

And it you say that it is demiurgic, you diminish its subsistence as

simply good.lhe.se distinctions therefore U-iug made, let us next consider the beginning of

what is here said. In the lirst place, therefore, as 1 lato xxheii inxestiualing the

mundane form, and inquiring \xhetherthe xxorld xxas generated, or is unbegotten,

adds prior to the \\hole demonstration,"

// mis generated ;"

and as when explor

ing the paradigmatic cause, he prexiotisly adds,"

it i.s manifest to every one, that

it U tis generated frith re la (ion to an eternalparadigm," adducing the conclusion

prior to the xxhole of the

reasoning;

thus also

proposingto discover

thefinal cai^e after all the others, he

add>,

"

lie r/v/.vgood," imitating int. llect

through this enunciation, and the at once collected comprehension of the

assertion. For in this colon, the xxhole of xxhat is hnestigated is comprehended,because goodness is the final cause, \\hether it is simply so and one, or whether*



it is the demiurgic goodness. Fora* the paradigm is txxo-fold, the onel>eing

intelligible, but the other intellectual ; and as the one is prior to the Demiurgus,

Frir avro lifrr, n-aJ a TO.

1

Lire is oniillrd in llic original.

ROOK ii.]TIM.l-US OF PLATO. 303

being primarily eternal and united, and comprehensive of all intelligible animals,

but the other which is in the Demiurgus of wholes, unically comprehends the

demiurgic number of forms;

thus also with respect to goodness, one kind is

simply so, but another is in the demiurgic intellect. And the former indeed, i.s the

fountain of all intelligible, intellectual, and supermundane good; but the latter

bein^ a certain goodness, is the cause and fountain of some things, but is allotted

an order subordinate to others. For if we wish 10 explore what it is which makes

a God, whether he be intelligible or intellectual, sii|>eriniindanc or mundane, we

shall find that it is nothing else than goodness. l;or what is it that makes each

of the bodies that are animated to be so, except tin; resemblance of soul ? What

is it which makes intellectual souls to be such, except the intellect that is in them,

and which is an illumination of total intellect? What therefore can deify intellect,

and an intelligible essence, except the participation of the first Clod, and the

forerunning illumination that proceeds from him? What therefore is the first? If

indeed, he were intelligible beauty we should say that intellect was a God

through beauty. But since the first God is the good, intellect also through partici

pating of goodness is a God. Hence this is the h\parxis of the Gods; and the

very essence of the Gods, if it be lawful so to speak, is goodness. According to

this likewise, every God r.xists as a (iod. And on account of this lie has a

providential,or a demiurgic, or a \i\ific, or a connective characteristic. For

intellect indeed, so far as intellect, isnaturally adapted to have an intellectual

perceptionand knowledge of beings; but to encrgi/e providentially is divine.

So that the demiurgic intellect likewise, possesses its subsistence as demiurgic, on

account of the goodness which it contains. For on account of this, the intellect

which is in the Demiurgus, is the maker, and is not only gnostic of being. The

bein^ also which is in him, is an efficacious paradigm, and produces by its very

existence, and is not alone perfective of intellect. And intellect indeed in

makingis corroborated

by

both these;by

the

paradigm,

because it

produceswith

relalion to it ; and by goodness, l>ecause it produces on account of it. But the

paradigm is corroborated by unity.

You have therefore, these successive, viz. goodness, the paradigm, intellect.

And these subsist in one way indeed, in the Demiurgus, and in another prior to

the Demiurgus. And if you are willing so to speak, the first goodness is the OIK,

*For

tprcrin this

place,it U

wccswryto read

304PROCLUS ON THR [BOOK n.

which in iK Yond even intellii-ibles themselves: for it is impnrticipable goodness.

But the paradigm is that intelligible which unitedly comprehends all the numlwr

of forms. And the maker is tin- intellectual intellect which gives subsistence to

v holes. So that if Amelius said that there are three deiniurî after tliis manner,

perceivingthis triad in the one Demiurtow, he said rightly.

For one of them,

says he, makes [as it wen-] by eontrectation, another by mandate, and another by

his will alone. And the first indeed, is arranged analogously to the manual

artificer; the second pre-exists conformably to the architect; hut the third is

established priorto both, analogously to a kin-. .V Jar therefore, as the Demiur-

frusiv intellect, he produces

till tiling/.v

the intellectual perceptions of himself ;but so

j:,rr/.v f,c is intrlliH lc

t/ic tunics In,

his nry l>an^ ;mul sof.ir * he is a du.l, hi, his

it-ill alone. If h\ve\er Amelias divulses the thiv,- Dnuiiir-i from the one Di.-miur-

j,nis>ve must not admit il, uhile MV follow Plato. IM.P the same Drmiur-us in

CiK>d,so far as he is a <iod,

and on ac.-oimt of -modm-ss he producesall things

by his will, and is int. -liable iutcll.-ctually ;for such is the- demiurgic

lein^.

lie-

is also intellect, the a.tifieci of the world. The words then-fore,"

//r TIVMgwJ,"

ha\e

an explanationof ibis kind; in the term WAS, ihc supcr-plntan/,

theconsummately

perfect,and the .êr -eternal nature of his iln hic hypar.iis, being indicated. For Hie

term is, is significant of eternal things; the term WAS, of the super-eternal unities;

and the term w ILL K, of things vliiclt tuhisl in tune. For // the term is pertainstn

rterinil natures,the term WAS tr/// be

adapted

tn the natures prior to // ,and the term

wi LL BK, to the natures posteriorto these. But such are the bein-s which are indi

gent of time.

Since however the Demiur-us is -m,d, <-nvyis never in-enerated in him about

anything But some one may say, what is there [ivmarkaWe] in inlelhrt not

b^Mnj; envious ? For this] does not happen even to men that are moderately ôod.

TluMer.u therefore tiever, is si-niticant of eternal p,-rfectioi ;since souls are at one

time passivelyell

ected,but at another, recur to impassivity.

But the It-nn about

anything, is Mnilic:int of s.-lf-sullicieMcy ;since we indeed, for the sake of oth, r

things,are fn-qnently purified

from envy, but in those things m which we have less

Ithan we think we ou-l.t to have in tlicse we are filled \N ith envy. What however, is

1 Fora/<tra(V

t r<. lifrc, MU ! u^.rt^rui.

1Tor loiru,. ,-rr. in.pwi, I ! II. cc^ary to r.M.t ill till*

I

l.iCC i-or/rr-i<rr mr^u

1 For T,JV>a, litre, it is rciuiile to read TOVTO yap.

BOOKII.J TIMJEUS OF PLATO. 305

the meaning of the term mtus, none." Is it because there are many kinds of envy that

he adds none? Or is it said through transcendency, in consequence of making a

perfect negation of envy ? But what kind of transcendency is it possible to find

in assertions concerning the Gods ? For all the appellations and words which are

employed about them, are beneath theirdignity. Is not envy therefore, a pain

arising from the goods belonging to others, this passion iif us being mingled from

pleasure and pain, as Socrates has shown in the Pliilebus? Envy likewise, is for

a man to be able to benefit, and yet notbenefiting, but keeping the good confined

to himself. And envyv aho l/ic -cant itselfofgood ; which the philosopher appears

to me especially to assume at present, exterminating it from a divine essence.

For it is naturally adapted to beperfectly exempt from this alone, since it is essen-

tiali/.ed in goodness itself. For to be pained from the goods pertaining to other*,

is inherent in all good which subsists according to participation, and which is not

primarily good. For adventitious good is one thing, good according to habit

another, and primary good another. For the first is mingled with its contrary,

in the same manner as adventitious beauty is mingled with deformity. But the

second is wholly boniform, yet is ,vc/* by participation. And the third, which

is primarily good, is good itself. For as intellect itself is the first intellect, and as

the beautiful itself is primarily beautiful, so good itself is primarily good. What

therefore is this ? It is the deity of each thing, according to which every truly-

existing being is a God. For it differs in no respect from goodness. But if any

one ofsecondary natures should be said to be a God, or good, it is among the num

ber of things drilled, and rendered good, and is a God through participation,

and not on account of its own proper essence, nor from itself.

This participation therefore, i liUo is accustomed to call indigence ;* just as in

the Banquet, he calls Love the rcant of things beautiful and good. Hence, a di-

\ine nature, so far as it is di\ine, is primarily good, and not according to parti-

(

ipation ;sso that neither is it indigent of good. Hence too, it is superior to all

i-nvy. For as to the sun, which is generative of light, it is impossible for dark

ness to approach, but it is excluded from it at a great distance, about the cavities

f the earth; after the same manner, it is impossible for envy to approach to a



divine nature. For what kind of indigence can there be in such transcendent

abundance ? What imbecility is there in almighty deity ? What participation in the

1i. t. OixVci tfiiotoi, no rnvy.

V.ttrinr if omittrd in the original.

Tm. Plat. VOL. I. 2 Q

306 PKOCLUS ON TI1K [BOOK n.

fountain of good?

The DemiurgUN therefore, being good byhi*

very being,trim-

scends ul! indigence, anil ;tll participationwhich uccedeu from another tiling.

For he is united to the one itself,and doen not proceed out of it. For intellectual

union is of one kind, lut the union priorto intellect ol another, according to

which the generative deityof the Pemiurgus, and the goodness which eonncctn

all things, are united to the vnc itself.1 or this goodness is not a certain power,

as some say, but the measure of all power. Nor is it will, hut will proceeds from

it. Nor is it a habit; for hahit pertainsto anoilier

tiling

different from haliit;

but goodness is itself of itself [i. e.jH-rtains

to itself alone J. Nor, in short, is it an

i-s&i-ntial hvpostasis; but it is that \\hich unites essence, and is inellable, connects

powers, and isprolific-

of demiurgic euer-ies. As therefore, every intellect is

essentiali/.cd in existing as intellect, but that which is above intellect is partici

pated b) it; and aseiery soul is es>entiali/ed in exiting as soul, but intellect is

participated by it; thus al>o every God is e>sentu-.lized in being a God, or rather

is superes>entialued, but there is not anything whichis

participated byhim

;*

because the Gods are the mo-t ancient and venerable of all things. The demiur

gic intellect therefore, so f.ir as it is a (iod, in e\i>tum as a God is primarily so,

and not according to participation.Thin however is the same with good. As

therefore, if some one should say that envy is the want of intellect, and a partial

intellect is superior to envy, but soul is not superior to it, for it is indigent of in-

lellert, because it is adapted to become intellectual by the participation of intel

lect ; thus also in goodnes>, envy> is the indigence of good; but every thing

indigent is not primarily good. Soul incited and intellect are indigent of good,

because they are not primarily good. But a God, so tar as a God, being good, is

exempt from all envy, and transcends all indigence of whatever kind it may be,

whether it subsists according to diminution, or according to deviation. For

indigence is twofold, one kind as we have said being evil, but the other not.

"

Being therefore entirely void of this,he was

willingthat all

things

should become as much as possiblesimilar to himself."

This is consequent to the before-mentioned axioms. For the first colon [or

1 or ii Wo lirrr, it it nfreoary to n ;nl ciXW.

i. -.i:\ii> (Jo.t. i t\ir a* In- 11 4

<;...!.\, a |)urlKi|Jitt of nothing inprrior to liiinxlf. For tlie

|ir<-rt>iouof (he (Jodi from the principle of all lhing, i not u participation,

but an a^fr(/i return,

an iii -llablf

unfoldinginto

li^-lil.

1For a^Ouiot here, read ^Oorui,

HOOK ii.J TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 307

part of the sentence] manifested the order, and the hyparxis of tlie Demiurgus,

that he i a God. And since with respect to deity, one God is imparticipable, but

another participate, IK; manife>ts that the Demiurgiis isparticipate. For he does

not say that he was good ness, but that he was good. But he who is good participates

of goodness. And goodness itself indeed, is primarily good. But intellect and

being are good by participation. Again, the second colon shows that the Oemi-

urgus does not rank among deified natures. For one thing is entirely imparticipable,

such, for instance, as the good ; but another is good by* the participation of someother

nature, as every thing which is deified.1 But that which is primarily good, isgood itself

And that which is participated, and is (lie medium of both the Iwfore-mentioned

natures is of such a kind as all the intelligible and intellectualordersof the Gods are

said to be. But this third colon comprehends the demiurgic peculiarity. For

not only to be good, but on account of the super-plenary, and the extended, to

proceed to all things, is indicative of the demiurgic and effective cause, desiring

to fill all tilings with itself, and to benefit all tilings; in order that all things maybecome as much as possible similar to itself, by participating of a certain divine

nature, and of arcane and ineffable impressions, which accede to them from the

whole fabrication of things. If therefore, the maker of the universe is superior

to all indigence, he is exempt from all imbecility, and this eternally. For being

signifies

the eternal;and because he

especially

benefits all things, heimpart?

to

all things by illumination, the measure of good, a greater thing than which each

of the participants is by no means adapted to receive. And this indicates the

extension of providence. If likewise, he wished to supply all things with the

participationof good, there is nothing in the universe solely evil, so that neither

is there any thing disorderly, nor without the inspection of providence, nor

indefinite; but all things participate of beauty and order, so far as they are

naturally adaptedto receive them. Hence he made all

thingssimilar to

himself,so far as he is a God, benefiting generated natures

;but he caused them to become

other things besides this, according to other paradigmatic reasons. For a*

Atticus says, as the carpenter makes all that he makes to be artificial, but diffcr-

1 a deity, bcraiiM; hi* intellect participate* of his goodness, wliicli

TheDciniurgus.ii participate

constitutes his hyparxis.

1Instead of ro

^tTo<rytiyin this pbce, it it necesory lo read TV ^irra^ttf.

* Thus inul is dpitied by the participation of intellect as medium ; because deity accede* to

soul Ihiough thf intervention of intellect ;and body is deified by the participation of oul a%

a medium.

30flPUOCLUS ON THE [BOOK n.

rnt things according to a different reason [or productive principle], causing one

thing to be a ladder, but another a bed ; thus also the DemiurgiH, HO far as lie i*

ood, assimilates all things to himself, rendering them good ;lint according to

forms which distribute their essences, he makes them with relation to paradig

matic causes. Porphyry however, admitting these tilings,thinks fit to a<k

what it is by the receptionof \\hiehgcneraare good. And he says it is by

the reception of harmony, symnu try,and order. For these are beautiful. But

every thing [truly]beautiful is good. Plato therefore manifests that good is

in these, when he says,"

That God UJ that which wax dimnlcrly into order, through

liii wish to communicate good.

From all that has been said, therefore, it is easy to infer, that the Demiurgus

produces eternally ;that the world is perpetual, according to a perpetuity

which

is extended through the whole of time; that it is always generated with

arrangement; and that it is not always incorruptible,but is always ^cm-nited

or

becoming to be so, in consequence of always receiving good. Hut it is not imme

diately good like its generating father. For in him all things are contained

unitedly, [but in the \\orhl distributed!) ],

1 and not \\ith perfect reality,as in

eternal natures. For if the uni\erse was generated in time, \\as it from the

Demiur-us that it did not exist before, or from its subject nature U ing without

order! For if from the Demiurgus, was it because he also did not subsist

eternally ? Or is it not unlawful to assert this, and in other respects in vain ? For

concerning him, there is the same mode of interrogation, and whether Khali we

make all things generated,or will there be something primarily unlx-gotten,

and the Demiurgus stilt more so? Let it therefore be admitted, that it was in

consequence of the Demiurgus not energi/ing.\\ hether then, did he not fabri

cate, because he vsas not willing, or because he was not able? It indeed

we sav it was because he was not willing, we forget that we thus deprive him

ofo-oodness. Hut if he was not able, it is absurd that he should at one time

have power,and at another imbecility. For we shall take away the eternal.

But if it was from its subject nature that the universe did not exist before,

whether was it from this nature being unadapted or adapted? If therefore it

was adapted, it was not this nature which prevented the universe from existing.

how for an infinite time, came it to be

But if it was unadapted, being unadapted

now changed [into an adapted condition]? Whether did it move itself ? But it is not

The words t K TV tow ftr/prj/if wt, are omitted in (lie original.

BOOK ii.]T1MJEUS 01- PLATO. 30j,

self- motive. Was it therefore moved by the Demiurgus ? And why was it not

moved by him before, if he also was then good, and was willing that all things

should Income similar to himself? The extension therefore of providence i*

suspended from the goodness of the father; but from this the eternal production

of the Demiurgus; and from this, the perpetuity of the universe, which subsists

for an infinite time in becoming to be, and is not a stable perpetuity. And the

same assertion subverts the perpetuity of the world, and the goodness of him who

made it. Tor if the Demiurgus was good, he always wished to impart good to

all things. For as the sun, as long as it exists, illuminates1

all things, and fire,

heats as Ion::; as it is fire ; for the one is essentially illuminative, but th<> other

calefactivc; thus likewise, that which is always good, always wishes to impart

good, lest being willing indeed, but unable, it should sustain the paoion of the

vilest natures. For neither does the worthy man wish to efli-ct other things than

such as he is able to effect. Uut if the Demiurgus was always able to impart good,

lie always imparts it in energy, lest he should have an imperfect power. If how

ever, he always imparts good in energy, he always makes that which is good.

But if he always makes it, the world is always generated. Hence the world is

perpetual ;for the Demiurgus is always good. The world then-fore is perpetual,

not being but becoming to he perpetually. Hence, as we have said, the perpetuity

of theuniverse

is

suspendedfrom the

goodnessof its maker. For the

orderlydistribution of the universe sufficiently manifests the demiurgic power. For

matter, on account of its privation of form and morphe, has appeared to some to

be without (jod, and the confused and disorderly nature, to IM- remote from

divine providence. Since the universe however, is well-ordered and decorated

with beauty, it clearly demonstrates divine production. The visible order of

things therefore, being the progeny of the demiurgic cause, is consnh>i*tcnt with

the goodness of the father.

" He therefore, who especially receives this mostprincipal or proper

and powerful principle from prudent men, will receive it with the

greatest rectitude."



Timjrns assigns the final cause which extends itself to the goodness of the

Demiurgus, according to which uniting himself to the first, and imitating him,

1 For rnraXi/j-arrt, it is nrcrttarv (o read

310 PROCLUS OX THE [BOOK n.

he generatesall things. For the first principle is that which primarily produces

all things, and this Timaeus denominates the most proper and powerful principle,

because it is motive of causes themselves. For the demiurgic principle moves

indeed that which is generated, hut is moved from thence [i. e. from the first

principle].And the paradigmatic principle moves the total fabrication, but

is moved bv goodness; because the good indeed, is prior to intelligibles, but the

paradigm is intelligible, and the Demiurgus intellectu.il. About the good also, all

intelligible and intellectual natures subsist: but about the intelligible,the order of

intellectuals subsists. The effective cause therefore, is a principal cause, but the

paradigmatic i more principal, and thefinal is most principal.For it is that for

tin- sake of which all things sub-i^t, from which other things are suspended, and

which i* truly the end of fabrication. Hence the world is perfected indeed, on be

coming animated and inspired with life; but it is most perfect,so far as it partici

pate* of good, and of the union which extends through wholes. For as the good

is the leader of all things, so the goodness which is in each thing has the first

dignity in each. On these accounts therefore, he calls the final cause the most

principal,or the most proper and powerful principle. For the name of principle

comprehends also concauses. But by the addition of most principal,he indicates

that which is truly*

cause. For the most principal principles are the causes of

generated natures;but concauses are subservient to other things, and are in the

effects themselves. It must be said however, that

generation

and tiie iiorld,

us we hair before observed, are the path between matter and the whole arrangement

of things,and the perfection itselfof tfit universe. Since also in dogmas concerning

the highest causes it is necessary that the speaker should have the intellectual

habit, and the auditor a prudent judgment, this is especially requisite in discu>-

sions concerning the gocd. For intellect subsists on account o{ the good, and the

intellect which is in us, on account of the good which is in us. Hence Plato

thinks it is

necessary,that those- who assert

something concerning

the ino.st

properand powerful principle,

should he prudent men, and that their auditors

should receive what they say with the greatest rectitude. What then,

may not any casual person say some-tiling concerning God and the final

cause? And do we not every day hear the multitude asserting that Cod is

Jlut God true virtue is but a name, ax Plot inunsaj/s ;

and

good *pktn vfiiithout

* Instead of *tpt ft rn orooi, ijrwv tonTvv iato^i;<m

in thi place,it is nrresvirv to rcacl vrp, ?f

rn oijrnr, n ru. vorpuv lianoopnoit. For the intelligibleis superior to the intellectual order.

1

Tor r|* otTOI dinar here, It l requisite to read rijr OTUJ mrioi .

.J TLNLEUS OF PLATO. ,,oil

tic is

sfwktn of hi/the

multitude, not according to wisdom, but according to chance.Do not da-moiis also know the goodness of the father, who dance [as it were]round him; anil dmum-ic angels, who precede as in a solemn procession the

paternal production of thirds; and Gods who receive demiurgic powers from theone fabricate cainu ? Gods however, possess this knowledge uniformly, an-els

intellectually,da nums with undeliled

purity, eternally, and in a way allied to"the

natures prior to them, l.ut we must be sntisf.ed with hating thisknowledge pru

dently and wisely, since we are in a certain respect media Urtwot-n more divinenatures and the multitude, between intellectual

beings, and those that are deprivedof intellect. For such is human prudence, proceeding indeed from intellect and

intelligence, hut ruling over a life destitute of intellect. Hence, when we speak con

cerning the most proper principle, what we assert must he received as uttered byprudent men. For prudence isa medium between intellect ami

opinion ; so that a ritrht

judgment will be concordant with it. Hence too, Plato adds, he whoespecially."

For the assertion concerning this principle must beespecially received from prudent

men. But from the natures above man, something better than this assertion mustbe sought ;

and from the multitude, a casual assertion.

1 For the divinity waswilling that all

things should be good, and that

as much as possible nothing should be evil."

The divine fabrication, and intellectual production proceeds from impartible*to partibles, from things united to such as are multiplied, and from thirvs with

out interval, to every way extended masses. This also the discourse concerning

it adumbrating, in the first place, celebrates the final causeapophthegmatieally ;

in the nextplace, discursively ;

and in the third place, it delivers iu an evolved

manner, the whole orderly distribution and progression from it. For the asser

tion,"

he was^ood,"

uniformly comprehends every

final and the mostdivine of

causes. But the words,"

//; him :t/io is cood, no cnry is ever ingeneratcdabout any

thing; and being entirely -coid of thi.s, he was willing that all things should become as

much aspossible similar

tohini*<lf" comprehend this causediscursively;

1

because

after the one will of intellect, he adds the divided theory of it. And what he now

says represents to us intelligence proceeding into all multitude, and interval, and



evolving all the demiurgic providence, and ail the parts of fabrication. The third

The word ^Kt^irwi is oniiltcd in the original.

311PROCLUS ON THE [BOOR n.

assertion, likewise, is in continuity with the second,and the second with the

Grst. For since the first division was,"

he wasgood"

on this account the second

begins from good, but proceeds as far as to the will of the father. And the third

beginning from his will, delivers the whole of his providential energy. For if he

was good, lie wished to make all things good. But if he wished, he made them

to be so, and tin; universe obtained an elegant arrangement. For providence

indeed, is .suspended from will, but will from goodness. And thus much con

cerning the order and connexion of the assertions.

I>-t us however survey what will is, in order that we may understand how it

is conjoined with goodness. The super-essentialunion itself, therefore, which is

of itself exempt from brings is one, ineffable, and uncircumscribed, from the one

//^// possessing its undefined and incomprehensiblenature. Hence, if it be requi

site to survey in this, from what has been said, the triad which is characterized by

unity, or w hich has the form of the one, goodness indeed precedes, but the second

is will, and the third is pro\idencc; goodness producing the perfect, the sufficient,

and the desirable ;but will exhibiting the super-plenary,

the extended, and the genera

tive; and providence imparting theejjicacioux,

the perfecti-cc of works, and the timle-

Jiled. According however, to this ineffable and united hvparxis of the triad, the

intelligible also is triply divided, into essence, power, and energy ;essence indeed,

)>cing firmly established in this triad, and exiting self-perfect;but power pos

sessing anever-failing and infinite progression;and energy being allotted pel lection

.md ev-ential production. And again, intellect analogously receives a triple di.i-

.-i.m, into being, life, and the intellectual. For the first of these is the supplier

of existence, the second of vitality,and the third of knowledge. After these,

soul likewise is divided into the object of science, into science, and the scien

tific. For the first of these indeed, is that whi-li is kno\,n, the second is know

ledge, and the third is that which receives its completion from both. These

triads therefore, l>eingfour in number, as goodness is to will, so is essence to

power, being to life, and the object of science to science. And as will is to

providence, so is power to energy, life to intellect, and science to that which

is scientific. For essence, heini;, and the object of science, have an order

analogous to goodness. For the connective, the stable, the uniform,

and the perfective, pertain to goodness But power, life, and science, are

which and



analogous to will. For the self-begotten, and that comprehends

measures all things li-long to will. And energy, intellect, and that which is

scientific, pertain to providence. For the efficacious, and that which proceeds

.] TIM /EUS OF PLATO. 3 J3

through and antecedently comprehends allthings, are the resemblances of divine

providence. Since therefore, the Demiurgus also is a God, and animparlicipable

intellect, so far as he is a Cod indeed, he possesses goodness, will, and providence

; hut asintelligible,

he has essence, power, and energy ; and as intellect,

-ie is, and Ins life, and a knowledge of wholes. The monad also which he

possesses is suspended from unity. And thus much concerning will.

Consequent to this, it remains to inquire how the Demiurgus wished all thin--*

to ho good, and if this is possible, and in what manner. For it may be said, if he-

was willing that this should be the case, it would be requisite that the progressionof things should stop at the Gods and undcOled essences. If, however, he not

only fabricated these, but also brutes, and reptiles, and men, and every thin"

material, he was not willing that all things should be good. Tor he was not willing

that better natures should alone exist, but also fabricated such as are worse. If

he had been willing, therefore, that all things should be good, he would have

stopped his fabrication at the Gods. We reply, however, that if the progression

of things was only as far as to the Gods, all things would not be good. For first

natures being allotted the last order, the good would l>e destroyed ; since

being able and willing to generate through their goodness, yet in consequence of

an arrangement as the last of things, they would become unprolitic and not good.Our opponents therefore say, if all tilings are good, the progression is as far as to

the Gods. But we say, if the progression of things extends only as far as to the

Gods, alltilings are not good. For if a divine nature is unprolific how is it good ?

But it will be unprolific, if it is the last of things. For every thing which generatesis better than that which is generated. But the less excellent nature not

existing,

that which is more excellent will have no subsistence. Let there l>e the God*,

therefore, and 1. 1 them have the first order. But after the Gods, let there IK? a

progression1

as far as to matter itself; and let us give a transition to all beings,

from the first to the last ofthings. And neither let there be any thing wanting

even of the last of beings, nor any vacuum. For what vacuum can there b

when things characterized by itself1

have the first subsistence; those that rank as

the second proceed from these;those of the third order proceed from these and

1



ripnotov is orniltcd in the original.*

viz. Self-subsuteut super-e^mtidl natures; for to tliese the avrn, or

itttlj, primarily belong*. Tlir

next to ihesc aro intellect*. Those in the third rank, are souli. Tlioie in the fouilh, the nature) lbt

,ve dnided about bodiet. And those in the fifth and last rank are bmliei.

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. 2 R

314 PROCLt S ON THE [BOOK u.

others ;those in the fourth rank are generated from things characterized by the

term another ; and those in the fifth rankl>eing

others only ; and on each side of

these those natures subsisting which are dissimilarly similar ! Such, therefore,

being the continuity in things, what can be deficient ? Immoveable natures In-ing

first established, self-motive natures hating the second, and ulter-motive natures,

the third rank, all of \\hicli are the last of tilings. For all beings derive their com

pletion from the above-mentioned orders. In short, the production of things may

be shown to be continued in

many ways;

and if you are willing so to speak,

analogy subsisting from on high as far as to the last of things, according to the

well-ordered progressionof all beings from the one.

I^t, therefore, all these things b.- acknowledged, and let the generation of beings

be extended as far as to nothing ;but \\ hether is there nothing ev il in these, or shall

we admit that there is in a certain respect, and that there is what i* called depravity

in bodies, and in souls ? For some have been led by this doubt to take away evil

entirelv ; but others have been induced to denyaprovidence,

in

consequenceof

lcliev ing, that if providence has a subsistence, all things are good. For il, indeed,

divinity was willing there should be evil, how can he be good? For it is the

province of that which is essentially good to benefit every thing, just as it is ot

that which is essentially hot, to give heat. Until is not lawful for the good to

effect any thing elve than what is good. And if divinity was not1

willing there

should be evil, how can it have a subsistence I For something will exist contrary

to the will of the father of all things. Such therefore is the. doubt.

M e must say, however, conformably to the doctrine ot Plato, according to our

preceptor, that the habitude of divinity with respect to things subsists in a different

manner from that of ours. And again that the habitude of things w ilh reference to

deity is dillerent from their habitude with reference to us. For whole.-; have a

relation to parts different from that of parts to each other. To divinity therefore

nothing is evil, not even of the things which are called evil. For he uses these

also to a good purpose. But again, to partial natures there is a certain evil, these

being naturally adapted to suffer by it. And the same thing is to a part indeed

evil, but to the universe; and to wholes is not evil but good. For so far as it is a

being, and so far as it participates of a certain order, it is good. For this thing

which is said to be evil, if you apprehend if to be destitute of all good, you will

1

\\i. Tht itr, and matter.

MI!

wauling iii thr original.

HOOK ii.]TIMJEUS OF PLATO. 315

make it to be beyond ovon that which in no resj)ect whatever is. For as the

gond itself \* prior to heinir, so & *il itself is posterior to the nothingness of non

entity. For that which is most distant from the good is evil, and not that which

has no kind of subsistence. If, therefore, that which in no respect whatever is,

has more of subsistence than evil itself, but this is impossible, it is much more

im;>os>ilIethat there should be such a thing as evil itself.

If, howrver, that which is entirely evil lias no subsistence, but evil is complicated

with good, you give it a place among beings, and you make it good to other

things. And, indeed, how is it possible it should not, if it ranks among beings?

For that which participates of being, participates also of unity, and that which

participates of unity, participates likewise of good. Hence evil, if it is, partici

pates of good ; because e\il has not an unmingled subsistence, and is not entirely

deprived of order, and indefinite. Who therefore made it to be such? Who

imparted to it measure, and order, and bound ? It is evident that it is the Demiur-

gus who rendered all things similar to himself. For he filled both wholes and

parts with good. But if he benefits all things, and colours evil itself with good,

there is nothing evil according to the power of divinity and of recipients. For

power is twofold, one being that of divinity which benefits the depravity that is

so abundantly seen ;* but the other being that ofrecipi< nts, which participate of

the goodness of the Demiurgus according to the measure of their order [in the

scale of beings]. In consequence therefore of I he Demiurgus being willing that

there should be nothing evil, nothing is evil. But if certain persons accuse him as

the cause of evil, because he gave subsistence to partial natures, they take away

the fabrication of the world, subvert theprolific power of wholes, and confound

the nature of things first and last.

That we assert these things, however, conformably to the opinion of Plato, may

beeasily

seen from his

writings.

For in the Politicus, heclearly says,

"

that the

world obtained from its maker all beautiful things, but from its former habit, all

such injustice, and evil, as are produced within the heavens." For Invause there

is generation, and also corruption, that which is preternatural has a subsistence.

* Tht good HtrlJ is prior to being. Nothing or non-being is not tii.it which is roost distant from



ihrgflod ; for it H tli.it in which the procession of being ends, but tfut winch is mo*l distant from tfi

fofd

is mlilir/J. Hence rril

iltrlfis ponterior to nonentity.

1For *o\vapaTov, it i necessary to read *-o\vop(tror.

For Tfipi here, it is requisite to read TO/MI.

PROCLUS ON TUG [BOOK n.

And because the deformity of matterfills

partialsouls with

inelegance, through

an association with it, on this account that which is not conformable to reason

is allotted a certain resemblance of subsistence. At the same time, however, all

thrse particularsbecome brauliful through the goodness of the maker of the

universe. But in the Hi-public,Plato assigns no other cause of good than God,

and says that certain other causes of evils are to be investigated; through which

he manifests that evils do not derive their subsistence from divinity. For it is

not, says he, the province of fire to refrigerate, nor of snow to heat, nor of that

which is aH-"ood to produce evil. Ami he asserts that certain partialcauses of

the>e are to be admitted, and such as arc indefinite. For it is not in evils us in

thin-s that are good, vi/. that the out and what is primarily good, precede multi

tude;and this on account of the indefinite diffusion of evil. The words others,

therefore, and cerium, evince that the causes of evil are partial and indefinite. But

in the Thca-tetus he says,"

that it is neither possible for evils to be abolished, nor

for them to be in the Cods, but that they revolve from necessity about the mortal

nature, and this placeof our abode." If, therefore, evil revolves necessarily in

the mortal place.itwill not be according to Plato, that which in no respect

whatever has a subsistence, and which is exempt from all beings. So that

according to him evil exists, is from partial causes, and is benefited through the

bonifonn providence of the Demiurgus, because there is nothing \\hich is entirely

evil, but every thing is in a certain respect accomplished conformably to justice

and divinity.

For we may make the following division: Of all that the world contains, some

things are wholes, but others parts. And of pails,some eternally preserve their

own good, such as a partial intellect, and partial da-mons, but others are not

always able to preserve their proper good. And of these, some are alter-inotive,

but others self-motive. And ol self-motive natures, some have ev il established

in their choice; but in others, it terminates in actions. With respect to wholes,

therefore, they are perfectly good, supplying not only themselves, but also parts

with good. Such things, however, as are parts, and yet preserve their own good,

possess good secondarily and partially.But such as are parts,

and alter-motive,

deriving their subsistence from other things, are suspended from the providence

of them, and are transmuted in a becoming manner, as is the case with such

bodies as are generated and corrupted. For if it is necessary that there .should



be generation,it is also necessary that there should be corruption. For genera

tion subsists according to mutation, and is a certain mutation. But if (here is

HOOK ii.] TIMvEUS OF PLATO. 317

corruption, it is necessary that the preternatural should l>e

secretly introduced.

As, therefore, (hat which is corrupted, is indeed corrupted with reference to itself,

hut is not destroyed with reference to tin? universe; for it is either air or water,

or something else into which it is changed ;thus also that which is preter

natural, is indeed with respect to itself disordered, but with respect to the

universe has anorderly arrangement.

For if though it should bedestroyed

and entirely deprived of order, it would not dissolve the order of the universe,

how is it possible that when having a preternatural subsistence which is of

itself nothing when deprived of all order, it can destroy the whole arran^e-

inent of things ? But again, partial natures which are self-motive indeed,

and whose energy is directed to externals, cause that which is effected by

their energy to be evil to themselves, yet in a certain respect this also is

good, and conformable to divinity. For since impulses and actions arcfrom choice, actions follow elections, according to justice, when he who

chooses not only deserves the retribution consequent to his choice, but that

also which follows from his conduct. And simply, indeed, the action is not good,

but to him who chooses a certain thing, and is impelled in a certain way, it is

introduced according to justice; and is good to this individual and this particular

life. For of goods, some are good to all things, others to such as differ accord

ing to species, and others to individuals, so far as they are individuals. Forhellebore is not tjood to all men, nor to all bodies, nor yet to all diseased bodies,

but it is good to one who is*Jiseased in a particular manner, and is salutary from

a certain principle. Whether, therefore, the action is intemperate or unjust, to

those who perform it indeed it is good, so far as it is conformable to justice, but

simply it is not good, nor to those by whom it is done, but is to them the greatest

evil. And so far as it proceeds from them and is directed to them, it is evil;but

so far as it proceeds from the universe to them, it is not evil. And so far as their

energy is directed to themselves, they destroy their life, becoming actually de

praved ;but so far as they sutler from the universe, they undergo the punishment

of their choice (just as it is said, that those who deliberate aboutbetraying a

suppliant, subvert divinity) ; or they suffer the punishment of their will.

jLet us, however, direct our attention to what remains, viz. to such partial na



tures as energize selt-inotively, and who stop their depravity as far as to their

choice. For they suffer the punishment of their cogitation alone. For, as it is

said, there is a certain punishment of mere imagination, impulse and will; since

the God* govern us inwardly, and as they reward taneucent choice, so likewise

318 IMtOCLUS ON THE[B6oK 11.

they punishthe contrary. But it may l>e said, how ran choice itselfhave that

which is conformable to justice and divinity? May we notreply, localise it is

necessary there .should Ix; an e>sence of this kind and a power of an ambiguous

nature, and which verges to ditleivnt lives ? If therefore that wliicli has dominion

over choice is from divinity,choice also i.s from divinity, and if this he tin* case,

it is good. For the electing soul alone is tr>n>terred to another and another

order. For all choice cither elevates tlie soul, or draws it downward [to an

inferior condition of being]. And if indeed the choice is from a depraved soul,

it is evil;hut if it transfers that which chooses to its proper order, it is according

to justice* and good. For the choice it.sclf introduces punishment to (he electing

soul. Or rather, the choice becomes punishment in him \\ho chooses, causing the

soul to apostatize from good. For as a beneficent choice becomes truly the re

ward of itself, so a depraved choice becomes its own punishment. For this is the

peculiarity of self-motive powers. Hence there is no evil, which is not also in a

certainrespect good

;but all

things participateof

providence.If, however, certain persons should ask on what account an evil-producing

cause had at first a subsidence, though it should not rank among wholes, but is of

a partial nature, to these it must be said, that the progression of beings is continued,

and that no vacuum is left among them. Whether, therefore, is it necessary that

there should not be every self-motive life ? But we shall thus take away many

natures that are divine. & )r shall we say il is necessary there should be wholes

that are self-motive, but there is no necessity there should be sell-motive parts?

Hut how is il possible they should be wholes, if deprived of their proper parts*1

And how will the continuity of beings he preserved, if wholes Mid self-motive

natures have a prior existence, and also partialand altcr-motive natures, but we

entirely destroy the intermediate natures, \i/. such as are self-motive indeed, but

at the same time partial ? And which through the partialform become connected

with habitude, but through the sc!f-moti\c power, are at a certain time lilxrated

from habitude. It is nece>sary therefore, that there should be this life also, which is

a medium in beings, and the bond of things which have a it were an arrangement

contrary1 to each other. Kvil, however, is not on this account natural to the soul

;

since she is essentially the mistress of her choice. For the animated body has an

essential tendency to disease ; for it is essentially corruptible ;and yet disease,

1 Mi^rtrjf/m

is omitted in the original.



1For the proprr parts of il self-motive whole, are aNo stlf-molMe .

For air riirmi licr,

it u uecesinr) to read awimtnuii.

KOOKn.j

T1M/EUS OP PLATO.310

is not according to nature. Hence, disease is indeed evil to the partial nature

which is allotted to connect this particular body, hut is t;ood to the wholeness

of bodies. For it is necessary that what is generated from other things, sliould

! changed into another tiling. As, therefore, to the nature which is in us, it is

good lor ihe nutriment to he changed, in order to the preservation of the animal;

thus also to every nature it is good for a part to he corrupted, in order that the

wholes may he preserved,which are always prior to parts. For if parts were

generated iioiu wholes, and the things generated should remain, all things would

he rapidly consumed, inconsequence of wholes becoming partial natures. For

a continued ahlation taking place from things of a finite nature, the whole must

necessarily fail, lint wholes not existing, either generation will he stopped, or

mutation to partial natures will IK- derived from other things. Hence that which

is evil to a partial nature is good to the whole life of the world.

Farther still, therefore, resuming theinquiry after another manner from the

beginning, if we are asked whether divinity was willing there should l>e evil, or

was not willing, we reply that he was both. For he was willing, indeed, consi

dered as imparting being to all things. For every thing in the universe which

has any kind of bring proceeds from the demiurgic cause. Hut he was not

willing, considered as producing all things good. For he concealed evil in the

use of

good.And if

jouare

willingto

argue physically,evil is

producedctfc/ili-

allil indeed from a partial soul, but (Hridcnlally from divinity, so far as it is evil,

if it is admitted thatdivinity gave subsistence to the soul. Evil also, so far as it

is essentially good, originates from a divine cause, but accidentally from the sonl.

For so far as it subsists according; to justice, it possesses good. Again, Plato in

the Laws defines what punishment is, vi/. that it appears to consume him

who Millers it, and resembles the opening of ulcers. And he -who is incapable

of being healed without a certain action, is incited to the performance of it, in

order that, tin; souj being liberated from her partnriency and stupid astonishment

about that which is base, and repenting of her own evils, may begin to bepuri

fied. For base and unjust actions, when they are the objects of hope, are lovely

to those that vehemently admire them, but when accomplished, till those that

perform them with repentance. And when, indeed, they are the subjects of medi

tation, they cause the soul to be latently diseased ;but when they have proceeded

into energy, they demonstrate their own imbecility, but liberate the soul from the

For TOn<v iyra/icroy

in this]>l;uc,

it is ueccunry to read, ro/HI bvyapitwr.

3lf) 1MIOC1.US ON Till: r -0o,i u.

most disgraceful parturition.And ome, indeed, exhibit thin punishment accord

ingto the whole of their life

;but others

according

to

partial energies.For he

who does any thing irrational, does it from choice, is implied to that which is

the object of his choice, and leads into energy that which pre-existed in hi*

imagination.

In short, evil is neither in intellectual natures;for the whole intellectual genus

is free from all evil; nor in whole souls, or whole bodies; for all wholes an*

exempt from evil, as being perpetual, and always subsisting according to nature.

It

remains,therefore, that it must be iu

partialsouls, or iu

partialbodies. Bui

neither is it in the essences of these.;

(or all their essences are derived from divi

nity ;nor iu their powers ;

for these subsist according to nature. Hence it re

mains, that it must be in their energies. But with respect to souls, it is neither

in such as are rational; for all theseaspire, after good ;

nor in such as are irra

tional;for these energize according to nature. But it subsists iu the privation

of symmetry of these with reference to each other. And iu bodies, it is neither

inform;for it wishes to rule over

matter;nor in

matter,for it

aspiresafter

the

supervening ornaments of form. But it consists in the privation of symmetry

between form and matter. From which also it is evident, that every thing evil

exists according to aparypo$tasi$,

or resemblance of subsistence, and that at the

same time it is coloured by good ;so that all things arr good through the will

of divinity, and as much as possible nothing is destitute of good. For it was not

possible, that generation existing, evil also should not have a shadowy subsis

tence, since it is necessary to the perfection of the whole of things. Arid fromwhat has l>een said, it is evident, that the w ill of divinity is not vain. For all

tilings are good with reference to him, and there is not any being which is not

vanquished by a portion of good. Xor are the words, "as viuch aspom>iL>lc

t

written superfluously. For they do not signify an imperfect power, but that

power which rules over all things, and benefits all things through an abundance

of good.

"Thus receiving every thing that was visible, and which was not in a

state of rest, but moved in a confused and disorderly manner, be led it

.

from disorder into order, conceiving that the latter was in every respect

better than the former."

Forvvufitri>i<f litre, it i

necessary to reJ, aavfitnT/iif.



BOOK ii.] TIM/tUS OF PLATO. 321

Plutarch of Cherona and his followers, and also Aiticus, understand what i*

here said literally, as testifying for them the generation of the world from a certain

time. Tliey also any that unadorned mutter existed prior to the generation of the

universe, and likewise a malevolent soul, which moved this matter. For, [they

add,] whence was the motion except from soul;and if the motion was

disorderly

it was from a disorderly soul?

It is said therefore, in the Laws, that a l>rnefi-

cent soul instructs in an upright and prudent manner, hut that a malevolent soul

is moved disorderly, and that what is governed hy it is conducted confusedly

and inelegantly. They farther add, that when the fahrication of the world hy

the Demiurgus commenced, matter was brought into a state adapted to the com

position of the world, and that the malevolent soulparticipating of intellect, was

rendered prudent, and produced an orderly motion. For the participation of

form, and the presence of intellect, brought it into order. Porphyry however,

and lamhlichus, and their followers, reprobate this opinion, as admitting in

wholes, that which is without, prior to that which has arrangement, the imperfect

prior to the perfect, and that which is without intelligence, prior to that which is

intellectual. And [they add], that Plutarch and Atticus are not only guilty of

impiety towards the Demiurgus, hut likewise, either entirely subvert his benefi

cent will, or his prolific power. For both these concurring, it is also necessary

that the world should be perpetually fabricated by him. They likewise say, that

Plato wishing to indicate the providence proceeding from the Demiurgus into the

universe, and also the supply of intellect, and the presence of soul, and the nume

rous and mighty goods of which they are the causes to the world, previously sur

veys bow the whole corporeal-formed composition is when considered it.self by

itself, disorderly and confuted. And that he does this, in order that by perceiving

by itself the arrangement derived from soul, and the demiurgic orderly distribu

tion of things, we may be able to determine what the nature is of the corporeal-

formed essence by itself, and what order it is allotted from fabrication; the world

indeed, always existing, but language dividing that which is generated from its

maker, and producing according to time things which are con-subsistent at once,

because every thing which is generated w a composite.

We may also observe, in addition to what is here rightly asserted, that since the

1

demiurgic production is twofold, the one being corporeal, but the other decora

tive, Plato beginning from the latter, supposes with the greatest propriety,that

1

For Lwr^arurji berr, it is neceary to read <r*i/jariiji.

Tim. P&/. VOL. I. 2 S

3->->


every thing corporeal is moved in a way perfectly confused and disorderly. For its

motion is such, so far as pertains to itself, when it is surveyed as not yet partici

pating of intellect, and animated by an intellectual soul. For when the universe

becomes a tiling of this kind, then it participates of supernatural powers. But

if it is moved, as he says, neither by intellect, nor by a prudent soul, from which

order is derived, its motion will be disorderly. A little after this however, Plato

delivers to us the demiurgic providence about the fabrication of bodies. For then

the

Demiurgus

is represented as fashioning the whole of a corporeal nature, which

Plato now says he assumed;the Demiurgus .being the maker, the adorner, the

artist, and the manual artificer. If then-fore, he produces the first bodies, it is

evident that the generation of body is a part of his fabrication, the visible nature

receiving certain vestiges of forms, which are the forerunners of their distinct sub

sidence;each thing when this distinction takes place, l>eing perfectly adorned,

and obtaining an appropriate position nnd order in the universe. And there is no

1occasion

indeed,to

saymuch about that which is moved in a confused and dis

orderly manner. For Plato clearly says, that the Demiurgus fashioned the whole

of the corporeal nature within soul. Withrespect to soul however, it is evident

that one thing pertaining to it \\as not a subject funproduced by the Demiurgus],

and that he alone produced its orderly distribution. For he first constitutes its

essence, and the same and the dillerent; of which as elements it consists. Hence,

if he produced the elements of soul, and the mixture of these, he produced the

whole of it. So that he did not assume one part of it as already existing, and addanother. And of soul indeed, which is incorporeal, this is true. But with re

spect to body, we have shown how divinity is the cause of the first forms.

Concerning matter itself, however, some one may enquire whether it is mibe

gotten, not being generated by a cause, as Plutarch and Atticus say, or whether

it was generated, and if so from what cause. For Aristotle indeed, in another

way demonstrates that it is unbegotten, as not being a composite, nor consisting

of another matter, nor again, Ix-ing analy/ed into another. The present discussion

however, says that it is perpetual, but investigates whether it is unbegotten arid

not generated by a cause, and whether according to Plato, t\\o principles of

wholes are to IK- admitted, matter and God, neither God producing matter, nor

matter God;

in order that the one may be entirely perpetual,and without God,

but the other entirely immaterial and simple. This tiling therefore, is among

the number of those which are much and has been considered

very investigated,

by us elsewhere. IS ow, however, it is requisite to e.vhibit to these men, what the

>*"-1 TIM.T-.US OF PLATO.

