promoting ethics in or and...promoting ethics in or, april 2003 - page 3 we may also attempt to...

Promoting Ethics in OR

INSEAD, Fontainebleau

April 25 & 26, 2003

An initiative of the EURO WORKING GROUP PROMETHEUS on Ethics in ORSponsored by INSEAD

Promoting Ethics in OR, April 2003 -

About us

The EURO WORKING GROUP PROMETHEUS on Ethics in OR gathers Europeanscholars in the field of Operational Research who are committed to inspire ORresearchers, teachers, students, consultants and decision makers to integrate ethicalaspects and considerations in their OR research, teaching, consultancy and decision-making.

Workshop Goals

This workshop aims at synthesizing the state-of-the-art of the relation betweenethical values and Operational Research at the theoretical, practical and institutionallevels. We will attempt to propose avenues of research as well as practical andinstitutional actions aimed at favoring the integration of ethical values withinOperational Research.

Relevance for Management Sciences

Although ethics is deemed to relate with the theoretical, practical and institutionaldimensions of management sciences, there remains ambiguity and skepticism as tothe form this relation might and should take. This results in a lack of representationof ethics within mainstream management sciences. A critical assessment ofOperational Research articulation with ethical values, as well as constructiveproposals for improvement, should contribute to the promotion of ethics withinmainstream management sciences.

Workshop Processes

The workshop shall confront scholars from Operational Research with experts inethical issues who are interested in helping ethics to move at the center ofmanagement sciences. Members of the PROMETHEUS WORKING GROUP willmoderate these encounters and synthesize them while pushing for constructiveproposals to promote ethics in OR.

Workshop Deliverables

We would like academic papers to synthesize the workgroups and the workshop ingeneral, featuring a critical synthesis of the state-of-the-art of the relation between theOR discipline and ethical values with proposals for action. The papers may beproposed for a special issue of an academic journal like OMEGA or the EuropeanJournal of Operational Research.


We may also attempt to present a proposal for funding of research under the sixthframework program of the European Communities, for instance in the area “Scienceand Society,” Sub-area “ethics.”

Participants

Jean-Pierre BransKim Cao vanMaria Eugénia CaptivoJoão ClímacoChristopher CowtonPhilippe DelquiéGiorgio GalloSaul I. GassIordanis KavathatzopoulosPierre KunshMarc Le MenestrelAlain LeplègeHeiner Müller-Merbach

Emmanuel PicavetErik PruytGraham RandFelix RauschmayerAndreas RobotisMaurice ShutlerIlker TopçuMichael TrickIbo van de PoelLuk Van WassenhoveWarren WalkerWilliam WallaceMarino Widmer

Structure and Time Schedule

The first day synthesizes the state-of-the-art of ethics in OR. The identification of mainweaknesses and strengths for combining ethics and OR should lead to discussions aboutfuture avenues for research and actions. The work is divided into three groups: theories,practices and institutions. After the introduction, the three groups work in parallel,followed by plenary synthesis and plenary discussions.The morning of the second day aims at synthesizing the proposals for actions within acoherent research program. The workgroups shall formulate explicit proposals that arethen presented and discussed in a plenary session.


FIRST DAY

Welcome and Registration in front of Amphi E (8.30-9.00)

Opening Session (9.00-10.00)

9.00-9.20 Welcome, introduction & organization (Luk Van Wassenhove)

9.20-9.40 Main issues of ethics in OR (William A. Wallace)

9.40-10.0 Opportunities and pitfalls of ethics in OR* (Emmanuel Picavet)

Break (10.00-10.15)

Ethics in OR today: Working Groups (10.15-12.30)

Workgroup 1: Ethics in OR theories today (Moderators: Giorgio Gallo & Erik Pruyt)

Workgroup 2: Ethics in OR practices today (Moderators: Iordanis Kavathatzopoulos & MarcLe Menestrel)

Workgroup 3: Ethics in OR institutions today (Moderators: Philippe Delquié & Luk Van

Wassenhove)

Lunch (12.30-14.00)

Ethics in OR today: Synthesis & Discussions (14.00-15.30)

Moderator: Michael Trick

14.00-14.30 State of the art of ethics in OR Theories (Workgroup 1 & Discussion)

14.30-15.00 State of the art of ethics in OR Practices (Workgroup 2 & Discussion)

15.00-15.30 State of the art of ethics in OR Institutions (Workgroup 3 & Discussion)

Break (15.30-16.00)

Where to go tomorrow? Brainstorming (16.00-17.00)

Moderator: Graham Rand

Avenues of research to make the scientific consideration of ethics in OR theories credibleand rigorous.

Methodologies, frameworks and tool-kits to make the consideration of ethics in ORpractice legitimate and effective.

Institutional measures to promote ethics in the profession.

Dinner at "La Table des Maréchaux", Hôtel Napoléon (19.00-22.00)

* Abstract provided page 15.


SECOND DAY

Ethics in OR tomorrow: Working Groups (9.00-10.30)

Workgroup 1: Ethics in OR theories tomorrow (Moderators: Giorgio Gallo & Erik Pruyt)

Workgroup 2: Ethics in OR practices tomorrow (Moderators: Felix Rauschmayer &

Marc Le Menestrel)

Workgroup 3: Ethics in OR institutions tomorrow (Moderator: Philippe Delquié & Luk Van

Wassenhove)

Break (10.30-11.00)

Ethics in OR tomorrow: Synthesis & Discussions (11.00-12.30)

Moderators: Erik Pruyt, Marc Le Menestrel & Luk Van Wassenhove

Proposals for actions (Workgroups and Discussions)

Closing Lunch at INSEAD (12.30-14.00)


Workgroup 1: Ethics in OR Theories today (10.15-12.30)

Objectives:Presenting the state-of-the-art of ethical OR theories;Clarifying the limits and trade-offs of ethical OR theories.

Questions for discussionWhat are the OR models that include an ethical dimension?When should OR models include an ethical dimension?What makes the combination of OR models and Ethics especiallyinteresting and/or problematic?Can we justify ethics within OR on scientific grounds?

Moderators: Giorgio Gallo & Erik Pruyt

Presentations:

1. Ten theses about ethics and OR; The contradiction of ethical training in math-oriented OR/MS education programmes(Heiner Müller-Merbach) See abstracts pages 15-16.

2. The scientific nature of OR and the role of normative and ethical judgements (Ibo van de Poel) See contribution pages 16-20.3. New paradigm in OR (Ilker Topçu) See contribution pages 20-27.4. Ethics in OR Theories and Models (Erik Pruyt) See contribution pages 27-31.

Other contributions:

Modeling the Social Dynamics of Individual Ethical Behavior: A Hybrid Multi-Agent Architecture (R. W. Robbinsand W. A. Wallace) See contribution pages 31-36.

Supporting the Ethical Problem Solving Process with Information Technology (R. W. Robbins, W. A. Wallace and B.Puka) ) See contribution pages 36-39.

Ethics outside, within or beyond OR models? (Marc Le Menestrel and Luk Van Wassenhove) See article in workshoppackage.


Workgroup 1: Participants

Kim Cao-van Kim Cao-van studied pure mathematics at Ghent University. And then shifted to more applied research. He iscurrently working on a Ph.D. (since October 1999) combining ideas from machine learning and Multi-CriteriaDecision Analysis, with the goal of applying his findings to problems related to sustainable development. Hisresearch has been focused on supervised learning of rankings (ordinal classification), with more specific (but notexclusive) attention towards the adaptation of classification trees. [email protected]

Giorgio Gallo Giorgio Gallo, professor of Operations Research at the University of Pisa since 1981, has been President of theItalian Operations Research Society from 1995 to 2001. His scientific work has been in the past mostly in the areaof Combinatorial and Network Optimization. At present his main interests are in the area of social responsibilityand ethical implications of Operations Research. He is currently the Director of the Programme in "Sciences forPeace" of the University of Pisa, a Programme oriented to International Cooperation, Mediation and ConflictResolution. [email protected]

Heiner Müller-Merbach

Heiner Muller-Merbach: chairs for OR/MS/BA/Leadership at U Kaiserslautern (since 1983), U Darmstadt(1972/83), and U Mainz (1967/72). President (1983/85) and Vice-President (1974/76) of International Federationof Operational Research Societies (IFORS). Promoter of change from Management SCIENCE to MANAGEMENTScience as well as from Operational RESEARCH to OPERATIONAL Research. Born in Hamburg in 1936 (=442)[email protected]

EmmanuelPicavet

Emmanuel Picavet has studied philosophy and economics and is now assistant professor at Paris 1 University inpolitical philosophy. His main research interests are in the field of collective norms and decisions, includingindividual rights and rationality criteria for decision-making. He has devoted a number of articles to the problemsof multilateral evaluation in a pluralistic ethical environment. He is also a researcher at the Institut d'Histoire etde Philosophie des Sciences et des Techniques (CNRS & Univ. Paris 1), working there on the cross-relationshipsbetween social science contributions and political theory, and on the methodology of social sciences (especiallyeconomics and political science). [email protected]


Workgroup 1: Participants (continued)Ibo vande Poel

Ibo van de Poel is assistant professor (UD) at the Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Technology, Policy andManagement, Delft University of Technology. He graduated in the Philosophy of Science, Technology and Society at theUniversity of Twente, where he also obtained his PhD in science and technology studies in 1998. Since 1996, he lectures atDelft on ethics and engineering. His research interests are in the philosophy and sociology of technical design and theethical and social aspects of technology and engineering. With respect to ethics in OR, he is especially interested inmultiple criteria analysis in engineering and the way engineers deal with conflicting moral values in engineering [email protected]

ErikPruyt

Erik Pruyt is researcher for the Flemish Fund for Scientific Research (FWO Vlaanderen) and is preparing a Ph.D. inCommercial Engineering at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel. His research topics include (1) The Adaptive ControlMethodology (combining SD and MCDA) (2) Applied multi-dimensional research on the electricity industry(liberalization, GHG emissions, etc.) and (3) Ethics in OR (more specifically the integration of ethics in OR theories andmethodologies). Currently, he is the Chairman of the EURO Working Group Prometheus on Ethics in [email protected]

IlkerTopçu

Ilker Topcu graduated from Istanbul Technical University, Management Faculty, Department of Industrial Engineering in1993). He received his M.Sc. degree at Istanbul Technical University, Institute of Science and Technology, EngineeringManagement Program in 1995. He accomplished his PhD studies at Leeds University Business School, Center of DecisionResearch and Istanbul Technical University, Management Faculty in 2000. His research areas are multiattribute decisionmaking, group decision making under multiple criteria, decision support systems, and ethics in OR and managementscience. [email protected]

MichaelTrick

Michael Trick is Professor of Operations Research and President, Carnegie Bosch Institute for Applied Studies inInternational Management in the Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Carnegie Mellon University. Hisresearch interests are in applied discrete optimization, with a specialization in scheduling and timetabling. He was theFounding Editor of INFORMS Online, and was President of INFORMS in 2002. [email protected]

WilliamWallace

Al Wallace holds his primary appointment at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute as professor of decision sciences andengineering systems, and joint appointments in cognitive sciences and civil and environmental engineering; and isresearch director of Rensselaer's Center for Infrastructure and Transportation Studies. U. S. NSF and U. S. Department ofTransportation are supporting his research on decision technologies for emergency response and incident management,including research on the vulnerability of critical infrastructure interdependencies with particular emphasis on the WorldTrade Center attack. [email protected]


Workgroup 2: Ethics in OR Practices today (10.15-12.30)

Objectives:Presenting the state-of-the-art of ethical practices of OR;Clarifying the limits and trade-offs of ethical practice in OR.

Questions for Discussion:What are the ethical dilemmas of OR practice? How to practice ORmore ethically?Which other practices can help OR practices to be more ethical?In OR practice, why are ethical concerns important for society, forbusiness and for individuals?

Moderators: Iordanis Kavathatzopoulos & Marc Le Menestrel

Presentations:

1. How to practice OR more ethically? (Warren Walker) See contribution pages 39-40.2. Combining MCDA and participatory approaches as OR ethical practice (Felix Rauschmayer) See contribution pages 41-43.3. Ethical competence in OR decision-making (Iordanis Kavathatzopoulos) See contribution pages 43-44.4. ‘Ethics and OR’ stands for ‘OR discovers ethics’ (Pierre Kunsh) See contribution pages 44-48.


Operations Research challenges in the age of the precaution principle (João Clímaco) See contribution pages 48-51.



