Profiles of New Islamic Schools in Northern Nigeria

Muhammad S. Umar Assistant Professor

Department of Religious Studies Arizona State University

Tempe, AZ 85287-3104, U.S.A.∗

The virtual collapse of public educational system in Nigeria, especially in the Northern states, is

now widely recognized, but the transformation of the Islamic educational system that has resulted

partly in response to that collapse has not been sufficiently understood.1 The main goal of this essay

is to demonstrate that a notable aspect of the current transformation of Islamic education is the

proliferation of new Islamic schools that are significantly different from the old Islamic schools, and

to show that the new Islamic schools have emerged in response to both domestic and international

forces for change.

Specifically, the essay argues that following huge educational expansion in the 1970s,

Nigeria’s public educational system deteriorated steadily during the 1980s-1990s. These decades

also witnessed the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (WB/IMF) actively promoting

privatization and deregulation under the structural adjustment program (SAP).2 Responding to

deterioration of the public educational system in the new policy environment of privatization and

deregulation, private initiatives established new Islamic schools in Nigeria that reflect a global trend

of transformation of Islamic education.3 Indeed, expansion of private initiatives in the educational

arena is equally observable in many countries influenced by structural adjustment programs.4 As the

global movement toward expansion, privatization, and deregulation of the educational sector

gathered momentum in the 1990s, education became the “last frontier for profit,” whose expenditure,

estimated at two trillion dollars, presents irresistible opportunities for private investors and

entrepreneurs.5 According to one estimate, “by the end of the 1990s, world governments had sold

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more than $1 trillion in assets to private investors. And a growing number of state and local

governments had turned to private operators to run prisons, parking lots, ambulance services, public

schools and social-services operations.”6 By profiling a small sample of new Islamic schools in

Nigeria listed in appendix I (Sample of New Islamic Schools), this essay hopes to contribute to our

understanding of both the for-profit and non-profit private actors that are changing education

globally. The essay also hopes to contribute to our understanding of the phenomenon of educational

dualism in Muslim countries.

Background Context

New Islamic schools emerged in Northern Nigeria in the context of the long evolution of

Nigeria’s new national policy on education, itself a part of larger transformation of Nigerian state,

economy, and society following the devastating civil war of 1967-1970, and the subsequent

emergence of the developmental state in Nigeria. It is, therefore, imperative to outline the basic

characteristics of Nigeria’s developmental state and its evolution within the last three decades. But

first, I must emphasize that it is no my goal to engage the larger debate on the failure of African

countries to have “hard states” capable of promoting sustained development in the sense of rapid

industrialization, steady economic growth and enhanced living standards.7 I only want to

demonstrate that the specific trajectories of development policies and programs adopted by

successive regimes in Nigeria during 1970s-1990s are the necessary background for the emergence

of the new Islamic schools that I want to analyze here. Therefore, I am expediently using the term

“developmental state” in the sense defined by Leftwich:

“those states whose internal politics and external relations have served to concentrate sufficient power, authority, autonomy, competence, and capacity at the center to shape,

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pursue and encourage the achievement of explicit developmental objectives, whether by establishing and promoting the conditions of economic growth, or by organizing it directly, or a varying combination of both.”8

The widespread view in the relevant literature is that Nigeria’s developmental state has been a

disastrous failure.9 It can hardly be disputed, however, that it did exhibit the defining features that

Leftwich highlights in the above quotation, particularly in the immediate period after the civil war.

Furthermore, Leftwich emphasizes six salient characteristics of the developmental state, namely: 1)

developmental elites who are “highly nationalistic,” “relatively uncorrupt,” very capable and

determined to articulate and enforce sound policies and programs for rapid industrialization and

steady economic growth; 2) relative autonomy that frees the state “from the demanding clamor of

special interests (whether class, regional, or sectoral …) that it can and does override these interests

in the putative pursuit of national interest;” 3) bureaucratic power in the form of “very powerful,

highly competent and insulated bureaucracies with authority to direct and manage the broad shape of

economic and social development;” 4) weak civil society that lacks the capacity to challenge or

disrupt the priorities already set-up by the powerful state bureaucracies under tight control of

developmental elites; 5) subordinating private capital both domestic and foreign to the articulated

agenda of the developmental elites; and 6) authoritarian tendency is an undesirable but inevitable

outcome of these five characteristics of the successful developmental state, forcing it to rely on the

tangible results of positive economic performance for its credibility and legitimacy.10 The following

paragraphs will sketch how Nigeria’s developmental state acquires (and loses) some elements of

each of these six characteristics, but certainly not to the degree necessary for the successful Asian

models in South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, or even in Botswana, the only successful developmental

state in Africa. Of course, the rise and decline of Nigeria’s developmental state is precisely the

relevant point that helps to explain the transformation of Islamic schools.

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To begin with, Letwich emphasizes that the developmental elites become “highly nationalistic”

often in response to “internal or regional security threats and thus underlining and extending Tilly’s

thesis (for Europe) about the importance of war-making in state formation.”11 The Nigerian civil war

represents the birth pangs of the developmental state as the imperatives of war dictated the need for

centralized planning that drew together the top ranks of the civil service and the military. In the

aftermath of the war, the civil-military coalition congealed into Nigeria’s veritable developmental

elites, who launched ambitious development plans that clearly reflected not only highly nationalistic

goals, but also the intent to transform Nigeria into “a free and democratic society, a just and

egalitarian society, a united, strong and self-reliant nation, a great and dynamic economy, and a land

of bright and full opportunity for all citizens.” These have been the objectives of Nigeria’s national

development plans that became a sort of mantra ritually recited by the developmental elites on all

available occasions of state ceremonies. The only feature conspicuously missing among Nigeria’s

developmental elites was, unfortunately, the decisive one of incorruptibility. The legendary

corruption of Nigeria’s developmental elites has earned the country unenviable position among the

most corrupt countries in Transparency International corruption index.12

The relative autonomy of Nigerian state from the clamor of special interests is stronger than

commonly acknowledged by scholars and Nigerians alike. The recent waves of communal and

religious violent conflicts point to the resurgence of powerful communal, religious, and regional

special interests that had earlier led to the Nigerian civil war. By once again gravely threatening the

continuing existence of the country, these special interests underscore the severe weakness of the

Nigerian state. But the important point to note is that the victorious emergence of the federal

government from the civil war meant not only the defeat of regionalist secession, but also the

opportunity to consolidate the relative autonomy of the state. Huge increases in petroleum prices in

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the 1970s yielded surplus revenue that enabled the federal government to embark on massive public

projects through five-year development plans. Beginning with reconstruction projects after the

Nigerian civil war, estimated at over £300 million,13 the federal military government financed large

projects that steadily widened and strengthened its hold on the national economy.

For example, Nigeria’s first national development plan for 1962-1970 period provided for a

capital expenditure of N2.2 billion, while the second plan for 1970-1975 budgeted N 3 billion in

capital expenditure. In contrast, the third national development plan during the oil boom years of

1975-1980 provided for an initial capital expenditure of N30 billion, which was revised upward to

N43.3 billion, while the fourth plan covering 1981-1985 provided for a capital expenditure of N82

billion.14 Increased petroleum revenues enabled Nigeria’s developmental elites to consolidate their

grip on state power, and by expanding their control over the economic, political, and social arenas,

they enhancing their relative autonomy from special interests. But regrettably, rampant corruption

among Nigeria’s developmental elites meant that at best no more than a quarter of these huge

revenues could be accounted for; the rest disappeared into private fortunes. And herein originates

one principal reason for the present weakness of the Nigerian state making it seemingly unable to

assert its autonomy against rising tide of violent communalism. Corruption robbed Nigeria’s

developmental elites of credibility, thereby assuring failure, for as Huff and Dewit demonstrate,

without building reputation and credibility, a developmental state is doomed.15

In the 1970s, series of political reforms neutralized communal and regional special interests and

also weakened civil society while at the same time enhancing the autonomy and authoritarianism of

Nigerian developmental state. Decentralizing the regional centers of power, most notably through

changing Nigeria’s federal structure from three regions at independence in 1960 to twelve states in

1967, nineteen states in 1976, thirty states in 1991, and thirty-six states in 1996, effectively removed

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the political platform for communal regionalism. In 1976, a nationally uniform political and

administrative system of local government areas (LGA) replaced provinces and districts that used to

provide municipal and rural local administration.16 Between 1976 and 1979, a Constitutional

Drafting Committee produced a blueprint for a new constitution that was debated in the Constituent

