prof. randall nichols source: cyb 610 – z3fall 2012
TRANSCRIPT
AfghanistanNational Estimate
Prof. Randall NicholsSource: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/maps/maptemplate_af.html
CYB 610 – Z3 Fall 2012
Team
TL – Chris Lewis
XO – Lester Thompson – Military Estimate
XO – Skip Corbin – Political Estimate
XO – Robert Howe – Economic Estimate
2Fall 2012
Team
Michael Amao
Heather Tarallo
Mo Ismail
Michael Surdey
Shane Liszewski
William Quick
3Fall 2012
Agenda
Executive SummaryAfghanistan National Estimate
Military Estimate - Facts - Evidence - Judgments - Summary
Political/Diplomatic Estimate - Facts - Evidence - Judgments - Summary
Economic Estimate - Facts - Evidence - Judgments - Summary
References
4Fall 2012
Executive SummaryMilitary Estimate
ANA will ethnically fracture after 2014
ANSF members join Insurgents and MilitiasStart in mid 2015
Peace cannot be negotiated
Civil warBy EOY 2015Biggest and most important judgment
5Fall 2012
Executive SummaryPolitical/Diplomatic Estimate
Increased infectious disease outbreaksHigh risk – mid year 2014
Rapid expansion of drug tradeGrowing poppies
Infiltration of ANSFVery high risk – 2014
Civil warBy EOY 2015
6Fall 2012
Executive SummaryEconomic Estimate
Afghanistan will not be able to self sustain its economy when foreign aid is reduced
Agriculture cannot be relied upon for economic growth
Mining won’t amount to economic prosperity
New Silk Road won’t amount to economic prosperity
Donor fatigue, corruption will lead to reduction in aid
Foreign military reduction will negatively impact Afghan economy
Reduction in provincial reconstruction teams (PRT)
Jobs and revenue loss
Reduced foreign spending
Fall 2012 7
Military Estimate
8Fall 2012
MILITARY – Facts
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)Afghan National Army (ANA)
- includes Afghan Air Force (AAF) - Security Operation Command (SOC)
Afghan National Police (ANP)Afghan Local Police (ALP)Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF)
ANSF growth target – 352,000 by end of 2012Already achieved
9Fall 2012
MILITARY – Facts
Manpower available for military service males age 16-49: 7,056,339 females age 16-49: 6,653,419 (2010 est.)
Manpower fit for military service males age 16-49: 4,050,222 females age 16-49: 3,797,087 (2010 est.)
10Fall 2012
MILITARY - Facts
Manpower reaching military age each yearMale – 392,116Female – 370, 295
ServiceMust be 22 years old4 year term
11Fall 2012
MILITARY - FactsANSF
Take security responsibility in 2014Two bodies responsible for civic order and protection
Afghan National Army (ANA)Reports to Ministry of Defence (MoD)
- oversees entire Afghan military Afghan National Police (ANP)
Reports to Ministry of Interior (MoI) - responsible for law enforcement in Afghanistan
12Fall 2012
MILITARY - Facts
13Fall 2012
Source: Checchia, M. (2012, January). Corruption in the afghan national security forces. Civil Military Fusion Centre. Retrieved from https://www.cimicweb.org/Documents/CFC AFG Security Archive/CFC_Afghanistan_Corruption-in-ANSF_Jan12.pdf DLA: December 1, 2012
Growth of ANSF 2003 – 2011
MILITARY – FactsANA
MissionPreserve peace and securityProvide for the defense of Afghanistan
Overall force strength178, 504 assigned to ANA
- 74-81% present for duty6,172 assigned to AAF – Target of 8,000 and 140 aircraft by 2016 94% present for duty
14Fall 2012
MILITARY - FactsSubunits of ANA
National HQ – Kabul National Commando Brigade – Kabul 111th Division – Kabul 201st Corps – Kabul203rd Corps – Gardez205th Corps – Kandahar207th Corps – Herat209th Corps – Mazar-e-Sharif215th Corps – Lashkar Gah
15Fall 2012
MILITARY - Facts Afghan National Air Force Units
AAF Headquarters – KabulKabul Air WingKandahar Air WingShindand Air Wing (planned)Jalalabad DetachmentMazir e Sharif DetachmentGardez DetachmentHerat Detachment
16Fall 2012
MILITARY – FactsANA Area of Operations
17Fall 2012
Source: Radin, C. (2011, May). Afghan national army update, may 2011. Long War Journal. Retrieved from http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/05/afghan_national_army_4.php DLA: December 3, 2012
MILITARY – FactsCurrent ANA Subunit Strength
18Fall 2012
Source: Sopko, John F. (2012, October). Quarterly Report to the United States Congress. Retrieved 12/04/2012 from http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/2012-10-30audit-13-1.pdf
MILITARY - Facts Afghan National Police (ANP) Units
Several Units including:Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP)Afghan Border Police (ABP) Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)Criminal Investigation DivisionCounter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA)Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF)
19Fall 2012
MILITARY - FactsOverall Police Force Strength
ANP (as of May 2012)106,538 assigned to AUP22,243 assigned to ABP14,585 assigned to ANCOPPlus other ANP forces
Target growth157,000 by end of October 2012Projected to be ahead of schedule in May 2012
20Fall 2012
149,208
MILITARY - Facts Police Force Strength
Afghan Local Police Est. July 201013, 412 (as of May 2012)Target growth of 30,000 by end of 2014
Complements counterinsurgency efforts by targeting rural areas with limited to no ANSF presence
21Fall 2012
MILITARY - Facts Police Force Strength
Afghan Public Protection Force10,000 guards (as of May 2012)Target growth of 30,000 by March 2013
Units trained to protectPeopleCritical infrastructureConstruction projectsConvoys
Fall 2012 22
MILITARY – FactsWomen in the Armed Forces
1,370 women in the ANP
350 women in ANAIncluding 2 female pilot candidates
Currently represent 3% of the ANA recruitsNumbers are increasing steadily
Fall 2012 23
MILITARY - FactsAfghan Local Police (ALP)
Established by President KarzaiAfghan MOIAugust 2010Complementary component of Village Stability Operations (VSO)
To enhance security and governance
Link local villages to the government
24Fall 2012
MILITARY - FactsAfghan Local Police (ALP)
Always deployed with VSO
To be expanded to 99 sites
Up to 30,000 ALP personnel
No future beyond two to five yearsTo be disarmed and absorbed into security forces
25Fall 2012
MILITARY - FactsAfghan Local Police (ALP)
Ineffective communications regarding implementation
Created confusion and disruptionLogistics and payHampered visibility of MoI payment recordsCandidates not being processed
Graduating and being assigned with incomplete administration requirements
Lack of equipment, fuel and ammunitionIssues with roles and responsibility
26Fall 2012
MILITARY – FactsIran
SharesSeveral religious, linguistic and ethnic groupsCommon languages
During Soviet invasion of AfghanistanMaintained relations
Soviet UnionAfghanistan
Supported Persian speaking Shia groupsHazaraFunded, trained, supplied and gave sanctuary in Iran