Maria Eugénia Captivo M. Eugénia Captivo is an Associate Professor at the Faculty of Sciences, University of Lisbon, Portugal. Sheobtained her Ph.D (1988) in Operations Research from the University of Lisbon. Her current researchinterests are in locational analysis, combinatorial optimisation, network optimisation, production planning,cutting and packing. [email protected]

João Clímaco João Clímaco, Full Professor at the School of Economics of the University of Coimbra, Portugal andresearcher at the INESC-Coimbra, Portugal. M.Sc. (1978) in Control Systems from Imperial College, Londonand Ph.D (1982) in Electrical Engineering – Optimisation and Systems Theory from University of Coimbra.Current research interests in multiple criteria decision aiding, decision support systems, location analysis,telecommunications planning. [email protected]

IordanisKavathatzopoulos

Iordanis Kavathatzopoulos is Associate Professor of Psychology and Human-Computer Interaction at theDepartment of Information Technology, Uppsala University. His main research interests are in the areas ofBusiness Ethics, Political Ethics and Information Technology Ethics. He is studying the development ofethical competence in professional moral problem-solving and decision-making by the use of specialtraining programs as well as by the construction of ethical assessment scales. [email protected]

Pierre Kunsh P. Kunsch Born 1947 Belgian. Senior economist radioactive waste management agency in Brussels. Invitedprofessor Vrije Universiteit Brussels teaching system dynamics Lecturer in OR Université Libre deBruxelles. About 50 papers on MCDA, dynamics of systems in finance, energy management andenvironment. [email protected]

Marc Le Menestrel Marc Le Menestrel holds a Ph.D. in Decision Sciences from INSEAD and is Assistant Professor ofEconomics and Business at University Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona, Spain). His work in utility theory,scientific methodology and business ethics investigates the trade-off between the procedural andconsequential dimensions of choice and of rational behaviour. [email protected]


Workgroup 2: Participants (continued)

Alain Leplège After medical and philosophical studies, with a specialization in psychiatry, Alain Leplège has become aleading expert in the field of quality-of-life measurement. He has developed quantitative and qualitativemeasurement programs in various countries, and simultaneously, a philosophical investigation of the basicaspects of measurement, including translation and impartial-judgment problems, as well as ethicalproblems concerning the implementation of measure-based social mechanisms such as cost-efficiencydecision procedures. [email protected]

Graham Rand Graham Rand has been at Lancaster University for 30 years, after three years in the Operational ResearchDepartment of Cadbury-Schweppes. He is interested in supply chain management. He has edited journals,organized conferences, and been an IFORS VP. He is also a leader of an independent [email protected]

Felix Rauschmayer Dr. Felix Rauschmayer (research fellow at the UFZ Centre for Environmental Research Leipzig-Halle) hasbeen working for the last 10 years on multi-criteria decision aid as a tool that allows to integrate resultsfrom different disciplines without loosing a normative foundation. His research topics in philosophy are:rationality, incommensurability of criteria and incomparability of options. Fields of application are:sustainable development, environmental conflicts and nature conservation. [email protected]

Warren Walker Dr. Warren E. Walker is a Senior Policy Analyst at RAND Europe, a professor in the faculty of Technology,Policy and Management at the Delft University of Technology, and Research Director of the TU DelftAirport Development Center. He has a Ph.D. in Operations Research from Cornell University, and has over30 years of experience in public policy analysis. He is the recipient of the 1997 President’s Award from theInstitute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) for his "contributions to thewelfare of society through quantitative analysis of governmental policy problems." [email protected]

Marino Widmer Marino Widmer is professor at the University of Fribourg (Switzerland), where he teaches OperationsManagement. His research interests deal with production system design, planning, scheduling and logisticsproblems. He is often confronted with ethical problems through his industrial [email protected]


Workgroup 3: Ethics in OR Institutions today (10.15-12.30)

Objectives:Presenting the state-of-the-art of ethics in the profession;Identifying key drivers for the promotion of ethics in OR.

Questions for Discussion:What are the institutions that promote and/or impede ethics in the ORprofession?What is the relevance of professional codes of conduct in OR?What proactive actions would be efficient and credible to promoteethics in OR?

Moderators: Philippe Delquié & Luk Van Wassenhove

Presentations:

1. Professional Codes of Ethics: Why and What? Overview of past and current efforts in promoting ethics within professionalsocieties and related topics (Saul I. Gass) See abstract page 52.

2. Ethics in the profession of OR (Christopher Cowton) See contribution pages 52-55.3. The Prospective Code of Ethics of The UK OR Society (Maurice Shutler) See contribution pages 55-57.4. The Oath of Prometheus (Jean-Pierre Brans) See abstract page 58.


OR, Ethics and Decisions: The oath of Prometheus (Jean-Pierre Brans) See article in workshop package.



Jean-Pierre Brans Jean-Pierre Brans is Honorary Professor at the VUB/ULB in Brussels where he teaches statistical analysis,OR, Mathematical Programming and MCDA. He has been Vice-President of IFORS and President of EURO.He received the EURO Gold Medal in 1994 and has published numerous articles and one book. He is the"father" of the Promethee-Gaia methodology and of the Oath of Prometheus. [email protected]

Christopher Cowton Chris Cowton is Professor of Accounting at Huddersfield University Business School. He took up hiscurrent appointment in 1996 after ten years at the University of Oxford, where he was University Lecturerin Management Studies and a Fellow of Templeton College. His publications range from philosophy tooperations management, but a particular interest over the years has been ethical or socially responsibleinvestment, and much of his current writing is focused on business and financial [email protected]

Philippe Delquié Philippe Delquié, Associate Professor of Decision Sciences, INSEAD. Professor Delquié's research interestsare in the area of decision, risk, and multicriteria analysis. His work has focused on the interface ofbehavioral and normative aspects of Decision Analysis, particularly the issue of bias and error inmeasurement and representation of preferences and value trade-offs. Philippe Delquié holds PhD fromMIT, a Master of Science in Technology and Policy from MIT, and a Civil Engineering Diploma from EcoleNationale des Travaux Publics, Lyon, France. [email protected]

Saul I. Gass Saul I. Gass received his B. S. in Education and M. A. in Mathematics from Boston University, and his Ph. D.in Engineering Science/Operations Research from the University of California, Berkeley. He is currentlyProfessor Emeritus at the Robert H. Smith School of Business, University of Maryland, College [email protected]


Workgroup 3: Participants (continued)

Maurice Shutler Maurice F. Shutler, Visiting Professor of O.R. at the London School of Economics since 1982. Until 1996 alsoChief Industrial Adviser to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission U.K. Former President of EURO andTreasurer of the UK OR Society. [email protected];, [email protected]

Luk VanWassenhove

Luk N. Van Wassenhove, Professor of Operations Management, INSEAD. Dr. Van Wassenhove is currentlyprofessor of Operations and Supply Chain Management at the INSEAD Business School in Fontainebleau,France, where he holds the Henry Ford Chair in Manufacturing. He is the founding director of the ResearchCenter for Integrated Manufacturing and Service Operations and of the INSEAD Supply Chain Forum, anindustry-academic network. Dr. Van Wassenhove’s research and teaching are concerned with operationalexcellence, supply chain management, quality, continual improvement and learning. His recent researchfocus is on closed-loop supply chains (product take-back and end-of-life issues) and on disastermanagement (humanitarian logistics). He frequently publishes in academic as well as managerial journalsand works with leading companies to advance the implementation of relevant knowledge. [email protected]


Opportunities and pitfalls of ethics in OR

Emmanuel Picavet

Operations research is basically concerned with the relationship betweenscientific modelling and the application of models in social contexts and socialpractice. At the level of the relevance criteria for models, and also insofar as thespecification of goals belongs to OR research (which is at least partially thecase), it thus inherits some of the basic, enduring questions concerning art andscience, the nature of applied social science, and above all, the relationshipbetween social science (and the neighboring fields in applied mathematics) andsocial engineering or institutional design. It will be argued that efficiencyquestions are best understood against an ethical background.

Ten Theses About Ethics and OR

Prof. Dr. Heiner Müller-Merbach

Thesis 1: Ethical categories cannot adequately be represented by mathematicalmodels.Thesis 2: Ethics cannot be maximised or minimised.Thesis 3: Ethics require choice of values, and choice of stakeholders.Thesis 4: There do not exist absolute measures for good and evil.Thesis 5: There exist many dimensions of opposing ethical principles, such asdeontological vs. teleological ethics, formal ethics vs. ethics of subject-matter,descriptive vs. normative ethics.Thesis 6: It is useful to distinguish (with Kant, 1724-1804) between “technical”action (objects, skills, sciences), “pragmatic” action (human beings, prudence,practical philosophy), and “ethical” action (values, wisdom, practicalphilosophy).Thesis 7: Action in reality includes technical, pragmatic, and ethicalresponsibility at the same time.Thesis 8: The design of mathematical models (including optimization models)in the service of decision making requires the anticipation of technical,pragmatic, and ethical responsibility at the same time. The models are theresults of ethical reflection, but do not serve the purpose to maximise ethics.Thesis 9: The ORSA definition (1977) “Operations Research is concerned withscientifically deciding how to best design and operate man-machine systems,usually requiring the allocation of scarce resources” includes ethics at leastimplicitly.Thesis 10: Prometheus is a counter example of sensitive ethical standards.


The Contradiction of Ethical Training in Math-OrientedOR/MS Education Programmes

Prof. Dr. Heiner Müller-Merbach

Ethics in the theorem-and-proof culture: “What are you going to prove?” Ethics and the “Given the problem” attitude. The position of purely technical responsibility (instead of Kant’s [1724-

1804] comprehensive responsibility for technical, pragmatic, and ethicalaction).

Science (including OR/MS) vs. practical philosophy (ethics). Cold logic (including mathematics) vs. warm humanity. Positivism vs. reflection. Rationality vs. sensitivity. Intellectual brightness vs. responsive understanding. Value-free abstraction vs. value-loaden (normative) concern.

The scientific nature of OR and the role of normative andethical judgments

Ibo van de Poel

The International Federation of Operational Research Societies describesOperational Research as “a scientific approach to the solution of problems inthe management of complex systems.”1 As this description makes clear, ORportrays to be both scientific and to contribute to the solution of practicalproblems. In other words, OR is not only a theoretical endeavour but also apractical endeavour. In this respect, OR is more like engineering than likescience. Its aim is not only to understand the world as it is, but also to developguidelines about how to change it in order to achieve certain aims or to solvecertain problems.In terms of knowledge aimed at, this means that OR aims not only atdescriptive knowledge but also at prescriptive knowledge. Whereas descriptiveknowledge describes the world as it is, prescriptive knowledge describes whatto do to achieve a certain end. 2 The prescriptive knowledge in OR has, I think,the general form “If A is desirable, do B”, where A is a certain goal to beattained and B is some action or sequence of actions. Statements of the type “IfA is desirable, do B” are hypothetical imperatives. Such statements are

1 www.ifors.org2 Vincenti, W. G. (1990). What Engineers Know and How They Know it; Analytical Studies fromAeronautical History. Baltimore and London, The John Hopkins University Press, p. 197.


normative statements: their aim is not to describe the world as it is but toprescribe certain actions.3

The above seems to imply that normative considerations play an indispensablepart in OR, but what type of normative considerations and where and when dosuch normative considerations come into play in OR? In order to answer thisquestion, it is useful to look in more detail at how we could justify prescriptiveknowledge of the type “If A is desirable, do B”. At first sight, this may seemeasy: we could just refer – as a justification – to the descriptive knowledge thatif B is the case, A will be the case (B � A).4 If I want to go to Fontainebleau, Ihave to take the train because the train will get me to Fontainebleau.Unfortunately, things are not that easy. If I go walking eventually I will also getto Fontainebleau, but given the time I can and are willing to spend on the trip toFontainebleau and the availability of alternatives, it does not follow that “If Iwant to go to Fontainebleau, I have to walk”.The above does not mean that the descriptive knowledge “B� A” plays no roleat all in the justification of the prescriptive knowledge “If A is desirable, do B”,it only means that this descriptive knowledge is not enough as a justification.What else is needed? I think what is also needed is that certain norms ofpractical rationality and maybe also of morality are met. I can think of at leastthe following types of norms (the list is not meant as exhaustive):

1. Efficiency. What is important is not only whether a certain course ofaction B (effectively) leads to a certain end A, but also how efficiently isdoes so. In general we will, ceteris paribus, prefer a more efficientcourses of action to achieve a goal to less efficient ones.5

2. Proportionality of side effects and risks. Often an action B not onlyachieves A, but also has other effects, so-called side effects. These sideeffects may be desirable or undesirable and sometimes side effects occuronly with a certain probability, in which cases we usually speak of risks.Even if the plane would be a more efficient (in terms of travel time andcosts) efficient way to get to Fontainebleau than a train, I would preferthe train because it has fewer side effects with respect to environmentaldamage. Sometimes, side effects may make an action outrightundesirable even if it leads to the intended goal A. If I have a non-fataldisease that I want to be treated and the only treatment available willresult in a fatal disease within five years, it seems not desirable to havethis treatment even if it leads to the intended result that my currentdisease is cured. In this case the side effects (or risks) are notproportional to the goal I want to achieve: the cure is worse than thedisease. The question when certain means are proportional to the end

3 Even if this prescription is conditional: B is only prescribed if A is desirable.4 Please not that in order to justify “If A is desirable, do B”, we do not need to justify the goal A,but only that B would be a good way to achieve A.5 Efficiency is often measured in terms of money costs, but that is not necessarily so. If I want togo to Fontainebleau, I may also compare the efficiency of different means of transport in termsof travel time.


aimed at is – I think – very difficult to answer but I would suspect that toanswer it in many cases we need not only norms of practical rationallybut also moral norms.6

The above considerations have a number of implications. First, they make clearthat the situation we are usually confronted with is a situation in which wehave to choose between different options or courses of action to achieve acertain aim. In this situation we have to compare the different option and choosethe one with the highest relative worth. Second, we have to compare thedifferent options not only with respect to their effectiveness and efficiency, butalso with respect to their side effects and risks. In order, to do the latter we needto know not only the goal to be achieved and what are seen as costs inachieving the goal (which are needed to determine effectiveness and efficiency),but also what are considered desirable and what undesirable side effects.Usually we also need to know the relative desirability of different side effects,risks, goals and costs since often the different options available will implydifferent trade-offs between these side effects, risks, goals and costs. It is at thispoint, I think, that the most important normative and in fact also moralconsiderations are introduced in OR. In determining what are desirable andundesirable side effects (and risks), we will in many cases refer to ethicalconsiderations and values.Now someone might object to the picture sketched above by arguing that it isnot the role of the OR practitioner, let alone the OR theorist, to determine whatare to be seen as goals, costs and desirable and undesirable side-effects, or tojudge about the relative importance of these. It is the decision-maker not the ORpractitioner who is to choose these values. After all, it is the decision-makerwho has to make the decision; the OR practitioner’s task is to provide therelevant objective information and knowledge. On the basis of that information,the decision-maker can then decide what is best to do given his or herpreferences.I think that two replies are in place with respect to this objection. First, from anethical point of view it is questionable whether it is justified to take thedecision-maker’s preferences as normative point of departure. I will come tothis point shortly. Second, it is questionable whether a division of labourbetween decision-maker and OR practitioner in which the latter only provides“objective” factual knowledge is attainable in practice. Such a division wouldmean that, after all, OR does not strive for prescriptive knowledge but only fordescriptive knowledge. It is then up to the decision-maker to draw normative(prescriptive) conclusions on the basis of this descriptive knowledge and on thebasis of the decision-maker’s preferences. However, I think that most decision-makers expect something more from OR as a decision aiding science than justbeing a provider of descriptive knowledge. Maybe that something more is to

6 Some ethicists would argue that actions have to meet certain moral norms independent fromthe goals achieved with these actions (deontological ethics), while other would argue that themoral norms relate to when the goals attained and the positive side effects compensate thenegative side effects.


offer decision models that can combine – in a consistent way – certaindescriptive knowledge (provided by the OR practitioner or by other scientists)with certain preferences (of the decision maker). OR in fact offers such modelsand these models are important decision-aiding tools. However, I doubtwhether such models can be completely value-free. I think the arguments givenabove imply that such models at least presuppose some norms of practicalrationality and probably also of morality.Apart from the question whether such a division of labour between ORpractitioners and decision-makers is attainable, there is the question aboutwhether it is ethically allowable to take into account only the preferences of thedecision-maker. I think this is only ethically allowable if either the decision hasno consequences for others than the decision-maker or the people undergoingthe decision have sanctioned the decision-maker to decide on their behalf. Inmany actual situations, none of the two conditions are met. In such situations,the preferences of the decision-makers cannot be the final word on what a gooddesign is from a moral point of view.In principle there would be two ways to overcome this moral flaw. However,both bring their own problems:

1. One option is to start from the presupposition, dominant in rationalchoice theory and I think also in OR, that goals and values are subjective.In that case, one could try to construct a utility function or decisionprocedure that takes into account the (subjective) values or preferences ofall relevant actors. This line of thought, however, leads to Arrow'simpossibility theorem that shows that it is impossible to construct acollective decision procedure that meets a number of minimallyreasonable conditions.7

2. Another way would be to see the relevant goals and (moral) values notas subjective, but as objective or at least as inter-subjective. I think is aline of thought that would be followed by many ethicists, at least bymany contemporary meta-ethicists. This line of thought, however, seemsto run into problems of value plurality and value incommensurability:the idea that there are a variety of (moral) values that cannot beexpressed in a common term (unit). If value plurality andincommensurability were true, it would at least in some situations beimpossible to select an option that best meets the relevant (moral)values.8

7 Arrow, K. J. (1950). "A difficulty in the concept of social welfare." Journal of Political Economy58: 328-346. The requirements that are usually given are somewhat weaker than those originallyformulated by Arrow. They are: collective rationality (which means that the collectivepreference function must be complete and transitive), unrestricted domain, Pareto principle (ifeveryone prefers a over b, the collective preference ordering should prefer a over b);independence of irrelevant alternatives and absence of a dictator. See e.g. Sen, A. K. (1970).Collective Choice and Social Welfare. Edinburgh and London, Oliver & Boyd.