Assembly. The new constitution adopted American presidential system in place of the British

parliamentary system inherited from the colonial era. These political reforms strengthen the relative

autonomy of the Nigeria’s developmental elites by expanding territorial and sectoral jurisdiction of

state power—in addition to its dominant role in the economy. Furthermore, legal reforms

implemented in the 1970s eliminated regional differences in judicial administration and the court-

system inherited from colonial era by creating a nationally unified legal system and judicial

structure. But more relevant to the main argument of this essay is of course the educational reform

(discussed in more detail below) that also radically altered the inherited colonial educational system,

and in turn provided the blueprint for new Islamic schools. Collectively, these reforms point to

Nigeria replacing the regionalism that nearly caused the country’s disintegration in the 1960s with

the relative autonomy of holders of state power, a salient attribute of the developmental state.17

The military regimes that formulated and implemented all these reforms did not allow for

Nigeria’s weak civil society to develop any significant political capacity. Apart from the complete

absence of political parties—except for the brief interregnums of the Second Republic (1979-1983)

and the still-born Third Republic (1986-1992)—professional associations, media outlets, students

and labor movements were all governed by military decrees that made them heavily dependent on

the government. More importantly, the military regimes of General Yakubu Gowon (1967-1975) and

Murtala Mohammed/Olusegun Obasanjo (1975-1979) emasculated foreign private capital through

series of economic indigenization decrees.18 Ostensibly promulgated to increase local private capital

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participation in ownership and management of key economic sectors, the indigenization succeeded

more in increasing the dominance of the developmental state over Nigeria’s economy, and in the

process fostered the prebendalism and neopatromonialism that scholars hold accountable for badly

stunting the development of private capital in Nigeria through rampant corruption.19

The reforms that unfolded in the 1970s played a crucial role in initially bolstering the

legitimacy of Nigeria’s military regimes. The seemingly endless flow of revenue from petroleum

export promised continuing provision of social services that gave popular legitimacy to the military

regimes. This is consistent with Leftwich’s observation that successful developmental states

maintain a “strange mixture of repression and legitimacy” that explains their ability “to distribute the

benefits of rapid growth, at least in terms of schools, roads, health care, public housing and other

facilities to an expanding circle of people.”20 The accomplishments of Nigeria’s developmental state

in this regard are, however, often eclipsed by monumental corruption. In particular, over-centralized

control of resources reinforced by the authoritarianism of military rule and the patrimonialism and

prebendalism of civilian rule, gravely undermined Nigeria’s giant development projects.21 In 1982,

Nigeria was forced to adopt austerity measures under an economic stabilization program that,

however, failed to halt the slide of economy.22 As the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary

Fund (IMF) began to articulate structural adjustment programs in the 1980s, the end of Nigeria’s

developmental state became only a matter of time. Beginning in 1986, erratic but continuous

implementation of structural adjustment programs by the military regimes of Generals Ibrahim

Babangida and Sani Abacha steadily forced the Nigerian state to retreat from provision and

financing of social services, including education, thereby paving the way for private initiatives in

educational sector.23 The rise and decline of the Nigeria’s developmental state is consistent with the

global trend that Mark Berger has convincingly documented.24

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Rise and decline of the developmental state in Nigeria’s educational arena

The specific trajectories of transformation of the developmental state in Nigeria’s educational

arena originated from a national curriculum conference held in 1969 and a sequel seminar attended

by educational experts in 1973. Following a series of discussions, workshops, and conferences, the

federal government of Nigeria accepted recommendations in a document titled The New National

Policy on Education that was first published in 1977, and revised in 1981.25 This document

envisaged a complete restructuring of Nigeria’s public education system that was further spelt out in

the detailed blueprint prepared by the Implementation Committee for the National Policy on

Education,26 a pointer to the prominent role of Nigeria’s developmental elites in policy formulation

and implementation. Significantly, the new educational policy adopted “national objectives of

Nigeria as stated in the Second National Development Plan, and endorsed as the necessary

foundation for the National Policy on Education,”27 thus clearly linking the new educational policy

to the expansion of the developmental state in Nigeria. Writing from the insider’s perspective of a

career educational administrator who actively participated in formulating and implementing the

policy, Aiyepeku hints at the high nationalism of Nigeria’s developmental elites by emphasizing

proudly that the new educational policy gave “Independent Nigeria … an indigenous national

policy” that helps to sever colonial ties to Britain.28 The intricate details of how the new educational

policy evolved are beyond the scope of this essay,29 but three notable aspects are relevant for

understanding the emergence of new Islamic schools.

First, the previous school system (modeled on the British public school system introduced during

the colonial era) did not operate uniformly in all parts of Nigeria. Different regions used to provide

eight, seven, or six years of primary education, five to seven years of secondary education, and three

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to five years for higher education.30 The new educational policy replaced these variations with a

uniform 6-3-3-4 school system that provided six years of schooling at primary level, three years at

junior secondary level, three years at senior secondary level, and four years at university level. The

new unified educational system reflects the centralizing tendencies of Nigeria’s developmental state

that were also evident in political, economic and legal reforms discussed earlier. In addition, the 6-3-

3-4 system implemented many other important innovations: new curriculum, new certification upon

graduation, new types of examination and assessment of learning outcomes, new areas of learning

concentration, and new educational goals and objectives that were all geared toward realizing the

main objectives of Nigeria’s development plan.31 Poor funding, mismanagement, erratic policy and

programmatic alterations due to changes of political regimes, have continuously plagued

implementation of the new educational policy over the last two decades.32 Still, the public

educational system currently operating in Nigeria is markedly different from the old system. But not

all the changes have been for the better. The dismal decline of educational standards associated with

poor implementation of the 6-3-3-4 school system became a very important factor for parents who

choose to send their children to the new Islamic schools for quality education.

There are even more linkages between the new national educational system and the

emergence of new Islamic schools. It is not coincidental that all the twenty-one schools discussed in

this essay emerged during the period of implementing the new educational policy that began in 1976

with the introduction of compulsory and free universal primary education (UPE). The UPE attracted

several millions of students to public schools, leading to a corresponding increase in demand for

resources.33 The first set of students to enroll in the UPE was estimated at 2.297 million, but the

actual enrollment was 2.992 million. Thereafter, enrollment continued to rise steadily: in 1975/76

academic year, a total of 21,223 primary schools had 177,221 teachers for 6.1 million pupils, and in

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1980/81, the number of primary schools had reached 36,524 with 376,681 teachers for 13.76 million

pupils.34 By 1988, the total number of primary schools declined to 33,796, enrolling 12.69 million

pupils, and 308,178 teachers.35 A similar pattern of rise and decline is also discernible at secondary

and higher education levels.36

Initially, huge revenues from the sudden rise of petroleum prices in 1973 provided enough

funding for massive educational expansion, but in the 1980s, funding declined sharply. For example,

expenditure allocated to education during the second national development plan (1970-1974)

amounted to over N282 million, with the federal government spending more on universities while

state governments “centered on the expansion of facilities at the primary and secondary schools

level.”37 In the third development plan of 1975-1980, the amount rose to over N 3.1 billion. Even so,

the federal government felt confident enough to take over private schools to meet the continuing rise

in school enrollment that mirrored the expansion of the developmental state in the educational

arena.38 Thus not surprisingly, the declining fortunes of the developmental state during the fourth

development plan for 1981-1985 appeared also in the allocation for education that fell to only N 7.7

million.39 Even these figures do not adequately capture the full extent of the decline of resources

available to the educational sector. The devaluation of Nigeria’s currency began in 1984 when the

exchange rate fell from one U.S. dollar to less than one naira—N0.70—and continued declining to

about N100 to $1 by the end of the 1990s. This massive devaluation means that fewer resources

were actually available for education.

Additionally, mismanagement and corruption meant that only a small fraction of budgeted

funds was actually spent on educational projects. The decline of petroleum revenues in the late

1970s was further aggravated by widespread financial irresponsibility that characterized the civilian

administration of the Shagari Regime between 1979 and 1983. Rather than fulfilling their promises

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to improve education, politicians diverted funds to their pet political projects.40 Consequently, school

buildings deteriorated without repairs, supplies of educational materials dried up, and teachers’

salaries were not paid for months. Successive military regimes continued to neglect education,

leading eventually to the virtual collapse of the public educational system. Sofolahan makes the

point nicely when he remarks that “the national policy was conceived in times of oil-boom, born in

times of oil-glut, and nurtured in times of economic depression.”41 The best way to decode this

cryptic remark is to recall that in 1976, the federal government introduced free universal primary

education, and in 1985 it withdrew completely from funding primary education as structural

adjustment program began the compression of the developmental state.42 In 1996, the federal

government had to concede that: “given the dramatic rise in the demand for educational services in

the face of growing population and dwindling resources available to the government for maintaining

an efficient educational system, the involvement of the private sector, communities and non-

governmental organizations would be inevitable, once again, in order to move education forward so

as to meet the challenges of the 21st century.”43 The rise and decline of the developmental state in

Nigeria’s educational arena between 1976 and 1996 paved the way for emergence of private

schools,44 including the new Islamic schools.

