property 452 reviewer-digests p6

PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS (ATTY. AMPIL) 6th week | 2D 2012|

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1. SANTOS v. BERNABE

FACTS:

Santos deposited 778 cavans and 38 kilos of palay in the

warehouse of Bernabe. At the same time, Tiongson also

deposited 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of palay. The share of

Tiongson and Santos were mixed together and cannot be

separated.

Later on and for some unknown reason, Tiongson files a case

against Bernabe to recover the 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of

palay deposited in Bernabes warehouse. So Tiongson files for

a petition for a writ of attachment and the Court granted it.

Bernabes properties were attached, including only 924

cavans of rice and 31 kilos of palay. These were sold at a

public auction and the proceeds were delivered to Tiongson.

Santos tried to intervene in the attachment of the palay but

then the sheriff had already proceeded with the attachment,

so Santos files a complaint. He says that Tiongson cannot

claim the 924 cavans of palay; he says that by asking for the

attachment of the properties, Tiongson is claiming that the

cavans of rice all belonged to Bernabe and not to him.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tiongson can claim the 924 cavans of

rice as his own.

HELD: No, both Tiongson and Santos must divide the cavans

and palay proportionately.

The cavans belonging to Santos, having been mixed with

those belonging to Tiongson, the following rule prescribed is

Article 381 of the Civil Code: If, by will of one of their

owners, two things of identical or dissimilar nature are

mixed, or if the mixture occurs accidentally, if in the latter

case, the things cannot be separated without injury, each

owner shall acquire a right in the mixture proportionate to

the part belonging to him, according to the value of the

things mixed or comingled.

RULING: The number of kilos in a cavan not having been

determined, the Court took the proportion only of the 924

cavans of palay which were attached andsold, therby giving

Santos, who deposited 778 cavans, 398.49 and Tiongson, who

deposited 1,026 cavans, 525.51, or the value thereof at the

rate of 3Php per cavan.

2. SIARI VALLEY ESTATE INC. V. FILEMON LUCASAN

If the commingling of 2 things is made in bad faith, the one

responsible for it will lose his share.

(guys its REALLY short so you can read it)

FACTS:

Siari Valley Inc. brought action to recover 200 heads of cattle

that were driven from its lands to that of Lucasans. Lucasan

however argued that although there was commixtion of

cattle, Siari already retrieved its animals. The CFI of

Zamboanga decided in favor of Siari thus the case at bar.

ISSUE: W/N Lucasan was in bad faith thus should lose his

share in the commixtion

HELD: YES

Although there was no actual evidence that all 823 missing

animals were taken by Lucasan or his men, on 2 occasions

however, his men drove away 30 heads of cattle. It is not

erroneous to believe that the others must have also been

driven away applying by analogy the principle that one who

stole a part of the stolen money must have taken also the

larger sum lost by the offended party.

Art. 382 (now Art. 473) of the CC states that if the

commingling of 2 things is made in bad faith, the one

responsible for it will lose his share thus since Lucasan is in

bad faith, he should lose his share in the commixtion.

[this is no longer in Phil Reports provided but in case Sir asks

about the dispositive portion]

The SC ordered Lucasan to deliver the 321 heads that had

been entrusted to his care to Siari; pay damages for the 400

heads he sold since 1946; ordered to allow Siari to round up

all the buffaloes that may be found on its cattle ranch

3. AGUIRRE V. PHENANG

FACTS

Spouses Aldaba sold to Jesus Aguirre a circular bolted steel

tank for Php900, which was not physically possessed by

petitioner due to prevention by the municipality where the

tank was located. The spouses sold again the same tank to

Zosimo Gabriel for the same price, who sold it to Leonora and

Company for Php2,500, who made an improvement

(investment and expenses) thereto worth Php11,299 and sold

it Nassco (National Shipyards and Steel Corporation) for

Php14,500. Aguirre filed a case against the spouses and L&C

where it was held that he is the absolute owner. While the

above case was pending, L&C filed a case against Nassco for

its non-payment, with petitioner as intervenor. It was held

that petitioner must reimburse L&C Php11,299 or upon failure

to deliver, Nassco must pay petitioner Php900 and L&C

Php14500.

If two things of identical or dissimilar nature are mixed and

the owners of the things are in good faith, OR if the

mixture occurs accidentally and cannot be separated

without injury, each owner shall acquire a right in the

mixture proportionate to the part belonging to him,

according to the value of the things mixed or comingled.

In specification, if both parties are in good faith, the

principal owner may acquire such property, provided that

he pay reimbursements made by the laborer for his

expenses. Without reimbursements, there is an unjust

enrichment in favor of the petitioner.


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ISSUE: Whether petitioner may acquire such property without

reimbursements

RULING:

Since there was alteration of such tank, Specification took

place. The court found that L&C was in good faith when it

made the improvements over the property. Since both parties

are in good faith, the principal owner may acquire such

property, provided that pays reimbursements made by the

laborer for his expenses. Without reimbursements, there is an

unjust enrichment in favor of the petitioner.