27Fall 2012
Military - FactsIran
Viewed Taliban rise as threatSecurityIdeologicalEconomic
Supported the Northern Alliance
Taliban backed Sunni Islamist militantsLaunched attacks against Iran
1988 Taliban massacredHazari civiliansIranians with diplomatic credentials
28Fall 2012
MILITARY - FactsIran
Ethnic and faction mindsetOpposed to Saudi Arabia
Involved in peace talks with Taliban
Guardian of Afghan Farsi speakers and ShiasTajiksHazaras
Against Pashtuns
29Fall 2012
MILITARY - FactsPakistan - History
British ruleWhat is now India, Pakistan and BangladeshSeparation between Hindus and Muslims
Pakistan and India granted IndependenceEthnic tribal clashes in Pakistan
Bangladesh broke away from PakistanBecame independent country
Helped by Indian soldiersCreated friction between India and Pakistan
30Fall 2012
MILITARY - FactsPakistan - History
Strategic goalPrevent Afghanistan and India alliance
In case of war with India
Soviet invasion of AfghanistanTrained and resourced mujihadeenWith aid of CIA
31Fall 2012
MILITARY - FactsPakistan - History
Later supported the TalibanPashtun organization
14 million Pashtun in PakistanViewed as Pakistan friendlyMilitary and ISI provided resources and training
Still supports TalibanProvides sanctuary in western provinces
32Fall 2012
MILITARY - FactsPashtun Regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan
33Fall 2012
Source: Militancy in the pashtun belt; perspective of a peace jirga participant. (n.d.). Regional Institute of Policy Research & Training. Retrieved from http://www.khalidaziz.com/MILITANCY_IN_THE_PASHTUN_BELT_FINAL.pdf DLA: December 3, 2012
MILITARY - FactsInsurgents
TalibanLeading factionLeadership resides in PakistanLed by Mullah Mohammad Omar
Other insurgent groups activeHaqqani networkHezb-e-IslamiTora Bora MilitaryThe Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)Logical and political base in Pakistan
34Fall 2012
MILITARY - FactsTaliban - History
Born in Kandahar and the Deobandi madrassWarlords running Afghanistan after Soviet withdrawalClerics came together to take action against warlordsAttracted young Afghan refugees
Provided free educationHousingFood
Presented ideal of recovering homelandCreating a pure Islamic state
35Fall 2012
MILITARY - FactsTaliban - History
Conquered Kabul in 1996Controlled 80-90% of Afghaistan by September 2001Unable to defeat pockets in the north
Commanded by RabbaniMassoudDostumSayyafIsmail Khan
They joined together to create the Northern Alliance
36Fall 2012
MILITARY - FactsTaliban - Organization
Hierarchical structureAutonomous groupsLeadership located in Quetta
Taliban published code of conduct for fightersThe Lahya
StructureHierarchical organizationResponsibilities
37Fall 2012
MILITARY - FactsTaliban - Organization
38Fall 2012
Source: European Asylum Support Office.(2012, July). Afghanistan Taliban Strategies – Recruitment. Retrieved 12/04/2012 from http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/european-asylum-support-office/bz3012564enc_complet_en.pdf
MILITARY - FactsTaliban - Organization
39Fall 2012
Source: Afsar, Shahid, Samples, Chris & Wood, Thomas. (2008, April 22). The Taliban: An organizational analysis. Retrieved 12/06/2012 from http://www.humansecuritygateway.info/documents/MILREVIEW_Taliban_Organizational_Analysis.pdf
MILITARY - FactsTaliban - Funding
Jihadist networks in the Arab GulfMosquesIllicit companiesPakistani ISI is a main funderTaxes in the areas they control
Agricultural productsIncluding Opium
40Fall 2012
MILITARY - FactsTaliban - Recruitment
Afghan refugee camps, mosques and Deobandi madrassasLocal recruitment by mullahsReligious networksKin, community, schools and universitiesLocals in AfghanistanPakistani fighters
NATO estimates 40 percent of Taliban ranks
41Fall 2012
MILITARY - FactsTaliban - Motivation
Two categoriesHard-core fighters
Driven by ideologyMadrassa studentsYoungsters recruited by clerics
Non-core fightersLocal militiaMercenaryPart-time fighters
Taliban seek buy-in from local communitiesFighters and commanders deployed in own area
42Fall 2012
MILITARY - FactsTaliban - Motivation
PovertyGovernment failingsThe presence of foreign troopsUnemploymentCommunity conflictsOutcastsReligionIndoctrinationCo-opting former enemies
43Fall 2012
MILITARY - FactsTaliban - Non-Pashtuns
Recruitment of non-PashtunsTaliban attitude changed in 2006Now actively recruiting non-PashtunsUzbeks, Tajeks and Turkmen
Ethnically mixed Taliban fronts now being seen
Non-Pashtun appointed local commandersTo connect to non-Pashtun village elders
44Fall 2012
MILITARY - FactsEthnic Composition in the North
45Fall 2012
Source: European Asylum Support Office.(2012, July). Afghanistan Taliban Strategies – Recruitment. Retrieved 12/04/2012 from http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/european-asylum-support-office/bz3012564enc_complet_en.pdf
MILITARY - FactsTaliban Insurgent Activity
46Fall 2012
Source: Radin, CJ. (2012, March 22). ISAF's new plan for Afghanistan. Retrieved 12/04/2012 from http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/03/us_general_john_alle.php
MILITARY - FactsWarlords
Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989Soviet supported government fell in 1992Mujahideen factions formed coalitions
Tajiks and Uzbeks in the northHazaras in the centerPashtuns in the east and south
Civil war 1992 to 1996Competing factions
47Fall 2012
MILITARY - FactsWarlords
Government formed in 1992Some Uzbek and Tajik joined mujahideenRegional strongmen controlled local communitiesGovernment had no control
Competing factionsFought street battlesAbused local populationExtortion
48Fall 2012
MILITARY - FactsWarlords
Ousted by Taliban in 1996Small pockets in the north formed alliance
Fought against Taliban during coalition invasion
Invited to join Karzai in government
49Fall 2012
1. ANA ethnically fracture after 2014
2. ANSF unable to defeat the Taliban
3. ANSF members join insurgents and militias
50Fall 2012
ANA dominated by Pashtun and TajikEthnic minorities resort to bribery for time off
Many don’t returnSapping morale
Ethnic fissures and patronage networks
Commanders cultivate circle of ethnic friends
51Fall 2012
ANA Ethnically Fracture after 2014ANSF Ethnic Groups
52Fall 2012
ANSF Unable to Defeat the TalibanCapabilities
MinistriesMinistries of Defense and Ministries of Interior
Neither rated as capable of autonomous operations
ANSFHighest rated units have gone down
From IndependentTo independent with advisors
53Fall 2012
ANSF Unable to Defeat the TalibanCapability Milestone (CM) Rating
CM-1A: capable of autonomous operations
CM-1B: capable of executing functions with coalition oversight only
CM-2A: capable of executing functions with minimal coalition assistance
