The politics of innovation in the public sector: initial thoughts

Professor Peter Carroll

University of Tasmania

Tel: 03 6226 2267

Email: Peter.Carroll@utas.edu.au

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Introduction

This paper is very much a preliminary exercise with a rather selfish motive, that of

attempting to develop a conceptual framework for understanding the politics of public

innovation for an author whose previous work on innovation has been in other areas

of innovation (Carroll, Pol, Robertson 2000, Carroll, Robertson, Pol 2001a, 2001b,

2002, Pol and Carroll 2004a, 2004b, 2006, Pol, Carroll, Robertson 2002, Robertson,

Pol, Carroll 2003, 2005). The interest in developing a conceptual framework arose for

two reasons: one, the growing emphasis on the apparent need for public sector

innovation expressed by governments; two, my failure to identify a satisfactory

framework for understanding the politics of public sector innovation in the literature.

Indeed, it was surprising to find how little published work existed in regard to the

politics of public sector innovation, despite its growing importance (the relatively few

academic works identified include Behn 1998, Borins 1998, 2000, 2001, Brewer,

Coleman, Facer 2000, Houston 2000, Lodge, Kalitowski 2007, Mintrom 1997,

Osborne, Brown 2005, Perry, Kraemer, Dunkle, King 1993, Vandenabeele et al

2006).

The paper begins by arguing that innovation in the public sector is inherently more

difficult than in the private sector. It then moves on to define a range of related

concepts: change; innovation, politics, power and authority. The concepts defined are

then used to inform the development of a simple ‘four arenas’, model of the politics of

innovation in the public sector. The four arenas model is used to provide a framework

for understanding the politics of public sector innovation in regard to two types of

innovation, product and process innovation. The final section outlines some basic

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research questions in regard to the politics of public sector innovation suggested by

the four arenas model.

Public and private sector innovation: the context makes a difference

This paper is not concerned with comparisons between innovation in the public and

private sectors. Thus, the aim of this section is simply to indicate two characteristics

of the public sector, competing interests and multiple constituencies, that differentiate

it from the private sector and that make innovation in the public sector a more

difficult and, usually, time-consuming task. What follows in later sections takes these

characteristics as a given, discussed only where necessary to emphasise particular

points.

Innovation in the public sector is more difficult and time consuming because

governments are subject to a very wide range of competing interests, on a scale

unknown to even the largest business corporations. Imagine, if you will, a team

proposes an innovative VOIP system to replace existing phone systems, with an

estimated, annual saving of $5 million for the corporation. In a privately owned firm,

with one owner, this represents a substantial, attractive, potential benefit to the owner.

In a firm with one thousand shareholders the benefits are diluted, but still

considerable. This contrasts markedly with the situation for an elected government

with a national electorate of, say, 30 million, where the saving per person (assuming a

proportionate decrease in taxation revenues), is 0.16 cents per person. In other words

the strength of the motivation to innovate will vary substantially, being far less for

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governments than for firms, so that any proposed innovation will have to offer

relatively large benefits if it is to prove attractive.

This is even more the case when multiple constituencies are considered. The

introduction of the VOIP system might, for example, result in redundancies for fifty

staff in the department concerned, or, if adopted across the whole of government,

perhaps five hundred, each of whom votes, as well as belonging to a trade union that

provides valuable support for the government of the day. It might also, for example,

necessitate that all citizens that use the services of the Department purchase an

accessory to make their non-VOIP phones compatible with those being installed. It

might also be that it is a Department for Veterans Affairs that is considering the

innovation, with a constituency that consists of a high proportion of low income

veterans ill-equipped to afford such an accessory. At the same time both domestic and

international firms are competing for the contract to design and install the system,

seeing it as the first step to the widespread introduction of VOIP systems into

governments around the world. In other words the combination of less powerful

motives and multiple, often competing constituencies, makes public sector innovation

more challenging than in the private sector.

Politics, power, authority, change and innovation: defining the terms

In this paper politics refers to the activities and processes arising from the interaction

of individual and group values, motivations and actions, notably in situations of

scarce human and physical resources. Conflict and cooperation, continuity, change

and innovation can result and, while conflict is not an inevitable result of such

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interactions, it is a very frequent characteristic, especially where individuals and

groups compete, successfully and unsuccessfully, for the scarce resources they see as

necessary to achieve their goals, or where the compete in relation to values, or both.