&

.,3

conception of Plato is on tin s subject. For that the Demitirgus is <not the first \who gave subsistence to matter, is evident from what Plato says further on, vix. that

these threethings preceded the generation of the world, being, place, and genera

tion ; and (hat generation is an offering, hut place a mother. II.; appear* there

fore through these things to divide matteroppositely as it were to the

Demiurgus,according to t!ie maternal and paternal peculiarity, hut to produce generationfrom the

Demiurgus

and matter. Does he nottherefore give subsistence to mat

ter from another order, which has an arrangement prior to the Demiurgus Inthe Phik-hus therefore, he

clearly writes," H r

e say that God* exhibited tie bound,and also the

infinity of beings,from which bodies andall beings derive theircomposition"

Hence, if hod ies are from hound andinfinity, what is the hound in them, and

what the infinity? It is evident indeed, that we say matter isinfinity, hut form

hound. If therefore, as we have said, God gives subsistence to allinfinity, he

^\likewise

gives subsistence to matter, which is the last infinity. And this indeed, )

is the first ind ineffable cause of matter. But since every w here sensible* are ana

logous tointelligible causes, and Plato constitutes the former from the latter

;as

for instance, the equal which is here, from the equal itself, the similar, from simi

litude itself, and after the same manner all sublunary animals and plants, it is

evident, that he likewise produces theinfinity which is here, from the first

infinity,

just as he produces the hound which is here from the hound which is there. It lias

however, been demonstrated by us elsewhere, that he establishes the fir>t

infinity

which is prior to things that are mingled inthesiimmitofintelligibles.andfromthencuextends its illumination as far as to the last of things ;

so thai according to him, matter proceeds from the one and being, or if you are

willing, from the one being also, [or

being characterized by t/icone] far as it is being in power. Hence likewise, it is in

a certain respect good and infinite, and the most obscure and formless being. Onthis account also these are prior to forms, and the evolution of them into

light.

Orpheus likewise delivers the very same things. For as Plato produces two-

told causes from the one, viz. hound andinfinity, thus too the theologist gives

subsistence to ether and chaos from time;ether being the cause of hound every

where, but chaos ofinfinity. And from these two principles he generates both

the divine and the visible orders of things ;from the more excellent

principle

indeed, producing every thing stable, effective of sameness, and the source of



Pleasure and connexion;but from the less excellent, every thing motive, eflectirc

1 i. Thr highest God, or the ottr.

.1-24PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK 11.

of difference, never failing progression, the nature \vhich is defined, and connected

by other things, and the last infinity by which matter also is comprehended.

Hence also matter is dissimilarly assimilated to the first infinity. And it is indeed

n separation (^(apif^a),us being the receptacle (xtupa)

andplace offorms ; but there is

neither bound, tior a buttom, tior a scat about it, as being infinite, unstable, and inde

finite. But a"am, the lust infinity may be denominated a perpetual darkness, asbeing

allotted a formless nature. Hence conformably to this assertion, Orpheus produces

matter from the first hypostasisof intelligible*. Fur there perpetual darkness* and

the infinitesubsist. And these, indeed, subsist there in a way more excellent than

the successive orders of being. In matter however, the unilluminated, and the infi

nite are inherent, through indigence, and not according to a transcendency, but a

deficiency of power. Moreover, the tradition of the Egyptians asserts the same

thin & s conrernin rrit. For the divine lamhlirhus relates that according to Hermes

O &

materiality (U>.OTT,TOJis produced from essentiality (tx TTJ otwiorijrof). It is pro

bable therefore, that Plato derived from Hermes an opinion of this kind concerning

matter. And matter indeed primarily subsists from these principles [bound and

infinity]. But Plato also produces it according to second and third principles,

viz. intelligibleand intellectual, super-celestial and mundane causes. And why

do I say this of the Gods themselves ? For the nature of the universe likewise,

produces matter so far as she is [a Goddess]4 and according to the hyparxis of

herself. For according to this she participates of the first cause. The Demiurgus

therefore, according to the- unity which he contains, according to which likewise

he is a God, is5 also the cause of the last matter; but according to his demi-

urjric being, he is not the cause of matter, but of bodies so far as they are bodies,O

1 For vpoi mirrijK hf re, it it necessary to read rpoi avri\v, fi. e. irpoi avr^v awetptur.]

* The first hvpostasis of intclligibles i being itself, which is mingled from bound andinfinity.

Per

petual darkness therefore, may he said to reside here, because this liypojtasis through proximity to the

ineffable nine of all become* f aikenrd." For being very near, as Damarcius admirably observes, to

the illumine principle, if it be lawful o to speak, it dwe!U as it were in the adytum of that truly mystic

silence." This darkness, however, is not any deficiency, but a transcendency of all that is luminous.

For as there is one kind of ignorance wlncli is below knowledge as being the defect of it, and another

which is above know ledge, being that iu which our ascent to the ineffable terminates;thus also, there are

two kinds of darkness, the one being below, and the other above light.

1 See lamblif. Oc Mvsti-rns, p.1 3f).

* The word Otoiii omitted in the original, but ought evidently to be inserted, because Proclus in the

Introduction to this work observes that Nature is a Goddess through being deified.



1 For enhere,

it is

requisiteto lead ion.

BOOK n.l TIM/EUS OF PLATO.32. &

and of corporeal qualities. Hence generation is theoffspring tfbeing. According

to the life which he contains, he is the cau>e of the animation which perxades

through all things; but according to his intellect, he is the cauve of the intellectual

supply imparted to the universe. And all such things indeed, as he produces

according to his secondary powers, lie produces in conjunction with those that

are primary. For every thing which participates of intellect, participates also of

life, of l>eing, and of union. That also which lives is, and is one; and bein rr is

connected through its own projKT unity. The converse, however, is not true.

For such things as lie produces according to the one,1 so many he does not produce

according to being. Nor does he give subsistence to as many things according to

the fountain of life, as he docs according to being. Noras many things according

to a royal intellect, as he does according to life;but he gives the greatest extent

to his providence from his more elevated powers. These things, however, we

have elsewhere more fully discussed.*

Lei us therefore return to the words of Plato, and survey the meaning of each.

The word thus then, suspends the whole orderly distribution of things from the

goodness of the Demiurgus, viz. from his divinity. But the words, "everything

that was visible" in the first place, leave nothing solitary; and in the next place,

they show that this visible nature is corporeal. For it would not be visible if its

was incorporeal and without quality. So that they neither signify matter, nor the

second subject [i.e. body void of quality]. But the visible nature is that which*

now participates of forms, and possesses certain vestiges, and representations, :

being moved in a confused and disorderly manner. For the idolic and indistinct:,

presence of forms produces different motions in it, as Timauis says farther on. 11

These, however, all the orders of Gods prior to the Demiurgus illuminate; but the

paradigm transcendently illuminates them by his very being, and prior to fabri

cation. For superior energi/e prior to secondary causes, and the Demiurgus

makes in conjunction with the paradigm, but the paradigm, prior to the Demi

urgus, and permeates to those things to which the energy of demiurgic providence

does not extend. If therefore, you wish to disjoin primordial causes, and the

things which proceed from them,4

you will find that the good which is the cause of v

all things, is also the cause of matter. On this account it is likewise the cause of

Instead of mra TO ij- here, it is uecrssary to read rara ro tr.

* For C4ij/rrara here, it is necessary to read fcrarr<u.

Instead of a^im^ty in this place, it i*requisite to read n^qnr.

4 For ra or airrav here, read ra air vrwr.

320 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK 11.

it* being invested with forum; for every form i.s n measure; and of it* participation

of order. For order is tin* reason of things that are arranged. The paradigm,

/however, in not the cause of matter, hut of the production of form, uml of the order

j

in forms. But the Demiurgus is the cause of order. Hmce also Plato says, that

the Dctniurgua received matter now advancing to the participation of forms.

Since all causes therefore, subsist always and at once, hut of their effects, some

proceeding as far as to things that are hibt [i. e. to hodies], but others as far as to

things which are beyond both, through the extension of superior causes; this

bring the case, the paradigm indeed, receives matter from the good, and invests

it with form; for forms, so far as they are forms, are the progeny of the paradigm ;

but the Demiurgus receiving forms from the paradigm adorns them with numbers,

and inserts in them order. After this manner tln-retbre, you must conceive, if you

disjoin causes. If also you say, that the Demiurgus is the one cause of all things,

he produces indeed in one. way according to his goodness [or (he good which he

derives from the ineffable], but in another way according to his own paradigmatic,

and as we may say, artificial peculiarity. A she produces likewise collectively, at once,

and eternally.diflerent things proceed from a different peculiarity contained in him.

j

For according to the good, he produces matter, form and order; but according to the,

paradigm in him, form; and according to his artificial peculiarity, order. Hence this

thing which is invested with form prior to order, has these representations of forms

from the paradigm which is in its own nature intelligible From this order like

wise, the Oracles produce abundantly-various matter. For they say," From thence

entirelyleaps

fortli the generation of abundantly-various matter." Fur the

firstmatter does not possess

a great variety ; nor is there a generation of this, but of that

matter uhich has tCAtiges thejorerunners offorms from which it is evident that the

paradigm and the Demiurgus dilli r from each other, since matter indeed partici

pates of the former prior to the fabrication of the world, when according to the

hypothesis, the Demiurgus was absent; but it especially receives something

from the latter when it is arranged and adorned, and then the Demiurgus is

present withit.

The word therefore receiving, may be saidto

indicate the para

digmatic cause which i.s exempt from the demiurgic providence, from which the

Demiurgus receives the subject of things, now varirgated with certain vestiges of

forms. It may also be said, that a different work participates of a different power,

though we may survey all powers in the Demiurgus. For he will !* the same

divinity who receives and who drlivers, cssentinli/ing, or adorning things by

different powers.



BOOK ii.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO.32?

But the words, "which xas not in a state of rest but moved? show that the &

hypothesis alone imparts to the subject a nature from which motion is derived.

For (lie nature of it being irrational and not governed by divinity, what kind of

order can it he able to preserve? This however is evident, from the Politicus,

where, separating the Demiurgus from the world, Plato says, that it was moved bya certain fate, and an

essentially ronnasrent desire. Hence supposing here in

conjunction with fabrication, what he there supposed after it, he introduces the

privation of order to the motion of the visible nature, this motion being producedwithout intellect. And thus much for this particular. Again, the words,

"

he

led it from disorder into order, signify the participation of intellect, and an intel

lectual life. But the wordconceiving indicates the demiurgic intelligence, which

is analogous to his will and power. Previously assuming therefore, will in the

expression"

being rci/Iing* and power in the expression"

as much aspossible"

in

the third place, he adds intellectual knowledge in the term,"

conceiving." For in

the Lairs, lie characterizes dinne providence l>y

these threethings, f/ c. by goodness,

pmccr, and knowledge. And goodness indeed is paternal, and pertains to the (irst

natures; but power is maternal, and ranks in the second place; and intellect,

which is gnostic, is the third. Goodness therefore is the first, but power is with

him, viz. with the first of the triad, and intellect, which is from him, is the third.

Again,the

words,

"

that icas inevery reject

betterthan fhis," signify that order is

better than disorder. For it was thus said, viz."

that he led itfrom disorder into

order." The word (his also has an indication of the disorder then present which

the Demiurgus received;but the word that represents to us the order pro-existent

in the Demiurgus, according touhich also he is about to arrange disorderly

natures. Aristotle therefore, did not know the order which is in theDerniurgus,

but that which is in effects. lie places however, the excellent in both;

in order

that according to him, intellect may abide in itself, but may in no respect In

effective of secondary natures. But Plato following Orpheus, says, that order

is first in the Demiurgus, and the whole prior to parts. For the Demiurgus being

all things intellectually, made all things to exist sensibly. For if he produces by \

his very being or existence ;and it is necessary that he should, in order that we)

may not ascribe to him deliberate choice, which is an ambiguous tendency ; he/

either produces by a separation of parts from himself, and by a diminution of his

own powers, in the same manner as fire, or abiding such as he is [without any

1

Forl]\tv hcrf

,it i. requisite to read

iyc>.

<128

PROCLl S ON THE [BOOK n.

alterationJ, he produces successive natures by his very being. It is however,

absurd to say, that lie produces byaseparation

ofparts

fromhimself: for neither

is nature diminished in producing the hair or teeth, or any other of the parts of

the body. Much more therefore, is it fit to preserve an exempt essence, and

which gives subsistence to itself, undiminished. But if remaining that which he

is, he produces by his very being, through this indeed, he produces that which is

similar to himself; but through a separation of parts, he does not make that

which he produces wholly similar to himself. For that which is diminished, does

not make according to the whole of itself. All things therefore, subsist in him

primarily.But external natures are the images of his allness, (wai/TOnjTOf) and

order exists in one way in effects, and in another in paradigms. For the former

is complicated with disorderly natures, but the latter is order itself, subsisting in,

and being of itself; that it may be able to arrange things disorderly, and may IK.-

exempt from them, and preserve its own e.ssence in undefiled purity. And thus

much concerning the meaning of the words.

It deserves however not to be omitted, that Plato here imitates the theologists,

in supposing the exigence of a confused and disorderly nature prior to the

fabrication of the world. For as they introduce the wars and seditions of tFle

Titans against the Olympian Gods. So likewise Plato presupposes these two

things, the unadorned and that vthich is effective of ornament, that the former

of these may IK.- adorned, and participate of order. They however speak theologi

cally.For they arrange in opposition to the Olympian Gods, the patrons of

bodies. But Plato philosophically transfer* order from the Gods to the -subjects

of their government.

In the next place, therefore, let us concisely narrate the sacred conceptions

which the philosopher Porphyry here delivers. In the first place, then, he opposes

Atticus and his followers, who admit that there are many principles, conjoining

to each other the Demiurgus and ideas. These also say, that matter is moved by

an unbegotten, but irrational and malevolent soul, and is borne along in a con

fused and disorderly manner. That according to time likewise, matter exists

prior to that which is sensible, irrationality to reason, and disorder to order.

/Let there however be, as they say, matter and God, both being without genera

tion from a cause. Hence, the unbegotten is common to them. At the same

j

time, they differ from each other. They differ therefore, by something else, and

\ uot by the unbegotten. Hence, that by which they differ from each other,

to read ov ia9



Instead of kafloWhcre. iti

necesiary

A

BOOK u.] TIM/EUS OF PLATO.

not be unbegotten. It will therefore l>c generated. It is impossible, however,

that things without generation,should differ by the generated. In the next place,

what is the cause to them of their difference, and which makes the one to be pre

servative, but the other corruptive 1 For it is absurd to say, that it is the unbe-

gotten ; (for either every thing unbegotten is preservative, or every thing

unbegotten is corruptive;) if the unbegotten nature of God makes God to be

preservative, or the unbegotten nature of matter makes matter to be corrnptive.

But if something else is the cause of their difference, whether is that something else

unbegotten or generated ? For if it is generated, it is absurd that it should be the

cause of things unbegotten ;or if unbegotten, that it should l>e the cause ot

unbegotten natures. So that again, we must investigate something else prior to

these, as the cause of their difference, and the ascent will be ad infinitum. For it*

there will be no cause of difference to things that differ, so as to render the one

preservative, but the other corruptive, the casual will have dominion over the

principles; for causel>eing subverted, the concurrence of sueh-like principles will

l>e irrational, and without a cause.

Farther still, it is absurd to make evil eternal, in the same manner as the good.

For that which is without God, is not similarly honorable with that which is

divine; nor is it equally unbegotten, nor, in short, is it to be contrarily dirided.

For

whyis the one more sufficient to iNrlf, or more immutable, or indestructible,

than the oilier, if each of them is from eternity, and neither is in want of the other?

Again, if one of them is adapted to l>e adorned, but (he other to adorn, whence

is their aptitude derived ? For it is necessary there should be something which

connects bolh, and makes them commensurate to each other. For these princi

ples being divulsed from, and subsisting contrary to each other, cannot render

themselves adapted to coalition. Unless they say, that this also arises from

chance. Norin

thus speaking do theyattend to the Athenian

guest, who says,that this is the fountain of stupid opinion, to assert that the irrational is prior to

reason, and that chance has dominion prior to intellectual art. IVor to Socrates

in the Republic, who says, that it is not proper to remain in multitude, but to

recur from the many to their common monads. ^Farther still, it is necessary to(^

characterize the highest principle not by this alone, that it has not another

principle ;for this does not yet demonstrate its dignity

*

[but that it Is the prin-

! It is necessary here to supply aytv^Tov rwf, and therefore instead of reading, as in the original,

cirr aycrfTwr orrwr, we must read, rirr aytrqror rwr aycrip-wv orrwp.

*For araia* hffe, it U DCCCSUrjr tO read nia .

Tim. Plat. VOL. L 2 T


^

J>

ciplc of all principles].But if this be the case, there will not be more [indepen

dent] principles than one. For if there were, God will not IMJ the cause of all

things, but only of certain things. But if lie also rules over matter, then- is one

principle,and not many principles.

Farther fctill, if the existence qf principle

consists in this, that it is the principle of certain things, and that it adorns that

which is disorderly, it will be simultaneous with the things that proceed from it,

and the principlewill be no less subverted from things posterior to it not existing,

than things posterior to it when the principleis subverted.

1

But this will be. the

case, since they frequently say, that the principle has its existence in fabricating.

If however this be true, it is not po-sihlelor the principle to exist, the woihl not

existing. But airain, averting dilleivntly from what they did before, they say,

lthat God exists without fabricating They a-,M-rl this however, not

1

knowing

that true powers energi/e by their \ery being, and that tin; augmentative and nu

ll tritive powers, by their very being, increase and nourish the body. Thus also the

soul by its very existence animates, vivifies, and mo\es its instrument [the body].

For the body does not perceive or palpitate in coiiM-qneiice of our pre-deliberation ;

but the presence of soul alone accomplishes the.-e energies. lAgain, every thing

which is always naturally adapted to a certain thing, essentially possesses the

power of effecting it;but that which is changed differently at different times, is

adscititious. If therefore God always fabricates, he will have a connascent

demiurgic power ;but if he does not, his power will be ad>cititious. How there

fore, from being imperfect, does he become perfect, and from notl>eing

artificial,

an artificer ?

The second head therefore after this, is that which shows that Plato refers all

things to one principle.And this is e\ident from the Republic, where he asserts

that the sun is the cause of \isibl.-, but the trood of intelligible natures. Again

also, he calls the sun the offspringof the good. This is likewise evident from

his Epistles,in which he says that all things are about the king of all, and that

all things are for his sake. For if all things are converted to him, and subsist

about him, he is the principle of all, and not only of certain things ; since what

ever you may assume \vill be derived from thence. This too is manifest from the

Phih-bus, in which dialogue lie clearly says, that all things are from bound and

Instead of KU oi<S>

^\Xo>>ci>/;W fr, rrj a

.pt.rai r, up^n. 1 read, <ni ovltv ,ia\\nv afif"lfttvt)i ," ** ra fitT at-r^- ;,

tt TLVTUV, r. X.

is omitted here in the original.



HOOK ii.] TIM/F.US OF PLATO. 331

infinity,but that ofIhcse principles

themselves there is onepre-cxistentrausc, which

is God. Hence, there is oneprinciple and many principles; but these are

|>er-

fected by the one principle. From what is said also in the Philebns this i* evi

dent, in which dialogue he confutes those who assert that beings are [alone]

many, and likewise those who admit theprinciple to be being itself. For he de

monstrates,that it is neither

properto

beginfrom the multitude of

beings, norfrom the one being, but from the one itself.

In the. third place, therefore, neither do the principles which they assume per

tain any thing to Plato. For ideas are not separated from intellect, subsisting

by themselves apart from it;but intellect being converted to itself, sees all forms.

Hence the Athenian guest assimilates the energy of intellect to the circulation of

an accurately-fashioned sphere. But they introduce ideas as things inefficacious,

resembling in themselves forms impressed in wax, and situated external to intel

lect. Nor is the Demiurgus the first God. For the first God is superior to

every intellectual essence. Nor does a certain irrational soul move that

which is borne along in a confused and disorderly manner. For every

soul is the offspring of the Gods. Nor, in short, did the universe, from being

without order, become arranged. For if God was willing to bring all things

into order, how was he willing ? Was he always willing, or at a certain time ? For

if he was willing at a certain time, this was either from himself, or from matter.

But if from himself, an absurdity follows. For he is always good. Every

thing good, however, which always exists, M always effective. And if this arose

from the resistance of matter, how came it to be now adorned ? Because, say they,

it became adapted to receive the demiurgic productive power. For God observed

this, vi/. the aptitude of it. It is necessary therefore, that it should have \trrn

brought into order, not being itself disorderly. For if it had been disorderly, itj

would not have been adapted ; since the disorderly motion of it is inaptitude.]

Hence matter is not the cause of the privation of order and ornament. Moreover,

neither is the will of God the cause of this. For he is always good, and therefore

the world is always adorned ; and the Demiurgus always arranges the confused

and disorderly nature. On what account, therefore, did Plato hypothetically in

troduce this privation of order? It was that we might survey how the generation

of bodies is one thing, and the order of them when, generated, another; bodies



indeed existing, but being moved in a disorderly manner. For they are inca-

1

Instead of TO c aynOor war, act or iroiijruor, it .sccrm necessary to rrad ro it nynW *nv nn rttt

332 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK n

pableof arranging themselves. Henet Plato, wishing to indicate the order which

accedes to bodiesfrom something differentfrom themselves,shows that

disorderis

con-

siibsistent with their motions, without a divine cause. Aristotle, however, blames him

who asserts that disorder is assumed prior to order, merely according to hypothe

sis, and says that those things will not follow for which the hypotheses are

assumed, as is the case in geometry. For the hypotheses of geometry are of

themselves able to effect geometrical conclusions. To this we reply, that it is

not said after this manner according to hypothesis, that the unadorned ought to

he admitted prior to the adorned, but that Plato saw that which is formless prior

to forms, though it is m-ver separate from them. Thus too, that which is invested

with form, though yet without distinction, is assumed prior to order, though it

never was prior to it, but is consuhsistent \\ith order.

The fourth head, in addition to those that have been already considered, is

that in which JMato demonstrates the mode of fabrication; a divine intellect ef

fecting this by its very being, which he infers through many arguments. For

artists are in want of instruments to their energy, because they have not dominion

over every kind of matter. Hut this is evident from the instruments which they

use, in order to render matter pliant, boring, or polishing,or elaborating

it with a wheel; all which operations do not insert form, but take away

the inaptitude of the recipient of form. The reasuti iVit// howcccr, ur Jonn,

becomespresent with the subject from art instantaneously,all the impedimenta being

removed. Hence if there was no impediment, form would immediately accede

to matter, and would not in bliort be in want of any instruments. Moreover,

the phantasy produces many passions about the body by its very energy alone.

For a man blushes through the imagination of what is base, and becomes red;

and through the conception of something dreadful is terrified, and his body is

rendered pale. And these, indeed, are the passions about the body. Hut the cause

of these is a phantasm, which does not employ impulsions and mechanical contri

vances, but energizes by being present alone. Farther still, theologists assert that

there arc certain powers superior to us, who employ efficacious imaginations, and

which by their very existence are effective of what they wish to accomplish, and

who are also able to produce illuminations, and to exhibit certain divine forms by

their motions, to such as are able to behold the visions which they externally pri-

sentto the view. If therefore human arts, the imaginations ofpartial souls, and

the energies of thrmons, effect things of this kind, why is it wonderful that the

Demiurgus, by the intellectual intuition of the universe, should gi\e subsistence to

that is that



the sensible nature ; generating, indeed, which material immaterially,

BOOKi!.]

TIMJEUS OF PLATO.333

which is tangible, without contact;and

extending impartibly that wliich possessesinterval ? And, indeed, it ought not to be considered as an admirable circum

stance, if something which is incorporeal, and without interval, is the fabricator

of this universe. For human seed produces man, who is so much larger than the

seed, and in each part of it contains all the differences of the solids; as for

instance of the bones, those that are compact, and those that are hollow;

of the

soft parts such as the lungs and the liver; of the dry parts, such as the nail*

and the hair; of thu moist parts, such as the blood and phlegm ;of the adipom

parts, as the marrow and fat; of the bitter parts, as the bile; of the parts with

outquality, as the saliva

; of the thick-set parts, as the nerves; and of the ex

panded parts as the membranes. For all these, the substances of similar parts,

and those that in a certain respect are composed of them, derive their subsistence

from a small bulk;or rather from that which is without

bulk. For reasons [or

productive powers] generate these, and they are every where void of bulk. For

whateverp;irt you may take of the seed, you will find in it all things. Much

more, therefore, is the demiurgic reason able to produce allthings, being not at

all in want of matter to their existence. But the fabricator of alltilings is eter

nally established in himself, and abiding in himself produces the universe.

1

But it neither was, nor is lawful, for that which is best, to effect

any thing else than that which is most beautiful."

Themis is very properly assumed in the beginning of the fabrication of the

universe. For she is the cause of the demiurgic sacred laws, and from her the

order of the universe is indissolubly connected. Hence also she remains a virgin

prior to the progression of the Demiurgus, according to the Oracles of Night.But she produces, in conjunction with Jupiter, the triad of the Seasons, to whom

Olympus and great Hcav n are giv n in charge,

And a dense cloud to open, or to close.

She is therefore the monad of all the mundane order; on which account also.

Socrates in the Republic calls herNecessity, as is demonstrated in that

dialogue.He likewise convolves the world on her knees, she preserving the order of it

perpetually immutable and unshaken. Conformably therefore to this divine

cause of order, the Demiurgus also, that which is disordered into order,



leading

imparts beauty to all things, and renders the world similar. to, and connects it

This word whith i* ucd here by Tlato, jignitifs both ihe Goddess of justice, ami lawful.

PKOCLUS ON THE nodV. 11.334

with himself. For being himself moat excellent, he very properly causes the

world to be most beautiful;because the first and intelligible beauty itself is sus

pended from, and is in goodness. Hence the world likewise, being most beauti

ful, issusj>ended

from the Demiurgus, who is the best [of fabricative causes].

And because the good is the cause of beauty, ou this account also the best of

fathers gives subsistence to the most beautiful ofl -pring. Farther still, as Themis

is the guardian of thfi divine laws, but they m:ike the generations of secondary

from first naturesto

proceedin an

orderly series,and

preservethe connexion of

divine beings, and the similitudes of things second to such as are first; on this

account also, the Deminrgus, rnergi/ing with Themis, renders the universe most

beautiful, being himself mo>t excellmt. For if Socrates, being a man, says that

it is not lawful fur him to concede any thing that is false, or to obliterate the truth,

how is it possiblewe should s:iy

that the demiurgic intellect effects any thing else

than what is I* autil ul, and that he does not exterminate deformity, being united

to Themis, who is likewise always present with him? And thus much concerning

this particular.

But the words,"

it neither was nor is" are very appropriately assumed with

that which is best : for before this, he had called the Demiurgus good,and then

also the term wax, was added. For Timanis says; he was good. For the sim

plicitywhich is above intellect, and the peculiarity itself of drily, are more adapted

to the term WHS, as being super-eternal,and better than all intellectual perception.

Now1

however he calls him the most excellent, as being a deified intellect. For

that which participates [of deity] is most excellent. The terms also avw and if,

are adapted to the Demiurgus ;as to a God indeed, the term WHS ; but as to an

intellect, the term is, in order that at one and the same time his divine union and

eternal hypostasis may be rendered manifest.

" By a reasoning process, therefore, he found that among the things

which are naturally visible, no whole work destitute of intellect would

ever be more beautiful than a whole work which possesses intellect."

Amelins in a wonderful manner endeavours to prove that Flato knew the

different demiurgic causes, and continually passes in a silent way from one of

these causes to another; exhibiting, on account of their connexion, no one of the

1 here for t .



Notf 11 erroneously printed

ii.]TLNLEfS OF PLATO. 335

divine causes themselves, but discoursing about them as if they were one and the

same, through the union of the demiurgi with each other. For all of them are

one, and one is all. Since now also he who rr///.v is one I)emiurus, he who

reasons is anoth* r, and he who assumes or receives is another. And the first, indeed,

makes by his will alone, the second by intelligence and intellectual perception,

but tin 1 ihird by [as it were] manual operation. For they placed intellect in soul,

but soul in

body,and thus

togetherfabricated the universe.

The divine lamhli-clnis however reprobates all such

interpretations, as very superfluously devised.

But he defines Xoj/rr/ioc,or a reasoning process, to be that which causally precedes

beings, vhich is fabricative of essence itself, and which is according to energy

invariably the same;from which all reasonings are connected, and have their

existence.

We indeed have already observed, that Tiimcus discourses about one and the

same Demiurgns, and shall now remind the reader that this mustl>c

admitted.For if there is a multitude in the demiurgi, [i. & if there are many demiting,] it is

necessary to arrange a monad prior to the multitude. Moreover, we think it fit

that the divine lamblichus should consider, whether the one and whole Demiur-

gus, being an intellectual world, is not multipoint, and does not by different

powers fabricate dilleient things, in addition to his being the father of all things ?

For let the same Demiurgus so far as he is good, and so far as he is a God, be

the producing cause of all things; yet since he comprehends in himself the cause

of all fabrications, and produces in one way the whole, but in another (he parts ;

the former indeed collectively and totally, but the latter in a distributed manner,

giving subsistence to each thin::, according to itspro|>er cause; hence by one

intellectual perception, he adorns the whole, and generates it, collectively ; accord

ing to which also, the world is one animal. Mtit by a reasoning process, he pro

duces the parts in the world, and these as wholes; because lie ix the Demiurgus of

latal natures, fabricating total intellect, and total soul, and all the bulk of bodv.

I fence, as composing parts, he is said to make them by a reasoning process.

For Xoyio /xoyix a distributed or divided evolution of parts, and a distinctive cause vf

things. For it docs not pertain to one who doubts; since neither does art, nor

science doubt;but arlists and scientific men then doubt when they are indigent

of the habits by which the former Income artists, and the latter men of science.

If however these do not doubt, ng reason can be assigned why intellect should

1

For *vKT( cr< in tliu place, it i nfcary to wad r>rcrair*rm.

.7.70PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK n.

doubt Hence thisXoy<r/Lioj

is not through the want of that which is fit

taking

place.But the Demiurgus produces the whole world by intelligence. For

intelligence is collective of multitude into one; just asXoyKrju.oj is distributive

of the one into multitude. Such therefore is the meaning of"

by a reasoning

process."

Withresj>ect

however to the tilings which are naturally visible, to say that

they are sensibles is perfectly absurd. For these are not yet arranged in tin-

discourseof

Timanis,and it is

amongthe number of

things impossible,that the

Demiurgus should l>e converted to them. For how can he verge to that which is

less excellent, or what kind of representation can he receive of material tilings, to

which it is not fortunate cvon for a partial soul to incline? It is better therefore,

as the divine larnbliehus interprets tin1

words, to think that things of this kind are

intelligibles. For that these are visible is evident from the things which Tima-us

shortly after says the Demiurgus perceives. For his words are," As many

therefore, and such ideas, as intellect perceived to be inherent in that which is animal,

<$r."

That they are also naturally visible, will be evident if we consider, that

some things are visible with relation to MS, but others according to nature.

And the things indeed which are visible with relation to us, are in their own

nature dark and irnmanifest;but those which are naturally visible are truly

known, and are resplendent with divine light. Hut intelligibles are things of

this kind. Perhaps too, as he had called that which is moved in a confused and

disorderly manner visible, and which subsists preternaturally as with reference

to fabrication, be now calls the intelligible paradigms of the Demiurgus, naturally

>isible. Hence, in the introduction he inquires,whether an eternal or a generated

paradigm of tin 1 universe must be admitted; these two things existing prior to

the generation of the universe, being and generation. And where else can the

Demiurgus find the causes of generated natures, than in intelligibles? For in

dention with him is not a fortuitous thing, nor a syllogistic process; since this

pertains to partial souls ; but a union with the intelligible causes of the parts of

the universe, and a suney and plenitude from thence derived. For all things

exist paradigmatically in the natures prior to him, both such as an: the objects

of intellection, and such as are deprived of intelligence ;since truly existing

being comprehends uniformly the cause of intellectual natures, and of those that

do notparticipate of intellect. And the intellectual beings which are there, are

J or Kojfrwv here, it is necfssary to read aioijrw*.



BOOK M.] TIM.1IUS Or PLATO. 337

of a superior hut the rest, of an inferior order. For though all things there are

objects of intellectual perception, and intellects, yet in some of them, the cause

pos* -sses the intellectual nature of the things caused, hut in others, the privation

of intellect and the irrational : the causes themselves being intellectual, but the

things which proceed from them, deprived of intellect. Hence the Demiunrus

looking thither, very properly admits that what possesses intellect is more venera

ble than that which is without it, the genus of the one, than the genii* of the

otlier, and the individuals of the one, than the individuals of the other. For

man is better than horse, and a certain man than all horses, according to the

possession itself of intellect. If however, you assume a certain part of man and

a certain part of horse, it does not entirely follow that the one is better than the

other. Nor if you assume man fashioned by nature, and the man made by the

art of the statuary, is the former in every resj>ectmore venerable according to

figure than the latter. For art is in many res|>ccts more accurate [in this instance

than nature]. One whole therefore, is every where better than another, when

the one possesses intellect, but the other is deprived of it. For through what

other thing c-m body l;e able toparticipate of intelligible beauty [than intrlh.-ctj /

Let no one therefore fancy that Plato makes the division of forms to be into those

that possess and those that are deprived of intellect. For all things there[i. e.

in the intelligible world] are, as we have said, intellects, where also Plato calls

all things in every respect Gods. But extending himself to the natures which are

there, he likewise perceived the separation which in here between the beings

which possess, and those- that are deprived of intellect. Hence lie thussays, that

nothing destitute of intellect, will be belter than that which possesses it, the

difference of these existing as in works, but there pre-existing according to cause.

Again however, let us survey how Plato says, that secondary enrrui/e on

account of more principal causes, the latter being more perfect than the former,

but the former Wing suspended from the latter. Because indeed, the Demiurgus

is good, on this account, he made the world to be most beautiful. For goodness

is the cause of beauty. But Ix-cause he mnde the universe to IK; most beautiful,

he rendered it endued with intellect. Andl>eauty

fills the first intellect with

its own power. Because also he made the universe to l>e endued with intellect,

he imparted to it soul. For soul proceeds from intellect. JJccause likewise he

rendered the world animated, he inserted life in that which was l>cfore moved in



1For vxrftrtpor read vrcprrpwr.

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. 2 U

338 PROCLUSONTHE [nooi n.

a confused and disorderly manner. For this being well arranged, is able to

jiiirtiripateof

soul, soul of ink-lied, andintellect

of beauty. The whole worldhowever, becomes most beautiful from the good, and after this manner may !>e

Miid to l>e a blessed God. The Demiurgus likewise, seems, in what is here said,

to behold all the paradigms, which Plato calls naturally visible, not those only

which are in animal itself, but also such as are more partial than the four ideas

which are there. Or how does he see some things which are the paradigms of

intellective, but others which are the paradigms of unintellective natures, which

are not separated in animal itself? But he mentions the forms of this animal

itself, when be causes the universe to be an animal. For so far as it is an animal,

it is the image of animal itself, and so far also as it (-(insists of four parts [i.e.

of the four elements]. .So far however, as it is now divided into intellectual,

and non-intellectual beings, so far it entiiely derives its subsistence from other

paradigms more partial than those which exist according to the four ideas in

animal it>elf. So that animal itself indeed, is a paradigm^but every paradigm

IN not:

annual itself. Having discussed these particulars however, let us proceed

to \\liat follows.

"

It is impossible however, for intellect to accede without soul."

The intellectual essence indeed, is impartible, uniform and eternal, but the

essence of bodies is partible and multiplied, and is consubsistent with temporal

representation. These therefore, exist contrarily with reference to each otherf

and are in want 01 a medium which maybe able to collect them together; a

medium, which is at one and the same time partible and impartible, composite

and simple, eternal anil generated. But according to Plato, the psychical order

i> a thing of this kind, intelligible, and at the same time the first of generated

natures, eternal and temporal, impartible and partible. If therefore, it is neces

sary that the universe should be endued with intellect.it is also necessary that

it ishould ha\e a soul. For soul is the receptacle of intellect, and through it

intellect exhibits itself to the masses of the universe. Not that intellect is in

want of soul: for thus it would be less honorable1

than soul; but that bodies

1

liiilr.ul ol ru ti7ruj>mSiy/ju

ill lliii place, it stems iH-ccstarv O read van bt -rapattiyftu.

1 r & ru ui/rcrwo here, it isneci ury to read uu To nvro taut.

I or rvri/iwrrn jf litre, it ii IH COiUM to It jd ari/iwrruot.



DOOK ii.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 339

require soul, in order to tlHr participationof intellect. For the last, ami not

the. first of things, are in want of secondary natures. For the first of things are

every where present without a medium.* Hence it is necessary to understand,

that the soul which connects intellect with a sensible nature, ou^ht to he intellec

tual, and not deprived of intellect. For how can that which is destitute of

intellect he suspended from intellect? But to these another nvdium \\ill lw>

requisite. The medium however, being a thing of this kind, will wisely and

orderly govern every corporeal-formed nature. But it will imitate intellect,

dancing as it were round it. If therefore, wholes are better than parts, things

eternal, than such as subsist in time, and efficients than effects, it is necessary

that the whole universe should be more divine than all the parts it contains. If

therefore, certain animals in the world, which arepartial, material and mortal,

are naturally adapted to participate of intellect, what ought we to say of the

whole world? Is it not, that the whole of it exhibits through the whole, the

presence of intellect! For its figure, its order, and the measure of its powers, maybe said to afiord clear indications of intellectual inspection. If however, intel

lect presides over wholes, and governs the universe, it is necessary that there

should l>e an intellectual soul in the middle of it, adorning and ruling over bodies,

and at the same time separate from the subjects of its government, and filling

all things with life, in order that the world may through it, be firmly established

in intellect, and that intellect may illuminate the world.

If you are willing, we will also recall to your recollection what is written in

the Philebus, where Socrates shows that the world possesses intellect and is ani

mated, because that which is terrestrial in us is from the universe, and the fire

which is in us is from the mundane fire, and in a similar manner the air and the

water which we contain; and that it would be absurd that things less excellent

in us should pre-exist in the whole, but that things more divine should not analo

gously pre-subsist in it, and that total intellect and total soul should not be

contained in the universe. For either it must l>e said that no animal possesses

intellect, or if there is a certain animal of this kind, it is absurd that it should

1Instead of ffw/iarvr in this place, it i* requisite to read it\Tfpav.

*viz. They are not in want of a medium in order to be present every where: but the last of things

require secondary

natures as media, l>v which alone

they

can receive the illuminations of the firt

of things.

1 For avafitaOufitv here, it i necessary to read


participateof intellect prior to the universe.

1 For the universe is always arranged,

and through the sameness of its subsistence, is nearer to an intellectual essence.

But much of the disorderly and confused is inherent in partial animals. Much

more therefore, must it be said, that soul is in the universe.1

Hence Plato very di-

\inelv admits that then- is a twofold intellect, the one being imparticipable and de-

minriiir, but the otlit-r participable,and inseparable

J

[from its subject]. For from

things \\hich are in themselves, those which an; in others, and are co-arranged

with inferior natures, are derhed. Me also gives to the universe a twofold life,

the one- connascent, but the other separate ; in order that the world may bean

animal through the life which is in it, animated through an intellectual soul, and

endued with intellect through much-honored intellect iiself. But Aristotle only

admits the half [of this doctrine of Plato], since he takes away4

imparticipable

intellect from his philosophy. For the first intellect with liim, is the intellect of

the inerratic sphere; but he cuts oil" the intellectual soul, which is the medium

between intellect and the animated body of the universe ;and immediately con

joins iiilell.rt with the In ing body. In addition to these things also he appears

to me to err in another particular.For having placed intellect over the spheres,

lie does not establish the wiiole world in any intellect ;but this is the most absurd

otall thin^; for how is the world one, unless one intellect luisdoininion in it? \\ hat

co-arrangement likewise is there of intellectual multitude, unless it is suspended

from a proper monad? And how are all things co-ordinated to an excellent

condition of being, unless there is a certain common intellect of all mundane

natures For the intellect of the inerratic sphere is the intellect of that sphere

[alone]; and this i> also the ca>e with the intelleet of the solar, and of the lunar

sphere,and in a similar manner of the other spheres. Against Aristotle however,

we have written a peculiartreatise about these particulars.

\\ith respect to Plato however, is not hi* method admiraJde? For receiving

the world, dividing it into parts,and surveying by itself that which is moved in

1 In tlif original i* f "* - --"* rf ioiro,, arcror. iiX.V i/ri Tf.u rK irairoi ou ^Tf^nv. But Ills

necessary to expui;e a\V. and l altering the punctuation, to rtad ajfollowt: i)ti tori rt $*<>

roinrrot,

9T ir.ti onr-fjt-

rot/ xu* rci, f. X.

*Tin- *oriljf>-rr r.nn (iK.i.aro t.nHtlc.l ill llu- <M i-m.il.

I of n^u/i.rjrot liiTf, It l IU I & >:ir\ to fi-ail X &

& TT *

*Fori>tiXt liffe, rfail nytiX*.

Fir an explanation >f Uie inttlU-cl to which Ari^lollv aacruilcd, also uhy he wy BolhiDg iboul

thdt wliuh i bo\..u(J intflle t, an. I wliy lie appears to liienl in many tlini ;s from Plato, hut docs not

in ruliU, HT m\ Uisprtaliou Ontlic 1 lnl

ix.phyof Aristotle.



BOOK ii.]TIM.EL S OF PLATO. 341

a confused and disorderly manner, he stops it in his discussion. Just as in the

Laws, wishing to show that the self-motive nature is the cause of all motion, lie

stops the whole hoaven, and having stopped it, introduces soul into the universe,

in order that by pouring forth an abundance of life, she may animate the world.

He likewise introduces intellect to soul, which governs the world, beinu: con

verted to itself; through which the universe is moved in a circle, the whole is

arranged, and the whole world is immovable. Since however, all these parti

culars give completion to one animal, and one nature, it is requisite that a

collective and uniting cause of them should have a prior existence, and that

this should he intellectual. For to comprehend wholescollectively and at once,

and to bring them together, to the completion of one thing, is the work of an

intellectual cause. Hence, Plato establishing imparlicipable prior to participate

intellect, and placing the causes of all things in it, he produces from thence,

intellects, souls ami bodies, from which he gives completion to the sensible

world. That it is necessary therefore, that the universe should participate of an

intellectual soul, if it participates of intellect, is evident from what has IM.TII

said. For this soul is the bond of the extremes which are contrary to each

other.

But it must also be demonstrated that the converse is true;

viz. that an

intellectual soul existing in the universe, it is necessary that there should lie an.

intellect of the universe. For since it is said that this soul is intellectual, it is

likewise necessary that it should participate of intellect. Whether therefore, does

it alone participate of the whole of intellect, or does it participate of it through

a certain thing in itself derived from it? But if indeed, that which is corporeal

immediately participates of the fountain of souls, and not through that which is

in itself, it will be also requisite to admit, that the same thing takes place in the

whole soul [of the universe]. If however, there is in the Demiurgus the fountain

of souls, and there is also the fountain of the soul of tin, universe, and the universe

participates through the latter of the former, it is likewise necessary that the soul

itself of the universe, should be entirely suspended from imparticipablc intellect

through participate intellects. For as the body of the universe is to its soul, so

is the soul of it to intellect. And if indeed, so far as it is soul it becomes intel

lectual,1

it would Iw necessary that every soul should be the same[i.

e. should lie

* Instead of cat ifitr

*aOt votpa, y\7 yifrrai, in thii place, it is necessary to rrad, *a n /irr KoOa

* of a

J/VVJ, p ytrtrat.


intellectual]. But if it becomes intellectual through theparticipation of intellect,

it is necessary that it should participate of an intellect commensurate to it.

A thing of this kind however, is not intellect itself, but that which is a medium

between intellect itself and soul, v.-hich lias intellectualperception adscititious.

This intellect also is a certain intellect, and isessentially intellect, and notT

becoming to be so, like soul; for it is better than soul. But by In-ing1

a certain

intellect, it is co-ordinate with soul. For intellect itself is intellect by c\m////".*

*

f

and not by bccomiNg tu be, and intellect which is simply so by its very being, it

superior to a co-ordination with soul. If also you collider, that every monadconstitutes a multitude similar to itself, a divine monad, a divine multitude,

a psychical monad, a psychical multitude, just as an intellectual monad producesan intellectual multitude, and that secondary orders always participate of the

natures prior to themselves, it is necessary these things being admitted, that there

should be a certain intellect of the whole world. For it is necessary that an

intellectual sold should participate of intellect. But if some one should say,

it participates of the intellect which ranks as a whole, it is absurd. For

this intellect will not be the Demiurgus of all things.* And if it par

ticipates of a certain other intellect, this is the intellect of the universe, and

that which is properly participated, as giving completion to the universe in

conjunction \\ith soul. But the intellect which ranks us a whole, is so participated

Ini, as illuminating the soul of the universe. If therefore intellect presides over

wholes, the universe is animated;but if the universe is animated, it is also

endued with intellect.

"Through this reasoning process therefore, placing intellect in soul,

but soul in body, lie fabricated the universe."

In the first place, it is requisite to see what this intellect is, and whether it is

essential,establi>hed

above soul, or a certain intellectual habit of soul. Fromanalogy however, it may be inferred that it is essential. For ns intellect is to

soul, so is soul to body. But soul does not so snb.sist with reference to body, a.s

to be a habit of it;and therefore neither is intellect a habit of soul. This like-

1

For to lr TU foni, readr<f

t rii mui.

\iz. The intellect participated by soul, will not be the Demiurgus of all things. For the demiurgic

is aniinjt.irlicipable intellect, ur in other word), is not coujubsistent with soul.

BOOK 11.]TIM.tUS OF PLATO. 343

wise, may be inferred from the final cause. For Plato says that soul \vas

constituted on account of intellect.1

But the converse is not true. If however,

soul is for thv sake of intellect, hut intellect is that for the sake of which soul

subsists, intellect is not a habit; for no where* does essence sr.bsist on account

of habit. And in the third place, the Demiurgus constitutes this intellect;but

the soul as Plato says, ^ives subsistence to the intellect which is according to

habit, through the motion of the circle of sameness about the intelligible. For

[a* he adds] through th s motion, intellect and science are necessarily produced.

How therefore does the J)cniiurus constitute prior to soul, that to which soul

herself font s subsistence? To which we may add, that it is ri^ht to assume,

that in the Deminrgns there is a royal soul, and a royal intellect, as Socrates

says in the Philebus, subsisting according to the reason of cause [or causally];

and that according to these fountains of these two-fold genera, the Dcmiurgiis

now places intellect in soul, and soul in body, not because better are in less

excellent natures, nor that intellect is in want of a certain seat, or that the soul of

the universe is in a certain thing. For these things are unworthy of wholes and

divine essences; through which the world is called by Plato, a blessed Clod.

Because however, we conceive of the nature of things in a two-fold respect,

either according to their progression, or according to their conversion; henc< ,

when we .survey their progression, wel>egin

from first natures, and say that

causes are in their ffleets. But we assert the converse of this, when we suney

their conversion. For then wo say that the things caused*

exist in their causes.

This second mode therefore, Plato delivers to us shortly after, when lie places

body in soul, and analogously soul in body. Now, however, treating of f ne

mode of progression, lie places intellect in soul, because the whole of it ha* the

form of intellect, and nothing pertaining to it can be assumed, which is not under

the dominion of an intellectual nature. But soul in body, because this according

to the whole of itself participates of soul, and no part of it can lx> assumed which

is inanimate; but oven that which is deprived of its proper life, .to far as it i-. a

part of the universe, is animated. For as we say that providence proceeds every

where, and isesery where because it is present with all things, and leaves nothing

destitute of itM lf ; aft< r the same manner likewise, wr say that intellect is in

1

For f ta tnv here, it is nece<;ir\ in rra<l <Sa t-ovf.

1

Al ler. i .

v

n/i a- in thi place, it rcrjuitilc to supply yan.1For ro curia here, it H necearv to rcadrra ainnra.

344 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK IT.

soul, as circularly illuminating the whole of it, and soul in body, because it is

pn sent with the whole of it.