CM-2B: can accomplish its mission but requires some coalition assistance
CM-3: cannot accomplish its mission without significant coalition assistance
CM-4: exists but cannot accomplish its mission
54Fall 2012
ANSF Unable to Defeat the TalibanMoD and MoI Capability Ratings
55Fall 2012
Source: Sopko, John F. (2012, October). Quarterly Report to the United States Congress. Retrieved 12/04/2012 from http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/2012-10-30audit-13-1.pdf
ANSF Unable to Defeat the TalibanCommander’s Unit Assessment Tool
Independent with Advisors:able to plan and execute its missionsmaintain command and control of subordinates
Effective with Advisors: Coalition forces provide only limited, occasional guidance to unit personnel
Effective with Partners: The unit requires routine mentoring
Developing with Partners: The unit requires partnering and assistance
56Fall 2012
ANSF unable to Defeat the TalibanCUAT ANSF Ratings-Quarterly Change
57Fall 2012
Source: Sopko, John F. (2012, October). Quarterly Report to the United States Congress. Retrieved 12/04/2012 from http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/2012-10-30audit-13-1.pdf
ANSF Unable to Defeat the TalibanANSF Literacy
86 percent of recruits illiterateCannot read
MapsTraining manuals
Specialized fields cannot be taughtLogisticsCommunications
58Fall 2012
ANSF Unable to Defeat the TalibanANSF Literacy
Hampering development of support systemsPersonnel managementLogistics
EquipmentFuel
Fuels corruptionSupervisors steal subordinates pay leads to:
ShakedownsIllegal checkpoints
Literacy training program started
59Fall 2012
ANSF unable to Defeat the TalibanANSF Drug Use
Drugs are a continuing problem
Drug tests 201017 percent tested positive
Rate likely understatedGhazni and Paktika Provinces
At least 50 percent positive
60Fall 2012
ANSF Unable to Defeat the TalibanANA Morale
Green on Blue attacksAffect moraleEroded trustHampered training effortsStruggle to fulfill mission requirementsStrained relationships
According to NATO/ISAF37 so far in 201225% had direct enemy planning support
61Fall 2012
ANSF unable to Defeat the TalibanANA Morale
Lack of leadershipQuick promotion of those who can read
Leadership abilities may not merit promotionOne of the reasons for low morale
Experienced NCOs in short supply
PaySoldiers not getting paid on timeMilitias pay moreInsurgents pay more
Soldiers going absent without leaveSoldiers go AWOL if fighting erupts
To join insurgents or militias
62Fall 2012
ANSF Members Join Insurgents/MilitiasBarracks and Garrisons Operation and Maintenance
ANSF lack personnel with technical skillsOperate and maintain critical facilities
MoD procurementUnable to provide O&M supplies
Slow procurement process
MoI budgetLate making allocation for O&M at police sitesFacilities
Poor construction qualityDifficulty obtaining parts and equipment
63Fall 2012
ANSF Members Join Insurgents/MilitiasFinancial Support
Paying for the ANSFFew taxes raised to pay for ANSF
Depends on US
ANSF target 352,000 by 2014Afghan government needs financial supportForce to be reduced to 228,500
125,000 soldiers unemployed Political disquietCriminalityConflict
ANSF members begin to join insurgents by mid 2015
64Fall 2012
Military Insurgents Judgments
1. Peace cannot be negotiated
2. Al-Qaida Sabotages Peace Efforts
3. Pakistan Sabotages Peace Efforts
4. Civil war in 3 to 4 years: 2015-2016
65Fall 2012
Peace cannot be negotiatedTaliban Demands
Precondition for talksWithdrawal of foreign troopsRecognition as legitimate interlocutor
Constitutional changesWill not accept current constitution
Greater role for Islamic law in legislation
Power sharingNot willing to join Karzai’s system
Karzai has power to make any changes he wantsNo guarantees deal will be respected in medium to long term
66Fall 2012
Peace cannot be negotiatedTaliban Demands
Afghan security forcesStaffed with bitter enemies
Taliban would not want to disarm
Financial packageMake up for lost revenue (e.g. Taxes)
67Fall 2012
Al-Qaida sabotages peace efforts
Forced back to Afghanistan from PakistanAmerican drone strikes
Joined up with TalibanProvide tactical and technical adviceTaliban dependent on Al-Qaida
Training Taliban bomb makersMaking bombs and IEDsPlanning sophisticated attacks
68Fall 2012
Al-Qaida sabotages peace efforts
Many Taliban leaders want peaceMany want to break ties with Al-Qaida
Breaking ties with Al-Qaida is a condition for talks
Taliban may refuseBecause of fear and pride
Al-Qaida pressuring to continue warTried to kill former treasury minister Mullah Agha Jan Motasim• Urged insurgents to seek political solution
69Fall 2012
Pakistan Sabotages Peace Efforts
Taliban in tribal regions of Pakistan
Pakistan wants to participate in any talksWilling to wreck negotiations if it is not
Arrested Taliban leader for negotiating without Islamabad
Sees Afghanistan as its sphere of influenceWants a regime loyal to Islamabad
Will not allow regime loyal to New Delhi
70Fall 2012
Civil WarWarlords
IranDoes not want a Taliban governmentSupports the northern alliance warlords
WarlordsFought with the coalition to defeat the TalibanDo not want to lose their government seatsCorrupt
71Fall 2012
Civil WarRegional Powers
PakistanWants a Pakistan friendly Afghan government
Doesn’t want an India friendly governmentSupports the Taliban and other proxies
Taliban controls most of its Afghanistan borderIncreasing support in readiness of NATO withdrawalNato not going to withdraw
Other regional powersIndia and Iran doing the same with their proxies
Could tip the balance towards civil war
72Fall 2012
Civil WarGovernment Forces
ANSFNot yet capable of defending country
Northern alliance re-armingIsmail Khan has called followers to reorganize
Have little faith in the ANSFMay hasten a conflict with Taliban
TalibanExpected to take back lost areas in south and east
Peace talksMay succeed in the short term
Differences between factions will likely lead to civil war
73Fall 2012
Civil WarAfghan Local Police
US Training local militiasProgram taking on life of its own
Militias asserting authorityCommitting crimes against civiliansGrouping into factions
Ruling over areas of AfghanistanCountry being divided into fiefdoms
Militias will join forces with warlordsFight against the Taliban when NATO leaves
74Fall 2012
Civil War
Start by end of 2015After build-up of forces
Impact on U.S.Must prevent Al Qaida establishing itself again
Destroy Al Qaida training campsKill leaders
Continue drone attacksSpecial forces presence
Support government and ANSFBear brunt of annual $4bn cost
75Fall 2012
Alternative Judgments
Pakistan collapses
Al Qaida Returns to Afghanistan
Power Devolved to the Provinces
76Fall 2012
Pakistan CollapsesMilitary carrying out operations against terrorists
Obligations to the U.S.