8 Chang, R. (1997). Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reasoning. Cambridge,Mass., Harvard University Press and Van de Poel, “Conflicting moral values in engineeringdesign”, Research Proposal, February 2002.


If I am right, integrating ethical values in OR leads to fundamental theoreticaldifficulties. The existence of such difficulties can, however, not be a reason toneglect ethical considerations in OR. Rather, it should be an incentive to take upthis challenge that is theoretically interesting in his own right.Conclusion and summary

OR aims at prescriptive knowledge. In order to justify such prescriptiveknowledge, we cannot only refer to descriptive knowledge. In addition we needreference to norms of practical rationality (and maybe also of morality). Thisincludes norms like efficiency and proportionality of side effects and risks. Inorder to judge the latter, we need not only information about goals to beattained but also about what side effects are considered desirable and whichones undesirable (and about their relative importance). One way to attain suchknowledge would be to ask the decision-maker. From a moral point of view,however, the preferences of the decision-maker cannot be the final word onwhat is ethically desirable, especially if decision affects others than the decision-maker, which is often the case. Overcoming this moral problem would requireconstructing a collective preference function or decision procedure, which runsinto fundamental difficulties according to Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem.Another way to deal with this problem is to consider judgements about thedesirability of goals and side effects as deriving from objective, or at leastintersubjective, moral values. This line of thought, however, seems to lead intoproblems of value plurality and incommensurability. So, while ethicalconsiderations seem indispensable in OR, it is not clear yet how they could beintegrated in theoretically acceptable ways.

New Paradigm in OR

Füsun Ülengin and Y. �lker Topcu

Abstract

The traditional approach to OR has been criticized severely since 1980s. Thebasic problems are concerned with the single objective, single decision makernature of the classical models where the decision maker is generally the boss ofa big corporation and the objective is either cost minimization or profitmaximization. The social, environmental aspects of the problem as well as therelated shareholders are generally accepted as nonexistent. This paper aims tohighlight the new paradigm in OR. A classification of the related toolsappropriate to analyze this new perspective will be given in detail.Introduction

In the early years of OR, all the preferences of the decision maker (DM) weresummarized into a single objective function. In such a case the notion of theoptimal solution makes sense and a certain rationality has resulted: theRationality of the Optimal Solution.


However, at least four classes of criteria are regularly considered as governingHuman systems: economical, technical, social and ecological. Additionally, inthe coming years, mankind will have to face plenty of serious major problems,such as: The renewal of raw material, the control of the temperature of theatmosphere, the control of the emissions, the production of energy, thepollution, and the social equilibrium (Brans, 2002a; 2002b). This necessitates amulti-attribute evaluation of the real life problems and thus underline theimportance of a new paradigm in OR.The characteristics of the traditional paradigm in OR will be explained in thesecond section of the paper. The third section will cover the necessity for a newparadigm in OR. The proposed approach for this new paradigm will be given inthe following section accompanied by proposals for the stages of decisionmaking process. Conclusions and further suggestions conclude the paper.Traditional Paradigm in OR

In the heydays of OR that took place in 1960s and early 1970s, the characteristicsof the dominant paradigm were as follows (Rosenhead, 1989):1. Problem is well defined and the problem formulation is realized in terms of

a single objective and optimization. Multiple objectives, if recognized, aresubjected to trade-off on to a common scale.In fact, as is also stated by Brans (2002a, 2002b) during this period, generallythe models were single criterion models, such as Linear and Non-LinearProgramming, Dynamic Programming, Queuing Theory, InventoryProblems, Network Analysis, etc.: (Rationality of the Optimal Solution)

2. Overwhelming data demands, with consequent problems of distortion, dataavailability, and data credibility.

3. Scientization and politicization, assumed consensus.4. People are treated as passive objects5. It is assumed that there exists a single DM with abstract objectives from

which concrete actions can be deduced for implementation through ahierarchical chain of command

6. Attempts to abolish future uncertainty, and pre-take future decisionsNeed for a New Paradigm in OR

From the 1970s, however, it appeared clearly that, in many cases, the basic ORmodels did not properly accord with the preferences of DMs. Therefore,nowadays a new paradigm is especially found to be indispensable for thefuture success of OR.The characteristics of the new paradigm is as follows:1. It is necessary to accept that problem is ill-defined and find an efficient way

of structuring it. It is also necessary to use non-optimizing models that seekalternative solutions which are acceptable on separate dimensions, withouttrade-offsIn order to improve the efficiency of the models, the DMs themselvesrequested that their freedom should be taken into account and that the


models should include their subjectivity, their emotionality, their real-lifeexperience, and their mind.Additionally, it is also understood that the evolution of mankind demandsmore and more Ethics.At least three Ethical components should be considered (Brans, 2002a; Brans,2002b):• Respect for the social environment• Respect for the ecological environment• Respect for the next generationsTherefore, all decisions should be well balanced among Rationality,Subjectivity, and Ethics and also all the related attributes should be revealedduring the decision process. However, this is not an easy task; HumanNature is so rich that several points of view had to be taken into accountsimultaneously.

2. Reduced data demands, achieved by greater integration of soft- and hard-data with social judgments

3. Simplicity and transparency aimed at clarifying the terms of conflict4. Conceptualized people as active subjects5. Facilitates planning from the bottom-up6. Accepts uncertainty, and aims to keep options open for later resolution.Proposed Approach for the New Paradigm

Problem StructuringThe first stage of the proposed approach will be the problem structuring.During this stage, all the shareholders related to the problem should bespecified. Then, their knowledge, opinion, and expertise should be revealedthrough a Delphi type group decision-making procedure. This step focuses onvalues and necessitates constraint-free thinking on the part of the shareholders(Keeney, 1992).The appropriate problem formulation should be the result of participatorydecision making taking into account the different perspectives from differentshareholders and should be a mirror of responsible management, leading to fairand prudent results (Berube & Villeneuve, 2002).As part of the process of critical reflection on issues of ethics, it is useful to useelements from specific OR / systems methodologies, in some instances as aprivate activity, in others with some of the other actors involved. These havebeen particularly useful in identifying conflicts of interest involved andwhether these are reconcilable or not. These have included in particular, the useof: cognitive mapping, aspects of soft systems methodology, and stakeholderanalysis (Taket,1994).For this purpose, a questionnaire should be given to a representative sample ofthe shareholders in order to determine all the factors that might be relevant toproblem on hand. In other words, the shareholders will be first asked topinpoint all the values that they believe to be an indispensable guide for


problem, to better alternatives than those already identified, and to a carefulevaluation of the alternatives.After identifying potentially relevant variables of the subject, the shareholdersshould be asked to indicate the relationship between variables. Synthesizing therelationship assignments between variables with respect to each executive, anaggregated cognitive map which represents an image of cognitive processesand which is an attempt to utilize the opinion and cognition of the shareholdersabout ill-structured social relationships can be constructed and drawn.An aggregated cognitive map, which represents the opinion of the experts, isdrawn using Decision Explorer software package (Banxia Software, 1996).Cognitive mapping has proved to be an excellent starting point in cases wherethe problem relates to a situation described predominantly by qualitativenotions (Eden, 1988). Additionally, when there are a number of perspectives ona problem, mapping is a good way of drawing them together and of negotiatinga new vision, which will enable all interested parties to work as a group.As a result of this survey, all the important variables relevant for the problemwill be revealed.Data Reduction and Simplification through Data MiningIn order to simplify the model, initially data mining techniques should be used.For example, the number of attributes can be reduced by factor analysis and,thus, specifying the independent attributes having the highest factor loading.Similarly, cluster analysis should be conducted in order to group theshareholders according to the similarities in terms of attributes that they believeto be important for the problem on hand (Hair, 1995).Constructing the Hierarchical ModelOnce the cognitive map is drawn the loop analysis is conducted to detect theloops of the map. If no loop is revealed by the analysis, the problem will befound suitable to a hierarchical representation with the fundamental objectivesat the top. Otherwise, a stabilization process proposed by Wang (1996) shouldbe conducted before constructing the hierarchy or Analytic Network Processproposed by Saaty (1996) can be utilized.To our knowledge, there is no computer-based system to support this activitywhich is generally accepted to be an "art" left to the facilitator (Ackerman andBelton, 1994; Bana E Costa et al., 1999).This paper proposes the iterative application of the "head" analysis for thepreliminary specification of the fundamental objectives. As is well known, a"head" in a cognitive map is a node having no out-going arrow. A map withrelatively large number of "head" indicates multiple and possibly conflictingobjectives (Eden et al., 1992). All the heads of the map will be listed usingDecision Explorer in order to specify the nodes at the top of the hierarchy.Those nodes will provide a preliminary list of fundamental objectives. Then, inorder to specify the nodes at the second level of the hierarchy these nodes areerased from the map and a second "head" analysis is conducted. This processgoes on until the whole map is represented hierarchically. This approach aimsto build a value tree based on top-down (value-focused) thinking (Keeney,


1992) based on which, the alternatives will also be revealed at the lowest part ofthe hierarchy.Assessing the Weight of the Attributes

Using the reduced number of mutually preferentially independent attributesobtained from the data mining stage the relative weight of these attributes willbe assessedThe assessment of relative weights of attributes can be done in two ways: usingdefault (pre-defined) priorities or asking to the shareholdersThe weights derived from the cognitive map necessitate the assessment of"domain" analysis in order to calculate the total number of in-arrows and out-arrows of each node. The results of domain analysis, when normalized, can beused as the weights of the attributes (Ulengin & Topcu, 1997; Ulengin et al.,2001).If the shareholders prefers to use their own judgment for weight determination,a pairwise comparison matrix will be filled by asking them importance of theattributes two by two on a special scale (proposed by Saaty (1989) for AnalyticHierarchy Process). An aggregated pairwise comparison matrix will becomputed and eigenvector of this matrix will be used as the relative weights(importance) of the attributes.Evaluation PhaseIn the evaluation phase, based on the attributes acquired from the structuringstage, performance values determined at the modeling, and the relative weightof these attributes, either assessed from the DMs or determined from thecognitive map constructed at the structuring first stage, the most appropriatedecision will be recommended to the DMs.The evaluation of such a complex problem from different perspectives is ratherdifficult. Initially, several optimization criteria were considered at the sametime which leads to the failure of the Rationality of the Optimal Solution. .The literature also shows the use of Goal Programming (Pruyt, 2001). Here theDM should express a target or goal for each attributes and the aim is tominimize the distance of the value of the attributes to the goals. However, theproblem with this approach is that the results are highly dependent on thedistance measure used. Therefore we should clearly explain why we use onedistance or another. These and other important problems like the fact thatdistances imply at least interval scales and are therefore not suited forqualitative data sets, or the interaction of weights and scales, force us toconclude that the goal programming framework is not very interesting for thenew paradigm in ORTherefore MADM or MCDA solution methods can be utilized for evaluation ofthe real life decision problems. There are lots of different solution methodsgenerated for this purpose. In fact, the choice of the most appropriate solutionmethod for the problem on hand is itself a complex process that maynecessitates multi-attribute decision aid.


An Integrated Decision Aid Model

An integrated decision aid model (IDEA), proposed by Topcu (1999), supportsDM in solving multi attribute choice, ranking, or classification problems. Thissupport is in structuring the problem, constructing the decision model, andanalyzing the problem; or briefly at each phase of the decision making processexplained above.IDEA defines the decision making situation concerning the problem in sixdimensions: DM's assessment of preferences on alternatives with respect toattributes (direct rating, trade-off, pairwise comparison), DM's preferencestructure (complete vs. partial order; usage of preference and indifferencethresholds), relative importance of attributes (ignoring weights and assumingthem as equal vs. giving importance to them), the type of the problem (α, β, γ),the size of the problem (number of attributes and the number of alternatives),and the type of the performance values (quantitative vs. qualitative).By matching the characteristics of these dimensions with the characteristics ofthe multi-attribute problem solving methods, IDEA proposes the mostappropriate solving method for any decision making situation. For thispurpose, a sequence of rules concerning the matching operation, whichincludes possible appropriate method transformations and neighborhoodtransformations supplying neighbor relations among decision-makingsituations, is formulated. Neighbor relations cause directly matched methods tobe proposed to new empty situations. IDEA also allows any change at thedimensions or dimension characteristics and new solving methods can beincluded to the model.As a result, it can be stated that IDEA can be used to choose the mostappropriate solution method for the problem on hand.Conclusion and Further Suggestion

The new paradigm of OR which propose a well-balanced and participatoryapproach to real world problems is not an easy task. First of all, it necessitates adetailed problem structuring and data mining phase that are usually neglectedin the traditional approach. Then a hierarchy should be modeled. Finally amulti attribute problem solution method should be selected in order to solvethe problem.This paper proposes a new framework necessary to apply the new paradigm ofOR and thus aims to contribute to the success of OR in the new millenniumwhere not only profit maximization or cost minimization but also ethicalconsideration are of major importance.Additionally, not all methods are will suited for the inclusion of differentdimensions. Therefore, the selection of the most appropriate methodnecessitates itself a decision support system based on multi-attributeevaluation.In fact, this proposed framework will be more effective and less timeconsuming, if the shareholders are invited to a workshop where SODA(Strategic Options Development and Analysis) can be conducted (Eden, 1988).