Hence, as defined, politics will occur in any group or social context, from the small,

informal group, to the family, formal organisations, systems of governance, and

government.

If politics refers to sets of interactive processes and related activities, then power

refers to the resources used in the attempt to achieve particular goals and also, in a

passive sense, to the stock of resources available, potentially, to various actors. It is

the successful use of power that largely determines the outcomes of the political

process. The concept of authority refers to the institutionalised use of power, usually

by those holding specified positions.

The concept of change underlies that of innovation and has at least two associated

meanings, all related to the notion of becoming different:

• One, where it is used to refer to differences in the characteristics of the same

object, activity or process at two different points in time. The changes can be:

unique; new only in a specific context or location, having been observed in

other contexts or locations; not new, but recurring;

• two, where it used to refer to those activities or processes that result in the

observed change in the object’s or processes’ characteristics, that is, the

causes of change;

Hence, there are two basic notions of change in relation to politics,

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• Where the notion of change refers to the differences (unique, new in a specific

context or location, or recurring), in the characteristics of the activities and

processes arising from the interaction of individual and group values,

motivations and actions in situations of scarce human and physical resources

at different points in time;

• Where change refers to the causes of observed differences in a political

system, ‘the changes that brought about’, the situation;

The concept of innovation is in most respects similar to the concept of change but

refers only to changes in which something new is involved, resulting in a claimed or

actual improvement over that which it replaces, and can be defined in at least two

broad fashions:

• Where innovation refers to differences in the characteristics of an activity,

process, object or system at different points in time, differences that are either

unique, or new in the specific context or location and that result, or are

claimed to result, in improvements over that which they replace (much of the

American literature uses the term invention to refer to unique innovations,

reserving the use of the term innovation for the adoption of an existing idea,

see Rogers 1995);

• Where innovation refers to the causes of the unique activity, process, object or

system, or to the new in context or location, situation, that is ‘the innovation

process’.

What, then, is meant by the phrase ‘the politics of innovation’? As defined, innovation

involves change that is unique or new, resulting in claimed or actual improvements

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over that which it replaces or modifies. Hence, the politics of innovation occurs,

primarily, where innovation involves, or is seen as likely to involve:

• A competition for scarce resources. Thus involves those proposing and

supporting an innovation in the competition for the resources needed for its

development and implementation.

• A change in the distribution of authority and power within the unit or

organisation in question as a result of approving and implementing the

proposed innovation, whether or not the innovation involves a claim for

scarce resources.

• A reduction in the stock of available resources as a result of an allocation for

a proposed innovation, leading to competition for a share of the reduced

resources. This politics of redistribution is not inevitable, as the available

stock of resources might be increased, so that, assuming that no new claims

on resources are initiated, redistribution is not necessary. However, the

perception that successful innovation proposals might result in a reduction in

the availability of the total stock of resources is at least partly the cause of the

resistance met by the proponents of an innovation. The politics of

redistribution following a successful claim for resources for innovation

development will not be examined in this paper.

It should be stressed that innovation does not necessarily involve politics, so long as it

does not require scarce resources or result in changes to the distribution of authority

and power. Indeed, some innovations result in changes, for example, to procedures,

work practices and organisational structures that are more efficient than those they

replace, reducing the call on available resources. Where this is the case and, in

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addition, where efficient innovations are not likely to result in changes to the

distribution of authority and power, then political activity is likely to be limited. Other

innovations, of course, require an increased use of resources, tending to decrease

those available for other purposes and more intense political opposition to determine

which actors lose out from the decrease in the redistribution process.

In the general senses defined above, innovation can and will occur in any context,

public or private and, where it involves the competition for resources and/or changes

to the distribution of power and authority, will almost inevitably, in part, be a political

process.