While the new national policy on education was unfolding, it initially helped to change Muslims’

longstanding negative attitude toward western education. The tremendous economic expansion

during the petroleum boom of 1970s created employment opportunities that the available manpower

could not fully utilize. Tangible material rewards of acquiring western education not only in the form

of regular employment, but also in access to patrimonial control of state economic enterprises of the

developmental state, were strong enough to neutralize Muslims’ negative attitude. Moreover, the

new educational policy provided free education first at primary level and later at all levels, including

12

scholarships at Nigerian and foreign universities. But just as bright economic opportunities, free

education, and generous scholarships raised Muslims’ acceptance of modern western education,

public financing of education began to decline precipitously. Now, Muslims must finance their own

education, a realization reinforced by the ideology of deregulation and privatization of state

enterprises. Some of the new Islamic schools were established by private entrepreneurs responding

to Nigerians’ excess demand for education beyond what the state could provide.

To sum up the argument so far, transformation of public schools under 6-3-3-4 system, massive

educational expansion, failures in implementing new national policy on education, and changes in

Muslims’ attitude toward modern western education are internal forces for change. They are

externally reinforced by the global triumph of neoliberal ideology of privatization and deregulation

as implemented in structural adjustment programs. Occurring within the last three decades, these

developments collectively demonstrate that the rise and decline of the developmental state in

Nigeria’s educational sector set the background context for emergence of new Islamic schools.

Islamic Schools: The Old vs. The New

The sample of the new Islamic schools in Appendix I shows that only one school was

established in 1976, but as the background factors discussed above unfolded during the 1980s,

eleven more schools were established, and additional nine schools emerged in the 1990s. Clearly, the

already identified changes within the broader educational arena between 1970s and 1990s are

relevant for understanding the proliferation of new Islamic schools within the same period. Before

examining more connections between changes in the broader public educational system and new

Islamic schools, let us briefly outline the contrasts between the old and the new Islamic schools.

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The Old Islamic Schools

The old institutions of Islamic learning in Nigeria comprise two tracks. First, Qur’anic

schools provide the starting point by teaching Arabic literacy and recitation of the Qur’an to pupils

from early childhood to adolescence. Second, Ilm schools provide the second track for specialized

training in diverse fields of Islamic learning. Unlike modern formal schools, both Qur’anic and ilm

schools operate with an open-ended structure that allows each student to pursue an individual course

of study. Abdurrahman and Canham observe that the structure and purpose of traditional Islamic

education differ radically from those of Nigerian national educational system. In traditional Islamic

education, “there is no clear-cut division into primary, secondary and tertiary levels. There is no

progression from one class to another and from one level to another, with examination barriers

erected along the way. There are no classes, there are no age-limits, and there is no rigid timetable

with neatly timed periods for subjects.”45 In addition to giving basic skills of reading, writing, and

calculating, Qur’anic schools also expose pupils to “the life-giving words of the Qur’an, without

which the child would have no hope of happiness in this world or of salvation in the next.”46 On the

other hand, ilm schools increase “students’ understanding of the divine purpose as revealed for all

time by the Prophet.”47 Furthermore, whereas Qur’anic schools emphasize “rote learning” of

memorizing the Qur’an,48 ilm schools teach through a pedagogy of close reading of a text, along

with extended commentary on its various meanings and implications.

Typically, the teacher will be seated on mat surrounded by his disciples, who will take turn to

read from their individual Arabic texts while the teacher gives interpretation and commentary in

Hausa or Fulfulde. The core subjects in the curriculum of ilm schools comprise Qur’an exegesis

(tafsir), Traditions of Prophet Muhammad (hadith and sira), Principles and Rules of Islamic

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Jurisprudence (fiqh and usul al-fiq), Theology (Ilm al-tawhid), Mysticism (tasawwuf), Arabic

Language and Literature (al-luggha and al-adab), Mathematics (al-hisab), Medicine (tibb), and

History (tarikh). The favorite textbooks are selected from ancient writings of classical Muslim

authors, although novices also utilize abridged versions or versification of the classics by local

authors. The traditions of Islamic learning in both Qur’anic and ilm schools emphasize the

supremacy of spiritual and moral values over bookish learning, application of knowledge to guide

the conduct of everyday life, and intellectual quest as lifelong endeavor. Also central to traditions of

Islamic learning is a master-disciple relationship characterized by deference to the master, and

sustained through face-to-face oral instruction that transmits not only learning but also spiritual

guidance, moral authority, piety and blessing.49 These traditions of Islamic learning have produced

outstanding Islamic scholars, including a number of prolific authors.50 Although still very much

alive, the ancient traditions of Islamic learning, particularly the Qur’anic schools, are facing serious

crises of relevance in contemporary Nigeria.51

As Okoye and Yau have documented, Qur’anic schools have increasingly failed to fulfill

their traditional educational mission. Instead of educating their pupils and giving them skills and

knowledge necessary for functioning effectively in society as they used to, Qur’anic schools have

deteriorated to the extent that many people regard them as no more than a breeding ground for street-

beggars.52 In the 1950s-1960s, early attempts to reform Qur’anic schools gave birth to Islamiyya

schools “originally established by private initiative to meet the growing demand for improved

standards in the [Qur’anic] schools.”53 To meet that goal, they adopted all the features of a formal

school system that were absent in Qur’anic and ilm schools.54 Islamiyya schools remained, however,

very negligible in Northern Nigeria. The new Islamic schools under examination differ in many

15

respects from Qur’anic, ilm and Islamiyya schools; they are also different from the Ilmiyya/Adabiyya

Islamic schools established in the western region of Nigeria during the early colonial period.55

The New Islamic Schools

The new Islamic schools adopt the organizational format of Nigeria’s modern public school

system, but differ in their fundamental institutional orientation toward promoting a broad Islamic

cultural orientation. The school environment is saturated with Islamic images (murals, maps of the

Islamic world, posters, Arabic calligraphy, and mosques). School administrators actively foster

Islamic identity and awareness among students and teachers not only in classrooms but also in all

school activities. Islamic congregational prayers are regularly observed in school mosques. Islamic

dress, particularly for female students, is another visually powerful way of fostering Islamic identity

and awareness in these schools. While these features collectively create a distinctly Islamic

atmosphere around the new schools, it is the curricular emphases on Arabic and Islamic Studies that

really shape their Islamic character and orientation, and differentiate them from both the old Islamic

educational institutions and Nigeria’s public schools. Variation in curricular emphases on Arabic and

Islamic Studies calls for classifying the new Islamic schools into two types: schools operating

madrasa curriculum, and schools operating modified national curriculum of public schools.

The new Islamic schools operating madrasa curriculum provide six years of training in

classical Arabic and Islamic education. The Northern Provinces Law School was the first madrasa in

Northern Nigeria. British colonial authorities established the school in 1934 to train Muslim judges

for the colonial administration of Islamic law. In 1947, the school was reorganized and renamed

School for Arabic Studies (SAS) to provide five-year training leading to Grade II Teacher

Certificate upon satisfactory performance in a written examination in English, Arithmetic, and

16

Teaching Methods, moderated and conducted by the West African Examination Council (WAEC).

Apart from these standard courses offered in all teacher-training schools, SAS requires additional

training in Arabic and Islamic Studies that qualifies its graduates to teach the same subjects in

primary schools.56 In 1954, SAS began to offer an expanded madrasa curriculum that provided four

years of training in classical Arabic and Islamic Studies, leading to a Higher Islamic Studies

Certificate upon successful performance in a written examination in Arabic Language and Literature

and Islamic Studies moderated and conducted by the Board of Arabic and Islamic Studies of the

Institute of Education, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. Unlike the Grade II teacher-training

curriculum that uses English as the language of instruction, the madrasa curriculum uses Arabic to

train ulama to serve as Muslim judges, as well as teachers of Arabic and Islamic Studies.57 The

Sokoto Arabic Teachers’ College, established in 1963, followed the SAS model, and by 1979,

similar Arabic Colleges had also been established in Gombe, Maiduguri, Hadejia, Katsina, as well as

two additional ones in Kano, one of which was exclusively for women. Thus there were no more

than ten SAS-type colleges teaching madrasa curriculum in the 1970s when Nigeria’s new national

educational policy began to be implemented, but they steadily grew during 1980s-1990s. For

example, in 1994, forty-five schools were officially affiliated with the National Board of Arabic and

Islamic Studies (NBAIS)—the new name for the reorganized agency that oversees madrasa

curriculum and co-ordinates its certification examination.58

A major transformation of madrasa curriculum came in 1989. After three years of negotiations,

