promoting social reconciliation in postconflict … of the third party..... 20 designing social...

USAID Program and OperationsAssessment Report No. 24

Promoting Social ReconciliationIn Postconflict Societies

Selected Lessons From USAID’s Experience

by

Krishna KumarCenter for Development Information and Evaluation

U.S. Agency for International Development

January 1999

Contents

Preface.................................................................................................................................... iii

Introduction ............................................................................................................................ v

Social Reconciliation.............................................................................................................. 1Conceptualizing Social Reconciliation ................................................................................. 1Social Reconciliation Strategies and Activities .................................................................... 3

USAID’s Case Studies............................................................................................................ 7Peace Committees in South Africa ....................................................................................... 7Scientific Collaboration in the Middle East ....................................................................... 10Media Projects in Bosnia and Herzegovina ........................................................................ 14Economic Reactivation and Interethnic Reconciliation ..................................................... 16

Policy Lessons........................................................................................................................ 19Validity of Social Reconciliation Strategies ....................................................................... 19Limited Effects of Social Reconciliation Interventions ..................................................... 19Critical Environmental Factors ........................................................................................... 20Involvement of the Third Party........................................................................................... 20Designing Social Reconciliation Interventions .................................................................. 21Channeling Assistance ........................................................................................................ 21Effects of Conventional Development Projects .................................................................. 21Informing Development Projects with Reconciliation Strategies ...................................... 22

References.............................................................................................................................. 23

THE CENTER for Development Informationand Evaluation (CDIE) has undertaken a

program of evaluation studies to analyze therole of international assistance in the politicalrehabilitation of postconflict societies. The cen-ter represented USAID in the multidonor evalu-ation of emergency assistance to Rwanda andsubsequently authored Rebuilding PostwarRwanda. This was followed by a volume, Re-building Societies After Civil War, that exam-ined the different dimensions of postconflictrehabilitation and drew policy lessons for theinternational community.

The center evaluated international expe-rience of assisting postconflict elections insix countries, presenting its findings in amonograph, From Bullets to Ballots. The vol-ume Postconflict Elections, Democratization& International Assistance expanded both theframework of analysis and the number of casestudies, adding greater depth and detail to ourunderstanding of these elections.

CDIE also undertook three case studiesto examine strategies to promote social recon-ciliation in the aftermath of civil wars. One case

Preface

study examined the role of peace committeesin South Africa. The second analyzed the roleof scientific cooperation in strengthening thepeace process in the Middle East. The third casestudy examined the role of media and economicreactivation programs supported by the inter-national community in promoting interethnicharmony in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This re-port seeks to synthesize the findings and con-clusions of those case studies.

Several colleagues and consultants havehelped me prepare this report, and I gratefullyacknowledge them. Robin Silver helped me inadditional research and Ross Bankson in edit-ing the report. Susan Merrill and JosephLieberson, respectively the director and deputydirector of CDIE’s Program and OperationsAssessment Division, provided not only intel-lectual leadership but also the resources for theongoing studies. I am indebted to all of them.But above all, I am grateful to the authors ofthe three case studies on which this report isbased.

—KRISHNA KUMAR

AS A PART OF ITS ONGOING EVALUATION of the role of international assistance in promot-

ing the political rehabilitation of postconflict so-cieties, USAID’s Center for Development In-formation and Evaluation (CDIE) undertookthree case studies of social reconciliation ac-tivities supported by the Agency and other do-nors.*

The first study investigated the nature,functions, and achievements of peace commit-

tees in South Africa. These committees wereestablished in pursuance of the National PeaceAccords, signed in September 1991, to preventviolence and promote peace.

The second study looked at interstate con-flict. It assessed the extent to which scientificcollaboration between Israel and its Arabneighbors succeeded in creating and sustain-ing the attitudes, perceptions, and institutionalrelationships conducive to peace.

The third study examined the role ofpeace media in promoting interethnic recon-ciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreimportant, it analyzed the effects of economicdevelopment initiatives on fostering ethnic tol-erance.

This paper is based largely on these threecase studies. It seeks to present and elaboratetheir findings within a conceptual frameworkto draw out policy and strategy lessons. Sec-tion 1 defines the construct of social reconcili-ation as used in these pages and identifies strat-egies the international community has adoptedto promote the process in postconflict societ-

*The expression postconflict societies refers to coun-tries in the aftermath of civil war. Such wars end as theresult of negotiated peace accords or after the victoryof one party. Such societies inherit a shattered politicalsystem, a fragmented society, and a devastated economy.A universal feature of postconflict societies is the per-vasive antagonism, mistrust, and hostility between theformer adversaries, even though peace has beenbrokered.

The term international community refers to all bilat-eral and multilateral agencies, intergovernmental or-ganizations, international nongovernmental organiza-tions, philanthropic organizations, relief agencies, andprivate firms involved in humanitarian assistance, con-flict resolution, and development.

Introduction

Promoting Social Reconciliation in Postconflict Societies

ies. Section 2 presents an overview of the casestudies, both the main findings and conclusions.Finally, Section 3 suggests lessons for USAIDand other international donor organizations.

A word about the data and information.CDIE examined four different sets of interven-tions to generate preliminary evidence about

social reconciliation strategies. All the datagathered were qualitative in nature, derivedfrom in-depth interviews, document review,and field observation. The researchers inter-viewed large numbers of informants and hadaccess to a wealth of material and ideas. CDIEdid additional literature reviews to complementthe data generated by the case studies.

vi

Conceptualizing SocialReconciliation

THE CONSTRUCT of so-cial reconciliation un-

doubtedly remains con-troversial. The word re-conciliation derives fromthe Latin expressionconciliatus, which means“coming together.” Strictlyspeaking, reconciliationimplies a process, that of re-storing the shattered rela-tionship between two ac-tors. The adjective socialsimply indicates that theemphasis is on group, andnot individual, reconcilia-tion.

This conceptual -ization has limited rel-evance for postconflict situations. First, it is bothunrealistic and impolitic to talk about restoringmutual trust in the aftermath of severe, brutalconflict, when memories of the violence per-

petuated by the warring groups are still freshand the social vestiges of destruction still quitevisible. Under these conditions, the reconcilia-

tion process can at bestpromote intergroup tol-erance, an attitude oflive-and-let-live. Theprocess cannot go be-yond this. Second, in-tergroup harmony didnot always exist beforethe conflict; to presumeso would be incorrect.

In these pages, theterm social reconcilia-tion has a singular defi-nition, unlike its usualconnotation. As con-ceptualized here, it is aprocess that beginswith the adversaries’acceptance of eachother’s right to coexist

in war-torn societies. Social reconciliation doesnot presuppose tolerance; it seeks to promote it.In some circumstances, it may culminate in thebeginnings of mutual trust.