Nor docs Plato speak after this manner, and Orpheus after another; but

if it he requisiteto give my opinion,

the conceptions of the thcologist become

manifest through what is here said. ForIp|>n

who is the soul of the universe,

and is Ihus called by tin- theologM, perhaps because her intellectual conception!*

are csM-ntiali/ed in the must vigorous motions, or perhaps on account of the most

r.ipidlation of the turners, of which she is the cause, placing a testaceous

v: -el1

on her head, and encircling the fig leaves thatbind her

temples,with a

dra-on, receives Dionysius [or Bacchus]. For with the most divine part of her-

M-lf, she Incomes the receptacle of an intellectual essence, and receives the mun

dane intellect, which proceeds into her from the thigh of Jupiter.For there it

was united with Jupiter,but proceeding from thence and becoming participate

by her, it elevates her to the intelligible,and to the fountain of her nature. Fur

she hastens to the mother of the Gods, and to mount Ida,1

from which all the

series of souls is derive.!. Hence also, Ippa is said to have received Dionysius

when he was brought forth from Jupiter.Fur as Plato before observed, it is mi-

possible fur intellect to accede to any thing without soul. Lut this is similar

to what is asserted by Orpheus ; by whom also Dionysus is called the sweet

ofl>prinuof Jupiter.

This however, is the mundane intellect, which proceeds

into li-ht conformably to the intellect that abides in Jupiter.Thus too, the di

vinely-delivered theology [of the Chaldeans] says, that the world derives its corn-

pi,tion from these three things [vi/. from intellect, soul and body]. Soul there

fore says [in the Chaldean Oracles,] concerning Jupiter fabricating the universe:

-J >ou"l reside after the paternal conceptions, hot, and animating all things.

1

For

the father uf Gods and men placedour intellect in soul, but soul he deposited in

sh.iiiiish body."Plato likewise, bears testimony to the Oracles, when he calls

the Demiurgus father, and representshim generating souls, and sending them

into the generationof men according to the lirt life. And thus much concerning

these particulars.Since however, as we have said, both soul and intellect give

completion to one animal, Plato appears to me to use very appropriatelythe

words to constitute and co-fabricat,:, through the common preposition<rw in both,

For Xiuox in this|>lce,

1 rtuil Au-trur.

1i. e. To The rrpion of ideas, an.l an intell^iljle

iratitre.

J for Ofo^rf^nau hfre, rtad Otopn \i.v^i\/ya.



HOOK ii.]TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 3(5

exhibiting the union of the universe. For by always making diviner to be more

comprehensive than less excellent natures, lie causes the world to become one;

but through the forms in each he manifests ia the one composition, but in the other

demiurgic art.

" In order that it might become most beautiful according to nature, and

the most excellentwork."

In what is here said, Tinv.rus recurs to the principle from which all the

mentioned particulars wore deduced. For the world has arrangement on account

of soul, soul subsists on account of intellect, but intellect proceeds into th; uni

verse on account of intelligible beauty, and the world participates of this in order

that it may also participate off/ic one ; and this is the end to it of its composition.

that it may IK- rendered most beautiful and the best. IJut it becomes most beau

tiful indeed, on account of the beautifying cause which subMsts in the intelligible,

but the best, or most excellent, on account of the fountain of good. For the good

is the most excellent of all things. And through all these, the world Incomes

most similar to the Demiurgus. For he was railed by TiiiKrus most excellent.

He however, is the best of demiurgic causes, just as thegw>d\s simply most excel

lent, existing beyond nil the divine causes. But the world is the most excellent

vorki for it is s\ fabrication. For here also the world participates of deity ;since

(lie goodness which is above intellect is deity ;and on this account the world is

denominated mo*t. excellent. In an admirable manner Plato likewise, does not

>peakof the deity of the world in the same way as concerning intellect and soul,

vi/,. as acceding after intellect. For the union of intellect with its proper deity is

ineffable, and itellect itself being divine proceeds from the father, which also is

the peculiarity of total production. For as intellect indeed, it derives its subsis

tence from the total fabrication, but as a divine intellect, from deity.1

Plato

therefore, does not make a division into deity and intellect, in consequence of

constituting the intellect of the world from the father. What however, is the

meaning hereof according to nature? Perhaps this is significant of order, according

to which the universe is likewise enabled toparticipate ofdivine beauty ;

and there

fore will be the same with according to order. Perhaps also it manifests to us, that

Instead ofa-o r?ji r\;i here, I read axortjf Onnjroi.

i.

Tim. Plat. VOL.

346 PROCLUS ON THK [BOOK n-

the Demiurgus makes by liis very being, and produces both intellect and soul

from his essence. And it is not improbable that it is used, because this fabrica

tion, the universe, is complicated with nature, and the most beautiful here is not

of such a kind as that which is better than nature ;but that which is above nature,

i* as it were mingled with nature, and intellectual with physical entities.

" Tims therefore, it is necessary to say, according to assimilative, rea

soning,that tins world was

generatedan

animal, possessing in truth [or

reality] soul and intellect through the providence of God."

As the world itself is mingled, being composed of images and divine essences,

of physicaland supernatural things, thus aKo Plato calls the discussion of itassi-

milative, and again truth. For according to that which is moved in a confused

and disorderly manner, it requires assimilative reasoning, but according to the

intellectual osence which is in it, it

requirestruth, and also

accordingto the

divine cause from which it proceeds. Hence Plato, \\heuaboutto speak con

cerning the world adds the word assimilative, or probable, but the word truth,

when about to speak concerning the providence of divinity. Farther still, you

may perceive both assimilation and truth m the speaker himself; not only dividing

these conformably to the nature of things. For he frequently apprehends the

fabrication of things in a partible manner, assuming reasonings, divisions and com

positions, thoughall

tilingssubsist at

oncein

divine production. And frequently,

he recurs to the whole intelligence of the father, as in the axioms, "lie vangood,"

and "

it neither was nor uill be lauful for that which is moat excellent toeffect any

thing else than that which u most beautiful? For in the former of these his appre

hension is assimilative [but in the latter, conies into contact withtruth]. For

from the multiform knowledges that are in us, he indicates what pertains to divine

and demiurgic intelligence. But how, say they, does he define the universe to be

an animal animated, or possessing soul, and endued with intellect ; for it seems

indeed, that unniuil is a certain part,but aninutted a genus ? In answer to tliis, it

is necessary to recall to our memory those IMatonists who say, that animal extends

as far as to plants themselves, and to see how, according to this doctrine,

every thing animated is an animal, but not (very animal is animated. For

intelligible animal is bevond the causes of soul. For as Plato calls the ra-

tional soul an animal but also arranges life after the rational soul, lie very pro-

1

/u/<>i i I imiit .1 In ic in the original.

HOOK-ii.] TIM.i;US OF PLATO. 347

perly denominates every thing animated an animal, but nof v ice versa. If however,this IM- the case, having said that the world is an animal, since there is an intel

ligible animal, and also a sensible animalparticipating of a rational soul, lie

properly adds, that it is animated. And since of souls, one kind is endued with

intellect, hut another is deprived of it, in addition to the universel>eing animated,

he likewise asserts that it possesses intellect. For it seems, that animal indeed,accedes from the fir>t intelligible, ami thus also from the intelligible father,

1 whois prior to the intellectual (iods. But the animated accedes from the middle

cause, hoth the triadic and the hehdomadic. And the possession of intellect ac

cedes from the intellectual lather [Jupiter]. For if you survey these as with

reference to the Demiurgus alone, according to the paradigm which is in him,

the universe, is rendered an animal; hut according to his royal soul, animated;

and accordingto his royal intellect, endued with intellect. All these however, Plato

comprehendsunitedly

in the words,"through

the

providencer>f

God." For from

thence the universe is rendered an animal, and a blessed God,* becoming perfect

through the providence of divinity. You may also see how the discourse proceedsfrom goodness through will, and ends in providence. For will indeed, is sus

pended from goodness, and providence from will. And the universe is gene

rated, on account of the providence, the will, and the goodness of the father; the

last of these being essence prior to essence [i. e. being superessential essence], the

second, beingas it

wrre

power prior to powers, and the first, energy prior to

energies. For these pertain to the Gods so far ax they arc Gods. For goodness

indeed isunijic of essence, and is the Jlowcr of it ; but will is the measure ofpmcer ;

find providence is an energy prior to intellect. For this I think, the very name itself

manifests. We. therefore thus distinguish animal and animated.

lamblichus however, arranges animal, with every thing that has life, \n\\. anima

ted, uith the peculiar participation of souls. And perhaps he also, through the

i. e. From TO tr or, or from being characterized by the our, and which is the summit of the in-

Ifllipildconlrr.

1i. r. From ;inim:ii itsrlf or i hancs, the eitrcmity of the

intelligible order.

i.e. 7 /if animnttd accedes from the life, which is in tlif urdrr called intelligible, and at the same

lime intellectual, ami also from the life which is in the intellectual order, which life u the middle

ram* in both these order*.

*For cut Ituftvv in llii* place, read t

}<n/iwr.

i.e. l\pvrtna pro\ idence, is an energy wpo rov pricr to intellect.



348PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK 11.

possessionof life

indeed, comprehends intelligibleanimals, but

throughthe ani

mated sensible animals alone. But it may be inferred, that the world is an ani

mal from its sympathy; that it is animated, from its perpetual motion;and that

it is endued with intellect, from its excellent order, For if according to this,

mortal1

are co-passive with celestial natures, and the latter impart an ellluxion to

the former, the universe is one animal connected and contained by one life. For

if this life were not common there would not be a sympathy of the parts in it. For

sympathy is effected through a participation of the same nature. And if the world

ispeq>etual!y moved, it is governed by soul. For every body which is itself

moved inwardly by itself, is animated;but the body which is moved externally,

is inanimate. If therefore, the universe is always moved, what is it which moves

it ? For this is either immoveable, or self-motive. But it is not lawful for the irn-

moveable cause of motion to approach without a medium to things which are

moved by something ditlerent from themselves. Hence, it remains, that the self-

motive nature is that which always moves the world. But this is soul. Theworld therefore is animated.

Moreover, in the third place, if the universe is always arranged, and if all

Ihinjrs are co-ordinated to well-bein", and there is nothing adventitious in then T

polity of the world, intellect governs the world. For the connexion, the order,

and the sacred l;iws of the natures contained in it, bring with them manifest

>ymholsof intellectual government. Aristotle also, in another way shows this,

when he says that of animated natures, animals have the left hand and the right,

but plants have the upwards and downwards, and also the right hand and the

left, so that the world is animated and an animal. But it is likewise endued

with intellect. For that which moves it is intellect. According to both philo

sophers therefore, the \\orld is an animal animated and endued with intellect;

except indeed, that according to Aristotle, if is animated, as having an insepa

rable life; for he does not admit that it has an intellectual soul, but that it lias

nn intellect above soul, and which isessentially suspended from another intelli

gible animal. For what I lato calls animal itself, he calls eternal animal, as in

liis Metaphysics, when he sa\s,"

JfV,V(/j/

t/uil (i/nl ii an clcnnil ttniniul" And in

short, since there are in the world thin:;- that are moved, and things that are

immoveable, things which are always one or the other of these, and things which

are sometimes in motion, and sometimes are immoveable, it is necessary that the

1 It is IUTCO.UIA lii-re, o suji|i!y ru tVrjrn.

1I .i b omitted h.ie in tin- on^iiial.

HOOK ii.]TIMJEUS OF PLATO.

causes of botli these should preside over the world. Soul therefore is the cau>t*

of motion; on vthich .Account also Plato in the Laws admitting [for the sake ot

argument] the universe to be immoveable, gives motion to it by the introduction

of soul. And in the Pha-drus taking away soul, lie makes all things to stand

still. Hut it !; evident that intellect belongs to immovcable natures. And beiiiL s

that are always moved, are moved about those that are immoveable, and on

account of the

permanency

of the latter, the former are

perpetuallymoved.

Ileacc: it entirely follov, s. that there, is a mundane intellect above, soul. J{y

no mr-ans therefore, mu<t that \\hich Chrysippus devised, be ascribed to the

world. For he confounded imparticipahle with participate causes, by sup

posing them to be the ,amo with each other, and also the. divine, and the intellec

tual, the immaterial and the material. For the same (iod, and who according to

him is the first God, pervades through the world, and through matter, and is both

soul and natur

e inseparable from the subjects of his government. Plato how-ever, establishing prior to the whole world three causes, goodness, intelligible

animal, and the demiurgic intellect, imparts from these to the world in the first

place, a perfect intellect always fixed in energy, exempt from matter, and full of

uniiefiled intellections. In the second place, a divine intellectual soul, evolving

the essence of this one intellect, dancing round it, and convolving the universe.

In the third place, a union of the total essences in the world, and one deity and

"oodncss, connecting all the mundane multitude, and causing it to l>e one. Ando

in the fourth place,a providence extending to all things its inspective care, sub-

sisting likewise from itself, and causing itself to be exempt from all the subjects

of its government.

Since however, as we have before observed, it is necessary to survey the pro

gressions and the conversions of wholes, both these are accomplished by Plato.

For he deliver* the progressions of them when he says that the Demiurgus placed

intellect in soul, and soul in body ; but their conversions, when beginning from

ttie world, he calls it an animal animated, and endued with intellect, and con

nects it through soul with intellect, which is the peculiar work of conversion.

And in the last place, he refers the composition of the world to the demiurgic

providence, through which conversion is imparted to all things. For goodness

indeed, unites the Demiurgus to the one. But will supplies wholes with good.

And providence converts all things to the good. For, as we have said, goodness is

1

II i* ncces?*ry litre to ?upply tat fn6i*Tut.

1501 ROCLUS ON THE [BOOK U,

analogous to essence, will to power, and providence to energy ;because the first

indeed, establishes all things ;the second moves them to progression; and the

third recalls them according to the retrogression of all things to that which is

priorto intellect. If however, the Demiurgus adorns the universe on account of

goodness, but through adorning it causes it to possess intellect, and to IM- animated,

and doing these things, eflects them on account of providence, (for these wen

generated through the providence of God) if this be the case.it is necessary that it

should l>e the same thing to produce on account of goodness as on account of provi

dence. And this very properly,because providence is the energy of goodness. So

that according to Plato, providence is nothing else than an energy conformable to

good. For in our concerns also, we say that to provide for some one, is to be the

cause ofgood to the object of our prov idential care. Not only, therefore, must provi

dence be defined to be that which converts all things to the first, but also to be that

the energy of which extends to all things, and which adorns all things, according to

one union. And this, is in reality providence,the communication of good to all

things, the conversion of all things to and the participationof the- giver [of every

good], who imparts to every thing that which it is able to receive. It is requisite

likewise to remember what the Cheronean [Plutarch] says about the name ol

providence, as that which Plato exhorts us to conceive of as something divine.

If also the Demiurgus is intellect, and providenceso far as he has something

which is better than intellect, he has deservedly this name, on account of an

energy which is above intellect. For all things aspire after good, but all things

do not aspire after intellect. For such things as are perfectlydestitute of intel

lect do not desire it, lest their desire should be in vain, or they should be deprived

of the end [which is their proper good]. And because lie is providence indeed,

he is suspended from thegw<l

itself; but because he is intellect he is suspended

from the first intellect. For the first intellect [i. e. Saturn] is not that which intel

lectually sees and fabricates, but that which alone intellectually perceives ;and

on this account, it is a pure intellect, as we learn from the- Cratvlus. Hence,

also, according to Plato, the hitter may be said to IM- ana; as having one energy

directed to him-elf; but the former l.,urt together with this energy leceiving idno

u power f.ibiiculive of the universe, and not only legislatively regulating things

posterior to himself, but also abiding in his own accustomed manner, as Plato

says shortly after.

Prorlui Mm lliii, -Hutling to llie (. haldmn oradcn, in wl.ich Saturn i cullnl t>nct bri/^nil, uml

Jujiitrr finer bryond.



HOOKii.] T1M/EUS Or PLATO. 3-,!

"

Tliis being determined, let us consider what is consequent to these,

things; vix. according to the similitude of what animal, the constituting

artificer constituted the world."

Plato clearly exhibits to us through what is here said the connexion of the

problems, and the suspension of secondary from primary natures. For the words,"

this bcin determined" and"

let us consider what is consequent to thesethings"

indicate the connexion of what has boon with what will he said ; and that through

the truth of the former, the latter receive the principle of investigation. For

since it has been shown that the universe was rendered an animal conformably

to the providence of God, it is necessary that it should be assimilated to intelligi

ble animal. For where did the Deminrgiis look when he made the world to I*;

an animal, except to the intelligible? For it was one of the things pro-demon

strated, that the world being most l>eautiful, was generated according to an

eternal paradigm. If therefore, the Dcmiurgns making it to be an image of the

intelligible, constituted it an animal, the paradigm itself will l>e an intelligible

animal. For if that was not an animal, how could that which was generated an

image of it l>e rendered an animal ? For so far as it is similar to that, it was gene

rated an animal. For it is sensible indeed, not as similar and separate [but as

visible and tangible]*. These however, [i. e. visibility, and tangibility,] it obtains

through a corporeal nature. But it is an animal, as being similar to intelligible

animal. And if it is similar, it is from thence allotted the morphe of animal. For

images also, have not only their forms, but their appellations, so far as they are

formalized, from their paradigms. So that if life is imparted to the world through

the paradigm, it is also similarly called an animal and animated from it, localise

the cause of its whole animation pre-existsin intelligibles. For the same reason

likewise,it is

endued with intellect.It

may however,in a

greater degreeIK*

railed an animal, on account of the most principal cause, Ix canse the paradigm is

the cause of animation, of the supply of intellect, and as I may say, of all life. For

every thing endued with intellect, is also animated, and tvcry thing animated is also an

animal ; but the converse is not true. For every animal is not animated. For that

In>tfH(l of irwi row TO (-retro ytyorot cu-wr in this place, it is ncce^ary to read irn TO rutu-ov yt /ot* t

flkMC.

1TJie words oXX #t rpnrov rot arof are omitted in the

original, but, as it appears to me, ought to

IK- inserted.

PROCLUSONTHK [BOOK M.

which participate! of a rational soul in animated. Nor it every thing which is

animated enduedwith intellect. For the

genus of

wen that

participate ofintellect,

is small ; so that animal is more comprehensivethan all the rest. And with those

things indeed, with which the rest are present,animal also is present; hut it is

not necessary that the rest should be inherent in those things with which this is

present.That however, which is more comprehensive,

is nearer to the fir.-4 prin

ciple.But that which is nearer to it, is of a more, causal nature, since the first

principleis the cause of all beings. That Plato also not only knew intelligible

animal, but also the intelligible animated,is manifest from what he

saysin the

Sophi*ta. For placing life and soul in being, and wishing likewise to give to it

motion, he adds," Hut that which has intellect and soul, if it ix tiut animated, mu*t

remain entirely tmmovcabk" II nee there are, intelligible life, andintelligible

animal; the cause of MMI!, and the animated; the cause of intellect, and that

which is endued with intellect. And animal itself is beyond all the intelligible

paradigms. Hence, Plato says, that the discussion of the similitude of the world

to intelligible animal, is consequent to the problem concerningthe

composition

of it. For because the universe being assimilated according to the form itself of

similitude, was rendered an animal by the Demiurgus, that may more properly

be called an animal, with reference to which the universe A\as generated an

animal. For it exists as an animal on account of the intelligible, and not on

account of that which is mo\ed in a confused and disorderly manner. It is

necessary however, that animal .should be present with the universe, either from

matter or from form ; so that if the world is not an animal from its subject

matter, it i.s so from form. If however from form, that which is primarily animal

is the cause to it of form.

It remains therefore, to survey in the next place after this problem, to what

animal the universe is assimilated. For that it is assimilated, is evident from

what has been already said, but to what it is assimilated, must next be con

sidered. For there is a multitude of intelligible animals, \\Iiich Plato aNo indi

cating, inquires to \\hat animal the Demiurgus constituted the world similar. For

beginning supernally from intelligibles, animal proee* ds through all the middle

orders; in one of these orders, subsisting intelligibly alone; in another intelligibly

For u(Vu)Tu. yap y<*<n, /VX"tariv cu

/<f7-<V".

it i nrc-ssar\ to read, aify.awuv )&

f ;troi, /^nn&

u

tart* row row /ir7^o. I or IMjto sa\i this in the latter partof ihi Dialogue.

*For aXXoi- hcie, il i obviou;lv rcijuisitc to read t-

t yvTfpai.

nooxii.]

TIM.T-HIS OF PLATO.3.- j

indeed, but as in intelligible* and intellectuals ; and in another intellectually

alone. And in one of these orders indeed, animal subsists intelligibly alone, but

as in intellectuals; but in another vitally. And thus in each of the intellects

there is intelligible animal, subsisting appropriately in each. For every intellect

has a conjoined intelligible. Wry properly therefore, does Plato investigate

what kind of animal is the paradigm of the universe, whether it is super-mundane,

or intellectual only, or intelligible, and at the same time intellectual, or intelligible.

only. For the nature of animal1

proceeds according to all the orders of intellect.

But Plato admits that the d inferences always subsist in the first animal itself

according to union, and gives a progression to them according to appropriate

numbers. For as the lust animal is tetradic, thus a different animal is defined

according to a different number. And in those things in which there is the same

number, in these there is a variety of subsistence according to the peculiarities of

animals. For it is necessary that in animal also, there should be the monadic

prior to the multiplied ; because this*

is more allied to the one.. And universally,

every divine multitude begins from a monad. As therefore, the Demiurgus is the

monad of all effective causes, (hough the effective peculiarity is in many (iods,

thus also animal itself is the monad of all animals; in which lik -wi-,e tin- 1110-4

total paradigms of mundane natures, and the one cause of the whole world pre

exist.

\Vhy. however, some one may say, does IMato call the intelligible paradigmanimal \ Because it is the supplier of life, as I have before ob>erv d

;and lecan>t

it -.enerates the rau-es of the whole vivilic series, and the fountains themselves of

life. Because likewise, it is replete with the first and intelligible life. For the

one h ing, or being characterized by the one, i-> be\ond life. But the middle

order of intelligible* is the first life, and is one and infinite. Animal itself, how

ever, being full of intelligible life, is very properly called animal. For as it is

eternal, on account, of being filled from eternity, thus also it is an animal, on

account of its reception of life. For it is intelligible, as being arranged [immedi

ately] after intelligible life. It is therefore called an animal, not as sensitive, nor

as having impulse, but as being vital. For every thing which lives, is according

to Plato, an animal."

For ficcanfc it ha.ilife, says / interns, it mm/ bejustly called

an animal." Hence also, Plato calls plants and seeds animals, characterizing the

1 tor f) rov rowif,uirn licrr, it is nfrfMfjr t irivl * riv ?*>

<fvrii.

1For rovTf lierr, rra<l TIVTO.

Tim. Plat. VOL. L 2 Y

3o4

animal by vitality.If therefore, the intelligible paradigm lives, as being eternal ;

for eternity, as Plolinus says, is the life of all things, so that the eternallives

;

and if every thing that lives is an animal, hence the intelligible paradigm is an

animal. And you may from hence assume that this paradigm is in the third triad

of intelligibles.For it is not in the lirst triad

;for this is prior to life. Nor is it

in the second ;for this is life. Hence it is in the third. For it does not exist

out of mtellrnbles; since Plato on this1

account alone calls the paradigm intelh-

-iblr. though he knew the super-mundane demiurgic intellect. But neither doe,

he call thehtter intelligible, nor the former intellectual. Before therefore, he

assumed every thin- "hid, perpetuallyexists as the paradigm of all generate.,;

among which eternally existing beings, animal itself and the Demiurgin are

included;

for each of these always is. Eternity likewise, which is the first thing

that always is, and the one bring itself, which is eternal being according to cause,

are in the number of eternally exiting beings. IS ow, however, he culls animal

Nell the paradigm of the world considered as living. Fur perpetual bangvas the

jwadivm ofJuorJcr/y pncratiun ; sinctfrom thence, forms without distinction, uere

patent with the disorderly nature, priorto tht generation of

the universe.

we should assume animal itself, whirl, has the forms of the elements, tins also is

l .e paradigm of the vestiges of the elements. So far, however, as it is animal, il

* the paradigmof this universe now possessing

life. So that simply considered,

animal itself, and the mt.-llig.ble paradigmare not the same. For eternity like

u ise w hich always exis.N is theparadigm of time, but is not an intelligibleanimal ;

since not eu ry paradigmis an animal belonging to the intelligible order.

animal itself is eternal, eternity is priorto it, which is not an animal. 1-or pno

to animal itself, there is no other animal ;since neither prior

to any other of tl.os

thills to which we apply the term itself,is there a certain-form prior

to 1 1. As 1 n-

fore "eternityis prior

to animal itself, not being yet an animal, so likewise, being i

is prior to Jternitv. Hence also eternity is that which is being, and is a certain

Mn-.Animal itself therefore, is the third intelligible triad, concerning winch

the [ChaMean] Oracles say,It is the operator,

and the giverof life- bearing fire

11 fills the vivinc bosom of Hecate/ and pours on the Synochesthe fertile strength

& i

-

fire end.ied with mighty power."For all these assertions in no respect

differ

from saying that all-perfect intelligibleanimal is the fountain of all Intel

For ?<o TI her, it isnefes>ary

to read <a rrtro.

1

For ttuorrn here, read E<ar>ji.



BOOK ii.]TIM;i:t S OF PLATO. :jo,5

life, and the cause of every paradigmatic iiyparxis. And thus uuicli concerning

this particular.

\\ith respect to the words of the text,"

to constitute in the similituilft

nmanifests

that the universe is in tlie highest decree assimilated to its paradigm. For not

every image is constituled in similitude, but that alone \vhich isperfectly similar;

since this is not the case, where dissimilitude predominates. For then similitude

is not the end. But the words,"

theCdnstittttittg artificer constituted," clearly de

monstrate to us, that the Demiurgus of the universe makes by his very being,

and possesses energy essentially. For Plato docs not call him in one way, and

the effective energy proceeding from him in another, hut he calls both by one

name. Farther still, the words likewise appear to signify, that the Demiurgusj

always produces, and that he always produces j>erfectly.For the word cnn.siitu-

ting, manifests an ever-present making; but the word constituted, anall-j>erfect

making, and which is suspended from its cause. But by the conjunction of both

these expression*, it is very manifest that tin 1 maker of the universe generates

eternally allthings,

his productive energy neither commencing, nor ending at

a certain time.

* We must not therefore assert, that lie thought it would be adequate

to its dignity, to assimilate it to any one of the animals which naturally

exist, in the form of apart.

For that which is similar to animperfect

thing, can never at any time become beautiful."

As there are many intelligible animals, some of which are more total, but others

more partial, some of which are united, but others divided, and some are

defined according to bound, but others according to infinity ;Plato inquiring

what the all-perfect paradigm of the universe is, and from what intelligible animal

the world is

suspended,thinks that no

partialanimal

oughtto be

placedin this

order. For each of these is imperfect as with reference to the whole. For it is

possible for the imperfect to be so called in a twofold respect, either with refer

ence to its own nature, or with reference to that which is better and more causal.

And the former indeed, it is not even lawful to conceive of divine natures. For

each has the measure of itselfeternally, and its own proper good always exerted.

For, as Socrates says in the Republic, each of them is most excellent in its own

It is obviously necessary m this place, to supply the words, rwr it

35<iJ ROCLL S ON THE [BOOK n

order. But the latter ranks, as it is said, among the things that are usual. For a^

in the Banquet, Plato calls that which is riot primarily beautiful, but participates

ofleauty, indigent of beauty, thus also he calls that an imperfect animal which i-,

not the first animal, nor animal itself, but is such by participation, and subMsts

according to a progression from that which is lirst. If therefore, every partial

animal is imperfect, but the paradigm of the world isall-perfect, the paradigm of

the world will not Iw a partial animal. For whether docs the Demiur;us intellec

tually j>erceivethis all-perfect and lirst animal, or not ? It is impossible indeed,

that lie should not intellectually perceive those things which we perceive when our

>oul t-nergi/es intellectually. But if he thus sees it, and all intellectual perception

of the Dcmiurgus is production or making, it is necessary that he should make

by intellectual perception itself. A\ hat therefore can he make more divine than

the universe ? .For he will not make any thing of a less excellent nature, v.hen

looking to I hat which is more excellent. Very properly therefore, does Plato

when investigating the paradigmatic principle of the world, recur to all-perfect

animal.

What then, some one may say, are not the sun and moon and each of the stars

(cautiful ? But how is this possible ? For each of these is assimilated to a partial

animal. To this we reply, that each of these is beautiful, when surveyed in con

junction with the whole, and co-arranged with the whole: just as the eye and the

chin are beautiful, in conjunction with the whole face, and while in the whole;

but surveyed by them.-elves apart from the face, do not exhibit the beauty which

is adapted to them. For in subsisting as a part and not as a whole, each when

essentially divnlsed from the whole, sutlers a diminution of its own proper beauty.

The. perfect therefore, and the beautiful are present \\ith these which are parts, on

account of the whole. The cause, however, of this, says Porphyry is, that in

intelligible forms the part is a whole.1

For all such things are in each partially,

as are in the whole ail-perfectly, on account of the union of intelligible forms.

Andthe assertion is indeed true, that each of the

parts

in them is in a certain

respect a whole, each rccei \inir the form of whole, and becoming essentially

united on account of its communicating with all, andl>eing

all things according

to participation. Neverthclos the wholeness of it subsists partially, and not.

like that wholeness which is simply a whole. For it is one thing to be alter ;i

solar manner a whole, or to be so after a lunar manner, in consequence of each,

Iij3ii.nl of TO tXovnifivt tony,

it 15 ntctjMiry

to rtail TOf* i* t<m> .

HOOK ii.] TIM/EUS OF PLATO. ^,7

intellect possessing all things in :i way adapted to itself, one form having: dominion,

v hieh makes tlie intellect to ho sucli an intellect, and a certain intellect;and ano

ther thin-j; to he all things, without a partial peculiarity, be in-.: all thin^ so far asin-

(llect, and not so far as a particular kind of intellect. \Vhat then, are not these

also generated according to intelligible paradigms, ^i/.the sun and moon and each

of the star-? How therefore, are these beautiful? To this wo reply, that these are

beautiful, but not most beautiful. liutthe world is that which is

trulymostl>cautiful.

As therefore each of these is perfect,but not

all-perfect,so likewise each is beautiful,

but not like the universe most beautiful. For that each of these isj>erfect,

Plato

manifests farther on, when, he says,"

that thc&orlJ zcas generated perfect from

things perfect,and a vholcfrom wholes" Ilcnco the perfection of the whole is ono

tiling, and of the part another. And the wholeness of the all-perfect is diflfe.ent

from tlie wholeness of that which is only perfect. The beauty likewise which is

inthe most beautiful

is

one tiling, but that which receives a more partial partici

pation of beauty, is another. And thus much in answer to this doubt.

The words however,"

//; theform (fa part," may l>e easily understood, if they

are considered ns signifying the same as, in the order of a part.And this is tin;

same with, becoming a part. IJut the divine lamblichus thinks tit to add the

conjunction ax to the words in theform, and to understand the whole as irnphing

that e\ery partial animal in intelligible*, naturally exists as in the form of a part.

For since part in them is not such as it is in sensible* ; since each is there accord

ing to its own order all such things as the whole is; on this account the philoso

pher adds, as in l/ie farm, in ordT that surveying the appellation of part in a

manner adapted to forms, we may not understand it as a thing attended with

interval, and susceptible of division, and thus relinquish the union of united and

impartible essences. For these according to the philosopher himself are impart

ible and united. ]>ut with respect to the word "

naturally,"we must not now under

stand by it according to nature, but the being c."serialized. For all essence* are

frequently calUd natures, as by Socratis in the Philebus, tchcn he says,"

hence, in

tin: nature of Jupiter you may say, that there is u royal soul, and tt royal intellect,,

according t the reason of cause.&

But the words,"

he thought it nould headequate.

to its dignity*are $?aid as if spoken in conjunction with the Demiiirgus and a<*

truly apprehending ihedignify of a divine cause. For he who mystically narrates

theci cniptand

all-perfect intellectual conceptions ofa dirine nature, has an arrange

ment in conjunction with him. And the words, "forthat which is similar to an im-

pcijcct thing can never bebeautiful,"

is indeed true, but is attended wilh u doubt..



35a PROCLl S ON TUT. [BOOK ii.

For if in that which is a whole one thing is more, hut another loss excellent, must

not the whole become inferior to its more excellent part, by the addition of that

which i* less excellent ? 13ut the douht may be solved by observing, that the

co-arrangement of the less with the more excellent makes the whole to be one and

perfect; but when they are not conglomerated with each other, then the mixture

of the less diminishes the power of the more excellent nature. If however, some

one should make a syllogism from opposites, through what is here, and what has

Ix-en before said, so as to infer that e\ery thing which is generated according to

an eternal,is not

generated according

to an elernal

paradigm,

we may solve the

objection by observing that what is employed by the objector as the middle term,

is not so. For in one place,the words "

in order that it might be beautiful"ma

nifest that which is beautiful, whether in a certain respect,or simply; but in

another place, they manifest that which is most beautiful. For a part has

indeed the beauty of a part,but simply considered, is not beautiful. But that

alone is absolutely beautiful which is a whole, to which also Hie beauty of the

parts contributes ; this beauty pertaining to certain things,and

beingitself a cer

tain [and not a tniircrsal) thing. For eury part is for the sake of another thing, i. e.

the whole, and the beauty which it possesses has the order of matter with reference

to the lieauty of the whole. Hence it is not so beautiful as to be most beautiful.

From what has been said, those assertions likewise maybe confuted, which

make they d to be a certain intelligibleform and not prior to all intelligible*.

For if it is a certain form, it is also a part of the whole intelligible profundity in

which it subsists. But every part, as it is here said, is imperfect ; so that the good

likewise is imperfect.How therefore being imperfect is it tin- most happy of all

things? In realityalso that which is similar to it is not beautiful. Nor are all

beings similarly with reference to it, either more good, or more beautiful, ii.

therefore the good being a part,will suffer tilings of this kind, it will not be a part

of the intelligible. Moreover, neither is it the whole of the intelligible.For

being the whole of the intelligible,over what will it still reign ? Since in ither is

the sun which has an arrangement analogous to the good the whole of that

which is visible. It is necessary therefore, that the good should be beyond the

intelligible,and lie neither a part nor the whole of it. Neither therefore, will

either animal itself, or the Demiurgus be the same with the good; since each of

these is a certain whole comprehensive of all lortus.

v

For r uyuOoK here, read rayutfy.



.1 TIM/EUS OF PLATO. 3^9

"

But \vc should admit it to be the most similar of all things to that

animal of which other animals, both according to one, and according

to genera, arcparts."

Some, as Atticus, assert that this"

according to one, andaccording togenera" gives

a division to individual opposite to that of more common forms. But they call

individual forms those that areproximate, and the causes of individuals ; such

for instance as man itself, horse itself, and each of such-like forms. And they

denominate genera the more total and comprehensive paradigms of these.

Others again, as Amelias, say that Plato by these words, distinguishes that

which is particular from things that are more common. For some things are

paradigms of parts, but others of forms. Theodorus also, following Arnelius,

says there are twofold intellects, one of these being divided into wholes, but the

other into parts. And that these are the same with,

"

according to genera, and

according to one." But others, as Xenarehus, assert, that according to genera

manifests the pre-existent intelligible causes of animals; such for instance as the

celestial, aerial, aquatic and terrestrial, which are shortly after mentioned byT ima-us. And that by

"

according to one" the formali/ing principles in earh of

these many are indicated. For in celestial natures, the paradigm of the sun is

different from the paradigm of the moon. In terrestrial natures, the paradigm of

men is different from that of lions. And in a similar manner in the natures whichhave an intermediate subsistence. The divine lamblichus however, turns into a

path of interpretation contrary to all these. For they indeed make the "accord

ing to one" subordinate to, and more partial than, "accordingto genera ;"

but lie,

on the contrary, makes it to IK* more venerable, as it is tit that inintclligibles

unity should precede multitude. lie says therefore, that all other animals are

the parts of animal itsrlf, both according to one, and according to genera. For

they are comprehended and perfected by animal itself, both according to the

multitudes they contain, and according to their unities. Nor is there any one of

them which does not proceed from theintelligible. For

intelligible animal it com

prehensive of all the things posterior to it, not as deriving its completion from them.

For it is a u-ho/c prior to, and doc* not derive its subsistencefrom parts. Nor is it

a whole, as being predicated of parts ; for it is the cause of the many. But it is

Intelligible animal, or animal itself, is a whole prior to parU, because it comprehends parts in

itself cautally.

PKOCLUS ON TUF.

a whole, as a primordial principle,and as filling all things posterior to itself with

itself. Hence it

comprehendswhat are called

parts impartiMy, many species

uniformly, and exists in an all-perfect manner prior to secondary paradigm*

For this principle indeed, is the universe intelligibly ; hut of the natures posterior

to it, one is all things celestially, another alter a solar, another after a terrestrial

manner, and another in some other way, according to the different cause* of

mundane natures. So that this principle comprehends all things ail-perfectly,

hut all things are comprehended hy each of the natures posterior to it pailially,

as with reference to theintelligible

allncss. The world therefor*,

is also >imilar

to these partial animals ;since it is likewise similar to the Deminrgus ;

hut it is

most similar to animal itself, so far as it is an animal. For animal itself was

primarily intelligible animal. Hence, that which is most similar is so in a two

fold respect ; either because it H similar to oilier things, or because other things

are similar to it. Hut this is esjwcially the case- \\ith the universe, and it is espe

cially similar to animal itself.

"

For this indeed, has allintelligible

annuals comprehended in itself,

just as this world contains us, and such other animals as are the objocts

ofsight."

Plotinns supposes animal itself to exist in a twofold respect. For at one time

he considers it to be more excellent than intellect, as in his treatise infilled

Different Considerations, but at another,a<

inferior to it, as in his treatise Concern

ing Numbers, when he sa)s that being is first, afterwards intellect, and afterwards

animal itself. But Theodoras, who says, that each of the demiurgi has atriple

1

hyparxis, thinks fit to call the third in each, animal itself. From both, however,

the truth may be assumed. From the admirable Theodorus indeed, that il has

flu- third order in intelligible* ;but from the mo.st di\ine JMotinns, that it is

inferior to one intellect, but beyond another. And it must be said, that unfold

ing it-elf into light at the end of intelligibles, it generates from intelligible life all

the number of intellectual,sup<

rmnndane, and mundane animals, stipernally as

fir as to the last of things. It is likeui.se conipnheiiM\e of all things, being ex

empt from, and uniformly and antecedently containing in itself the causes of them.

For Orpheus also indicates things of this kind about it, when theologi/ing

1

I or rpir/jj- hrrr, it is ntc< usan to n-Jil rmT\i/i.

DOOKii.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO.

3fil

concerning Phanes. The first God therefore, with him, has the heads of manyanimals, viz. of a ram, ahull, a serpent, and a fierce lion.

1 He also proceedsfrom the primogcnial egg, in which the animal exists

spermatically ; and Plato

knowing this calls this mighty God animal itself. Tor what difference is there

U twern calling an occult cause anegir, or that which is unfolded into

light from

it, an animal ? For what can l>e generated from the egg of all things, hut an

animal ? This egg however, was the offspring of ether and chaos, the former of

which is established conformably to the bound, but the latter to theinfinity of

intelligibles. For the former is the root of all things, but the latter has not any

boundary. If therefore that which first consists of bound andinfinity is that

which is primarily l>eing, the being of Plato will be the same with the Orphic

egg. And if Plianes is from this, who is arranged according to animal itself, it

is necessary to investigate it as situated next to eternity according to Orpheus,

which is a medium between animal itself, and that which is

primarily being.And thus it will be more clearly evident, that animal itself is no other than the

Plianes of the theologist. For if Phanes first proceeds from the egg, which is

manifestly with Orpheus the firstintelligible intellect, but that which first and alone

proceeds from an egg, is necessarily nothing else than an animal, it is evi

dent that the most mighty Phanes is nothing else than the first animal; and,

as Plato would say, animalitself. This therefore is demonstrated.

Let ushowever,

in the nextplace, survey

what is

consequentto this.

Phanes,therefore, thus unfolding himself into light from the occult Gods, antecedently

comprehends in himself the causes of the secondary orders, viz. of the effective,

connective, perfective, and immutable orders; and also contains in himself

according to one cause, all intelligible animals. For he excites himself to the

most total ideas of all things. Hence also, lie is said [by Orpheus] to be tl.c first

of the Gods, and to have a form. But he produces all things, and unfolds the

intelligible and united causes of things, to the intellectual Gods. Hence too,

the Demiurgus being filled from these causes, gives subsistence to this visible

1 This M anOr)>hic line, which M not noticed cither by Gesner or Hermann in their collodion of

Orphic fragments. It is however in theprinle<l original in a defective Mate: for it is, *m mi

raepiovi <xpiai, ^apo^nv rt \tot-Toi. Hut from Escheubach, who quote* it from a manuscript, it may be

amended as follows: xpw *n ravpov, oyxoi, ^.-ipox-ovre Afocroi.

*It is here necessary to supply the words row yw OITOJ.

1 For tivttfitfHf in ibis place, it u obviouily necessary to read qrw/itra, in order to agree with ona.

Tun. Plat. VOL. I. 2 Z



302 PKOCLITS ON THE [BOOK n.

world, and cause* it to contain nil sensible animals, both KUC!I as ore more divino,

nnd Hiich us an* mortal, which are prosily Osiauara1

thrtimnuta, or tiling* \cltkk

m-c nourished, us entirely participatingof the nutritive soul. All bodies likewise,

may properlybe railed O

e (

u(uTM, us U- rng the progeny of nature, and as always

living from, and being connected by it, even though they should bo perpetual

bod it*; but not as requiring externally adventitious nutriment.. Unless indeed,

it be requisiteto call all thiu-s in the world ^f/x/Ar, as b. inij nourished by Un

king of visible natures through the communication flight. I or Socniten iit lh

Hepublie*avN, that the HUH is the eau-e of nutriment and generation to all micll

tilings as he illuminate*. I- or every visible thin- i> nourinhed U-iui; perfected by

li-^ht. I- or as we learn in the INditieus, it i* poN.sible

to !H> nourishvd e.xteimdly,

and not only internally. The Peiii mr^us tin -r Ime, eompiehend.s all that the

world contains, in order that this hen>ible worhl may IK- till and perfi-clfrom the

parts that arc* in it, conformably to u similitude to him. Hence, this world is a

various animal, according to a different part of itself emitting a dillerent \oice,

and from all its parts one voice. For it is al>o one, [as well as many]. 13 y u

much greater priority however, the intelligible world is one animal and a multitude

[of animals], contracting multitude in the one, just as this visible world also,

exhibits the one in multitude. Ami the latter indeed, is a whole from parts ;but

the former is a whole prior to parts, exempt I v, uniformly, and according to cause,

comprehending intelligible animals. For from it the fountains of divine, natures,

and all the most total genera proceed. JIciicc tilm, the tficdnifi^t n-jirc.H.-iilA it as a

most total animal; surroumls.it U it/i the heads of a ram, a hull, a //*///, ami a Jragun ;

and ascribes to it primarilythefemale and the mak, as to the first animal.

Female ami fatlier, strong ami miglil) Goil,

Ericapaeus,

1

hays the theologist. He is likewise the first Cod that is represented with wings.

And what occasion is there to be prolix? For if lie has his progression from the

primogenial egg, this falile manifests that lie is the first animal, if it is fit to pre-

>crve the analogy. For as the eggJ

antecedently comprehends the spermatic

1 The word used by Pl.ito here for animals.

1

In the origiual erroneously r/pi/*e irpoi.

1 For ro ox here, it is necessary to read TO *or.



BOOK n.] TIM/EUS OF PLATO. 3^3

cause of the animal, thus also llic occult order, uniformly comprehends the

whole of tin; intelligible.And as the animal now possesses in a distributed

manner, such things as were in the egg spennatically, thus likewise this (iod

produces into a visible subsistence that which is ineffable and incomprehensible

in first causes. Concerning these things however, what has now been said may

suflicc tor the present.

If however, as this world comprehends in itself all \isible natures, so its para

digm comprehends all intelligible*,and the mode of comprehension, as we have

said, is different in each, yet at the same time the visible in the former is analogous

to that of the latter. .For Phanes supernally illuminating intelligibles with intel

ligible light, causes all of them to be visible, and exhibits all things [in the intel

ligible] generated from invisible causes; and the world imparts visibility to bodies

through the light of the stars. Farther still, this also may IK- con>idered as

admirable in the doctrine of J*lato, that at tin; same time that he preserves the

union of intelligible* unshaken, In; imparts to them an unminglcd purity. I "or if

all of them were so united to each other as to be confused, and so as not to

permit the peculiarity of each to remain undeiiled, there would ha\e l>een no

occasion to enquire, according to what kind of paradigm the universe was gene

rated. For in things confused there is no distinction of quality. Andifthe.se

were so divided from each other as to IK; without any communion, some intel

ligibles would not comprehend, but others be comprehended. For to comprehend

and l>e comprehended pertain to order and communion of power*, and to the

rapid conspiration of all secondary natures to become one. .Moreover, for the

union of them to subsist from essence, but their separation to be rendered appa

rent from externally proceeding energies, will be the peculiarity of incorporeal

and immaterial effects*. For if they are surveyed, themselves by themselves, all

will U> found to IK- in each other, on account of their IKing, as it were, of the

same colour, and especially if the unities of them are seen with the eye of intel

lect. But from secondary natures, and from theirparticipants, we collect their

unconfused union. For whence is the separation of these derived, except from

the unmingled purity of their, efficient causes? For things which are confused

with each other, give subsistence to other such-like natures, [i.

e. to natures which

are similarly confused.]

1

i.e. The firt Iriail of ihf iiitclliciW^ order, wliicli i called ly Plato in llic Parmfni Jc* r r.1,

throne bring, or bring characterisedl

ami .ilisorlKtJ il were in Ihr our.



364 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK u.

"For the divinity wishing to assimilate this universe, in the most exqui

site

degree,

to that which is the most beautiful, and in every respect per

fect of intelligible animals, he constituted it one visible animal, contain

ing all such thingswithin itself, as are allied to its nature."

Atticus, in \vliat is here said, doubts whether the Demiurgus is comprehended

l)\ intelligible animal. For it would seem, if he were comprehended, that he is

ni.t perfect.For partial animals, he says, are imperfect,

and on this account

tilings

which resemble them are not beautiful. But if he is not comprehended,

animal it-elf will not be more comprehensive than all intelligible*. And having

doubted, he easily solves the doubt, by supposing that the Demiurgus is above

animal itself. On the contrary, Porphyry gives an order ,to the Demiurgus infe

rior to the intelligible. For establishing a supercelestialsoul to he the maker of

llie world, he places in intellect the paradigm of generated natures. The divine

lamblichus, as a medium between both these, connects and unites the paradigm to

the Demiur-us, throughthe union of intellect \\ith the intelligible. But Amelius

makes the intelli-ible, which is defined according to being, to be the same with the

Denmir-us.1 We however say, that animal itself is prior to, subsists in, and is

posteriorto the Demiurgus. For it proceeds to every intellectual order both total

and partial.The 1), miurgus himself likewise, sees himself, and the natures prior

to himself: for it is not lawful for him to look to natures posteriorto himself.

Beholding therefore, these superior natures, he produces all things, and makes the

ijnherse, so far asit is

the universe,or the at!, to IK- the ima-e of the whole intelli

gible world. The Demiurgus however, is comprehended by the intelligible, accord-

Hi- to the cauM- of the intellectual Gods which there subsist ;not as being a part,

or oue vpeciesof it

;but as a second order in the order which is prior

to it. For a

divine intellect is in one way said to be comprehensive of forms, and in another

way to comprehend partialintellects. For each of the latter indeed, is all things

in a>elf-|M-ilect

manner; but each of the former is united to olher forms,1

but H

not all things. Fur each is itself presen ing its own peculiarity, unmingledand

uuconfused. According to the same reasoning also, the intelligible*which are in

intelligible intellect, are comprehended by it in one way, but in another way the

iiin-ll.-ctual orders which proceed from it. For you may say, that each of llu-e

For TfixvTovtri.tLvaycvintliij

jl.ice, it is necessary to read ry f

n> rti ^..o.-oyy.

1

YOT ru uVVw* tiv m litre, rmt! roif nXXfcii titcro-.



HOOK n.J TIM.tL S OF PLATO.

l>eing self-perfect, is comprehended in all-perfect animal. All such things there

fore, as are in the paradigm, are likewise in the Demiurgus; and in making the

world with reference to the paradigm, lie also makes it with reference to himself.

