proliferated drones game of...
TRANSCRIPT
6/29/2016 Game of Drones - Proliferated Drones
http://drones.cnas.org/reports/game-of-drones/ 1/23
Game of DronesWargame Report
Drones are rapidly proliferating around the globe. Not only has the commercial market for
drones dramatically expanded, but arms transfers of unarmed and armed drones between states
are also steadily rising. The United States and its allies must consider how the widespread
availability of drones will change conflict, particularly in ambiguous engagements that remain
below the threshold of conventional war. They also must anticipate how actors will use drones
and how others will respond to those uses.
In October 2015, the Center for a New American Security held
a two-day wargame entitled Game of Drones at the National
Defense University to explore the implications of a world of
proliferated drones. The wargame brought together a diverse
group of experts from the U.S. and allied militaries, academia,
think tanks, media, and international organizations.
Participants represented a range of actors, from major nation-
states to non-state groups, across a dozen multi-turn scenarios.
The wargame found that although existing drone technology is relatively simple, the
availability of drones can have important tactical, strategic, and political implications across the
spectrum of conflict. Drones increase the options available to state and non-state actors to apply
military force where they might not have had the resources or will to act without access to
uninhabited (“unmanned”) technology. This increased optionality is particularly impactful in so-
called “hybrid” and “gray zone” conflicts, the types of ambiguous interactions short of full-scale
war that are typical in today’s security environment.
Introduction
1
2
3
PROLIFERATED DRONES
6/29/2016 Game of Drones - Proliferated Drones
http://drones.cnas.org/reports/game-of-drones/ 2/23
Already, more than 90 countries and non-state actors operate drones. The use of drones by
increasing numbers of states and non-state actors will have a growing impact on strategy and
policy as they expand and complicate the spectrum of conflict. The optionality provided by
drones has started to change behavior within the international system with initial, observed
effects on crisis stability, escalation dynamics, and norms regarding sovereignty violation.
Furthermore, the sophistication of uninhabited aircraft and the number of countries employing
them is likely only to increase as the commercial market for drones expands, states build more
robust indigenous industries, and technology advances. More operators of more capable and,
increasingly, weaponized drones will heighten the ambiguity that already characterizes drone
use and increase the severity of consequences from misinterpretation and miscalculation.
Limiting the spread of this technology is neither practical nor probable with the growth of
commercial drones, international sales by drones exporters such as Israel, China, and even the
United States, and increases in indigenous production. Given these conditions, understanding
how various actors will choose to employ drones and respond to their use is a critical step in
preparing for the challenges of a drone-saturated world. Considering how to adapt strategically
and politically to this new reality early on will mitigate the dangers of decisionmaking in the
midst of crises and create an opportunity to shape the long-term evolution of drone use.
3
4
Drones increase the options available to state and non-state actors to
apply military force where they might not have…without access to
uninhabited (“unmanned”) technology.
5
6
About Gameplay
Over the course of two days, four teams representing fictitious actors played through 12 multi-
turn scenarios. Game of Drones included two major power teams, a minor power team, a non-
state actor team, and representatives from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
charged with observing gameplay. Each team consisted of the same six to eight participants
6/29/2016 Game of Drones - Proliferated Drones
http://drones.cnas.org/reports/game-of-drones/ 3/23
throughout the wargame. While each team’s role (such as major power) remained constant, the
fictitious actor it represented varied from one scenario to the next to introduce a wide variety of
strategic and political variables. Game design pitted teams against each other in one-on-one
match-ups such that every team played two scenarios against each of the other teams.
Teams played up to four moves within each scenario. Moves lasted for 30 minutes with 20
minutes allotted to teams for deliberation of actions and 10 minutes to control officers for
adjudication of the move. During adjudication, control officers compared teams’ actions and
determined the most realistic outcome. At the end of each move, control officers communicated
their conclusions to each team. This cycle repeated for all subsequent moves within a scenario.