Social Reconciliation1

Soon after the genocide,social workers with Catholic

Relief Services initiatedseminars in Rwanda to talk

about “reconciliation.” Theirwell-meaning effort fell flat.

Rwandans were not ready toreconcile, and the mere

mention of the word“reconciliation” so soon

after a genocide struck manyRwandans as insensitive at

best, deeply offensive atworst.

— Jeff Drumtra

Social reconciliation inter-ventions are therefore specificallydesigned to foster intergroup un-derstanding, strengthen nonvio-lent conflict resolution mecha-nisms, and heal the wounds ofwar. They differ from conven-tional projects and programs inthat their primary objective is topromote social reconciliation, andnot to provide services or advanceeconomic, social, or political de-velopment. Table 1 lists examplesof various types of interventionsthat can promote social reconcili-ation in postconflict societies.

A social reconciliation inter-vention is supposed to achieveone or more of the following ob-jectives:

n To prevent or resolve the oc-currence of violent conflictby facilitating communica-tion and by developingpeace structures

n To reduce deep-seated anger,prejudices, and misunder-standings among the con-flicting groups through recip-rocal dialog, cooperative ac-tion, and acknowledgmentof the past

n To establish or reestablishpositive relationships amongconflicting parties throughcommunication and coop-erative activities.

Political and Governance Related

1. Democratic institution building (e.g., political parties)2. Free and fair elections3. Power-sharing arrangements4. Devolution of political authority5. Institutional capacity building for governance6. Judicial and legal reforms7. Law-enforcement system based on the rule of law8. Observance of human rights

Military Related

1. Civilian control over the military2. Professionalization of the military3. Demobilization4. Reinsertion and reintegration of demobilized soldiers

Social Rehabilitation Related

1. Repatriation and resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons2. Expansion of literacy and education3. Equitable access to health services4. Promotion of civil society

Economic Growth

1. Rebuilding war-shattered economy2. Employment and income generation3. Increased economic integration of excluded ethnic, social, or political groups in the economy4. Land reforms5. Economic decentralization6. Intercommunal trade

Table 1. Examples of ActivitiesAffecting Reconciliation in Postwar Societies

Social ReconciliationStrategies and Activities

To achieve these objectives, conflict theo-rists and practitioners have proposed severalbasic strategies around which a wide array ofsocial reconciliation interventions can be de-vised and implemented (see table 2). Some ofthem are briefly described below.

UncoveringThe Past

A consensus exists amongconflict theorists that uncoveringthe past is an essential step in thesocial reconciliation process.Without a comprehensive exami-nation of the violations experi-enced on all sides, mutual accep-tance remains illusive at best. Itis important to bring to lightthose traumas—acts of violence,human rights abuses, disappear-ances, and loss of property—sus-tained during the conflict andoften hidden from the generalpopulace. While uncovering thepast may heighten intergroup ten-sion in the short run, conflicttheorists contend that it is neces-sary to address the fragmentedrelationships and to initiate psy-chological healing. Furthermore,disclosing the past helps estab-lish a social climate that condonesneither repression nor violence.

Truth commissions are undoubtedly themost visible example of this strategy. Such com-missions uncover the past and fix responsibil-ity. Argentina was one of the first countries toexperiment with the idea, followed by El Sal-vador and Haiti. The Truth and ReconciliationCommission in South Africa was probably themost comprehensive attempt to examine andexpose the gross human right violations perpetu-ated during the apartheid regime. Its avowedpurpose was restitution, not revenge.

1. Uncovering the pasta. Truth commissionsb. Indigenous mechanisms of acknowledging the past

2. Promoting dialoga. Problem-solving workshopsb. High-profile conferencesc. Conflict management trainingd. Sustained dialog

3. Promoting understanding through mediaa. Documentaries and films promoting mutual understandingb. Peace radio and televisionc. Professionalization of media, both print and electronicd. Institutional infrastructure for independent media

4. Developing grass-roots structures for peacea. Peace committees and commissionsb. Peace research and training organizations

5. Collaborative activitiesa. Scientific and technical collaborationb. Collaborative development interventionsc. Collaboration in sports, music, and arts

Social Reconciliation

Table 2. Social Reconciliation Strategies

4 Promoting Social Reconciliation in Postconflict Societies

Traditional societies often have indigenousmechanisms for acknowledging past misdeeds.Examples include public confession of guilt;reconstructing the past through storytelling;public feasts signifying that the past is, if notcompletely forgotten, then nonetheless forgiven;and public ceremonies attended by conflictingparties.

Promoting Dialog

Another strategy promotes dialog amongthe conflicting parties. The implicit premise isthat dialog entails a willingness to listen to op-posing viewpoints and helps in acknowledgingmutual needs, rights, and obligations. The pri-mary object of dialog is the process itself, ratherthan the specific outcomes.

The international community has sup-ported four types of activities to promote dialogin postconflict societies. The first, problem-solv-ing workshops, usually convened by third par-ties, bring representatives of conflicting groupstogether to seek solutions to shared difficulties.Participants generally include academics, pro-fessionals, social leaders, and religious leaders.The second popular activity is the high-profileconference usually organized by religious, aca-demic, philanthropic, or intergovernmental or-ganizations. Regional representatives, high-levelgovernment officials, faction leaders, and reli-gious figures, as well as potential donors, par-ticipate in them.

The third activity, conflict managementtraining, has gained support in recent years. Thegoal of such training is teaching the methodsand skills necessary to limit or avoid intragroup

conflicts. Conducted by nongovernmental or-ganizations, professional institutions, and pri-vate foundations, it entails information ex-change, skills learning and rehearsal, collectivereflection, and possibly conflict analysis. Thelast category includes “sustained dialogs.” Un-like conferences and workshops, these effortsattempt to redefine the relationship between theconflicting parties and work through the under-lying issues of contention. Generally, participa-tion begins with interested individuals and ex-pands to include civil servants or governmentofficials.

Promoting UnderstandingThrough Media

The third strategy establishes and strength-ens responsible, professional media—both printand electronic. The premise is that such a strat-egy can promote social reconciliation in severalways. It helps dissipate the rumors and propa-ganda disseminated by extremists, which feedsocial and political tensions. It also creates aspace for articulating diverse viewpoints, ap-proaches, and opinions. Above all, it contrib-utes to both transparency and accountability inpublic affairs, exerting pressure on political andsocial leaders to behave in a responsible way.