The political arenas of innovation

In the previous section innovation was described as involving political processes, as it

involved, usually, competition for scarce resources and changes, or potential changes,

to the distribution of power and authority. Indeed, given that, for the most part,

innovation usually involves the competition for scarce resources and, perhaps

somewhat less frequently, changes to existing distributions of power and authority,

innovation is a political process. It was further suggested that the political activities

occurred at two different, though related stages of the innovation process: one, in

relation to gaining approval and resources for the innovation, the politics of

innovation; two, at a later stage, the politics of redistribution. In this section the aim is

to examine the politics of innovation processes in more detail, by developing a simple

model that might guide research and understanding. The model is stimulated by the

work of Bruggemeier and his colleagues, drawing on the earlier work of Yin (1977),

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who, on the basis of empirical studies of IT related innovations, suggest it is more

useful to consider the politics of innovation as a more complex system involving four

linked subsystems, or arenas, each characterised, in part, by particular sets of political

activities and an increased intensity of competition over resources, power and

authority, the project proposal, concept development, implementation and

routinization arenas (2006: 3).

The project proposal arena

The first arena, the project proposal, can involve competitive, political action in

relation to three fundamental activities: one, the drawing up or design of the basic

project proposal; two, getting the proposal on to the agenda of the unit’s key decision

makers; three, importantly, the gaining of approval to undertake the second, more

complex, time and resource-consuming activities involved in the concept

development arena. The first activity, drawing up a basic project proposal or design,

will require only a limited use of scarce resources and involve little more than an

informal, individual or very small group decision to allocate a portion of the

participants’ time for conceiving and drawing up the project proposal that outlines the

innovation. In so far as there is a competition for resources it will occur only as the

potential members of the group decide whether or not to cooperate in the project and,

in so doing, allocate their time and efforts to the project in question, rather than to

other activities. An important qualification to this latter assertion concerns

innovations where it is apparent to the individuals involved that they are likely to

require substantial resources to develop and implement, or that are likely to have

substantial, symbolic importance. In these, more sensitive cases, it is likely that the

individual or group members concerned will engage in lengthier, if still preliminary

discussions about the workloads involved, the repercussions they might face, both

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now and in the future, from those affected by the proposal. There might also be some

preliminary lobbying of those with authority to approve the project. In other words

political activity will increase rapidly in frequency and intensity.

The second activity regarding the project proposal, getting the proposal on to the

agenda of key decision makers within the unit, will vary in its significance,

depending, again, upon the likely resources needed for its development and

implementation, or its symbolic importance. In the case of small scale innovations it

will involve little more than a discussion with the unit manager and a brief document

outlining the proposal. In the case of the larger projects then a more complex set of

activities will result, involving the initiation, specification and expansion phases of

agenda setting as described by Cobb et al (1976).

It is the third activity, that of gaining approval for the allocation of resources for the

following, more sophisticated, conceptual development arena, that will involve a

more intense competition for resources, especially for large projects. This competition

might take place in one of two contexts. The first context would be predominantly

intra-unit, perhaps a branch or division within a department, involving competition for

existing, budgeted, unit funds, assuming the branch or division manager has either a

budget for innovatory activities (unlikely), or the discretion to move funds between

budgeted accounts, or both. The competition would take place with other members of

the unit putting forward other innovative proposals, or those with responsibilities for

existing, routinized operations potentially threatened by the proposed innovation, or

both. The focus of the competition would be the manager of the unit with authority to

make resource allocations. The second context would involve the inter-unit context,

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focused on gaining resources in the department’s budget for the next year. The first

phase of the competition in this context would be largely intra-unit as staff competed

to gain a place on the unit’s draft budget for their proposal. The second phase would

be inter-unit, as the unit’s manager competed with other unit managers for funding in

the department’s overall budget. A final point to note is that smaller innovations

might not involve the second, concept development arena, as their conceptual

sophistication would be limited, as would their resource claims, enabling them to

move directly to the implementation arena, as discussed below.

The concept development arena

The second arena, concept development, takes place after a successful bid for

resources in the first, project proposal arena and would involve only those more

complex, sophisticated and resource-intensive innovations that take time to develop.

Competition takes place in relation to two sets of activities: one, in relation to what

might be called the politics of conceptual definition; two, in relation to the gaining of

approval, on the basis of the more fully developed innovative concept, for resources

for the implementation of the project. The politics of conceptual definition is a

particularly interesting process that is stimulated by a growing, more accurate

awareness of what the innovation is likely to involve for members of the unit or larger

department. Its potential impact upon resources, organisational structure, processes

and, most importantly, upon the existing distribution of power and authority, emerges

as the process of concept development progresses. The result is a particularly intense

period of political activity as key actors manoeuvre to maximise their gains or

minimise their losses, given their greater understanding of what is likely to be

involved if the innovation is agreed to and implemented. It is intense because, while

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the innovation’s likely impact is clearer, it is still in the development stage and can be

delayed, terminated or, possibly, conceptually modified and re-modified as key actors

attempt to resolve the project’s future before the final decision as to implementation.