U.S. activities unpopular in Pakistan societyAnti-terrorist operations in border regions
People suffering and being killed
Taliban political resurgence in the westAfghanistan civil war
Islamic insurgency threatens Pakistan government
Fall 2012 77
Pakistan Collapses
Strengthening of political IslamReligious right alliance
Seeking political powerIslamism suffusing society
14 year old imprisoned for flying a kite
Pakistani TalibanSupporters of Afghan Taliban in tribal areas
Transitioned to Taliban forceReaction to Pakistani army incursion into tribal areas
78Fall 2012
Pakistan CollapsesIslamist Army Faction and Militant allies
Seize power to create radical Islamist stateGain control of some of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal
Supports Afghan TalibanConsolidate grip on Afghan southern and eastern regionsPakistan and Afghan Taliban join forces
Break away from Pakistan and AfghanistanCreate new state of Pashtunistan
RiskLow
Requires disintegration of the armyWar, ethnic or sectarian differences
Fall 2012 79
Pakistan CollapsesPashtunistan
80Fall 2012
Source: Zeb, Jahan. (2012, April 5). The Pashtun Land – Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, FATA, Afghanistan, Pakistan. Retrieved 12/06/2012 from http://pdc-afpak.blogspot.com/2012/04/pashtun-land-khyber-pakhtunkhwa-fata.html
Al Qaida Returns to AfghanistanGroup is active in Afghanistan
Spreading extremist messagesRaising moneyRecruitingProviding military expertise to the Taliban
Building ties with Afghan Islamic militant groupsPakistan-based Lashkar-e-TaibaNorth Afghanistan Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
Fall 2012 81
Al Qaida Returns to AfghanistanEastern Afghanistan
Expanded support networkStrong relationship with Haqqani network
Retains a command structure in AfghanistanWant to take advantage of Americans leaving
Increasing their numbersLaunch new attacks from AfghanistanRisk
High
82Fall 2012
Power Devolved to the ProvincesLong history of weak central government
Unable to govern in rural areas
Limited central governmentU.S. assistance to national government
Focused on supporting matters of stateTerritorial integrityInternal securityNational infrastructure development
Delegate power to local leadership councils
Fall 2012 83
Power Devolved to the ProvincesCedes south and east to the Taliban
Minority groups would not opposeUS support Pashtun militias in Afghanistan
Pakistan supports Haqqanis infiltration into AfganistanUS supports Afghan Pashtun militia infiltration into Pakistan FATA
Provides leverage over Pakistan
Prevents civil warRisk
Medium
Fall 2012 84
Military EstimateSummary
Peace cannot be negotiated Risk
HighWhen
Between 2012 and 2014Reasons
Taliban want greater role for Islamic law in legislationNot willing to join Karzai’s systemTaliban would not want to disarmPressure from Al-Qaida
85Fall 2012
Military EstimateSummary
ANA ethnically fracture after 2014Risk
HighWhen
Start to occur in early 2015Reasons
Ethnic divisions and patronage networksCultivation of friends from same ethnic backgroundPashtun minority in the army
Ethnic discriminationDesertions
86Fall 2012
Military EstimateSummary
ANSF members join Insurgents and MilitiasRisk
HighWhen
Start from mid 2015Reasons
ANA morale lowInsurgents and militias pay moreAfghan government cannot afford ANSF annual cost
ANSF to be reduced to 228,500125,000 soldiers unemployed
87Fall 2012
Military EstimateSummary
ANSF unable to defeat the TalibanRisk
HighWhen
2015 to 2016Reasons
Units aren’t readyDrug abuse and IlliteracyLack of Leadership and corruption
Ethnic tensionsLow moraleDesertions
88Fall 2012
Military EstimateSummaryCivil war
RiskHigh
WhenWar starts by end of 2015
ReasonsInsurgent leaders based in Pakistan will returnNot enough NATO troops to combat TalibanANSF not competent to defend against insurgentsPakistan and Al Qaida sabotage peace efforts
89Fall 2012
Political\Diplomatic estimateMap of Afghanistan tribal areas and neighboring countries
(NOTE: tribal areas bleed over national borders)
Source: United States Army Combined Arms Center. Retrieved from:http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/10-64/ch_4.asp
Fall 2012 90
POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC - FactsPolitically Afghanistan is in the Muslim countries of the Mid-east region
Islamic Republic 34 provinces
Landlocked bordersPakistanIranTurkmenistanUzbekistanTajikistan China
Current Afghan Constitution found here: http://www.afghan-web.com/politics/current_constitution.html
Fall 2012 91
POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC - Facts
Legal system mixedCivil, custom, Islamic law
Islamic law % not available
Current President Hamid Karzai (re-elected in 2009)Vice Presidents
Mohammad FAHIM KhanAbdul Karim KHALILI
25 appointed ministers
Fall 2012 92
POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC – FactsEthnic Tribal Groups Percentages
Pashtun - 42%Tajik – 27%Hazara – 9%Uzbek – 9%Aimak – 4%Turkman – 3%Baloch – 2%Other – 4%
Fall 2012 93
POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC – FactsEnthnicity
Ethnic group Members in Loya Jirga (including 68 women: 27%)
Pashtun 96
Hazara 61
Tajik 53
Uzbek 15
Aimak 8
Arab 8
Turkmen 3
Nuristani 2
Baloch 1
Pahhai 1
Turkic 1
Source: CIA world fact book Afghanistan. Retrieved from: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html
Fall 2012 94
POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC – FactsParty Ideology
Party IdeologyAfghan Liberal Party SecularRepublican Party of Afghanistan RepublicanismAfghan Social Democratic Party Social DemocracyAll other legal parties Islamist
Currently the Taliban and also Communist parties are not legal
Source: Political parties/groups and leaders in Afghanistan. Retrieved from:http://www.afghan-web.com/politics/parties.html
Fall 2012 95
POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC – FactsPolitical Party includes only political parties approved by the Ministry of Justice
Leader
Afghanistan's Islamic Mission Organization
Abdul Rasoul SAYYAF
Afghanistan's Welfare Party Meer Asef ZAEEFI
Afghan Social Democratic Party Anwarul Haq AHADI
Islamic Movement of Afghanistan Sayed Hussain ANWARI
Islamic Party of Afghanistan Mohammad Khalid FAROOQI and Abdul Hadi ARGHANDIWAL
Islamic Society of Afghanistan Salahuddin RABBANI
Islamic Unity of the Nation of Afghanistan Party
Qurban Ali URFANI
Fall 2012 96
POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC – FactsPolitical Party includes only political parties approved by the Ministry of Justice
Leader
Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan Mohammad Karim KHALILIIslamic Unity Party of the People of Afghanistan
Haji Mohammad MOHAQQEQ
Law and Justice Party Hanif ATMARNational Islamic Movement of Afghanistan
Pir Sayed Ahmad GAILANEE
National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan
Sayed NOORULLAH
National Solidarity Movement of Afghanistan
Pir Sayed Eshaq GAILANEE
National Linkage Party of Afghanistan Sayed Mansoor NADERYUnited Islamic Party of Afghanistan Ustad Mohammad AKBARI
Fall 2012 97
POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC – FactsLanguages
Afghan Persian or Dari (official) 50%
Pashto (official) 35%
Turkic languages (primarily Uzbek and Turkmen) 11%
30 minor languages Primarily Balochi Pashai 4%
Bilingualism is very present but Dari functions as lingua Franca
Fall 2012 98
POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC – FactsPolitical Influencers
Minority religious groups and other sects within Sunni and Shia branches
Sunni – 84%Shia – 15%Other – 1%
Tribal leaders
Local leaders of the various ethnic groups
Taliban
Fall 2012 99
POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC – FactsUS Ambassador to Afghanistan
James B. Cunningham
Afghanistan Ambassador to US
Ekil Ahmad HAKIMI
Age % of Population
Males Females
0-14 yos 43.2% 6.67 million
6.46 million
15-64 yos 54.4% 8.41 million
8.12 million
65 yos + 2.5% 350 ,000 401,000
Population 30 million (July 2012 est)Median age is 17.9 years
Source: CIA world fact book Afghanistan. Retrieved from: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html
Fall 2012 100
POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC – FactsHealth
0.21 physicians per 1,000 population
Infectious diseaseBacterial and protozoal diarrhea Hepatitis ATyphoid feverMalaria Rabies
Malnourishment 32.9% of children under the age of 5
Fall 2012 101
POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC – FactsAfghan Diplomatic Issues
Border issues with Pakistan and Iran
World’s largest producer of opiumRough relationship with US and other developing countries who struggle with drugs domestically Further increases challenges with neighbors through whom the drugs must pass to reach markets
Taliban still a major issueBehind the scene Terrorism complicating Af/Pak relationship further
Fall 2012 102
During January of 2010 a study collected by UNODC, examined the corruption within the Afghan Government
Determined bribery is an Issue
Fall 2012 103
Yes No Don’t remember No answer Total
East-central 53.1 36.6 1.9 8.4 100.0
Northern 60.9 30.5 3.8 4.7 100.0
Southern 61.5 28.5 2.0 8.1 100.0
Western 20.7 55.8 4.9 18.6 100.0
Total 52.2 36.4 2.9 8.5 100.0
Percentage of adult population who paid at least one bribe to a public official during the last 12 months, by region
Source: Corruption in Afghanistan. Retrieved from:http://www.unodc.org/documents/afghanistan/Anti-Corruption/Corruption_in_Afghanistan_Bribery_Reported_by_Victims_2010-Eng.pdf
Fall 2012 104
Source: Corruption in Afghanistan. Retrieved from:http://www.unodc.org/documents/afghanistan/Anti-Corruption/Corruption_in_Afghanistan_Bribery_Reported_by_Victims_2010-Eng.pdf
Fall 2012 105
Higher incidence of bribery in small towns
i.e. Tirin Kot and Mihtar Lam bribe rates > 70%
Lowest figures were in large cities
< 40% in Kabul and Hirat
Fall 2012 106
Source: Corruption in Afghanistan. Retrieved from:http://www.unodc.org/documents/afghanistan/Anti-Corruption/Corruption_in_Afghanistan_Bribery_Reported_by_Victims_2010-Eng.pdf
Fall 2012 107
“At the moment, the Afghani people are under the impression that it is cheaper to buy a judge than hire a lawyer”.