The international community has sup-ported a wide range of media interventions dur-ing conflict and postconflict situations. Theserange from preparing documentaries for massconsumption, broadcasting peace education pro-grams, establishing radio stations and newspa-pers committed to peace and democracy, andassisting independent media. Peace radios wereestablished in Burundi, Rwanda, and Somalia

5

during the conflict. In Rwanda, for example,Swiss-supported Radio Agatashya, establishedin August 1994, was instrumental in correctingthe Hutu extremists’ propaganda. In early 1994,World Vision supported a radio program pro-duced by local church groups in Burundi. Theprogram covered issues such as alternatives tothe ongoing ethnic violence, interethnic har-mony, and conflict resolution. An internationalnongovernmental organization (NGO) calledSearch for Common Ground has promoted astudio that produces radio programs to encour-age reconciliation. Low cost is one attraction ofradio in these countries. With little investment,peace messages can be disseminated to millionsof people, even those in remote areas.

As part of its activities promoting democ-racy, USAID has taken the lead in strengthen-ing the independent media in many postconflictsocieties. Such programs are generally imple-mented in partnership with local broadcasters,with the funding and at the behest of NGOsand independent institutions.

Developing Grass-RootsStructures for Peace

The fourth strategy creates grass-rootsstructures to maintain peace. Variously knownas peace committees, peace commissions, orcitizens groups, these grass-roots organizationsmobilize local leaders and community mem-bers to prevent eruptions of violence and tofoster tolerance. This may involve a number oftasks, such as countering rumor and exaggera-tion, advocating nonviolent solutions to con-flicts, offering peace education through com-munity programs, and mediating between

contentious groups or between groups and thegovernment.

In 1947, peace committees in the majorcities of India attempted to control the outbreakof interethnic conflict then engulfing the coun-try. Their membership consisted of prominentcitizens, such as the leaders of ethnic groups,political parties, academic institutions, and reli-gious and social organizations. The committeesplayed a major role in subduing the conflict andrestoring peace. In both Nicaragua and SouthAfrica, peace committees have been creditedwith reducing the level of conflict and promot-ing mutual understanding. Ethnic reconciliationcommissions have also been established in Po-land, Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic. Peacecommittees function as well in the former Yu-goslavia. Receiving only minimal support fromthe international community, these bodies con-tinue to rely on local funding.

In many countries, grass-roots researchingand training institutions have been establishedto promote communal harmony and understand-ing.

AdvancingCollaborative Activities

The last strategy promotes collaborativeactivities for members of conflicting groups onthe assumption that such activities help fosterpositive attitudes among the participants. Oncethey start working together, members of antago-nistic groups gradually move beyond bitterness,anger, and resentment. Through collaboration,they eventually come to see each other as hu-man beings, not as old enemies.

Social Reconciliation


Unlike other interventions, collaborativeactivities often have an important secondaryobjective—promoting development. The inter-national community has funded such collabo-rative projects in trade, extension, agriculture,infrastructure, and small-scale industry. Most ofthese programs were modest, implemented byprivate voluntary organizations. In addition to

economic development projects, collaborativeactivities have provided local communities withmuch-needed social services such as child care,recreation, and primary education. Since theseefforts bring positive benefits to the participants,they help develop constituencies in support ofcollaborative development activities, contribut-ing to social reconciliation.

THE FIRST THREE CASE STUDIES presented hereare examples of the last three strategies for

social reconciliation. They highlight both theirstrengths and weaknesses and indicate the con-ditions most propitious for success. Strictlyspeaking, the fourth and last case study is notan example of a social reconciliation strategy asdefined above. It does illustrate, though, howeven in an ethnically divided society, interven-tions in economic development can also con-tribute to social reconciliation.

Peace CommitteesIn South Africa*

In South Africa the National Peace Accordsestablished new structures and new mechanismsto offset those of the apartheid regime. Thesemechanisms also prepared the groundwork foran eventual transformation of the politicalorder. The first was the establishment of a truthcommission to document past human rightsabuses committed by the government as well as

opposition political parties. To confront the per-vasive turbulence in South Africa, the peaceaccords mandated the creation of a secondmechanism: local and regional peace commit-tees. The network of local and regional com-mittees, supervised by a National Peace Com-mittee and its secretariat, was intended to guar-antee communities recourse to the peacefulmanagement of conflict and settlement of dis-putes.

Composed of senior political leaders, theNational Peace Secretariat created and moni-tored the peace committees. In doing so, it ac-corded high priority to the areas most affectedby violence—the Witsvaal and the KwaZulu–Natal regions. The secretariat eventually estab-lished 11 regional peace committees, which inturn formed, staffed, and supervised 260 localpeace committees. The regional committeeswere composed of the representatives from dif-ferent political parties, security agencies, con-cerned government departments, and importantcivic organizations.

Although the government provided thebulk of the resources, the peace committees also*Nicole Ball wrote the case study with Chris Spies.

2 USAID’s Case Studies


received substantial grants from the internationalcommunity as well as the South African privatesector. The major international donors were theBritish Overseas Development Agency andDanish International Development Assistance.USAID supported nongovernmental and com-munity-based organiza-tions engaged in media-tion, conflict resolution,and civic education.These provided mem-bers, expertise, and aready-made constitu-ency for the peace com-mittees.

The regional andlocal peace committeesperformed several inter-related functions withvarying degrees of suc-cess. They openedchannels of communi-cation among antago-nistic groups. By pro-viding a forum for dis-cussion, they generateda dialog where none ex-isted or seemed pos-sible. In the highly po-larized political climateof South Africa, this was a formidable task;individuals entering into dialog with opposinggroups often found themselves ostracized, evenpunished, by their own communities.

Still more important, the peace committeesoften negotiated disputes and monitored imple-mentation of the agreements. They created aphysical and psychological space where people

could meet and resolve their differences. Theyacted as an unbiased third party, facilitating ne-gotiations and, when necessary, even mediat-ing between the antagonists. In fact, peace com-mittees mediated in a wide range of disputes:between township associations and the security

forces, between man-agement and workers,and between organiza-tions belonging to dif-ferent ethnic groups.

Peace committeesoften tried and generallysucceeded in negotiat-ing multiparty agree-ments (between the gov-ernment, event organiz-ers, and adversaries)about the rules and con-ditions for holding pub-lic meetings, marches,and rallies. For ex-ample, peace commit-tees worked with marchorganizers to avoid sen-sitive routes and toavoid scheduling con-flicts that involved op-posing groups. Theyalso worked with the

security forces to ensure an adequate but non-threatening presence. As a result, peace com-mittees contributed to the reduction in violence,saving human lives.