4. VICENTE SAPTO VS. FABIANA FACTS: The subject property was originally owned by Sapto (this Sapto was a Moro, so only one name) and located in Alambre, Toril, Davao City. He died, leaving three sons Samuel, Constancio, and Ramon. The latter predeceased his brothers, leaving no heirs. Samuel and Constancio executed a deed of sale for a portion of said property in favour of Fabiana in consideration of P240.00. The sale was approved by the governor of Davao but was never registered. The property was transferred to Fabiana and from then on he enjoyed possession from 1931 until the case was filed. Constancio died with no issue, leaving Samuel as sole administrator of the property. Upon the latters death, his widow and two children filed the present action for recovery of the parcel of land sold by their predecessors to defendant. The CFI held that although the sale between the Sapto brothers and Fabiana was never registered, it was binding valid and binding upon the parties and the vendors heirs. The CFI also ordered the petitioners to execute the necessary deed of conveyance in favour of the defendant. Hence this appeal. ISSUE W/n the CFIs order of conveyance in favour of Fabiana was valid. HELD: The SC first affirmed the validity of the sale between the Sapto brothers and Fabiana, ruling, that even though it was never registered the sale was valid, binding, and effective upon the heirs of the vendor. According to the court, actual notice of the sale served as registration. Futher, that the transfer and possession of the property was a clear indication of the validity of the sale. Regarding the issue on the validity of the order of conveyance, the SC ruled that it was valid. In assailing the order, the Sapto heirs claimed that the CFI cannot order the conveyance because the defendants cause of action had already prescribed. The SC ruled however, that the action for conveyance was actually one to quiet title. In ruling so, the SC cited American jurisprudence and Art. 480 of the New Civil Code, which

states, that actions to quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible. The judgement is affirmed, cost against appellants.

5. TITONG v CA

FACTS:

A 20,592 square meter parcel of land located at Barrio

Titiong, Masbate is the subject property being disputed in this

case. The property is being claimed by 2 contestants,

however legal title over the property can only be given to one

of them.

The case originated from an action for quieting of title filed

by petitioner Mario Titong. The RTC of Masbate decided in

favor of private respondents, Vicente Laurio and Angeles

Laurio as the true and lawful owners of the disputed land.

The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Titong asserts that he is the owner of an unregistered parcel

of land with an area of 3.2800 hectares and declared for

taxation purposes. He claims that on three separate

occasions, private resps, with their hired laborers, forcibly

entered a portion of the land containing an approximate area

of 2 hectares and began plowing the same under pretext of

ownership. On the other hand, private resps denied the claim

and said that the subject land formed part of the 5.5 hectare

agricultural land which they had purchased from their

predecessor-in-interest, Pablo Espinosa.

Titong identified Espinosa as the his adjoining owner asserting

that no controversy had sprouted between them for 20 years

until the latter sold lot 3749 to V. Laurio. The boundary

between the land sold to Espinosa and what remained of

Titongs property was the old Bugsayon river. When Titong

employed Lerit as his tenant, he instructed the latter to

change the course of the old river and direct the flow of

water to the lowland at the southern portion of Titongs

property, thus converting the old river into a Riceland.

Private resps, on the other hand, denied claim of Titongs,

saying that the area and boundaries of disputed land

remained unaltered during the series of conveyances prior to

its coming into his hands. Accdg to him, Titong first declared

land for taxation purposes which showed that the land had an

area of 5.5 hectares and was bounded on the north by the B.

River; on the east by property under ownership by Zaragoza,

and on the west by property owned by De la Cruz. He also

alleges that Titong sold property to Verano. The latter

For one to file an action to quiet title to a parcel of land,

the requisites in Art 476 of the NCC must be complied with

meaning there should be an instrument, record, claim,

encumbrance setting forth the cloud or doubt over the

title. Otherwise, the action to be filed can either be

ejectment, forcible entry, unlawful detainer, accion

reivindicatoria or accion publiciana.

Actions to quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible.


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reacquired the property pursuant to mutual agreement to

repurchase the same.

However, the property remained in Titongs hands only for 4

days because he sold it to Espinosa. It then became a part of

the estate of Espinosas wife, late Segundina Espinosa. Later

on, her heirs executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate

with Simultaneous Sale whereby the 5.5 hectares was sold to

Laurio for 5,000 pesos. In all these conveyances, the area and

boundaries of the property remained exactly the same as

those appearing in the name of Titongs.

The court found out that 2 surveys were made of the

property. First survey was made by Titong, while the second

was the relocation survey ordered by the lower court.

Because of which, certain discrepancies surfaced. Contrary to

Titongs allegation, he was actually claiming 5.9789 hectares,

the total areas of lot nos 3918, 3918-A and 3606. The lot 3479

pertaining to Espinosas was left with only an area of 4.1841

hectares instead of the 5.5 hectares sold by Titong to him.

Apprised of the discrepancy, private resps filed a protest

before Bureau of Lands against 1st survey, and filing a case

for alteration of boundaries before the MTC, proceedings of

which were suspended because of instant case.