-Antonio Maria Costa, Executive Director, UNODC
Source: Corruption in Afghanistan. Retrieved from:http://www.unodc.org/documents/afghanistan/Anti-Corruption/Corruption_in_Afghanistan_Bribery_Reported_by_Victims_2010-Eng.pdf
Fall 2012 108
Source: Corruption in Afghanistan. Retrieved from:http://www.unodc.org/documents/afghanistan/Anti-Corruption/Corruption_in_Afghanistan_Bribery_Reported_by_Victims_2010-Eng.pdf
Fall 2012 109
40% of citizens were forced to pay an official a bribe
25% were forced to pay a bribe to police officers
18% were forced to pay a bribe to a judge
13% were forced to pay a bribe to a prosecutor
Fall 2012 110
POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC – FactsAfghan Diplomatic Issues
Speed up procedure
Make finalization of procedure possible
Avoid payment of fine
Reduce cost of procedures for me
Receive better treatment
Receiving information on the process
No specific purpose
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
Bribes paid by purpose, as percentage of bribes paid (urban areas)
Source: Corruption in Afghanistan. Retrieved from:http://www.unodc.org/documents/afghanistan/Anti-Corruption/Corruption_in_Afghanistan_Bribery_Reported_by_Victims_2010-Eng.pdf
Fall 2012 111
POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC – FactsAfghan Diplomatic Issues
Source: Corruption in Afghanistan. Retrieved from:http://www.unodc.org/documents/afghanistan/Anti-Corruption/Corruption_in_Afghanistan_Bribery_Reported_by_Victims_2010-Eng.pdf
Fall 2012 112
POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC – FactsWater Issues with Iran
Water consumption in upstream Afghanistan negatively affects water supply to Iran
Afghan construction of hydro-electric damsIran perceives as direct security threat
Shared Iran and Afghan water sourcesHelmund and Harirod-Murghab basinsNo active agreement
Fall 2012 113
POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC – FactsWater Issues with Iran – Afgan River Systems
Source: Hanasz, P. (2012, March 1). The Politics of Water Security between Afghanistan and Iran. Retrieved from http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publications/food-and-water-crises/416-the-politics-of-water-security-between-afghanistan-and-iran.html
Fall 2012 114
POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC – FactsWater Issues with Iran
Increasing human strain on Sistan wetlandsStrain due to mass migration
Leads to environmental disaster
Unlikely issues will be resolved No positive collaboration between Iran and Afghanistan
Fall 2012 115
POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC – FactsPashtun Tribal Lands
“Afghanistan shares borders with six countries, but the approximate 1500-mile-long Durand Line along Pakistan remains the most dangerous”
- Jayshree Banjoria (2009) Council on Foreign Relations
Pashtun tribal lands in Pakistan long claimed by Afghanistan as part of their own tribal region
Source: Bajoria, J. (2009, March 20). The Troubled Afghan-Pakistani Border. Retrieved from http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/troubled-afghan-pakistani-border/p14905
Fall 2012 116
JUDGMENTS - Political\Diplomatic
High risk of Taliban led civil war by EOY 2015
High risk of infectious disease outbreaksFood/water-borne, vector-borne, animal-borne diseases
High risk of rapid expansion of drug trade
High risk of Infiltration of foreign agents from Iran, Pakistan and other extra-nationals
Fall 2012 117
Civil War - Political\Diplomatic
High risk of Taliban led Civil WarLongstanding tribal boundaries creates significant distrust between factions
Lack of funds for ANSF accelerates return of ANSF forces to their home villages
Warlords gain huge influx of trained soldiers
Fall 2012 118
Civil War - Political\Diplomatic
High risk of Taliban led Civil War (cont.)Taliban aiding farmers to grow poppies in south
Government unable to provide for their citizens
Citizenry less loyal to central government than to local leaders
Afghanistan vulnerable to insurgents from Taliban and Iran
Fall 2012 119
Civil War - Political\DiplomaticEvidence
ANA ethnically fracturing after 2014
ANSF inability to defeat the Taliban
Increasing Green on Blue attacks reveals influence of Taliban
Corruption at all levels of government leaving many feeling disaffected and overlooked
Fall 2012 120
Civil War - Political\DiplomaticEvidence
85% of funds being spent on security
These funds at risk of shrinking rapidly due to donor fatigue and inability to meet Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework
Fall 2012 121
Civil War - Political\DiplomaticEvidence
Coalition force leaving slows economy
Increasing pressure on politicians to improve economy
Corruption will increase
Fall 2012 122
POLITICAL/DIPLOMATICCivil War Risk
High risk of civil war due to:Deteriorating domestic security conditions
Reducing of foreign aid
Dependence on the poppy fields for GDP growth
Decreasing participation by the US and allied forces
Chaos due to Taliban efforts
Fall 2012 123
POLITICAL/DIPLOMATICHigh risk of infectious disease outbreaks
Coalition forces withdraw: Afghan left with weakened medical system
Just 21 doctors per 100,000
Increase of water/sanitation modest at best according to the WHO
Fall 2012 124
POLITICAL/DIPLOMATICHigh risk of infectious disease outbreaks
Source: Afghan Health Profile. Retrieved from: http://www.who.int/gho/countries/afg.pdf
Fall 2012 125
POLITICAL/DIPLOMATICHigh risk of infectious disease outbreaks
According to the WHO, contributing factors to the government’s inability to provide a higher level of health is due to:
Limited fiscal resources
Poor security Terrorism and criminals
Weak governmentCorruption
Poor business sectorTerrorism and drugs
Growing narcotics - opium
Fall 2012 126
POLITICAL/DIPLOMATICHigh risk of infectious disease outbreaks
High risk food/water-borne diseasesDiarrhea bacterialHepatitis ADiarrhea-ProtozoalTyphoid/paratyphoid fever
High risk vector-borne diseasesMalaria
High risk animal-contact diseasesRabies
Fall 2012 127
Disease - Political\DiplomaticTop 10 illnesses (2007) include diarrhea and Malaria
Source:http://www.who.int/countryfocus/cooperation_strategy/ccs_afg_en.pdf
Fall 2012 128
POLITICAL/DIPLOMATICDisease - Alternative
Easiest infectious diseases to fight are food/water borne through sanitation efforts
The WHO, US, and other international organizations may provide:
Free clinicsInoculation campaigns Production of crops to replace poppy crops in some regionsDigging of wells to provide safe water and better sanitation
Civil war may be averted avoiding deterioration of general health and welfare
Fall 2012 129
Drug Trade - Political\Diplomatic
High risk of rapid expansion of drug trade
Taliban helping farmers in south to grow poppy
Taliban as middlemen to sell drug cartels
Profits then used for pending civil war
Fall 2012 130
Infiltration - Political\Diplomatic
Infiltration of foreign agents from:IranPakistanOther extra-nationals such as Al Qaida
Afghani’s alienated by the government and weakly functioning state agencies
Fall 2012 131
Infiltration - Political\Diplomatic
State cannot be trusted (crimes unpunished)MurderExtortion Land theft
August 2012 Mullah Omar (Taliban leader) bragged of infiltration into Afghan forces
Fall 2012 132
Infiltration - Political\Diplomatic
UN acting to counter infiltration of ANSF
Iran denying refuge to Afghani’s creating opportunities for embedding agents
Iranian currency is growing in basic trade on Afghani market