NABAIS persuaded Federal Government officials to grant official recognition to a modified

madrasa curriculum to be taught on the 6-3-3-4 school system. NBAIS had already redrawn the old

madrasa syllabus from a four-year course of study to a six-year one, divided into three-year Junior

Islamic Studies (JIS) and three-year Senior Islamic Studies (SIS). Other changes added courses on

17

Arabic Literature by Nigerian Authors, Social Studies/General Knowledge, Teaching Methods,

Hausa/Yoruba, and Home Economics for female students. Significantly, English and Mathematics

used to be optional subjects in the old four-year madrasa curriculum, and taught at primary school

level. Under the new six-year curriculum, both English and Mathematics were raised to compulsory

subjects and to the same level as in the public secondary schools. Junior Islamic Studies schools are

also required to offer courses on Physical Education and Integrated Science, while Senior Islamic

Studies are required to offer one science subject (Physics, Chemistry, or Biology) and Agricultural

Science or a Vocational Subject. Arabic is still the language of instruction for Arabic Language and

Literature and Islamic Studies, while English is the language of instruction in secular subjects.59

Thus whereas the old madrasa curriculum provided classical Arabic and Islamic education, with

only marginal proficiency in English, the new madrasa curriculum aims to provide proficiency in

English, and also broad competence in western secular education while still offering classical

Arabic/Islamic education.60 Appendix II (Educational Tracks and Levels) shows that 7 out of 21

schools teach both JIS and SIS curricula, one school offers only JIS, and two schools offer only SIS.

A point worth emphasizing is that all the new Islamic schools are experiencing several

problems implementing the new madrasa curriculum. Shortage of teachers for western secular

subjects, teaching materials, laboratories and textbooks are the more common problems that prevent

most schools from offering science subjects. Consequently, most students graduate without gaining

the expected competency in western secular education. Another problem is that some teachers,

parents and students regard secular subjects as a nuisance; a small number parents protest against

introduction of western secular subjects. But both sets of complainants comprise a very small

number of those who still prefer pure Islamic education, and do not affect significantly the general

impetus for combining both Islamic and western education. A more common complaint is that solid

18

classical Arabic/Islamic education had been diluted, leading to lower standards. Despite these

problems, thousands have been graduated under the new madrasa curriculum; many have completed

university education and are pursuing careers in modern professions.

I have elsewhere documented the emerging career patterns among the new cadre of ulama

trained in both Islamic and western education under the new madrasa curriculum. I have also shown

that long-term sociological consequences can be observed in the correlation between various Islamic

trends and different educational backgrounds. Specifically, I found that Islamic traditionalism is

more common among those educated in traditional Islamic education of Quranic and ilm schools,

Islamic modernism is more prevalent among those with modern Islamic education of the madrasa,

and Islamic fundamentalism is more common among those trained in the secular education of public

schools.61 Another important consequence of the transformation of Islamic education is the

increased access of more Muslim females to advanced training in classical Arabic/Islamic education.

In contrast to the very few exceptional women who used to receive Islamic education, the new

Islamic schools have produced thousands of Muslim women with high level of Arabic and Islamic

learning. The majority of these women take teaching careers in public schools while some teach at

colleges and universities, and a few of them follow the traditional ulama career of writing,

preaching, counseling, and officiating in ceremonies and ritual services. Predictably, some female

Islamic scholars favor modernist views while some adopt more traditional views particularly on

gender issues such as family planning, women’s participation in public life, etc. It seems very likely

that career Muslim women with advanced Arabic/Islamic learning will change traditional gender

roles and expectations, but the exact trajectories remained to be seen.

Before turning to examining the new Islamic schools operating the 6-3-3-4 curriculum of

public schools, I will call attention to one other important outcome of the transformation of Islamic

19

education. The Senior Islamic Studies Certificate has now replaced the old Higher Islamic Studies

Certificate based on the four-year madrasa curriculum. The old certificate was not officially

recognized by the Federal Government, and even in the Northern states it was given only limited

official recognition for careers in teaching and administration of Islamic law. Its holders could only

study Arabic/Islamic Studies or Islamic Law (Shari’a) at federal universities in Zaria, Kano, Sokoto,

and Maiduguri, and even then only after completing a three year course of study, thus doubling the

period of their university education into six years instead of the regular three years. These

restrictions are no longer applicable to holders of the Senior Islamic Studies Certificate that is now

recognized nationally as equivalent to the Senior Secondary School Certificate awarded by public

schools. The two certificates are recognized as equal levels of educational attainment for

employment and admission to universities, thus qualifying holders of the Senior Islamic Studies

Certificates for various professional courses at universities and specialized academies for police,

immigration, customs, state security service and military training. As the formation of a new Muslim

elite unfolds, it remains to be seen how much of their Islamic education will influence their future

professional lives, and how their public influence may intersect with that of graduates of the new

Islamic schools that operate the national curriculum of public schools.

Whereas madrasa curriculum provides classical Arabic/Islamic education, the national

curriculum taught in public schools provides modern western education. The two curricula also

differ in their aims and objectives. Among other goals, madrasa curriculum aims to foster Islamic

identity and consciousness with competencies in Arabic and Islamic Studies to “equip students to

orient their lives in accordance with Shari’a.”62 In contrast, the national curriculum aims at “self-

realization, better human relationship, individual and national efficiency, effective citizenship,

national consciousness, national unity, as well as towards social, cultural, economic, political,

20

scientific and technological progress.”63 It is of course true that madrasa curriculum does not neglect

secular educational objectives such as citizenship and national unity, while the national public

curriculum also seeks to foster “moral and spiritual values … [and] shared responsibility for the

common good of society.”64 Still, observable differences in institutional orientation and “silent

curricula” of the new Islamic schools and the public schools combined to make a clear difference in

the schooling impact on students attending the two types of schools. Given curricular differences in

both contents and objectives, the new Islamic schools had to change aspects of the national

curriculum to conform to their Islamic identity and goals.

Apart from the general Islamic orientation of the school environment, the second set of new

Islamic schools teaches a modified version of the national curriculum of public schools. First, Arabic

and Islamic Studies are compulsory in all the new Islamic schools instead of their optional/elective

status in national public curriculum. Most of this set of new Islamic schools include Qur’an

memorization and use Arabic as the language of instruction for Arabic/Islamic Studies. Additional

encouragement for students to focus more on Arabic, Islamic Studies, Qur’an memorization come in

the forms of special prizes for accomplishments in the three subjects, school sponsorship of major

Islamic festivals, and promoting students’ clubs and organizations. Appendix II (Educational Tracks

and Levels) shows that nine out of twenty-one schools teach the modified version of the national

public curriculum at junior secondary school level (JS), twelve schools teach it at senior secondary

school level (SS), and nine schools teach it at both JS and SS levels.

This modified curriculum provides students with modern western education and an intermediate

level of Arabic/Islamic education. In this regard, the new national curriculum as modified and

operated in the new Islamic schools differs from the new madrasa curriculum and the old national

curriculum. The new madrasa curriculum aims to train ulama that are also knowledgeable in modern

21

secular subjects, while the modified national curriculum aims to produce modern/western educated

Muslims who are also knowledgeable in Arabic/Islamic Studies. The two curricula proceed from

opposite directions: new madrasa curriculum is roughly divided into 70% Arabic/Islamic education

and 30% modern western education, while the modified national curriculum is roughly divided into

70% modern western education and 30% Arabic/Islamic education. In contrast, the old national

curriculum offered Islamic Studies only in English, and at a considerably lower level, while the old

four-year madrasa curriculum gave solid training in classical Arabic/Islamic studies with only a

trifling exposure to elementary English and Arithmetic. Clearly, the new Islamic schools offer wider

and more intensive training in Arabic and Islamic studies as well as modern subjects.

Again, the long-term consequences are not yet fully clear. One observable outcome is that the

new Islamic schools that teach the modified new national curriculum are also encountering

implementation problems similar to the ones facing the schools operating on the new madrasa

curriculum, particularly shortage of qualified teachers and textbooks. But addition of Arabic and

Islamic Studies into the new national curriculum is more popular with both parents and students than

addition of secular subjects in the new madrasa curriculum. This popularity enables the new Islamic

schools to draw more and more students away from traditional Qur’anic schools that are losing their

functional relevance in relation to the contemporary economic, social, political, cultural and

intellectual realities of Nigeria. In contrast, the new Islamic schools train students for university

education and careers in modern professions, while still providing Arabic/Islamic education that

qualify students to win prestigious prizes in international competition for Qur’an recitation.