Withresj>ect

to allncss (;ravr&rr,cy however, one isintelligible, but another intellec

tual. For both the tetrad and the decad contain all things in themselves; but the

former unitedly, and the latter distributedly. The decad likewise, though it con

tains all such things as the tetrad contains, yet because it contains them in a more

divided manner, it is metre imperfect than the tetrad. For the tetrad being nearer

to the monad is more perfect ;and in proportion as

quantity is diminished, the

magnitude of power is increased. ,So that the Demiurgus possessing all Mich

things as intelligible animal possesses, yet at the same time, he has an allncss

inferior to that, which is intelligible. In short, as comprehension is twofold, the out

being such as that ofparts in their wholeness, Lut the otlier, as tJial of effects in their

causes, Plato now assumes the former of these, and says, that the genera and

sjx.-ciesof animals, are comprehended as parts in their whole, i. e. in animal itself;

all which likewise, he denominates imperfect, as with reference to the whole. But

the Demiurgus indeed, proceeds from thence as from a cause, yet he likewise

possesses all things intellectually. The Demiurgus therefore, is comprehended

by intelligible animal according to the reason of cause, and is not so compre

hended as a part, so as to U- also imperfect. Hence likewise, Timicus in a cer

tain respect thus speaks. For the Demiurgus has nil intelligible animals compre

hended in himself. For in reality, these are contained in him as parts, which

remain in unproceeding union with their proper wholeness, and give completion

to it, as a whole which is notprior to parts, but is from parts. And thus much

in answer to the doubt.

In the next place, this also deserves to be surveyed, vi/. in what an admirable

manner Plato, at one time in a way known to us, passes from images to para

digms, and at another time, from paradigms to images; at one and the same time

indicating the connexion of things, and their progressions and conversions. For

when he says, that as this world comprehends us, thus also animal itself comprehends

intelligible animals, he recurs from sensible animals to the causes of them. But

when he says, thatdivinity wishing to assimilate the world to the most beautiful

of intelligibles, rendered itcomprehensive of all things,

he is willing to pass from

causes to their effects, imitating the progression of secondary natures. He is leJ

however, to such a transition as this,

through analogy.For as effects are to each

other, so are the paradigms of them. And the more total and the morepartial,

300 PKOCMJS ON THE[BOOK i,.

subsist in both according to the same ratio. Why however, does he call animal itself

the most beautiful ofintelligible.*, though it is the end of

intelligible* ? May we not

say,that

thoughthere are

intelligibleorders

priorto

it, yetthe

most beautiful is

inferior to them ? For they do not participateof beauty ;

but the producing cause

ofl>eauty,

and the first beauty and elegance subsi>t in them. Hence also animal

itself is according to Orplieus, intellectually unfolded into li^lit in this order. And

a* U-auty had a prior existence in ihe first intelligible*, unitedly and \\ithout inter

mission, hence Phanes is called by Orpheus, "the very beautiful son ofether,"

and "

delicate lx)ve." Because therefore, this (Jod is the first that is filled with

occult and ineffable beauty, hence ;ilv( &

IK- is denominated most beautiful, beingthe f\t>l of participants, though all intelligible-, are united to each other. For it is

not proper to di\ ide them from each olher,after the same manner as the intellectual

order*, but survey one and an indivisible union of them. These things therefore,

are le;tiililiillv asserted [by Orpheus and IMatoj.

That however, \\hichisinostsynoplical1

in the words of Plato, is this, that

lie Mays animal itself is the most beautiful, not of all intelligible* simply, but of

intelligible animals. For comparing all-perfect animal with more partial animals,

he says, it is the most l>eaiitiful of all intelligible animals;so that if there is some

thing more excellent than the nature of animal, it has nothing to do with the

present assertion, ll is necessary however, that there should be a tiling of this

kind, l>ecause being itself, ;iml U-auly itself are more simple than the nature of

animal, on which account also they are participated by things which an? not

animals. .Moreover, theinterpreters say, that the word at&iniitdtiuiiix appropriately

assumed by Plato. For he is frequently dubious concerning the mode of par

ticipation,whether it is from forms themselves being present with sensible*, or

from their communicating with them in some other way : but he is not dubious

whether or not it is similitude which makes the sensible world to IM- the image of

the intelligible. Dividing however, they say, that of physical forms indeed, the

sensible woild participates as of impressions in wax, but that it receives the

representations of psychical, and the similitudes ofintelligible forms.

1

S<> that

since Plato is speaking concerning intelligible paradigms, he very properly, as

they say, assumes similitude. Farther still, the world is an animal, as the image

1I or *vict,TiKMrcirvr Ili-rv, I H ilil ovtnrrnvraTfi.

1C oucrminx I lie HUM! in Mhicli forms ihciu -iht s an-

|i.irtiri|iatcd by icruillc>,

sec I hi- Notes toinj

tnuulittion & (lie I .inm inlf> ol I lalo.

BOOK ii.] TIM .TIL S OF PLATO. 307

of this intelligible aniiual, and of intelligible allness. But it is visible as l>eing

assimilated to the splendour of its paradigm. Tor what colour is there, that

the visible is here.

The Ciods admir d, in etlicr when thev saw

A liiiht uiilooLM lor, bunting on the view,

i roin the immortal I luiic*glittering .skin

;

[says Orpheus]. And the world comprehends all kindred natures, because it IM

comprehensive of all sensible*. But Plato adds,"

us arc allied to its nature"

because intelligible* are paradigms to the world of things which are accordingto nature, and not as some Platonists are accustomed to say, of things preterna

tural. .For in short, mundane things leing divided into such as are according to na

ture, and such as are preternatural, into universal* and particulars, and into

essences andaccidents,

wealways

admit that there areformal causes of the more,

but by no means of the less excellent. For that which is produced from ideas,

proceeds through nature. But if tins is the case with that \\hich is according to

nature, but not with that \\hich is preternatural, that which is generated from

ideas is a certain whole., and is perpelual. For if this is not admitted, one of two

things must take place, either that things contingent will have no existence, or

that of forms some \\ill necessarily produce, but it will happen that others may

either produce or not produce. And in the third place, every thing which proceeds from ideas is essence. For since they produce by their very Ix iu^;, each is

productive of essences. For it would be ridiculous to say that a partial nature is

elective of essence, but thatintelligible form gives subsistence to accident.

1

These things however, we shall elsewhere more copiously discuss. But what

ever the world contains is allied to it, because all things in it subsist according to

intelligible causes. Plato likewiseapju-ars in this place to have given a definition

of the world, vi/. ";/r visible annual, comprehending in itself all animals." For

intelligible animal also is one, but is not visible. And the sun, and each of the

monadic natures, [or those natures of which there is only one,] is one visible

animal, but docs not comprehend all others. So that it is evident that the

above is the definition of the universe. Let us however proceed to the word*

of Plato.

1

For TO orciTorriX/le

in this

place,it is

necessaryto read

ry fttv airfffriA/k.1koi <Ti

/i ( >/>!jkorrjj trot nroirramo* , readffv/ /3f/3i|i;oro >( vroTraruor.

" Whetlier therefore, shall we assert that there is one world, or is it

more ri^ht to say that there arc many and infiniteworlds?"

This problem follows indeed logo;raphieallywhat has just now *

liceii said.

For because he had defined the world to be one visible animal, comprehending

within itself all such animals as are naturally allied to it, it is necessary that he-

should think this to be worthy his attention and discussion, whether the world

i one certain tiling, or not. For of physiologists,some make the world to be

one; but others asert that thereare

many worlds;and others contend that

there are not only many, but also infinite worlds. The consideration of this

likewise, has a connection with what has Ixxm before said, derived from the things

themselves. For since it has been shown that the world is the image of animal

it.M-lf, and is an animated animal, endued with intellect, it was requisite to add

a Mimmit to the discussion of it, by showing that it is also one. For thus he will

demonstrate that it is a God, in consequence of participating a unity which is

above intellect. For it was not only possible for him to say thatit is

an image

Iwcause other things also are images, some being fashioned by nature, but others

bv art. Nor an animal alone, because there is a multitude of partial animals.

Nor alone animated; for man likewise is an image, and an animated animal.

Nor alone endued with intellect; for both a iknnon and an angel are animated

animals possessingintellect, lint this which especially and primarily pertains

to divine natures, he before sulleivd to l>e ineflable, through the cause which we

have already assigned. Now, however, he adds the one, and the nl<nie.

For

,-very thing which is monadic in the world is divine, as being an image, if it U>

l.iwful so to speak of the one. But I denominate duine, that which is such as the

angelic, as the demoniacal, and as that which is in partial souls. For ea< h of

tht-ise is divine, so far as it is suspended from its proper deity, and each of these is

monadic. Such monadic natures however, as have generation and corruption,

and are expelledinto the mortal abode, are opposed to every thing dnine.

Hence this problem is suspended from what has been before said. For since the

paradigmof the universe is indeed a <Jod,

and is intelligible, is the supplier of

life, and is also intellect ;according to that which is divine in him, he makes the

world to be one; according to the one and the intelligible, he causes it to he

.sensible; but according to the one, the intelligible, and life, he makes it lo be

For ra X>K here, read ra



r,ooK ii.] TIMJEUS OF PLATO. 309

animated and an animal ; and according to all these and intellect, he causes it to

he endued with intellect. For union accedes prior to othertilings, and posterior

to other things. Animal cnergi/es prior to, and in conjunction with other

things. And the giltof life generates and proceeds together with, and prior

to intellect.

From what however is now shown, and from what has been l>efore demon

strated, you may assume, that at flu; same time, the paradigm of the universe is

unical, and the \\hole multitude of intelligibles. And neither is the simplicity of

i; without multitude, nor the multitude of it divided;hut it has the all-various at

once consubsistent with the one, the monadic with theall-perfect,

and the uniform

wiMi the multiform. For because it proceeds indeed from the good it is united.

But because it pre-establishes in itself the order ofintelligible ideas, it is alj-

perfect. And as infinite, it unfolds the multitude of intelligible^ ;but as contained

by bound, it is only begotten. As proceeding likewise from being characterized

by unity, it has the relation of a monad ; but as being the third from it, it produces

in itself all theintelligible Gods, and on this account is demonstrated to l>e all-

perfect.These things, however, we shall more fully unfold as we proceed.

But there is a controversy with the interpreters about the text. For to some

of them itappears that two things are now distinguished by Plato, the one, and

all multitude. And the word whether being applied by the ancients to two things,

seems totestify in fa\ or of their opinion. But to others, it appears that there

is a division into three things, the one, finite multitude, and the infinite.And lh

patron* of this interpretation are Porphyry and lamhlichus, who .speak conforma

bly both to the things themselves and to the doctrine of Plato. For shortly

after he takes away two things, but assumes one thing from division. But from

three things, an ablation of two and the position of one is effected, and not from

two things alone. Nevertheless the word whether seems to contradict what

they

assert. It

maybe remedied however

by sayingthat cither whether

signifiesthe same as shall we therefore ; (rto ap o-jv TO irorcpw trr^ouvuv TO.-JTOV) for it is

frequently thus assumed by the ancients; or that the words, or not(r, ov)

are

wanting to the sentence; and that it will l>e perfect by reading, whether do we

rightly assert thai there is one world, or not ? And if not, whether there arc many, or

infinite worlds ? Plato omitting to"say

this through conciseness. Perhaps too:

you may say, it is not without design that he omitted the words muck vn& finite.

For wpnTtfwy hfrt, read worrpo-.

Tim. fiat. VOL. I. J A

370PHOCLUSONTHE [BOOK u.

For to say how many, or *o many, is to speak in a way that gives completion to

what is said. And as if the paradigm is not monadic, HO as to be the cause of

our thin",the things generated are infinite

;after tliis manner it is probable that

there are infinite worlds, if there is not only one. For the- vacuum l>emg infinite,

\vill \te the recipientof intinite worlds.

" One [i. e. tliero will be hut one world,] if it be admitted that it is

fabricated according to theparadigm."

A:;ain Plato in concord with himself, announces the whole of the conclusion

prior to the demonstrations, previously to hclief, dissolving the doubt. For the

word one is uttered analogously to, // was guicraUd,and to he MIS good,

* and the

demonstration on account of it, is conformable to the proper method. For it is

himself who doubts, himself who dissolves the doubts, ami himself who demon

strates. Through the doubt, indeed, converting himself to intellect; but through

the concise solution of the doubt, energi/ing according to intellect. For to com

prehend the whole of a sentence in one word, is an linage of intellectual projec

tion. And through the demonstration descending from intellect to dianoia.

For everyone who demonstrates, receives the principlesof his demonstration

from intellect. Hut it is intellect, sa\s Aristotle, by which we know terms; for

through this we apprehend [true] lieiin;s by simple projection*. Such therefore

throughout is the form of ihe words.

Let us, however, if&

on think (it, in the first place, svllogistieally survey the truth

of the words themselves. The whole sentence, therefore, is of the following kind.

If the world was gem rated according to a paradigm, and the paradigm is one,

then the world is one.1

Hut the antecedent is true, and therefore (he consequent

also is true. That the world, however, was generated according to a paradigm,

was asserted before, and was mentioned both by I lato and us. Hut thai the

paradigmis

one and monadic,I lato asserts as he

proceeds. The assumptiontherefore beini; true, it remains to see how (hat which follows from it is true.

He says then that if the world imitates especially and accurately the para

digm, it ought to imitate it in all things, and ought to resemble the essence

of it. For if it imitates the paradigm in sonic things, and not in others,

Iiiotc.til of ro ayuOoi v v i" I pla *, it isr<-f|ui~ilc

to rr.ul TU u^ufoi r;>-.

1

I lie *\rif!s oKDirftti apa i> mri>

,arr oiniltcd in the original,

Imt evidently ouybt to be insetted.



BOOK ii.] TiMJEUS OF PLATO. 371

it will not be the iinare of a certain whole. Tor the paradigm making

by its very be-in-, it makes a certain ima^c of the whole of itself. But this

beini; the case that which is generated with reference or according to the

whole paradigm itself, is monadic, is perpetual, and is an animal. For as he

who imitates the whole of Socrates expresses the whole of his life, after the same

manner, the world beinir fashioned in the resemblance of animal itself, imitates

all things in it, so far as it is naturally adapted to such an imitation; possessing

all things sensibly which animal il>elf possees intelligibly.

Some however oppose what is- here said, by adducing the ni illiiude of men and

o! horses, lor man itself is the cause of many men, horse itself of many horses,

and this is the ease with e\ery other form or idea of the like kind. Hut if some

one should say, that these because they are parts of other things, are on this

account monadic, the objector will not cease adducing tons the sun and the

moon, and all the partof the world which are monadic. Hence moreprofound

solutions of the objection are requisite. The philosopher Porphyry therefore

slri\ in.; lo solve the dilliculty, says, that forms as they proceed, always descend

into multitude and division, and pass into bulk, and an all-various distribution

into parts. Hence an intelligible essence, proceeding into the world, terminates

in a divided, ;rross, and material multitude, though on liinh it is united, impar

tible, and monadic. To every tiling, tin refore, which is intelligible, nothing else

impartsthe

whole,for the

intelligibleitself nives subsistence to it. Hence it

constitutes it as jjreat as it is able to become. But this universe supplies man

itself with matter. And on this account the matter of one form receives many

impressions of that form. The world, therefore, is one from one [paradigm], JUid

a whole from a whole. But man is numerous from one form, the world supply

ing the matter of it. Why, therefore, says he, are there not many suns and

moons. Tor the matter of these is from I he universe. To this he replies, that to

incorruptible natures in the world, though they may be parts, the monadicis

appropriate; but to corruptible natures, multitude. For if there, were not many

participants of the same reason [or form] but only one corruptible participant, the

form would perish, this bein^ corrupted. It is necessary, however, that all [mate

rial] forms peri.shin:;,the lull perfection of the world should still remain. Such

therefore is the solution of Porphyry.

The divine I amhliehus how c\er reprobates this solution, as dissolving no one

of the doubts. For let, says he, the whole sensible world possess impartible

natures partibly, indivisibles divisibly,and monadic natures multitudinously, yet

PROCLUS ON "THE [BOOK n.

why do some tilingsin it still remain monadic, but others not ? For this is what

was dubious from the beginning. He therefore adduces a certain solution of the

doubt, which is indeed admirable yet is in want of assistance. For he says that

of forms some rejoice in sameness and|>eriir.ineii<:y,

but others in motion and dif

ference And that some, indeed, are the. causes of monadic and perpetual natures,

but others of such as are mutable, and multitudinous. And this indeed is very

admirably asserted, but requiresa certain admonition, which it is necessary to

make, by considering that after the one two principles proceed, bound and infinity,

as Socrates asserts in the Phih.-bus. And as of numbers, some are more monadic

but others are dyadic, though all numbers derive their subsistence from the monad

and at the same time from the. duad, thus likewise, though all forms subsist accor

ding to these two principle, yetat the same time some are the progeny of bound,

but others of infinity.And what occasion is tin-re to speak of forms; since of

the Gods themselves, some belong to the co-ordination of bound, but others to

that of infinity, both according to tluir whole orders and according to parts ?

According to total orders indeed, because every paternal, connective, and

demiurgic series is defined according to bound;

but every vivilic and effect

ive series, according to infinity,lint according tu

part>,because of the pater

nal and of the vivilic series, some belong to the order of bound, but others to that

of infinity. If, therefore, this is the case with the Gods, why is it wonderful that

of forms some are more than others allied to bound, but others to infinity ? And

according to this analogy some forms give subsistence to monadic tilings, but

others to those that proceed into multitude. After this manner, therefore, it is

requisitetu assist this solution.

Our preceptor, however, dissolves this doubt after another manner, multifarious-

U. He says, therefore, that every intelligiblenature is uniform and eternal, but

that of mundane tilings, some are able to be more, and others less assimilated

to the essences of intelligibles.For such things as are more immaterial and pure,

are capable of being assimilated in a greater, but such things as are more material

and TOSS, in a less degree. As all paradigms therefore subsist in monadic and

eternal essences, the more excellent natures in the universe especially imitating

the causes of themselves, are generated in all things most similar to their para

digms, viz. according to the monadic, the essential, and the perpetual ;but the

less excellent, being allotted a secondary form of similitude, are in a certain re-

s-pect assimilated to their causes, and in a certain respect not. Hence, as there

are these three things in intelligible forms, viz. the monadic, the essential, and the

eternal, whether do mundane natures imitate the monadic and perpetual peculi-



BOOK...] TIM/EUS OF PLATO 373

arity of intelligible?, but not the essential? By no means. 1 For it has been de

monstrated that it is requisite thetilings

which proceed from them should be

essences, since they produce by their very being. Will mundane natures there

fore be imitations of them according to the monadic and the essential, but not

according to the eternal ? This however is impossible. For each of them will

peri.-h ; being monadic indeed, but not perpetual. For because not perpetual,

it \\i\\ vanish into non-entity ;but in consequence of being monadic, there will

not bo that fiom which it may be generated. Besides, every thing which subsist*

from immoveable causes, is immutable in essence. But forms are immoveable, for

they are intelligible. Either therefore it is possible for all things to imitate them

in all things, or in certain things. But it is impossible for all things to imitate

them in all things. For the natures which are more remote from their principles

are in a less degree assimilated to them. Just as with respect to Pythagoras, who

possessesall

sciences,he who is nearer to

him,receives all his

knowledgesecon

darily, but he who is more remote from him, learns some of his sciences, but is

unadapted to the reception of others. If it is impossible therefore, for all things

to imitate them in every respect, it remains that this must be effected by them in

certain things. And if in certain things as there are three peculiarities which are

characteristic ofintelligible forms,

1either imitating the extremes, they become

destitute of the middle, or receiving the two first, they will appear to have re

linquished the third, or not partaking of the first, they will participate of the twowhich are posterior to it. It has however been shown, that neither the first nor

second is true. 1fence it is necessary that they should not express the monadic pecu

liarity offarms, but only the essential and (he eternal. On this account all mundane

forms imkcd arc essence?, and arc alu-ays invariably the same, but alli>J

them arc not

monadic. For all mundane forms do not subsist commensurately to alt the

powers of their paradigms. But that every intelligible form, and whole paradig

matic cause having a primary subsistence, is monadic, eternal, and essential, is

evident. For whatever is not essence, will be an accident. Every accident,

however, subsists about matter, and is conversant with things which are in matter,

but not with those which are in separate causes. If likewise an intelligible form

is not eternal, neither will the image of it be perpetual. Ii is necessary however

that it should, if the world always consists of all forms. But the principle perish-

Instead of ro c ov?twct of, va^w> ;iu this

place,

it ii

necessary

to read TO e evti^n cv,

I fa/uwi;

1Viz. the monadic, the escnlial, and the eternal.

3?41 ROCLUS ON THE [BOOK 11.

iii, that which in derived from it ran by no possible contrivance be preserved.

Am! if an intelligibleform is not monadic, it will be no longer primarily a para

digm. For it is impossiblefor any tiling to be two tilings primarily, as Socrates

savs in the Republic.I or whence is allness derived to these mundane forms,

evcept from one certain common form ? These three things therefore are present

^ith all first paradigms.And it seems that the monadic is present with them

from bound, the perpetualfrom infinity,

and the essential from the first essence.

rail her still, it is also possiblefor us after another nrumer to solve the doubt.

I or of the things contained in the world,some indeed subsist from (he lir.st fabri

cation Ti. . ihe fabiication of (he Deiniurirus] alum-; but others from the first

and also from the second [or the fabrication of the junior <iod<].Those, there

fore, that subsist from the first fabrication, are invariably the same, and are

monadic, hf.ilatin- the onlyness of their producingcause. Tor the supermun

dane fabrication is immovcable, one, and eternal. Hut things which proceed

from the second fabrication are mutable, are borne alone in multitude, ami sub

sist dillerently at different times. JW the second fabrication is multiform,makes

that which it makes with motion, and has time but not eternity eonnascent with

itself. Hence the things \vhich proceed from it are \ery mutable, and multiplied,

and entirely mo\ed. i or things \\hich proce.-d from causes that are inou-d, arc

natural! \ of this kind. Whence also 1 think the Demiur-us, ha\ in- constituted

all the monadic and perpetual natures m the world, excites the junior Gods to

the fabrication of mortal natures ; in order that these, so far as they have some-

thin- perpetual, may dense their subsistence from him, but so far as they are mor

tal, from the juniorCods. And that so far as one thin- participates

of one form

they mi-lit be constituted by him, but so far as this one is multiplied, they mi-ht

derive their subsidence from them. For the mutation and multiplication of mor

tal natures are from many causes, and such as are moved.

Auain, therefor.-, this also may be said, that the onl\ -be-otteii is threefold. Tor

it either >i-uities the monad of it-* proper series; according to which signification,

the form of man is monadic, and the form of hor>e, and every form of things ot

this kind. & )r it signifies one thin- participatedh\ one thin-, aecordint; to winch

si-nificalion man and horse are not monadic, but the form of the sun and the

form of the moon. Or it si-ni!ies that winch has no other thin- co-ordinate with

itself, according to which meaning the above-mentioned natures are no lon-er

only-begotten,since they are co-ordinate with each other but whole annual [ot

1

I orT^uy/ioT-ok

licfc, it ib utctss.irv to rt;itl irufayvrTo.

HULK ii.]TIM.KUS OF PLATO.

.-575

;iuiiii:il itsrlf] is only-begotten, in consequence of not bein^r co-ordinate with any

dlier ;iiuiii:il. A- (In1

only-begotten, therefore, lias ;i threefold subsistence, if you

assume that \\lnrh is truly only-bejrotten, it is the third, as the- cause of all

animals, having the relation of u monad to all of them, UiiiLT participated l>y

one

thinir, and not hein^ co-ordinate with any animal, hut beini; truly monadic.

This, however, being assumed, that which is conjoined \\ith it no\vnecessarily

follows. For if the paradigm is only-begotten, that also which is gnu-rated

according to it is only-begotten, imitating the only-begotten nature of the. para

digm, and nothing else besides the world is a tiling of this kind. For no other

tiling besides animal itself, is according to this signification, only-begotten.

Farther still, it is requisite to solve tin- doubt after another manner, by consider

ing as follows : J- renj form is generative r>f

one thing, and of a multitude. Of one

thing, indeed, Iwcausc it constitutes a monad similar to itself, prior In the multitude irhic/i

it produces, lint it produces multitude, because ereni monadhas a number co-ordinate

with itself. Animal itself, therefore, as a monad, constitutes the whole world.

But according to each order, it -rent rates a number analogous to the whole, and

which is able, to preserve the similitude to the universe conformably to that series.

Hence the solar paradigm, generates indeed (lie visible sun itself, but it likewise

generates a number of solar animals possessing the same form, according to u

similitude to their proper form. And of animals of this kind, some are

celestial, but others sublunary, so that such a number as this extends as far as to

the earth. Man itself, therefore, does not immediately produce this infinite multi

tude of men ; for progression is no w here without a medium;but through numbers

proximate to the monad and appropriate. Hence, since an intelligible form is

one, it is necessary that it should not immediately produce the infinite, but in the

first place a monad, afterwards an appropriate number, and so on in succession.

For between l/icintelligibleform trhich is one, end the frnxihk :r ///<;// is

multiplied, the

medium is the

form

~cliich is xeiiuhlc indeed, but monadic ;

ihnm^k proceedingbecdin-

ing ,v(//wA/V; but through preserving the similitude nf its panidigni, having n nn.iKtdic

subsistence. For it may be said to be truly absurd, that dnine, intr!lii:ible, and

immoveable causes, should not l>e primarily the causes of things essentially imi iu-

table, but of things material and mutable.* For how is it possible, that things

which are in the profundity of the universe, can be conjoined with those HMJMT-

\fnQfiov

omitlrd in tlir

original.1In the origioal

I m ruv crvXwr, & ^frn ( )Afjr.<> ;but .Na ought evidently to be expunged.



.17 &

PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK n

mundane natures ; things deprived of intelligence, with intellectuals; perfectly

mutable, with eternal natures; very composite things, with such as are simple; and

things which in their own nature are dissipated, with united essences ? It is

necessary, therefore, that man itself, and each of such-like forms, should generate

stable monads prior to a dispersed multitude ;from which the progression of

each to its appropriatenumber is derived. It is likewise necessary that these

monads should exist in the second fabrication. Hence they remain invariably

the same, as being alone produced by an immoveahle cause. You must not

wonder, therefore, sf some one should call man immortal, a brute rational, and a

plant intellectual. For each of these is primarily a thing of this kind. But pro

gression producing a diminution of the all-various imitation of the paradigm,

exhibits some things sensibles, others irrational, and others intellectual incapacity.

For as the water, which primarily proceeds from its fountain, is most similar to the

fontal water, and preserves its proper purity undefined;thus also the natures

which are first unfolded into light from intelligible forms, genuinely presenethe

hinnlitudes of their paradigms ;but as they proceed, dissolve the perfect similitude,

and are filled from their subjects with composition and inelegance.

In another way, likewise, the solution of the things investigated may be

attempted. For of fabrication the first is total, one, and impartible; the second

impartial and multiplied, and proceeds according to a distribution into parts; and

the third is not only partible like that whichprecede.-, it, but comes into contact

with generated natures, and with the form* they contain. You have also these

three fabrications in Plato, viz. the Jovian, theDioiijjsiai fll, and the Adutuiical [or

pertaining to Advnis], conformably to which he divides his threepolitics,

a,t ire have

elicit here short >t. 7 he third fabrication, thcrejoie, is the cause of wholes* and parts,

and of things which arc not monadic. The second is the cause of things which are

monadic indeed, but are not wholes. And the first is the cause of the whole and the

monadic. For such is the universe, which is not a part of any thing, as the sun

and moon are, and each of the peculiar parts of the world. If therefore Plato

had nowspoken concerning every

fabrication, it would have beenrequisite

to

annex the extensions of forms into multitude, and their divisions. But since the

present discourse is alone concerning the whole fabrication, or the fabrication

which has a total subsistence, what occasion is there to disturb ourselves, in con

sequence of not remaining in the first fabrications, which are eflected by an

1 For Ciwc her*, it i* necosary to read o\uir.

BOOKii.]

mu;us or PLATO. 3 77

immoveable and toLil cause ? For the whole Dcmiurgus is a fabricator totally and

monadtcally ; sine* 1 also producing many Gods, be produces them monaJieally.

For rncli of tin (MH!S belonging to the inerralic sphere, is constituted according

to one form;since the form of earth i.s different from that of water, and the form

oY water from that of fire; tho parts of \\hicli have a temporal generation and

corruption. Much more, therefore, do such perpetual natures as the stars, and

also partial souls, differ in form from each other. For every individual and at the

,-ame time partial nature, is material. If also partial souls produce different

peculiar lives, from exerting the reasons they contain, it is evident that they pos

sess the reasons of all things universally, and subsisting in forms alone, so that

the progressions of each of them are according to different forms. This number

too of forms must be placed in \\\r fountain of souls unically [or having a subsis

tence characterized by unity], but distributed!/ in the principle1 of souls. For bow

is it possible it should not be necessary, souls being finite, that the number of them

should pre-exist in the causes from whence they are derived ? Since even nature

comprehends the numbers of the things which she produces according to numbers.

If, however, the (jods are monadic, and souls, the genera between these, are like

wise monadic;so that each thing which the Demiurgus constitutes, is entirely

monadic. This likewise appears to be the cause of the perpetuity of the things

vhirh he produces, that each receives the whole, form of the paradigmatic cause.

Hence every thing which proceeds from the whole Demiurgus has a nature of this

kind.

If, therefore, he gives subsistence to the world, the world is one; both on

account of the demiurgic monad, and the onlyness of the paradigm ; which Plato,

as it appears to me, knowing, says,"

if it be admitted that itixfabricated according In

tlicparadigm."

For by not .saying if it was generated, but il it was fabricated, accord

ing to the paradigm, be indicates the onlynefs both of the paradigmatic and the

demiurgic cause. For the Demiurgus is a monad, and the

paradigm

also is A

monad;and therefore this universe

l>eing generated by a monad, with reference

to a monad, is monadic. Why, therefore, you may say, is he satisfied in what

follows, with the demonstration from the paradigm ? We reply, because the

i. r. In Rhgi, or tlic vivitic Goddess, considered according to In r first subsistence in the intellec

tual order of Gods.

*i. r. In Proserpine, who subset* in the sivilic triad of the super-mundane order of Gods, which

order consist* of the Gods who arc calledan\<u

or

Principle*.

See Ihe Mh and 6th Books of

myTransla

tion of Proclus on the Theology of Plato, for an account of (he deities called jcuntaint and prinnjiltt.

Tim. Plat. VOL. J. 3 C



n?8PROCLL S ON THE [BOOK it.

])aradigmis more united than the Demiurgus. For the Demiurgus himself is a

monad, through his similitude and analogy to the paradigm. This however is

evident. For among the kings, he is analogous to it;and both the Demiurgus

and the paradigm are analogous to the intelligiblemonad. 1

Hence, since the

monadic nature is from thence derived to the Demiurgus himself, what ought we

to think concerning the universe? Is it not, that it primarily possesses its only-

ne from the paradigm7 The panidiirm, therefore, is a more principal thing, for

the purpose of demonstrating the onlyness of the world. And again, you may

see, that these are three monads, viz. animal itself, the demiurgic cause, and the

universe. But the first, is an intelligible monad, the second, an intellectual

monad, and the third, a sensible monad.

" For that which comprehends all such animals as are intelligible,can

never be the second, [or co-arranged]with* any other

thing."

The necessity of these demonstrations is admirable, showing that all-perfect

animal is one and monadic,1

similar to those methods through which in the

Sophista,he demonstrates that the multitude of beings is to be referred to one

truly existing being. For if there are two principles of beings, either each of

them is primarily being, or only one of them. But it only one of them, the other

will proceed from this. And if each, it is necessary there should be another being,

from which both of these are beings. For each of these is a certain being, and

not simply being. After the same manner likewise, he now shows, that all-perfect

animal is one. So that according to all the orders of things, that which is said to

exist primarily,will be only-begotten. For being itself is primarily being, just as

animal itself is here demonstrated to be primarily animal, or only-begotten.

For how is it possiblethis should not be only-begotten? For if there is another

animal co-arranged with it, either each has all things, or one of them has all things,

but the other not, or neither of them has all things. For besides these, there are

no other consequences. If, therefore, it should be said that neither of them is all

things, each of them is imperfect.We however are speaking of that which is all-

perfect, and we investigate whence it possesses all things. For it must not be

i. e. To the summit of the intelligible order, or being itulf.

JIn the text of Produs fuff trtpov erroneously inttrad ol ^iff irepou.

* In the onginuJ if bt> KU fitvur.But for fitmf I read puvultKor.

HOOKii.] TIMJEUS OF PLATO.

.37. )

said, that the sensible universe has indeed all things

accordingto its own

order,and that the soul possesses all reasons, as is evident from the things to \vhirli it

applies itself, and from assigning to every tiling its appropriate reason;hut that

there is not a certain intelligible, which istruly comprehensive of all intelligible?

just as soul contains all things dianoetically, and the universesensibly. For

whence is allness derived tothe<e, except from

intelligible* ? If, therefore, the

intelligible is all-perfect, that will be the paradigm of the universe which is prima

rilyall. But if one of them is all

things, and the other not, these will neither be.

co-arranged with each other, nor con-numerated; but th.it which has not all thirvs

will be inferior to the other, and that which isall-perfect will have a more com

prehensive power. Hence the one will be a part, but the other a whole; and

both will not beall-perfect animals, but one of limn will be more perfect than the

other. For that which has a diminished perfection is notall-perfect. But if

each of them is all things, whence did they obtain ;;!! things ? For it is necessary

that they should receive this allness from something. For as participating of oneform, they subsist from one cause. And thus the natures which similarly participate

of all things, possess this allness from one cause. There will therefore le a cause

prior to them;since it is necessary that, where there are two things there should be

an antecedent caue, whirh conducts them together. This cause, therefore, which

is prior to them, is either all things indivisibly, or divisibly. But ifindivisihly,

another cause will be requisite as a medium. For Ihe medium between that which is

perfectly indivisible, and the dnad which possesses all things dirisibly, is the monadu7uM has all things indivisibly; this indeed being itself united by an indivisible canst,

but uniting the allness which is in (he duad. Iknee that ir/iich primarily comprehendsall things is the monad which is prior to the duad. lint in that which subsists indivi

sihly, the seed and cause arc contained of an allness which is characterized by unity.

Deservedly, therefore, is all-perfect animal said to be monadic, and incapable of

being the second with another thing, not only as the words appear tosay, localise

it is not conjoined with another, bullM-cau.se if it were arranged with another, it

would besecondarily, and no longer primarily all things. For after

all-perfect

animal, there are causes which are co-arranged with other kindred natures, but

which have not primarily all things. That, however, whichprimarily possesses

all things is monadic. But if it is comprehensive of all things, there will

Theoriginal is, row yap aliatfifrut TJOTO OVTOI, KOI rijt Ivatof rijt irnvra r^ovmjf, ptanv tirrir rj fintat

)Tarra

t^tvaa ti^nfttvm. But it appears to me to be ncorssary to read, agreeably to thr al*oto transla

tion. TOV yap n^iaifXTwi warry orroi, ai rr|i t-wiJoi ri,i *arra i\ovorn icF^^f^wi, ptvor wtr i portu if

-rayrn fovva aiiaipcrwf.




not be an intelligibleanimal besides it. For if there were, this would no

longer be all-perfect, but a part. And that will be the whole of which this will

be alone a part.For it is necessary that multitude should stop at the monad.

Why, however, does Plato say, the second with another thing ? For it would

h jve been sufficient to have said, with another by itself, or the second, by itself. But

lie conjoins both, for the purpose of indicating that the nature which is co-ar-

ranwed with another, and is not monadic, cannot as we have before observed, be the

first. Perhaps likewise, it signifies the contrary, and that what is said pertains to

thin & sand not to words. For the form which is incorruptiblenaturesentirely f-uhsists

with another. For the human form is in this individual, and in that, the partici

pants being many, and on this account each is with another. That form, however,

which is perpetual, yet not a whole, though it maybe monadic, and on this

account not with another, yet it is moreim|>erfect

than a certain whole. But

that which is neither in many things, nor a part witli another thins, is not secon

dary, as being one and a \\hole, and not apart. Very properly, therefore, does

the theolo-ist produce Phanes, the only divinity l>earingthe seed of the illustrious

(iods,1

from the Cod who is occultly all things ;and from Phanes gives subsis

tence to all the second orders of the (iods. For Heaven indeed proceeds togc-

lh r with Earth. But she,

Again tli tteiidfd licav u and ciirili1

brought forth.

AndSaturn

proceeds together

with Ithea. For according to a third

progeny,Earth produced [as the theologist says,] "seven pure taautiful virgins with rolling

fyes,and seven sons that were kings, with line long hair." But the Demiurgus,

who is the great Jupiter, is conjoined with Juno. Hence also, she is said to be

of equal rank with him, and proceeds from the same fathers. Phanes, however,

proceeds by himself alone, and is celebrated as female and father. He also produ

ces the [three] Rights, and is presentwith the middle Might. For he

PlucVd the shorn flower of Night.1

According to this theologist therefore, all-perfectanimal is not the second with

another, but fills the orders of Night, and also fills the celestial orders with the

1 For (kc.f k-Xvrov here, it is necessary to read 6*uv t\vruv.

1i. e. The intellectual Earth brought forth the sensible Heaven and Earth.

JIn the original aurot yap ri) waibot aftiXtro tm-piftoy arPc. But for

*>j *ailoi, it appearsfrom

Lichcnhdch to be neceary 1o read nji Nfri.



BOOK ii.] TIMA;US or PLATO. nai

all ness of himself; in imitation of whom, Jupiter likewise, produces twofoldorders, the

super-celestial and the mundane. Phanes, however, gives subsistence

to twofold triads, but Jupiter to twofold duodecads. For on this account bis

sceptre is said to consist of four-and-twenty measures. Hence, the demiurgic is

always assimilated to the paradigmatic cause, but proceeds into multitude from

intelligible union. These things, however, are also elsewhere discussed.

But that animal itself rejoices in onlyness, is also manifested through the

Orphic theologies. For as Phanes is the offspring of an egg, it is evident that he

is an animal. At the same time also, he is called by Orpheus the happy a/id

venerable Metis, bearing the seed of the illustrious (iods; to whom Jupiter

being analogous, is likewise denominated by Orpheus Metis and a d;rmou.

One power, one dxinou, tlie great lord of all.

Thus too, the Oracles call this mighty God [i. e. animal itself] the fountain of

fountains, and say that he (done generated all things." For from thence the gene

ration of abundantly-various matter entirely1

leaps forth. Thence a tiery whirl

wind sweeping along, obscures the ilower of fire, leaping at the same time into

the cavities of the worlds. For all things thence begin to extend their admirable

rays downwards."

"

For again, another animal would be required about these two, of

which they would be parts : and it might be more rightly said, that the

universe is assimilated to this comprehending third, rather than to the

other two."

This which is now asserted by Plato, may be easily demonstrated from the

demiurgic goodness. For if the Pemiurgus is good, he fabricated the universe with

reference to all-perfect animal. liul he is good and the best of causes, and therefore

he assimilated the world to all-perfectanimal. For it in necessary that thefirst Demi-

nrgiis should U; intellective of the first paradigm ;and that being intellective of it,

he should be the maker of that which is in every respect most similar to it. For if

there is nothing which is intellective ofit, it will no longer have the order of a

paradigm, with respect to that which is fabricated by the first Demiiirgus. If,

however, you should say, that it is necessary there should be other secondary

causes, which produce with reference to more partial paradigms, you say well

1For tt-Otr of

ij her*, read itQtv np^rjy. And for apvlpoio, afivlpci.




indeed, hut at the same time you should preserve the universe one. For the fabri-

cations of these partial paradigms are parts of tho universe, in the same inunner

n.> tlie paradigms, and vice versa. As therefore paradigms are parts of paradigms,

demiurgic1

are parts of demiurgic causes, and fabrications of fabrications, it is

necessary that the wholeness of the universe- should be the image ofall-perfect

animal ;and that

a!l-j>erfectanimal should be the paradigm of the universe.

IMoreo\er, it has been demonstrated that animal itself is one, and alone, as being

monadic. The world therefore is one and monadic, in order that it may perfectly

imitate its paradigm. For as it primarily receives a similar idea of it, how is it

possible it should not adumbrate all the nature of it, in consequence of having

been generated intellectual, perpetual,and monadic?

"

In order, therefore, that the world from its onlvncss or being alone,i

might be similar to all-perfect animal, on this account the artificer nei

ther made infinite, nor two worlds."

Again, Plato reminds us of the Demiurgic cause, in order that we may un

derstand also from this, that every thing which is generated by the whole fabri

cation, is monadic, perpetual, and intellectual;and that the Demiurgujs is the

cause, of all tiling, in consequence of prmlucing the monads of them ; but that he

delivered the multitudinous and partialfabrication to the junior Gods. Farther

still, lie also latently teaches us \\lio this all-perfect intellect is the name of

which is so celebrated by the more modern philosophers ;vi/. that it is intelligible

intellect, in which the universe. primarily subsists. IJelore, therefore, he called it

distributed!)"

according to all tilings perfect"because he then celebrated its all-

ness;but now speaking of it collecti\ely,

he calls it"

all-perfect"since his dis

course is about the only-begotten.

The infinite, however, in a certain respect is, and in a certain respect is not.

Buta

tittupis said to be

infinitein a

three-Jukimanner

;

cither

accordingto

pwcr,or

according to multitude, or according to magnitude.The infinite therefore according

to jxrd cris in divine natures, and in the world. For the never-failing,

and the per-

jKtual,are the peculiarities of the

infinite according to power . Ji/ t t/ie infiniteac

cording to multitude partly is, and partly is not. For it has not an at-once

collected subsistence, but e.iisls according to a part. And the infinite according to

I IiikicAii ofq/iioi>pytyiura herr, ills iirccjs-ar)

to iraJ byftiofp-yuu,



HOOK ii.l TJM.I US OF PLATO. 3Q3

magnitude, neither c.iists according to a part? nor /nts any existence whatever

Hence the infinite according to multitude, if it exists in the worlds, in the tirst

place, will le without arrangement with reference to itself. For what order can

there he in the infinite of things first and second, where there is no tirst ? /// the

tic.rlplace,

it will not have one producing cause. For if it had, that cause would

produce the one prior to multitude, and the whole prior tn parts. For being itself one

it wouldjirxt assimilate to itself t lie things posterior toitself.

For every cause which

is effective of things according to nature, produces things similar to itself. But

there is no first in those worlds, since they are infinite. And if they suppose

other worlds consisting of others, either the causes ofthem will be unco-ordinate

or co-ordinate. And if co-ordinate, it is necessary that the worlds should have

one co-arrangement. But in the infinite there is no order. To which we may

add, that the intervention of a vacuum in the middle, will separate the worlds.

But if the causes are i.nco-ordinate, we must admit that there is a divided and

unsympatheticmultitude in the

principles. This, however,will

entirelyabolish

both all the causes themselves, and the things posterior to them. For the causes

will becorruptive of each other, not being able to subsist in conjunction with, in

consequence of being perfectly foreign from each other. But the things which

proceed from them, collapsing, will stop, and will not have any thing from

whence again they can be generated, the principles being destroyed.1

Perhaps, however, some one may say that there is neither one world, nor infi

nite worlds, but many and finite. For we have heard of a certain Barbaric

opinion, which the Cheronean Plutarch relates,1

placing in one equilateral tri

angle the intelligible world according to the middle of it, in each of the sides

sixty worlds, about theintelligible, and in each angle one world; all of them

(except the intelligible) being such worlds as that in which we are comprehended.

So that there are three leaders, and thrice sixty others, under them. For the

angular are of a more ruling nature than the lateral worlds. This opinion, there

fore, introduces a multitude of finite worlds, and makes the intelligible to be one

of them. Unless, indeed, you arrange the intelligibleworld in the middle, as the

The words, ovfc Kara firpct arc omit led in the original ; but, a* it appears to me, ought to be

inserted.

*These argunirnt!i, which possess an invincible strength, fully

show thefutility nftlut very popular

theory of the moderns, that there are infinite worlds. Tor like most other modern dogmas, it

unscientific and rambling.

3 Sec Plutarch s Treatise on the Silence of the Oraclts.




root of all things, but the three angular worlds ns connective of all things, and

oausirvall

thingsto !>e

one, accordingto one mundane intellect, one soul, and

one natnrt . Or according to the t mpyrean, etherial, and material world. For

an angle is connective of the sides, lint the three sixty worlds maybe said to

bo the multitude according to each sphere of thee. For the spheres arc

twelve in number; and the multitude in each is spherical, of which the pentad

i.> a symbol, being the first sphericalmnnl>er. Hence there are thrice sixty

world*, localise there is an intellectual, a psychical,and a physical series, accord

ing to each sphere of whichthe

pentadis a

symbol;or localise there is an

empyrean, etherial, and material multitude of Gods. If, however, some one

shoHld not admit that these tilings are obscurely signified [in this narration of

Plutarch], but should assert that the worlds are truly divided according to num-

l>er,we ask him, whether it is In-fter to make one world comprehensive of all

things, or many worlds separated from each other For the former makes

multitude to be connectedly contained by the monad, and parts by the whole ;

but the latter dissipates production into an unco-ordinate multitude; though

nature, and every cause of this kind, makes a monad prior to multitude, and a

whole connective of part*. If likewise the worlds being spherical,touch each

other, they will touch according to a point, but in the, whole they will be separated

from each other, and will be more unsympathetic than sympathetic. It is neces

sary however that things which proceed from one cause, should be co-passive

with each other, and gi\e completion to one life. But if they do not at all touch

each other, they will be [entirely] separated. How also, Aristotle would say,

will things which are upward be downward, and things which are downward be

upward, interval being external to the worlds ? And how will this thing pertain

ing to the worlds be arranged here, but another there? For that which is upward

to us, will \*s to others downward. \Vill not the earth therefore of the other

worlds, and every thing there which is heavy, be impelled to this world, if the

motion of that which is heavy tends downward ? But at one and the same time,

a body which in one of those worlds tends upward, will, as proceeding to this

world, tend downward. And there will not be an order of motions, or powers, or

of things which are co-ordinate in the universe. Unless some one should say in

answer to this, that there is a dim-rent middle in each of the worlds : for the middle

is not the middle of a vacuum, but of a world. Each parttherefore of a world

tends either to the middle, or to the circumference of that world, but not to that

.vliich is foreign to it. All the things, however, that are in other worlds, are



"OK"] TIM.T1US OF PLATO.

foreign to each other. If therefore, some one should thinkthat these assertions

are worthy of belief, let them remain as Mich.

Plato however, has chosen the most principal and proper cause of theirl>eing

but one world, viz. that which is derived from the paradigm of the universe ; buthas omitted as concauses the above, and such-like causes. A demonstrationalso of (his kind is definite. For it does not

separately confute those who saythere is a multitude of worlds, and separately those who introduce an infinite

number,dispersed

in differentplaces, and intercepted by a vacuum, but at one

and the same time he shows that the assertions both of the former and the latter

are false, directly proving that the world is one from the onlyness of the paradigm.And farther still, he avoids the modes of argument which are derived from

matter. For he neither demonstrates, as Aristotle docs, from matU-r being one,nor from places being definite

according to nature, nor from essence, i.e. matter

which is a body, being united, according to the doctrine of the Stoics, for

Plato alone or especially employed, says Thcophrasltts, the cause which is derived

from providential inspection ; beautifully testifying this of Plato. As we hate said

therefore, be ascribes the onlyness of the world to the paradigm. For if the pa

radigm is one, and the Demiurgus is one, it is necessary that the world should

be one. .Or rather, if the paradigm is one, and the world adumbrates the

onlyness of the paradigm, the world is one. But the antecedent is true, andtherefore the consequent. For the paradigm is one, as he before demonstrated,

and constituted the world conformably to the onlyness of itself. For as the in

telligible paradigm was generated one from Me owe which is the good, so likewise

with reference to itself being one, it constituted the worldonly-l>egotten. Hence

the world is one. And neither are there many worlds; for there are not many

first paradigms ;nor infinite worlds

; for the infinite according to multitude, does

riot even exist in mortal natures, so far is it from having a subsistence in perpetual

l>eing.s.

But it is possible, says Porphyry, to use the demonstration of Plato in all

other principles. For through this, not only intelligible animal is demonstrated

to be one, but also the first Dcminrgns. And in short, it may be demonstrated,

that there are not many principles ofintelligible.*, but one principle. For again

another principle of their being many would be requisite, through which the

principles themselves areunbcgottcn. For every thing which is naturally inherent

in many things, isnecessarily derivedfrom one canxc. He therefore who says, that.