SODA would allow the group members to refine the objectives and alternativesto be used during the evaluation.As another further suggestion, the neural network approach can be used inorder to specify the relative weights of the attributes. Especially, whenever it isnecessary to study with nonlinear data; ANN gives better results than thetraditional methods. In fact, one of the primary applications of ANN is theunderstanding of complex nonlinear mapping (Hruschka, 1993).Additionally, it is possible to convert the cognitive map directly to a BayesianNetwork (Nadkarni and Shenoy, 2001). In this way the variables identified canbe expressed as discrete or continuous variables and the set of possible valuescan be specified so that the statistical relationships between variables can becaptured probabilistically. This will allow the specification of joint probabilitydistribution of several variables in terms of conditional distributions for eachvariable. Since the conditional probabilities will be obtained it will also bepossible to obtain directly the transition between scenarios.A final practical problem with this new paradigm is to specify “Who pays thebill?” (Kleijnen, 2001). In fact, when more than a single party benefits, theapplication of game theory can be suggested to obtain an equitable answerReferences

Ackermann, F. and Belton, V. 1994. Managing corporate knowledge experienceswith SODA and VISA, British Journal of Management 5: 163-176.

Bana E Costa, C.A., Ensslin, L., Correa, E.C., and Vansnick, J-C. 1999. DSSs inaction: Integrated application in a MC decision aid process, Eur. J. Oper. Res.113: 315-335.

Banxia Software 1996. Decision Explorer, Version 3.0.4 Analyst User Guide,Univ. of Strachlyde, Glasgow

Berube G.G. and Villeneuve F. 2002 Ethical Dilemmas and the Decision MakingProcess: Is a Consensus Realistic? Energy Policy 30, 1285-1290.

Brans J. P. 2002a. Ethics and Decisions. Eur. J. Oper. Res . 136, 340-352.Brans J. P. 2002b. OR, Ethics and Decisions: The Oath of PROMETHEUS. Eur. J.

Oper. Res. 140, 191-196.Eden, C, Ackermann, F., Cropper, S., 1992. The Analysis of Cause Maps. Journal

of Management Studies, 29/3, 309-323.Eden, C. 1988. Cognitive Mapping: A Review, Eur. J. Oper. Res. 36: 1-13.Hair, J., R., R.L. Anderson and W.B.Tatam:1995, Multivariate Data Analysis

with Readings, Prentice Hall, London.Hruschka, H., 1993. Determining Market Response Functions by Neural

Network Modeling: A Comparison to Econometric Techniques, Eur. J. Oper.Res, 66, 27-35.

Keeney, R.L., 1992. Value Focused Thinking: A Path to Creative DecisionMaking. Harvard University Press, London

Kleijnen J.P.C. 2001. Ethical Issues in Modeling: Some Reflections. Eur. J. Oper.Res, 30, 223-230.


Nadkarni, S. and Shenoy, P., 2001. A Bayesian Network Approach to MakingInferences in Causal Maps”, Eur. J. Oper. Res, 128, 479-498.

Pruyt E. 2001. Ethics in Operational Research. Working Paper.Rabins M.J. and Harris Jr. C.E. The Ethics of Modeling. Control Eng. Practice 5(4),

519-526.Rosenhead 1989. (ed) Rational Analysis for a problematic world, John Wiley

and Sons, ChichesterSaaty T.L. 1990. Multicriteria Decision Making: The Analytic Hierarchy Process,

RWS Publications, Pittsburgh.Saaty T.L. 1996. Decision Making with Dependence and Feedback: The Analytic

Network Process, RWS Publications, Pittsburgh.Taket A. 1994. Undercover Agency? – Ethics, Responsibility, and the Practice of

OR. J. Oper. Res Soc, 45(2), 123-132.Topcu Y.I. 1999. An Integrated Decision Aid Model For Multiattribute Decision

Making. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Istanbul Technical University, Instituteof Science and Technology, Istanbul.

Ulengin F. and Topcu Y.I. 1997. Cognitive Map-Knowledge Based DSSintegration in transportation planning. J. Oper. Res Soc, 48/11, 1065-1075

Ulengin F., Topcu Y.I., and Sahin S.O. 2001. An Integrated Decision Aid SystemFor Bosphorus Water Crossing Problem. Eur. J. Oper. Res, 134, 179-192

Wang, S., 1996. A Dynamic Perspective of Differences between Cognitive Maps.J. Oper. Res Soc, 47, 538-549.

Ethics in OR Theories and Models

Erik Pruyt

Introduction: 'Ethics in OR'

Most OR1 theories and models contain implicit or hidden ethical2 aspects.Examples are root metaphors [3], hidden assumptions and value-choices, butalso more technical choices like the distance to use3.One step further than accepting the existence of and revealing the implicitethics in theories and models is the explicit blending of ethics or ethicalframeworks and some4 OR theories or models.

1 In this text, OR denotes Operational Research as well as all quantitative and qualitativemethods, modelling, problem structuring, simulation and other analytical techniques to supportdecision making.

2 'what is right and what is wrong'3 Mostly the Manhattan distance L1, or the Euclid distance L2 are chosen for their convenienceand not for their ethical qualities in contrast to e.g. the Rawlsian distance LK.

4 Of course not all OR theories and models should contain ethics explicitly. But when dealingwith for example complex multi-dimensional human problems, there seems no way to leave


In this short paper, the explicit consideration of 'ethics in OR'[5] theories andmodels will be discussed. In order to show a way to blend ethics and ORtheories and models explicitly, a possible ethical framework will now beintroduced. This framework will be briefly blended with a MCDA model.Finally some potential gains, problems and limits of 'ethics in OR' will belooked at.Blending a possible 'ethical framework' and MCDA

The ethical framework proposed here is based on the respect for [2] and theresponsibility towards5 the other (humankind, nature and culture) in thepresent as well as in the (far) future. Making people fully responsible for theiractions in a deontological6 and a consequentialistic7 ethical sense, forces them totake into account the effects on all potentially impacted dimensions (people andnature and culture). This renders any complex decision context at leastmultidimensional and multiple-person. Therefore MCDA seems to be theevident OR tool to integrate this ethical framework in.Indeed, this ethical framework can be blended successfully with MCDAmethods like (among others) Single and Multi Objective Optimisation Methods(adding ethical restrictions and ethical objective functions), with Multi-Attribute Utility Functions, with the PROMETHEE I and II methods and withMCDA 'elimination methods'8. Depending on the (existing) MCDA methods itis integrated in, different extra steps have to be taken in the theories, methodsand the OR processes, like adding 'ethical' objective functions, extra 'ethical'restrictions or minimal 'ethical' weights9.To keep this paper short and non-technical we will now have a look at the basicand general steps to integrate such a framework with a MCDA eliminationmethod:

1. Make sure all relevant dimensions for the decision maker(s) andall potentially impacted are represented by (potentially) importantcriteria.

2. Develop creative strategies.3. Remove all deontologically unethical strategies (e.g. strategies

involving killing).4. Determine the minimal ethical acceptable consequence for each

criterion or for combinations of criteria.

ethics aside, since theories and models should be compatible with the problem and its context,and with the worldviews of the people concerned.5 It is based on the Full Responsibility Principle and the Full Rationality Principle as

explained in [7]. It is similar to Gallo's Responsibility Principle [4].6 the act itself7 the consequences of the act8 For a working out of this ethical framework in all these MCDA methods see [8]9 To avoid the elimination of important criteria by forbidding weights equal to zero. Here theweights should not be proposed by an ethical committee as in [1] and criticised by [5]


5. Analyse, develop or simulate the strategies to obtain theconsequences of the strategies in the short and very long term onthe different criteria.

6. If the consequence of a strategy is worse than the minimal ethicalacceptable consequence on the criterion, then remove thisstrategy, so that all actions that are not ethical in aconsequentialistic sense will be removed.

7. Now that all consequentialistically and deontologically unethicalstrategies are removed from the set of possible strategies, manypossible ways and MCDA methods remain to determine the mostappropriate strategy. A possible elimination method could nowremove from this set of ethical strategies all strategies that are notefficient or Pareto optimal and that are not robust and not exible.The most appropriate strategy is then the strategy that first attainsthe goals (most important to the decision-maker).

Some benefits from 'Ethics in OR'

There seem to be many benefits from explicitly integrating ethics and revealingimplicit ethics in OR theories and models. First of all it could be argued thatbetter decisions could be reached because:

more or better information is available. we come closer to a reality10 with the integration of subjective and ethical

constructs. So-called 'objective' OR theories or models dealing with'subjective' human, multidimensional and complex real-world problemswhich always contain ethical dimensions, are per definition omitting animportant part of reality, which could be added through ethics.

normal set of efficient solutions could be further reduced by integratingethics

more insight in a problem could be gained by simulating the same modelbut with different 'ethics'. This way, the uncertainties and risks due todifferent ethical perspectives could be analysed [9].

less compensations will have to be paid by the decision-makers.Second, it could be argued that the quality of the OR process could benefit fromor be guaranteed by:

making sure through the theory or models that the steps a good ethicalanalyst would certainly take in the OR process are not overlooked,ignored or neglected by inexperienced analysts11

10 'There is a fundamental methodological inability of objective OR models tointegrate these specific concerns.'[5, p4]11 More and more non-experts use OR tools without the guidance of anexperienced OR expert (see e.g. [6, p183]).


clearly explaining the theory and the ethical framework separately sothat the decision maker and stakeholders understand better whathappens, and find the OR tools less black-box-like and more human.

Third, existing theories, methods and models can be improved, or better newones can be created. Two examples from the MCDA field show this:

MCDA methods require additional information to choose between theefficient solutions. While nowadays this additional information often istechnical and difficult to understand by decision-makers, ethics couldprovide this additional information.

Ethics could also (partially) solve some problems in existing MCDAmethods. An example is the problem of rank reversal of thePROMETHEE methods. This could be solved partially by reducing theinitial set of strategies to an ethical set.

Finally, revealing the (implicit and explicit) ethics might show that the ethics ofthe theory or model is consistent with or conflicts with the worldview or ethicsof the decision maker or analyst, or with the ethics of other theories or models itis combined with, or with the problem at hand, etcetera. This might reduce themeta-decision problem [3, p40].Problems and limits of 'ethics in OR'

A clear limit is posed by the possible incompatibility of several types of ethics.By accepting that theories and models possess an ethics of their own (implicitlyor explicitly), it becomes clear that not all theories and methods can be used forany problem, any context and any group of decision makers. A potentialproblem is that the perception of manipulation and subjectivity mightundermine the 'objective image' of OR. Another problem is that the acceptance,integration or consideration of ethics in theories and models renders the job ofthe analyst and the OR process more difficult by requiring more elaborateexplanations and attention.Conclusions

The OR process and practice should always be as ethical as possible. As part ofthat ethical practice, the implicit or hidden ethics in theories and models shouldalways be revealed. Apart from that, ethical frameworks could also be explicitlyintegrated in some OR theories and models. The degree of ethics in the theoriesand models will necessarily vary according to the problem, the theories andtechniques behind it, the philosophical and ethical worldviews of the peopleconcerned and the OR process. Ethics in OR could offer interesting advantages,but there are also some problems and limits. By treating them as explicitly andclearly as possible, these problems might however be overcome.References

[1] Brans, J.P., 2002. Ethics and Decision. EJOR 136 (2002) 340-352[2] Brans, J.P., year. The management of the future. Ethics in OperationalResearch. Respect, Multicriteria Management, Happiness. EJOR?


[3] Carrier, H.D., and Wallace, W.A., 1994. An Epistemological View of DecisionAid Technology with Emphasis on Expert Systems. In: Wallace, W.A. (ed), 1994.Ethics in Modeling. Oxford: Pergamon. P37-57[4] Gallo, G., year. Operations Research and Ethics: Responsibility, Sharing andCooperation. EJOR, accepted for publication.[5] Le Menestrel, M., and Van Wassenhove L.N., year. Ethics outside, within orbeyond OR models? EJOR, accepted for publication.[6] Mason, O., 1994. Morality and Models. In: Wallace, W.A. (ed), 1994. Ethics inModeling. Oxford: Pergamon. P183-194[7] Pruyt, E., 2002. Ethics in Operational Research. Working Paper. CSOO, VrijeUniversiteit Brussel.[8] Pruyt, E., 2003. Ethics and MCDA. Working Paper presented at the 2nd

doctoral conference in Decision Aid, Han-sur-Lesse[9] van Asselt, M.B.A., 2000. Perspectives on Uncertainty and Risk. The PRIMAApproach to Decision Support. Kluwer Academic Publishers: Dordrecht.

Modeling the Social Dynamics ofIndividual Ethical Behavior: A Hybrid Multi-Agent

Architecture

R. W. Robbins and W. A. Wallace

Introduction

Simulation is a particular type of modeling. Building a simulation is a wellrecognized way of understanding the world.1 A model is a simplified version –smaller, less detailed, less complex, or all of these together, of a system.Simulations have inputs entered by the researcher and outputs that result from“running” the simulation.2

Computational modeling of social systems, a form of simulation, helps gaininsight into organizations3. Organizations can be groups, teams, societies,corporations, industries and governments.To date, there has been no attempt to employ simulation to represent howpeople interact with other people in terms of each person’s understanding ofwhat is right and wrong, good or bad, virtuous or not, or how a personperceives the purposes of their interactions with other people.We postulate that the work 1 Powell, Stephen G. 1995. The Teachers’ Forum: Teaching the Art of Modeling to MBA Students.Interfaces, 25:3, pp. 88-94.2 Gilbert, Nigel and Klaus G. Troitzsch. Simulation for the Social Scientist. 1999. OpenUniversity Press. Buckingham, UK.3 Carley, K.M. & Wallace, W. A. ‘Computational Organizational Theory’. 2000. In Encyclopediaof Operations Research and Management Science. Gass, S.I. & Harris, C.M. (Ed.) Kluwer.