Certainly, graduates of the new Islamic schools are likely to play important social and

political roles, but the exact trajectories of those roles are not yet clear. In a sense, the establishment

of so many new Islamic schools in Northern Nigeria is indicative of a broader societal shift toward

22

the global trend of Islamic resurgence. It is the same broad shift that is also manifested in the

widespread enthusiasm for the ongoing implementation of the “Full Shari’a” in Muslim majority

states of Northern Nigeria. As new Muslim elites, graduates of the new Islamic schools will continue

to reinforce the broad societal shift toward a more prominent role for Islam in public life, especially

if these Islamic schools develop into self-perpetuating educational institutions.

Institutional Characteristics

All the new Islamic schools adopt the institutional format of modern school systems. It is not,

however, certain that they will all develop into enduring institutions principally because they have

not fully embraced the key modern traits of efficiency, innovation, record keeping, financial

accountability and bureaucratic management. It is encouraging to note that some of these schools

have already developed beyond the second decade since their establishment. Still, their institutional

continuity will depend on the extent to which key modern traits prevail over inevitable interference

of traditional attitudes and expectations.

Organizational Innovation

Their modern organizational format allows the new Islamic schools to combine both

Arabic/Islamic education and modern western education. The general tendency is for one school to

provide multiple tracks at various educational levels. There are three tracks: Arabic/Islamic Studies,

Qur’an memorization, and modern western education. And there are six educational levels: nursery

(N) pre-primary (PP), primary (P), junior secondary (JS) and junior Arabic/Islamic Studies (JIS),

senior secondary (SS) and senior Arabic/Islamic Studies (SIS), and national certificate of education

23

(NCE)—which forms the first part of Nigerian higher education system. Appendix II (Educational

Tracks and Levels) shows that only four out of twenty-one schools provide a single educational tract

or level: AIM provides only Junior Arabic Islamic Studies (JIS), BIS provides only Senior Islamic

Studies (SIS), GDQ provides only Qur’an memorization, and NCI provides only Senior Secondary

Certificate (SS). The remaining seventeen schools provide at least two tracks at multiple levels.

MCE has the largest number of four levels (PP, P, JS/JIS, and SS/SIS) and the two tracks of

madrasa and modern western education, followed by ATC with the same two tracks and three levels

(PP, JS/JIS, and SS/SIS). CIS is the only school offering the higher level NCE in addition to two

levels (JS, SS/SIS). Combining the two tracks of madrasa and modern western education at multiple

educational levels allows schools to take advantage of economies of scale, but also requires

considerable organizational skills that are not evenly available in all schools. In particular, record-

keeping, which is necessary for institutional continuity and planning for growth, is quite poor.

Similarly, only very few of these schools maintain standard accounting of their finances. Without

regular and meticulous record-keeping and financial accounting, no school can aspire to a bright

future of institutional development.

Influence of the founder(s)

Out of twenty-one schools under examination, state and local governments established three

only. Appendix III (Founders of New Islamic Schools) reveals that organizations established nine

schools, individuals established seven, and community and group of individuals established one

school each. This prevalence of private initiative in establishing these schools reflects the impact of

the neo-liberal ideology of deregulation and privatization; it also lends credence to the increasing

24

optimism that civil society and non-governmental organizations will revitalize societies devastated

by authoritarian regimes. But to what extent will these schools survive their founders?

Ordinarily, one expects that schools established by organizations will have a greater chance of

developing as an enduring institution since their future does not depend on the continuing goodwill

of the founding patron. But Appendix III reveals that of the seven schools established by individuals,

one was established in 1980, one in 1985, one in 1986, and four in the 1990s. Clearly, schools

established by individuals have endured as much as those established by organizations.

A point worth emphasizing here is that two schools (BIS and IIS) were established by

organizations with international affiliations, and it is not a coincidence that the two are among the

best managed schools. In fact, IIS is by far the best in terms of organization and academic programs;

its students have won first or second prizes in national and international competitions, including

Qur’an recitation international competition. The parent association of IIS is Nur al-Islam, which is

funded and run by a Syrian engineering firm, Shinco Nigeria Limited. Almuntada al-Islami, the

London-based parent organization of BIS, sponsors staff members to attend international seminars

taught by experts on modern management techniques. The positive impact is unmistakable in the

very efficient management of the school, leading to the steady rising of its high reputation as a center

of excellence.65 It is also relevant to note that BIS attracts foreign students from neighboring

countries. The involvement of international Islamic organizations, however, should not be over-

emphasized, since it can only be detected in two out of twenty-one cases.

The other organizations are primarily local, though not lacking some international connections.

This is especially true of Izala, which is the parent organization of two schools (AMC and AGC) and

the inspiration for many others. Izala’s Wahhabi reformism makes it possible to attract support from

Saudi Arabia, particularly in the form of scholarships for graduates of Izala schools to attend Saudi

25

Islamic universities. The Nuruddeen Society, which has a longer history of establishing schools in

Yorubaland, is the parent organization for one school in the list under current examination (NCI).

Jama’atu Nasril Islam runs three schools (AIM, ATC, JGC), and the Moslem Women Association of

Plateau State is the founder of TPS. These organizations are working hard to keep their schools

functioning as effectively as they can: some of the schools and their students have won prizes in

various local and national academic competitions, and all could easily boast of their former students

who have successfully graduated from institutions of higher learning, including premier Nigerian

universities. Still, their schools do not impress a visitor that they are as well managed as the two

schools affiliated with international Islamic organizations. The difference is partly attributable to

poor record-keeping, financial accountability, and management, and partly to the fact that the two

internationally affiliated schools enjoy greater access to more resources.

The individuals who established seven out of the twenty-one schools fall into four categories.

First, a wealthy patron provides resources including land, buildings, and equipments needed to start

the school, and often remains the major source of funds for expansion and capital projects. Such

wealthy patrons may exert strong influence on the orientation of the school. AMC, BMM, and HSS

were established by individual wealthy patrons; and AIM was also initially established by a wealthy

patron, who later handed-over the school to Jama’atu Nasril Islam organization. Second, an

individual Islamic activist who was able to mobilize resources from the local community, including

volunteer teachers, established CIS. His indefatigable activism has kept the school growing despite

numerous challenges, notably inadequate resources and lack of professional management. Third,

reputable Islamic scholars are the individuals who established GDQ and KRS by transforming their

traditional Qur’anic schools into the modern institutional format and then attracting community and

governmental support to keep the school going. Finally, an individual entrepreneur established JNI

26

to take advantage of market opportunities in Islamic education arena that have been greatly enhanced

by the prevailing deregulation and privatization. Similarly, the group of individuals who established

GMP comprises entrepreneurs responding to market opportunities (excess demands, and willingness

of parents to pay for their children’s education). This diversity of founders produces different impact

on the institutional functioning and continuing development of the new Islamic schools.

Conclusion

Three important aspects of the new Islamic schools of Northern Nigeria reflect key features of

the current transformation of Islamic education in Muslim countries, and changes in the broader

global educational arena. First, neoliberal reform measures of privatization and deregulation have

forced the state to retreat from provision of social services, including education. These policies

appeared credible in light of the mismanagement, corruption, and inefficiencies associated with the

failures of the developmental state, for which Nigeria stands as the paradigmatic example. Private

initiatives have emerged to meet excess demands for education. Shobhana Sosale observes that

private financing and provision for education have historically been prevalent, but “during the course

of the 20th century, however, the role of the state (public sector) assumed predominance for purposes

of nation-building and instilling national identity.”66 State predominance in education has created

“numerous constraints,” including inefficiencies, misallocation of resources, and financially

unsustainable educational expansion. Pressures for increased private initiatives in the educational

arena comes from both the supply side (declining state provision and increased private provision),

and from the demand-side (parental choices for quality, cost and value, and cultural and religious

preferences). These observations are clearly reflected in the changes in Nigeria’s educational system.

27

For example, the rise and decline of the developmental state in Nigeria’s educational arena and

serious decline of educational standards resulting from the corrupt management and erratic

implementation of the 6-3-3-4 school system created the supply-side factors (i.e. shortage of

providers of quality education) that contributed to the emergence of the new Islamic schools of

Northern Nigeria. Muslims’ preference for combining both Islamic and western types of education

constitutes the strongest demand-side factor for the continuing growth of the new Islamic schools.

The participation of state governments, local and international Islamic organizations, wealthy

patrons, and individual entrepreneurs all reflect how supply/demand and public/private factors

combined to create different models of private initiatives in the educational arena. This development

shows that educational privatization and deregulation occur in several forms: 1) the auctioning of

public educational assets to private entrepreneurs, 2) various models of provision, financing, and

management of education, and 3) opening different levels of primary, secondary and higher

education for private participation.67 While conforming to the global trend of educational

privatization, the new Islamic schools profiled in this essay illustrate the specifically Islamic features

that are also observable in the educational transformation of many Muslim countries.