Although it was not their mandate, thepeace committees performed yet another impor-tant function: spotlighting the accountability ofpublic officials. For example, during the apart-

In Thokoza township, south ofJohannesburg, the ANC

[African National Conference]planned a march. Its originalroute would have taken the

demonstrators past IFP[Inkatha Freedom Party]

hostels. The Thokoza localpeace committee worked withthe ANC to modify the route.When the march was held,

however, the police failed toblock off the relevant street

entirely, and the ANC memberswere able to divert from the

agreed-upon route and marchpast the hostels. In the

resulting violence, 19 peoplewere killed.

—Nicole Ball with Chris Spies

9

heid regime, there was no code of conduct forthe police; the force did not have to answer forits actions. The peace committees regularlymonitored police activities in many communi-ties to ensure that the police adhered to the codeof conduct established by the National PeaceAccords. They also tried to hold political par-ties responsible for their actions to see that theyfollowed their code of conduct. This continualinvolvement in conflict resolution activitiesprompted the peace committees to keep a watch-ful eye on the behavior of other public officials.All this was unprecedented in the history ofSouth Africa.

Several factors affected the performance ofthe South African peace committees as well. Theexistence of a national mandate and the politi-cal commitment of key political leaders, the busi-ness community, and the Church were critical.They gave the committees legitimacy, resources,and visibility. The cooperation of the securityforces and other armed groups was also vital.When cooperation was not forthcoming, peacecommittees faced insurmountable problems. Forexample, the presence of “third force” deathsquads jeopardized the ability of peace commit-tees to carry out their tasks, particularly in theWitsvaal and KwaZulu–Natal regions. Localownership was another important variable; thegreater the sense of ownership within the com-munity, the more effective and legitimate thecommittee. Local ownership allowed the peacecommittees to claim community resources, suchas volunteer labor or funds for employee sala-ries.

The perceived evenhandedness of thepeace committees affected their capacity to bro-ker agreements among adversaries. In the

KwaZulu–Natal region, a section of local lead-ers questioned the committee’s evenhandedness,adversely affecting its performance. In additionto these factors, differences in the nature of lead-ership, the commitment and quality of the staff,organizational flexibility, and access to re-sources explained variations in peace commit-tee performance.

Finally, the supportive elements of the po-litical environment—local, national, and inter-national—served to enable the development andfunction of peace committees. International sup-port for the peace process and reconciliation,as steps toward system change, reinforced thecommitment from both elite and local leaders.These persisted, even as other factors—the po-litical opposition, the apartheid regime, thestruggle mentality—limited the cumulative ef-fects of social reconciliation interventions.

The South African experience demon-strates that the peace committees at local, re-gional, and national levels can contribute, al-beit within certain delimitations, to conflict man-agement in deeply divided societies. Given theright conditions and prerequisites, they can fa-cilitate intragroup communication, work withopposing parties to reduce violence, and pro-mote some tolerance.

In many respects, the experience of peacecommittees in South Africa is not different fromthat of peace commissions in Nicaragua. Es-tablished in pursuance of the 1987 EsquipulasII Peace Accords and the National Reconcilia-tion Commission, peace commissions have per-formed communication and mediation functionsto promote peace and reconciliation. In fact,these commissions gave a more formal charac-

USAID’s Case Studies


ter to the efforts of religious leaders to open linesof communication between the Sandinista gov-ernment and the different factions of the contraarmy. Often the regional and local peace com-missions built on existing networks of personalcontacts to arrange for continual dialog and theexchange of information between the govern-ment and the contras.

During the transition, the peace commis-sions facilitated negotiations over the release ofprisoners, demobilization and reinsertion, refu-gee repatriation, and amnesty. They mediatedconflicts between the government and thecontras and compas, working out new disarma-ment agreements, monitoring elections and in-vestigating human rights abuses.

The Nicaraguan peace commissions still actas channels of communications and as mediat-ing bodies, with an additional emphasis on con-flict resolution and prevention. Over time, pro-cessing human rights accusations has become akey function. Consequently, the peace commis-sions have become the object of institutionalstrengthening efforts aimed at building capacityand ensuring some uniformity of practice andprocedure.

At least two factors that affected the per-formance and impact of peace committees inSouth Africa have also been relevant in Nicara-gua. First, as was the case in South Africa, themandate emanating from the National Recon-ciliation Commission and the endorsement andefforts of both the Catholic and EvangelistChurches and their institutions legitimized theroles of the peace commissions. This support wascritical, since the government, whether

Sandinista or Opposition National Union, of-ten relied on the peace commissions to monitorand reach out to armed groups. Church sup-port often ensured that the commissions wereperceived as neutral players, and not govern-ment agents.

Second, local ownership of peace com-missions was also an important factor, as inSouth Africa. When regional commissions didnot have community-based counterparts, theywere less successful in fulfilling their mediat-ing functions and were less likely to survivethe numerous transitions that have character-ized Nicaraguan politics.

Scientific CollaborationIn the Middle East*

The Middle East Regional CooperationProgram (MERC) is a good example of socialreconciliation interventions that seek the ben-efits of collaborative activity. It has been de-signed to advance peace and reconciliationamong former adversaries and still-hostileneighbors by promoting scientific cooperation.Under its auspices, Israeli and Egyptian andother Arab scientists, and their respective insti-tutions, have worked on a variety of researchand training projects that meet common devel-opmental needs. After the 1979 Camp DavidPeace Accords, Congress funded the programat $5 million annually and then $7 million ayear after 1990. USAID is responsible for grantadministration.

*Krishna Kumar wrote the case study on the MERCprogram with Irving Rosenthal.

11

The MERC program provides grants forcooperative projects between Israel and its Arabneighbors. U.S. intermediaries often administerthe projects. These are not limited to scientificresearch; most include technical assistance,training, extension, and institution building. Todate, MERC has un-derwritten collabora-tive scientific andtechnical endeavorsin health, agriculture,mariculture, waterand the environment,and education forpeace. Initially, Israeland Egypt were theprincipal benefactors;however, the Norwe-gian-sponsored 1993talks known as Oslo Ibrought the PalestineAuthority and otherMiddle Eastern countries into the fold.

As a development program, MERC withits various projects has supported advances inapplied technology, improved scientific infra-structure, and fostered technology transfers—accomplishments that would not have been pos-sible in the absence of this mechanism. As aninstrument of social reconciliation, MERC haspromoted tolerance and provided an institutionalbasis for further cooperation. However, the verynature of scientific research and the postconflictsetting have limited its ability to effect wide-reaching change.

The program has promoted social recon-ciliation in three ways. First, various aspects ofscientific collaboration have generated mutual

goodwill and understanding between participat-ing Egyptian and Israeli scientists. Initial en-counters evolved into close professional, andthen personal, relationships. As a result, formerantagonists began to see their counterparts lessas enemies and more as friends. New relation-

ships gradually dissi-pated old stereotypesand replaced them withmore positive imagesand perceptions. WhileMERC participantsdiscovered their com-mon humanity andshared desires forpeace, they did not be-come public advocatesfor peace or reconcili-ation in the region.Given the fragile na-ture of peace duringthis period, this may

not have been possible.