Cod and matter arcprinciple*, must le compelled to admit that there is a certain

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. 3 C

PROCLUS ON THE TIM7EUS OF PLATO. [BOOK n.

other cause prior to them. For neither is matter sufficient toitself, nor will God

be comprehensive of all things [ifthere is another principle independent of him].

It is necessary therefore, that theie should be a cause prior to these which com

prehends all things, and which is truly sufficient to itself, and is not in want of

any other thing.

" But this heaven [or universe] was generated, is, and will be one

andonly-begotten."

The only-begotten indeed, adumbrates the monadic cause, and indicates an

essence which is comprehensive of all secondary natures, and has dominion over

wholes. Fur (lie theologistis accustomed to call Proserpine only-begotten ; as pre

siding in a leading and ruling manner over all mundane natures, and as the cause of

only-begotten animals. Fur the Caddcss \>.-ho is posterior tu tier - ins subsistence to

the animals which are not only-begotten,as being irrational. The ideologist theie-

fore, on this account calls Proserpine only-begotten, though lie produces another

divinity from the name causes as he produced Proserpine, t nity however, is

imparted to the universe fi\>in i ie one unity ol unities. For as the being which is

every where, is derived from being itself, mi the one which is in all things is from

(lie one it m-If.

lint the words "

teas generated, is, and leili be" manifest the tem

poral perpetuity of the universe, which is extended with the infinity of time. For

the term t/v/i,

is indicative of (lie past, the term is, of the present, and the term

u-ill be, of the future time. Again therefore you have the term o/ie conformably

to the image- of the one being [the summit of intelligible*]; but the terms</</*, /.v,

and M-/// be, conformably to the image of eternity. For theinfinity of time

imitates the eternal infinity.Lint ull these are according to tin 1

image of animal

itself. For this was primarily monadic, and truly an eternal one. lint the

world is monadic and perpetual through the imitation of it. Farther still, the lirtti

"

zi dtgenerated"

i$ significant of perfection ; the turn"

is" of the participation of

being ;<ind the term

"

willbe," ofperpetual generation, through ///(// the \rorltl

has a never-failing subsistence. So that of these, the just is from the one; for

from thence JMrfeelion is imparted to all thinus. lint the second is from /// r (, tlf

being. And the third is from eternity ; for from tlience thenever-failing is inhe

rent ill wholes.

1

For TO & mot* o* here, it is obviously ntctsiarv to /tail re . *aint .



an;

BOOK III.

THE present treatise in one way surveys the world according; to the wholeness

which it contains, conformably to which also it is similar to all-perfect animal,and was generated an only-begotten animal, animated and endued with intellect

;

but in another way, according to the division which is in it;as when it divides

the soul from body, and likewise things which have a more formal order. But

how docs the psychical breadth proceed from fabrication, and according to what

kind of reasons ? For since the world is an animated animal and endued with

intellect, three things are exhibited in it, vi/. a certain body, soul, and intellect.

Intellect however, is entirely imbrgotten: for it is allotted an eternal essence and

energy. But body is entirely generated: for it consists according to the whole

of itself, in the whole of time. And soul is of a middle essence. As therefore,

it is arranged in the middle of impartible and partible natures, after the same man

ner also, it is the boundary of unbcgotten and generated essences. Hence it is

generated indeed, as with reference to intellect, but is unlw^otten, when consi

dered with relation to a corporeal-formed nature. It exists also as the end of eter

nal beings, but ranks as first among things that are generated. On this account

therefore, Plato delivers to us an all-various generation of body, producing it

wholly from causes different from itself; but he produces soul both from itself,

and from the total fabrication and vivitication. lie does not however, in words

devise any generation of intellect. For neither is intellect produced according to

idea, nor does it admit of any name of generation, being entirely unbegotlen,

and eternal. It is however unfolded into light from wholes but abiding in them

1For *pwt hert, it is nfCfswiry to read

*yx>i.



38gPROCLUS ON THE [OOK in.

inherently, it proceeds unitedly, together with its tuore total causes. Hence it

abides impartibleand undivided, being preserved by undented and inflexible

powers,while another life is distributed and divided about the parts of the uni

verse. Plato therefore, delivers the- lirst hypostasisof the universe from fabrica

tion, viz. an hypostasis according to wholeness; according to which it becomes

animated, divine, and endued with intellect, conformably to a similitude to all-

perfectanimal. But lie adds a second hypostasis,

which divides the world ac

cording to wholes, and the productionof total parts; soul and the corporeal-

formed nature existing according to this hypostasis.For intellect is entirely unbe-

"Otteii, as we have said, because.it is without generation and indivisible; except

that it proceeds in an unbegott.-n manner, from the providence of the Demiurgus.

But he calls the nature which receive* intellect, the evolution itself into light of

soul. Tor the Demiurgus himself places the circles of soul in intellect, unfolding

it without division, as being impartible,and without figure,

as being perfectly

unfigured.And he delivers after this, the third hypostasis

of the universe, divid

ing it according to parts, and giving perfectionto each of the parts.

Tor lie

delivers to us, how fire and air, water and earth are generated. But in the last

place,he surveys the energy of fabrication which is effective of body; and neither

in this does he descend to particulars,but abides in the whole elements. For

the total fabrication is the fabrication of wholes, and of total parts.But he deli

vers the formation of individuals, and of things which are truly partial,to the

junior Gods ;in order that imitating the providence of their father about wholes,

they also may receive a similar fabrication about particulars,and may have that

analogy to him which he has to the int-lligihle paradigm. For being intellectual

as with reference to this paradigm, and having the order of intellect, as with

relation to intelligible intellect, he becomes himself intelligibleto the, mundane

Gods.

As we have said therefore, fabrication being triple,the first, according to whole

ness, the second, according to a division into wholes, and the third, according

to a division into parts/ Plato now intends to deliver to us the middle or second

fabrication; having indeed a transition of this kind consentaneous from things

themselves ;and having also an opportune progression

to this, from what Irid been

1

For nifuotv herr, rratl^u>ni>.

*F>r ra iurtffrn, H iil ra tuOttuvra.

1In ibrr worth fobm-itit.il ucithrr Jouan, or DIPJ .!, or Adon,cat, a *M before obwmd

\ Prodis.

HOOK in.] TIM/EUS OF PLATO.3CP

before said. For since he had defined the world to be one visible animal, comprehending within it all such tilings as are

naturally allied to it; that the world

indeed is one, he demonstrated from the onlyness of the paradigm ;but that it is

visible, and that it is comprehensive of all kindred natures, is rendered manifest

to us by the division of the universe into wholes. For if we can discover from what

cause (ho world is u>il>l<

,and how all the elements are co-arranged in it, and

through what analogies, we shall easily perceive that it comprehends all kindred

natures, and that there is nothing sensible which is not contained in the one ambit

of the world. Perceiving this however, we shallsufficiently obtain the object of

investigation. For this was, how the world is visible, and how it is comprehensive of all things which are naturally allied to it. For from what has been before

said, we assume that the world is alone; but from these things, that it is all-per

fect.

"

Since, however, it is

necessary

that what is

generatedof a

corporealnature should be visible and tangible ; but without fire nothing can become

visible, neither can any thing be tangible without a certain solid, nor solid

without earth ; hence divinity beginning to fabricate, constituted the

body of the universe from fire and earth."

Plato having a little before given the definition of that which is generated, call

ing it that which is becoming to be, and which is perishable, he defined it to bethat which is the object of opinion in conjunction with sense. Hut demonstrating

that the world is generated, he converts the definition. For he says that scnsibles

are seen to be things which are becoming to be, and are generated. But novr

transferring that which is itself generated, to the order of a subject, he predicates

of it the visible and tangible. For these are the extremes of sensibles, just as the

sightand the touch are the extremes of the senses. Hence there, as I have ob

served in what he says respecting the world being generated, he converts the

definition. But here he gives it according to nature. For that which is becoming

to be was in the order of the indefinite. But as he said in (lie hypotheses, that

which is the object of opinion in conjunction with sense, is to be assumed in the

definition. lie says therefore, it is necessary that what is generated should \>e

sensible, not indeed every generated nature, but that which we before called gene

rated, viz. the composite nature, and which is always becoming to be through the

whole of time. For soul also is generated, but the discourse is not about this.



300 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK in.

If hovrever, some one should say that according to Plato material forms and

qualitiesthemselves are apprehended by sense, and yet are

incorporeal, and at

the same time have generation,let

him know, says thedivine

lamblichus, that

these likewise contribute to the hypostasis of bodies, and are surveyed in conjunc

tion with them. Since therefore the world bus a certain corporeal and likewise

an incorporeal portion in it, and this latter is two-fold, one being inseparable, but

the other separate from body ;since also the portion of the incorporeal, \\hichis

separate from body is two-fold, viz. psychical and intellectual;and further still,

since the world also has the unbegotten and the generated, but the whole of

every thing v\hich consists of the unbegotten and the generated, is generated,

Plato very properly calls the whole world something generated and corporeal-

formed. For if a whole con>ist?> of the mortal and the immortal, the whole is

mortal;

if from the unbegotten and the generated, the \\hole is generated; and if

from the incorporeal and the Corporeal, the \\hole has the form of a corporeal

nature. For if indeed, the incorporeal itself is co-passivewith body, it becomes

itself corporeal-formed, and not the \\hole only. If, however, that which is prin

cipally and properly incorporeal, is it>elf exempt and impassive, being raised

above body, this more excellent nature i.s not indeed body, since it remains in its

own purity, but the whole may more justly be denominated corporeal-formed.

Hence, since the world participates of many and ble.vsed prerogativesfrom its

generator, but partakes also of body, it is deservedly called corporeal- funned,

visible and tangible, according to the whole of itself. For it is generated.But

that which is generated is visible and tangible and has a body, as was rightly

asserted before.

Plato beginning therefore from body, in the first place gives it to be sensible

according to the extreme senses. In the next place, he imparts to it that which

is more perfect than this, vi/. the bond through analogy, which is connective of

the bodies it contains. In the third place, he makes it to be a whole consisting

of the wholes of the elements. Afterwards, in the fourth place, he gives it a sphe

rical figure, in order that it may be most .similar to ithelf according to form. In

the fifth place, he shows that the world suffers all things in itself. In the sixth

place, he distributes to it an appropriate motion. Afterwards, in the seventh

place, he animates it through a divine soul. In the eighth place, he imparts to

it a temporal period. Afterwards, in the ninth place, he establishes the series

1 For & pa hfrf,itli nreessarv to read attna.

BOOK in.] T1>LEUS OF PLATO. 391

of Gods iu it, who conjointly produce the perfect year. And in the tenthplace,

he makes it to be ]>crfect from all animals which aro assimilated to the four ideas

[in animal itself].And thus through the decad he gives completion to the whole

fabrication of things. The.-e particulars however will be unfolded as we proceed.

Now therefore, we shall observe, that since the world possesses interval, and

is apprehended by sense, it is known through the sight and the touch; being

visible indeed, in consequence of being wholly filled through the whole of itself

with light ;but existing tangible in consequence of being a solid. For it is suf

ficient for it to receive through these senses, all sensible natures. The visible

also, and the tangible conceived as always existing in the world in the four ele

ments, are contraries. For these as being most distant from each other and un

der the same genus, are contraries. For both are sensibles, and this is their com

mon genus, and they are most distant from each other, since the one is immedi

ately sensible, but the other is not sensible without a medium. If however,

we investigated the contraries in the elements so far as they are mutable, we

should not say that they are fire and earth, but fire and water. For wateres|>e-

cially extinguishes fire. Kach also of the assertions is true. For it is common

to both to have their contrariety consist in being extremes. And in this the asser

tions accord, as in sensible.* indeed, earth bang contrary toJirctbut as in things of a

mutable nature, water to fire. IJ< nee also Plato opposes the visible to the tangible.

Or, fit may be said] that he assumes the sensible elements, as not yet considering

the mutation of them, according to which water is more contrary to fire than

earth. "What Plato therefore here says, is not as Theophra.slus thought, imjK rfect :

for he doubts as follows : Why does Plato say that the peculiarity of fire is visi

bility, and of earth tangibility, but does not at all mention the peculiarities of

the other elements ? Wereply, it is because we see the world, and also touch it,

but we do not taste, or hear, or smdl it. The world itself also is visible and

tangible to itself. And as being luciforrn indeed, it is visible, perceiung itself

throughdivine light, which is extended through all heaven, and is similar, as

Socrates says in the Republic, to the rainbow. For this divine light is that which

is primarily visible, and pervades through the whole world. For as the sphere of

the sun is the sight of the soul which is in it, thus also the sight of the sphere is

that divine light, which pervades through all visive* natures, and operates on,

and imparts life to things that are visible. You may likewise say, that this is

For vvxj hire, it i* necessary to read

1 Instead of <y>arwin this place ,

I read



392PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK in.

the first and most principal sight, but not that which subsists in conjunction with

passion,and which is separated from visible natures. But again, the world as

being solid and full of life, lias what is called a co-sensation of itself. For wealso have a co-sensation of the motion* or passions which inwardly subsist in us.

And through this consciousness, the world becomes tangible to itself. The most

proper solution however of the doubt, is that which says, that Pluto assumes the

extreme elements prior to the others, because the latter subsist for the sake of the

former. And he intends to show that the rest are constituted us the bond of the

extremes. Or it may be said, that through the extremes he also comprehends

the media. For as the universe is defined through tire and earth, and the media

which are comprehended in these, thus also through the visible and the tangible

he comprehends all the variety of .sensible natures.

This however, lie. mploys as an axiom. For it is usual with him prior to each of

the subjects of discussion, to assume an axiom from which he demonstrates the thing

investigated. Thus for instance he assumes axiomatically the sentence,"

In him

who is good envy is never ingenerated about any thing"in order that ho may demon

strate that the Demiurgus imparts good to all things. And again, in this way he

assumes the words,"

// neither :ras, nor u-ill be lawful for the most excellent nature to

effect any thing else than that which is most beautiful ; in order to show that the uni

verse is an animal endued with intellect and animated. This too, is the case with

the words,"

That tt hicft is assimilated to an imperfect thing can /;trtr become beauti

ful ;"in order that he may survey what the nature of the paradigm is, according to

which the Demiurgus constituted the world. After the same manner therefore here,

previously assumingas an axiom, that u-liat is generated is risible and tangible, he de

monstrates from this, how the elements contribute to the composition of the world,

ind how they are arranged in the universe. For if it is necessary that the world

should be visible and tangible, tire and earth are necessary to it : for that which

ite primarily visible is fire. In the first place, indeed, because visible natures them

selves are luminous substances: for alt colours are the progeny of light.In the

next place,because (he sight itself is light proceedingfrom an cthcriiil-f

armed essence.

And in the third place,because sight, and that which is visible, require the con

gregating power of light,in order to their existence in energy. For what else is it

than light that collects both these together? So that the world will be in want

of fire, in order to be visible. To which also may be added, that Pythagoras in

v-hat he says to Abarix, demonstrates that the eye is analogous to Jire.For it is the

most elevated of the instruments of sense, just as fire is of the elements, and cm-

ploys

as well as fire acute energies. The conical emission also of its rays, has no



" *] TIM.KUS OF PLATO. 30.3

small similitude to the

pyramidalform of fire. Plato

however,does not

sayth.it

lire alone is viable : for this is false in a twofold respect. For tire itself by itself,

unmingled with the other elements, is by no means [externally] visible, but is only

visible in mental conception. And farther still, none of the other elements will

be visible if lire alone is visible. It is one thin^ therefore, to be visible

through lire, and together with lire, and another for lire itself to be the only thin:;

visible. Hence, he does not assert the latter, which may be confuted in a twofold

respect,but the

former, because nothing is visible separated from fire; fromwhich also you may assume, that all bodies part cipate of fire. But in different

bodies there is a different lire. Forlight, fame, and a burning coal, arc not the

same thing. Hutfrom on high there, is a diminution as far as to the earth of fire,

which proccedsfrom a more immaterial, pure and incorporeal nature as Jar as to the

most material andgross bodies. Tor there arc streams of fire under the earth, as

Empedocles somewhere says ;

Beneath the earth burn mim minfiery streams.

>or ought we to wonder how fire, though in water, is not extinguished. For

all things proceed through each other, and that which predominates is different

in different things. Light also is fire pervading through all things. Numenius

therefore, being of opinion that all things are mingled, thought that nothing is

simple. But Plato knew the mixture of things, and separately delivered the

nature of each, fashioning the elements from figures.

Perhaps however, the wonderful Aristotle will object to what is said, not

admitting that every thins u^ible is such through theparticipation of fire ; because

the choir of the stars, and the great sun itself, though they do not consist of fire,

yet at the same time are visible. But if some one should say to him, that with

respect to lire, one kind is material, but another immaterial, as with reference to

sublunary fire which is material ; that one kind is corruptible, but another incor

ruptible; that one is mingled with air, but another is pure; and in short, that

there are many species of fire, perhaps he will assent to the assertion, and also to

the theologists who call the mn a fire which is the channel offire, and the dupensator

of fire, and all such-likcappellations. For to what else can he ascribe visibility,

than to that which is generate e of light?But what except fire is a thing of this

1

vii.

TheChaldean

Tburgit.Sr

mycollection of the ChaliJcau Oracle*.

Tim. Plat. VOL. l".3 D



394 PROCLUSONTHE [DOCK m.

kind? For earth1

is effective of that which is entirely contrary to light: for it is

the cause of darkness. And that which is more terrestrial

participatesin a less

de-zree of light ;but air and water are diaphanous, and are not of themselves

visible. Hence each of these is a medium between that which isprimarily visible,

and that which obumbratcs visible natures;each lacing the cause of

visibility to

other things, but not to itself, so far as each of these is diaphanous, hut othrr

things are transparent through these. It remains therefore, that fire alone illumi

nates the things with which it is present, and makes them to be \ibible.

If however, some one should say,that the celestial

element which is visible

and illuminative, is not fire, we ask him, whence does the fire w hich is Ix^re,

become such as it is ? For if each of these is generative of sensible light, why mav

not each of them be fire, though the one is immaterial, but the o;her material?

When, however, I say that the one is immaterial, I mean as was before observed,

ihat it is so when compared with the grossest* matter, which is not able to sus

tain forms, so as to prevent them from gliding away, and which is distinguished

from the matter that invariably remains in its own proper form. For we learn

that matter pervades through the whole world, as the Cods also say. Hence

I lato, as he proceeds, calls matter the receptacle of the universe. Such therefore,

as are the kinds of light, such also are the kinds of lire; and analogy shows that

thelight which is from the celestial element is from fire. Hence, it must be said,

that Plato does not characterize lire by heat, nor by being, moved upward ;for

these things are ihe peculiarities of the fin which is here, and which is not in i s

proper place ; but that he characterizes it by visibility. For through this he

comprehends all fire, the divine, the mortal, the caustic, and the vehement.

Farther still, the same things must likewise be said concerning earth, that

rarth is that which is primarily solid. For it must not be said that earth derives

its solidity from some other place ;but in sensible*, that which is

especially solid,

has thispeculiarity, prior to such things as are less solid

; since also that which is

"specially hot, is hot prior to things which have less heat, and from this things

which have less heat, participate of this quality. If therefore, earth is more solid

than the other elements, but that which is most solid is the cause of things which

are less solid being solid, and things which are less such are not the causes of-

solidity to those which especially and particularly have this power; -if this bo

1

Instead of inj in ll.i-. place, it is necessary to readyij.

*For rcivirnr| here, it is ncccss.irN to read wu\ vmriii .

HOOK in.] T1M/EUS OF PEATO.

the case, it is necessary that earth should be the cause ofsolidity

to the other

elements, having itself a subsistence contrary to fire. And it indeed, we assume

things which are apparent to our senses, vi/. heaven astiery, and the earth on

which we walk, as especially earth, the contrariety of these will be manifest, the

former being always in motion, but the latter being immoveable; the former being

transcendency visible, but the latter tangible: and the one being most attenuated

through light, but the other most gross through darkness, lint if we wish to

surveythe fust elements of

these,vi/. fire itself so far as

fire, andearth

ibself,so

far as earth, we shall shortly alter unfold all the oppositions of these, when we

discuss the analogy of the four elements. That visibility therefore, is the pecu

liarityof lire, and tangibility of earth, we may from these things asstnw to \tc

most true. Hence Porphyry says, that of daemons some, bring visible, have in

their composition more of a fiery, in consequence of not having any tiling of a

resisting nature. But others, participating also of earth, are capable of bring

touched. lie adds, that such a.s these appearing near Italy about the Tuscans,not only emit seed from which worms are generated, but also strike against other

things, and leave behind them ashes;from which likewise he shows that all things

participate of earth. There is not, however, the same nature of earth erery where,

and in all parts of the world, but in some places it is more pure and immaterial,

and without gravity. For not gravity, buttangibility, is the peculiarity of earth.

Hut in other places, it is more material, and heavy, and is moved with difliculty.

In some place s likewise, it exhibits solidity alone; but in others, it receives other

grncKiurgic and material powers, after the same manner as lire.

If however, thesetilings being asserted by n*, Aristotle hhould doubt, how if

fire is in the heavens it is moved circularly, and not in a right line, we mut

adduce in answer to him, what Pl itinux stii/s, t/iut every simple body, when in its

proper place, cither remains immovcalilc, or is inn-red in a circle, in order tJiat it may

//t/ no means*

relinquishit.i proper plncc.

For if it is moved in it different manner,

it M-ill either nn longer he in it* own place, or will not j/( / he in if. \ celestial body

therefore, l>eing fiery,is necessarily moved in a circle. For earth also, if it were

moved without leaving the place about the middle, would be moved in a circle.

For when fire is moved to the upper region it is so moved in consequence of

being in a foreign place. For the same reason likewise, a clod of earth is moved

downward;and in short, the local motions nf the elements in a right line, arc ncca-

Instead of o-a ;jij bt w< in thit pUcr, I rend ira/ii|in/<wi.



PKOCI.US ON Till: [BOOK in.

stoned In their beingprctematurally tllsjxjscd ;so that it is false to say that fire, is

naturally moved in a right line. For it then especially subsists according to

nature when it possessesits proper plaee.

Hut when it tends to its proper place, it

i not yet in a Condition conformable to nature. This however being demon

strated, it is evident that the celestial fire when it is moved, is moved in u circle ;

and nothing that has been said disturbs the Platonic assertion. For if fire is

moved in a right line, it is not yet in its natural place.Hut if it is in its natural

place,it will cither be immoveable, or moved in a circle, his impossible however,

that it should be immoveable : for all lire is naturally moveable. In its natural

place therefore, it is alone moved in u circle. Hut let us return to the thing pro

posed to IK discussed.

If therefore the universe is generated, it is necessary that it should be sensible.

Hut if sensible, it is visible and tangible. And if so, it consists of lire and earth.

Hut if this U- admitted, it also consists of the middle elements. For lire and earth

are as much disjoined from each other as the sight and the touch, and require the

other elements as connecting media. If however, the world is visible, it is neces

sary there should be lire; and if tangible, it is necessary there should be earth.

For that which is solid is tangible, and is also able to resist the touch ; since that

which is friable, and cannot sustain the touch, is by no means tangible. Hence

Pythagoras calls the earth the sititaincr, as being solid, and resisting the touch,

and as moved with difUculty, and participatingof stable power. If therefore, as

we have said, fire is requisite in order that the \voild may IM: visible, but earth, that

it may IK? tangible, divinity beginning from lire and earth, made the universe.

Not that he first made these ; for we have already rejected the generation which

is according to time; but sin^:e every physiology commences from contraries, on

this account Plato says that the composition of the universe originated from fire

and earth, in order that it might become visible through lire, and tangible through

tin? solidity of earth, which with great accuracy he calls a certain iolit/. Fora

physical solid i> one thing, but a mathematical solid another. And the latter is

intangible, hut the other, which the discussion now requires, is tangible. For

that solid is tangible, which is physical. 1 Jence those are absurd who doubt

whv earth alone is solid : for, say they, water and air are also solids. For it may

lx- t-aid, in answer to them, that resistance especially pertains to earth;since it is

the support and foundation of the other elements. For earth supports water, and

The words r* tvOnat, tit omitiert in thf onpmal



in.] TIM/EUS OI; PLATO. 397

both earth and watersupport

air.

Earth therefore, is thefirst tangible, and thcfirtl

resisting substance, and on this account is the. first solid. We shall omit however to notice those who say that Plato here calls the three elements after fire,

earth. For if this were admitted, it would not be possible to assign what is the

medium of earth and fire.

"

It is impossible however, for twotilings alone to cohere in a beautiful

manner, without the intervention of a certain third ; for a certain collec

tive bond is necessary in the middle of the two. But that is the most

beautiful of bonds, which causes itself and the natures which are bound,to be one."

In what is here said, a bond is assumed as affording an ima^e of divine union,

and the communion of powers, according to which the intellectual causes of

wholes effect their generations, liut beauty appears to be assumed, as having an

uniting and binding essence and power. For the words,"

to cohere in a beautiful

manner, and the most beautiful of bonds," appear to me to be significant of thi*.

Beginning therefore from the duad, ns allied to generation, progression and

difference, Plato introduces union to theparticipants of

it, and an harmonious

communion through a bond, imparting to the world this as the second gift from

the

Demiurgus."NVe shall however here avoid the

introduction of such doubts asare adduced by those who do not rightly understand what is said by I lato.

For neither do those who say that semicircles require no bond in order to the

generation of a circle, speak rightly ;for a circle does not consist of semicircles,

Kut on the contrary, the circle now existing, and not subsisting from these, the

diameter being drawn makes the semicircles. And this is eudent from the name

affording a generation to these from the circle, but not vice versa. Nor do

those speak rightly who assume the monad and the duad, which in a certain

respect arc opposites, and have no medium. For Plato does notabsolutely say,

that there is something between all things, in whatever manner they may exi^t,

which gives perfection to the hypostasis of one composite. For he says, that two

things alone cannotl>eavitifully

cohere witlxnit a third. But the monad and the

duad are not contraries, since the duad consists of monads. Nor again, is there

Kny rectitude in the assertions of those who introduce things that are corrupted

together, ais for instance, wine mingled with honey. For these no longer exist

when the mixture take.* place.AVe however, do not investigate how things are

corrupted ; for this is not wonderful ;but how remaining what they are, they are

co-harmonized with each other. For this bond is the cause of safety to the

things that are bound, but not of their common corruption and abolition. Nor

do those speak rightly who adduce as a witness the communion of man and

woman, which requires no third thing to its subsistence. For through ignorance

they do not jvrceive the greatest bond, that of love, which excites to communion,

in one way indeed, to a communion of the psychical life, and in another to that of

the physical life. For the bond through animation is the medium in these. IV or

are they right who adduce things which are melted together, as gold and silver.

J ur of these there is the same essence ; since both are water. All these therefore,

vrander from the conception of Plato.

We however, again sav, conformably to what has been IK- fore observed, that it is

necessary these two things should be assumed, in the first place, in order to the

composition of one thing, and in the next place, in order that their coalition may

not be corrupted. For they would no longer be bound, but would cease to exist.

In the third place, also, it is necessary that they should truly be the elements of

that which consists of them. For having these conditions, they will entirely be

in want of a certain third tiling to their colligation. For what, since they are

separate, divided, and most distant from each other, will collect them into one 1

For if nothing accedes to them, they will remain divided, and will subsist after the

same manner as before. Hut if something accedes to them besides what they

already are, this thing which accedes \\ill become their bond. For it was this

which collected them into the

composition

of OIK- thing. A bond, however, is

said to be so in a threefold respect. For one bond is that which pre-exists in the

cause of the things that coalesce. Hut another is that which is inherent in the

tilings themselves that are bound, and which is co-ordinate to, and connascent with

them. And a third is that which exists in the middle of these, proceeding indeed

from the cause, but presenting itself to the view* in the things that are mutually

bound. If you are willing also, one bond of an animal, and of the parts in it,

is theone reason which

is

pre-establishedin the cause itM-lf of the animal. Hut

the nerves and the fibres are another bond, connecting the parts of the animal.

And another bond is the physical reason or productive and forming power, which

1

For fu)<ipr/jp( OITOI, it is nectssiiry lo r ad o

yo/> ?^<r/iOovrai.

1For tvtfnncfiftn iii thii place, it is obviously necf^arv lo read

/<fan>/jt<>i.



BOOK in.) TIM.U S Ol- 1 LATO. 3,^

proceeds from the cause of the animal, andemploys

thenerves,

and all themate

rial organic bond.- for the colligation of the animal. For this bond is neither

exempt from the things that are bound, nor yet ranking among things which are

without effective power, is it destitute of the true cause. You must not therefore,

understand the bond which is now mentioned by Plato, according to the first

modi;for this is not attended with cause

;but cause is entirely exempt from the

things which proceed from it, so far as it is cause. But Plato says, that the bond

is in the middle of thethings

that arebound. That, however, which is in the

middle of certain things, is not separated from them. TS or does this bond subsist

according to the organic and last kind of bond. For the bond which is confor

mable to this, is not the lord of itself nor of its own proper union. Plato how

ever adds, that the bond of which he is sneaking, makes both itself and the

things which are bound to be one. For it is possible for this to be arranged in the

middle. But it possesses such a power as this through analogy, which is the most

beautiful bond, and which imparts to it a power that causes all things to havesameness and union. This bond therefore, is inseparable from the things that are

bound, and is analogy, which is different from all the natures that are bound,

but has a subsistence in them. The demiurgic will likewise, is a bond, but is

exempt from the things that it binds;"

Mij tr///, fnys the Demiur^us, being a

greater and more principal bond than those rriffi -cfiic/i you were bound at the commence

incut of j/our generation."It remains therefore, that we must understand the homi

here mentioned, according to the middle mode, and as having a middle form, so

\is to be neither effective nor organic.

Whence then is the conception of such a bond derived, and of what is it the

symbol? It proceeds indeed from the one cause of wholes. For the power ot

imparting union is present to all things, from that fountain of all union, through

which also intellect is conjoined to the intelligible, and which produces the light

of truth, or the first of bonds, through which all things are connected with each

other, and become perfectly one thing through similitude. It is through lhis like

wise, that things which have proceeded from their proper principles are converted

to them. But this bond also proceeds from the one being, which is the first of

beings, and which unitedly comprehends the causes of all things, according to the

bond and divine union contained in it. It likewise proceeds from all-perfect

animal. For every intelligible animal is by a much greater priority united to

itself, than a sensible animal ; and the causes of wholes which it contains, pervade

1For N TO roarer here, it it evidently necessary lo read ^ TO ntvOijrov.



4(K) PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK in.

through each other prior to analogy; which analogy imitating, makes all tilings

to be in all, and imparts the same powers to different things. It also proceeds

from the connectedly-containingcause.

1For

analogyinserts

connexion, causingthe natures which are hound by it, as Plato says, to l>e indissoluhle by every thing

except by him who hinds hern. Hence this bond proceeding from these causes,

is connective, is the cause of the communion, and one union of separated natures,

and is the supplier of harmony, and of the conspiration hastening to unity of dif

ferent things ;in order that it may be similar to the causes from which it was

derived.

These things, however, being thus divided and defined,let us return to the

thing proposed to be considered. For since it is necessary that the world Vicing

generated should l>e visible and tangible, it will !>e in want of tire and earth. Of

fire, indeed, l>ecause it is visible. For vision is of an etherial nature, on which

account also it emits rays ;and that v\hich collects both si^ht, and that which is

visible, is light. But all liiiht is from lire; for it is not from earth, which produces

darkness. As we have before observed, however, there are many kinds of fire.

Ik-cause likewise, tin- world is tangible, it is in want of earth. For earth is that

which is especially solid : for it is more stable, and more of a resisting nature than

the other elements. Hut that, which is especiallysolid is especially tangible.

For it in a greater degree sustains resistance, than that which is not solid. Hence

earth is especially tangible. I>et .1 therefore be admitted, that there are primarily

these two elements in the universe, and that they are contrary to each other;

lire

indeed, being analogous to form, to the masculine nature, and to things of this

kind; but earth, being co-ordinate to the female nature, and to matter. Hence,

of these, which are thus oppositely divided, in their essences, powers, and

energies, in the senses by w hich they are jn-rceived,and in the places of their

abode, there will not be one order, nor one world, unless a bond accedes to them,

and communion with each other. For it is impossible for two things to cohere in

a beautiful m inner without the intervention of a certain third. And Plato indeed

adduces an universal assertion by saying,"

a certain or name thirdthing."

But if

you add theifords,"

which are entirety contrary" [immediately (i/ter the tronls,"J

or

{no things alone"] you tfill render what is said incontrovertible, and more itchiou-

For rpot nfdXoyiai ii) ilii> |l;ite,rratl rpo avnXo^iui.

i. e. From Ilie iniddlr tnail of the order of (iods i allrd intelligibleand at ibr anu- limt lutrlltctuJ.

1 For ro opwr heft, it is i!.co>ai> to read TO opyr.

minx in.] TIM/EUS OF PLATO. 40 |

Forit is

impossiblefor

two things which arc most contrary to concur into one

composition with each other, without the intervention of a third. For either they

collect themselves, or they are congregated by another tiling. Being, however,

contrary, and most distant from each other, andsecretly living from each other,

though (lie fear of losing their own essence, they cannot bring themselves toge

ther. Hence they are congregated by something else. But this is a bond; so

that they are in want of a certain third thing. The universe, therefore, proceeds

from theduad to the triad. For it tagan indeed from the duad, because ail generation subsists in a way adapted to this principle. For difference, the infinite,

and the Kmpedoelean strife [as taint; allied to the. duad] are adapted to generated

things. But the universe proceeds as far as to the triad, through the bond which

is now mentioned. Again, therefore, a certain medium must be assumed tatween

earth ami tire, which is collective of both. And let thisfor the sake of <in example

be moisture, which is common to air and :eatvr. For this is connectire indeed of earth,

cong/ntinatcs it, tm<l holds it together, so that it may not he dispersal ; hut being as a

subject to /ire, it imparts to it nourishment and permanency. From this triad, how

ever, the tetrad \\ill shortly after be unfolded, because the natures which are bound

together are solids. Hence it is rightly said, that a bond imparts beauty, and an

harmonious communion and union. But what this bond is, and how it is inhe

rent in the things that are bound, Plato shows through the following words.

"

This, however, analogy is naturally adapted to effect in the mostbeautiful manner."

It must be said, therefore, that this analogy is the bond which is now inves

tigated ;but that the middle or media, are after a certain manner bonds. For

analogy is in those things which have the same ratio, and is naturally adapted to

bind itself in conjunction with them; them indeed, through ratios; but itself,

through preserving the same form in things numerically different, and continuingto be one in multitude. For it has this from itself, and according to its own

reason, and this consentaneously. For analogy proceeds from equality. But

equality is of the co-ordination of unity. For as the monad is the fountain and

root of quantity considered by itself; so is equality of all relative quantity,

having the order of a monad, to all habitudes. For that we may omit other

middles or media, wliich more recent philosophers have added, I mean Nicouia-

*

For rnv ynft ,read TOVTO ynp.

Tim. Plat, VOL. I. 3E

402PROCI.US ON Tflli [ROOK m.

ohus, Moderatus, &c., we shall confine ourselves to tlie throe media from which

Plato constitutes the soul, arithmetically, geometrically, ami harmonically.

It mav l>e seen, however, how all these middles -are generated from equality,

by the following method. The arithmetic middle, indeed, after this manner:

Make the first nmnher equal to the first; the second to the first and the second;

and the third to the first, second, and third. Three monads therefore heing pro

posed,there will be produced according to this method three terms, vir.. 1. 2.

3. preservingan arithmetic middle. For this middle consists in equally surpass

ing according to nmnher, and being equally surpassed.1

Hut the geometrical

middle is produced as follow* : Make the lir>t equal to the lir>t ; the second, to

the first and second ;and the third to the

lir>t,to twice the second and

the third. For again, there being three monads, there will thus be

generated the three terms 1. -2. I. forming the geometric middle. For the

peculiarityof analogy consists in preM-i-\ing the same ratio in greater

and lesser terms. And the harmonic middle, which has the third order, is

"eiierated in the following manner: Three monads U ing proposed make theB

first equal to the first, and to twice the second ; the second to twice the fir-t, and

twice the second;and the third to the tir>t,

to tw ice the second, and thrice the

third. Forl>y

this method the three terms 3, 4. and 0. will be produced, form

ing the harmonic middle. For the harmonic middle, according to the Platonic

definition itself, counts in surpassing and being surpassed by the same part o

the extremes. 1 All the middles, therefore, have their generation from equality.

Hut if this be the case, they have the uniform, and a power which collects things,

and causes them to be one. For equalit)is analogous to sameness, to the monad,

to bound and to similitude, through which communion is produced in beings.

Hence Plato appropriatelyadd* the words,

"

mifunil/i/</</<//;//,

because the ana

logies and all the middles have the spontaneous. For they neither introduce an

artificial, nor an adscilitious bond, but present themselves to the \icwin tin;

essences and powers themselves ol things.

"For when cither in three numbers, or masses, or powers, as is the

1

For an account of these media, see my Theoretic Arithmetic.

1In tlie oiiginal, by Mime negligence of I lit. Ir.in^tnlnr^ after taa cV vxrpc\ofA(vii,

if/*- nfujllif nir-

uamd, llie words uraifvaiv

utroi oyj.\iji y-;i, iiuiiiritijtfl^ Killow, \\liuli are olniou->l\ toially lorei^ il

to this place.

Tims 3 is surpassed by 1, by 1 which is a third partof 3, ami 6 jurnaiM s I by 2 which is a third

partot" ti.



OOK in.] TIMJKUS OF PLATO. 403

middle to the first so is the last to the middle;and

again,

as is the last

to the middle, so is the middle to the first; then the middle becoming

both first and last, and the last and the first becoming both of them

middles, it will thus happen that all of them will necessarily be the same.

But becoming the same with each other, they will be one."

In the first place, it is requisite to explain what is here said mathematically ;

and in tin- next place, physically, as hciu^ that which is especially proposed to be.

elVected. I- or it is not proper to separate the discussion from its appropriate

theory. There are therefore some. \vho think that Plato in these words defines

the geometric middle, and amoni; other things which they assert, they sny that

the geometric middle is properly exclusive of all the others analogy ;hut that the

others may he justly called middles. Aicomachus also is of this opinion, and he

speaks rightly. For geometric proportion isproperly ana/n^t/ ; Intt it is rcyui-

sifc tn call (lie t>tliers middle, as Plato also saijx fur ther on in the generation of the

sou/. lint tlic others are improperly called analogies. To others, howe\er, these

appear not to have apprehended the meaning of IMato properly. For they say

that it is not definitely asserted in these words, that there ou^ht to he the same

ratio ; hut thus much only is said, that it is necessary there should he such a ha

bitude of the last to the middle as there is of the middle to the first. lint this

is common to all the before-mentioned middles. For as the monad is to the

duad, accordini: to the arithmetical middle, and the equal iu quantity, so is the

duad to the triad. For by as much as the duad is surpassed by the triad, by so

much is the triad less than the tetrad. And as the monad is to the duad, ac

cording to the geometric middle, so is the duad to the tetrad. For the ratio is

the same. And as the triad is to the tetrad, according to the harmonic middle,

and the part of the triad by which the tetrad surpasses it, so is the tetrad to the

hcxad. For by that part of the triad by which the triad is exceeded by the

tetrad, by the same part of the liexad is the tetrad surpassed by the hexad.

Such, therefore, is their opinion, though Plato clearly assumes the reometric

middle. For it is the peculiarity of this proportion, that tin* first has the same

ratio to the middle that the middle has to the third term. As, however, there

are three middles, the arithmetic, the geometric, and the harmonic, and these

being tuch as we have shown them tol>e,

Plato very properly assumes these

1 For Karti^vfitroi here, I lead K

HOOK in.] TINLKUS 01- PJ.ATO. 405

extremes according to ratio, from our pouer to the other. For analogy is that

which is principally and properly a liond. Hut it is a bond as tliat thrcu<rhO

:cfiic/i, an<l the middle. For through tli(> middle analogy l>inds the extremes.

From this therefore, he roiiuin iicrs as most allied to the nature of analogy, and

because habitude recei\es its completion through it. Hence, also, they are called

middles, and In cause sameness is llie end of all this analogy. For MIICC they

proceed from equality, but equality i< sameness, it comerts all things to sameness.

Sameness, however, may l>e properly and principally asserted of the geometric

middle, for there is the same ratio; but equality of the. arithmetic; and similitude

of the harmonic middle. And in the third place, the ascent is through sameness

to union. For analogy indeed is suspended from equality,1

belli;; a habitude

intern-rated in the boundaries of equality. Hut equality is suspended from same

ness, and sameness from union.

It is necessary, however, after the mathematical resumption of these words, to

direct our attention to thephysical theory.

For it is not tit that those whoapply

themselves to this discussion, should dwell on mathematical speculations ;for

the dialogue is physical; nor that they should neglect such speculations, investi

gating onlv what relates to sense;but it is

requisiteto conjoin both, and always

connect physics with mathematics; just as the tilings themselves are connected,

are homogeneous, and of a kindred nature, according to the progression from

intellect. For, in short, if the Pythagoreans arranged the mathematical e>sence

as a medium between intelligible* and sensibles, as bemi; more evolved than,

intelli^ibles, but more universal than sensibles,1

why is itrequisite, omitting

mathematics, to pay attention to physiology alone? For how is the sensible

nature adorned, according to what reasons is it arranged, or from what reasons

does it proceed, except from those that are mathematical ? These reasons there

fore [or productive powers], are primarily in souls, descending into them from

intellect; and afterwards they are in bodies, proceeding into them from souls.

Hence it is necessary not to remain in mathematical speculations a.s some do;

for this produces false opinions in the auditors, and induces them to think

that physical figures and numl>ers are mathematical. It is also in another

respect absurd. For the reasons of nature do not receive the accuracy and finn-

1

Instead of ftqprijrui ~/ap TJ (itv ev riji arnXoyiai, it is requisite la read in tinsplace, t)f>ri}rai ynp

il fitv aruXnym er ri]t iiorrjrnj.

For rw* rvijTW here, it is obviously necessary to read rwr aurOrjTvr.



406 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK MI.

ness of the mathematical reasons. To which may he added, that in so doing we

shall not follow the demonstrative canons, in which it is said that things

pertaining to one genus must not be transferred to another. Neither then-fore is.

it possible,to survey physical ohjects arithmetically.

Let us, then-fore, if>on

think lit, discuss the theory of the proposed words

physically. The first analogy then, according to which nature inserts harmony

in her works, and according to which the Deiniurgus adorns and arranges the

universe, is one certain life, and one reason, proceeding through all things; which

first, indeed, connects itself, hut afterwards the natures in which it exists; and

according to which sympathy i- ingi-nerated in all mundane essences, as existing

in one animal, and governed by one nature. This life, therefore, which is the

bond of wholes, total nature [or nature which ranks as a whole] and the one

.soul of the world constitute. The one int. Heel likewise generates it;and always

more excellent beings, insert in mundane natures, a greater and m. ire perfect

union. ls-l it he said, therefore, that the hahit which predominates in material

subjects, that material form, and the powers of the middle elements, are bonds.

All these however, have the relation of things U it/toitt ir/in/i the primar\ hond is

not participated, and are analogous to the middle in mathematical entities,

through which habitude subsists in the extremes. 15ut tin- life of which we art-

speaking, which collects and unites all tilings, and is suspended indeed from its

proper causes, but binds the things in which it is inherent, is /;//(/ analogy, and

preserves bold its own imin and the union of itsparticipants. Again, then-fore,

a bond is threefold. Tor the common powers of tint elements are one bond;the

one cause of bodies is another; and a third is that which is the middle of both

the others, which proceeds indeed from the. cause of bodies, but employs the

powers that are di\ided about body. And this is the strong bond, as the theolo-

gist says, which is extended through all things, and is connected by the golden

chain. Fur Jupiter after this, constitutes the golden chain, according to the

admonitions of IVight.

Hut \\htn jour pow r around the whole has spread

A Mi 011^;tori live Loud, a gulden clum

Suspend from a/llier.

1 Tins golden chainma>

In- >aid to IM; the scries of unities proceedingfrom the one, or the ineffahle

principleof things and 4 xtcndmj; a> far as lo matter it-sdl. And of this chaiu, the light immediately

proceeding flout llie .>un is an im.igc.

BOOK ni.j TIM.KUS or PLATO. 497

Physical analogy(lion

beinsj

a tiling of this kind, Ictussurvey

in whatthings,

and through \vli;it, it is naturally adapted to U* established. As Plato therefore

says, it subsists in numbers, inasses, ami powers. Physical uunihirs, however, an?

material forms divided about the subject I i. e. about bodvj. But miitscx are the

extensions of these forms, and the separations or intervals of them about matter.

And powcrx are the things which connect, and îve form [or specific distinction] to

bodies. For form is one tiling, and the power proceeding from it is another. For

form indeed is impartible and essential, but becoming extended, and dilated into

bulk, it emits, as if it were a blast from itself, material powers, which are certain

qualities. Thus, for instance, in fire, the form and essence, of it is impartible,1

and

is truly the imaê of the cause of tire. For in partible natures there is that which

is impartible. Hut from the form in lire which is impartible, a separation and

extension of it take place about matter, from which the powers of fire are exerted,

such as heat, or refrigeration, or moisture, or something else of the like kind.

And these qualities are indeed essential, but are by no means the essence of lire.

For essences are not from qualities, nor are essence and power the same;but

every where the essential precedes power; and from that beini; one, a multitude

of powers proceeds, and that which is divided, from that which is indivisible; just

as from one power many energies proceed. For by how much more each Ihinsf

proceeds, by so much mure is it multiplied and divided, conformably to [the

characteristic of] its principle and cause, which is impartible and indiv isible.

As in every body, therefore, then1

is this triad,

1

I mean number, bulk, and power,

analogy and I lie physical bond, occupy from on hi^h the numbers masses, and

powers of bodies, and likewise conirreâte their partible essences, and unito

them for the purpose of producing the one completion of the world. They also

insert communion in forms, symmetry in masses, and harmony in powers. And

thus all things are rendered eflable and consentaneous to each other. Hut Una

analogy proceeds from the middle to the first, and from the third to the middle;

from the first also to the middle, and from this to the last; and again, from the

last to the middle, and from this to the fust. Because, likewise, a bond of this

kind imparts progression and conversion to bodies, it begins indeed from the

*Iri -tcitd of ro firv

ei^nt nvrov Knt uvnn, aftrpovtrirri nat rot ayn\fin rrjt niriai rnv Typni, it 15

r"<(li

ilr to rend, rn^tv tttnt nvrov unoi Tiau/irfin rari, i oTtt ya\/jarj airiat row pci.

For row Tftiniv ruirou ill llns jlacr ,it is

rc<|iii->ilc

to rtiul roi rpiakov rovro\,

)nic.i(l of n/jfHii licrc, it is nvcojary to rcxd^r>i<rrcu.



400PUOCLUS ON TIIK [BOOK in,

middle, in consequence ofl>eing

connective, and the cause of union, and is

defined according to thisj>eculiarity.

Hut it proceeds from the first through the

middle, to tlie last, as extending :md unfoldingitself, as far as to the last of

tilings.

And it recurs from the last to the first, as converting all things through harmony

to the intelligible cause, from which the division of nature, and the separation and

interval of bodies were produced. Tor by converting them to this cause,

according to one circle, one order, and one series, secondary Iwing suspended

from primary natures, it causes the \\orld to l>e one, and most similar to the

intelligible- [paradigm].For as there all things an; truly united to each other, so

here all things are ada|>ted to each other. And as intelligible* proceeding from the

good, are airain converted to it, through the goodness \\hieh is in tin in,1

and

through the intelligible monads ;thus also sensible* proceeding! from the Demi-

urtrus, are aijaiii converted to him, through this bond, which is di>tributed and

pervades through all of tlieiu, and binds all tiling together. For in this respect

it imitates tin: intelligible. But it subsists intellectually in intellect, totally in

wholes, and partiallyin partial

natures.