Shorter one- to two-move scenarios often required teams to take action quickly, anticipating the
actions of their adversary, whereas longer gameplay allowed teams to test the responses of their
adversary or set up capabilities for future use.
While fictional, the scenarios emulated modern security settings ranging from low-intensity
conflict and irregular warfare to conventional military engagements. The wargame challenged
teams to conduct stand-off attacks against more powerful adversaries, make shows of strength
supporting claims in contested geographic environments, intervene in foreign wars to hasten
regime change, employ information operations to gain control over the narrative, and even carry
out deniable attacks in sovereign territory. Teams responded to the conditions of each scenario
according to current norms of state behavior and employed only military assets based on
existing technologies. Controlling these variables allowed CNAS to focus gameplay on
operational concepts and the thinking behind them across a broad range of contingencies.
Each day of play concluded with a plenary session during which participants reflected on
whether access to drones significantly impacted the concepts of operation their teams employed
or their ability to achieve political or military objectives. ICRC participants also presented their
observations on how teams used drones throughout gameplay within the context of evolving
norms of drone use and international humanitarian law. The final plenary session focused the
discussion on comparing the utility of drones among different actors and contexts, identifying
game-changing technological developments, and predicting likely trajectories of future drone
use.
6/29/2016 Game of Drones - Proliferated Drones
http://drones.cnas.org/reports/game-of-drones/ 4/23
Game of Drones was designed to explore how various actors might employ drones, whether
drone use differs significantly from traditional airpower, and how drones will impact state
behavior and power dynamics. Specifically, the wargame sought to draw out concepts of
operation unique to the capabilities of drones, the thinking behind them, and likely responses to
drone use within various realistic scenarios. The wargame challenged teams to take action in
contexts ranging from verification of treaty compliance, counterterrorism operations, and
special forces raids to competing territorial claims and major power interventions.
Teams had access to drones – from small commercial drones to sophisticated military-specific
ones – based on existing technologies and their role as major nation-states, minor states, or non-
state actors. Teams also had access to traditional military assets they could use to achieve their
aims. The choice of whether or not to use drones in each scenario and how to employ them was
left up to the participants.
While participants almost always chose to include drones in their operational concepts, more
often than not, they were used in conjunction with traditional capabilities. In a few cases,
participants noted that access to drones had little to no impact on their success or failure in
achieving their political or military objectives. These scenarios typically required teams to take
decisive action and demonstrate resolve, resulting in the use of traditional systems as the more
effective means of messaging in conflict.
In most scenarios, drones significantly expanded teams’ options and shaped the types of
operational concepts they developed. The following cases present the main archetypes of drone
use observed during the wargame:
Drones increased the capabilities available to non-state actors. Non-state actors experienced
higher marginal utility from access to drones. Adding drones to their arsenal provided them
Findings: Use Cases
7
8
6/29/2016 Game of Drones - Proliferated Drones
http://drones.cnas.org/reports/game-of-drones/ 5/23
capabilities they did not have with traditional military assets. As with other actors, commercial
drones also gave non-state groups potentially deniable assets because of their widespread
availability.
The non-state actor team was given access to a variety of small hobbyist drones and midsize
military and commercial drones that could conceivably be purchased or provided by a state
sponsor, depending on the scenario.
Battle Damage Assessment
6/29/2016 Game of Drones - Proliferated Drones
http://drones.cnas.org/reports/game-of-drones/ 6/23
The non-state actor team launches unguided rockets against their adversary. Drones are
deployed to observe the adversary’s response and to collect targeting intelligence on military
installations and other potential targets.
6/29/2016 Game of Drones - Proliferated Drones
http://drones.cnas.org/reports/game-of-drones/ 7/23
The non-state actor team continues drone surveillance over their adversary’s territory. They
identify whether any targets were destroyed in the first strike and relay more accurate targeting
intelligence back to their operators to conduct a second strike.