1. -of Piaget, Kolberg, Rest, et al (Moral Development)2. –of Forsyth, Pope, Nye, et al (Ethical Ideology)3. -of Aristotle, Kant, Bentham, Stuart Mill, Nietsche, et al, (Ethical Analysis)are complementary. We propose that the computational modeling technologiesavailable, such as RePast4, can support and create a better understanding ofhow the ethical behaviors of individuals interact with each other and affectgroups. We further propose that a hybrid (Belief-Desire-Intention and Layered)multi-agent architecture called Moral and Ethical Agents (MEA) can mimicethical problem solving and display the corresponding social dynamics ofindividual ethical decisions. The MEA architecture can be used to show theconsequences to a social system, e.g. a business, when individual agents havediffering desires, orientations towards morality, and ways to analyze ethicalproblems. These same individual agents may have varying degrees of idealismand each agent’s willingness to accept universal rules can differ. The MEAarchitecture captures these characteristics as well.Moral and Ethical Architecture Objects

The agents (Figure 1) within the MEA architecture are software modules thatcontain information about 1) characteristics of particular agents [AmoralDesires] and 2) methods [Actions] that can be performed by a particularindividual agent within the MEA environment. Each agent is unique. Eachagent is meant to replicate the moral concerns, ethical analysis techniques,desires and abilities of people within social systems. Actions are those thingsthe agent is capable of doing within the MEA environment. Actions are drivenby Amoral Desires (Figure 2). Simple actions like walking, talking, buying,selling, teaching, learning, giving and receiving, will be implemented in the firstversion. Walking and talking are basic abilities that emulate the physical world.In our simple first world, an agent cannot perform other basic agent-to-agentinteractions without being near another agent and subsequentlycommunicating with that agent.Buying, selling, teaching, learning, giving andreceiving are those agent-to-agent actions that bring about ethical problems orhelp agents provide solutions to ethical problems.The packets (Figure 1) within the MEA architecture are software modules thatcontain information that is passed between agents within the environment.Packets are Problem|Solution pairs. A packet may have 1) a problem or 2) boththe problem and solution encoded within it.A problem (Figure 1) is one object within a packet. An object is a unit of codethat contains self-descriptive information, potential actions the object canperform, and events the object can react to. A problem is an attempt by anagent to become more complete by attempting to obtain units of property,knowledge, or create an affinity link between itself and another agent.A solution (Figure 1) is another object within a packet. A solution is a responsefrom second agent to a problem request from a first agent. Solutions are either

4 University of Chicago – Social Science Research Computing. 2003.<http://repast.sourceforge.net>.


provided or not provided to problem requests. In the future, negotiationprotocols 5,6,7, based on fulfilling Amoral Desires, could be implemented tomore fully simulate agent-to-agent interactions in social systemsMoral and Ethical Architecture Layers

At the highest layer (Amoral Analysis and Interface Layer) in the MEAarchitecture, the agent knows what it has and what it wants, and knows whatother agents want (Figure 3). It understands these desires in terms of property,knowledge, and affinity with other agents. It can rank its desired sequentialinteractions with other agents based on its amoral desires. This is also the layerthat performs actions that affect the agent’s environment.All agents have a moral orientation (Moral Orientation Layer) (Figure 3).Kohlberg formalized this orientation with his Moral Development theory8.Each orientation is based on beliefs the agent has about itself and itscommunity. Agents at one extreme of moral orientation perform very littleethical problem solving. Agents at the other extreme of moral orientation basetheir decision about whether an interaction is right or wrong (or good or bad orvirtuous or vicious, or some combination) by self-chosen, comprehensive,rational, and universally applicable principles.Agents that have more complex moral orientations also subscribe to ethicalideologies (Ethical Ideology Layer) (Figure 3). These ideologies9 can bedescribed using a 2x2 matrix with “willingness to accept and apply universalmoral rules” on one axis and “level of idealism” on another axis.Depending upon which quadrant describes the agent, the agent uses certainethical analysis techniques at the lowest layer (the Ethical Analysis Layer)(Figure 3, Figure 4) in the MEA Architecture, that is, if the agent has acquiredthose techniques by learning, that is, obtaining knowledge, from another agent.Bodies of knowledge exist regarding how to analyze an ethical dilemma (Figure4) Three main perspectives have been taken. Do that which has “good”results.10 Do that which is “right”.11 Do that which makes you a “moreexcellent” person. (Definitions of “good”, “right”, and “more excellent” ofcourse vary, but are contained within a limited set.

5 Conry, S., Meyer, R.A. and Lesser, V. 1988. ‘Multistage Negotiation in Distributed ArtificialIntelligence’. Readings in Distributed Artificial Intelligence, A. Bond and L. Gasser (Ed.),Morgan Kaufman.6 Durfee, E.H., Lesser, V.R., and Corkill, D.D. 1989. ‘Cooperative Distributed Problem Solving’.In Handbook of Artificial Intelligence. Vol. IV. A. Barr, P.R. Cohen, and E.A. Feigenbaum (Ed.),p. 83-148, Addison-Wesley.7 Sycara, K. 1989. ‘Multiagent Compromise via Negotiation’. In Distributed ArtificialIntelligence. L. Gasser and M. Huhns (Ed.), Pitman.8 Kohlberg L 1981. The Philosophy of Moral Development. Harper and Row. USA.9 Forsyth, D. R. (1980). A taxonomy of ethical ideologies. Journal of Personality and SocialPsychology, 39, 175-184.10 Bentham, Jeremy. 1823. Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation.11 Kant, Immanuel. 1785. Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals.


Agents exist and interact concurrently in several different networks. This isanalogous to the fact that people work in one social network, play in anothersocial network, and learn in another social network. Interactions and transfersbetween agents in one network can affect other networks via changed desires,viewpoints, and abilities in the agent that is within more than one network.Grounding the Model

For these models to be tested in a simulated environment, they need to becodified. We are using RePast 2.0.1 (http://repast.sourceforge.net) supportedin the Java 1.4 environment.We will obtain descriptive information from human subjects and complete thelayers of individual agents. We plan to use the Defined Issues Test12 or aderivative to understand our human subjects’ moral orientations; the EthicalPosition Questionnaire13 or a derivative to understand our human subjects’ethical ideologies; the Ethical Judgment Scale14 or a derivative to understandout human subjects’ beliefs and knowledge about ethical analysis techniques.In addition to capturing this descriptive information, we will ask the subjects tosolve an ethical problem and then capture their solution.The data from each subject will be used to create an agent with the same moralorientation, ethical ideology, and ethical analysis abilities as a particular subject.Each agent will then be given and asked to solve the same problem as thatgiven to the corresponding subject. We will capture the solution developed bythe agent (meant to replicate the moral and ethical concerns of the subject), andcalibrate as necessary. These agents will then be used to study the socialdynamics of individual ethical behavior.

12 Rest, J.R. (1979). Development in Judging Moral Issues. Minneapolis: University of MinnesotaPress.13 Forsyth, D. R.14 Van Hoose, W. H., & Paradise, L. V. (1979). The Ethical Judgment Scale. The Carroll Press.


PACKET

Figure 1: Problems (inside ofpackets) are requests thatderive from Amoral Desiresvia Actions (inside agents).

Figure 2: People DESIREthree types of things(Property, i.e. P), (Knowledge,i.e. K), and (Affinity, i.e. A).People seek to increase levelsof P, K, and A

AMORALDESIRES ACTIONS PROBLEM SOLUTION

PROPERTY

I have XI need Y

I would like Z

KNOWLEDGE

I have XI need Y

I would like Z

AFFINITY

I have XI need Y

I would like Z

AMORAL DESIRES

AGENT PACKET

Solutions (inside of packets)are responses to requests thatderive from Amoral Desiresvia Actions (from anotheragent in the social system).

Figure 3: Agents makedecisions about theirinteractions with other agentsin order to increase Property,Knowledge, and Affinity, butdo so with a certain moralorientation towards their socialsystem.

Agents have beliefs about how“relative” a problem or solutionis as well and Agents havevarying degrees of Idealism. Ifan agent’s orientationrequests a deeper ethicalanalysis, the analysis optionschosen, are affected by theagents’s ideology.

DECISION REGARDINGINTERACTING WITH ANOTHER

AGENT

AMORAL VALUES: PROPERTY,KNOWLEDGE, AFFINITY

MORAL ORIENTATION

ETHICAL IDEOLOGY

ETHICAL ANALYSIS


Figure 4: Choices fromEthical Analysis includethinking about Good/BadResults, Right/Wrong Actions,and Self-Actualization andoccur within procedural logicin the ETHICAL ANALYSISLAYER. Note: The agentneeds to KNOW the EthicalAnalysis Technique in order touse it.

DECISION REGARDINGINTERACTING WITH ANOTHER

AGENT

AMORAL VALUES: PROPERTY,KNOWLEDGE, AFFINITY

MORAL ORIENTATION

ETHICAL IDEOLOGY

PROBLEM OR SOLUTIONTO BE SENT TO

ANOTHER AGENT

ETHICAL ANALYSIS BASEDON POTENTIAL GOOD BAD

RESULTS

ETHICAL ANALYSIS BASEDON SEEKING A BALANCED

SELF ACTUALIZATION

ETHICAL ANALYSIS BASEDON RIGHT / WRONG ACTIONS

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ETHICAL ANALYSIS LAYER

Supporting the Ethical Problem Solving Process withInformation Technology

R. W. Robbins, W. A. Wallace and B. Puka

Introduction

As part of our research into how information technology can support ethicalproblem solving, we have developed an interactive web site to help users createsolutions to ethical dilemmas. Here we describe this system and preliminaryresults of our experiment to assess its value as a decision aid.Decision Support

Ethical dilemmas are often complex. Complex problems are seldomcompletely understood. Also, most ethical theories are not expressed in, orhave not been converted to calculi.Therefore we are focusing our efforts on


creating a decision aid (the Ethical Assistant) that helps the user, as opposed toproviding a solution. An ideal decision aid for supporting ethical problem solving should have thefollowing characteristics:

an informative, interactive user interface; support for using multiple ethical theories, that is, techniques to solve

ethical problems; provides access to summary as well as detailed information on the

theories; allows the user to create multiple paths to solution depending upon his

or her values; an area of the system where the user can continuously revise their

developing answer; “ticklers” within the system to remind users of ethical theories not yet

considered. Our Ethical Assistant (Plate 1) has these characteristics.

Plate 1

The Ethical Assistant tries to make the user cognizant of these approaches toanalyzing an ethical dilemma:

respect for equal individual rights; welfare and harm possible for those involved; reciprocal/mutual fairness and just desert; expression of virtuous traits and character.


Correspondingly, we included the following theories: Deontology1,Utilitarianism2, Egoism3, and Virtue Theory4. To the original form, we alsoadded a caring perspective, one recently presented by Gilligan, in her study ofmoral development and its relationship to women.5 We made these practicalusing action-oriented verb phrases directed at the user as follows: Be Caring,Respect Yourself, Be Fair, Respect Others, Consider Benefit and Harm, andThink Carefully. By using these terms we simplified the basic tenets of eachethical theory. Each action-oriented verb phrase links to more informationabout the theory. The Ethical Assistant provides “coaching” by placing questions directlyrelevant to the case on the page where the issue was prominent or where theapplication of an ethical principle would be clear to a moral philosopher. Sincethe system has all pages available from any page, the user can move to thesolution screen and address the “coaching” question in their solution, if desired.We ask each user via a web page to attest to the following statements. The useris free to answer the statements with a “True”, “False” or “Not sure”.Each user of the system is asked to record a potential solution to the dilemma.This solution can be entered and revised as long as the user is logged into thesystem.Experiment

The case we chose to use for our experiment was BRITISH COLUMBIA'SPHARMANET PROJECT6. This case has depth in that it has many stakeholderswith many competing interests. The case is set in a real place, and the dilemmapresented can be perceived as factual by the reader. The scenario of the case isset up carefully so that the problem solver has information similar to what theywould have in a real dilemma. During the Fall 2002 semester, 84 students (8 Computer Information Systemsstudents, 30 Information Systems students, 31 Anarchism students, and 15Microcomputing and Information Systems students) were asked to use theEthical Assistant in order to solve the Pharmanet Case. Each student took theDefined Issues Test7 pre- and post- and entered a textual solution to the case.The Defined Issues Test is a psychological instrument meant to activate moralschemas within subjects (to the extent that a person has developed them) and to

1 Kant, Immanuel. 1785. Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals.2 Bentham, Jeremy. 1823. Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation.3 Hobbes, Thomas. 1651. Leviathan.4 Aristotle. 350 B.C.E. Nichomachean Ethics.5 Gilligan, C. 1982. In a different voice: Psychological theory and women's development.Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press6 Chee, Emily, and Scott Schneberger. 1998. British Columbia’s PHARMANET Project.University of Western Ontario - Richard Ivey School of Business.7 Rest, J.R. (1979). Development in Judging Moral Issues. Minneapolis: University of MinnesotaPress.


assess these schemas.8 The paths and timing, that is, process tracing, of eachsubject’s movement through the Ethical Assistant were captured as well. Weare currently analyzing the Defined Issues Test and the process tracing data andthese results will be available for presentation at the conference.Concluding Remarks

It is our goal to show that information technology can support ethical problemsolving by helping its users consider and use ethical perspectives, developed bymoral philosophers, and that in this process, users would become more awareof potential ethical problem solving strategies they could use in the future. Wedeveloped a decision aid, assessed it in an experiment, and are currentlyanalyzing the results to see if we have accomplished this goal.

8 University of Minnesota – Center for the Study of Ethical Development. 1999.http://education.umn.edu/csed/default.html.

Responsible Policy Analysis

Warren E. Walker “For the analyst to be credible,

moral claims to truth telling must be made,for without these,

why should anyone ever believewhat a planner or policy analyst says?.”