Second, MERC projects also contributedto the establishment, and often the consolida-tion, of relationships between Egyptian and Is-raeli institutions. Before MERC, no scientificcooperation existed between Egypt and Israel.Even in the aftermath of the Camp David ac-cords, participating institutions did not sign bi-lateral agreements with each other or trilateralagreements with the United States. Rather, thepolitical climate necessitated that each sign sepa-rate agreements with a mediating institution,often of U.S. origin. The lack of formal agree-ments did not affect the science; it merely re-flected the political situation of the time. Later,Egyptian and Israeli institutions entered intoformal trilateral agreements (with the United


As one who participated inthree wars with Arabs, I must

confess that I see themdifferently than I did in the past.

My contacts with Egyptian scien-tists have changed my whole

thinking. They are nice, friendlypeople who want peace as muchas we do. I hope that our leaders

realize that.

—Israeli agricultural specialist


States) and multilateral agreements (with orwithout the United States). This formalizationof relationships strengthened and anchored thenew cooperative relationships and arrangements.

MERC projects also created opportunitiesfor the participating organizations to institution-alize their cooperative research. These institu-tions have now developed procedures, struc-tures, and networksto initiate and sustainnew collaborativeprojects. As they or-ganize future projectsand seek funds inde-pendently, they haveless and less need forU.S. intermediaries.

Finally, MERCprojects have gener-ated tangible benefitsfor both the nationsinvolved and the con-stituencies that have astake in the sector.Cooperation in agri-cultural development,for example, has pro-duced a strong con-stituency of scien-tists, progressivefarmers, businessmen, and bureaucrats who en-joy the fruits of technology transfers, training,and extension in this area. Their eagerness tomaintain these projects translates into strong sup-port for greater social reconciliation.

Nonetheless, the overall impact of theMERC program on social reconciliation hasbeen limited.

First, cooperation has been limited in mostMERC projects. Many of the studies undertakenhave been “parallel” investigations, rather thancollaborative enterprises. That is, scientists fromEgypt, Israel, and other countries work inde-

pendently on similar,though not identical,research problems intheir own countries.A consequence hasbeen that the oppor-tunities for individualand institutional co-operation have beenlimited. In manyMERC projects, co-operative activitieshave often been con-fined to participationin annual or biennialmeetings and work-shops, some techni-cal advice, and occa-sional site visits.

Second, an elit-ist bias has generallyprevented lower

level scientists and administrators from attend-ing regional enclaves. In most cases, only a na-tional coordinator, principal investigators, andperhaps a sprinkling of other scientists have metwith their counterparts. These two factors, in-herent to most MERC projects, have actuallylimited the potential for reconciliation.

There was a desire on the part ofeach and every participant to

continue the collaborativerelationship, but, in fact, many ofthe scientists had already taken

steps to ensure that thecollaborative efforts would

continue in the future. Jointproposal planning sessions had

occurred prior to the arrival of theteam in the region. . . . There is

great enthusiasm to develop thisactivity into an even more regionalconcept by endorsing the inclusionof other country participants in the

follow-on activities.

—Final Evaluation Report, 1995Trinational Animal Health Research

13

As with other postconflict strategies forreconciliation, environmental factors have influ-enced project perfor-mance and the subse-quent payoff for recon-ciliation. Here the inter-state nature of the con-flict has been a criticalfactor, offering oppor-tunities for additionalroadblocks. The politi-cal climate has oftenupset the schedule ofresearch, data-genera-tion, and collection andinformation exchange.For example, whengovernment officials orpolitical leaders op-posed to a project peri-odically have createdbarriers that interferedwith the timetable foroverseas trips, site vis-its, or data exchange,both project implemen-tation and social recon-ciliation have suffered.Projects perceived asbeing in the nation’sprime interest and which have tangible benefitscould gain the support of influential governmentofficials in sidestepping these roadblocks. Forexample, the entire program of agricultural co-operation between Egypt and Israel would nothave survived the vicissitudes of political changebut for the strong support of the deputy primeminister of Egypt. The relative autonomy of theIsraeli institutions and the support of Israeli for-

eign policy establishment have also been criti-cal factors.

Finally, asym-metries in the infra-structure for scien-tific research—dif-fering capacities aswell as the extent ofgovernment con-trol—affected per-formance and setboundaries aroundcooperation. Theseasymmetries madecollaboration and es-tablishing linkagesboth difficult andunlikely. This wasparticularly true ofthe earlier MERCprojects. Recently,MERC-funded de-velopment has re-duced some of thesedisparities, permittedmore collaboration,and so augmentedthe possibility forreconciliation.

The 20-year chronicle of MERC projectexperience suggests certain policy lessons. Co-operative pursuits that emphasize realization ofmutual objectives—such as solving problems,developing new technologies, or training sci-entists—can engender social reconciliationthrough proximity and joint effort. In some cir-cumstances, such efforts can generate positive


Cooperation has benefited fromthe help of an influential

supporter, Dr. Youssef Walli, thedeputy prime minister and

minister of agriculture. He haslong been convinced that agricul-

tural cooperation with Israel isessential to modernizing Egyptian

agriculture in a cost-effectivemanner.

MERC projects in other sectors—marine, health, and environment—have generally not been perceived

as matters of prime nationalinterest and have not evoked

strong support from thegovernment, influential leaders,

and powerful ministries and theirclientele.

—Krishna Kumarwith Irving Rosenthal


images among the participants, promote long-term institutional linkages, and build politicalconstituencies that sustain cooperation and thenormalization of relations. However, the over-all effects of such cooperation on social recon-ciliation are likely to be modest. In thepostconflict setting, participants must be pre-pared to invoke different modalities of coopera-tion to expedite both implementation and rec-onciliation. Collaborative projects will receivemore political backing if they concentrate onproblems of paramount concern to both the gov-ernments involved and the people.

Media ProjectsIn Bosnia andHerzegovina*

Prior to the outbreak of civil war, the Serbnationalists succeeded in using the media, par-ticularly the broadcast media, to sow the seedsof ethnic chauvinism and antagonism. They uti-lized it to create new ethnic myths, to rewritethe history of interethnic relations with scant re-gard to the truth. They invariably depicted Serbsas victims of exploitation by other ethnic groups.Once the war broke out, Croats and Muslimsused the media for the same purposes.

Consequently, the three major ethnicgroups controlled individual segments ofBosnia’s fragmented media during the conflict.