The second set of competitive activities in this concept development arena involves

competition for approval for the project’s implementation and the resources necessary

for that implementation, based on the more detailed and sophisticated concept. Unlike

the project proposal arena, competition at this stage normally would not involve

competition for existing, budgeted resources as these are unlikely to be sufficient for

project implementation on any significant scale. Rather, competition focuses on next

year’s budget.

The implementation arena

It might be imagined that the third arena, that of implementation of the innovatory

project, would be free from the intra-unit or inter-unit politics that characterise the

earlier arenas, given that the project has already gained approval and an allocation of

resources. In practice, this is rarely the case, for at least three situations might occur

that will tend to result in renewed political activity. The first occurs where approval

has been granted only for an implementation trial, with a final decision to be made on

the basis of the project’s performance in the trial period. Where performance in the

trial period is uncertain or difficult to measure, then there will tend to be renewed

political activity and competition between those who continue to support the

implementation of the innovation and those who do not, in the period leading to a

final decision. The second situation can occur even where the implementation of an

innovation is unconditional, if, during its implementation, unanticipated, negative

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consequences are revealed. In such situations political activity will tend to arise, with

competing groups arguing for either a continuation with the project, its modification

or, more drastically, its termination. The third situation is that in which an even newer

innovation develops during the implementation phase that promises even greater

efficiencies or electoral gains than the one being implemented!

The routinization arena

The fourth arena is that of routinization, the point at which the innovation becomes

embedded within the unit or department, following its implementation. This does not

imply that the innovation is successful, bringing the improved performance promised

by its designers, merely that it is now a part of the unit’s standard operations. Nor, of

course, does it mean that routinization is free from political activity, for at least three

reasons. One, if the innovation is not successful, at least as perceived by some actors

within the unit, they might attempt to gain support for modifications to the innovation,

or even to replace it, with resistance from those who support the original innovation.

Two, even where the innovation does bring benefits it might prove difficult to provide

empirical evidence of the benefits, at least in the short run, so that those who suffered

a loss of power, status and position from its implementation can question its merits,

proposing modifications, termination, replacement with another innovation, or a

return to the status quo. Three, as might be the case within any of the four arenas, a

new innovation might arise, exciting supporters and detractors.

Thus, a public sector innovation, among other things, can involve a complex series of

political activities that take place within linked, but conceptually distinct arenas

associated with the differing phases of an innovation decision process. The arenas can

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be intra-organisational or inter-organisational in extent, as well as crossing domestic

and international, jurisdictional boundaries.

The type of innovation and the politics of innovation

It is possible to distinguish many different types of innovation but only two will be

examined in this section, using the four arenas model as a framework for analysis,

with the aims of: one, identifying the characteristics associated with the three types;

two, generating a number of research questions and hypotheses. The two types

examined are product, process and organisational innovation. It could be argued that a

third type, policy innovation, also should be examined. It is not examined for two

reasons. One, there exists already a substantial literature related to policy innovation

in the public policy literature (see, for example, Hogwood and Peters’ classic text,

‘Policy Dynamics’ 1983). Two, the notion of policy innovation, given the meaning of

the term policy, refers to any proposed course of action, including any one or more of

those related to proposed changes to organisation, product and process that are

formally adopted and authorised by the government of the day, within the context of a

whole of government policy process. Most innovations are not made subject to the

formal policy process at a whole of government level as their likely impact is not

regarded, rightly or wrongly, as sufficiently large to warrant that degree of attention.