-- John Forester [1983, p. 55]

The word ‘ethics’ is based on a Greek concept of ‘trying to do good’. Unethicalbehavior means consciously doing something you know (or society says)should not be done. These ‘things’ include deception, bias, lying, falsification,distortion, and withholding information. I maintain that the issues that policyanalysts confront in their course of work are normally not ethical questions, butare questions of good practice. The problems they face can generally beresolved by following tenets of good professional practice. Those tenets canand should be laid down in a ‘code of good practice’; they can and should betaught to analysts-to-be in courses (and to existing analysts in professionaljournals). In sum, the question of ethics in policy analysis (or operationsresearch) is really a question of quality control.Although by its very nature our profession has been unable to define ‘goodwork’ (policy analysis and operations research are crafts, not sciences), we usethe scientific method in performing our work. This means that there are clearprinciples of good practice that should be followed and clear yardsticks ofquality to judge analytic success. Among the most important of these are:


The work is open and explicit, and its results are verifiable, reproducible, andfalsifiable. Our data, calculations, assumptions, and judgments should all bedocumented so that they can be subjected to checking, testing, criticism, debate,discussion, and possible refutation.The work is objective. Unlike many other professions, the credibility andvalidity of our work is not based on the renown of the analyst or his status inthe profession. Its credibility is established by logical and empirical methods;its hypotheses are tested and verified. It strives to avoid the analyst’s bias.Quantitative aspects of the work are treated quantitatively. Subjectivejudgments are used as little as possible; when used, they should be notedexplicitly.The above statements are based on the assumptions that the policy analyst isserving as a decision aider to one or more decisionmakers and otherstakeholders, that there is an issue of corporate or public policy being discussedon which the analyst has been asked to shed light, and that the role of theanalyst is to provide these decisionmakers/stakeholders with the mostaccurate, complete, and unbiased information possible about the issue. Thisrole requires analysis, not advocacy. It requires clarity, not distortion. Itrequires a continual search for truth, not participation in partisan politicaldebates.There are many possible roles that a skilled operations researcher may play inthis world. Each role requires different types of behavior on his/her part. Forexample, the operations researcher as policy advocate will have a point of viewon an issue, and will use his/her expertise to support that position (much as alawyer does to support a client). However, when playing the role of policyanalyst, the operations researcher has a responsibility to provide unbiasedinformation to all sides involved in an issue, regardless of who wins and wholoses. When playing this role, the analyst must make sure that the analysis is asobjective, neutral, and value free as possible. Interpretation of the results shouldbe left to others who are playing different roles. Thus, as Mood [1983, pp. 286-287] concludes, “the analyst is in the happy ethical position of being able toserve his sponsor best by adhering as rigorously as possible to the standard ofcomplete objectivity and realism in assessing the effects of alternatives anddesigning an effective compromise.”Both of the above roles are legitimate ones for an operations researcher. Theethical issue involves making it clear which of these roles he/she is playing atany given time, and playing the chosen role responsibly. As Warwick andPettigrew [1983, p. 356] put it: “Policy researchers, like other citizens, haveevery right to express their policy opinions forcefully. But, on the other hand,these views need to be sharply separated from their research findings and theirrole as ‘experts and social scientists’. That is, the modeler may switch roles, butmust maintain clarity about which role is being played whenever he/she‘performs.’


Combining Multicriteria decision aid and participatoryapproaches as OR ethical practice

Felix Rauschmayer

Is there an ethical foundation of OR procedures? How can the procedure andhow can the results of the procedures be justified? These are the key questionsof my contribution focussing on OR aid to public decision making. I will arguethat the use of participatory approaches combined with structuringmulticriteria tools will generally have good chances to be justified. In thispaper, justification will be analysed only with respect to the question ofnormative justness, questions of truth and sincerity will not be treated (cf.Genard & Pirlot 2002).OR models want to contribute to decision making, they want to help thedecision maker to reach better or even optimal solutions.1. The models arebased on assumptions concerning the rationality of the decision maker and onassumptions concerning the identification of the goodness of a solution.Focussing on public decisions highlights the ethical challenges of OR practice:public decisions as decisions concerning other beings than just the decisionmaker demand for justification of decisions, and, therefore, of modelscontributing to this decision. As in public cases, decisions and models used cannot be justified personally to all beings concerned, justification has to be doneaccording to an accepted set of moral principles. In a pluralistic world, such aset has as a minimal requirement the openness to all kinds of values thatconcerned persons have.Different such sets are proposed; I will treat more specifically pre-modernbehaviour-oriented ethics, utilitarianism, discourse ethics, and pragmatism.2Behaviour-oriented ethics, like the approach put forward by Brans (2002, 2003),justify procedures essentially by the goodness of the behaviour of theparticipating actors. This is somehow an Aristotelian approach: actions aregood if they are taken by a good person. But it does only take into account thebehaviour of the participants during the process. Furthermore, this approachaccepts one-dimensional interests: "Each community has its own objectives, itsown optimisation criteria. The Industry has technological ones, the Economy

1 Kleijnen (2001: 226) claims that some OR methods do not aim at optimisation, whereas LeMenestrel & Van Wassenhove assert that "(t)raditionally, models used in Operational Researchhave aimed at identifying an optimal solution ..." (2003: 2). Here, I will only analyse modelsused for the (help towards) finding of optimal solutions (prescriptive interactions, as Bell et al.(1988) call it).2 A similar classification could be made according to the rationality model of the decisionmaker: whether decisions are guided / should be guided by calculatory rationality only(utilitarianism), or whether this should be complemented by communicative rationality(discourse ethics and pragmatism) (Cf. O'Neill 2001: 488, FN 11).


financial ones, the Governments social ones and People environmental ones."(Brans 2003). This is far from an Aristotelian ethics demanding an overallvirtuous life.Utilitarian ethics justify procedures by the goodness of the results, i.e. by thechoice of the result with the highest utility for the concerned beings. Thisapproach is close to natural science methodology: the original aim ofutilitarianism was to identify the (Newtonian) physics of happiness. Subjectiveutilities are treated as objective data with interpersonal and intrapersonalcommensurability. The assumptions needed for a sensible application ofutilitarianism are very strong. Both approaches correspond to the model whichLe Menestrel and van Wassenhove (2003) call "Ethics outside OR models".Discourse ethics focus on the procedure: if the discourse about the best solutionis close to an ideal, fair discourse including all concerned persons, then theconsensual result is justified. Such an ideal and fair discourse is not attainable,but it is possible to approximate it in order to have better decisions.Pragmatism, finally, focuses mainly on the procedure as well: an ideal discourseis a necessary prerequisite for a good solution, but the aim of pragmatism in notto define the goodness of an decision with a consensus. Here, the truth andgoodness of the result of the procedure is contingent on the changingperspectives of the participants. In cases of great uncertainty (Hansson 1996),decisions have more the character of a concept than that of a rationalcalculation. It is an important aim of such processes that participants changetheir values and ways of behaviour in order to adapt to the new circumstances.It is this last set of principles which is the most open of the considered ethics,and therefore appropriate as a general framework of justification of ORpractices without any constraint. It also comes closest to the ideas ofmulticriteria decision aid (Roy 1990).It will be argued that in a profoundly pluralistic world with non-commensurable values (Rauschmayer 2001), only the last two sets of moralprinciples can be candidates for an ethical foundation of OR practice. A set ofkey issues can be deduced from this ethical foundation in order to evaluatedifferent decision aid methods. These several key issues can be classified in thefields of information management, procedural and value compatibility, andsocial dynamics (cf. Wittmer et al. 2003). It will be shown that the use ofparticipatory approaches combined with structuring multicriteria tools willgenerally have good chances to be evaluated highly according to these issues,and therefore, to be justified in the face of the public.ReferencesBrans, J.P., 2002. Ethics and Decision. European Journal of Operations Research,

136: 340-352.Brans, J.P., 2003. The Management of the Future. Ethics in OR: Respect,

Multicriteria Management, Happiness. European Journal of OperationsResearch, forthcoming.

Genard, J.L. and Pirlot, M., 2002. Multi-Criteria Decision-Aid in a PhilosophicalPerspective. In: D. Bouyssou, E. Jacquet-Lagrèze, P. Perny, R. Slowinski, D.


Vanderpooten, and P. Vincke (Editors), Aiding decisions with multiplecriteria. Essays in honour of Bernard Roy. Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp. 89-117.

Hansson, S.O., 1996. Decision Making Under Great Uncertainty. Philosophy ofthe Social Sciences, 26: 369-386.

Kleijnen, J.P.C., 2001. Ethical issues in modeling. European Journal ofOperational Research, 130: 223-230.

Le Menestrel, M. and Van Wassenhove, L.N., 2003. Ethics outside, within, orbeyond OR models? European Journal of Operational Research,forthcoming.

O'Neill, J., 2001. Representing people, representing nature, representing theworld. Environment and Planning C-Government and Policy, 19: 483-500.

Rauschmayer, F., 2001. Philosophical Aspects of Incommensurability andIncomparability. Informatica, 12: 119-132.

Roy, B., 1990. Decision-Aid and Decision-Making. pp. 17-35.Wittmer,H., Klauer,B., and Rauschmayer,F., 2003. How to Select Instruments for

the Resolution of Environmental Conflicts? Land Use Policy, , submitted.

Ethical competence in OR decision-making

Iordanis Kavathatzopoulos

My contribution will concentrate on the conditions for ethical decision-makingin OR. It is broadly accepted that ethical decision-making cannot be basedsolely on optimal solutions. It has to take into account a difficult-to-identifynumber of external factors as well as subjective feelings and values, and this isnot possible to do in a mathematically rational way.A lot of psychological research has shown repeatedly the inadequacy of rationalmodels in human decision-making, and it has described the dominant use ofheuristic models. Furthermore, in ethical problem-solving and decision-making,psychological research has shown that people tend to be heteronomous.Heteronomy implies thinking that is locked and constrained on one or a fewgeneral moral principles, while overlooking other significant ones.Heteronomous persons make uncontrolled decisions and react automatically toa moral problem. Heteronomy is also characterized by responsibility avoidance.Responsibility is placed on a counterpart, on general conditions, on tradition,on authorities, etc. Decision-makers locked in heteronomous thinking are notsupposed to be able to analyze critically the moral problem situation, since theyfix their thinking on the directives of a moral authority, or simply attempt toignore the problem and avoid responsibility. On the other hand, autonomouspersons have already taken the first step in the critical analysis process byhighlighting the core of the moral problem; they have a clear perception of theconflict; free from heteronomous constraints, they can consider and confrontsystematically all possible actions for every value and interest involved in theproblem.


Nevertheless, decision-making procedures in OR need to accommodate ethicalcriteria as well as their weights before they can provide the necessary supportfor a complete decision-making process, i.e. a process that takes into account allrelevant ethical aspects. This presupposes the ability of decision-makers to addthese ethical aspects in the model. But from psychological research we knowthat ethical autonomy is difficult to use. It is not easy for decision-makers toidentify all relevant values and interests as well as all possible alternative waysof action in a moral problem situation. They have also great difficulty insystematically describing what impact every alternative action may have oneach and every value and interest related to the problem.It seems, therefore, that proper education for ethical competence need to be anintegrated part of decision-making in OR, since it can open up for the inclusionof ethical aspects in the decision-making process. Indeed, psychologicalresearch in professional moral problem-solving and decision-making hasshown that education promotes autonomy, and thus ethical competence. Inthose training programs decision-makers learned autonomy by applying it ontheir own real moral problems. These results are positive regarding theacquisition and use of ethical autonomy, both longitudinally and in real life.Thus, it leaves for us to find how to develop and apply educational programsfor ethical competence in OR.

‘ETHICS AND OR’ STANDS FOR‘OR DISCOVERS ETHICS’

M. Theys and P.L. Kunsch

The population problem has no technical solution; it requires a fundamental extensionin morality

Garrett Hardin (1968)What is ethics ?

‘Morale’ (Latin origin) and ‘Ethics’ (Greek origin) are in fact synonymouswords (A. Schweitzer 19961). They refer to what is complying with establishedcustoms. In the usual use of these words morale includes the set of rulesrequired for a ‘moral’ behaviour, while ‘ethics’ refers to the science of morale,the search of ‘good’ and ‘fair’ attitudes in human conducts. These adjectiveshave different meanings in space and time, as we discuss later. When talkingover ‘Ethics and OR’, it is usually assumed that a well-defined ethicalframework is available. Then comes a discussion over deontological aspects, orover the prescriptive role of OR within this established framework. In thispaper we follow a different path. In our opinion, because ethics cannot bedefined in a universal way, it has first to be ‘discovered’. We think that the

1 A. Schweizer (1996) Kultur und Ethik reprint of an original work published in 1923, VerlagC.H. Beck, 1996.


quantitative OR techniques can provide an eminent support in this discovery,and for the elaboration of ethical values.Mimesis and the role of ethics

In one of his seminal books 'La violence et le sacré' (Grasset 1972; Violence andthe Sacred, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), René Girard has developedthe impressive sociological theory of ‘mimesis’. ‘Mimesis’, i.e. desire imitation,plays a considerable role in the human development. The ‘desire’ appears fromthe very beginning of any human life. A small child will be rewarded (pat oncheeks, tenderness, good school results, etc.) for first imitating his parents, andlater his teachers and masters, indicating to him the very objects he shall desire.In this way synaptic links in the brain get created and reinforced through(positive) feedback loops. Later on, the pupil becomes autonomous and thepossession of the desired object creates its own satisfaction. At maturity themaster model is no longer needed, and the former pupil becomes himself amodel for others to imitate. The human desire is only weakly inspired by theanimal instincts, because it is mainly cultural. Therefore, although it is notsingular, i.e., attached to a specific individual, human desire is not universaleither. It will be strongly attached to a specific culture in a given geographicalspace, which might become more and more global in modern society, and at agiven moment in history. Given this cultural process of mimesis, two evolutionsare possible in human associations:The ‘co-operative mimesis’ or ‘good reciprocity’ explains why humanassociations are rewarding in the first place, and create welfare surplus. This isbecause the objects of desire are common goods of symbolic nature, which areshared, and further developed by co-operation: knowledge, art, crafts, technicaland agricultural progress, dance, fiestas, etc. The good reciprocity is associatedto a ‘virtuous’ growth loop (positive) and explains the creation of civilisationsand cultures. This type of mimesis induces a founding and growing progress of‘All for One & One for All’.The ‘appropriation mimesis’ or ‘bad reciprocity’ happens in a second stage afterthe human association has started to thrive, thanks to the co-operative mimesis.This is because there are goods, which are only available in limited supply: non-renewable resources, food, sex, but also search for power, prestige, etc. Thismimesis leads to the violence of ‘All for One & None for All’, with other word toegoism and exclusion of rivals. This is the very mechanism which explains themuch celebrated ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ introduced in the economic theoryby Garret Hardin2. It will appear every time scarce resources limit thesatisfaction of individual desires. It rests on the existence of ‘vicious’ loops(positive), which can lead to outburst of mimetic violence and competition. Itcan end up with the collapse of the concerned human association. It is also one