Despite the cessation of hostilities after the 1995Dayton Peace Accord, the situation has notchanged much. The media continue to be di-vided throughout Bosnia’s two entities: theRepublika Sprska and the Bosniac–Croat Fed-eration.

International media interventions were de-signed to accomplish two broad objectives: 1)to disseminate objective, unbiased informationto counteract misinformation and vicious pro-paganda and 2) to support or establish sociallyresponsible media outlets that can promotepeace and tolerance.

First, to reach a greater audience, manyinternational broadcasters expanded their pro-grams and services in Yugoslav languages. Themost influential of these broadcasters—BBCWorld Service, Deutsche Welle, Radio FranceInternationale, Radio Free Europe, and Voiceof America—provided a balanced coverage ofevents. Local stations often picked up these pro-grams, especially after the Dayton accords. Inmany instances, these broadcasts were the onlysources of credible information.

Second, the international community pro-vided extensive support to create and sustainthose independent media outlets that could pro-mote the peaceful resolution of the conflict. Bi-lateral and multilateral agencies invested con-siderable resources on such efforts. USAIDalone had allocated $6 million to 43 media out-lets by April 1997.

The international community funded manyhigh-profile media initiatives. The Office of theHigh Representative (the agency coordinatingthe Dayton accords’ civilian aspects) underwrote

*The case study on media interventions in Bosnia andHerzegovina was still in production at the time of thiswriting. The author has relied on the notes of EileenAugenbraun and Susan Merrill, as well as on othermaterial, published and unpublished.

15

the Open Broadcast Network, also known asTVIN, which prepares programs for five promi-nent Bosnian television stations. Efforts are be-ing made to privatize TVIN, making it morebroadly based and sustainable. The Swiss gov-ernment supported the Free Elections RadioNetwork to provide unbiased coverage duringthe elections. FERN has correspondents all overBosnia and transmits a mélange of liberal pro-grams and modern music. USAID has fundedan entirely new newspaper insert, Ogledalo(“Mirror”). It is printed in Cyrillic script for itsSerb readership and in Latin script for its read-ers in the federation. Like FERN, Ogledalo hasits own news correspondents. It is distributedfree of charge inside other newspapers.

The independent media outlets receivedvarious types of assistance from the internationalcommunity. We will limit discussion to three.First, outlets obtained financial assistance to pur-chase machinery and newsprint or to cover over-head costs. While donors followed different poli-cies and used different criteria, subsidies weregenerally available to the interested outlets re-gardless of their long-term viability. Second, theinternational community helped the broadcastmedia to develop expertise in preparing andbroadcasting interesting news and televisionprograms.

The third form of assistance—short-termtraining for journalists—proved to be moreproblematic. The international community triedto address the shortage of professional journal-ists by sending experts to organize these train-ing courses. However, most of these experts hadlittle or no knowledge of the local languages.Often, they came with manuals that had little

relevance in the Bosnian context. Still worse,they competed with one another to recruit train-ees; senior editors were usually reluctant to com-mit junior staff to training programs they viewedas both superficial and irrelevant.

Several factors affected the performanceof media interventions. First, the internationalcommunity did not formulate a long-term strat-egy to build an independent media. Often theprojects were driven by the urgency of the situ-ation rather than by a realistic assessment ofneeds and long-term viability. This was under-standable, given the immediate necessity ofcounteracting misinformation, but it did resultin a considerable waste of economic and hu-man resources.

Second, donor coordination was practi-cally nonexistent prior to the accords. Almostall major bilateral donor agencies vied to sup-port media projects without consulting one an-other. In fact, they often competed in recruitingtrainees or identifying potential candidates forfinancial assistance. This produced an unnec-essary duplication of efforts. Only recently havethe international agencies begun to coordinatetheir media efforts.

Third, the media projects were often as-sembled with minimal input from local stake-holders, partly because of the lack of local ex-pertise and mainly because of the haste in whichthey were put together. No efforts were thenmade to create a sense of local ownership.

Fourth, the international community didnot examine the viability of the alternate news-papers, journals, and radio stations it funded.



Finally, the overriding concern for socialreconciliation occasionally led the funding agen-cies to exert subtle pressures on, if not controlover, the media. For example, when Muslim lis-teners began to recall their wartime torture byCroats on Radio Mostar, the European Unionadministrator of Mostar warned the station di-rector that this would heighten Muslim–Croattensions. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (a pan-European securityorganization) and Radio FERN proscribed eth-nically loaded phrases, and FERN even refusedto play local music in case the lyrics containedhateful messages. Although such pressures mayhave been desirable to prevent ethnic tensionsand to push social reconciliation forward, theydid not help in institutionalizing the norms of afree press.

Absent hard data, it is difficult to assesshow effective media projects were in reducingethnic tensions or promoting interethnic toler-ance. Anecdotal evidence suggests, though, thatdespite the limitations just mentioned, media in-terventions probably contributed to social rec-onciliation, if modestly. First, they helped toundermine the credibility of the state- and na-tionalist-controlled media. A growing segmentof the people listened to the broadcasts byFERN, the Open Broadcast Network, and in-ternational news agencies or read newspapersand periodicals supported by the internationalcommunity, thus getting unbiased information.Second, the projects helped create and nurtureindependent media, although those media stillstruggle to survive. Third, media assistance hasbolstered the emerging moderate political lead-ership in Bosnia and Herzegovina, clearly a pre-condition for any reconciliation.

The experience of the international com-munity in supporting media intervention pointsto a few policy lessons. First, it underscores theneed for a coherent, long-term strategy to buildand strengthen an independent, professional me-dia. Such a strategy should attend to the variousaspects of the media sector: the legal and regu-latory framework, the training of journalists,technological improvement, and the economicviability of media outlets. Second, when thereis a multiplicity of international actors, mecha-nisms for mutual consultation should be estab-lished to avoid duplication and to ensure that allcomponents of the sector receive adequate sup-port. Finally, the international community shouldrecognize the trade-off between the need for pro-moting social reconciliation and the norms offreedom of press. The dividing line between“message” and “propaganda” is thin indeed.

Economic ReactivationAnd InterethnicReconciliation*

The case study presented in this sectionexplores the slightly different strategy pursuedin Bosnia–Herzegovina and Croatia. In its ef-forts to restore peace and rehabilitate the shat-tered economy of the region, the internationalcommunity has supported a vast array of projectsthat concentrate on microenterprises and smallbusinesses, business organizations, and physi-cal infrastructure. There are indications that inaddition to reviving the economy, these eco-

*This section is based on a report by Eliene Augenbraun,Karl Feld, Iain Guest, and Susan Merrill.

17

nomic interventions contribute to social recon-ciliation. They generate, though in a limitedfashion, interethnic cooperation, thus promot-ing mutual tolerance and understanding. Threecategories of development interventions can bementioned in this connection.