Product innovation

Product innovation can be conceived as a continuum, with product invention, product

adaptation and product purchase innovation representing three points on the

continuum. It is likely that each of the three points, or types, are characterised by a

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rather different politics of innovation. In liberal-democratic polities, product invention

(unique innovations) within the public sector is not common (if, historically, it ever

was), as governments divest themselves of the ownership of manufacturing

enterprises. The one major exception is in relation to defence and security, where

governments often are in monopsonistic positions, exercising very considerable

control over the production innovation processes of notionally private sector

businesses. While product invention in defence and security areas is notionally

external to the public sector in terms of ownership, there is little doubt that the public

sector exercises a great deal of influence on product invention in the sector

(McNaugher 1989, Mayer 1991, Trim 2001). Hence, not only is product invention

relatively uncommon, it is often inter-organisational, involving at least one public and

one private sector actor, with a low degree of transparency, engendered by the real or

imagined needs of national security and commercial confidentiality concerns.

In terms of our four arenas, the politics of defence and security product innovation is

usually complex and intense within all four arenas, as it often involves a high level of

uncertainty, very large scale expenditures and politically sensitive issues over long

periods of time, for example, the Collins Class Submarine Project (McNally 1997,

McNally and Bates 1999). Indeed, military requirements set the basic parameters

within which the basic project proposal and more sophisticated concept development

discussions and activities take place.

While the politics of product invention are complex and intense, the politics of

innovation by product adaptation to public sector needs varies, largely in relation to

the extent and cost of adaptation required. The greater the degree of adaptation, the

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greater the cost and the more likely the politics involved will be similar to that of the

politics of product invention, for all four arenas, as with the adaptation needed for

large scale computer and software products. Unsurprisingly, the politics of large scale,

costly product adaptation sometime concludes in embarrassing failure, as with large

scale IT projects. The OECD, for example, has argued that the nature of public sector

budgeting systems tends to encourage the funding of large, expensive IT projects as

they are highly visible during the negotiations that characterise the budgeting process,

gaining more widespread attention from decision makers simply because of their

sheer scale. They seem to be particularly attractive to ministers, favoured because

they can be used as dramatic, public ‘evidence’, of political action and leadership in

response to pressing problems (OECD 2001a). This is despite mounting concern

about the propensity of such large scale projects to fail on a similarly large and

dramatic scale, prompting, for example, OECD members to investigate the causes and

policies necessary to minimise risk in large scale IT projects (OECD 2001b).

In contrast, at the lower end of the continuum, the politics of product innovation by

the purchase of products developed and used in the private sector has often become

formalised, taking place within a set of procurement rules that substantially limit the

discretion available to decision makers. The decision to allocate resources in this

situation is based primarily upon performance, price and quality criteria that reduce

uncertainty and enable more objective decisions about whether or not to engage in

product innovation. At the higher end of the continuum the opposite tends to be the

case, despite the higher risk of failure.

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Hence, there are at least two, rather different politics of product innovation, the first a

‘constrained politics’, in which the ability of individuals or groups to lobby for and

organise support from key actors is limited by a set of procurement rules, taking place

at varying, often relatively low levels in administrative hierarchies, with little

involvement by elected ministers or their advisers. The second is the politics of large

scale product invention and adaptation, which commands high level administrative

and ministerial attention and involvement, attracting more sustained and intensive

lobbying by business interests keen to gain a share of the large contracts involved. It

is a far more complex and lengthy process, in which there is greater potential for those

with a capacity for organising the support of key actors to bring their talents into play.

The decision criteria of price, performance and quality, while not unimportant, are

less important, being joined by a range of differing criteria that spring from the

concerns and priorities of ‘higher level’, political actors. Questions such as the likely

impact of a project on the electoral popularity of a government, or its strategic impact

on a major national or international company, are asked and, in part, determine

whether or not a proposed innovation is successful in gaining resources.

Process innovation

In this section process is defined as a series of related activities aimed at one or more

objectives, including the manufacture of products and the provision of services

(Damanpour, Gopalakrishnan 2001:47). In general terms, process innovations have an

internal focus, being concerned to increase efficiency within the organisation

(Utterback and Abernathy 1975).

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Large scale process innovations may face inherently greater difficulties in attracting

support as they are less physically observable and, perhaps, psychologically of lesser

status, being ‘only’, about how, for example, a service or product is to be provided,

rather than being a service or product. In addition, the degree of change necessary to

implement a process innovation of any scale, at the unit, departmental, or whole of

government level is likely to be disruptive of existing procedures, work activities and

social relations in the organisation. In other words, the less organisationally congruent

and compatible the proposed innovation, the less likely it will gain support in any of

the four arenas. A good example of this can be seen in the introduction of regulatory

impact assessment (RIA), procedures into government policy development systems.