6/29/2016 Game of Drones - Proliferated Drones
http://drones.cnas.org/reports/game-of-drones/ 8/23
Based on the drones’ battle damage assessment and new targeting intelligence, the non-state
actor team launches a second attack correcting fire.
Drones were used by the non-state actor team in a variety of ways:
Small commercial drones were armed with explosives and used to launch attacks on
civilian, government, and military targets from standoff distances.
6/29/2016 Game of Drones - Proliferated Drones
http://drones.cnas.org/reports/game-of-drones/ 9/23
This type of use maximized the impact of attacks, causing confusion and inflicting
mass casualties, and offered the non-state actor team some increased force
protection by not putting their forces directly at risk.
In one scenario, the non-state actor prepositioned commercial drones strapped with
explosives in order to launch targeted strikes against a state adversary. This allowed
them to carry out strikes even while under persistent surveillance by their state
adversary, which had denied them the ability to use rockets from their territory
without compromising their position. The improved force protection gained by using
prepositioned autonomous commercial drones allowed the non-state actor to
conduct a more sustained campaign of attacks at reduced risk.
Midsize military and commercial drones were used to collect targeting intelligence on
adversaries’ military assets to conduct kamikaze strikes or launch guided munitions if
they were available. After initial strikes, drones were used to conduct battle damage
assessment operations.
This use case demonstrated the use of drones to replicate traditional capabilities.
Drones allowed the non-state team to act more quickly on intelligence and improve
precision.
Small and midsize drones were used to capture and transmit propagandist video footage
of attacks and messages from central leadership.
The “live-feed” aspect of drones’ video capabilities enhanced the intended impact of
events, particularly terrorist attacks. The video added to the chaos and confusion of
attacks on civilian targets and increased perceptions of the group’s strength.
Drones reduced tactical risk to state actors, but heightened strategic and political risks. Because
uninhabited aircraft do not put pilots in harm’s way and are generally less expensive than
human-inhabited counterparts, they gave actors the option to use force in many situations
where they might have previously been reticent to take action. State teams often viewed drones
as a relatively expendable resource to carry out operations that, if conducted using human-
inhabited aircraft, might have been prohibitively risky or costly. As a result, drones changed the
calculus surrounding the use of force, lowering the threshold for military action in some
circumstances because the perceived risk was lower.
…while the use of drones lowered the tactical risk of operations, it
heightened secondary strategic and political risk, as it increased the
6/29/2016 Game of Drones - Proliferated Drones
http://drones.cnas.org/reports/game-of-drones/ 10/23
However, while the use of drones lowered the tactical risk of operations, it heightened
secondary strategic and political risk, as it increased the likelihood of engaging in conflicts in
the first place – particularly in contested geographic areas and ambiguous conflicts that fell
short of conventional war.
In the wargame, state actors included teams representing major and minor powers. Teams were
provided access to midsize military and commercial drones and large military-specific drones
according to the represented state’s capabilities.
Additional operational concepts highlighting risky behavior by state actors included the
following:
Drones were flown over the sovereign territory of adversaries. Overflight was primarily
intended to be deniable and objectives included persistent surveillance and the collection
of targeting intelligence.
If states had only the option to use traditional aircraft in similar scenarios, they
might not have taken action due to the risk to pilots and the strategic risk posed by
rapid escalation, whereas drones were both expendable and deniable.
Drones were used as a low-cost way of intervening or engaging in low-end or gray zone
conflicts. State actors used drones to conduct surveillance, collect video footage for
propaganda, carry out deniable attacks, and to assist friendly forces.
Drones allowed one of the major power teams in the wargame to engage in a gray
zone conflict for which there was little political will. The team had large, military-
specific drones in addition to small commercial drones. These assets allowed the state
actor to provide deniable low-risk support to friendly forces at no domestic political
cost.
Armed drones engaged in persistent surveillance missions were used to reduce the steps
between identifying and eliminating a target, carrying out strikes as soon as a target was
identified and confirmed.