First, the interna-tional community has pro-moted microenterprises aswell as small businesses togenerate employment andincome. Such projectshave particularly targetedreturning refugees, inter-nally displaced persons,and female-headed house-holds. They have pro-vided short- and medium-term loans, and occa-sionally technical assistance, to these new en-trepreneurs.

Such efforts have partly alleviated the suf-fering of the highly vulnerable groups. But theyseem to have had only a modest effect in pro-moting social reconciliation. By their nature,microenterprises tend to have limited backwardand forward linkages to the larger economy.They employ family labor and cater to localmarkets. As a result, they do not generate op-portunities for interethnic interactions. Smallbusiness ventures are only slightly better, to theextent they are more prone to seek labor andcapital, as well as markets, beyond family andimmediate community—undertakings that in-crease opportunities for interaction.

In many cases the international commu-nity has encouraged joint business enterprisesinvolving members of different ethnic groups.

For example, in the divided city of Gornji Vakuf,two women (one Muslim and the other Croat)established a cottage industry producing knit gar-ments. They exported their products to Scandi-navian countries and received marketing and de-sign expertise from abroad. The Travnik Busi-

ness Center, a nonprofit or-ganization, formed a soli-darity group consisting ofMuslims, Croats, and Serbs.The group worked togetherin producing poultry. Oneindividual produced eggs,another chickens, and thethird egg cartons. Suchmultiethnic ventures havebeen few so far. Moreover,they have generally de-

pended on international assistance. It remainsto be seen if they would be competitive in theabsence of outside support.

Second, the international community hassupported the creation of economic organiza-tions—financial intermediaries, economic asso-ciations, and informal groups—to spur eco-nomic development. These organizations tendto have an ethnically mixed management andstaff. For example, the international communityhas supported integrated financial intermediaryorganizations that can reach out to different eth-nic groups. Such financial institutions have beeninstrumental in creating ethnically blind busi-ness ventures, hiring multiethnic employees, es-tablishing multiethnic boards of directors, andcatering to multiethnic markets.

Economic associations, often revived orcreated with the assistance of the internationalcommunity, are also emerging as voices of mod-


As one interviewee hasstated, “Commerce is

ethnically blind; we buyand sell to whoever

pays.”

—Myra DautovitchBusiness Center, Travnik


eration and interethnic cooperation. The impera-tives of the market economy force these organi-zations to move toward some integration. Forexample, a small busi-ness organization ex-isted in the multiethniccity of Tuzla before thewar. USAID’s grant en-abled it to establish theIndependent Associa-tion of Businessmen ofBosnia and Herzegov-ina. The associationworks to facilitate busi-ness ventures and restoretrade between the enti-ties. The common eco-nomic interests of itsmany members havepushed the associationto lobby for economicpolicies it views as fa-vorable to business.

Finally, the interna-tional community hasprovided massive re-sources to rehabilitatethe devastated physical infrastructure—utilities,roads, bridges, railways, airports, telephones,and telecommunication. Such reconstructionhas expanded economic opportunities and gen-

erated modest growth. Movement of goods andpeople between the two entities has increased.It is too early to assess the effects of infrastruc-

ture rehabilitation on in-terethnic relations, butthere is little doubt it hasbeen contributing to theeconomic and politicalintegration of the region.Such integration can actas the foundation for eth-nic tolerance.

The internationalsupport to economic re-activation programs inpost-Dayton Bosnia andHerzegovina presents animportant lesson. Inter-ethnic reconciliationneed not rely solely on thetraditional social recon-ciliation programs out-lined in the first chapterof this study. Interven-tions that allow groups tocapitalize on mutual eco-nomic interests also pro-

vide some momentum toward social reconcilia-tion and tolerance. A variety of economic de-velopment initiatives can serve this purposewithin certain bounds.

In Osijek, in Croatia, USAIDhas funded Opportunity

International to establish asmall lending organization,

commonly known by itsacronym, NOA, to provide

loans in Eastern Slavonia. . . .NOA is an example of a

project designed to crosscommunity and ethnicfactions. Its board of

directors . . . includes a Serb,Croat, Muslim, Hungarian,

and Albanian. Each individualserves as a contact from his

or her community to theproject. Loan officers are

both Serb and Muslim.

—Eliene Augenbraunand others

AS OUTLINED in the foregoing chapters,these case studies are instructive, deepen-

ing our understanding of the limitations and pos-sibilities inherent in social reconciliation inter-ventions. They also suggest a few policy les-sons, elaborated below.

1. Social reconciliation interventions,whether directly or indirectly supported bythe international community, generally havea positive impact on postconflict societies.

USAID’s experience indicates that all threesocial reconciliation strategies—creating andsupporting grass-roots peace structures, peacemedia, and collaborative projects—have somevalue. Specific interventions can contribute toreducing social tensions and fostering intergrouptolerance.

Peace committees in South Africa helpedreduce the magnitude of violence. They helpedcreate a social space for dialog and contributedto crisis prevention in many communities. Me-dia projects in Bosnia helped, though on a lim-ited scale, to counteract extremist misinforma-tion and propaganda. They also helped createalternative media outlets. Scientific cooperation

in the Middle East positively affected the atti-tudes and perceptions of the participants. Oncepeople met in a professional context, their oldstereotypes and prejudices dissipated. Coopera-tive projects generated new institutions and cre-ated political constituencies in Egypt that had astake in continuing cooperation and thereforepromoting social reconciliation. In Bosnia, eco-nomic development projects have either soughtto fund intentionally multiethnic business ven-tures or to develop a sense of shared economicinterest that transcends ethnic considerations.

2. Taken in context, the impact of inter-nationally supported social reconciliation hasrecognizable limits.

Although social reconciliation interven-tions foster dialog or cooperative action, as in-tended, the cases presented suggest that overallimpact is modest indeed. Even the peace com-mittees, which probably performed better thanthe other types of interventions, had a mixedrecord. While they were effective in West Cape,they did not take root in the KwaZulu–Nataland Witsvaal regions. Moreover, even in thegeographical regions where they were effective,they could not prevent all violent conflicts. The

3 Policy Lessons


media interventions in Bosnia and Herzegovinahave encountered many obstacles since their in-ception, including opposition from nationalistparties. A significant number of new media out-lets supported by these projects foundered. Analternative media continues to grow, fueled bydonor funds.

The scientific collaboration program in theMiddle East has affected only a small numberof scientists and institutions and has not had asignificant impact beyond the scientific commu-nity. A sense of realism is needed about the ef-fectiveness of social reconciliation programs.Unrealistic expectations breed unjustifiable frus-tration.