Iran providing aid to bolster Afghanistan
Fall 2012 133
Infiltration - Political\Diplomatic
Afghani’s concerned about growing Iranian influenceNOTE growth of Iran friendly media outlets
Source: Behn, S. (2012, November 27). Afghans Worry About Iran's Growing Influence. Retrieved from:http://www.voanews.com/content/afghan-worry-about-iran-growing-incluence/1553651.html
Fall 2012 134
Infiltration - Political\Diplomatic
Iran and Afghanistan have long standing dispute over rights to water
Large migrations of displaced Afghani’s reignite old disputes
Iranian weapons found in Afghanistan19 tons of explosive devices48 Rockets range-20 kmExplosively formed projectiles (EFP)
Alleged spies claim to be trained by Iran Revolutionary Guard
Fall 2012 135
Infiltration - Political\Diplomatic
Iranian support of insurgentsTraining, arming, and directing attacks
Chinese-Afghanistan relations: China exports trade into Afghanistan
Pakistan is Afghanistan strongest neighboring trade partner
shares antagonists: Islamist insurgents in tribal regions
Fall 2012 136
Infiltration - Political\Diplomatic
Pakistan is an important ally to help Afghanistan survive a civil war
Only if Pakistan can avoid its own disintegration
Tribal regions in Pakistan support insurgents causing friction with Pakistan
Fall 2012 137
Infiltration - Political\Diplomatic
Very High Risk of infiltration due to:
Afghan Taliban placing agents into ANSF
Iran providing support to insurgentsTraining, arming, directing attacks for insurgentsLikely inserting agents into Afghanistan
Fall 2012 138
Infiltration - Political\DiplomaticAlternatives
Alternative: Pakistan may fall dragging Afghanistan with them into civil wars
Alternative: Iran will step in and provide a stabilizing force in exchange for concessions in trade and with the water supply
Fall 2012 139
Political\Diplomatic Summary
Civil WarRisk
HighWhen
EOY 2015Reasons
Deteriorating domestic security conditionsReducing of foreign aidDependence on the poppy fields for GDP growthDecreasing participation by the US and allied forcesChaos due to Taliban efforts
Fall 2012 140
Political\Diplomatic Summary
Increased infectious disease outbreaksRisk
HighWhen
Mid year 2014Reasons
Poor Sanitation will worsen with reduced funding and no assistance from coalition forces
Fall 2012 141
Political\Diplomatic Summary
Rapid expansion of drug tradeRisk
HighWhen
2014Reasons
Taliban helping farmers in south to grow poppyTaliban as middlemen to sell drug cartelsProfits then used for pending civil war
Fall 2012 142
Political\Diplomatic Summary
Infiltration of ANSFRisk
Very HighWhen
2014Reasons
Afghan Taliban placing agents into ANSFIran providing support to insurgents
Training, arming, directing attacks for insurgentsLikely inserting agents into Afghanistan
Fall 2012 143
Economic Estimate
144Fall 2012
ECONOMIC – FactsCurrent State of Afghan Economy
Growing strongly
Significant growth Foreign aidGood harvest Services and construction sectors growing because of high military spending and external aid
145Fall 2012
ECONOMIC – FactsHistorical Trends Overview
Mid 1950’sLacked necessary social organization and institutions for modern economic activities
Also lacked managerial and technical skills
Afghanistan on a much lower stage of economic development than most of it’s neighbors
Fall 2012 146
ECONOMIC – FactsHistorical Trends Overview
Between 1956 and 1979Economic growth was guided by several five-year and seven-year plansAlso aided by extensive foreign assistance
Aid accounted for more than 4/5 of government investment and development expenditures
Primarily from the US and Soviet Union
Fall 2012 147
ECONOMIC – Facts Historical Trends Overview
Improvements during 1956 and 1979 include:Construction of roads, dams, power plants, factoriesIrrigation projects carried outEducation broadened
1970’sSale of natural gas to Soviet UnionAlbeit at a bargain priceMore than compensated in financing budget expenditures
Fall 2012 148
ECONOMIC – Facts Historical Trends Overview
1990’sEconomic collapse – economy sunk lower than period of communist rule
Further declined under Mujahideen and Taliban governments
Economic activity flourished mostly in illicit enterprises
Growing opium poppies for heroin productionSmuggling goods
Fall 2012 149
ECONOMIC – Facts Historical Trends Overview
OpiumBecame Taliban’s primary source of incomeOvershadowed the taxing of opium trafficking
By the late 1990’s Afghanistan became the world’s largest producer of opium
Afghan Opium field
Source: Afghanistan (n.d.). Brittanica. Retrieved from http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/7798/Afghanistan/21426/Demographic-trends
Fall 2012 150
ECONOMIC – FactsGross Domestic Product (GDP)
Explaining GDPThe monetary value of all the finished goods and services produced within a country's borders
Includes all of private and public consumptiongovernment outlays, investments, and exports less imports that occur within a defined territory
Fall 2012
Source: Gross domestic product - gdp. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gdp.asp
151
ECONOMIC – FactsGross Domestic Product (GDP)
GDP= C + G + I + NX :"C" is equal to all private consumption, or consumer spending, in a nation's economy
"G" is the sum of government spending
"I" is the sum of all the country's businesses spending on capital
"NX" is the nation's total net exports, calculated as total exports minus total imports. (NX = Exports - Imports)
Source: Gross domestic product - gdp. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gdp.asp
Fall 2012 152
ECONOMIC – FactsGross Domestic Product (GDP)
GDP- indicator of the economic health of a country and standard of living
Critics of using GDP does not take into account the underground economy
GDP is not intended to gauge material well-being, but serves as a measure of a nation's productivity
Source: Gross domestic product - gdp. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gdp.asp
Fall 2012 153
ECONOMIC – FactsCurrent State of Afghan Economy
Despite the progress the past few years, economy is poor
LandlockedHighly dependent on foreign aid
Much of population continues to suffer from:Shortages of housingClean waterElectricityMedical careJobs
Fall 2012 154
ECONOMIC – FactsCurrent State of Afghan Economy
Challenges to future economic growth
Criminality
Insecurity
Weak governanceDifficulty in extending rule of law to all parts of country
Fall 2012 155
ECONOMIC – FactsCurrent State of Afghan Economy
Medium outlook is optimistic
Foreign aid has been pledged at July 2012 Tokyo conference
16 Billion over 4 years
Long term outlook is less clearPolitical changes, corruption, violence, and reduction in foreign aid will have a large effect on state of the economy
Fall 2012 156
ECONOMIC – FactsCurrent State of Afghan Economy
Population:30.2 million
GDP (PPP):$27.4 billion,8.2% growth in 2010 5-year compound annual growth 10.2% $907 per capita
Unemployment: 35.0%
Inflation (CPI): 8.0%
FDI Inflows: $75.7 million
Public Debt: n/a
Fall 2012 157
ECONOMIC – FactsGDP Growth
Fall 2012
Source: Brookings Institute: “Afghanistan Index”
158
ECONOMIC – FactsGDP Growth
Source: “Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014”. The World Bank.
Fall 2012 159
ECONOMIC – FactsComposition of GDP Growth
Source: Center for Strategic & International Studies, “Creating the Economic Conditions”
Fall 2012 160
Economic-FactsDependency of Foreign Aid
Source: “Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014”. The World Bank.