Access to armed drones allowed state actors to strike almost instantaneously upon
receiving actionable intelligence and at a much lower cost than conducting
traditional airstrikes.
Drones expanded information opportunities for all actors. The ability to conduct persistent,
low-cost intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) is a well-recognized and core
likelihood of engaging in conflicts in the first place.
6/29/2016 Game of Drones - Proliferated Drones
http://drones.cnas.org/reports/game-of-drones/ 11/23
advantage of uninhabited systems. In addition to the direct military benefits drones provided,
drone surveillance was also used for political effects: to publicly increase transparency, shape
public opinion through propaganda, or sow misinformation. Many of the most interesting use
cases came from non-state actors, who used information (or misinformation) as a tool to counter
or blunt the advantages of stronger opponents.
Show of Strength
6/29/2016 Game of Drones - Proliferated Drones
http://drones.cnas.org/reports/game-of-drones/ 12/23
The non-state actor team outfits a drone with fake missiles such that it appears to be armed.
The ‘armed’ drone is filmed by a second surveillance drone while flying over an adversary’s
military base.
6/29/2016 Game of Drones - Proliferated Drones
http://drones.cnas.org/reports/game-of-drones/ 13/23
Video footage of the drone overflight is disseminated publicly in order to generate a deterrent
effect within the context of an ongoing conflict.
Operational concepts taking advantage of information opportunities gained by drones included:
Non-state actors used small and midsize commercial drones to film propaganda videos
demonstrating their military capabilities, including armed drone overflight and
6/29/2016 Game of Drones - Proliferated Drones
http://drones.cnas.org/reports/game-of-drones/ 14/23
improvised attacks carried out by small drones.
In one particular scenario in which the non-state actor was weakened and unable to
launch further strikes against their adversary, they turned to drones’ information
capabilities to bolster their position. The non-state actor rigged an unarmed drone
such that it appeared to be armed and partnered it with a second uninhabited system
to film its overflight of their adversary’s military base. Transmission of this footage to
their adversary helped the non-state actor build a small deterrent capability and
defer continued conflict to rebuild their forces.
Use of such video granted non-state actors the ability to wield greater control over
their public image and undermine their adversaries’ narrative.
Non-state actors employed midsize military and commercial drones to draw fire and
collect targeting intelligence on the location of their adversaries’ defenses.
Improved and timely intelligence collection using drones provided non-state actors
with a method of replicating traditional precision-strike capabilities.
State actors used midsize and large military-specific drones to collect and publicize video
evidence of adversaries’ activities that flouted international law or other norms of
behavior.
In one case, the state actors team used drone video feeds to increase transparency
about their adversary’s behavior.
Responding to and countering the use of drones. As states
and non-state actors evaluated when and how to employ
drones, they also considered how to respond to and counter
others’ use of them. The breadth of use cases demanded that
participants consider a variety of options for responding to
and countering drones. Actors chose to ignore, escort, or
shoot down drones – traditional response options for human-
inhabited aircraft – or they chose to employ tools of electronic warfare, such as jamming, or
exploited drones’ cyber vulnerabilities. Notably, the non-state actor team had the most limited
resources available to respond to or counter drone use and most often had to change their
behavior in order to avoid persistent surveillance or strikes from drones.
Tactics employed in response to the use of drones included:
State actors did not hesitate to shoot down and destroy their adversaries’ drones if they
were discovered within their territory or posed an obvious threat.
This action sent a clear message to adversaries using drones and risked little in the
way of backlash.
6/29/2016 Game of Drones - Proliferated Drones
http://drones.cnas.org/reports/game-of-drones/ 15/23
State actors also attempted to intercept and escort drones out of sovereign territory.
These efforts proved less successful due to uncertainty about how to communicate
with the operator of the drone.
To counter or prevent the use of drones within specific areas, state and non-state actors
often used jamming and other electronic warfare tactics.