RIAs are rational processes for policy making that, typically, prescribe the major tasks

and related activities to be undertaken at each stage of the making of a regulation

(OBPR 2006, BRE 2007). As described, they are similar to the existing, more general

departmental policy making processes that they are intended to either strengthen, or

replace. However, in practice their implementation has proved difficult, with line

departments often reluctant to integrate RIA procedures into their existing systems,

having difficulty in using the cost benefit techniques associated with them because of

a shortage of staff skills, varying, usually limited degrees of commitment to RIAs by

ministers and senior public servants, and often a degree of initial resentment to what

some see as the intrusion into departmental matters of the central agencies responsible

for managing RIA systems (Carroll 2006, National Audit Office 2006). In the latter

case such intrusion can be seen as a relative loss of power for line departments viz a

viz central agencies, in the UK’s case, a loss of power to the Cabinet Office’s Better

Regulation Executive.

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In order to offset the disadvantages of low observability and low

congruence/compatibility, major process innovation in the public sector needs to

bring with it the promise of relatively high and widespread, efficiency and

effectiveness gains, if it is to achieve support. This poses a challenge, for it is very

difficult to forecast the costs and benefits of process innovations with any degree of

accuracy. Interestingly, it may be this very factor, uncertain costs that might make

major process innovations attractive for governments needing to improve their public

image, particularly in the period leading up to elections. The innovation can be

publicised as a major breakthrough, portraying the government as proactive, keen to

improve the quality of government, with relatively little chance of it being

successfully contradicted, at least in the short term. Indeed, for some years now

several OECD governments have promoted not only specific innovations, such as

RIA, but the need for sustained public sector innovation as a general objective and

value, developing system-wide processes in the attempt to achieve this goal (for

example, Mulgan and Albury 2003 in regard to the UK).

In summary, observability, compatibility and potential, widespread benefits are

necessary for successful process innovation in the public sector. However, they are

characteristics in relatively short supply, perhaps favouring, for the most part, small

scale or incremental, process innovation in the public sector, where it is easier to

demonstrate observability, compatibility and cost benefits, reducing risk and

disruptive change. Again, as with product innovation, this suggests that there are two

basic types of politics of public sector innovation. The first is relatively rare, whole of

system in nature, originating in prime ministerial offices, the minds of political

advisers and public servants in central agencies. It is top-down in nature and, to be

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successful in implementation, requires substantial cultural change in line departments

and agencies, a process that, in turn, requires major and sustained political

commitment and resources. The second, in contrast, is far more modest, typically

confined within a department or agency, or even to a specific division or section of a

department. It is more likely to be bottom-up in nature, modest in scale and scope,

designed to improve existing procedures.

Research questions

The first set of research question need to address the more speculative assertions

about the politics of public sector innovation developed in this paper, notably:

RQ1

Is innovation in the public sector a more difficult and time consuming task than in the

business sector because it faces a greater range of competing interests and multiple

constituencies?

RQ2

To what extent, if at all, is the politics of innovation in the public sector structured

around the proposed four arenas?

RQ3

To what extent, if at all, do different types of innovation result in differing extents and

types of political activities?

RQ4

Is the politics of product innovation characterised by two rather different sets of

political activities, a ‘procurement-constrained politics’, and the less constrained,

politics of large scale product invention and adaptation?

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RQ5 How important is politics in determining the success of innovatory proposals?

Conclusion

There has been little substantive research in regard to innovation in the public sector,

though it has been growing. Hence, it is not surprising that research into the even

narrower field of the politics of public sector innovation is in very short supply, so

that our ability even to model relevant processes is similarly very limited. Rather,

most work has focused on factors seen as necessary for, or hindering, successful

innovation. In that context politics is sometimes identified as an explanatory factor,

but rarely receives detailed attention.

The author found it useful to develop a model in which politics and innovation ‘come

together’, in the shape of four basic arenas, suggesting that there is no single politics

of innovation, but, instead, a complex set or political subsystems and related activities

that characterise the innovation process at different stages of the process, being the

project proposal, concept development, implementation and routinization arenas. The

model was then used, in a limited, introductory fashion, to examine some of the

characteristics of product and process innovation, suggesting that they stimulate rather

differing political responses.

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