After the same manner, therefore, as the intelligible, the sensible world has all

things, according to all its parts. For tire, so far as it is tangible, participatesof

earth, and earth, so far as it is visible, participates of lire, and each participates of

moisture. For earth indeed is conglulinated and connected through moisture,

and its dissipated nature is united through it; but tire is nourished and increased

bv it. So that the extremes are the middle, in order that w hat is said may

become physicallymanifest in things that are known by us. The extremes, there

fore, are in a certain respect the middle, as preserving through it their proper idea,

and remaining such as they are. And moisture itself, so far as it is coloured,

participatesof tire, and so far as it is re-invigorated through heat. I5ut again, so

far as it is tangible, it participates of earth. So that each of the extremes gives

iM rfcction to moisture. These things, however, will shortly after become more

known to us.

lint through this harmony and analogy, in the first place, sameness presents

its* -If to the view, and in the next place union. For bodies themselves according

to their own nature are partible,and are subdued by dillereiic" and strife. Thes\

however, at the same time through harmony, are leagued in friendship with same

ness, and through sameness >\ith union. For through analogy the universe is

1 or fvavrifi

read i wcu.



BOOK in.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 409

completely rendered one, this having the power of making things (hat t\re divided

to l>e one, of congregating things that are multiplied, and connecting things that

are dissipated. Hence, theologists surveying the causes of these things in the

Gods, enclose Venus with Mare, and surround them with Vulcanianl>onds;

the

difference \\hich is in the world being connected through harmony and friendship.

All this complication and connexion likewise has Vulcan for its cause, who

through demiurgic bonds connects sameness with difference, harmony with dis

cord, and communion with contrariety. And this being effected, Apollo, Her

mes, and each of the Gods laugh. But their laughter gives subsistence to mun

dane natures, and inserts efficacious power in the bonds. Let these things, how

ever, as it is said, be preserved in sacred silence. But now, from what has been

discussed, let thus much be manifest to us, that the physical bond being Vulcanian

and demiurgic, (forthe one and

all-}>erfect Demiurgus comprehends also the pro

duction which is through necessity, as being Vulcanian and Dionysiacal, and

causingeach of the

partsof the universe to be a

whole,)is collective of

contraries,and connective of material things; uniting their essences, measuring their masses,

and harmonizing their powers. It likewise makes all things to be in all, and

exhibits the same things in each other, according to all possible modes, empy-

really, aerially, aquatic-ally, and terrestrially.

"

If then it were necessary that the body of the universe should

been generateda

superficies,and not

have depth, one medium mighthave been sufficient for the purpose of binding both the natures that sub

sist with it, and itself. JUitnow it is requisite that it should be a solid,

and solids are never adapted to each other by one, but always by two

media."

The scope proposed to us [in the Timseus], is, as we have before observed,

to learn how the universe is constituted, and of what it consists. But this being

the design, we may see in what a well-ordered manner the discourse devises the

composition of the tour elements. For it is impossible that there should be one

simple element alone ;since there would not be generation. For all generation

is a certain mutation. But all mutation is naturally adapted to be effected

in two things. All generation likewise is from contraries. But a simple

element itself, is by no means contrary to itself: for it would be itself corruptive

of itself. If, therefore, it is necessary there should be generation, it is

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. 3 F



410 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK MI.

necessary there should not be one element only. For as Hippocrates says,

if there was one element only, it would l>e impossiblefor things to be changed.

For mutation and motion are not to the similar, but to the contrary. Hence

there is not one simple element only. If, however, there is not one, but two

at least, it is necessary that these should be contraries: for generation is

from contraries. It is necessary, therefore, that there should be two elements

having in a becoming manner a nature contrary to each other. Hence, if

they are contraries, they will be in want of a certain bond and medium. For it

is impossiblethat two contraries can in a becoming manner coalesce, without a

third

thing;

since it is necessary that a bond should intervene, which is collective

of both. For being themselves contraries, they will avoid communion with each

other. Hence it is necessary, there should be another third thing which conjoins

them and leads them to the completion ofone tiling.But it is likewise necessary

that this medium should IK. of a bifurmed nature. For if tin: elements which

were to l>e bound were superficies,one medium would be sufficient. But since

thev are solids, they are connected through two media. For the duad being

the pr-imary|-ader of solids, is also allotted the

primordial

cause of the bonds

that are in them. Hence, likewise, Tima-us calls a binding of this kind harmony,

asin>erting

in the extremes a symmetry of communion with each other. "1 he

analoirv also \\hich is in >olids is introduced through two media. For two media

sinaloiriHi-lycome between two similar solids. If, therefore, these things are

rightly asserted, all the elements are four; and there is m-ither one alone, lest we

should destroy mutation; nor two contraries without a third thing, lest there

should notl>e

a bond of things\\hich are hostile to each other. For there will not

be order and ornament from two tilings mo>t foreign to each other. But if you con

ceive a certain thing of this kind, the solution of the doubt will be easy. Moreover,

neither will there be alone two things which are not1contraries. For they will

not IK.- able to operate on each other. For whiteness suffers nothing from a line,

but from blackness. .Nor does heat suffer any thing from whiteness, but from

cold.

Ajiain, therefore, it must be said still more universally, reasoningfrom

things

known, that either there is one element alone, or not one. If, however, there is only

one element of the world, the variety of the phenomena, the oppositionof the cir-

1 For Jet iff* In re, read twain.

1& W is oiiiiltcil in this place in the original.

J Ux i a^ l & l r* omitted in the original.



UOOK in.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 4U

dilutions, and the war of generation, will ho subverted, and either all things will l>e

perpetual,

or all things will hocorruptible.

But if there is not ono elementonly,

tlioro will either he t\vo elements, or more than two. And if t\vo, they will either

he contraries, or notcontraries. If, however, they are not contraries, there will

neither he action, nor passion, nor opposition in bodies, nor will there ho genera,

tion in things which have generation. But if they are contraries, these will require

a medium. And if this ho tin; case, there will either he ono medium, or two

media. Jt is impossible, however, that there should ho only ono medium : for the

elements are notsuperficies. Hence

there aretwo media. Hut

ifthere are

two media of two things, all are four. That so many elements therefore in

numher are sullicicnt to the world, is through these things manifot.

Let us, however, if you please, concisely survey the mathematical meaning of

the words hefore us, and afterwards adduce the physical theory pertaining to

them. J:or how of two similar superficies or pianos there i.s one medium, and of

two similar solids two media, we will survey in numhcr hy themselves. For the

primordial and spontaneous nature of numhers,is

to ho omhraced prior to geometrical necessity. In the first place, therefore, let there he two square numhers 9

and 10, the loss of which has for its side 3, and the greater 4. By multiplying

these and making 1 2, we shall ha\e an analogy in the three terms i), 12, and 10.

\A t two numhers likewise bo assumed, which are not squares indeed, hut at the

same time are similar planes, and let them he IB and32,"

the formerl>eing gene

rated from the triad and hoxad, hut the latter from the tetrad and ogdoad. If

then lore, we multiply either the triad hy the ogdoad, or the hoxad hy the tetrad,

we shall have for the product 24, binding in analogy IB to 32, according to a

sesquitortian ratio. This, however, is caused hy their sides having the same ratio.

If, therefore, the sides of the assumed numl>ors are found to receive no analogous

mean or medium, all the planes generated from them will have hut one medium,

according to the before-mentioned mode. But if the sides themselves should he

1For as 9 is to 1 2, so is 1 2 to 1 6".

1 The two similar plane number* 18 and 3" here adduced hy Proclus, prove that (iaston Pardies

was prrally mistaken in assertingin his F.leuicnts of Geometry,

"

that if two numbers are similarplane.),

the greater may be divided into a* many squares as there are uniti in the less." See the Translation of

this work by Harris, p. 133. For 32 cannot ! divided into as many square* as there are units in 13.

And 32 and IS arc evidently similar plane numbers, because their sides are analogous. For ai 3 is (o

6 so is 4 to 8.

1 The sides of these numbers are 3, 6, 4, and 8, and they have no analogous mean. For there is no

geometrical mean between 3 and 6, nor between 4 and 8. Hence the planes generated from them, vij.

18 and 3?. will have but one medium, which is S4.

found to receive a certain analogous mean, the planes also produced from them,

will necessarily receive more than one mean. For let there l>e two squares 10 and

81, and let the side of the former be 4, but of the latter 9. Since, therefore, the

analogous medium between 4 and 9 is 0, according to a sesquialter ratio, it is

necessary that more than one mean should fall between them. For the tetrad

multiplied by the hexatl will produce 24; but the hexad multiplied by itself will

produce the square of itself30; and multiplied by 9, will produce 54. And there

will be a continued analogy, in the terms l(j, 24, 30, M, 01. Hence, when

the sides have an analogous mean, the planes produced from them, will have more

than one mean.Hence,

too, Platoappears

to me to

say very cautiously,

not that

there is entirely one medium in similar planes, but that it is possible for one to !>e

builicient. For more than one plane Ix-ing produced, one medium would be suf

ficient to conjoin them, \iz. 3<J alone, according to the duple sesquiquartan ratio.1

And thus much concerning similar planes.

Let us, however, now pass onto similar solids, and survey the media in these.

In the first place, therefore, let there IK? two cubes 8 and 27, the former having

for its side 2, and the latter 3. Of these cubes, there will be two media, the onelieing produced from twice two multiplied by three, i. e. 12, and \\hich on this

account is (ocx^) a beam, but the other from thrice three multiplied by two, i. e.

18, and which is therefore (VjuvSo^J

)a tile. These will make a continued analogy

with the before-mentionedcu1>es, according to a sesquialter ratio.* And here you

may see how each of the media has two sides from the cube placed next to it, but

the remaining side from the other <-u!>e. This however will be useful to us for

the purposes of physiology. Again, if the numbers were not cubes, but similar

solids, they will likewise have two analogous middles or means. For let there

be two similar solids 2 i and 19*2, the sides of the former being 2, 3, 4, but of the

latter 4, 6, 8. And from the duad, the triad, and the ogdoad, 48 will be produced,

but from the tetrad, the hexad, and again the tetrad, the product will be 06.

Here too, each of the media will have two sides from that similar solid of the ex

tremes which is next to it, but one side from the other cube, in the same manner

1 For as 16 is to 21. so is 21 to 36~, so is 36 to 51, so is 51 to SI, the ratio being sesquialter.

1For 36" is a geometrical mean between 16" am! 81, according to a dujilo sesquiquartau ratio. For

36 contains 1 6 twite, and a fourth part of it, i. e. 4 also; aud 81 contains 36" twice, or 72, and $

besides, which is -a fourth part of 36.

1 For rXiOi/k here, read w\n-0vt.

*For 12 contains 8 once, and the half of 8. And in a similar manner

^"=ljand -*

J=

1J.

5r oi- 12=2X2X3, 2 being the cube root of 8, and 3 being the cube root of 27 ; and 18=3X3x2.



BOOR MI.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 413

as in the media of the before-mentioned cubes. Hence between similar solids,

two media are sufficient; just as Platosays, that two media adapt solids to each

other, but never one medium. "What then, some one may say, is there not one

medium alone of the two solid numbers G4 and 720, which medium is 216 ? For

04 is a cube produced from 4, but 729 from 9. And 729 is thetriple and su-

perparticular ogdoan part of 210; and after the same manner 210 of 61. For

each contains the other thrice, and three eighths of it besides.1

And this will not

only be the case in these, Iwt also in other numbers: for these are the smallest

numbers which admit of this. In answer to this however it must lw? said, that

the above-mentioned numbers are cubes and at the same time squares; the one,

i. e. 64, being the square ofO, but the other, i. e. 720, being the square of 27.

Hence they have one mean, not so far as they are cubes, but so far as they have

the tetra^onic peculiarity. For the tetragonic side of 04, i. e. 0, being multiplied

by 27, which is the tetragonic side of 729, produces the analogous mean 210,

accordingto the method delivered

[by mathematicians]of

finding the mean between two squares. He who makes the objection, therefore, using solids not as

solids, binds them together by one medium. .But if he had surveyed them so far

as they are solid numbers and cubes, he would have found that there arc also

two media between these, the one being 144, from four times 4 multiplied by 9,

but the other 324, from nine times 9 multiplied by 4.

But Peinocritvis doubts, how it is said that one analogous medium falls be

tween two planes. For by assuming four lines in continued proportion, it maybe shown that the squares from them are analogous ; so that two analogous

media will fall between two extreme planes. He adds, that different persons

have been involved in different difficulties through this doubt, and have l>een led

by it to the duplication of the cube, and such-likc investigations. Plato, however,

docs not say that one medium only falls between any casual planes, nor again

two media between casual solids, but between those that are similar, and in an

oflable ratio, and which have their sides arranged according to numbers. For

1 Tim* 729 contains tlircc limes 2lfi, i. c. G4S, and llirce eighths of it beside*. For the eighth part of

2l6 is 27, and thrice 27 is HI, the difference between 729 and 6 18. And thus also 2l6 contains

64 thrice, i. e. Ip2, and 24 besides, which i. three eighths of 04.

1Thift i most probuhlv the junior Ucmocrilus mentioned by Porphyry in hit life of Plotinu*.

1Tor let the lines be tu tbc numlxn 2. 4. 8. ]6, which are in continued proportion; then the

Kjiiarrs of them 4. 10. 64. 250 will aUo be analogous. Fora* 4 it to 10, to it 10 to 64, ami 10 it

64 to 256.

the things generated by the demiurgic God, are efiable with reference to eacli

other, and are variegated by demiurgic nmnl>ers, as Plato says in another part of

tliis dialogue. And it is requisite to assume similar planes, and solid numbers,and to survey in these the truth of the Platonic assertion. We shall show there

fore at the end of these Commentaries, how it is possible, two right lines being

P\en, to find two analogous media, selecting for this purpose the demonstration

of Archytas, rather than that of Mena-chmtis, because he uses conical lines, and

in like manner rather than that of Eratosthenes, because he employs the apposi

tion of a rule.1

With respect however to the things investigated, it must now be said that Plato

appears to Ime perfect confidence in arithmetical demonstrations, since it is also

possible to find in geometrical figures of two solids an analogous medium. For

if there are three analogous right lines, a, , y,in a duple ratio, the squares from

them will be in a quadruple ratio, as o, j-r, and o. But the solids from them

will be in an octuple ratio, as ^i3, o, and rr Hence there will be three culies, the

extremes of which will ha\e one analogous mean. And it is manifest that all

cubes are similar to each other. For the angles are the same in each cube and

aie equal; and they are also comprehended by similar plane:- ;and the multitude

of them is equal. Moreover, we may thus demonstrate in the same manner as

Democritus, that two analogous media fall between two similar solids. For that

all squares are similar to each other is evident; since the angles are the same

in each, and are equal, and the sides are analogous. Hence it seems that

Plato

employingnumlN-rs, shows that solids are never

co-adaptedby one mean,

but always by two media. For in these, as you see, the extremes are cubes, and

at the same time similar planes. For<p3,

is from J-TT, and X^,. But the other of

the extremes rlt

is from,and 3, and there is the same ratio of the sides. There

is therefore one medium of these, so far as they are similar planes, but not so far

as they are solids. So that you \\ill have the solution of what is said, by assum

ing numl>ers. For it is possible to find the same numbers which are at the same

time similar solids and planes; but it is impossible to assume geometrical figures

which are at one and the same time similar planes and solids ; since this also

may be said, that all of them being cul>es,the form of them is one. But Plato

From the most unfortunate loss of the l.iiirr partof these commentaries of Proclus, tins method

likewise of his Cudmt: two analogous nitilia between two gitcn liues, is lost.

noon in.] T1MJEUS Ol- PLATO.

H.ssuming that the moans are similar to the extremes, is thus confident in the

theorem. For how would the extremes be in want of other

bonds,if

theyhad

entirely the same form ? And how would the media communicate with the

extremes, and differ from them according to the sides, if they were all of them

cubes? Hence it is evident that he assumes the media, as being truly media, and

thus says, that solids are never conjoined by one, but always by two media;

every medium containing the communion and difference of the things of which it

is the medium. For to say universally, that all solids are connected through

twomedia, makes

themedia

to le infinite. It is

manifest, therefore, that heassumes things which are mo>t distant, and in every respect contrary to each

other, and which have all the sides opposite to all ; these in natural bodies being

corporeal powers. But he does this, in order that of the media, one of them mayhave a greater communion with one of the extremes, but a less with the other;

and that this may be vice versa with the other medium. Unless that also is true

which is asserted by our preceptor. For he says that it is necessary to assume

the same ratio in the media or means, as there is in the sides of the extremes.

Thus, for instance, if one of the cubes is 8, but (he other 27, we shall find the

media of them, if we take their sides 2 and 3, and multiply the square of 2, i. e.

4 by 3, and the- square of 3, i. e. 9 by 2. For then the media will be 13, and 10,

which will conjoin the extremes through thesesquialter ratio, which is the ratio

of the wides of the cubes. Hence, as there is the same ratio in the sides of the

cubes, and in the media, Plato says that there is necessarily two media, and this

in a manner more consonant to the proposed physiology. For in the powers of

the elements, and in simple forms, the Demiurgus inserted communion prior to

things of a composite nature. \\ e however conjoin the extremes through the

octuple ratio, the sides of them not having an octuple ratio. For the mean beinir

assumed in a duple ratio, the extremes will have a quadruple ratio. Thus, for

instance, in the three proposed terms, if we assume a fourth analogous term, we

shall find that as the side 2 is octuple of the side Hi, so the first cube is con

joined to the fourth through the octuple ratio. For if you add 10, as a fourth

term to 2. 4. 0, the cube from 10, is conjoined to 0, through the octuple ratio

which 64 has to 8, arid 512 to C4, and 4090 which is the cu\tc of 16; to 512. So

that the sides of the media receiving an octuple ratio, two media will fall between

1

If each of the lorms 2. 4. S.J(<,

is cubed, the four terms 8. G 1. 312.l"! (j, will Ix- producer), and

C4 is octuple of 8, 512 of 64, and 4096 of 512; and the first cube 8 is conjoined to the fourth

through tlieoctu|>le

ntio.

PROCLUS ON THE in.



4]6 [BOOK

the extremes. But if a fifth analogous term is added, the aides will no longer be

conjoined in an octuple ratio hut in the ratio of 10 to 1 ;and on this account there

will Ix? threeanalogous

media between the two cubes. What Platosays,

therefore,

is true according to the before-mentioned method. Are not the sides also co-

adapted to his purpose? And it is requisite to say, that there may be one medium

IxHween two cul>es, yet not according to harmonic ratios. Hence, when there is

trul v a colligation of the extremes through these ratios, then it isj>erfectly requisite

that there should IK; two media. Through these things, therefore, it is manifest

mathematically, that similar planes requireone medium, and similar solids two

media, and tlr.it they can never be bound by one mediumalone.

Being impelled, however, by these observations, let us see how physical concep

tions accord \\ ilh them, and let us adapt probable to scientific assertions. And in the

first place,let us survey what a physical plane is, and how in planes of this kind,

there is one medium, but two in physical solids. The divine lamblichns indeed

(forthis man in a remarkable degree comprehended a theory of this kind, others

be-in-- as it were asleep, and conversant only with the mathematical meaning of

the words) appears to me to distinguish things simple from such as are composite,

partsfrom wholes, and in short, material powers, and material forms, from the

essences, to which they give completion. And some of these, he calls superficies,

but others solids. For as a superficiesis the ultimate boundary of a mathe

matical body, so likewise material form, and material power, are the morphe and

boundary of their subject*. These thin-s, therefore, being thus divided, in

things* of a simple nature, one medium i & siillicient, because there is [one] difference

of the reasons and forms, and according to the common bonds of the reasons

and the life. For in these there is one mrdium. Hence qualityis uniformly

connected with quality,and power with power, according to the difference

and sameness of forms. 15ut in things of a composite nature, there are very-

prop* rlytwo media. For the dtiad is the supplier of all composition and

separation. Every composite nature however consists of many essences and

powers. Hence, there are many media. And these at least are two-fold. For

there is one medium according to form, and another according to subject.

We however, conformably to physical principles, speak as follows, receiving

auxiliaries from what Plato says as he proceeds.Or rather, let us speak from

the beginning.There are some physiologists then, who ascribe one power to

each of the elements;to lire indeed heat, to air frigidity,

to water moisture, and

!.o earth dryness ;in so doing entirely wandering from the truth. In the first



BOOK III.]TIM/F.US OF PLATO. -H7

place,

because they subvert the world and order. For it is

impossible

for tilings

to be co-adapted to each other, when they possess the most contrary powers,

unless they have something in common. In the next place, they make the most

contrary natures allied to each other, viz. the hot to the cold, and the moist to

thedry."

It is necessary however, to make things which are hostile more remote

than things which are less foreign. For such is the nature of contraries. In the

third place, therefore, the first two powers will have no sympathy whatever with

the rest ; but will ledi\

ulsed from each other. For it is impossible to saywhat is common to humidity and

frigidity. And in addition to all these things,

as the elements are solids, they will not be conjoined to each other by any

medium. It has however l>een shown that it is not possible for solids to !*

conjoined through one medium. IVor can they be conjoined without a medium.

For this is alone the province of things that are perfectly without interval.

But some others, as Ocellus, who was the precursor of Tinr.eus, attribute two

powers to each of the elements, to fire indeed heat and dryness, to air, heat and

moisture, to water, moisture and coldness, and to earth, coldness and dryness.

And these things are written by this man in his treatise On Nature. In what

therefore, do these err who thus speak ? In the first place, indeed, wishing to dis

cover the common powers in the elements, in order that they may preserve the

co-arrangement of them with each other, they no more assign communion than

separation to them, but equally honour their hostility and their harmony. What

kind of world therefore, will subsist from these, what order will there l>e of things

which are without arrangement and most foreign, and of things which are most

allied and co-arranged ? For things which in an equal degree are hostile and

peaceful,will in an equal mode dissolve and constitute communion. But this

communion being similarly dissolved, and similarly implanted, the universe will

no more exist than not exist. In the second place, they do not assign the

greatest contrariety to the extremes, but to tilings most remote from the extremes;

though we every where see, that of homogeneous natures those which are most

distant have the nature of contraries, and not those which are less distant. How

likewise did nature arrange them, since they are most remote in their situation

from each other? Was it not by perceiving their contrariety, and that the third

was more allied than the last to the first? How also did she arrange the motions

1 For TO trnmtrrtiTahere,

rcatl rei

trnrriwrara,and for

ry Orppnv ry 4lV

Xf*ftr

Orpfior,c. X.

*For mrr\(irr\ptva in this J)laCf,

I read tiypifirra.

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. 3 Ci

418 HROCLUS ON THE [HOUK in.

of them, since fire is most light and tends upward, but earth is most heavy and

tends downward? But whence were the motions ofthem which are most contrary

derived, if not from nature ! If therefore, nature distributed to them most contrary

motions, it is evident that they are themselves most contrary. For as the

motions of simple brings are simple, and those things are simple of which

the motions arc simple, thus also those things are most contrary of which

the motions arc most contrary. And this may occasion some one to wonder at

Aristotle, who in \\liat lie says about motion, places earth as most contrary to

lire; but in what lie says about powers, he makes the most remote of similar

natures to Ix- more friendly than tlue that are proximate, when they are moved

with most contrary motions. For a^ the elements have contrary places in their

positions, as they have contrary motions in lations, as they have contrary powers,

"Ta\itv and levity, through which motions subsist in their forms, thus also they

ha\e contrary passive qualities.Aristotle himself likewise manifests that earth is

contrary to fire. For wishing to show that it is nece.ssarv there should lw more

bodies than one, he savs:"

Moivo\cr, if earth e\its, it is al>onec-s>ary

that

lire should exist. I-

or in things, one of the contraries of which naturally is,the

other likewise has a natural subsistence." So that neither was he able after any

other manner to show that then; are more elements than one, than by asserting

that file is contrary to earth.

Farther still, as the elements are solids, how can they be bound together through

one medium ? For this is impossible,iu solids, as we have before observed.

Hence those who assi 1 1 these things, neither speak, mathematically nor physically,

but unavoidably err in both the>e respects. For physical are thrived from mathe

matical entities. Tuna ustluref(>re atone, nr any other irhu rightly follows linn,

neitfitr attributes t>nc i<or i:co]K,\H->-S

alone, to tin. elements, buttriple [town ; to /ire

indeed, t unity of purls,acutenti,s and facility of motion ; to air, tenuity of parts,

cbtusencss, nnJ juniity of nioHnii ; tu tenter, grossiusa oj parts, out likeness, andfacility

of motion ; ana t eai t/i, grossiiexs o/ parts, obtuxencss, amidifficulty of motion. 15ut

this is in order that each ofthe elements

mayhave two

powers,each of which is

common to the element placed next to it,and one power which U dillereiit, in

the same manner as it was demonstrated in mathematical numbers and figures;

this diHerent power being assumed from one of the extremes ;and also in order

that earth according to all the powers, may subsist oppositely to tire; and that

1

1 i-rfiav here, it u obviously nece>-iir> to rc.ul nun put.

BOOK in.] TIM/CUS OF PLATO. 419

llu; extremes may have t\vo media, and the continued fjiiantitiestwo; the latter

having solids for the media, but the forme/, common powers. For let lire

indeed be attenuated in its parts, acute, and easily moved. For it has an attenu

ated essence, and is acute, as having a figure of this kind[i.

e. a pyramidal figure],

and on this account is incisive and fugitive,1

and |)enneatcs through all the other

elements. It is also moved with facility,1 as being most near to the eel -stial

bodies, nnd existing in them. For the celestial fire itself is moved with celerity,as

is likewise

sublunaryfire, which is

perpetuallymoved in

conjunctionwith it, and

according to one circle, and one impulse. Since therefore, earth is contrary to

fire, it has contrary powers, viz. Crossness, obtuseness, and difficulty of motion,

all which we see are present with it. But these being thus hostile, and being

solids, are also similar solids. For their sides and their powers are analogous.

For as the cross is to the attenuated, so is the obtuse to the acute, and that which

is moved withdifficulty, to that which is moved with facility.

But those are

similar solids of which the sides that constitute the bodies are analogous. Forthe sides arc the powers of which bodies consist. Hence, as tire and earth are

similar bodies, and similar solids, two analogous media fall between them; and

each of the media \\ill have two sides of the extreme situated next toit,

and the

remaining side from the other extreme. Hence, since lire has for its three

physical sides thetriple powers, tenuity, acuteness, and facility of motion, by

taking away the middle power, acuteness, and introducing instead of it obtuse-

ness, we shall produce air, which has two sides of lire, but one of earth, or two

powers of lire, but one of earth;

a.s it is lit that what is near should rather com

municate with it, than what is separated in the third rank from it.

Again, since earth has three physical powers, contrary to the powers of fire,

vi/. grossness ofparts, obtuseness, and difficulty of motion; by taking away

difficultyof motion, and introducing facility

of motion, we shall produce water,

wi ich consists of gross parts, is obtuse, and is easily moved;and which has

indeed, two sides or powers common with earth, but receives one from fire.

And thus these media will lit;spontaneou>ly conjoined with each other; com

municating indeed in twofold powers, but diilering in similitude by one power;

and the extremes will be bound together by two media. liach element also will

thus be in a greater degree conjoined to, than separated from the element which is

1

For vworikoK in tins |We, rc;t<l virn>.ruor.

1InMf;<l of <uirr)ro licrr, it is ncct ssarv to read luifjjror.



42o PROCLUS ON THE [noon nr.

near to it ; and one world will be perfectlyeffected through all of them, and one

harmonious order, through the predominance of analogy. Thus also, of the two

cul>es 8 and 27, the medium 12 l>eing placed next to 0, will have two sides of

this, hut one side of 27. For 12 is produced l>y

2 X 2 X 3. But it is vice versa

with 18. For this is produced by 3 X 3 X 2. And tin; side of 27 is 3, in the

same manner as 2 is the side of 0. The physical dogmas then-fore of Plato about

the element* of the universe, accord with mathematical speculations.

Hence these things being thus determined, let us physically adapt them to the

words of Plato. We call a [physical] plane or superficies therefore, that which

has two powers only, but a [physical]solid that which has three powers. And

we say, that if we fashion bodies from two powers, one medium would conjoin

the elements to each other. But since, as we a.-^sert, bodies|>osse.ss triple pow

ers, they are bound together by two media. For there are two common powers

of the adjacent media, and one power which is different. And the extremes

themselves, if they consisted of two powers,would be conjoined through one

medium. For let tire, if

youwill, be alone attenuated and easily moved

;but

earth on the contrary, have alone grossnessof parts and immobility. One me

dium therefore, will !* si.Hicient for these. Fur grossuess of parts and facilityof

motion, and tenuity of parts,and dilliculty of motion, are all that is requisite

to

the colligation of both. Since however, each of the elements istriple,

the extremes

require two media, and the things themselves that are adjacent, are bound toge,

liter through two powers.For solids, and the>e are things that ha>e triple con-

tr.iry powers, are never co-adapted by

one medium.

" Thus therefore, the divinity placing water and air in the middle of

lire ami earth, and rendering them as much as possible analogous to

each other, so that what (ire is to air, that air might be to water, and

what air is to water, that water might be to earth, he bound together

and constituted the heaven, visible andtangible."

Some of the Platonists, being implied by the assertions of Aristotle, extend

Ihiouiih the whole world one passive matter, not at all different from that of tlie

lictn-eHx, and in consequence of embracing certain barbaric opinions, give to the

world a fifth body, r.nd refer the doctrine concerning it to Plato. For Aristotle,

following these opinions, introduced a fifth element. And this in a certain re-

vprct he obscurely signifies, adducing the observations of the Barbarians as a



BOOK in.] TIM.EL S OI- ILATO. 421

testimony of tlio |wrpetuity and sameness of the motion of irther. But others

assert, that tin1

heavens are of a different essence, as having a different form of

life, a more simple motion, and a moreporpetual nature

;i>nt that Plato is now

speaking ali>ut the sublunary elements, and adorns these by analogies. These

men indeed, speak rightly, both withres|>ect

totilings, and the opinion of Plato,

in asserting that the nature of the heavens is dillcrcnt from mutable, and in short,

material things; but at the same tune they neglect the Platonic words, in which

the philosopher says, that"

the Dciniurgitx bound together and constituted the hea

ven [or the universe} through the analogy of the four elements ;n and again, in another

place,"

that lie elaborated the idea of the stars, for the most part fromfire."

Lot us therefore, if you are willing, preserving the opinions of both these men,

perspicuously show, that the whole world consists of the four elements, and that

the heavens are of a different essence [from the sublunary region]. And in the

first place let us discuss the latter. For it is necessary, either that the heavens,

should be entirely different from the four elements, being, as some say, a fifth ele

ment;or that, the heavens should consist of the four elements

;or from some one

of the four;or from more than one. And if

1

the heavens consist of the four, they

either consist of elements specifically the same with the sublunary, or of others.

If however, that element is different from the four, how does Plato say that the

whole world consists of the four elements? But if it is constituted from one of the

four, how does he say shortly after, that the stars consist for the most part of fire?

And if the world is constituted from more elements than one, [but not from all

the four] how will ithapj>en

that a. divine body will not be imperfect, and how will

it possess all things, though the earth, and in short the sublunary region, have all

things ? But, if the world consists of all the elements, how does it happen, that in

the heavens the composition of them is indissoluble, but in these [sublunary]

realms is dissoluble. For they will not be indissoluble on account of equal domi

nion. For whence, if there is equal dominion, is the variety in the heavens

produced?

And howdoes Plato

saythat fire for

the most part predominates there,

if there is an equal domination? But if the heavens consist of four elements spe

cificallydifferent from the four sublunary elements, how, since they are com

posites,are the heavens moved with a simple motion ? Where also are the whole

nesses of the things which are there mingled ?

1 Fortifiuy in Uiis place, it is necessary to read o/iwt.

14 is omitted here iii the

original.

1MIOCLUS ON THE [BOOK in.



4-21

Such therefore bring the doubts, it is better to say that all heaven consists offire,

trhic/t Ihere predominates ;but thai it also comprehends according to cause, the powers

of the other ektaents, such as iho solidity and stability of earth, the congliitinaling

and uniting power of water, and the tenuity and transparency of air. Tor as

earth comprehends all things terrestrially,so the heavens compn-hend all things

according to a fierycharacteristic. So that one tiling [r e. tire] has dominion,

and the other elements are comprehended in it causally. It is necosary how

ever totliiuk, that the fin- which is tin-re, is nut the same with sublunary lire, but

that it is di\inefire, consiibsistent with life, and an imitation of intellectual lire.

And that the lire which is here is wholly material, generated, and corruptible,

(ienuiue lire therefore, is in the hea\cns, and total tire [or the wholeness of tire]

is there. But earth is lucre according to cause, U ing another species of earth,

and as it is lit it should, connaseeiit with di\ine fire, possessing solidity alone, m

the same manner as lire possesses an illuminative power. And as this celestial

lire is not caustic, neither is the earth which is there gross, but the summit of each

is there. And as genuine and truly existing lire are in the heavens, so real earth

is here, and the w holeiiess of earth;but tire is here according to participation,

and materially, in the same manner as earth is primarily.For that which remains

is in each appropriately ;there the summit of earth [or earth according to cause;]

but here the dregs of lire. But this is evident from the moon which possesses

something solid and .lark, and obstructing the light.For to obstruct is alone the

province"of earth. The stars also obstruct the sight, as producing a shadow

above themselves. And it is evident this being the case, that since lire is in the

heavens, and also earth, the diaphanous media between these, are likewise

necessarily there piimarilv ;air indeed, such as the most pure and agile air which

is here; but water, Midi as the most exhaleable with us, and even still purer than

these; in order that all things may be in all, but appropriatelyin each. For on

this account we chataet.-ri/.e lire by visibility,which is deservedly the peculiarity

ot

all lire. For as earth is piimarilv tangible, so lire is primarily \isible; because it

is notin want of

anyone of the other elements, in order that it may be visible, as

the others are in want of tin: illuminative power of lire to their visibility.But lire,

becomes itself visible through it-elf. And this is common to all lire. The.

questiontherefore is solved.

That all the prudes-ion of the elements however, may In-come manifest to n*.

and the gradations of them, it is requisitethat we should begin the theory of them

from un liigli.These four elements therefore, tire and air, water and earth,

toon in.] TIM.KUS OF 1 LATO.l-J. i

subsist primarily, and uniformly according to c.iuso, in the i)<-luui^us of wholes.

For all causes are

antecedently

contained in him,according

to ourcomprehen

sion. Hence ho comprehends the intcllectttal, divine, undcliled, and vigorous

power of lire; the connective and viviiic cause of air; thepn>liti<:

and regermi-

nating hyparxis of water; and the firm,1

stal>le, immutable, and unvacillating

idea of earth. The theologi.st therefore, knowing tliese things, nays of the

Dcmiurgus,

His body * boumllcM, linn, and lii

rj-bii^lit ;

And,

I lic \\idr-c\tciidfilall-pci vailing uir,

I ornn hit broad shoulders, turL, mid bosom fair,

Ills middle zone s llicsjircinlin^ sea profound,

Hi* fcil, (lie nu>(s<Itq>-fix

d \\iiliiit the solidi;n>und.

l^ut from tlioso demiurgic causes, a progression takes phre of these four elements

into tin; unmT.se, though not immediately into the sublunary world. For howcan tli<- tno^t immaterial natures give subsistence without a medium, to the most

material;and immoveable natures, to those that are in every respect moved ? J

;or

theprogression of things is nowhere without a medium, but exists according to a

well-ordered gradation. The generations also into these material, dissipated, and

dark realms, are ellected through things of a proximate nature. For these are

capable of being fashioned by the junior (iods, nnd especially so far as thev have

a tangible composition. Hut the Demiurgus is the father of greater and more

beautiful effects.

Since therefore, the clemenls in the Demiurgus himself are intellects, and impar-

ticipahle intellectual powers, \\ hat \\ ill be the fu>t progression of them Is it not

evident, that they will still continue to he intellectual powers, butparticipated by

mundane natures ? For the progression from impart ieipable intellect is proximatelvto that intellect which is

participated. And in short, the progression fromimpartici-

pable causes, is to those that are participated, and from supermundane to mundaneforms. These powers however, still remaining intellectual, but participate, what

kind of diminution will they have? Is it not this, that they will no longer !

For yoji/Kiiii iJiis place, it isnccf-sary to rr;ul /n/fi.

424 PROCLUS OX THE [BOOK in.



intellectual ? But I call intellectual natures, the forms of intellect, and of an

essence truly intellectual. Being however, participate,but no longer intellec

tual, it is evident that they will not be immoveahle. And not being immoveable,

they will be self-motive. For these are proximately suspended from immoveahle

natures; and the progression is from things essentially intellectual, to those that

are so by participation, and from immoveable beings, to those that move them

selves. These elements therefore, will subsist in life, and will be intellectual

according to participation,and self-moti\e. But it is evident what that is which

will proceed from this. For the descent from life is to animal;

for this is

proximate to life. And from that which is self-motive according to essence,

to that which is self-motive according to the participation of life. And so far

indeed, as the elements proceed from life to animal, they are changed ;but so

far as they proceed from that which is immaterial to immaterial natures(1

mean

immaterial as with reference to mutable matter,) ami from a divine life, to a

di\ine essence, they are assimilated to truly immaterial essences. Hen; there

fore, taking away the immaterial, and the immutable, you will make the material

and the mutable. And through this they will be inferior to the natures prior to

them; but through the order and symmetry of their motions, and the immutability

in things mutable, they will be assimilated to them. If therefore, you also take

away this order, and survey the great confusion and instability of the elements,

you will have the last of all things, and those which are allotted an ultimate

separation, being the dregs of all the elements prior to these. Hence, of the

elements, some are immoxcable, intellectual, demiurgic; others are intellectual

indeed essentially, and immou-able, but are. participated by mundane natures;

others are self-motive, and have their existence in li\es; others are self-motive,

but Ihe[i.

e. are animals], and are not lives only; others are alter-motive, but

are moved in an orderly manner;and others, are disorderly, tumultuous and

confused.

The difference of the elements therefore, In-ing so great, what occasion is there

to disturb what is here said

byPI; to, as if the elements existed oidy in one way ?

For it is necessary to survey the elements in as many wajs as there are media

between the Demiurgus and sublunary natures; because their progression is

through media. The elements therefore, are in the heavens, but not after the

1 Ou is oniiUtil litre in the original.

B OK in.] TiM.nrs or PLATO. ^same manner us in genesiuigic bodies

;for neither do they subsist in the heavens,

after the same manner as in the Demiurgus. JJut prior to the sublunary elements,there are, the celestial fire (and this light manifests which is a secies of

fire)and

celestial earth. Or why -lues the moon being illuminated produce a shadow, and

why does not the solar light pervade through the whole of it ? It is also necessarythat the middle elements should be in the heavenly bodies, but that ditfrrent ele

ments should abound in different parts of the celestial regions. And in tonic

places indeed, it is ntccssary tliat the fiery nature should widely .scatter its splendour,

on account of solidity, as in the starry bodies ; but in others, tliat it should be concealed

from us, as in (he spheres that carry the stars. Hence, thepeculiarity of allfire ;>r/.-

bilitif, but neither heat, norjloating. And solidity and tangibility, arc the character

istics of all earth, but not"rarity, sinking, and a d<m>nrard tcndcnci/. If therefore,

we assume thesepeculiarities, we shall find that fire and earth subsist also analo

gously in the heavens;

tire indeed, defining the essence of them, but each of the

other elements being consubsistent with it.

For again, this also may be said, that causes and the efficients of certain thing?,

every where antecedently comprehend the powers of the natures which art-

adorned and produced by them;and especially when they produce according to

nature. For thu* nature possesses the form of the teeth, the eves and the hands,

through which also she gives tnnrphc to matter. And not every rye possesses

interval, but there is something in which it has an impartible form. Again, soul

is one, and contains in itself that which i* divine, and that which is irrational.

And in the divine part of itself, it comprehends rationally the irrational [towers,

by which it governs, and arranges in a becoming manner irrationality. And

neither is the unity of the soul, nor its multitude destroyed through different

essences. For these things subsist in one way in the sujwrior, and in another in

the inferior part. In a similar manner, the world also is one and many ;for the

heavens are one thing, and generation another. And generation i* adorned from

the heaven*;and these elements are in the heavens, but

celestially.

Forthey

are in soul, psychically, in intellect, intellectually, and in the Demiurgus, demi

urgically. For how could the sublunary elements be governed by the etlluxions

from these natures, unless they also subsisted In them after another manner?

Thus also in the arts, we may see that the physician does not preside over the

carpenter ; for the physician does not antecedently comprehend in himself the

works of the carpenter. Nor does the. mechanic preside over the cook;for the

former does not antecedently comprehend things pertaining to hamjucts. Butit

Tim. P!at. VOL. I. 3 II

PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK in.

420

is the provinceof that which antecedently comprehends the whole power of a

thin<r,to

govern

it. Hence it is evident that the mechanist entirely presides over

the carjK nter, and the physicianover the cook. If therefore, the heavens govern

all generation, the elements will he contained in them primarily.

The Pythagoreans however say, that the elements may l>e surveyed in the

heavens in a twofoldresj>ect,

in one way indeed prior to the sun, and in another

after it : for the moon is ethereal earth. This therefore, the thcologist clearly

asserts. For he says :

.Another boundless earth besides lie made,

Which (jods if/tut, mortal* t>if/ie call,

AVilh num rous houses, ulits, mounts adorn if.

Hut they say that the planet .Mercury is ethereal water, Venus air, and the sun

tire. And again, that Mars is celestial lire, Jupiter celestial air, Saturn celestial

water, and the inerratie sphere celestial earth. And thus shaking in a divided

manner they make the extremes to he every \\here lire and earth, hut conjoin the

ethereal natures through media, \i/. through Venus and .Mercury: for both these

have a collective and unifying power. Hut they conjoin the celestial natures,

through Saturn and Jupiter : for through tlie.se that which is connective of wholes,

and the commensurate, accede to all thinu*. What we now .say, however, is con

formable to the history delivered by many [! the Pytliagoric doctrines]. For

that this mode of distribution is not Platonic, we may learn from this that Plato

arranges the sun immediately above the moon, afterwards Venus, and then

Mercury.

It is necessary therefore to understand, thr.t all the elements are in each of the

celestial spheres, since in the sublunary elements also, each participates of tin-

rest. For lire participates of earth;since Ix-ing moved with facility,

it would

most rapidly perish,if it was entirely without stability. And earth participates of

fire;

for U-inur moved withdilHculty,

it

requires

heat to resuscitate and restore it.

As this therefore, is the case in the-e sublunary elements, much more must all the

elements be in each of the celestial spheres, though some of the heavenly bodies

participatemore

1

of lire, others of air, others of water, and others of earth.

Again therefore, from the beginning we must say, that the elements being coa-

M.iVV i ii I niilttil in llii? jilaccin the original.

BOOK in.] T1M/EUS OF PLATO.-127



ceivcd in one way as nnminnled, but in another as mingled, the first mixture oi"

them produces flu- heavens, which contain nil tiling according to afiery

charac

teristic. [But the second mixture of them produces the sublunary region],1

in which

all tiling subsist according to a middle characteristic. And the last mixture of

them produces the subterranean realms, in which the dregs of all things arc con

tained, Pyriphlegethon, as they say, and Acheron, Ocean and Cocytus. Henceit may be said, that the four immin^led elements are every where, and that there

are live, all hra\m being assumed as one element;but that the last elements are

comprehended in :he earth. The five elements however, are said to iethe elements of the rcor/d ; and on this account the world derives its completion from

them. But it must be said that the four elements an- the elements both of the

heavens and of generation. Hence the heavens are of a fifth essence, besides the

four elements;but are mingled from the simple elements. For these sublunary

four are not in the heavens, but the summits of them are there, and all the four

elements unmingled, and separated from each other by their proper forms. Andthese assertions are most concordant with

Plato,w ho

at one time .says that theheavens consist of the four elements, bound together by analogy, and that the

whole world is constituted from these; but shortly after fashions the fivefigures,

and calls them live worlds. Tor these things ^i\e- a fifth essence to the heavens,introduce a tetractys of the elements, and accord with truth. Tor all things are

in the heaven according to a fiery mode ; and on this account it is a simple body,different from that which is sublunary, and truly comprehends all things pertain

ingto these

material masses. We must not therefore admit that all earth is heavy,nor that all lire is light ;

but sublunary earth and fire areperhaps things of this

kind, while those in the heavens subsist after another manner. For the solidityand stability which are there are derived from earth. And hence each of the

spheres is not moved according to the whole of itself [but revolves round an im-

moveable centre]. But the celestiallight, and

facility of motion, are derived

from fire. The connective and transparent nature of the heavens am from air

and their equability and smoothness, from water.

That Plato however, affords us these auxiliaries, he clearly showsshortly after,

when he says,"

that liewho constituted the world composed itfrom allfire vater, air and

earth, leaving nopart norpower ofany oneofthem externally"For he does not say from

Itapjxars^tbat tue words rj t tuvrrpat rov vxo9t\vr,v row, arc wanting in this plac*. in Ibc

original.

4.

2fiPROCLUS ON THE [BOOK in.



tire or water simply, hut from all fire and all water, through which he indicates

that there w much tire in the universe, and of a dim-rent nature, and also much

water, and which i* essentially dillerent. .Moreover, the theology of (fie Adrians

:,hich vaa UttfoIM into light from divinity, ddii-era the Mine things. For in that

theolotry, the Demiurgus is said to have made the whole world from fire, water,

.irth, and all-nourishing ether or air; and the artificer is said to have fashioned the

world as it were with his own hands. For itsays,"

there was a certain other mass

of lire." Hut he fashioned, as it were manually, all thin;;*, in order that he might

conglomerate the mundane body,"

that the world might U-ome manifest, and

mii;ht not appear membraneous;" which is the same tiling as to say, that it miujit

not alone In-ar the obscure and imU-eile vestiges of forms. For the word mem-

bratieous signifiesthe indistinct subsistence of reasons [or forms]. As we ha\e

said therefor*,the Oracles nUo bear w itness to what is asserted by Plato, since

they too generate the world from the four elements. And thus much concerning

the concord of philosophersabout this particular:

for we shall see in w hat fol

lows, if there is any dillerence respecting it in the doctrine of Plato.

It is manifest however, that the elements are every where IMMIIH! to each other

hy analogy. For analogy, as we ha\e said, imitates di\ine union, and is a de

miurgic bond. And the analogy indeed in mathematics, possesses the accurate

and the scientific : fur the ralios there are immaterial. Hut in physics this is no

longer similarly the case. For the analogy which is in the heavenly bodies

participates of a certain accuracy ;but in sublunary natures the analogy is less

accurate,localise it is conversant with matter. Again therefore, the order of the

elements becomes apparent, ami we see that Plato very properly procures from

the mathematics U-licf in physical reasons. For they are causes, and the demi

urgic progressionis tllected through soul. The generation also of physical es

sences appropriately proceeds through media;and celestial natures are in a

certain respect more allied to accurate reasons, but sublunary natures have an

obscure truth. Plato therefore knowing these things, adds,"

as much aspossible"

in orderthat

you maynot

entirely requirein

physical

reasons a mathematical

accuracy. For if yon arc \nllin to e.iamine each(>f

the cloncnts, you Kill pcrccire

an abundant wirturcin it. Tlnt.s, for instance, air is not simply a tiling ufattenuated

parts. Fur it has also sinmt/iing gn>s.f,iicl>utims,

and uyueuus.\or is water

Min]>ly

easily mo-ccd. And the part ofjirc itselfwhich is mingled uith air, resembles the

1Instead of on c

ve aa\oyio ^curai in lliis plate, il ii necessary to read, on uvuXuyiy ^^.;(7ru^.

HOOK 1 1 i.l TJM.EUS OF PLATO.

429

obtuscness of air ; and this necessarily. For it isrequisite to conjoin the summits

of secondary"with

(lie dregs of primary natures.Farther still, \vo ought also to understand tlie manner in which Plato constitutes

the analogy. For he begins from the media, and preserves the order of the terms,

just as the Demiurgus made all things to IK? in each other,1

together with preserv

ing the distinction of them; and lie denominates all this contexture a bond and

composition. For it is a bond indeed, as imparting union and analogy from the

demiurgic cause; hut it is a

composition, as being thcnco produced according to

essence itself. For some one may hind things which he did not compose. This

however, is not the caw with the Demiurgus hut he is the father, he is the uni

fying cause, and he is the guardian of all his own works. In addition to these

things also, it must he observed that Plato assumes here, as we have said, the geometric mean, and indicates that this is analogy. For it is the

peculiarity of this

middle to have the same ratio. J|< nee somepel-sons proj>erly

call it analogy.The other media then-fore, appear to lc the suppliers of more partial goods to the

world, and not to IM- the sources of the. order which proceeds through all thin??,

and of uninterrupted connexion. For in the generation of the soul the other*

media are assumed for the sake of binding together the geometric ratios, and are

comprehended in the whole geometric middle, as in that which is alone analogy.