2 Hardin, G. (1968) The tragedy of the commons, Science, 16, 1243- 1248.


of the archetypes of the Fifth Discipline3, setting a brake on the co-operativegrowth induced by the good reciprocity.Ancient societies have soon recognised that the social cohesion of the group(‘Gemeinschaft’) must be enhanced in order to promote the co-operativemimesis, and to keep in bounds the appropriation mimesis. According toGirard it is why they invented religions, from very simple ones (animism) to thetoday existing much more sophisticated ‘world religions’. Basically religions arenot attempting to forbid desires. But they operate a transfer operation, forexample for earthen desires to later happiness in heaven. They are also usingthe myth of the scapegoat to discharge the collective aggressiveness to acommon enemy, who at the same time has to take on him all ‘sins’ of the world,and becomes at the same time a ‘salver’. By setting rules for regulating mimeticviolence religions created ethical codes. According to this anthropologicalmodel ethics is, at least at the origins, a manifestation of religion.The modern needs for ethics

In modern times however new forms of appropriation mimesis, and theassociated violence, are arising. In our opinion they are no longer adequatelyaddressed by existing religions alone. This is because religions are – admittedlyat various degrees – quite rigid, with some tendencies to return to thefundamental tradition, attached to a given geographical area and history, inwhich they were born. Moreover they tend to be mainly repressive with respectto ‘desires’ (at least in the present time because of their approach based ontransfer). Not all desires are bad, however: the sharable goods being the objectsof co-operative mimesis are necessary for the growth of cultures andcivilisations (‘Gesellschaften’).New ethical forms have to develop, outside the sphere of the sacred tradition.The purpose is to regulate the mimetic violence of modern societies. At leasttwo worrying manifestations of this violence are today visible and caught in adiverging spiral, i.e., in a positive feedback loop:

1. The rapid decay of the environment due to the immoderate desire forconsumption of rare material goods and resources, mainly in developedcountries;

2. The unregulated globalisation of markets with all negative consequencesresulting from the immoderate desire for immediate profits.

New ‘ethics’ have been born in the late 20th century to counteract these newforms of emerging mimetic violence:

Sustainable development has been proposed to solve (1). Extreme formsobserved in ‘deep ecology’ also appeared. The latter show characteristicsof new religions based on coercive repression of consumption ‘desires’;

3 Senge, P.M. (1990) The Fifth Discipline. The Art and Practice of The Learning Organization,Doubleday & Co., New York.


With respect to (2). Tenants of the globalisation advocate the self-regulating forces of the market, while stern anti-globalisation movementsdevelop. Both orientations have religious traits in fact.

We think that the regulation should not be left to such religion-like movementsalone. It is where OR can play a beneficial role, based on more rational andflexible grounds than religions can do.OR shall ‘invent’ the modern age ethics

We agree with Professor Brans4 that Multicriteria Decision Aid (MCDA) has animportant contribution in moving away from the sole shareholder value tostakeholders’ values. Nevertheless, the search for preferences (inclusive those offuture generations, which are difficult to consider in a credible way, especiallywith respect to the choice of weights) does not guarantee an ethical foundation(Rauschmayer5). Also quite often some very contemporaneous decision-makersare indifferent to ethical consequences (to be identified), though they may havesufficient bargaining power in the decision process to impose their views. Wethink that we ought to be quite ambitious for the ethical role of OR. OR can be afacilitator tool for group MCDA- negotiations with pluralistic arguments, but itcan afford to be more than just that.All good managers know that coercion alone is not the adequate way to governtheir staff (or the citizens if they are public managers). They have to discoverthe successful rules, i.e. ethical rules in the given context, of highly complex,non-linear, adaptive, and self-organising systems, moreover capable ofmutations in the relation between their members. Religious incantations won’thelp. Intuition, or qualitative analysis, is often a miserable guide, because thesesystems are behaving in a counter-intuitive way. Forrester, the inventor ofSystem Dynamics, remarked this thirty years ago. OR, a quantitative andoperative technique for management can assist the discovery process. It shall‘invent’ ethical values to be respected (in the meaning of the Latin word‘invenire’, to come upon). The final purpose is to regulate the mimetic violence,which is taking unbearable proportions in the two indicated directions (seesection 3).To do the job, we need more than the traditional OR-tools, which are much toostatic to describe those complexities, and the often unexpectedly emergingproperties. Think of the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’, first rediscovered in the late1960’s6 by modern economists thanks to a dynamic view at problems. In a

4 Brans, J.P. The management of the future. Ethics in operational research. EJOR, to appear inSeptember 2003.5 Rauschmayer, F. (2001), How to consider ethics in MCA?, in A. Colorni, M. Parrucini, and B.Roy (Eds), A-MCD-A, European Commission, JRC, EUR-report 19808 EN, 273-279.6 The Swiss peasants in alpine regions have discovered for many centuries the importance ofcontrolled access to grazing pastures, in order to avoid recurrent tragedies of the commons.These access rules were obviously an important part of their own ethics to avoid appropriationviolence (see Stevenson , G.G. Common Property economics, Cambridge University Press,1991).


recent paper7 the authors have described the direction in which OR models willhave to evolve in order to remain adequate in today’s organisations andsocieties. If this is recognised, several techniques will take a central part in thisreforming process towards a more dynamic approach of the Real World:System Theory, in particular System Dynamics, Game Theory, Agent-BasedModelling, Adaptive Control Methodology (developed by two of the authors),Genetic Algorithms, Small World Theory, etc.In conclusion, ethics has to prove in permanence its pertinence through itscontribution to the common well being of the human associations, in which it isactive. This requires rediscovering its values every day. This task can be themost significant and useful contribution of OR to ethics.

7 Theys, M., Kunsch, P.L., and Brans, J.-P. (2003) The rise of complexity in organisations and thenecessary evolution of OR-techniques, unpublished.

OPERATIONS RESEARCH CHALLENGES IN THE AGEOF THE PRECAUTION PRINCIPLE

João Clímaco

The most recent advances in the field of Telecommunications, particularly theInternet, merit special attention. It allows diverse physical means of connection,for example, the telephone network, satellite, cable television and optic fibrecables, culminating in an ongoing process that integrates diverse means ofcommunication using the same terminal, which we call multimedia. It istherefore, at least in appearance, the most pacific of inventions, with enormouspotential for science, education, administration of territories, autonomousprofessional fulfilment of the most able, leisure, etc. Without wishing to devaluethe positive aspects, I believe an appreciation of other implications of this topicis indispensable.Let us, for instance, analyse the domain of industrial production. Thecentralisation of means of production, the specialisation of labour and seriesproduction, typical of Taylorism and Fordism, are now yielding to moredecentralised production, with production units spread all over the planet.Production is more flexible, both in production and in desynchronisation oftasks, the multiple branches of every global company, as well as their HeadOffices, are connected in real time by networks of computers using the Web.The new structure of the production system destroys, obviously, thehierarchical organisation of the factories of decades ago, but, unfortunately, theannounced creative action of people and groups is almost always virtual,regardless of the function they perform within the institutions. The functioning


of the system is subordinated to the market, or rather to the global marketsmade possible by the instant communication of the Internet, and not to thenational or regional markets which had specific characteristics and their ownlegal/fiscal regulation. In the current circumstances, as Manuel Castellsmentions (1999), we are experiencing a pure Darwinist dynamic, in which onlywhat is profitable survives. Competition is universal, and is encouraged byinstantaneous communication.Pierre-Noël Giraud (1998), placed the current technical innovation, aimed atlowering production costs, within the framework of the famous “destructivecreator” to which Schumpeter attributed the continual renovation of thecapitalist system. I suspect that the global economy raises a question about thisinterpretation. As the world’s resources are finite and increasingly scarce, andglobal capitalism is mono-rational, exclusively orientated towards profit, howcan we be sure that, beyond a certain degree of exploitation of resources, theworld-system will not behave like a thermodynamically closed system in whichcrises of destruction change from being creators to forecasts of death?It is clear that many opposing arguments can be put forward. The question liesin knowing whether they have sufficient strength to put the brake on thedevastation which is starting even now, avoiding the final break-up. As LucienSfez wrote (1992), “[...] the heterogeneity of rationales explains the imbalance oflevels, and imbalance is indispensable for exchanges. A closed system isentropic precisely because the rationales of each of its subsystems becomeprogressively identical”. (translated from the original in french). Thisimmediately advises a much more cautious look at any type of globalcivilisation which is tending towards mono-rationality.Besides this theoretical issue, the evolution of the globalized world and itsconsequences in everyday life (e.g. people living in fear of losing their jobs, thedominant ideologues repeating incessantly that the major goal of our life isbeing efficient to earn money, to consume more and more, no matter what etc,etc) justify the pacific acceptance by most of the persons these economicist (ormono-rational) policies.The obnoxious effects of this mono-rational attitude can be found in differentaspects of Human activities. For instance, in the financial markets functioning,in the environmental implications of economical growth, in the health care ofpeople, etc, etc, etc…New technological options, omnipresent in our society, are characterised bygreat complexity issues (as the risk of irreversible consequences and dynamicuncertainty), advising the precaution to face potential risks. The idea ofprecaution, already mentioned in Rio declaration (1992), led to a “principle”embodied in the juridical framework of several countries, namely EU countries.As it is said by Dominique Bourg and Jean-Louis Shlegel: “…face à menacesgraves, qualifiées d’irréversibles, dans le domaine de l’environnement, on nedoit pas attendre d’avoir acquis une certitude scientifique pour agir. Le Principede Précaution incite donc à l’action face à des menaces graves, alors même quel’on n’est pas certain de la réalité de ces menaces ni de leur ampleur. Il a donnée


lieu à des formulations différentes dans divers textes internationaux etnationaux de droit positif: une situation inévitable pour un principe dont lesdomaines d’application n’ont cessé de s’élargir”. The difficulties to findadequate methodological analysis tools and the associated economical, socialand cultural issues reinforce each other raising great challenges. As it isunderlined by Claude Roger: “…Au nom d’un “principe de précaution” de plusen plus fréquemment invoqué, le traitement des questions globales qui seposent aux communautés nationales (biotechnologies, sécurité sanitaire, etc) etinternationales (réchauffement climatique, biodiversité, etc.) comme lesnouvelles relations entre science, progrès technique et société, intègrent souventdans les processus de décision publique, des expertises de plusieurs disciplineset des contribuitions des différents acteurs sociaux et économiques. L’interfacede la connaissance et de la prise de décision politique s’en trouve doncmodifiée”.However, this was not yet adequately established, even by the legislation ofmany countries, as, for instance, the U.S.A. In the E.U. the legislation is moreadvanced, but, even when it exists, it is not yet correctly applied by most of thedecision makers. It must be recognised that a fundamentalist interpretation ofthe idea of precaution also raises difficult questions, but it does not justify theatavistic acceptance of science and technology uncertainties, in name of theprogress. Looking for a reasonable and equilibrated interpretation of the“precaution principle” is a crucial challenge nowadays. Obviously, ethics is acentral issue in this task, and the influence of OR tools on the decision processesassociated with a “precautionary development” can be positive or negative,depending on several methodological and practical issues.I believe that all of you are convinced that a deep reflection on these subjects isnecessary. So, I will try to motivate the discussion raising some questions andissues concerning OR challenges:Some authors say that the major goal of OR is creating “wisdom”. It is clear thatdecision-makers with wisdom should be more prepared to interpret wisely the“precaution principle”. In these circumstances OR should be one of the mostimportant disciplines of our University curricula. Unfortunately, I am sure thatit is not possible to reach it! However, I believe that this target must be pursuedall the time, and so, the role of OR teaching is a very important issue. Theprincipal questions are: what should be the contents of OR curricula? and inwhat profissional areas learning OR should be obligatory?, and in what shouldbe optional?While the so-called “rational decision” is mono-rational, the social reality isclearly pluri-rational. Research into possible alternative futures, based on a newvision of OR is opened. In our perspective, Hard and Soft OR models, methods,and techniques are not alternatives. We believe they are complementary,enabling the incorporation, both quantitative and qualitative models inassisting decision makers, with a large spectrum of options, from the traditionalmodels of Optimisation, to Statistical Inference, to the techniques of ArtificialIntelligence, to the Cognitive Maps, imported from Psychology, and used withconsiderable success in the structuring of decision problems, etc, etc… In recent


years, models of Multicriteria Analysis, Group Decision models andNegotiation models have undergone great development, and, in many cases,are models rooted in constructivism. New technologies allow very flexibleInteractive Decision Support Systems to be constructed, which makes it easierto put a constructivist view of OR into practice. I believe that this evolution ofOR, the so-called “Decision Aiding Science” (Roy, 1999), represents animportant step to adequate OR to the precautionary decision makingrequirements. In conclusion, I think that a major point for discussion consists inforeseeing the OR evolution, taking into account environmental andtechnological risks associated to many decisions…Reality is integral, it involves complex social processes, and therefore thesynergies between different scientific areas will help us to understand it, so thatwe can intervene better. There are cases in which the use of mathematicalmodels resolves decision problems by itself, but they are rare, especially whendealing with complex problems. Do you believe that a pluridisciplinary attitudein research, and teaching, as well as the multidisciplinary composition of teamsdealing with complex decision aiding problems could help? What is theimportance of communication, cognitive psychology and other social sciences,together with mathematics, in structuring decision problems? How to combinethe teaching of methodological aspects with the classical OR tools?Another key issue consists in the discussion about “what is an OR specialist?” Itis still an open question. For instance, is it adequate to provide OR UniversityDegrees? and what should be the role of OR in Business Administration or inEngineering courses?Finally, I remember a sentence on OR and Social Responsibility, by RusselAckoff. He told: “Loyalty to one is a vice, not a virtue. It should be replaced bylove for all”. Should this type of concerns be reflected in OR teaching? How?Bibliographical ReferencesCastells, Manuel (1999), “Uma polarização social inédita”, Economia Pura,

Novembro, 18-21.Bourg,Dominique and Schiegel, Jean-Louis (2001), “Parer aux Risques de Demain

– Le Principe de Précaution”, Paris, SeuilGiraud, Pierre-Noël (1998), “Les Causes des Inégalités Croissantes dans les Pays

Riches”, Études, 1, 388.Roger, Claude (2000), “Analyse de Risque et Principe de Précaution: vers de

Nouveaux Rapport“Conaissance”/”Politique”?”, inwww.inria.fr/Internet/Departments/ESR/comprendre/js/risque.html

Roy, Bernard (1999), “Decision-Aiding Today: What Should We Expect?”, in TomasGal et al. (orgs.), Multiple Criteria Decision Making – Advances in MCDMModels, Algorithms, Theory and Applications. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1-35.