Drones’ limitations. Where these archetypal use cases shed light on the overall utility of drones
and the operational concepts that best take advantage of the capabilities of uninhabited
aircraft, they also illuminated the limitations of drones. Although every team chose to employ
drones in each of the 12 scenarios, they did not necessarily function as the core asset or enabler,
nor were they used in every move within a scenario. In some cases, participants expressed that
their team’s use of drones made little to no difference to the final outcome of the scenario. For
example, one team noted their preferred asset was a human-inhabited long-range maritime
patrol aircraft because countering this aircraft more clearly identified their adversary as an
aggressor in a maritime dispute.
Reasons why actors chose either to not use drones or limit their operational role compared to
traditional military capabilities included the following:
Drone use signaled hesitancy or a lack of resolve. Although a team might have been able to
achieve their operational goal using drones, the implicit messaging associated with
uninhabited aircraft prevented them from achieving their political or strategic goal.
Drones were more vulnerable to countermeasures like jamming. This vulnerability made
drones a less reliable tool for essential operations.
Drone capabilities were insufficient to achieve the operational goal. Because the
technology of uninhabited aircraft is still relatively new, it did not match the capabilities
of traditional human-inhabited aircraft, particularly speed and maneuverability.
Overall, the scenarios in which drones played a secondary or limited role demanded more
decisive action, making the use of traditional military capabilities more appropriate.
Comparatively, the scenarios in which drones played a stronger role were the more ambiguous
conflicts that demanded flexible assets in terms of messaging and capabilities.
A central finding of the wargame is that despite drones’ relatively common capabilities, their
Analysis of Findings
6/29/2016 Game of Drones - Proliferated Drones
http://drones.cnas.org/reports/game-of-drones/ 16/23
expanded use will have significant political and strategic implications. The core difference
between drones and traditional aircraft may be a simple one – the absence of a human on board
– but it has a profound impact on the way actors choose to behave and interpret the actions of
others in crisis and conflict scenarios. Drones’ uninhabited nature provides a wider set of
options for military action to more actors across the spectrum of conflict.
Increased optionality grants states and non-state groups greater flexibility in terms of when and
how they choose to engage in conflict, particularly in those interactions that fall short of full-
scale war. The uses of drones observed during gameplay highlighted those capabilities unique to
uninhabited aircraft that influence operational concepts and reshape strategic decisionmaking
in conflict.
First, actors can use drones without risking the life of a pilot.
This opens up more potential uses for drones. Actors are
more likely to employ them in situations where they are at
greater risk of being shot down, which might include
situations where previously they would not have taken any
action. Actors might even try to provoke others to shoot
down their drones to paint their adversary as an aggressor.
Second, drones can replicate the capabilities of traditional, human-inhabited aircraft at a lower
cost. This lowers barriers to entry for actors that previously had limited access to airpower and
associated power projection and ISR capabilities. Additionally, drones provide states a cheaper,
or even expendable, alternative to traditional aircraft that can lower the cost of asserting
airpower and expand possible use cases.
Third, drone ownership and use can be deniable. Due to the widespread commercial availability
of drones, the use of a commercial off-the-shelf system could conceivably be from anyone,
The core difference between drones and traditional aircraft may be a
simple one – the absence of a human onboard – but it has a profound
impact on the way actors choose to behave and interpret the actions
of others in crisis and conflict scenarios.
6/29/2016 Game of Drones - Proliferated Drones
http://drones.cnas.org/reports/game-of-drones/ 17/23
complicating attribution. Furthermore, even if drone ownership is perfectly clear, the actions of
a drone can be disavowed. Because there is no pilot onboard, an actor can claim they lost
communication with the drone and had no control over the drone at the time of its actions.
Fourth, because drones are new, actors can define the message of drone use and respond to
others’ uses at their own discretion. This flexibility comes from the lack of any internationally
accepted normative framework for using or responding to the use of drones. There is no specific
intent associated with the use of uninhabited aircraft, nor is there necessarily strong political or
public pressure to respond to the shoot-down of a drone because no lives would be lost.