3. Three environmental variables—po-litical commitment, indigenous ownership,and perceived fairness—are critical to the ef-fectiveness of social reconciliation interven-tions.

All the design, performance, and environ-mental factors that explain the relative successof development projects in general are relevantto social reconciliation interventions; beyondthat, political commitment, local ownership, andperceived fairness also appear to be critical totheir success.

Political commitment. The peace commit-tees had a national mandate; they enjoyed thepolitical support of national leaders. Even whennational support did not translate into local sup-port, it was still a major factor for legitimacyand credibility at the local level. The scientificcollaboration program in the Middle East sur-vived mainly because of the continual supportof the powerful deputy prime minister of Egypt

and those actors in the Israeli foreign policy es-tablishment who viewed cooperation as beingin the national interest. Such political commit-ment—at both the national and local levels—was often missing for social reconciliation ini-tiatives in Bosnia, and that blunted the projects’effectiveness.

Local ownership. The South Africansthemselves organized and instituted the peacecommittees; international involvement waslimited, at best. MERC awarded grants forprojects designed and submitted by participat-ing institutions and agencies. Once the grantswere awarded, the scientists and their institu-tions enjoyed complete freedom. Thus the senseof indigenous ownership was high in theseprojects. In sharp contrast, where such owner-ship was absent in Bosnian social reconcilia-tion projects, they were perceived as interna-tional efforts.

Perceived fairness. In South Africa, adver-saries appreciated peace committee efforts totake a balanced approach. Often the peace com-mittees assigned two individuals to a task in or-der to produce a rough political balance. In mostcases, MERC grants established parity betweenEgyptian and Israeli institutions, and conse-quently participants from both countries viewedthem as fair. The situation was different in thevolatile Bosnian environment. Serb extremistsalways resented international involvement andperceived all assistance programs as skewed infavor of the Muslims and Croats.

4. The involvement of a neutral thirdparty can be useful in deeply divided societ-ies.

21

The role of outsiders in the promotion ofsocial reconciliation presents something of aparadox. On the one hand, local ownership ofthe program is essential. Social reconciliationinterventions can hardly succeed if conflictinggroups are not involved in design and imple-mentation. On the other hand, in some contexts,neutral parties may be in a position to launchreconciliation projects. Without the direct in-volvement of USAID, the MERC program inthe Middle East would not have become a real-ity. In Bosnia, only the international commu-nity was in a position to support reconciliationinitiatives. The various adversaries had neitherthe political will nor the resources to design andimplement them.

5. Because of the social, cultural, andpolitical sensibilities involved, it is essentialthat designers of social reconciliation projectsconsider factors not always salient in tradi-tional development interventions.

First, they should pay attention to local cul-ture, traditional mechanisms of conflict resolu-tion, and local power structures. They shouldconsider the values, beliefs, and perceptions ofthe people. Second, they should seek to lowerthe level of public visibility, when possible. Hadthey had higher profiles, many MERC projectswould not have taken off. Low public profilehas also assisted projects in Bosnia andHerzegovina. Finally, project designers shouldconsider the singular problems that intergrouphostilities pose for project staff and participants.

6. To enhance opportunities for socialreconciliation, innovative strategies and in-struments should channel technical and fi-nancial assistance to indigenous organiza-

tions without forcing them to compromisetheir legitimacy, autonomy, and flexibility.

All of the case studies underscore the needfor innovative strategies and instruments, par-ticularly when channeling assistance to indig-enous organizations. In South Africa, practicallyall international assistance was indirect. Thepeace committees remained a largely indig-enous effort. The MERC program’s reliance onintermediary institutions—universities, researchinstitutes, and nongovernmental organiza-tions—to manage the grants enabled local ac-tors to view MERC as a scientific research pro-gram rather than as a social reconciliation ef-fort. This contributed its political and intellec-tual legitimacy. Most of the resources for socialreconciliation projects in Bosnia andHerzegovina have been channeled through in-ternational private voluntary organizations. Thiswas necessary during the conflict; afterward,indigenous NGOs resented the considerableresources that PVOs expended on expatriatestaff, travel, and office equipment, rather thanon programs.

7. Carefully designed economic devel-opment interventions can foster varying lev-els of cooperation and therefore toleranceamong antagonistic groups.

The experience of Bosnia andHerzegovina demonstrates that interventions ineconomic development can promote social rec-onciliation in postconflict societies. For ex-ample, the vast array of economic developmentprojects, ranging from support to small busi-nesses to the rehabilitation of physical infrastruc-ture, has created both incentives and opportu-nities for mutually beneficial multiethnic inter-

Policy Lessons

action. Guided by the profit motive, farmers,businessmen, and entrepreneurs are forging tiesthat transcend ethnic boundaries.

8. As far as possible, the internationalcommunity should support development in-terventions that are informed by a social rec-onciliation approach.

Such an approach will require that

a. Designers critically examine all possibleconsequences—both intended and unin-tended—for social reconciliation. For example,when initially preparing structural adjustmentprograms, USAID should analyze possible ef-fects on the relations between former adversar-

ies. If a planned intervention is likely to fostersevere intergroup competition or hostility, itshould be revised, with adequate safeguardsadopted.

b. As far as possible, development initia-tives be designed and implemented such thatthey augment social capital—norms of toler-ance, cooperation, and trust—in that society.

c. The project and program staff be ex-posed to conflict management and resolutiontechniques. They should be sensitive to exist-ing perceptions, intergroup relations, local powerstructures, and indigenous approaches to con-flict resolution.


Augenbraun, Eliene, and others. Forthcoming.Reconciling Ethnic Conflicts. U.S.Agency for International Development.Center for Development Informationand Evaluation. Washington.

Ball, Nicole. Forthcoming. Managing Conflictin South Africa. U.S. Agency for Inter-national Development. Center for De-velopment Information and Evaluation.Washington.

Catholic Relief Services, Program for Nicara-gua. 1998. Proyecto Consolidación dela Paz y Los Derechos Humanos.Managua.

Conradi, Loramy. 1993. “Grassroots Peaceworkin Nicaragua.” Peace Review 5(4).

Drumtra, Jeff. 1998. Life After Death: Suspi-cion and Integration in Post-GenocideRwanda. U.S. Committee for Refugees.Washington.

Jeffrey, Paul. 1997. “Risky Business: PeaceCommissions in Nicaragua.” The Chris-tian Science Monitor 114(27).

Kumar, Krishna; with Irving Rosenthal. 1998.Scientific Cooperation and Peace Build-ing. U.S. Agency for International De-velopment. Center for Development In-formation and Evaluation. Washington.

Organization of American States. 1998. Informede Actividades del Programa deFortalecimiento a la Infraestructura deAtención a los Derechos Humanos.Managua.

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