"Hence from these and things of this kind, which arc four in num

ber, the body of the world was generated, being concordant through

analogy, and possessing friendship through those, so as to conspire into

union with itself, and to be indissolubleI)} any other nature than by him

through whom it was bound."

That the tetrad itself of the elements, primarily proceeded fromall-perfect ani

mal, (for it was theintelligible tetrad) and that on this account all things exist

tetradically,becomes I think

evident through the words before us ; ami also that

generation proceeds to the tetrad from the monad through the cluad. For the

world is only-begotten and one. Afterwards we find it is mvessary that there

should 1-e the visible and tangible in it; in the next place, we find that these beingmuch separated from each other, are in want of a certain third thing; and iu the

1

For er nXAn,j hero, it isncctiwry to read tr a

*There i* an oumsiou in this

]>latt-of01 oXAai.

third place,that the medium is Informed, and thus \ve arrive nt tlie tetrad. This

therefore, is \vliat the Pythagoric hymn says alxjnt number: That it prucicdsfrom

the secret recesses of the monad, until it arrives at tfu divine tetrad, And this gene

rates the dccaJ, which in the motlier<//

all things. Thus also the father of the Golden

Verses, celebrates the telractys itself, as the fountain of perennial nature. For

the world being adorned by the tetrad, which proeeeds from the monad and triad,

is terminated by the decad, as being comprehensive of all things. That the world

likewise is one through analogy, subsisting from these elements, and from such

like things according to powers, ami from so many according to quantity, Plato

clearly manifests by saying, that not the sublunary region, but the body of the

universe, was generated from the four elements. I5ut thefriendship of the world

is the end of the analogy, through which also the world is saved by itself. For

cverr thing which is friendly, wishes to \H: preservative of that to which it is

friendly : but every thing foreign turns from, and does not even wish that to exist

to which it is abhorrent; M> that the nature which is friendly to, is preservative of

itself. The world however, is friendly to itself through analogy and sympathy,

and therefore it preserves itself. Hut it i.s also preserved by the fabrication of

things, receiving from it an incHahlc guard. Hence also, the theologist denomi-

uates the bond derived from the Pemiurgus strong, as Night is represented say

ing to the Deminrgns,

l?ul \\litn jour po\M-r around llie whole lias spread

A strong cocrciM- bond.

Analogy however, imparts this friendship to the world, by connecting and com

prehending the powers of the elements that are in it. Total nature likewise im

parts it, producing the sympathy and harmony of contraries. Uut prior to nature,

soul imparts it, weaving the one life of the world, and co-adapting all the parts of

it to the whole. And still much prior to these, it is imparted by intellect, which

produces in all things, order, perfection, and one connexion. And even prior to

an intellectual essence, the one divinity of the universe, and all the Gods that are

allotted the world, are the primordial causes of the union that is in it. Jlut much

prior to this, the one D.-miurgus imparts this friendship to the world. This

greatest however, and most perfect of bonds, which the father on all sides throws

round the world, as being effective of the friendship and harmonious communion

in it, is denominated by the [Chaldean] Oracles, the. bondoflove heavily-ladjLn with

fire. For they say, "The paternal self-begotten intellect understanding his works,

HOOK in.] TINLEUS OF PLATO. 431



disseminated in all things, the bond of love heavy with fire." And they add the

cause why he did lliis," That all things might remain

1

loving for an infinite time,

woven together intellectually in all the li^ht of the father. For on account of this

love, all things are adapted to each oilier, "That the elements of the world might

remain running in love." Ilenee, the mundane elements are l)onnd together,

possess friendship, and this indissoluble for an infinite time, through the will of

the father. If also together with these,* you are willing to survey the super-

nnmdane cause of friendship, you will find this likewise celebrated by theologists.

For the J)emiur^usproduced

Venus, in order that shemight Ix-autifully

illuminate

all mundane natures, with order, harmony, and communion. And lie also pro

duced Love as her attendant, who is the unifying cause of wholes. The Demiur-

gus however, likewise possesses in himself the cause of Love. For he is"

.Metis

the first generator, and much-pleasing Jx>ve." Hence he is very properly the

cause of friendship and concord to his fabrications. And pcrhnps looking in this

Phcrccydes said, thatJu]>ilrr

n-licn he was about to fabricate, "CHS i-liangcd into Lore.

Because however, he constituted the world from contraries, he ledit

to concordand

friendship,and disseminated in all things sameness and union which jwrvade

through wholes.

Through these things therefore, the world is indissoluble, and it is likewise so

from its maker. For how can that which generates all things by its very

existence, le the cause of corruption to all things? Besides, every tiling which is

corrupted is corrupted either from matter, or from form, or from its maker; and

from each of these in a two-fold respect. For it is corrupted from the maker,either beinu imbecile, as a partial nature

;or changing its intention, as a partial

soul. It is also corrupted from form, either not being well constituted at first,

or being dissolved in the course of time. And it is corrupted from matter,

either beiujj inwardly deprived of symmetry, or sustaining violence externally.

As corruption therefore, is produced in a sixfold manner, Plato subverts all the

modes of it. For the world is not in either way corrupted from its maker. Not

from his want of power, because the Derniurgus is the l>est of causes, and imbeci

lityhas no place with him, since he governs the universe by inflexible powers.

ForMr>

ir herr, readMIJI-JJ

tr.

*In llic original irjw rnvrwr, Init n* Vrnu i posterior lo the Dciniurgu*, wlio Ir.n prwiotuly bfen

&nid to be (lie CBUM of fririullti|tto llit world, it

ii|>prurilo nir that HO nliouKI read wpot TMTHV, or

ict ruvrou, a rut* nclJotn tignilies ictth, when it govern* the gcuitire.

4M PROCLUS ON THE fiiooK m.

Nor from his will, l>ecanse he doe* not at different times will different things ;

and !>ecause,to \te willing to dissolve that which is beautifully harmonized, and

well constituted, is the province of an evil nature. But he is good, and th

universe, is beautifully harmonized. It is a similar tiling therefore, for the Demiur-

gus to be willing that the universe should not exist, and for him not to bo good.

Nor is the world corrupted from form; for it is harmonized according to analogy,

and isj>erfect

and one. And through harmony indeed, form vanquishes; but

through wholeness and onlyness, the \\oild will ne\er l>e deprived of eongruit}.

Nor is it coiTiipted from matter. For its inherent analogy subverts the privation

of symmetry. But its onlyness removes it from the reach of external vklence.

By no means therefore, is it possible fur the universe to be corrupted. Why then

does Plato add, thai it cannot be corrupted, except by him by whom it was

bound? It is evident indeed, that it every M here belongs to him who binds, to

dissolve. And you may assume from this, that the world is generated in such ;

way,1

as alone subsisting from another cause. For as it is not dissoluble by any

thing else than its generator; so it is not generated by any other than by him

who Ixumd it, which is, as we have said, through his possessing the cause of the

dissolution of that which is bound. NYhat is here said al>o lias another indica

tion. For the universe is indissoluble by every thing, except by him who hound

U. For it is not indissoluble by him; since this is a small thing to assert. But

on tin- contrary, it is eternally bound by him. As if therefore it should be said,

that he who pose!M& s scientific knowledge, i* incapable of being deceived by all

thins*except by

intellect; for he is not incapable of bring deceived by intellect ;

since it is not Miflicient to intellect that the soul is not deceived, but that it

possesses wisdom; thus also the world is not indissoluble by him who tx>uud it,

but is rather bound by him. For by other things it is indissoluble; but to him it

rather belongs to bind, and not to dissolve. Ju>t as it belongs to the sun to

illuminate, and not to darken. For this is the province of certain other things.

"

But the composition ofthe world received one whole of each of the

four elements. For it was constituted by him who composed it, from all

fire, water, air and earth ;and he did not leave externally any part or

power of any one of the elements."

1 Instead of ovrok here, it is requisite to read ourut.

.]TIM/EUS OF PLATO.

4<rj



Plato know, a.s we liavc l>efore observed, that there arc many differences of

fire, of water, and of each of the other elements ; from all which, he snys, the world

derives its completion; and he confers this as the thin, demiurgic gift on the

world. So (hat we must not wonder if he leaven the summits of the four elements

in the heavens, but ihe middle progressions of them in the sublunary regions, and

the last dregs of them in the subterranean realms, distributing the elements analo

gous to the three demiurgi Jupiter, IVeptune, and Pluto. .For each whole of

them is assumed, and the universe consists of all of each;whether you .speak of

that which is

primarilylire, and is celestial, or of that which ha.s a middle

rank,or of that which is the last, which is disorderly and confused, and JK coloured

over with certain fiery qualities. l;or such as we suppose the confused and in

ordinate to be, sueli especially appears to be each of the subterranean elements;

because fabrication in proceeding, ends gradually in that which is unadorned,

and whichparticipates in the smallest degree of order. These things, therefore,

are manifest.

We say, however,that

part and power differ; so far as a part of each of the

elements, is of a similar essence with the whole of which it is a part, but power

gives completion to each of the elements. J or a part of lire is fire ; but power is

one of the many peculiarities in fire, such as motion, acuteness, and tenuity. It is

evident, therefore, that all fire, and all the powers of fire, and of the other elements,

are comprehended in the world. What then, some one may say who is impelled

by the divine wisdom which is beyond the confines of common philosophy;1

who divides all things, into the empyrean, the etherial, and the material ;

*

andwho calls the visible alone the material world, what shall we assert of the firma

ments that are above the world, whether it be requisite to call them Olympus, or

empyrean, or ethers ? May we not say, that though those firmaments should not

consist of the four elements, again it is true, that no part of the four, is external to

the universe, or rather, as Plato says, is c.rternalli/. For the termc.cternally,

is

more cmphatical, because it manifests, that the violence which these elements

bring with them, is not within the universe, but externally invades it. For those

firmaments are fiery, nnd are comprehended in the whole world. And again it

I roi his nicaiu by llm, the wisdom of the Chaldeans, as drlivrrcd in llu-ir Oracle*.

1

According to tlir Chaldean* there Air even corporeal worlds, one empyrean and (lie first ; aAer

iJin, thrcr filirr.nl; and linn llirec material worldi, which consUt of the mmaiic sphere, tlie seven

punelarv tplwrct, und thf sublunary region.

Tim. Plat. VOL. J. 3 I

434 PROCLUS ON THE[UOO K ur.

is true, that there is no fire out of tho universe, but the universe comprehends the

whole of it, such as the universe is, and such as is the amplitude of its bulk. So

that the assertion of Tiinauis is perfectly true. But why then, some one mav sav,

does he give subsistence to the universe, bej^innin^ from the inerratic sphere? Is it

not because it Ix longs to a natural philosopher to discourse about fisible, and in

short, sensible natures ? Perhaps, too, he very properly alone makes mention of

these, as pertaining to the fabrication of Jupiter. For of those[i.

e. the empyrean,

elherial, and material worlds] the etherial is most vivifir, but the empyrean is

paternal, and the material is demiurgic. For the fire vhich is the

Jirstbei/ond, did

not encli se its ptncer in works, but in intellect : fur the artificer of thefieri) [i. c. the

empyrean] icorld ii an intellect*

of intellect, sayx the Oracle. Unless it be requisite

to say this, that Plato produces soul analogous to the etherial worlds, but intellect,

to the empyrean world. Hence also he says, that soul was mintded from three

parts, but that intellect is impartible. For the etherial is triple, and the Pst/cho-

crator, or mingler of soul, who ascends into the (tin-rial worlds, is a Teletarch.

We learn, also, that the

empyreanworld is

one,and is

essentiallyintellectual.

The*e things therefore must hereafter be considered : for it is very dubious how

they accord \\ilh the dogmas of IMato. Now, however, let us pass on to tin-

words that follow.

" For by a dianoctic or reasoning process be concluded, that it would

thus be a whole animal in the highest decree perfect fromperfect parts.

And besides this, that it would be one, as nothing would be left from

which any other such nature might be produced. And further still, that

it would neither be obnoxious to old age, nor disease. For lie intel

lectually perceived, that the heat and cold which meet in body, and all

such things as have strong and vigorous powers, when they surround

bodies externally, and fall on them unseasonably, dissolve their union,

and introducing diseases and old age, cause them to perish through

decay."

1

For ccivra/jir heir, read tif* .

vi

<i^nx.

Irish ad of tuv -yap M>,it is licirsiary to read v yap rovi.

1 The Tclttari-lis subsist at theeitreruity of that order of Gods which is called

intelligible and at

tkr Mint lime intdltctval. Sec the 4th liook of my translation of Proclus oo the Theology of Plato.

BOOK in.] TIM;-EU> OF PLATO. 435

Plato assigns thnv causes, that I may s|>cak summarily, through which no

clement is left externally to tlic universe, viz. perfection, unity, andperj>eliuty.

But all tlicse reciprocate in the subject of them. For if the universe is perfect,

there is nothing external to it. For another world might be generated from that

which is external;since why should one tiling be generated from these elements

[which are within the world], but nothing from those [which are external to it]?

And if there is nothing external to the world, the world is one. Again, if the

world is perpetual, there is no body external to the universe, homogeneous to the

elements which are in it. F<r if any thine: should invade it, it would injure, and

dissolve the universe. For heim; external, it would be foreign to the world, and

being foreign it would molest the universe. And if nothing is external to the

world, the world isj>erpetual.

For it will not have that which is corruptive of it.

If also the admonition resecting the onlyness, perpetuity, and perfection of the

universe, is true, it was liefore assumed from the paradigm. For that was all-

perfeet, uniform [or having the form of one], and eternal;

the second of these, on

account of the one being, from which the only-begotten is derived; but the third,

through eternity, from which perpetuity is derived;and the, first, through com

prehending all the forms of intelligible animals. For this is the peculiarity of all-

perfeel animal. Hut the all-perfect, indeed, is the cause of perfect natures; the

uniform, of monadic; and the eternal, of perpetual natures ; sinceexery producing

cause, produces that which is second similar to itself, and especially when it pro

duces according to essence, and has an essence in energy. At the same time, also,

each of these is demonstrated from these as material causes. For if there is

nothing external to the universe, and if it comprehends all appropriate parts, it is

one, perfect,and perpetual. Some one however may doubt, how Plato arguing

from perpetuity, sajx that nothing is left external to the universe. For there ait;

other perpetual natures, such as the celestial bodies, and yet something is external

to them. But may you not say of these, that other things arc external to them,

and yet not external ? For as naturally separated from other things, there is

somethingexternal to

them ;

but asbeing co-passive

withthem,

andcomprehended

together with them as most principal parts of the universe by one nature, there

is not any thing external to them. But if any thing was external to the universe,

it would le external alone, having no sympathy with the world. It would also

be a thing of a foreign nature, would be destitute of the life which is in the world,

and would lie cut oil from it, by the intervening vacuum.

If, likewise, some one should doubt concerning the psychical vehicles, how they

43(5 PROCLUS ON THE [HOOI in.



are not passivelyaffected by these elements, since they do not vanquish them in

the same manner as divine bodies, it must be said that they would sufter from

(horn, if they consisted of things similar to the elements. But now being com

posed of other things, they remain according to hypostasis indissoluble. At

the same time, however, they are not entirely impassive; but material bodies being

agglutinated to them, they are hindered from their natural motion, and are moved

in an inordinate manner;neither being able to be moved circularly, on account

of the connexion with them of the material bodies, nor to proceed in a right line,

on account of their own nature. Hence also Plato calls the periods of our souls&

disorderly and confuted;not only on account of the psychical motions, but like

wise on account of the motions of our vehicles, in consequence of such a con

glutination taking place from these sublunary bodies. If then-fore the universe is

perpetual, and always subsets according to nature, it will bo requisite that there

should be nothing external to it. For this being perfectly foreign from it, and fall

ing on it externally, would become the cause of its corruption. You may also

say conversely, that the words,"

in artier that the universe nidi/ beJtcrpflutil

an

(hf conclusion;but that the middle term and the cause of the conclusion is this,

that there is nothing external to the unnerve. For Ixrause there is nothing external

to the universe, nothing can introduce corruption to it, us something foreign; so

that it isprrjK. tual. To the universe therefore this is the cause of

|>erpetuity;but

to the parts in it, not this, but other things are the cause of incorruptibility ;such

for instance as, the being constituted by the one l)emiuri;us. For he is simply

the cause of immortality to all things; so that the universe is in a greater degree

incorruptible. For it is incorruptible on account of the Demiurgus, and l>ecause

there is nothing external to it. Thus, likewise, it is possible to convert the other

parts of the text, as, that because there is nothing external to the universe, the

universe is only-begotten ;that the only-begotten may IK. threefold, viz. on account

of the paradigm, on account of all matter being comprehended in it, and on ac

count of the Demiurgus being one. And, also, that the universe isall-perfect,

because it is comprehensive of all things. Kach of these? assertions therefore is

evident. Hut with respect to the things which are the converse of these, such as

that, if the universe is only-begotten it has nothing external to it, this is immedi

ately true of the universe alone;and the demonstrations will be as follow : The

universe is only-U-gotten ;but if it is only-begotten, it will have nothing external

1

I i>r I wcfliffiK hen-, it seems necessary to read worrum*.


to itself, from which another of the like kind be The



tiling may generated.

universe is indissoluble; but if indissoluble nothing foreign to the natures of

which it consists, will be external to it. The universe is all-perfect. For the all-

perfectis that which is not defective in any thing. Hence Aristotle also says, that

the universe alone is perfect; but all things in it are imperfect, as Inking parts

of the universe. These therefore, that I may speak summarily, are the particulars

which are discussed by Plato.

If, however, you are \\illing, we will recur to the words themselves. Through

the words therefore,"

by & t/ianoetic or reasoning process,"he evolves the intellec

tual perception in the Demiurgus, calling it diano ia; since he apprehends it

dianoctically and not through simple projection. Fur a various evolution of cause,

is t/ic work of diannia ; but a uniform apprehension, and the comprehension of all

things in one intellectual perception, are the employment of intellect. Plato therefore,

making himself the promiilgator of the causes antecedently comprehended in the

Demiurgus, refers his own discursive energy to the uniform intellectual perception

of the fabricator of the world. Thus also the oracles call the partible iult llection

of the Demiurgus, dianoia. For they say,"

I soul being hot and animating all

things dwell after the paternal dianoias." But the words,"

a whole animal in the

highest degree perfect from perfect purls,"assimilate the world to the intellectual

wholeness, and the intelligible allness. For parts snbsist with a reference to

whole, and are not perfect from themselves;but they have indeed the perfection

ofparts, yet are simply destitute of perfection. The universe, however, is properly

a whole. For a icholc totallyis one thing ; a part totally is another ; a whole

parti

allyis another ; and a part partially ranks in the third place. And the universe,

indeed, is a whole totally,ax being a whole (f wholes. Hut each of the spheres is a

part totalli/, according to the second form of wholeness. And partial animals, are

wholes partially.For the third wholeness ix in these, but with a partial peculiarity.

And the parIs of these arc parts partially : for they are parts alone.

Moreover the words "as nothing would Itcleft from which any other such nature

might be produced,"is

an explanation oftlie cause through which the world is one;but it is an explanation of the material cause. For if there was anything of this

kind external to the world, another world greater or less might be generated

from it. For the Demiurgus would not leave it unadorned ; because he wishes

1In the original

TO Tar npa nnXcf, but afxi is cfi lenlly superfluous. For (bat Ihe universe i* all-

,i* now about to b proteil.

PROCLUS ON THE [HOOK in.

all to l>e and to be bad. But if the world is one,

things good, nothing nothing

of such a nature as the things from which it is generated, is left external to it.

Perhaps, too, Plato adds this, on account of the celestial bodies, and in short, on

account of monadic natures. For the celestial bodies arc monadic, no other thing*

being left extctnal tothein from which such like bodies could be generated* For each

of them consists of those things, which in magnitude, power, and multitude, are

constitutive of them alone, but of no other thing.1

Hence also they arc called

monadic, becau.se they alone consist of these things alum-. Nor is anyone of the

simple bodies[i. e. of the four elements], such in all respects as the element* of

each of these [celestial bodies]. From the elexated conceptions therefore of

Plato, it follows, that then alone a thing is corrupted by the natures that surround

it, when it consists of the same things as those by whirh it i> surrounded;so that

there :ire as many differences of fire, and of each of the elements, as then* are

monadic natures from which (he universe consists;and the Dciniurgus c.oii.Hli-

tuteil as m.my ideas & Minplc budies, as of theeoni|>.>-ile

n,ilun -, \\hieh he ill-

tended to produce. 1 lence, all of them gi\e completion to one certain thing, nrul

nothing else i generated from them.

Hut the won!>, ncil/n.1 o liiiiiious to<//</</;<,

nor tlifCtisc, ha\e a manifest cause.

For tlisctitc. m /.M * /mm tin. \cttnt of sijnunetn/ in the thunj* that enter into (lie body,

sonic of t lie Jmrtx in iiv being augmented In/ others, nnd dinMilciiig tltc unulugi/ with the

remaining parts &

which we consist, through which a superabundance and deficiency

uj the humours ai c secretly introduced, and old a^e accedes, nature becoming

imbecile, as Plato says further on, through contending against many things that

externally attack it, and enduring a numerous succession of labours. For the

concoction and management of the food, purgation, and all such things as are. the

works of nature, are not without labour. And from this you may assume, that

the Demiurgus A\ ho renders the Atorld free from old age and disease, possesses

the fountain of the IVoniaii >crics. For it is necer-sary that tin; truly existing

cause, and which is alone the cause of heallh, should subsist prior to the genera

ted cause, or the cause of health which the world contains. For, in short, if the

cause of symmetry is the health of the elements, it is necessary that this should

exist in the most beautiful manner in the universe, in which there is in the most

1

IiiMc.nl of \X oi fe oi/feyot liiTe, it i* requisitelo read oXXov fc oi^cim.

For in .* ro fKiorou roi-ru)*-irroi^fiu/r,

I ri-a<t cior ro tkaarnv rovruf irroi\fior. Tllf Cclrsti.ll J>Oili 5

consist of, what Aristotle calls, a litili tlnnent, and winch is essfuliull)<liflcrent from each of the

four clement*.

B o o K m.]

T fM JEUS OF PLATO. 439



eminent degree a symmetry of all the element*;so- thai the fountain of this is

primarily with the J)emiurirus. And it seems that there is one concurrence witheach constitution of composite natures, and which is a certain demiurgic Iiealth ;

but another which renovates the existing state of being, or the state of being,which is still j)rcserved, or is in a perishing condition; wliicli is preserved, indeed,

in tin- natures that are connected by indissoluble bonds, but is in aperishing

condition in those whose connecting bonds are dissoluble. For indissoluble

natures, as bein-r finite, and having a finite power, are in want of renovating

causes: for they are renovated from things which possess infinite power. And

here indeed[i. e. in what Plato now says] the providence of

divinity about the

imiverso, in order that it may be free from disease, concurs with the composition of

the universe. But the providence mentioned in the Politicus, according to which

divinity coming into contact with the helm of the universe, corrects what was

vitiated in a former p-riod, is the paradigm of the second kind of health, which

is of a renovating nature, /fence also theorists refer one kind of health to Kscula-

pins, this beir/ all (he medicine of things preternatural, whether itperpetually or

sometimes only represses a preternatural suhxistencc. But tliey generate another

prior toEsculapius, which is consubsistcnt with the fabrication of things, and which

they produce from lferfnation and Love. Hence, as Plato says, the universe is from

intellect andnecessity, intellect persuading necessity; but necessity Win"

converted to intellect, in order that it may lead all things to that which isl>est. Forit is evident from these things, that the universe subsists according to nature, from

its first composition, through the persuasion proceeding from intellect, and the

conversion of necessity to intellect. Hence, it is manifest that tin- Demiurgus

comprehends the fountain of health, both that which is Esculapian, and that

which is Demiurgic. And thus much for this paiticular.

But the constituted hotly, is a composite, and allcr-motive. That which is

^elf-motive therefore, is preservative of itself; but that which is alter-motive, in

a particular manner requires not to be disturbed by other things. Theuniverse,

however, so far as it is a body is alter-motive. But Plato assumes heat and cold as

things of an efficacious nature, and as possessing strong and vigorous powers ;the

former producing corruption through section, but the latter through violent con

gelation. But the word unseasonably manifests the privation of symmetry, and the

inaptitude arising from the want of symmetry, and besides these, the incursions

*Tor row rov here, read roviov.

440 I ROCLUS ON THE [BOOK in.

For it to those who leave something external to the



from chance. apix-ared

universe, that it was proper to commit the accidents of bodies to fortune and

chance. Plato, however, in saying that heat and cold by surrounding mid falling

on the world, would introduce disease and corruption, may seem to grant that

the world is in short l>oth hot and cold. For if it did not suffer something of

this kind, though the natures which surround it should l>c hot and cold, it would

suffer nothing from them. For he says that the world would sutler hy the things

which would surround it. And if indeed it consisted of things some of which are

hot and others cold, it would sutler hy these; hut if of others, which have strong

and vigorous powers, it would suffer from tin m. For whether these surrounding

nature* should happen to he contrary to the things of which the world consists,

because contrary, they would cause the composite on which they fall, to decay ;

or whether they were similar, they would dissolve the proportion according to

which the world was constituted, through being mingled with the similar natures

that are in it. As he spe.iks, therefore, of esery composite, he very properly

makes mention of heat and cold, as of things universally known. For there is a

certain composite, and it consists of these, and is known to all. Hence, Ix-cause

it i* known, he mentions the->e. Since, however, every composite does not con

sist of these, he adds, in what he afterwards says, universally," ami all such things

as have strong and riorum flutters," though they should not IK- heats and colds.

For it is necessary that every physical hody should have a physical power, through

which it may lie aMe to act according to nature. If, therefore, any hody should

tiurround the world, whether similar or dUsimilar to certain things contained in it;

if dissimilar, indeed, it would disturb the world; but it is necessary that what is

impassive should not IK? disturbed by that which is foreign, and by something

which is situated in a certain place; and if similar, iu consequence of being

mingled with what issimilartoit.it would dissolve the ratio of the elements in

the world, from which it is constituted according to the most beautiful bond.

Such therefore is the explanation of the particularsof the text.

Let us, however, surveyitself

byitself, how there is nothing external to the uni

verse. For why did not the Demiurgus who constituted matter, fabricate many

kinds of matter, and many worlds? May we not say, that he constituted matter,

and always constitutes it, according to the unity which he contains, so that on

this account, he very properly produces but one matter; and that the multitude

of sensible forms possess differences, which distinguish them from each other,

but that matter is without difference and without quality? For though we should

BOOK in.]TIMvEUS OF PLATO. 44,

errant that there .ire many kinds of matter in clii.s universe, yet we must say that

there is one matter which proceeds from on hi jh through diminution, as far as to

the last dregs of things which last sediment also is truly formless, the summit of

matter having a threat alliance to forms. For all things according to their

summit are most allied to the natures prior to them. 80 that there is one, and

yet not one matter, which proceeds through all things, itself subsiding into itself.

On account of this matter, therefore, the. Demiurgus produced one world having

itself a diminution with reference, to itself.1

Every thin? likewise which makes

by its very existence, being one in itself, makes one image of itself, and one whole

form; and especially when it remains immoveable. For lieing moved, it is pos

sible for it to make other and other images of itself. Farther still it may be said,

that to divide production into multitude, is no longer theeffect of power, but of imbecili

ty. But to comprehend multitude inunity,

and to connect then-hole number of things

through the monad, is the province of admirable abundance. If, therefore, total power is in the Demiurgus, if he is an iimnoveable cause, if he fabricates by his very

lcing, and if he generates that which is similar to himself, he generates the world

one, whole, and perfect. What then, it may he said, is not the Demiurgus able to

gorern main/ andinjinite worlds ? We reply, that multitude and the infinite [in qitan-

lity] are not theprerogatives ofpower, but that it pertains to paver to congregate things

that are divided, and togive hound toinfinites. For this assimilates things to the good,

to uhic/i also the Demiurgus e.itends all his prodvctinn*. This, therefore, is demon

strated through many other arguments.

That Plato however, in an admirable manner informs UN, that nothing is left

external to the universe, from which any thing else of the like kind could l>e ge

nerated, and that each of the things that are monadic alone consists of the simple

natures of which it is composed, and there are not other*

things external to it

of a similar kind, from which any other such nature could be produced, we maylearn by observing that he says, an all-various inequality exists in the seeds of

bodies. And also, that on account of this inequality,the differences of fire, and

of each of the elements, are incomprehensible. Hence, all fire is not similar

to all fire, though visibility is common to all. Oa this account likewise, there is

a certain lire which burns, and this is all-various from the smallness and magni-

1 For aura ru ratrrjjf licre, it seems necessary to read avror ta tavror.

1Instead ol mi

/ii|tirai tsrot avrov, aXXa roirou fftout, it is HCtctsarv to rctH KO.I fiq corn ro

avrnv <i\Xa c. X.

1

O-xis

omitted here in the original.

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. a K


tude of the elements of which it consists. And the sametiling is true of all the



elements. Each of the monadic natures therefore, consists of all such things,

as are contained in it alone, but in no other thing whatever. Hence it is not ex

ternally mingled with them nor is connascent with them. But you may also as

sume this from these sublunary bodies. For not every one is nourished by every

one, but different bodies by different things, because all of them are not similar

to the elements of which they consist. But each body becomes greater through

those things by which it is able to be nourished, the things that enter into it re

ceiving the places of those that depart from it. On this account, therefore, cor

ruptible natures ]>erish, Ix eause there are external to them things of a kind

similar to those of which they consist, and which are contraries some to one

thing, and others to another. Each of these also, being added to their appro

priate natures, introduce corruption to composites, by dissolving the symmetry

which is in them. In things that are corruptible therefore, the reason or product

ive principle, especially effects a difference, since it is very different from that

of simple natures. But in things that are indissoluble, the difference, and Un

reasons of the composition of them, pertain to the same things. Hence, they

are indissoluble, and in short monadic, alone existing from elements alone, ac

cording to one reason, and one symmetry. These things, therefore, should be

examined more fully. .For we shall find that they subsist in a beautiful manner,1

if we look to things, and do not rest in words alone, as is the case with many who

meddle \\ith the theory of these particulars. Let us, however, proceed to what

is next said by Plato.

"

Through this cause, therefore, ami this reasoning, lie fabricated the

world one whole, perfect from containing in itself all wholes, and free

from old a e and disease."c?

Cause indeed, uniformly comprehends every thing which proceeds from it, but

reasoning comprehends its productions in a divided manner, as we have before

observed. .So that the universe as one whole is

comprehended byits

cause,and

is generated according to cause;but as consisting of all wholes, it is generated

by a reasoning process.1 And it is generated one indeed, by the demiurgic deity,

1 Instead oftipTjffo/jfK yap ov taAwi i\cyrn, it is obviously necessary to read ivpriovpi* yap m\Mf

C^OtTU.* A reasoning process in ibe Dcmiurgus signifies, is h5 been before observed, a distributed or divid

ed cause of thins*.

BOOK in.] Ti M.T.US OF PLATO. 443

and according to divine union;but a whole according to the wholeness which

is connective of intellectuals.

1

For this producing totally renders the universe awhole. And it is a whole containing in itself all wholes, according to the divided

causes of forms. For the monad possesses with itself the whole number [of which

it is the cause.] The universe also is perfect, as being always converted to its

principles, andimitating the demiurgic conversion. But it is free from old age

and disease, as having a flourishing, vigorous, and ever vigilant life, and as par

ticipating of admirable powers. For from the causes which renovate the world

a pure and unwearied life is imparted to it, and from the inflexible*

Gods, unde-filed power. And through the former indeed the world is free from old age,

always becoming new; but through the latter, it is free from disease, being purified

from every thing preternatural. The Demiurgus, however, comprehends the

cause of both these.

" But lie gave to it afigure adapted and allied to its nature. For to

the animal which was to comprehend all animals in itself, that figure will?

be adapted, which contains within its ambit allfigures of every kind.

Hence he fashioned it as with a wheel of a spheriform shape, every where

[or from all the parts] equally distant from the middle to the bounding

extremities; this being the most perfect of all figures, and the most simi

lar to itself. For he conceived that the similar is infinitely more beauti

ful than the dissimilar."

Aftrr the total causes of the world, the whole composition of it, and its essence

consisting of total plenitudes, Timnpus speaks concerning the figure of the uni

verse;the most similar of all figures, l>oing essentially imparted to it by the Demi

urgus. And this is the fourth demiurgic gift conferred on the universe. There

are therefore, other demonstrations both physic;.! arid mathematical, that the

world is spherical, which we shall afterwards discuss. Now, however, let us first

direct our attention to the Platonic demonstration, which is truly a demonstration,

and together with that it is, showing why it is. The demonstration therefore, is

1 The wholeness which i* connective of intellectuals, constitutes the middle triad of the orJerof G<xh

which it denominated intelligible and at the same time intellectual. See Book ir. of my translation

& Proclus on the Theology of 1 lato.

1These are the Amilictior Curetci of the Greeks, and form the unpolluted triad of the intellectual

order of Gods.


triple,tlie first being derived from the one, the second from

intelligible beauty, and



the third from intellectual production. Or rather each of these is manifold, and

at least triple. We may say then, immediately with respect to the demonstration

from the o/ic, that the Demiurgus is one, and you may also say that the paradigm

is one, and that the good is one. From these things likewise, you may assume,

that in figures that which is especially one is more divine and more perfect than

that which is not one. For that which the one is in the Gods, that which the one

intelligible animal itself, is in intelligible, animals, and that which the one maker

and father is among the Demiurgi, that the sphere is among solid figures. For

the one is comprehensive of many unities, animal itself, of intelligible animals, the

one Demiurgus, of many causes, and the one spherical figure, of all figures. The

second demonstration therefore, is from the beautiful and the becoming. For

the spherical figure is becoming to the receiver, to the giver, and to the paradigm.

To the receiver indeed, because lit.- beinic jn-rfect,is friendly to the most perfect

of figures, and he who is comprehensive of all things, is friendly to that which

comprehends

all things in itself. But it is In-coming to the giver, because; he being

intellect, and converted to himself, generated a becoming figure, and most simi

lar to himself. For as IMato says in the Laws, intellect possesses intelligence

similar to the motion of a sphere fashioned by a wheel; Ix-ing extended according

to the same things, after the same manner, in the same, and about the same.

And it is becoming to the paradigm, because the intelligible universe is a thing

of this kind, converging on all hides to itself,

On all sides like a sphere s revolving bulk,

\Vell from the middle poisd with equal force,

And round its stable centre glud to tun :

-,.\ysParmenides. The same things also are asserted by Empedocles. For he

makes a two-fold sphere, the one being sensible, in which strife predominates, but

the other intelligible, which is connected by Venus. Jle likewise calls the one

the image of the other;but it is e\ ident which of the. two he denominates the

image.

The third demonstration therefore, is from the allied. For a spherical figure

is allied to the universe; since it is allied to the one, to the Demiurgus, and to all-

perfect animal. To the one indeed, ln-cause of the oneness of a spherical figure.

Tor TO wfKvov here, it is necessary to read TO o$atpt*or.

BOOK in.] T1M/EUS OF PLATO.

For as the world is one, so likewise the figure of it is uniform. But a



spherical

figure is allied to the Pemiurgus, because he contains all

things intellectuallyin

himself. And it is allied to the paradigm, because it first proceeds from it.

Hence this figure, is primogenial to the world. It also presents itself to the view,

in the occult order itself.1

For [what is said in the Orphic verse]

Unwearied in a boundless oib it move*,

is asserted of that order. But it is moreclearly seen in

all-perfect animal. For

it is said of this divinity by the theologist, tltut he is c.icitcd in an ineffable circle.

And it is still more clearly visible in the[intelligible and at the same time] intel

lectual Gods. For there, intellectual figure, the rectilinear, and the circular sub

sist, as it is asserted in the Parmenides. Farther still, after these Gods, this

figure is seen in the Pemiurgus. For as he is intellectual intellect, the universe

subsists appropriately in him, and he receives demiurgic powers from the Gods that

areprior to him. Hence also he is the Pemiurgus of all mundane figures. But

what shall we say after the Pemiurgus of much-honoured Vulcan ? Poes henot fashion all mundane natures, elaborating all heaven and generation, and

making

Bracelets nnd chains, and necklaces andrings.*

For how is it possible, since he produces the essence of the mundane body, (hat

be should not impart a figure adapted to each of the bodies contained in the world?

lie however gives figure to the universe as it were with his own hands; but (he

Pemiurgus by his will alone. For manual operation with him is will, and production is intellection. And thus much we have inferred from these particulars.

Because, however, the spherical figure is allied and adapted to the universe, it

is necessary that the universe should have a figure of this kind. Perhaps, indeed,because1

a sphere, as those who are skilled in mathematics say, is the most capacious of all solids that have equal perimeters, and as we shall

shortly after show

by collecting what they have asserted. Perhaps also l>ecausc every polygonous

figure of equal sides may be inscribed in a sphere ;

4 but it is not possible to

i. & At the cstrcraity of the first triad of theintelligible order.

M Had XVIII. T. 402.

3 On is omitted here in theoriginal.

Instead of CM aXXo ^tyta ivraror cyypa^oOai, it it necessary to read, cu fffatpor vraror cyy/xt-



in.] TIM.T:US or PLATO.417

are not in their proper places. Farther still, tlio unceasing motion of tlio universe,is similar to infinite its uniform



power; circulation, tosimplicity of essence; and

the circulation of wholes, after the same manner, and about the same centre, to

eternal permanency. A"tin, as the one motion of the world comprehends all

motions, one wholeness, all wholes, and corporeal parts; and as one nature,

comprehends all second and third natures, thus also it isnecessary that the one

mundane figure, should he comprehensive of allfigures. This figure, however, is

spherical, at the same time being one, and capable of containing multitude; whichis a circumstance truly divine, to have dominion over every thing multitudinous*

without departing from unity.

In addition also to these things, asintelligible animal itself comprehends all

intelligible animals, according to one union, thus also the world lining assimilated

to its paradigm, comprehends all mundane figures, according to thespherical

figure. For a sphere alone is able to comprehend all the elements. As there

fore the world by its onlyness adumbrates theintelligible universe, thus also by its

spherical figure, it imitates the comprehension of wholes in that universe. Farther still, the world through this figure is assimilated to intelligible beauty. Forhow is it possible that a thing which is perfectly equable, commensurate, and

similar, should not be in a remarkable degree beautiful ? If, therefore, it is neces

sary that the world should !* the most beautiful of sensibles, it isrequisite that it

should have a figure of this kind, on all sides equal, definite, and accurate.

Again, the spherical figure isjrimtjJ;ipted

to bound itself. For other figures

through the multitude ofsuperficies, and their angles, or fractures, are elongated

from bound, and the end. But a sphere being monadic, andsimple, and on all

*ides the same, pert.aiii*kjp_thc(.cause of bound. Farther still, that which is col

lective of many things into one, and likewise the generative, and the spermatic,

rejoice in a figure of this kind. But this is manifest in seeds, and in the more prin

cipal parts of animals : for nature renders these as much as possible, spherical.

Again.the immutable, the unbroken, and the perpetual, are most adapted1

and allied

to a spherical figure ; since in consilience of

everywhere

vergingto

itself,it

ismost powerful. For the centre is unific and connective of the whole sphere. Veryproperly, therefore, did the Dcmiurgus constitute the universe, which is connectiveof itself, of a spherical figure. These

tilings, therefore, may bephilosophically said

concerning this particular.

1

Tor oufioro he/f, read ouoorarn.

44RPROCLL S ON THE [BOOK in.

After another manner, however, the same thing may besyllogistically inferred,

in the in which Aristotle endeavoured to prove it. Tor since the

physically way

universe is moved in a circle, and it has been demonstrated by him that there is

nothing external to the extreme circumference of the world, neither vacuum, nor

place, it is necessary that the figure of the universe should be spherical, and not

rectilinear. For if it was rectilinear, there would be a vacuum. For as the

universe revolves in a circle, it would never ha\e the same place through the alter

nate mutation of the angles and superficies.For since of every other figure besides

a sphere, the lines from the middle are unequal, there will be a vacuum according

to the less interval, where the bulk of the body is not. Whether therefore it be

according to length, or according to breadth, there will be, during the revolution,

a less interval. For a vacuum is perfectly equidistant;bat where there is no

body nor figure, there will be a de!iri uey, iu consequence of the magnitude being

less than the vacuum.1

Farther still, from secondary natures also, you may

assume physically,that the universe is spherical.

For the earth is spherical, as is

evident from all things every way tending to the middle of it. 15ut water is dif

fused round the earth, and it is spherical. For there is a eonllux of it into the

concavity, till it comes into contact with the central part of the earlh. The air

also surrounds the water and the earth, and the tire surrounds the air. If,

however, this be the case, the heavens likewise will IM- spherical. For there will

be a vacuum within them, unless they also spherically comprehend lire.

Airain, nature distributes to the lir.it ol bodies, tho first of figures, and a simple

figure, to a simple body. For in eaeh genus of things, the one is prior to the many,

and the simple,to the composite. As, therefore, ve distribute motions in a way

adapted to their works, to simple works indeed, simple notions, but to composite

works, composite motions; thus also there is an allotment of appropriate Ggures,

one kind to simple, but another to composite bodies. Figure, huircvcr, is, as it

u-ere, the visible resemblance ofform, the morplie of tiiorp/ie.ami as it uere an of/lotion of

the ptculiur hypar.ris of each particular tiling. Hence, that which is essentially

simple, proceeds into a simple figure, but that which is variously mingled, lias also

a co-mingled idea of figure. Farther still, the celestial motion is the measure of

motions ;but the measure in each thing is that which is least. The least motion,

however, is the swiftest, lint circulation is the swiftest of motions. If, however,

1h.sli-ad of..i>f ro ffX.,,mX\.,X ^,n

r../j<y )o.. .Xarro*- ov row tooir in this place, \\ i licro.-ary

to rta l,ovl*. r *\ lf*

a, tVVeiyti, Na ro pt ytOo fKtirrurof ton tirov.

UOOKIII.] T1M.EUS OF 1 LATO.4 l:t

this l>o the care, the heatens aresjhrrir;il. For the spherical is the swift rst ,f

motions, inconsequence,asthe

FJe;un,Miest says, of proceeding on l!n small. .-si

foot. A^:un, of bodies, some consist of similar, but others of dissimilarparts. To

bodies, ihmlore, of dissimilarparts, dissimilar figures arc

necessarily distributed

1);-nature. For polyconous and, in short, angular furiires. an- of tliis kind, and

tr>.*o tin ise that consist ofmany superficies. But to bodi-s of similarparts, similar

li,-urcs are adapted conformably to their excellence. J or the sphere alone amon?solids is a similar fi-ure; since oil the rest have dissimilar

figures. For some

have two su|>crficics, as the cone, others three, as the cylinder, others four, others

five, and others more than five, as pyramid? on poly-onous bases arranged in suc

cession. If, therefore, ether consists of similar parts, but thefigure of that which

consists of similar parts is similar, and the similar is spherical, ether is spherical.After this manner, therefore, we may physically prove that the world is spherical.

If, however, it berequisite to elucidate what is snid, by mathematical demon

strations, let us summarily relate what appears to be the truth to those who are

skilled in these particulars. In the firstplace, therefore, they endeavour to prove

filial the universe is spherical] from the starsl>eing

moved in parallel circles, boththe fixed stars and the planets, the sections always becoming- une

({M al, as we

approach to the north;so that some of tho circles touch the horizon; but others

which are less than these, do not touch it. And, at last, there is a certain

immoveable point, about which all the circulation is moved. In the next place,

they infer this from the nights nnrl days becoming unequal, conformably to thi;

r>olar motions to the north or south. Jn the third place, from shadows, Forwhence is it that tho sun when he begins to rise,

1 and also when he sets, is morenorthern lo us, and appears to pass beyond the crab, but when he is in the

meridian, he sends the shadow to the north; unless from the universe bcin~moved in a circle, which inclines to our motion ? Farther still, they prove that

the universe isspherical, from the stars which are not moved according to depth,

always appearing to have mi equal magnitude. For if the heavens were not

spherical but cylindrical, or some other such likefigure, it would be requisite that

the sun, when he becomes more southern to us, should appear to be less, oaaccount of the inequality of the interval. Nothing of this kind, however, ia s^onto take place. From these ihinps, therefore, astronomer*, in short, endeavour to

prove that the universe is spherical.

For <nx .^ her*, it it necessary to relavitrxrn .

1

For vntvrcuftmt in this place, it i nece*ary to rc l <iro-rrnTi,t.

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. 3 J/

450 PKOCLUS ON THE[ BOO K in.

But thut a sphere is the most capacious of all bodies that harp equal perimeters,

is also demonstrated by them. Likewise that all bodies of equal bidrn may be



inscribed in asphere,

but not all of thorn in

anyone of the

polyedm. Noris there

uny occasion that we should transcribe what is demonstrated by them. l o r \>e

write to him who has been sufficiently instructed in these particulars. At the

same time, however, thus much must be related, that they demonstrate thesuper*

ficies of the sphere to be more capacious than that of all other solid bodies of

equal ambits, and they particularly demonstrate that it is more- capacious than

the bodies which are called by Plato, equilateral and equiangular polyedra;

partly employingtin-

propositionsof

Kuelid,and

partlythose

of Archimedes.As I have said, therefore, the demonstrations of this may be obtained from their

writings. It is our intention, alv>,al ier we ha\e commented on the whole of the

TitiiiL UK, to discuss more fully in a collection of the Mathematical Theorems in

the Tiuucus, such mathematical particulars as are disseminated in the Comment

aries;

in order that the lovers of truth, by having a collection of these things,

may be assisted in the all-various comprehension of the mathematical parts of

thedialogue. But enough of mathematics.

J>. t us therefore return to the words of Plato, and survey after what manner

each of them is delivered. That in intellectuals then, jigurc is after rrho!c, and

that Plato having demonstrated the universe to be a whole, very properly in what

follows teaches us concerning the figure of it, we have before observed. Since,

however, this proceeds into -the universe from tlio tU-miur^ir cause, on this account

he says that figure was given to it from thence. But the giver evidently possesses

by a much greater priority that which he gives. The spherical figure, therefore, is

in the Demiurgus, butintellectually ; so that it is in all-perfect animal

intelligibly,

and in that which is still prior to the latter of these,1

occultly. For if it be

requisite to speak what appears to me to be the truth, where intellect is, there

also the spherical peculiarity exists. For intellectual energy has an essence^ of

such a kind as that to which the Athenian stranger or guest assimilates it. But

in one place, this peculiarity subsists unitedly and intelligibly,as those say who

are divinely wise. In another place, it subsists intelligibly, indeed, but with a

1i. e. In first intellectuals, or in other words, in that diunc order which is denominated intelligible

anJ at tin- i Hue time intellectual.

1

i. e. In bti*e ittelf, or the summit of the nitf Ili^iMe triad.

1In the 1 jlli book of the Laws, he assimilates it to the resolution of |.ncre fashioned bv a wheel.

BOOK in.] TIM;RI:S or PLATO. 451

more abundant intelligible division. In anotherintellectually, but accompanied



with an all-various diversity. And in another sensibly, accompanied with sep-.ua-

tiou and interval. And this last, indeed, is not simply called by Plato xpherk af

(g-yai/sixif),but spheriform (rya^oi5y), as bein^ an imitation of the intellectual or

intelligible sphere. Tor the universe also is moved in a circle, because it imitates

intellect. But cither the intellectual or theintelligible universe, will be moat

principally

spherical ; and thai which is truly astronomy, will be conversant with these. For this

is to astronomize above the heavens. Moreover, to be from all the parts equally

distant from the middle to the bounding extremities, pertains indeed, to the

sensible sphere, because all the lines from the centre of the earth to the extremities

of the sphere are equal, for from all the parts is :significant of distance accord

ing to the three intervals [of length, breadth, and depth]. It also pertains to the,

mathematical sphere. For there there is a middle, and the intervals are from all

the parts equal. After another manner likewise it pertain* to intellect, for to

converge to itself, and to be as it were of the same colour according to every part of

itself, and to have all the powers in it conjoined to the one of itself, is the sphericalpecu

liarity in intellect. Proceeding also still higher, it will no longer be possible to

separate the centre from the sphere, on account of the ineflable and united nature

of the intelligible

*

peculiarity. He says, therefore, that it is the property of the

sphere to Ime all the right lines every way equal from the middle, in order to

distinguish it from the circle. For the term every way, or from all parts, doe*

not pertain to this, since it has only two intcrrals.

