professor ken wong on mayoral accountability

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MAYORAL ACCOUNTABILITY AS A STRATEGY TO RAISE PERFORMANCE IN URBAN DISTRICTS Dr. Kenneth Wong Annenberg Professor and Chair of the Education Department Brown University Presentation in Bridgeport, CT, March 13, 2012

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Professor Ken Wong presented this powerpoint to the Bridgeport public and the Charter Revision Committee on March 12, 2012

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Page 1: Professor Ken Wong on mayoral accountability

MAYORAL ACCOUNTABILITY AS A STRATEGY TO RAISE PERFORMANCE IN URBAN DISTRICTS

Dr. Kenneth WongAnnenberg Professor andChair of the Education Department

Brown University

Presentation in Bridgeport, CT, March 13, 2012

Page 2: Professor Ken Wong on mayoral accountability

Mayoral appointment of school board is gaining national prominence

Currently, almost two-thirds of the states have passed legislation authorizing either the city or the state to govern and manage school districts that are underperforming.

An appointed school board now runs the district in Chicago, New York, Philadelphia, Boston, Baltimore, Cleveland, and Providence, among others.

Page 3: Professor Ken Wong on mayoral accountability

UNIQUE CHALLENGES FORBIG CITY SCHOOL BOARDS

SCALE: 26.6% of the nation’s K-12 students are served by the largest 129 districts, and nearly 41% are taught in the 375 largest

FRAGMENTATION: Local politics and decentralization make system-wide reform and accountability more difficult

COMPETITION: Pressure to keep middle-class tax base, retain jobs, and stabilize city population

Page 4: Professor Ken Wong on mayoral accountability

Design Rationale

Enables the mayor to rely on system-wide standards to hold schools and student accountable for their performance. Failing schools and students are subject to sanctions while being given additional support.

Designs to reduce institutional fragmentation that often impedes strategic improvement.

A single office is ultimately accountable. Integrate electoral accountability and school performance at the system wide level.

Page 5: Professor Ken Wong on mayoral accountability

Three Enabling Processes

State legislation that authorizes the mayor to replace an elected board with an appointed board (such as Chicago and New York)

State legislation that calls for a citywide referendum on whether to grant the mayor the authority to appoint the school board (such as Boston and Cleveland).

Voter approval of changes in a charter that allow the mayor to appoint school board members (such as Oakland in 2000).

Page 6: Professor Ken Wong on mayoral accountability

VARIATIONS OF MAYORAL ACCOUNTABILITY

District New / Old Style

Mayor appoints majority of board?

Mayor appoints all of board?

Mayor has full appt. power?

Boston New Yes Yes No ^^

Chicago New Yes Yes Yes

New Haven New Yes Yes Yes

Baltimore New No: Joint appt. with governor

Providence New Yes Yes No ^

Detroit a New Yes No * Yes

Cleveland New Yes Yes No ^^

Wash. DC New Full Governance Authority

Oakland New No No Yes

Philadelphia New No: Joint appt. with governor

New York New Yes No Yes

Hartford New Yes Yes Yes

NOTES: a) In 2004, Detroit reverted to an elected school board. ^^ Nominating committee pre-screens candidates and then gives a slate to the mayor. ^^^ Council confirmation was required when this policy was in place (2000-2004). * State places 1 of 7 on board for first five years.

Page 7: Professor Ken Wong on mayoral accountability

Chicago as an Example

As a result of the 1995 State Reform Act, the Mayor of Chicago appoints all members of the school board

The mayor also appoints the Chief Executive Officer, who in turns oversees the Chief Education Officer and other top administrative chiefs

The district has improved capital funding, balanced the budget, and secured labor stability through a four-year contract with the teachers’ union

Media and public confidence remains strong

Page 8: Professor Ken Wong on mayoral accountability

Does Mayoral Accountability Raise Student Performance?Consider Findings in The Education Mayor:

Mayoral Accountability has a statistically significant, positive effect on student achievement in reading and math at both elementary and high school grades.