Fall 2012 161
ECONOMICDependency on Foreign Aid
Excluding international military spendingSource: “Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond
2014”. The World Bank.
Fall 2012 162
ECONOMICAfghan Estimates and Indicators
Source: Poole, L. (2011). Afghanistan: Tracking major resource flows 2002-2010. Retrieved from http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/gha-Afghanistan-2011-major-resource-flows.pdf
Fall 2012 163
ECONOMICPast Assistance
Source: Poole, L. (2011). Afghanistan: Tracking major resource flows 2002-2010. Retrieved from http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/gha-Afghanistan-2011-major-resource-flows.pdf
Fall 2012 164
ECONOMICPast Assistance
Source: Poole, L. (2011). Afghanistan: Tracking major resource flows 2002-2010. Retrieved from http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/gha-Afghanistan-2011-major-resource-flows.pdf
Fall 2012 165
ECONOMICU.S. Assistance to Afghanistan: FY2009/2010 Appropriations and FY2010
Supplemental/FY2011 Requests (in $ millions)
Source: Afghanistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance. Curt Tarnoff. Specialist in Foreign Affairs. August 12, 2010
Fall 2012 166
ECONOMICCurrent Assistance
Source: Afghanistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance. Curt Tarnoff. Specialist in Foreign Affairs. August 12, 2010
Fall 2012 167
Economic Judgment
Afghanistan is too dependent of foreign aid
Fall 2012 168
ECONOMICAffect of Military Drawdown
Thousands of jobs held by Afghans under contracts financed by the State Department and USAID will be lost
American civilians working in the country expected to go down as the number of development projects decrease
Fall 2012 169
ECONOMICAffect of Military Drawdown
Troop withdrawals will hurt development aid in Afghanistan
Initial estimates indicate that it will cost $6 billion annually to maintain Afghan security forces following the drawdown
About three times Afghanistan’s current national tax revenues
Currently, 90 percent of the Afghan government’s budget comes from foreign sources
About 97 percent of the country’s GDP has come to depend on foreign aid and international military spending as well
Source: Byrd, W., Nassif, C., & Osorio, C. (2012). Retrieved from website: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/AFGHANISTANEXTN/Images/305983-1334954629964/AFTransition2014Vol2.pdf
Fall 2012 170
ECONOMICAfghanistan Faces Downturn
Risk of a deep financial crisis when foreign troops leave in 2014
If the United States is unable to overhaul its multibillion-dollar package of nation-building assistance
Source: Cassata, D. (2011, June 8). Report: Afghanistan faces economic downturn. Retrieved from http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2011/06/ap-report-afghanistan-faces-economic-downturn-060811
Fall 2012 171
ECONOMICAFGHANISTAN PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS (PRT)
PRTs in Afghanistan are key instruments delivers assistance at the provincial and district level
Improve security support good governance and enhance provincial development
Combination of international civilian and military resources allows PRT to have wide latitude to implement their mandate
PRT generally covers one province in Afghanistan- currently 26 PRTs operating in Afghanistan
Source: Provincial reconstruction teams. (2012, April). Retrieved from http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/partnerships/partners_provincial_resconstruction_teams
Fall 2012 172
ECONOMICAFGHANISTAN PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS
PRTs establish an environment that is secure and stable for aid agencies/civilian reconstruction efforts
PRTs able to deliver development and support to less secure areas
USAID’s programs attempt to work with PRTs to deliver services in less secure or underserved areas of Afghanistan
Source: Provincial reconstruction teams. (2012, April). Retrieved from http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/partnerships/partners_provincial_resconstruction_teams
Fall 2012 173
ECONOMICAFGHANISTAN PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS (PRT)
USAID has personnel in 19 PRTs across Afghanistan
USAID officers monitor all U.S. development efforts in the area of responsibility of the PRT
Implement PRT-specific programming
PRT works to: build relationships with local leadersidentify local needsreport on significant developments
Source: Provincial reconstruction teams. (2012, April). Retrieved from http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/partnerships/partners_provincial_resconstruction_teams
Fall 2012 174
ECONOMICAFGHANISTAN PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS
Troop withdraw presents challenges for the reconstruction effort
Difficult for U.S. agencies to implement and monitor projects at the provincial and local levels
NATO/ISAF troops have provided security for both the PRTs and officials traveling outside of Kabul
Likely to become harder for SIGAR and other oversight agencies to visit and assess projects
Fall 2012 175
ECONOMICAFFECTS ON POVERTY AFTER US WITHDRAWAL
Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world
Reduction in foreign military will increase unemployment
Poverty has increased in the last ten yearsFailure to counter the root causes contributing to poverty despite billions of dollars of foreign aid
Fall 2012 176
ECONOMICREGIONAL AFGHAN MUNICIPALITIES PROGRAM FOR URBAN POPULATIONS
The Regional Afghan Municipalities Program for Urban Populations (RAMP UP) assists governments in urban centers
increase the capacity of municipal officials
improve the delivery of municipal services
support economic growth initiatives
increase own-source revenues
Fall 2012 177
ECONOMICREGIONAL AFGHAN MUNICIPALITIES PROGRAM FOR URBAN POPULATIONS
USAID funds small service delivery improvements and small-scale infrastructure projects such as:
road pavingparkssolid waste management
Community projects seek to develop municipal management capacity while improving service and delivery
Increases the amount of locally generated revenue
Fall 2012 178
ECONOMICAfghanistan Workforce Development Program
USAID’s Afghanistan Workforce Development Program (AWDP) offers access for 25,000 Afghan men and women to:
labor-market-driven vocational education and training
business-development support
business-management training programs
financial credit
job-placement servicesSpecial Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, (2012). Quarterly report on afghanistan. Retrieved from website: http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2012-10-30qr.pdf
Fall 2012 179
ECONOMICAfghanistan Workforce Development Program
Goal of the program isFacilitate job creationDevelop a skilled and semi-skilled workforceIncrease self-employment, and promote economic growth in Afghanistan
Program aims to provide alternatives to illicit economic and insurgent activities
Fall 2012 180
ECONOMICAfghanistan Workforce Development Program
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, (2012). Quarterly report on afghanistan. Retrieved from website: http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2012-10-30qr.pdf
Fall 2012 181
ECONOMICEmployment After Withdrawal
Combat vets hope to create Afghan jobs with footwear
Company is paying Afghan workers to produce high-quality flip-flops
Combat Flip Flops, an Issaquah-based online store selling flip-flops made in Kabul
Fall 2012 182
ECONOMICCurrent Job Market in Afghanistan
Agency coordinating body for afghan relief. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.acbar.org/
Fall 2012 183
ECONOMICEmployment/Military Relationship
Chart: Number of contractors in afghanistan will surge as u.s. troops withdraw. (2011, June 29). Retrieved from http://thinkprogress.org/security/2011/06/29/256726/afghanistan-contractors-surge/?mobile=nc
Fall 2012 184
Judgments on Reduction of Foreign Troops
Military drawdown will reduce spending in Afghanistan
Jobs and revenue will decrease with decrease in foreign troop levels
Reduction in PRT will negatively impact growth
Fall 2012 185
ECONOMICNew Silk Road Initiative
The State Department’s “New Silk Road” initiative:
A key element of the U.S. development strategy in Afghanistan
Seeks greater regional economic integration Free movement of goods, services, capital, and people between Afghanistan and its neighbors
Fall 2012 186
ECONOMICNew Silk Road Initiative Issues