What do these options mean on the battlefield, and what
are the larger political and strategic consequences?
The proliferation of drones expands access to airpower, providing higher marginal benefits to
weaker actors. Wider access to drones expands the realm of the possible, particularly for weak
states or non-state groups. Compared to more established powers, weaker actors experience
higher marginal utility from access to drones. Because their military capabilities, specifically
airpower, tend to be limited, acquiring drones represents a more significant gain in military
capacity.
This gain empowers weaker actors to engage in a new domain, enhancing their abilities to
project power and improving their capacity to contest airspace, resulting in a shift in traditional
power dynamics. As drones proliferate, it is unlikely established powers will be able to count on
uncontested air dominance, especially in irregular warfare settings.
The use of drones complicates messaging and escalation dynamics. New options for
engagement in conflict afforded by drones can complicate the understanding of messaging and
traditional escalation dynamics in conflicts. This lack of clarity in action can be because drones
allow deniable action, put a new rung on the escalation ladder, or because actors have greater
flexibility in how to respond and interpret the use of drones.
Drones offer actors a more gradual escalatory action compared to the use of other military
assets; uninhabited aircraft do not demonstrate the same resolve that a fighter aircraft might.
Therefore, with drones, actors have the ability to take military action in contentious scenarios
with less risk of provoking a significant response. Yet, in expanding the space for action on the
spectrum of conflict below full-scale war, drones create increased opportunities for
misunderstanding and miscalculation and can even encourage riskier political or strategic
choices.
9
10
6/29/2016 Game of Drones - Proliferated Drones
http://drones.cnas.org/reports/game-of-drones/ 18/23
Widening access to drones creates more opportunities for the use of information and
misinformation. As access to drones expands, not only will more actors be able to build up their
airpower, but they will be able to implement more robust real-time ISR capabilities. Increased
ISR will heighten competition for information dominance within the battlespace and will create
more opportunities for the use of information and misinformation.
More actors will have the ability to release photographs or video footage gathered by drones to
shape the public narrative surrounding a conflict to their advantage. In conflicts where there
are competing interests, these increased information opportunities heighten the risk of
misinterpretation and miscalculation instead of improving transparency.
Generally speaking, drones’ optionality fundamentally augments the types of military
operations actors can choose to undertake in conflict settings. These new choices allow for
increased flexibility and room to engage adversaries, especially in uncertain environments. More
importantly, this resulting shift in strategic decisionmaking changes the political implications
of military force.
Increased ISR will heighten competition for information dominance
within the battlespace and will create more opportunities for the use
of information and misinformation.
Implications
6/29/2016 Game of Drones - Proliferated Drones
http://drones.cnas.org/reports/game-of-drones/ 19/23
As evidenced by the behaviors observed in the wargame, the proliferation of drones will
continue to influence and shape new behaviors and distribute power in ways that demand
greater attention. While U.S. drone use currently looms large as a precedent for how one major
power has used drones, it would be naïve to assume that all actors will emulate the way the
United States uses drones. The demands of different conflicts and crises will generate different,
perhaps unpredictable, uses of drones. The way in which actors use them – and respond to their
use – has several implications for future conflicts and crises.
Battlespace monitoring will rise. Policymakers need to consider the impact of the potential
constant, real-time exposure of the battlefield and explore the effects it will have on strategy
and the success of military operations. Nonstop drone surveillance could be a natural
escalation of the “CNN effect,” in which the 24-hour news cycle affects how states conduct
foreign policy. With a potentially overwhelming amount of information widely available as a
result of increased drone surveillance, there is increased potential for the spread of
misinformation, a lack of context surrounding actions, and political pressure for immediate
political or diplomatic responses.