Sfez, Lucien (1992), “Critique de la décision”, Paris: Presses de la FondationNationale des Sciences Politiques.

Partially supported by the project POSI/37346/SRI/2001


Professional Codes of Ethics: Why and What?

Saul I. Gass

We will present an overview of past and current efforts in promoting ethicswithin professional societies and related topics. We will review pastunsuccessful efforts in the U.S. to develop and adopt a code of ethics for theOperations Research Society of America. We will also review codes of ethicsadopted by other professional societies and individual consultants. The basicquestion of interest: Why OR societies do not adopt codes of ethics?

A Code of Ethics for the OR Profession? Challenges andPossibilities

Christopher J. Cowton

The purpose of this short piece is to consider the contribution that a code ofethics might make to the behaviour of the OR profession and to discuss some ofthe issues that are entailed in the development of an effective code.On Professions

The term ‘profession’ is employed quite loosely in everyday speech, being usedto refer to a wide variety of occupational groupings. However, the term is usedmore narrowly, in its more traditional sense, by sociologists. Notwithstandingthe long and vigorous debate about definitions and characteristics in theacademic literature, and the different nuances in different national contexts, agood definition for present purposes is that provided by Jary & Jary (1991):

A profession is any middle class occupational group,characterised by claims to a high level of technical and intellectualexpertise,autonomy in recruitment and discipline,and a commitment to public service.

The reference to class might be eclipsed in some cultures by earning power, butthe references to particular types of expertise, a degree of autonomy and apublic service responsibility are classic elements of a claim to professionalstatus.Not all observers are convinced that professions really do serve the publicinterest though. For example, George Bernard Shaw famously remarked that‘All professions are conspiracies against the laity’, and there have beensustained Marxist and, more recently, consumerist critiques of professions’protection of their privileged position. However, to the extent that they arevalid, one of the ways in which public service credentials are frequently attestedis the presence of a code of ethics


On Codes of Ethics

A code of ethics may be defined as a formal, explicit statement of what isexpected by way of ethical behaviour in a business or professional setting. Asindicated below, it is more than a ‘pledge’, such as the Hippocratic Oath or theOath of Prometheus currently being promoted within the OR community.Codes of ethics might go under other names, such as ‘code of conduct’ or‘professional standards’, but whatever they are called, they are increasinglycommon in business and professional fields.Codes of ethics have their detractors though. For example, with reference tocompany codes, Richard Warren (1993) describes them as ‘superficial anddistracting answers to the question of how to promote ethical behaviour incorporate life’, while Richard De George’s accusation is that codes ‘haveenabled some firms to clothe themselves in moral trappings, while changinglittle or nothing in their structures or practices’. According to some critics,then, a code of ethics could be a toothless document or, worse, a misleading PRexercise.However, it would be unwise to judge – and dismiss – all codes in such generalterms. Although they can be subject to abuse and are not a panacea for dealingwith all professional ills, their contribution to the support of professional ethicsis better viewed as an empirical or contingent matter which is dependent on atleast three things – aims, content, and processes.Where the aim is simply to appease external parties, perhaps in a rather reactiveor even deceptive way, the critics probably have it right, and a code is unlikelyto make a socially valuable contribution to the behaviour of a profession.However, even though there might be associated PR benefits, codes are oftenpromulgated with a broader purpose in mind. One common aim would be todistil current values and practices to prevent poorer than expected behaviour.In this case an attempt is being made to deal with ‘ethical outliers’, seeking toreduce or eradicate unethical behaviour and thus prevent the profession fallinginto disrepute. Some codes are more ambitious and seek to improve the generallevel of behaviour and change values. The two approaches are not mutuallyexclusive, but it would be fair to say that some codes are intended more thanothers to make a positive contribution to the promotion of ethical behaviour. Inboth cases, though, a code offers the potential to provide insiders (ORprofessionals) with guidance regarding their behaviour and outsiders (clientsand other stakeholders) with an indication of what they have a right to expect.How well the code does these things depends on what it contains.Vague moral exhortation is of little practical help to professionals and is viewedsceptically by outsiders. At the other extreme, though, detailed rules can neverbe complete when professionals work in a diverse, dynamic environment.There will always be loopholes. There is a also the risk of legalism and moral‘dumbing down’, with professionals taking a ‘box ticking’ or minimalcompliance approach which would seem to be the antithesis of the expertjudgment expected of those who claim professional status. What is probablyneeded is a mix of general standards or principles, supported or illustrated by


concrete directions or specific rules for common situations. The principleswould be deemed to take precedence and professionals would be required to beable to demonstrate that their behaviour was in accordance with these.Adherence to particular rules would be a prima facie demonstration of that, butno more.The fundamental issue about the effectiveness of codes of ethics, though, comesdown to a question of implementation. How can commitment be generatedand compliance ensured? There is probably a tension between the degree ofambition represented by a code and the likelihood of its being fullyimplemented, but there are several processes that might help. First, assumingthat a code of ethics is being developed from new, how is the content to bedecided upon? Who is to take the lead, who is to be consulted, and who willsimply be told the results of the exercise? Such factors affect manydevelopment processes, affecting ownership and perceived legitimacy. Second,how is the code to be up-dated? If a good job has been done, one would hopethat the principles would be relatively stable, but the specific rules are likely torequire revision to deal with new circumstances and emerging issues. Abalance has to be struck, since frequent revision helps to maintain relevance butcan undermine credibility. Third, how are new entrants to be inculcated with aproper understanding of what is required of them as members of theprofession. Perhaps degree programmes and textbooks have a useful role toplay here. Fourth, how can expectations be effectively communicated toexisting professionals and stakeholders? Fifth, and finally, what enforcementmechanisms should be put in place to act as a safety net? Indeed, areprofessional bodies strong enough to introduce effective disciplinaryprocedures? Although empirical evidence on the effectiveness of codes ofethics is relatively limited, enforcement is one area that has been identified asimportant.

ConclusionA fair summary regarding the contribution of codes of ethics is provided byMolander (1987):

A well written ethical code, reliably and fairly enforced, can eliminateunethical practices, relieve ethical dilemmas and throughout the processdemonstrate a firm’s or industry’s commitment to ethical conduct.

If poorly designed and implemented, the code will not only beineffectual but could further reduce business’s credibility with thegeneral public and important opinion-forming institutions in the society.

This short piece has delineated several challenges for the OR professionregarding the development of a successful code of ethics. Regarding outsidersor stakeholders, there is a certain amount of scepticism, not to say cynicism,regarding claims to public service and the value of codes of ethics. Regardinginsiders, there is the challenge of gaining commitment and ensuringcompliance. What is needed is a code with sound principles and concrete


guidance which is both acceptable to OR practitioners and credible tostakeholders – remembering that a code, alone, cannot achieve everything.

However, this contribution is about possibilities as well as challenges, whichcalls for some positive notes to be sounded. First, there is a the momentum ofthis group itself. Change of this sort requires champions, and a good start hasbeen made. Second, the contemporary environment in which these discussionsare taking place is characterised by widespread concern and debate regardingbusiness and professional ethics, which provides both fertile ground for ORethics and plenty of examples of other professions and organisations fromwhich to learn. The challenges in promoting ethics in the OR community aresignificant, but there has probably never been a better time to meet them.

ReferencesDe George, R.T.

Jary & Jary (1991), Collins Dictionary of Sociology, Collins.

Molander, E.A. (1987), ‘A paradigm for design, promulgation and enforcementof ethical codes’, Journal of Business Ethics, 6 (8), 619-631.

Warren, R.C. (1993), ‘Codes of ethics: Bricks without straw’, Business Ethics: AEuropean Review, 2 (4), 185-191.

The Prospective Code of Ethics of the UK OR Society

Maurice ShutlerIntroduction

There has been a tradition in the UK going back to the mid 19th. Century ofprofessional institutions having codes of ethics (CE) to which all theirprospective members must subscribe before being admitted. Although theydiffer in detail, they have a number of common features such as:

-safeguarding the public interest

-inducing fairness and integrity-imposing a duty of care

-need to declare conflicts of interest-accepting dismissal on matters of conscience

The principal reason for these codes has been to give guidance to members onwhat constitutes ethical conduct in their relations with each other, with clientsand with the general public. From reading a large number of them one wouldconclude that their priorities have been always in that order. For examplesolicitors in the UK were for many years banned from advertising on thegrounds that this would constitute ‘unfair competition’. Moreover, having awritten code by which one can abide, is a helpful legal argument if a member issued by a client for professional misconduct.Existing CEs in UK OR and similar professions

In the UK CEs are used by the following professional bodies with similar


application areas to those of OR:-Institute of Actuaries-Royal Statistical Society-Institute of Mathematics and its Applications-Market Research Society

and in OR there still exists the CE of the OR Fellowship, the professional ORbody founded in 1973 to continue the former qualified ‘A’ grade membershipof the OR Society.The UK OR Society’s proposed Code of Ethics

This code was approved by the Council of the OR Society in 1997 for the thenproposed professional grades of members. It was put to the membership andapproved with a majority of 69%. However the new membership gradesinvolved changing the Society’s constitution which required by law a 70%majority. In 2002 a different set of professional membership grades wereapproved, but the proposals did not include a new CE. However, since the oldCE has already been approved, it could be introduced by a simple vote ofCouncil. It is quite likely that the professional members who are now beingaccepted will wish to have such a CE, for self-protection, if for no other reason.This CE was produced after much debate, but ended as a simple document. Itimposed five duties on members:

1. A duty to be honest

2. A duty to behave ethically and to resolve conflicts of interest in an ethicalmanner

3. A duty to make available all relevant information except where disclosure isprevented by confidentiality

4. A duty to continuously update and enhance knowledge, competenceand skills [which are] relevant

5. A duty to ....avoid bringing the profession into disrepute

These were then expanded in the body of the CE.HonestyHonesty meant exactly what it said and the explanation was what any honestperson would accept.Ethical behaviourThe duty to behave ethically is probably the one of most contemporary interest.It was defined as including a number of specific duties, but excluded none, e.g.

To have due regard to the public interestTo identify and resolve conflicts of interest

To avoid giving too much weight to professional as distinct from the public interest

First of all note the word ‘due’ above. In American English it is called a‘weasel’1 word. The main problem, however, is the resolution of conflicts of

1 So called because it destroys the force of a statement as a weasel destroys eggs by sucking outthe contents


interest. The member is told to do this in part by ‘listing the ethical implicationsof each course of action. Decide which is the most appropriate approach fromthe ethical point of view and record the reasons for arriving at that decision’.Notes should then be filed in case of a hearing by a Disciplinary Committee [orperhaps by a court of law].Making information availableIn spite of what one might think, this is a duty towards the client. That is to sayone should make sure that the client knows what you know as a result of yourinvestigations in constructing your model. Well, yes, some clients are still notsophisticated ! However the last sub-paragraph does impose a duty on themember to consider whether one should reveal information to a third party thatis not protected by confidentiality. If it is one cannot. Such a prohibitionaccords with English (and probably U.S.) law on the subject.Updating competenceUpdating competence is a duty common to most professional UK bodies. Somego as far as requiring an annual return from members of what each has done.Avoidance of disrepute of the profession

A duty to avoid bringing the profession into disrepute, or more generally toavoid ‘unprofessional conduct’ is common in CEs of the medical, legal andengineering professions. In so far as such a duty acts to protect the generalpublic, it can be welcomed by most people. In so far as it is the profession itselfalone that is protected, the worth of such a duty these days is doubtful unlessthe act of bringing the profession into disrepute served to undermine publicconfidence wrongly. There was once a professional member of the ORS in the1960's who said that OR was nothing more than common sense and the ORSshould be disbanded. Many people thought that that was unprofessional andcertainly brought the profession into disrepute.Conclusion

The question remains then as to whether it is worthwhile for OR to have a CE.Many people cite examples of where the CEs of e.g. lawyers are used simply toprotect lawyers against their clients. However, the strongest argument for anOR CE is that since so many OR people are now employed as single persons,they need some professional back-up, especially when they are asked toperform some act which is against their consciences or which could haveadverse consequences for the general public. In such cases an OR person hasthe right to be able to call on the professional society for support and thegeneral public will benefit from such intervention.


OR, Ethics and DecisionsThe Oath of Prometheus

J. Pierre BRANS

The role of OR is first emphasised. An analogy with Physics is considered.There are strong similarities between OR and Physics but also majordifferences. While Physics is modelling Natural Real World Phenomena, OR isfacing Human Systems. However, in Physics “GOD” is keeping the decisionstick unchanged, i.e. the laws of Physics remain the same, while in OR theresponsible actor is the Decision-maker. “GOD” has been replaced by man.: it isa Promethean-like situation.It is then suggested to have all decisions well-balanced between the influence ofthree poles. In the early years of OR a “Rational pole” has first been developed.From the 1970’s a “Subjective Pole” has been considered to include theemotionality, the real-life experience, the preferences of the Decision-maker. Inthe future an “Ethical pole” should also be taken into account to respect thesocial and the ecological environment of the affected people, to promotesustainable development for the future generations.In order to stimulate an Ethical dialogue, an OR commitment, the OATH ofPROMETHEUS, has been proposed to the OR community. The author stronglyhopes that all OR researchers will support this action and take the oath.


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promoting ethics in or and...promoting ethics in or, april 2003 - page 3 we may also attempt to...

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