Afghan neighbors and regional powersLittle interest in investment or integrating their economies with Afghanistan
Chinese and Indian firms have won major mining contracts potentially worth billions
Neither has made the infrastructure investments required to start breaking ground
Fall 2012 187
Economic Judgment
“New Silk Road” won’t takeoff because of instability and lack of interest in Afghanistan investment
Fall 2012 188
EconomicCorruption will impede Foreign Aid
Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework:
Aid depends on government’s ability/willingness to reduce corruption
Reduce corruption in government, law, public finance
Improve human rights for children and women
Fall 2012 189
ECONOMICCorruption will impede Foreign Aid
Misspent foreign aid can lead to:CorruptionAltering of markets Lack of ability of the Kabul government to control its resources
World Bank found that 97 percent of the GDP in Afghanistan is linked to spending by the international military and donor community
Fall 2012 190
ECONOMIC Historical Examples of Aid Reduction- “Donor Fatigue"
Source: Center for Strategic & International Studies, “Creating the Economic Conditions”
Fall 2012 191
ECONOMICFailure to follow through on aid
Highly likely that much of the aid pledge at the Tokyo Conference will never make it to Afghanistan
Many governments have currently yet to come up with funding
Europe’s debt crisis has raised fears that some of the pledges won’t be fulfilled
Fall 2012 192
Economic Judgment
Donor fatigue and corruption will lead to reduction in aid
Fall 2012 193
ECONOMICAfghan Agriculture
Agriculture is volatile
Cannot be relied upon for economic prosperity
Source: Central Statistics Office (2011): http://cso.gov.af/en
Fall 2012 194
ECONOMICAfghan Agriculture
20-30% of the GDP depending on harvest and weather
Wheat makes up 75% of aggregated licit agriculture
Crops are highly dependent on rainDry seasons/drought determine %GDP
Fall 2012 195
ECONOMICAgriculture and GDP Relationship
Source: The World Band: “Afghanistan Economic Update”
Fall 2012 196
Economic Judgment
Agriculture is too volatile to be relied upon for economic growth and won’t sustain economy
Fall 2012 197
ECONOMICMining
Assessment, extraction processing, transportation and sales
Require high investment and significant time
Investment will be limited because of instability
Reduction in foreign assistance will delay startup costs
Fall 2012 198
ECONOMICMining
Current legislative and regulatory environment is unfavorable for investment
Progress in developing Aynak copper mine is lagging behind schedule
Developer has recently withdrawn most of its foreign staff due to security instability
Fall 2012 199
Economic Judgment
Mining affect on GDP is marginal and won’t amount to economic growth
Fall 2012 200
Alternative Judgment
Industrial and service based economy can sustain economy
-Because:Afghanistan’s Agricultural sector cannot sustain the economy
Fall 2012 201
ECONOMICAgriculture cannot sustain economy
Source: CIA World Fact Book https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html
Fall 2012 202
ECONOMICAgriculture cannot sustain economy
Source: CIA World Fact Book https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html
Fall 2012 203
ECONOMICAgriculture vs. Service and Industrial
Current state of Economics in AfghanistanCurrently 78.6% of the labor force works in agriculture
5.7% of the labor force is industrial, which accounts for 25% for the GDP
As seen in the previous two slides, industrial and services make up only 22% of the labor force, yet accounts for 65% of the GDP
Fall 2012 204
ECONOMICAgriculture vs. Service and Industrial
The main crop is not viable for long-term stability
Multi phase transitionContinued aid must be focused on Education and Infrastructure in order to provide for economic stability
End gameService-based economy such as Japan or the U.S.
Shift from Agricultural > Industrial > Service
Fall 2012 205
ECONOMICAgriculture vs. Service and Industrial
1%
72%
27%
Japan - GDP by Sector
AgriculturalServicesIndustrial
4%
70%
26%
Japan - Labor force by sector
AgriculturalServicesIndustrial
Source: CIA World Factbook: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ja.html
Fall 2012 206
ECONOMICAgriculture vs. Service and Industrial
17%
56%
26%
U.S. - GPD by Sector
AgriculturalServicesIndustrial
52%
34%
14%
U.S. - Labor Force by Sector
AgriculturalServicesIndustrial
Source: CIA World Factbook: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html
Fall 2012 207
ECONOMICAgriculture vs. Service and Industrial
Multi-phase approach > developing nation approach
Afghanistan economic development must happen in several phases
Industrial sector must first be developed
Focus on education to provide a innovative labor force to continue economic growth
Transition to service-based
Fall 2012 208
ECONOMIC Agriculture vs. Service and Industrial – India developing economy
17%
56%
26%
India - GPD by Sector
AgriculturalServicesIndustrial
52%
34%
14%
India - Labor Force by Sector
AgriculturalServicesIndustrial
Source: CIA World Factbook: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html
Fall 2012 209
ECONOMIC Agriculture vs. Service and Industrial
How do you get there?
Transition won’t be easily made, first, there must be a strong development in the industrial sector
Currently, approximately 15% of foreign aid is being devoted to Economic Infrastructure and Services development
Funds should be redirected to more impactful areas of the infrastructure
Fall 2012 210
ECONOMICODA = Official Development Assistance
Source: http://www.oecd.org/dac/aidstatistics/44789608.gif
Fall 2012 211
ECONOMICAfghan Education
Less than 10% (roughly 6% based on the chart) is being devoted to Education
Necessary to increase in order to have a skilled work force to move Afghanistan towards industrial and service based
Fall 2012 212
ECONOMIC Agriculture vs. Service and Industrial
Once transition to Industrial is made, to continue growth as a world power
Service is the market to get into
Fall 2012 213
Alternative Judgment
Mining can sustain economy
Aid should be focused on industry-mineral / mining and the industries that are associated
If developed properly, mining could become one of Afghanistan’s primary industries
Officials claim deposits – copper, iron ore, oil, gas, niobium, cobalt, gold, molybdenum, silver and lithium could generate $3.5 billion a year
Fall 2012 214
ECONOMICAlternative Hypothesis: Mining Potential
Mining industry could provide the means for Afghanistan to move towards an industrial and service based economy
Mining generates secondary/tertiary industries
Refinement and manufacturing as secondary industries
Retail, trade, and financial as tertiary industries
Fall 2012 215
ECONOMICAlternative Hypothesis: Illicit Opium Economy
Decline in aid may create a reliance on the opium trade or other illicit means for finances
Opium crop provides livelihoods for many rural Afghans
Half of agricultural production is from opium
2011-Farm gate value of opium was 8% of GDP and overall contribution to GDP is around 33% (includes distribution)
Fall 2012 216
EconomicAlternative Hypothesis: Illicit Opium Economy
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime: 2011 production value: increased 133% from 2010
1.4 Billion or 9% of GDP
2011 export value: 2.4 billion or 15% of GDP
Farmers can make 11 time more money than wheat
60% of surveyed farmers were “motivated” by profits
Fall 2012 217
ECONOMICOpium Production
Source: Brookings Institute: “Afghanistan Index”
Fall 2012 218
Summary of Military Drawdown Judgments
Military drawdown will reduce spending in Afghanistan
Jobs and revenue will decrease with decrease in foreign troop levels
Reduction in PRT will negatively impact growth
Fall 2012 219
Summary of Additional Judgments• Mining affect on GDP is marginal and won’t amount to
economic growth
• Too Dependent of Foreign Aid
• “New Silk Road” won’t takeoff because of instability and lack of interest in Afghanistan investment
• Agriculture is too volatile to be relied upon for economic growth and won’t sustain economy
• Donor fatigue and corruption will lead to reduction in aid
Fall 2012 220
Collective Summary of Economic Judgments
Won’t be able to sustain itself economically when foreign aid is reduced
Foreign military force reduction will negatively impact economy with troop reductions in 2014
Fall 2012 221
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