When socio-economic factors and other governance conditions are taken into full consideration, mayoral control shows positive student improvement in reading and math at elementary grades. Two years after the introduction of a mayor appointed school board, we expect to see student achievement improves 0.15 to 0.19 standard deviation in reading and math at elementary grades.

The lowest performing schools show persistent improvement in student achievement in districts that are under mayoral control.

Academic progress is also correlated to institutional checks and balances in the mayoral control system.

Page 9: Professor Ken Wong on mayoral accountability

Mayoral Control

Grade 4 Math Achievement, NYC & NY State, 1999-2008

Page 10: Professor Ken Wong on mayoral accountability

Does Mayoral Control Improve Management?Consider Findings in The Education Mayor:

“The Education Mayor” is strategic in prioritizing resource allocation and management. Mayoral accountability lowers spending on general administration, while targeting resources on instructional purposes.

Mayoral accountability improves the district’s fiscal discipline and management performance.

Page 11: Professor Ken Wong on mayoral accountability

Strategic Management

Within the first couple of years, mayoral appointed boards seem able to show financial solvency, often turning a deficit into a balanced budget.

Mayoral control systems are also able to raise the bond rating, maintain labor peace, improve client satisfaction, and improve efficiency at the central office.

In Chicago the Standard & Poor’s raised the district’s bond rating from BBB- to A- during the first two reform years.

In Philadelphia, the board identified $44 million of waste and launched a $1.5 billion capital plan to build new schools and modernize facilities.

Page 12: Professor Ken Wong on mayoral accountability

Management Reform

Mayoral control systems tend to reprioritize the role of the central office New York example on decentralizing support

services Mayoral selected CEOs often broaden the

pool of expertise in operation, finance, and management. Chicago example

New efforts to broaden the teacher pool Need incentive structure on performance-

based accountability Philadelphia and other districts move toward

diverse providers

Page 13: Professor Ken Wong on mayoral accountability

Public Opinion Matters – Electoral Democracy Works

In 2004, Detroit voters chose to end the mayoral appointed school board after poor district performance under mayor’s leadership

In 2002, Cleveland voters chose to continue mayoral control after strong performance

More recently, D.C. Mayor was voted out of office for not sufficiently engaging the public on reform

School improvement contributed to re-election of mayors in Boston, Chicago, and New York

Lesson: voters can discern school performance, and will hold mayor accountable

Page 14: Professor Ken Wong on mayoral accountability

Voters asked: Do you think Mayor Bloomberg's take-over of the public schools has been a success or failure? Percent who said it was a success …

Page 15: Professor Ken Wong on mayoral accountability

Factors for Success

Establish clear and attainable strategic goals Mayor’s willingness to put financial and

political resources to leveling up failing schools Work together with the existing administration

for a smooth transition Recruit managers who bring diverse expertise Take a portfolio approach in school

management Diverse human capital pipeline Focus on performance-based accountability

Page 16: Professor Ken Wong on mayoral accountability

Options for governance change in Urban Districts:

Option One: Complete Mayoral Accountability Mayor appoints majority or all board

members Mayor has full appointive power of the CEO or

Superintendent Examples: Boston, Chicago, New York,

Washington DC

Option Two: Shared Governance between Mayor and Governor

Jointly appoints board members Examples: Baltimore, Philadelphia

Page 17: Professor Ken Wong on mayoral accountability

Issues on Governance Change:

Is timing appropriate for governance reform?

What design features work for the District? Is public opinion supportive of governance

reform? Who will oppose the reform? Who will support the reform? Is the Mayor ready to lead the district? What is the opportunity cost in not

implementing the reform? How to sustain support for the reform?

Page 18: Professor Ken Wong on mayoral accountability

Benefits of Mayoral Accountability Internal accountability:

Clear standards of accountability at different levels of the policy system

Strategic deployment of resources Institutional checks and balances Portfolio approach to school improvement

External accountability: Institutional checks and balances Including a nominating process for school

board appointment Budgetary approval by the City Council External and independent evaluation

Page 19: Professor Ken Wong on mayoral accountability

EDUCATION MAYORS: IMPROVING AMERICA’S SCHOOLS

For More InformationPlease Contact:

Dr. Kenneth K. WongBrown [email protected]