Plato likewise uses the expression to fashion as with a wheel, because bodies

with us are rendered more accurately round through a wheel which cuts off thr

inequalitiesof the bodies. And that the similar and the

perfect especially pertain

to the spherical peculiarity, is evident. The similar, therefore, is analogous to the

one, but the perfect to the good, so that through both he refers the spherical pecu

liarity to the first principle of things by saying that it is most similar to itself, and

most perfect ; equallizing that which is most unical and most boniform. For

neither the mixed perfect or similar, nor the right line, which always receives an

addition and may become angular ;but the spherical peculiarity alone, is mast

similar and most perfect. After this, he adds, which is evident,"

that the similar

it Letter than the dissimilar." For similitude is of an uniting, but dissimilitude of a

1 Which the Coryphcan philosopher mentioned by Plato in the Thraetelus, is said to d.*

Instead of rn lotfxu titorjrui in thii place, it isiircc*>arj

to read rip reijryi

, PUOCLUS ON THK [noon in.** O Jt

dividing nature. And the former belongs to the co-ordination ofsameness, but the

latter to that of difference. And the former is the cause ofsimplicity, but the lat

ter ot variety to things. As the artificer therefore of the universe found, that among

things* naturally visible, the intellectual is more beautiful than that which is desti

tute of intellect, thus also he thought that the similar is better than the dissimilar.

Tor in intelligible*,similitude is better limn dissimilitude, in powers, in intellectual

perceptions,ami in productions, \\heiice also some one may wonder at thos<i

Plalonistn, who admit that dilli rence is belter than sameness, though Plato

says that the similar is infinitely more beautiful than the dissimilar. At the samu

time, also, dissimilitude is in a certain respect secretly introduced into beings

from matter, but similitude accedes from forms alone, and intelligible causes.

Similitude, therefore, is infinitely better than dissimilitude; >o that sameness is

also more excellent than difference. This i the judgment of Jupiter. Through

this, aNo, in the mm err e the similar is better than tin- dissimilar, in essences, in

motions, in figures, and in all other things. Tor the progression of things is very

properly effected through the similitude of productions to the cause of the produc

tion;and again, conversion is the primary leader of another similitude. ^ cry

properly therefore is the world, on account of the>- things, under the dominion

of similitude, being a God according to /,///* itnlf. Hence Plato also endcaxour.s

to show what the figure of the world is, fiom similitude, and the Pythagoric

Timaeus himself, assigns this as the first cause of its figure, in conjunction with

making a physical mention of it.kl Kor a sphere alone, says he, both when it

is quiescent,and when it is moved, is capable of being co-adapted in the same

place; so as never to fail nor receiv- anotherplace."

Aristotle likewise alter him,

well knew, that with whatexer other figure you may surround the mmerse, you

will make a vacuum, through the alternate mutation of the angles, and the une

qualdistance of the extremes from the middle.

44 He also accurately elaborated the external circumference of the uni-

verse, and rendered it smooth, for the sake of many things."

Some one may think that the same thing which was before asserted, is again

here repeated. For in what does this smoothness diller from rotundity, or what

mutation is there of similitude f in a certain respect, therefore, this universe com

prehends what has been said about similitude; but at the same time, there is a

difference between surveying what the nature is of I he whole figure which per-

TIM.TEUS OF PLATO.loo

vades as far a* to the centre of the earth, nnd aloneconsidering itself by itself,

the most rxt.Tn.ll superficies of the universe. And what is hero said about smoothness, contends as ii appear, to one thin-, vi/. to show that (lip universe is neitherin want of -nosiic, nor of partible motu-e organs, for the purpose of acfin- uponor anflrrinff from other

thing*; intmJurin- this as the uith itoninnric gift to theworld. What is said, then-fore, nbo.it the smoothness, is a medium between whatH asserted respecting the bulk, and the soul of the universe. For the proximateboundary of body is smoothness

; hut the exempt boundary is soul, and prior to

soul, intellect. For tlm is the boundary of soul itself. And prior to intellectthe one

deity winch connects the whole mundane multitude, is the boundary ofthe body of the world. You may therefore .speak after this manner.But yon may also

say, according to a more perfect mode, that the universe

being a luminous whole, it is most luminousaccording to its external

superficies,and is full of divine splendour. For on this account also poets place Olympuson the summit of the world, being; wholly luminous and

light itself.

Xor clouds, nor rain, nor winter there are found,

Butdazzling splendour spreads its radiance round.

Of this luminous subsistence, smoothness is a symbol. Why therefore are thesummits of the universe smooth ? Plato savs, for the sake of many things. For

they are so, in order that it may be spontaneously conjoined wiih .soul and intel

lect, and may be adapted to supermundane li-hts, through a similitude to them.

Smootfwcst, therefore, is significant*

i>f

the /////<./fi/itiimle, tlirou

:Jt a7/,VA the uni

verse is a file to receive the illumi>i>,tioi,sfrom inidial and soul ; in the same manneras minors receive the representations of liiiu-s by their smoothness.

Formerlyalso by theolojrists, u mirror was assumed as a symbol of aptitude, to the intellec

tual completion of the universe. Hence they say, Vulcan made a mirror for lii-

onysius, or Bacchus, into winch the God looking and beholding the image of

himself, proceeded into the whole partible fabrication of things. You may saytherefore, that IMato remind* UN of (his catoptric apparatus, in \\hat he now

.saysof the HiuooUuuss of the external superficies of the world. Hence the corporeal

Il .m. Odvst. vi. v. 4.1. But iii Proclu* for XAa /uaAXw atOpr,, read oV\/^oX

1

mtOfii,.

1 orfvfiiianrn-ti here, n-ad rn[tatTnrj.

1 KOCLUS ON THH [BOOK in.

universe in ft thing of thin kind, externally smooth, according (a which also, it i

connuscent with it* own intellect, and witli the Detniurgu*. Ili-uce too, )>octN

establish the Demiurgus on tin- highest Hiunniit of the world;

it bring allottod MO



great an aptitude from him, to thr participation of intelligible causes.

If you are willing, also, according to another mode, smoothness itself is a symbol

of the divine and simple life in the world. We, therefore, since we have a partible

life, have also the parts of the body multiform, and variously mixed, because

different thing* are prepared by nature for a different life. But the universe has

one and a simple life. -For it is purified from those things of which terrestrial

animals are in want, through a matt-rial and partible life. Hence it is the reci

pient of one life, but is exempt from a various life. It is also prepared for one,

but is unreceptive of a divided life. On this account, it is said to beaccurately

elaborated externally, and rendered smooth, because it is fitly adapted l>y the

demiurgic can.se, to the reception of one lift-, being constructed an the organ of

such a life. What follovvn, however, is significant of this.

"Nor was the addition of

eyes requisite

to the universe: for

nothingvisible was left external to it. Nor was hearing necessary : for there was

nothing externally audible. Nor was it invented with burrounding air,

that it might be in want ofrespiration."

Through these things, Plato appear** to do nothing duo, tlinn to take away a

partible life from the universe, and thepartible organs, which are suspended from

us, when, we descend into generation. For while we abide on high, we are not

at all in want of these multiform lives, and partible organs. Hut the hieiform

vehicle is sufficient, which possesses all the senses unitedly. If, therefore,- we are

purified from every life of this kind, when we are liberated from generation, what

ought we to think respecting the univer.se? Is il not, that it has one simple life,

that it is wholly vigilantly excited to it, and is equally in every part prepared for

the completion of one life f Or must we not in a much greater decree admit these

things of the universe I

For wholes are more divine than parl.s, nnd comprehendingthan comprehended natures. And thus much as to the common conception

of the things proposed.

Since, however, in what is now naid, and in what follow*-, flato takes away

.]TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 4.55

all sense from th^ world, viz. seeing, hearing, smelling:, tasting, andtouching,

let IH in (lie first jilnce consider this, whether the universe is sensitive or not. For

of the ancient s some were led to one, and others to another opinion on this sulh-

ject.We indeed hear thcologists speaking of the fountain of sense, and asserting

of the father fi. c. of (lie Demiurgus] that he possesses intelligihlcs through intel

lect, hut iiitrodtir.es sense to the worlds.1 And again, we hear from the Greeks,

Sun who ice st all things, and dost all things hear.*

Seeing and hearing not existing in him partibly, as in us, but according to onelife, and one .subject. Since in us also, Aristotle proclaims, that there is princi

pally one sense, and one principal sensorium. IS or were the wise men amongthe Greeks ignorant that there are divine senses, nor did they refuse to assert of

the Demiurgus himself,

Theundccaying roynl eiW form*

His intellect from falsehood free; by which

He alltiling^ indicate* and knows

;nor mice,

Nor louml, uyr rumor can Jovu t cars elude.

And why do I speak of theologists, when Plato himself says that the universe is

an animal, and that animal is characterized by sense ? So that asserting likewise

that a plant is an animal, he immediately imparts to it a certain other sense. On

hearing therefore, as I have said, these tilings, we are unwilling to admit that the

universe is without sensation. For in the Thraitetus, sense is said to be the frus

tration of truth;and it is universally agreed that its knowledge is passive, and

conversant with the images of things, llonce, it is better, in order that we maybe in the middle of both these, to take away from the universe every sense of this

kind, and to give to it another more excellent than this, and more adapted to the

Gods.

What, therefore, is this sense, and after what manner may it be assumed ? That

the universe, indeed, is sensitive, we may render manifest from its being an animal,

and from the soul of it being dianoetic and doxastic, and imparting to the mun

dane body a participation of both these, which participation is an image of dia-

1 This it asserted in the Chalman Oracles.

O.:

.j. XI. T. 108.

* Forava here, read v/i-j ; nod /or*Xdri in the foiiowiflg line, *) \-,<Jti.TLcte versri are Orphic.

PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK in.

noia and opinion ;and this we say is tin mundane phantasy itself, adumbrating

intel licence, and possessing invisible sensations of thfi sensible* vdiich exist in

from these and other to



every period. It is possible, therefore, many arguments,be persuaded that the universe possesses sensation. lint it requires an nppropriatc

inspection, to know what sense it possesses. I say then, tint of sense, the first

and most principal kind, is that which imitate-. intellect. For every where thing*

that rank as first, have an imitation of the natures prior to them. Hence, thib

sense is conjoined to things that are first, comprehending in it.-elf the sensible object

of itd perception,and neither passing from some things toothers; for this is tlie

province of sense distributed into various parts ; nor proceeding outwardly ; for

this i imperfect ;but it posses-.es

the whole of what is sensible in itself, and is, as

it were, rather consciousness than si u^e. The second kind of sense alter this, is

that which proceeds indeed outwardly, but according to a perfect energy, which

every where always apprehends the whole object of its knowledge with invariable

sameness, and is purifiedfrom all p.ission, and from all the imbecility which is

adapted to partible and material organs. I ut the third kind of sense is that,

which suffers from externals, and is mingled from passion and knowledge; be

ginning indeed from passion, but ending in knowledge. And the last kind ot sense

is that with which the most obscure knowledge is present,which is full of passion,

and proximate to physical sympathy, so as not to have a knowledge of the forms

of sensible*. Thus, for instance, it does not know that the thing which acts on it

is hot or cold, but alone pen t-ite* ihni **hat f:\lls 011 il is pleasant or painful.

For Timxiis farther on informs us that the sense of plants i.s a thing of this kind,

being an apprehension alone of the pleasing and the painful from sensible ob

jects.

.Sense, therefore, thus proceeding supernally, the world, indeed, is sensitive

according to the first kind of sense. For according to the whole of itself it is the

rtung been, and the eye [by which it is seen] ;since we also say that the sun, and

each of the stars, is an eye. The whole world therefore is si^lit and that which is

visible, and is truly comprehensible by sense and opinion. Hence the knowledge

in it is all -perf et, its sense is indi\ isible, and it is itself all tilings, \i/. that which

is sensible, the sensorimu, and s, use; just as tin- Deiniurgns of it, is intellect,

intelligence, and the intelligible. As, likewise, it comprehends in its: whole body

partial bodies, so in its total sense it contains many senses. And it does jioj

1 aioOfrtu M omitted in the original.

OOK in.] TIM/EUS OF PLATO.I->7

know the colours and the sounds of sensibles, but the essence of all of than,so far as it* material and undivided. Hence also it has a sensible



essence, andessential*/, but not according to accident, sensible. For as that which is alwaysintelligible, is not in a certain respect intelligible, and in a certain

resj>ect not, butis wholly intelligible, though not to those

In-ings whose intellectualperception

ispartible, but to a divine intellect; after the same manner the generated

sensible nature, is not in a certain respect sensible, and in a certainrespect

deprived of sense, but is wholly sensiNle, not to us whose sensible|>erception

is

partible, but to total

animal,in

whichalso there is

a total sense. For as the intellectual perception of the Gods is of one kind, but that of men of another, thusalso the sense of Gods is different from that of partible animals; the former

having a knowledge ofpartial essences, but the latter of things alone

pertaining to

essences. The world therefore, has the first sense, which is immutable, united to

the object of knowledge, andall-perfect according to energy. But total animals,

which are purified from generation, are allotted the second form of sense. Forbecause

indeed, they are parts of the universe, the sense of them proceeds to thewhole

; for there is also something of them which is external. But because theyare exempt from generation, they comprehend that which is sensible impassivelyand energetically. And .such partial animals as have communication with generation, and employ as organs, luciform vehicles, possess sense mingled from

passion and knowledge. But there are also certain last animals, such as plants,which

participate of a vestige only of lift; ami sense; one kind of sensebeing

total, another partible, another knowing the essences, and another the images of.sensibles.

It is not proper, therefore, to be disturbed, because Plato takes away from the

world, all partible organs. Forbearing is not divided in it from sight; since

neither, as we say, is the one divided from the other, in ourspirit, but there are

in it, as Aristotle say*, one sense which is truly so called, and oneprincipal scn-

sorium. Hence the world is neither in want of eyes extended to things out of

itself, nor of ears,1

to receive information externally, but it is itself both eye, andthat which is visible, ear, and that which is audible

;and the one sense in it

knows all sensible natures. For whence also is the one sense in us which is priorto the many senses derived except from the universe? The world therefore, knowsall the beauty that is in itself, through sight; and through the hearing all the har-

1 Instead of omrr here, it u obviously neceiury to read wrwr.

Tim. Plat. VOL. I.

3 ]yj


mony which pervades through wholes. Hence it neither requires eyes in order

to see, nor ears in order to hear. It possesses also this eyeless peculiarity

according to the image of the intelligible God, to which it is assimilated. For

that this eyeless



Orpheus says God has Love,

In his breast feeding eyeless, rapid Ix>ve.

Thus therefore, the universe is conjoined through love to the natures prior to

itself, and beholds the Vauty which is in them through that which is in itself;

and this not by perceiving with partible senses.

" Nor was it invested with surrounding air, that it might be in want of

respiration. Nor again, was it in want of any organ, through which it

might receive nutriment into itself, anil discharge it when concocted. For

there was nopossibility that any thing could either accede to, or depart

from its nature, since there was nothing through which such changes could

be produced. For indeed, the universe affords nutriment to itself through

its own consumption; and being artificially fabricated, suffers and acts

all things in itself, and from its own peculiar operations. For its compo

sing artificer thought that it would be much more excellent, if sufficient

to itself, than if in want of othcithings."

Through what is here said, Plato takes away two other senses from the universe,

the smell and tin; taste. The former indeed lx>cause it is without respiration.

For not every thing which respires is in want of smell, though every thing which

has smell respires. lint ih.it \vhieh respires is more perfect. This therefore, he takes

away from the universe. He also takes a\\ ay the taste, because the universe is not

nourished. For the anim.il which is nourished, is in want of the taste. Again

therefore, how shall we say? Must it not be thus, that these partible senses are

not in the universe, but that it contains one simple sense in itself, which has a

knowledge of all colours, sounds, juices, spirits, andqualities, the sensible

essences themselves existing in the universe as in a subject. For if the one

i. c. Plianes, or animal itself, the exemplar of ihe universe.

Instead of TO yap ayarvtvf If i -ai rrjj coy,vt]Otui, ti ui/jij -xav TO \ov oo^pijatv, atawnvanxof tirri, in

ihis place, it iff insrequisite

to read, ov yap war uiawvtov letrat rrft oofyitjotvt, ft ai JTOK TO t\ov i. \.

BOOK in.] TIM;EUS OF ILATO. 459

[common] sense which is in us, uses :ill the

partiblesenses, and knows all things

according to tlie same, how much more must the world know at once all the

variety of sensible?, according to one reason, and one sen^c 7 As therefore, it is

one in essence, and as it is allotted a uniform figure, thus also it has one sense,

comprehending in itself all sensible*. For it likewise contains one nature, which

connects and vivifies all bodies. And these are the dogmas respecting the

universe.

I>-t ushowever,

discuss theparticulars

ofwhat

is here saidby

Plato. In the.

first place therefore, he admirably refers the use of the smell to respiration, but

not to the discrimination of fragrances ; giving us the more comprehensive cause,

as existing in respiring natures. For when we have a sensible perception of

fragrant or A-tid substances, we respire; but when we respire, we have not entirely

a sensation of them. For respiration is more natural, and more comprehensive

than the proper subjects of the smell;since such animals as have the sense of

smelling, but do not respire, in consequence of not having lungs, are moreimperfect than those that do respire. Very properly therefore, does he frame his

argument from more perfect animals, that if the universe had the sense of smelling,

it would be requisite that it should have it accompanied with respiration, in the

same manner as the more perfect of smelling animals. But in the second place,

he refers the use of the taste, to nutriment. For nature formed this as a criterion

of juices, through which nutriment and increase subsist. For that which is

wi

hout moisture has the power of manifesting this. The world however, is not

in want of nutriment externally, but imparts it to itself, increases itself, and is the

cause of its own consumption. And in the first place, if you are willing, it effects

this, according to a division into two;the heavens augmenting and changing all

things,but the sublunary regions l>eing

increased and consumed. For the gene

ration of one thing is the corruption of another. Hut of each of these," the motion,

of the heavens is the cause. In the second place, the world effects this from the

heavenly bodies themselves, receiving by their motions an analogous increa.se and

consumption, according to their risings and settings, their visibilities and occulta-

tions, their elevations and depressions, their illuminations, and mutations of light;

through which the celestial bodies receive and lose a certain thing, in the same

manner as sublunary natures. For from these, generation also is changed.

1 For tuartpot here, it U requisite to read

40 PROCLUS ON THE[B<>O)C

,.

And again you see that the natures which are above the moon, have increase and

consumption according to analogy only; but that sublunary natures areessentially the

recipients of both these. Hut the moon is between these, and is truly an isthmus, ex

in the mutation to an



hibiting herself beginning of according increase and diminution

of liiJit. For in the bodies prior to it the same form perfectly remains, in their increase

and consumption; and in the bodies posterior to it, their very existence isnaturally

adapted to reciprocate. But in the moon the essence remains, but thelight is changed

externally according to diminution and increase, which is not the case u-ith the lumina

ries that are above it. Hence it is not proper to say, that the heavenly bodies are

nourished from exhalations, as some fancy they are. For things which are in

want of an influx externally, and receive addition and ablation, have not indisso

luble bonds. Hence the celestial bodies remain immutable;as of the ancients

I rocltis, Alalotes, and I hilonides assert, and of those that are more modern, all

the Platonists from IMutinus. For as I lato has not yet delivered to us the

generation of the heavens and stars, how could he speak about the nutriment of

them ? And it seems, that now generating the elements alone, andperceiving

that these proceed through each other, and that all are in all, lie calls l/iis mutual

transition, the nutriment uf the universe, of itself by itself; *incc it both acts upon and

Differs in itself, by imparting to all things, all the things f \chidi it consists. Hencewhen he likewise constitutes the other natures

(i.e. the

celestial), then he intro

duces tl.eir illuminations, and the communion of all of them with each other,

through these. Alone therefore, directing t,i=, ntUmtitm to the composition of the

four elements of the universe, andperceiving that in these, there are certain com

munications with each other, he says, that the consumption of some, is the nutri

ment of other parts of the universe. But it is not yet manifest what each of these

may be. Now however, thus much is evident, that all the parts confer somethingon each other, in order that the universe may become one, and are in each other,so as to nourish each other, and this without any diminution of themselves. Forall things of which the universe consists, are in the earth, and a 1

! of them arc

likewise in the middle elements; and thus the whole world is nourished by itself,

from its own parts, having all things in all.

Farther still, this also may be said, that if nothing proceeds to the universe,there is no body external to it, and that if nothing departs from it, there is notaeuum out of the world. For it would be in \ain not being the

recipient of anyhing, as that is which receive* the world; vthich things were

particularly em-

BOOK iii.lTIM.EUS OF PLATO. 4fl i

braced by Aristotle, who subverts the existence of a vacuum in energy, and

preserves the world only-begotten. Hut that nothing departs from, or accedes to



the universe, Plato infers, the latter indeed, Iwcause there is nothing external to it,

and the former, from the universe making the consumption of itself, its proper

nutriment. As therefore, not having the organs of nutriment in itself, it has nutri

ment, ami is that which itself nourishes itself, and is at the same time nourished;

thus also, not having senses extended outwardly, it possesses sense in itself, and is

itself sensible to itself. And that Plato intended the latter should be inferred as

well as the former, I think he clearly manifests by saying, that"

the universe suffers

and acts all things in itself, andfrom its own peculiar operations But if all that is

generated, is the consequence of the universe acting on and suffering from itself,

it must not be said, that either consumptions or corruptions are simply evils. For

neither does a worthy man, and much less the universe, do any evil to him

self. And this indeed, is a divine corollary, which is to be assumed from what

Plato hays.

Again however, he recurs to the true cause of all mundane effects, viz. the

demiurgic art, and the principle which is perfective of wholes. For from thence

art also proceeds into the demiurgic order. Hence the Oracles call the Demi-

urgus of the universe one icfio produces works by art ; which expression Plato

divides, at one time calling the things contained in the world, the works of the

Dcmiurgus, [as when he represents the maker of the world saying]"

ofwhom I am

the Dcmiurgus and father of u*>rks;" just as the Oracles also when they .av;

for understanding the works of tlie paternal self-begotten intellect ; but at another

denominating the energy of the Pemiurgus art, which in the end becomes the

cause of the sufficiency of the universe to itself. For the Demiurgus being good,

made all things similar to himself; i. e. he made all things perfect and self-

sufficient. For self-sufficiency is an element of the good. lh/ no means however is

the world, asptMsc.ising

the poirer of being sujjicicntto

itself,drculsed through this self

-

sujjicicnciifrom its maker, but is in a greater degree united to him. For // how much

the more self-siijjicientit is, by so much the more is it constituted in a similitude, to him.

And by how much the more it is assimilated, by so much the moreperfectly is it united, to

the deu.iurgic.goiidiitss.The universe therefore is self-sufficient, as

l>cingthe object

of sense to itself,1

and as not being in want of other sensible*. For to the.-e

the appellation of indigence belongs. Hut it is in want of the Gods, as

1

Hairy is ciniltril in the original. %

402 PROCLUS ON THE[BOOK m.

always filled by them. Or rather neither is it in want of these, for divinity is every

where present, and the universe is always prepared for the reception of divine

goods. And as the similar is better than the dissimilar according to thejudge

ment of Jupiter; so likewise, the self-sufficient is more divine than that which is



indigent. For the self-suflicient has dominion in the Gods, and similitude1

in

l>eings.And this is another dogma of the mighty Jupiter.

" But he neither thought that hands were necessary to the world, as

there was nothing for it either to receive or resist ; nor yet feet, nor any

other members which are subservient to progression and rest."

The touch is the last of the senses, and of this an animal especially participates

according to the whole body, butparticularly according to the hands. For these

have the greatest power of touching, as may be seen in the operations of them.

Since however, the hands aflord us a twofold use; for through them we receive

things that delight us, and repel such as pain us;but the universe cannot receive

anything,

for it has

every thing

which it wishes; nor repel anything, localise

there is nothing foreign to it;

this being the case, it is not at all in want of hands.

For as Aristotle says, neither nature, nor (iod, does any thing in vain. iSo that

the Demiurgus did not make hands to adhere to the world, because they would

have IMVII added in vain. Since however, that which is motive is suspended from

that which is sensitive, but I mean that which is naturally motive, the discussion

of Timarus, appropriately and at the same time reasonably proceeds, from the

sensitive to theprogressive organs.

For the feet were formed as instruments for

rectilinear motion, as likewise were the other parts subservient to progression, such

as theleg,

the knee, the tUigh, and any other such-like part.It. is impossible

however, for the universe to be moved in a right line: for, as we have before

shown, there is no vacuum external to the universe. Through these things there

fore, he takes away the progressive and sensitive parts. And here again it may

be said, that in taking away the motive organs, he alone takes away feet, but not

wings; localise feet are Miflicient to more perfect animalsfor the

purposes of

motion; doing the same thing here as he did respecting smelling and respiration.

Again however, it must be said, that these organs are by no means in the

universe, but that sense and motion after another manner are. For since every

1 For& o^oiurr/rc

in this place, it is obviously necessary to rcail& ofinorrft.


thing sensible of whatever kind it may Ue is comprehended in it, and it is itself

the first sensible, it has also one sense conjoined to a sensible of this kind, just as

the intelligence of the Demiurgus is conjoined to the whole of the intelligible, and

is said to absorb the universe in itself. After the same manner therefore, the

universe absorbs itself by the sense of itself, and comprehends the object of know

ledge, by a cpnnascent knowledge. Besides, it lias indeed powers which appre-

hend ami are the guardians of allthings, and these are its hands. It possesses

likewise perfective orders, and these are

analogousto nutritive

parts.And it

exhibits vivilic causes, which correspond to the parts of respiration. Besides

these also, it has other powers, some of which fill it with invisible causes, and

others conjoin it tointelligible light; of which the latter are analogous to seeing,

but the former to hearing. By those also who survey it physically and theologi

cally, it will be found, that it has a motion analogous to this sense. For as it has

a sense of itself with itself, so likewise it has a motion in itself, and circulatingO

about itself, and boththese, according

to the similitude of its

paradigm. Forin

thijj there wasintelligence converging to itself, life converted to itself, and know

ledge not subsisting according to transition, nor according to a distribution into

parts, butself-perfect, and united to

intelligibles themselves, /or such is the intel

lect which if there, energizingprior toenergy, because [according to the Oracle] // has

not proceeded, but abides in the paternalprofundity, and in the adytum according to Ihc

God-nourished silence.

"

For from amon<j the seven species of local motion, he distributed to

it that which especially subsists about intellect and wisdom, and which is

adapted and allied to itsbody."

Of the ancients, some converting the world to intellect, and imparting to it mo

tion through love about the first appetible, say that nothing proceeds into it from

intellect, thus depriving intellect of fecundity,1 and giving it an arrangement

equivalent to that of lovely sensible objects, which have nothing generative, in their

own nature. Others on the contrary, acknowledge that intellect, or soul, or

whatever that may be which is above the world, operates on it, yet they do not

give to the world a spontaneous and proper motion, but only say that it is exter

nally convolved in a circle. These however, Aristotle blames, as subverting the

For/jr n/.c.f Lcrc, it is ntccssary to read

461 PROCXUS ON THE [BOOK m.

perpetuity of the universe. For that which is violent is not perpetual. But Plato

guarding against the oversights of l>oth these, assigns to the world a proper and

spontaneous motion, and shows that the Demiurgus is the cause of ibis motion.

Andthis is the sixth

demiurgic gift impartedto the

world ;

asimitating

*

themotion of which the world both from and from the

intellect, possesses itself, father.

For the expression he distributed, refers us to the paternal cause. For from that

from which essence, from that also motion according to nature, is imparted to the

universe. But the words,"

adapted mid allied to itsbudy"

refer us to the peculiar

nature of the world through which it is excitedl>y

itself to a motion of this kind.

For it possesses something adapted and allied to the motion in a circle, both ac

cording to the self-motive nature, and to its figure, which is spherical. Perhaps

also, if he had asserteil one of these things only, the other might have been in

ferred. For if he had said, that tho motion of the universe was adapted and

allied to it, whence did it possess this except from the father, from whom also its

essence is derived? But if this motion was imparted to it by the Demiurgus, he

entirely gave to the recipient an appropriate motion, he being intellect, and assign

ing to all things that which is according to desert. The Philosopher however,

combines both these in order that you may see tlie-similitude of the world to the

Demiurgus. For as he himself intellectually perceives himself, is converted to

himself, and surveys intelligibles through energizing about them, which be

come tho c< ntres of the demiurgic intelligence; thus also the world i.s moved

about itself, tinge* to it.-*-lf, and licxrmoniously revolves about the middle,

which becomes the centre of the mundane motion. And as the Demiurgus is

said to absorb the intelligible, by proceeding to it, thus also the world is .said

to comprehend in itself, the centre of it.-clf. Fur the absorptions ichich arc celebra

ted by thcolugists,arc certain comprehensions.

But the absorptions by grandfathers

comprehend intellectuals intelligiblv, and those by sons, intelligibles intellectually.

1 If the principal partiof the universe therefore are perpetual,

and thatIlieyare j,o is most

fullydr-

mouMraU d in these commentaries, ilnecessarily follows that the modern Mstcin of astronomy, which

IiH. the luavriii vutli \iuleiit millions, is faUe.

1Instead of rtuif ^tfHi\ip.ini t(/im in tkii place,

I read art vov ^t^oi/^m; JCIKI/WU.

1 For cii eavroy ^wfin^ here, read rjjtn tavrov -^vptiv.

*In>te.id of a\.V ui ftrv ir^oyomai ra vcijra vffii\afjpa>

<jvfft rotpui, at te Ttitv xaifw, ra vntpn

mt|rwk in thi pbcr, it u necesjary to read, nXV ai ^tr jrpoyouac ra it po. rpiXa^/1ai-oiffi tonrui, m

^ rwi traicwl ,ra & orjrti lurpui.

HOOK in.] TIM.TTS Oi- PLATO

For tl.cf Jin- (l.o generators of tl.,>m again eonrert them to themselvesAmlcr m in ll ir own alines. The universe then-fore imitates boi

thes indeed, as it revohes a | m .t the centre, and comprehends the centrel



in .taring the progonir absorption ; l,,it so far as it comprehends its ownm itself, affording nutriment to itself by its own consumption, am! a-ain

.11- in it. -If the nature-, distributed fn.m itself,- so far it imitates tlie com-ension of children in th.-ir fathers. And these

things indcrd, are assorted

,r Iho sake of tho analogy of the universe to tliotwo fathers.

Ajjain, lunvever, yon may s.-e, iio\v the Arisfotehc. axiom is li-re pre-assurr.ed.

that the t lotion is simple of a simple body. In the first place, therefore, the bodvin the \\ >rld which is more simple than other bodies, is moved with a circuit

motion, nsl>ein^ adapted to it

; and in th? next place, the whole universe i.s th:is

moved. For the body which is posterior to it, i.s as much as possible convolver}

in a circle. For what else is the meanin- of the wordadapted, than that the mo

tion in a circle is natural to the essence of the universe ? For as it was allotted a

-pherical figure, so likewise a circular motion according to nature. And farth-r

still [another Aristotelian axiom is also here pre-assumed] that a circular motionhas nothing contrary to it. For as there are seven local motions, that which is iu

a circle, the upward, the downward, that which is to the ri-ht hand, and that

which is to the left, that which is anterior, and that which is to the posterior parts,

you will find that six of these have a contrary. For the motions arccontrary,

whirh nro from contrary to rontmry places. But the motion in a circle is exemptfrom all contrariety. For since the motions in a i i-ht line are trcnerafed .ind

contained by the motion in a circle, as iMechanics demonstrate, how can it i

!! that any one of these is contrary to it? For the contrary is corruptive andnot generative of the contrary. Nor does Plato

stop here, but having mentionedthe peculiarity of the circular motion, he shows its admirable

transcendencyabove the othet motions. For he denominates it to be that which subsists aboutintellect and wisdom, and this not simply, but he also adds

especially. For of

these seven motions, the circular imitates intellect, and thointellectual life, beingestablished in the same, and about the same, according to one reason and one

order, and possessing a motion which in vanquished by permanency. But all th^

1

i.e. The absorption ofPhanrs, the paradigm of the worM Sj /ujitfr.For ra-.r-fi h*Tf n*d rava.

Twi. Plat. VOL. I.;{ \

PKOCLUS ON THK [BOOK m.

remaining motion pertainsto soul. For in l\m,Jrom so/rr/irc,.aml whither, and

transition first subsist. In her also the intelligibleis the upward, Uut ihe sensible

downward. And the circle of sameness, indeed, is the right hand, but tin- circle

ofdillerciice, the left. Intellect likewise is before her, but nature behind. For

at iirst. And circulation, indeed, is to



thus *he was constituted adapted intellect,

according to both numbers, whether you wish to adduce the monad itself, or th/

heptad, enumerating it the first or the seventh motion. Fur the monad and the;

lieptad,art certain intellectual numbers; the monad indeed being directly intellect,

hut theiieptad,

the light according tu intellect. And on this account also the mundane

intellect is, as Orp/icus siiys,h,,t/i monadic, and htltdomadic. Fartiier slu l, the. monad

is .-lljoHoniucal, hut the Inptad Mincn\il. Again therefore it is intellect am! wisdom.

So that circulation through the alliance of numbers, *hows that it is suspended

from intellect and wixlom. Hut rcctitnh-ar tnutmn, ucmunstrata through the

hetad itt alliance to the psychical i>i.culunity.For the number bix is allied to the

aoul, and this will be mamkst as we proceed. Let us however pass on to what

is next said by Plato.

"

Hence by a circumJuction according to sameness, in the same, and

in itself, he caused it to be moved convolving in a circle. But he sepa

rated from it all the six motions ami framed it void of their wandering

propulsions. And as feet wero not requisiteto tins periodical motion,

he generatedthe universe without K-

ft.i unJ fret."

\Ve have before observed that intellect and wisdom are the paradigms of circu

lation. But what this is, and how it is assimilated to intellect, is delivered in

the words before us. For circulation is a motion which is led round according

to sameness, and in the same, and in itself, as Tima us here says, and the Athe

nian guest in the Laws. Of which definition indeed, the words "

according to

same nts*" signify according to one reason, anil one order. For what it the

urmerse should be mo\ed circularly indeed, but should be differently changed at

different times, by rising or setting,as the fable says in the Politicus. That we

may not therefore apprehend this to be the case, the words"

according to samc-

Hcso" are placed respecting it, before the rest. The Platonic Severus therefore,

for we shall here speak freely against him.) is not right in admitting fabulous

circulations, and thus making the world to he both general, d and unbegotteii.

i iM.i:rs OF PLATO. ,,.-jit/

The universe indeed, Platosays, is moved

according lo sameness ami after :|

similar manner;

ami a( cording to one reason am] one order. lint such a nrru-lalion as Severus speaks of, snhvorts the one



order of motion. The mode, ho-.v-

ever, in which such a motion isfabulously introduced, is shown by our preceptor

HI his Commentaries on (hat dialogue, conformably to the meaning of Plato.it the words in the. same," manifest the immutable in transition, and that the

u.ot.on isvanquished l>y permanency. Tor because there is not a vacuum external

the universe, but it isnecessary that the universe should be moved, being a

physical body; for nature is a principle of motion; it is moved convolved about.

itself, and m the sameplace. For the bulk o. the universe occupies the whol-

>l place, and possesses by its parts theparts of interval

;and as a whole bem

immutable, it i>

locally moved m itsparts. JJut the. words "

in////,"

manifestthat it is moved on account of this

very transition of its parts. For it does not

require the transition of another thin- in order to the motion of ij.eif, but it*,-!:

yields to itself, and itself is transferred into the place of itself; so that it is movedin itself, the parts Of it being transferred by their motions into the places of -aH,(her. Hence, through the words

"accordingto

sadness," you have theperpetual

through the words "

in thesame," the immutable

; and through the word, " m

itself^the form of the transition. And from all these you have, that circulation is

a motionunceasing, remaining in one place, and effected by the transition of tl...

parts into the places of each other. But being Slicn lt is ev ident, that it is mo;fsimilar to intellect. For intelk-ct etcrnall*

energizes intellectually,is

pstanlMio,|in the same order, and all things in it are intellectual, mostenergeJic, and

po.ss.rs-,An

ever-vigilant life. And this indeed is evident.

It is however worthy of admiration in I lato, that whendiscoursing a |)0ut t , )f

.

essence of the universe, he assimilates it to intelligible animal; but that now"aching us concerning the motion of it, he refers the similitude of it to intellect

;

delivering to us from these things the analogy which is in them, liz. thrtt the intel

ligible

has the relation ofessence, but intellect of energy. When, liiSrwiso, he

.says that the.universe isspherical, he at the same times gives it to l>c moved in a

enele, and lo be convolved. For it appears to be moved in a circleaccording to

the greatest circle which is in it. liecau.se however a cylinder is moved ia a

1

M*. On tlu I\.|.lifi,siii whii-li dMln^ur it i

rabulninly asserted lint Hie sun and Vst, no* s , luh*

plHcf fro,,, nhc,, ih lormf.lv rose. Sre M, fahl,f,,,|

amcrf in H,r not, lo n,, er-n,l,.i ,i ,.

408 PROCLUS ON THE[,OOK m.

Circle \heu it IK rolled along, he adds, for the sake of accuracy, the word convol-

ri/ig.*It is also admirable in him, that lie takes away the six motions from the

universe. For this is most peculiar to the world, there being in the stars an

advancing motion. The world, therefore, is truly inerratic, not only because the



summit of it is a thing of this kind, but because it is moved with one and the same

simple motion.

It is necessary however to observe, how the form of motion which exists in the

most principal part of the universe, is said to have been given, as appropriate

to the whole world, by the father. For all the other parts, participate of the

circulation of the world;and the inerratic is ptvsent \\ith some of Ihem more

manifestly, but with others more obscurely. For the streams under the earth

being moved in a disorderly manner, and differently at different times, are espe

cially said to wander. But the sublunary elements being naturally moved from

one place to another, participate of less wandering than the subterranean effluxions.

For those things wander which are transferred from one place to another. Andthe divine bodies in the heavens, wander still less than these. For so far as they

are moved according to length, and also

accoiding

to breadththey

are

wanderers; but so far as they are moved according to the equable and

orderly, and according to one reason of motion, they are inerratic. But the

world itself may most properly andprincipally be called inerratic, as not receiving

the representation of any other motion.

If also you are willing to make n division in incorporeal natures, the irrational

life wanders in a remarkable degree, not having the measure of its energies from

itself. The soul that

opines rightlywanders, but less than the irrational life.

For this soul also participates in a certain respect of wandering, through being

ignorant of cause. But the sonl that possesses .scientific knowledge, \\anders

still less than this. For in such a soul, the transiti\e form of life alone produces

the wandering; because it is not arranged to one intelligible, but becomes a

different intelligible in different forms. And intellect alone is inerratic amou"-O

beings, always intellectually perceiving the same thing, and energi/ing towards

and about the samething.

Theworld, therefore, which imitates intellect in its

motion, is deservedly truly inerratic, always making the same uniform period

after the same manner. That however which is thus moved, has no need what

ever of the addition of feet, or in short, of progressive organs. And hence the

mm else \\as generated without feet and legs. Tliculoghts alsowiiliing

in a a r/ .-://!

1 tor riiifin/Kiov lure, it is obviou.lv nccc^.irv lo read or^o^/mrf.

BOOK .,..]T1M.EUS OF PLATO.

4ti9

respect to indicatf this to M, are accustomed to call the God who is the Dcmiurgus of

the corporeal nature, lame in both feet, as constituting the unirerse vcithout legs and

They say (oo that the Gods at him with



feet. laugh inextinguishable laughter*

and by their laughing incessantly attend rril/i providential care to mundane natures.

"

All this reasoning, therefore, being employed by the eternally exist,

ing Clod, about, the God that would at a certain time or once exist ; in

consequence

of this

reasoning,

lie made his

bodysmooth and even,

everywhere from the middle equal and whole, and perfect from perfect bodies."

What is here said, imitating the one intellect, and the united intellection of

wholes, collects all things into the same, and refers them to one summit, the fabri

cation of the corporeal system. It is necessary, therefore, that we should recol

lect A\h:it has been before said. It was said then, that the elements rendered aJl

things in the world concordant through analogy; that the universe was generated

a whole consisting of wholes; and that it is spherical and smooth, and has a

knowledge of itself, and a motion in itself. But this being the case, it is evident

that the whole world itself, is assimilated to all-perfect animal. The orderly dis

tribution of it, however, according to wholes, proceeds analogous to second and

third causes. And the number of the elements, indeed, and the unifying bond of

them through analogy, proceeds conformably to the c-senco which is uncoloured,

unfigured, and without contact ; for there number subsists. But the first wholeness which adorns all things, and which consists oi the whole eletnen.s, is assimi

lated to the intellectual wholeness.* The sphericity of the universe is analogous

to the intellectual figure.1

Its self-sufficiency, intellectual motion, and convolution*

in sameness, are assimilated to the God who absorbs in himself all bis progeny

[i.e. to Saturn]. Its possession of soul, is analogous to the vivinc cause [i. e. to

Rhea]. And its participation of intellect, is analogous to the Demiurgic intellect;

though all these proceed from this, and from the natures prior to it, to vthitii

these are respectively analogous. And the more excellent natures, indeed, ivre tho

& Tlii* etsetirv forms the summit of that order of Gods wlticli is culledintclligiUr, mil at iLr sam

timr intilicrtu.il.

*Tin-, form* llic middle of thr abovr-mrntioru-ii order,

1 And (hi* forms llie extremity of that order.

*For rp^t hrrr, it is nccc*Mrv to read

orpo^jj.

4?0PKOCLUS ON THK [BOOK in.

cause* of all Uio thincp of which secondary natures are the causus ; Imt the latter

are the causes of fewer effects than tlie former. For the DeiuUirgiN himself, so

far, indeed, s he is intellectual, makes all thing* to he intellectual ;but so far as

he is being, he is the father of all hoilies, and incorporeal natures ; and so far as

he constitutes matter itself. In what is lien; said, therefore, Plato

he is a Cod,

makes a summary r jM-titionof all such particulars

as the universe derives from

the intellectual (jods. And thus much concerning the whole theory.

It is requisite, however, that we -should understand the truth pertaining to each

of the words. Din-clly, therefore, the words "

all tliir," imply that you should

survey

in one the whole cause of the corporeal-formed nature, and know the di

vision of forms. For wholene-s is as-undated to one tiling, figure to another, and

motion to another. And tin- word this indeed indicates union ; hut the word all

the miml>er of cau*rs. Moreover, the words "

restoring tmploi/ttt In/ the eternally

esixtin* (VoJ,"make the e.-^ence, and at the same time the intelligence of the

Demiurgus to !>e eternal, through which the world is perpetual. It is necessary

likewise to observe, tliat IMalo by aiTan-in- the Pemiurgus among eternal beings,

jives to him an eternal order, so that he will not [according to Plato] he soul.

For in the Laws he say*, that soul is immortal, indeed, and indestructible, but is

not eternal. Hence every one who fancies that soul is the Demiurgus, seems to

Ix? ignorant of the difference between the eternal and the indestructible. But the

word "

reasutiimr" is significant of a distributed fabrication. And the words

that would at a certain time c.iistnare not f0^niii-ant of u beginning accortlin^r to

time, as Atticus fancied they were, but that the world has an essence conjoined

with time. For time was generated together with heaven [or the universe,] and

the world is temporal,and time is mundane. For they wen? co-produced

with

each other, and arc consulistent from one fabrication. The words therefore ,it

a certain time ur once do not si-jnilya part of time, but reason is time as compared

with eternal lieinaf. For that i- truly always bein<, ;but the temporal always is

once as with reference to the eternal, ju>t

as that which i* beinar, after a generated

manner, is mm -bein; with reference to that which is intelligibly beina:. Hence

though the worldoxi*ls throu-h the whole of time, yet the existence of it con-

s-stsin iM-roining to be, and is in a part of lime. This however is owtr, and is not

Mmultaneouvly m all time, but is always once. For the eternal is always m the

whole of teriiity;but the t.-mporal, in a certain time, is always at a different

time in nnolh.-r time. As with reference therefore, to the eternally existing fiiwl,

(!,. worbl is very properly called, ihr God that iroufil "ncc fritt." For if, with r-

471OOK ni.j

1 IMyEUS Ob i LATO.

ferenee to that God who is intellectual, this is senr.ible. Hence, the

world i< im!er& generated, or

becoming to be, always, but is once. For it has its ^x-

isfenre pvrnbly, always advancing to being from eternal being. For since, as we

have More observed, it ha* an eternal of derived from a



power existing cause

iKnVrenl irom itself, and the power which it possesses it possesses terminated, but

I .y always receiving, it always is, having the power in that which is terminated

numbered toinfinity ; this

U>ingthe case, it is evident that it is owe, from the once

always acquiring existence, and always becoming to be, in consequence of that

which gives it loexisl, never ceasing.1

According

to its own nature, however, it

is once, and liris a renovated immortality, as Plato sayn in the Politicus, possess

ing its being in advancing into existence, and on this accountparticipating not

at once wholly of the whole [of time] but once ; and this again and again, existing

in generation, and not being uilhout an extension [of existence]. Unless, there

fore, the word once signifies with Plato the whole of time. J or the transitiir

subsistence of time, as compared with eternal energy, js once, and the whole of tune

hus the same ratio to

eternity,

r/J the

part oftime the once to the whole

oftitnt.

If you are willing also to consider what is said after another manner, since

Plato has hitherto fashioned a corporeal nature, but has not in words constituted

soul and intellect, he denominates the God that would exist, and who subsists ia

discourse according to a part, once. For divinity indeed constitutescollectively

paits and the whole, but language divides things which are consubsistent, generates things which arc iinlwufoitm, mid distributes according to time, eternal

natures. The Godtherefore,

that would onceexist,

is

the God that would existm the discourse, in which there is a distribution into parts, and composition. Forthe Pythagoric Tima us likewise, indicating this in his treatise to those who arc

:ti!e to understand him, says"

that before heaven [or the universe] was generated

in words, there were idea and matter, anil God theDemiurgus." For that he

fashions the generalion of the universe in words, he clearly manifests in what he

ay. Moreover, with respect to the smooth and the wen, they manifest, as wv

have before observed, the one comprehension in the world, and the greatest apti

tude to the participation of a divine .soul. But the words, "a-ery ichere from the

middleerjua/,"

define thepeculiarity of the spherical figure. For this is every

where equidistant, according to all interval*. And the words "

whole, and

Intad of tat &io ro ^ Xeye.*, TO Ho* r yixo^r*. in this plate, it intctistrj \ rtad, ,. f ,

*"

fii \T/ny re ltbtitact yi*0utxo.

PROCLUS ON THE [OOK in.

perfectfrom perfect bodies? establish the world in the highest degree of similitude

to all-perfectanimal ;

for that was in all respects perfect ; and, liluwtie, to the

Di-miunniH himself. For as he is the father of fathers, and the supreme of rulers,

thus also tho world is the most perfectof perfect

natures, and the most total of

likewise that the world is smooth, as not being in waut



wholes You may ,-ay

of any motive, or nutritive, or sensitive organs. For this was proximatelydemo,

tratcd But "it is every where equal from the middle," as having a nphencal

figure and"

a whole and perfect;as being all-perfect,

and leaving nothing ei

nal to itself: for this is properlya whole and prrfert.

And it consists of pe.

bodies as boing composedfrom the four elements. It w also Haul to be in tl

singular number a My, as being only-begotten.And thus Plato

bej.nnmgfrom

the only-begotten,and proceeding

as far as to perfection,he again convert

through the above-mentioned particularsto the bame thing [i. e.

begotten]; imitating the progressionof the world from its parad.gm,

*

perfectconversion to it.

UNO OP VOL. 1.

proclus commentary on timaeus

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