Combining Islamic learning and modern western education has remained a difficult issue in

Muslim countries since the nineteenth-century. The new Islamic schools of Northern Nigeria exhibit

some of the varieties of educational dualism that have been developed in Muslim countries,

including Mali,68 Senegal,69 Sudan,70 Malaysia,71 and Indonesia.72 Incorporating Qur’anic education

in the tahfiz track of the new Islamic schools has made it possible to memorize the Qur’an and

acquire both Islamic learning and western education, thereby equipping graduates with the multiple

sets of skills they need to function effectively in meeting contemporary challenges of modern

society. This Northern Nigerian experiment provides a solution to the crisis of relevance confronting

28

the old Qur’anic schools more effectively than the UNESCO/UNICEF initiative of introducing

vocational training into the old Qur’anic schools. Similarly, offering both Islamic and western types

of education in the same school environment seems to be more realistic than the idealistic model of

“Islamization of knowledge,”73 and cheaper than attending separate schools to acquire Islamic and

western education. These Northern Nigerian experiments have not yet solved all the persistent

problems of educational dualism in Muslim countries;74 they do, however, point to the possibilities

of educating Muslims to live according to Islamic values and beliefs in the multi-cultural and

increasingly inter-connected modern world.

The social and political consequences of the worldwide educational transformation in Islamic

societies are manifesting themselves in contradictory trends. On the one hand, Dale Eickelman

demonstrates the subtle ways in which mass education, mass communication, and neo-liberal

policies of privatization and deregulation have opened up public spaces for debating the relevance of

Islamic heritage in modern society. As a consequence of these developments, Eickelman contends

that Islamic modernity is underway, leading to an understanding of Islam as civic dialog.75 On the

other hand, Nasr calls attention to the active role of the state in the transformation of Islamic

education in Pakistan. The Islamization policies of the military regime of Ziaul Haq have resulted

not only in the expansion of madrasas and reform of their curricula, but also in the increased

militancy of the teeming number of madrasa graduates. Doctrinal and regional differences

characterizing the various madrasas translate into factions among the new cadre of Islamic elites

seeking alternative employment outside the public sector that could not provide needed jobs to all of

them. Escalation of sectarian violence is the outcome of the intense competition for limited

employment opportunities as well as for dominance of the Islamist political constituencies in

Pakistan.76 The Pakistani trend seems more prominent in Nigeria, where growing Islamic activitism

29

has steadily become more and more attractive in the face of continuing deterioration of the public

sector under the predatory regimes of Generals Babangida and Abacha. As I argued elsewhere,

graduates of the new Islamic schools are at the forefront of the increasing demands for the full

application of Islamic law that has become more irresistible since Nigeria’s return to civilian rule in

1999.77 The Islamist activism of graduates of new Islamic schools, not only in Nigeria and Pakistan,

but in many Muslim countries as well,78 can be seen as the conservative wing of an emerging Islamic

modernity.79 This observation corrects the over-emphasis on Islamic liberalism that features

prominently in Eickelman’s insightful analysis of the social and political consequences resulting

from transformation of Islamic education.

30

Appendix I

New Islamic Schools: Abbreviation, Name, and Date of Establishment

1 AMC Abdulrahman Mora College of Islamic Studies, NO 56 Aminu Road, Tudun Wada, Zaria 1985

2 AGC Abubakar Gumi College of Higher Islamic Studies, Aminu Road, Tudun WadaZaria 1990

3 AIM Ali Iliya Memorial Junior Arabic Secondary School, P.O. Box 2872, Jos 1981 4 ATC Arabic Teachers’ College, P.O. Box 927, Jos 1976