In spite of the increased amount of information available to actors, ambiguity about the
meaning and intent behind actors’ actions will increase. As the global demand for drones rises,
commercial and state production and sales of a wider variety of drones will also increase. In a
short amount of time, it will become more difficult to identify the owner of a drone and
attribute responsibility for actions undertaken by drone operators. Expanding use of
uninhabited aircraft in an uncertain policy environment and increasingly complicated
attribution will only increase opportunities for misinterpretation and miscalculation of the
intent behind drone usage. With various actors crafting individualized strategies and policies for
using and responding to the challenges of proliferated drones, there is a heightened risk of
conflict escalation.
The maturing development of counter-drone capabilities will increase the stakes of drone
employment and the frequency of response. While counter-drone capabilities and strategies will
likely emulate those of traditional airpower, following constructs of airborne interception or
The demands of different conflicts and crises will generate different,
perhaps unpredictable, uses of drones.
11
6/29/2016 Game of Drones - Proliferated Drones
http://drones.cnas.org/reports/game-of-drones/ 20/23
targeted strike from surface assets, other capabilities will be developed, making drone
employment even more unpredictable. Over time, counter-drone options are likely to grow
further as drones proliferate and counter-drone technology advances. Nonlethal means of
disabling drones, counter-drone lasers, and cyber hijacking tactics are already being explored
and in some cases have been demonstrated. It is imperative that policymakers think through
these potential consequences while they are still in a theoretical stage in order to consider
appropriate responses before a crisis occurs.
Recommendations
When we look out at the horizon of a world of proliferated drones, it is necessary to consider the
steps the international community and the United States can take to adapt successfully.
Following are key considerations policymakers should weigh carefully.
12
UNITED STATES
Understand that the United States is unlikely to remain the dominant user
of drones and recognize the patterns of global proliferation.
Consider how U.S. operational concepts are setting a precedent for other
actors’ employment of drones.
Explain more clearly internationally how the United States employs drones
and U.S. expectations for appropriate drone use.
Consider targeted, conditional drone exports to key allies and partners to
improve their capabilities and help shape their norms and expectations for
drone use.
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
Anticipate the varied ways in which state and non-state actors will use and
respond to drones.
Consider how the escalation picture will develop in different crisis and
conflict situations.
Understand that norms surrounding drones will develop over time and act
accordingly, rather than attempting to create generic normative policy.
6/29/2016 Game of Drones - Proliferated Drones
http://drones.cnas.org/reports/game-of-drones/ 21/23
Understanding the implications of drone proliferation and analyzing both external and internal
attitudes toward drone usage will facilitate the development of strategy and policy that better
equips us to handle the contours of a drone-saturated world. Presently, drones are used entirely
based on the isolated judgments of expediency by each state or non-state operator. Precedents
are being set haphazardly through decisionmaking motivated by crises.
Furthermore, as advances in robotics and autonomy continue, uninhabited ground and
maritime systems will mature and are sure to mirror the proliferation of drones. Looking ahead,
their proliferation and use in land and sea domains is likely to have an impact at least as
significant as drones are having on traditional airpower. Identifying and setting effective
precedents to cope with the challenges of drone proliferation early on will help limit the
disruption further proliferation of uninhabited systems will have within other domains of
warfare.
Acting now grants the United States and its allies the greatest opportunity to shape policies and
emerging norms surrounding uninhabited systems to their advantage and adapt strategically to
a new landscape.
About the Author
Alexandra Sander is a research associate with the Center for a New American Security.
Endnotes
1. George Arnett, “The numbers behind the worldwide trade in drones,” The Guardian,
March 16, 2015, www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2015/mar/16/numbers-behind-
worldwide-trade-in-drones-uk-israel.
2. Within the context of Game of Drones and this wargame report, “drone” refers only
to an uninhabited aerial vehicle. The wargame excluded uninhabited ground and
maritime systems from gameplay.
3. Michael C. Horowitz and Matthew Fuhrmann, “Droning on: Explaining the
Proliferation of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles” (October 24, 2014),
6/29/2016 Game of Drones - Proliferated Drones
http://drones.cnas.org/reports/game-of-drones/ 22/23
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2514339.
4. Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Israeli-made kamikaze drone spotted in Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict,” The Washington Post, April 5, 2015,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/04/05/israeli-made-
kamikaze-drone-spotted-in-nagorno-karabakh-conflict/?
utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=New%20Campaign&utm_term=%2ASituation%20Report
Dan Gettinger, “An act of war: drones are testing China-Japan relations,” Center for
the Study of the Drone, November 8, 2013, http://dronecenter.bard.edu/act-war-
drones-testing-china-japan-relations; and “Hezbollah admits launching drone over
Israel,” BBC News, October 11, 2012, www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-19914441.
5. Clay Dillow, “All of these countries now have armed drones,” Fortune, February 12,
2016, http://fortune.com/2016/02/12/these-countries-have-armed-drones.
6. George Arnett, “The numbers behind the worldwide trade in drones,” World News:
Datablog on TheGuardian.com, March 16,
2015, www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2015/mar/16/numbers-behind-
worldwide-trade-in-drones-uk-israel.
7. Participants were not required to use drones if they did not see them as adding a
unique advantage.
8. It is important to note that CNAS’ wargame only included violent non-state actors
and thus did not explore possible humanitarian applications of drones by
nongovernmental organizations.
9. Greg Jaffe and Thomas Erdbrink, “Iran says it downed U.S. stealth drone; Pentagon
acknowledges aircraft downing,” The Washington Post, December 4, 2011,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/iran-says-it-downed-us-
stealth-drone-pentagon-acknowledges-aircraft-
downing/2011/12/04/gIQAyxa8TO_story.html.
10. Shawn Brimley, Ben FitzGerald, and Kelley Sayler, “Game Changers: Disruptive
Technology and Defense Strategy” (Center for a New American Security, September
2013).
11. Paul Scharre, “The Smartphone Wars are Coming,” The National Interest, November
29, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-smartphone-wars-are-coming-14463.
12. Jordan Golson, “Welcome to the world, drone-killing laser cannon,” Wired, August 27,
2015, www.wired.com/2015/08/welcome-world-drone-killing-laser-cannon; and James
Bach, “Airbus, CACI among companies unveiling counter-drone technologies in
growing market,” Washington Business Journal, January 13, 2016,
www.bizjournals.com/washington/blog/fedbiz_daily/2016/01/airbus-caci-among-
companies-unveiling-counter.html.
6/29/2016 Game of Drones - Proliferated Drones
http://drones.cnas.org/reports/game-of-drones/ 23/23
Bold. Innovative. Bipartisan.
Image Credits
Naval UAV Air Demo, 2005, pictured are (front to back, left to right) RQ-11A Raven,
Evolution, Dragon Eye, NASA FLIC, Arcturus T-15, Skylark, Tern, RQ-2B Pioneer and
Neptune: U.S. Navy photo by Photographer’s Mate 2nd Class Daniel J. McLain via
commons.wikimedia.org
An MQ-9 Reaper performs aerial maneuvers over Creech Air Force Base, 2015: U.S. Air Force
photo by Senior Airman Cory D. Payne via dvidshub.net
An AN/TWQ-1 Avenger with the 1st Batallion 204th Air Defense Artillery Regiment of the
Mississippi Army National Guard destroys a drone during a live fire exercise at Fort Bliss,
Texas, Oct. 7, 2015: Mississippi National Guard Photo by Staff Sgt. Scott Tynes, 102nd Public
Affairs Detachment via dvidshub.net
MQ-1 Predator controls, Capt. Richard Koll, left, and Airman 1st Class Mike Eulo perform
function checks after launching an MQ-1 Predator unmanned aerial vehicle August 7, 2007,
at Balad Air Base, Iraq: U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sergeant Steve Horton vis
dvidshub.net
The Pentagon, 2016: U.S. Army photo by Sgt. 1st Class Marisol Walker via dvidshub.net