5 BMM Baban Maryam Memorial Primary School, No 59/13 Dilimi Street, Jos 1997

6 BIS Al-Bayan Islamic Secondary School, No 30 Rock Haven, Jos 1995

7 CIS College of Islamic Studies, Bauchi Road, P.M.B. 2003, Jos 1986

8 CQS College of Quranic Studies, Kano State Ministry of Education, Kano 1986

9 GMP Gamji Memorial Private School, 10 Bauchi Road, Opposite Unipetrol Station, Jos 1998

10 GDQ Gwani Danzarga Qur’anic Secondary School, 504, Koki, P.O. Box 13616, Kano 1993

11 HSS Al-Hilal Secondary School, P.O. Box 1638, Rikkos, Jos 1996

12 IIS Al-Iman International School, P.O. Box 6334, Jos 1982

13 JNI Jabal Nur International School, 828, Bauchi Ring Road, P.O. Box 1883, Jos 1991

14 JCS Jos Community Secondary School, P.O. Box 2122, Naraguta, Jos North Local Government Council, Jos 1993

15 JGC Jama’tu Girls College of Arabic Studies, P.O. Box 1054, Zaria 1983

16 KCI El-Kanemi College of Islamic Studies, P.O. Box 2334, Jos 1985

17 KRS Kofar Ruwa Senior Islamic Secondary School, Kofar Ruwa, Kano 1980

18 MCE Muslim Community Education Center, 14/15 New Rikkos Layout, P.O. Box 2700, Jos 1986

19 NCI Nuruddeen College of Islamic Studies, P.O. Box 316 Laranto, Jos 1986

20 SAI School for Arabic and Islamic Education, Gaskiya Road, Zaria 1993

21 TPS Taoheed Private School, Old Airport Road, P.O. Box 1499, Jos 1983

31

Appendix II

Educational Tracks and Levels

School N PP P JS SS QM JIS SIS NCE

1 AMC x x x

2 AGC x x x x x

3 AIM x

4 ATC x x x x x

5 BMM x x

6 BIS x

7 CIS x x x x

8 CQS x x

9 GMP x x x x

10 GDQ x

11 HSS x

12 IIS x x x x x

13 JNI x x x

14 JCS x x

15 JGC x x x

16 KCI x

17 KRS x x x x

18 MCE x x x x x x

19 NCI x

20 SAI x x x x

21 TPS x x x x x

32

Appendix III

Founders of New Islamic Schools

SN School Date Founder

1 AMC 1985 Individual

2 AGC 1990 Organization

3 AIM 1981 Organization

4 ATC 1976 Organization

5 BMM 1997 Individual

6 BIS 1995 Organization

7 CIS 1986 Individual

8 CQS 1986 Kano State

9 GMP 1998 Group of Individuals

11 GDQ 1993 Individual

12 HSS 1996 Individual

13 IIS 1982 Organization

12 JNI 1991 Individual

14 JCS 1993 Jos L.G.A.

15 JGC 1983 Organization

16 KCI 1985 Organization

17 KRS 1980 Individual

18 MCE 1986 Community

19 NCI 1986 Organization

20 SAI 1993 Kaduna State

21 TPS 1983 Organization

33

∗ I collected the data for this essay in field research in Nigeria during July-December 1999 and May-August 2000 with funding from Faculty Grant of Arizona State University, which I hereby gratefully acknowledge. I presented an earlier version of the essay at the workshop on innovations and their contextualization in African Islamic societies at University of Bayreuth, Germany, 9-10 February 2001. I am grateful for the generous hospitality of the organizers of the workshop, Professors Roman Loimeier and Rudiger Seesmann, and critical comments and suggestions of the workshop participants. I collected more data at the Melville J. Herskovits Africana Library of Northwestern University, Evanston, IL during my tenure (2001/2002) as preceptor of the Institute for the Study of Islamic Thought in Africa (ISITA) at the Program of African Studies (PAS), Northwestern University. I wish to thank ISITA directors, Professors John O. Hunwick and Sean R. O’Fahey, ISITA co-coordinators, Mathew Cenzer and Rebecca Shereikis, and all ISITA 2002 fellows, PAS administrators and staff who made my ISITA experience productive and memorable. 1 Arewa House, Northern Education Research Project, Towards the Improvement of Education in the Northern States of Nigeria: An Agenda for Action, (Kaduna: Arewa House Center for Historical Research and Documentation of Ahamadu Bello University, 2000); Festus Okoye and Yunusa Z. Yau, The Condition of Almajirai in the North West Zone of Nigeria, (Kaduna: Human Rights Monitor, 1999); E.O. Adeniji and K.A. Salawu, Stabilizing the Nigerian Educational System (Abeokuta, Nigeria: Federal College of Education, 1996); P.K. Ajila, et el., Restoring Confidence in Nigerian Educational System in the Year 2010, (Abeokuta, Nigeria: GOAD Educational Publishers, 1998); B. Olamosu, Crisis of Education in Nigeria, (Ibadan, Books Farm Publishers, 2000); and D. Ojerinde, Falling Standards of Education in Nigeria: Myth or Reality, (Ibadan, Tafak Publications, 2000). 2 World Bank, Nigeria’s Structural Adjustment Program: Policies, implementation, and impact, (Washington, D.C.: 1994). 3 Dale Eickelman, “Mass higher education and the religious imagination in contemporary Arab societies,” American Ethnologist 19 (1992): 643-655; Mozammel Haque, “Muslim Education in India,” Muslim Education Quarterly 17/3 (1999): 66-75; Linda Herrera, “Song without Music, Islamism and Education: A Case From Egypt,” Revue des Mondes Muslmans et de la Mediterranee 85-86 (Spring 1999): 149-159; A.E. Muzawi , “The Contested Terrains of Education in the Arab States: An Appraisal of Major Research Trends,” Comparative Education Review 43/3 (1999): 332-352. 4 David Cohen, “The Worldwide Rise in Private Colleges,” The Chronicle of Higher Education (March 9, 2001); Leon Tikly, “Globalization and Education in the Postcolonial World: towards a conceptual framework,” Comparative Education 37/2 (2001): 151-171; and World Bank, Priorities and Strategies for Education: A World Bank Review, (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1995). 5 For example, see: “Investment Opportunities in Private Education in Developing Countries,” An International Conference Sponsored by the International Finance Corporation, Member of the World Bank Group, (Washington DC, June 2-3, 1999); and the cover story titled “Education: The last Frontier for Profit,” The UNESCO Courier (November, 2000): 16-37. 6 Yochi Dreazen and Andrew Caffrey, “Private Concerns: Now, Public Works Seem Too Precious for the Free Market,” Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition) (Nov 19, 2001): 1A. 7 Pierre Englebert, “Solving the Mystery of the AFRICA Dummy,” World Development 28/10 (2000): 182-1835. 8 Adrian Leftwich, “Two Cheers for Democracy? Democracy and the Developmental State,” in Democracy and Development: Theory and Practice, edited by A. Leftwich, (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1996), p 284. Cf. Meredith Woo-Cumings, ed., The Developmental State, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), particularly the chapter two “The Developmental State: The Odyssey of a Concept,” (pp. 32-60) where Chalmers Johnson, whose 1982 book on the role of the state in fostering “Japan’s economic miracle” is generally credited with sparking the on-going controversies on the concept of developmental state, revisits his earlier views and replies his many critics. 9 For example, see: Peter M. Lewis, “Economic Statism, Private Capital and Dilemmas of Accumulation in Nigeria,” World Development 22/3 (1994): 437-51; Sayre Schatz, “Pirate Capitalism and the inert economy of Nigeria,” Journal of Modern African Studies 22/1 (1984): 45-57; Adebayo Olukoshi, Economic crisis, structural adjustment and the coping strategies of manufacturers in Kano, Nigeria, (Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1996), and Adebayo Olukoshi, The elusive prince of Denmark: structural adjustment and the crisis of governance in Africa, (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikaninstitutet, 1998). 10 Letwich, “Two Cheers for Democracy,” p. 285-89. 11 Leftwich, “Two Cheers for Democracy?” p. 285. 12 Hakeem Jimo, Tidiane Sy, and Dame Wade, “West and Central Africa,” Transparency International Regional Reports, 2001, available online at http://www.globalcorruptionreport.org/, accessed on December 14, 2002.

34

13 Yakubu Gowon, Nigeria’s Forward March: Broadcast by His Excellency Major General Yakubu Gowon, Head of the Federal Military Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, on the Occasion of the Launching of Nigeria’s Second National Development Plan, 1970-74, (Lagos: Associated Press of Nigeria), p. 6. 14 Federal Republic of Nigeria, Fourth National Development Plan 1981-1985, (Lagos: The National Planning Office, Federal Ministry of National Planning, 1981), vol. 1, p. 1. Also see: Federal Republic of Nigeria, Building the new Nigeria: national development plan, 1970-74, (Lagos: Nigerian National Press, 1971). 15 W.G. Huff and G. Dewit, “Credibility and Reputation Building in the Developmental State: A Model with East Asian Applications,” World Development 29/4 (2001): 711-24. 16 Federal Government of Nigeria, Guidelines for Local Government Reform, (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, 1976). 17 Eghosa E. Osaghae, Crippled Giant: Nigeria Since independence, (London: Hurst and Company, 1998); Richard Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 18 Thomas J. Biersteker, Mutinationals, the State, and Control of the Nigerian Economy, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 53 ff. 19 Peter Lewis, “From Prebendalism to Predation: The Political Economy of Decline in Nigeria,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 34 (March 1996): 79-103. 20 Leftwich, “Two Cheers for Democracy?” p. 288-89. 21 Peter Lewis, “From Prebendalism to Predation,” 79-103. 22 The National Institute, Workshop on the Economic Stabilization Act of 1982: Its Impact on the Nigerian Economy with Particular Reference to the Indigenization Policy (Kuru, Nigeria, The National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, 1983). 23 Adedotun O. Phillips and E. C. Ndekwu, eds., Structural Adjustment Programme in a Developing Economy: The Case of Nigeria, (Ibadan: Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1987) and Adebayo O. Olukoshi, eds., The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Nigeria, (London: James Curry, 1993). See also Osaghae, Crippled Giant, pp. 188 ff. 24 Mark T. Berger, “The Rise and Demise of National Development and the Origins of Post-Cold War Capitalism,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 30/2 (2001): 211-34. 25 Federal Republic of Nigeria, National Policy of Education, (Lagos: Government Printer, rev. ed. 1981). Babs Fanfuwa, History of Education in Nigeria, (Ibadan: NPS Educational Publishers, new edition 1991), pp. 206-255. 26 Federal Republic of Nigeria, Implementation Committee for the National Policy on Education, Blueprint, (Lagos: Federal Government Printer, 1978). 27 Federal Republic of Nigeria, National Policy on Education, p. 7. 28 T.F. Aiyepeku, 6-3-3-4 System of Education in Nigeria (Ibadan: NPS Educational Publishers, 1989), p. 3. 29 J.S.O. Sofolahan, “Main Paper: Implementing the 6-3-34- System of Education,” in Moving Education in Nigeria toward the Year 2000: Proceedings of the First, Second, and Third Congresses of Nigerian Academy of Education, edited by R. Ogbonna Ohuche, (Enugu: Optimal Computer Solutions in association with Nigerian Academy of Education, 1991), pp. 19-38. Cf. Fafunwa, History of Education, pp. 206 ff. 30 Aiyepeku, 6-3-3-4 System of Education in Nigeria, p. 2. 31 S. I. Okoli, Curriculum Provisions in the National Policy on Education, (Awka, Nigeria: Christon Printing and Publishing Company, 1991). 32 Sofolahan, “Main Paper,” 19-38. 33 Leo C. Okeke, “Education reform and expansion in post-independence Nigeria: A nation in transition, 1960-1992,” Ph.D. diss., Boston College, 1993. 34 Federal Government of Nigeria, Statistics of Education in Nigeria, 1980-1984, (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Education), pp. 5-8. 35 Federal Government of Nigeria, National Rolling Plan, 1996-1998, (Abuja: National Planning Commission, 1996), vol. 1, p. 181. 36 Ibid., pp. 182-87. 37 Federal Republic of Nigeria, Second National Development Plan, 1970-1974: Second Progress Report, (Lagos: Central Planning Office, Federal Ministry of Economic Development and Reconstruction, 1974), p. 84. 38 Cordelia C. Nwagwu, “The Development of Private Educational Institutions in Nigeria: Issues, Problems and Prospects,” Proceedings of Nigerian Academy of Education on Private and Community Participation: Proceedings of the 1997 Congress of the Nigerian Academy of Education, 1998, pp. 73-80. 39 Federal Republic of Nigeria, Fourth National Development Plan, vol. 1, p. 255-59. 40 Sofolahan, “Main Paper,” pp. 25-29. 41 Ibid., p. 34.

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42 Federal Government of Nigeria, Fourth National Development Plan, vol. 1, p. 259. 43 Federal Government of Nigeria, National Rolling Plan, 1996-1998, vol. 1, pp. 171. 44 Nwagwu, “The Development of Private Educational Institutions in Nigeria,” p. 77. 45 A. M. Abdurrahman and P. Canham, The Ink of the Scholar: The Islamic Tradition of Education in Nigeria, (Lagos: Macmillan, 1978), p. 51. 46 Ibid., pp. 51-52. 47 Ibid., p. 54. 48 Vivid description of traditional pedagogy of Qu’anic schools can be found in Danjuma A. Maiwada, “Curriculum Development in Koranic Education,” Kano Studies new series 2/2 (1981): 146-68. 49 M. Maqsud, “Moral Education in Islamic Schools in Northern Nigeria,” Kano Studies new series 1/3 (1978): 53-60. 50 A. Mohammed and M.B. Khan, “From Cradle to Grave: The Contribution of the Ulama to Education in Nigeria,” Kano Studies new series 2/2 (1981):110-128; Omar Bello, Islamic Education in 18th Century ‘Nigeria’: Tarikh Mustafa al-Torodi, (Sokoto: The Islamic Academy, 1994). For bibliography of individual scholars, see. John O. Hunwick, et el., Arabic Literature of Africa, Volume II: The Writings of the Central Sudanic Africa, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995). 51 For example, see: Abdulkarim U. Dan Asabe, “Islam and History of Learning in Katsina State from the Jihad (1807) to the Colonial Conquest (1903): The Case of the School of Tsohuwar Kasuwa, Katsina City,” Tambari: Kano Journal of Education 3/1 (1996): 72-78; M.D. Sulaiman, “Islamic Education and the Preservation and Transmission of Culture: A Study of the Hausa Migrants in Lokoja, 1903-1933,” Tambari: Kano Journal of Educatio 2/1 (1995): 118-25; Zakariyya I. Oseni, “The Traditional and Modern Ulama in Edo State of Nigeria: Achievements and Problems,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 19/2 (1999): 223-34. For comparative perspective on Islamic education in West Africa, see: Humphrey J. Fisher, “Islamic Education and Religious Reform in West Africa,” in Education in Africa: Research and Action edited by R. Jolly, (Nairobi: East African Publishing House for African Studies Association of the United Kingdom, 1969), 247-62; Saul Maher Saul, “The Qur’anic School Farm and Child Labour in Upper Volta,” Africa 54/2,(1984): 71-86. 52 Okoye and Yau, The Condition of Almajirai, p. 67. Cf. Sulaiman Khalid, “Nigeria’s Educational Crisis: The Almajiranci System and Social Realities,” Islamic Culture LXXV/3 (2001): 85-103. 53 Abdurrahman and Canham, Ink of the Scholar, p. 65. 54 For the origins and development of Islamic schools during the colonial period (1903-1960), see the colonial records preserved in Nigeria’s National Archives in Kaduna under the title “KADMINEDUC AS 2/8 Volumes 1 and 11: Islamic Schools in Northern Nigeria.” Also see: G. Tahir, “The Significance of Leadership Perceptions and Solutions to Issues and Problems of Western Education in Hausaland, 1940-1960s,” Kano Studies new series 2/3 (1982-1985): 163-78. 55 For example, see: W.O.A. Nasiru, “Attractions and Reactions of Lagos Muslims to Christian Sponsored Western Education, 1890-1926,” Al-Fikr: Annual Journal of the Department of Arabic and Islamic Studies, University of Ibadan 13 (1992):70-80; M.A. Abdur-Rahim, “Colonialism and Islamic Education in Western Nigeria before 1960,” Al-Fikr: Annual Journal of the Department of Arabic and Islamic Studies, University of Ibadan 13 (1992):13-20; Muhib O. Opoleye, “An Assessment of the Contributions of Ilmiyyah schools for Arabic and Islamic Learning in the Southern Nigerian Uiversities,” Muslim Education Quarterly 11/2 (1994): 29-45; Stefan Reichmuth, “A Regional Center of Islamic Learning in Nigeria: Ilorin and Its Influence on Yoruba Islam,” in Madrasa: La Transmission du Savoir Dans Le Monde Musulman, edited by Nicole Grandin and Marc Gaborieau, (Paris: AP Editions Arguments, 1997), 229-245; Stefan Reichmuth, “Islamic Learning and its Interaction with ‘Western’ Education in Ilorin, Nigeria,” in Muslim Identity and Social Change in sub-Saharan Africa, edited by Louis Brenner, (Bloomingdale, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1993), 189 ff., and Stefan Reichmuth, “Education and The Growth of Religious Associations Among Yoruba Muslims—The Ansar-ud-Deen Society of Nigeria,” Journal of Religion in Africa 26/4 (1996): 365-405. 56 Colonial records relating to School for Arabic Studies are preserved in Nigeria’s National Archives, Kaduna, under file NO “KADMINEDUC AS 2/12.” 57 “Report of the Committee on Higher Moslem Education, 1953,” in file No ZARPROF SCH/1, Nigerian National Archives, Kaduna. Also see: H. Alkali, “A Note on Arabic Teaching in Northern Nigeria” Kano Studies 3 (1967): 10-11. 58 Sheikh Nuruddeen Hassan, Muhammad S. Abdullahi, and Alhaji Ben Yunusa, The History and Activities of the National Board of Arabic and Islamic Studies, (Zaria: Institute of Education Ahmadu Bello University, 1994), pp. 61-66. 59 Ibid, 43-56. 60 Nigerian National Council of Principal and Supervisors of Islamic and Arabic Secondary Schools, Manhaj al-Dirasat al-Islamiyya Li’l-Thanawiyya, (Zaria: Institute of Education, Ahmadu Bello University, n.d.). 61 Muhammad S. Umar “Education and Islamic Trends in Northern Nigeria: 1970s-1990s,” Africa Today 84 (Summer 2001): 127-150. 62 Manhaj al-Dirasat al-Islamiyya Li’l-Thanawiyya, p. 3. 63 Federal Government of Nigeria, New National Policy on Education, p. 7

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64 Ibid. 65 Ministry of Education (Plateau State), Area Inspectorate Office of Education, Jos North Local Government Area: Annual Report for 1996/97 Session, p. 205. 66 Shobhana Sosale, Trends in Private Sector Development in World Bank Education Project, (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2000), p. 1. 67 Ibid., p. 3. 68 Louis Brenner, Controlling Knowledge: religion, power, and schooling in a West African Muslim society, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001). Cf. Peter Easton, “Mali: Indigenous Knowledge—Blending the New and the Old,” World Bank IK Notes 25 (2000):1-4. 69 Sylviane D. Kamara, “Senegal Upgrades its Koranic Schools,” UNICEF Feature No 00143.SEN, (April 1995). 70 A.A. Qasim, A Study on Quranic Schools as a Tributary of General Education in the Sudan, (Khartoum: UNESCO, 1991). 71UNESCO, Regional Seminar of Experts on Quranic Schools and their Roles in the Universalization and Renewal of Basic Education, (Khartoum: UNESCO, 1993). Also see: UNESCO, Mobilizing Project to Combat Illiteracy: Igniting the Spirit of Exchange, (Paris: UNESCO Workshops, Basic Education Division, 1994), 14-17; and Peter Easton et el., “Education and Koranic Literacy in West Africa,” World Bank IK Notes No 11 (August 1999). 71 R. Hashim, Educational Dualism in Malaysia: Implications for theory and practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). 72 Roland A. Lukens-Bull, “Two Sides of the Same Coin: Modernity and Tradition in Islamic Education in Indonesia,” Anthropology and Education Quarterly 32/3 (2001): 350-72. 73 B. Aisha Lemu, “Islamization of Education: A Primary Level Experiment in Nigeria,” Muslim Education Quarterly 5/2 (1988): 70-80; Sheikh A. Lemu, “Initial Success of Islamization of Knowledge in Nigeria,” Muslim Education Quarterly 10/3 (1993): 33-38; and Bshir S. Galadanci, ed., Islamization of Knowledge: A Research Guide, (Kano: International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), Nigeria Office, 2000). 74 Bradley J. Cook, “Islamic versus Western Conceptions of Education: Reflection on Egypt,” International Review of Education 45:3/4 (1999): 339-357; J. Mark Halstead, “Towards a Unified View of Islamic Education,” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 6/1 (1995): 25-42; and Muhammad Q. Zaman, “Religious Education and The Rhetoric of Reform: The Madrasa in British India and Pakistan,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 41/2 (1999): 294-323. 75 Dale F. Eickelman, “Islam and the Languages of Modernity,” Daedalus 129 (Winter 2000): 119-35. 76 S.V.R. Nasr, “The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan: The changing Role of Islamism and the Ulama in Society and Politics,” Modern Asian Studies 34/1 (2000): 139-1980. See also Jamal Malik, Colonialization of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institution in Paksitan, (New Delhi: Manohar, 1996), pp. 120 ff. 77 Umar, “Education and Islamic Trends,” p. 145. See also Victor F. Wan-Tatah, “The Shari’ah Issue in Nigerian Politics,” Studies in Contemporary Islam 2/1 (2000): 28-37. 78 A. I. Tayob, “Defining Islam in the Throes of Modernity,” Studies in Contemporary Islam 1/2 (1999):1-15. 79 For the idea of religious modernities, see the review essay by Robert Hefner, “Multiple Modernities: Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism,” Annual Review of Anthropology 27 (1998), pp. 83-104.