Private resps. Avers that Titong is one of the four heirs of his

mother, Leonida Zaragoza. In the Extrajudicial Settlement

with Sale of Estate of late Zaragoza, the heirs adjudicated

unto themselves the 3.6 hectares property of the deceased.

The property was bounded by the north by Verano, on the

east by Bernardo Titong, on the south by the Bugsayon River

and on the west by Benigno Titong.

Instead of reflecting only .9000 hectares as his rightful share

in the extrajud settlement, Titongs share bloated to 2.4

hectares. It then appeared to Laurio that Titong encroached

upon his property and declared it as part of his inheritance.

The boundaries were likewise altered so that it was bounded

on the north by Verano, on the east by B. Titong, on the

south by Espinosa and on the west by Adolfo Titong. Laurio

also denied that Titong diverted course of the B. river after

he had repurchased the land from Verano because land was

immediately sold to Espinosa thereafter.

ISSUE: W/N Titong is the rightful owner of the subject

property

RULING: NO

The remedy for quieting of title may be availed of under the

circumstances mentioned in Art 476 of the NCC wherein it

says that action to quiet title may be made as a remedial or

preventive measure. Under 476, a claimant must show that

there is an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or

proceeding which casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow

upon owners title to or interest in real property. The ground

for filing a complaint for quieting title must be instrument,

record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding.

In the case at bar, Titong failed to allege that there was an

instrument, claim etc be clouded over his property. Through

his allegations, what Titong imagined as clouds cast on his

title were Laurios alleged acts of physical intrusion into his

purported property. The grounds mentioned are for action for

forcible entry and not quieting title.

In addition, the case was considered to be a boundary

dispute. The RTC and CA correctly held that when Titong sold

the 5.5 hectare land to Espinosa, his rights and possession

ceased and were transferred to Laurio upon its sale to the

latter.

Thus, it is now a contract of sale wherein it is a contract

transferring dominion and other real rights in the thing sold.

Titong also cannot rely on the claim of prescription as

ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good

faith and with just title for the time fixed by law.

6. PINGOL V. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

In 1969, Pingol, the owner of a lot (Lot No. 3223) in Caloocan

City, executed a DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF ONE-HALF OF

AN UNDIVIDED PORTION OF [his] PARCEL OF LAND in favor of

Donasco (private respondent), payable in 6 years.

In 1984, Donasco died and was only able to pay P8,369 plus

P2,000 downpayment, leaving a balance of P10,161. The heirs

of Donasco remained in possession of such lot and offered to

settle the balance with Pingol. However, Pingol refused to

accept the offer and demanded a larger amount. Thus, the

heirs of Donasco filed an action for specific performance

(with Prayer for Writ of Prelim. Injunction, because Pingol

were encroaching upon Donascos lot). Pingol averred that

the sale and transfer of title was conditional upon the full

payment of Donasco (contract to sell, not contract of sale).

With Donascos breach of the contract in 1976 and death in

1984, the sale was deemed cancelled, and the heirs

continuous occupancy was only being tolerated by Pingol.

ISSUES:

(1) W/N Pingol can refuse to transfer title to Donasco (2) W/N Donasco has the right to quiet title

A vendee in an oral contract to convey land who had

made part payment thereof, entered upon the land and had

made valuable improvements thereon is entitled to bring

suit to clear his title against the vendor who had refused to

transfer the title to him. It is not necessary that the

vendee should have an absolute title, an equitable title

being sufficient to clothe him with personality to bring an

action to quiet title.

An action to quiet title of property in ones possession is

IMPRESCRIPTIBLE.


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RULING: (1) No. The contract between Pingol and Donasco is

a contract of sale and not a contract to sell. The acts of the

parties, contemporaneous and subsequent to the contract,

clearly show that the parties intended an absolute deed of

sale; the ownership of the lot was transferred to the Donasco

upon its actual (upon Donascos possession and construction

of the house) and constructive delivery (upon execution of

the contract). The delivery of the lot divested Pingol of his

ownership and he cannot recover the title unless the contract

is resolved or rescinded under Art. 1592 of NCC. It states that

the vendee may pay even after the expiration of the period

stipulated as long as no demand for rescission has been made

upon him either judicially or by notarial act. Pingol neither

did so. Hence, Donasco has equitable title over the property.

(2) Although the complaint filed by the Donascos was an

action for specific performance, it was actually an action to

quiet title. A cloud has been cast on the title, since despite

the fact that the title had been transferred to them by the

execution of the deed of sale and the delivery of the object

of the contract, Pingol adamantly refused to accept the

payment by Donascos and insisted that they no longer had the

obligation to transfer the title.

Donasco, who had made partial payments and improvements

upon the property, is entitled to bring suit to clear his title

against Pingol who refused to transfer title to him. It is not

necessary that Donasco should have an absolute title, an

equitable title being sufficient to clothe him with personality

to bring an action to quiet title.

Prescription cannot also be invoked against the Donascos

because an action to quiet title to property in ONEs

POSSESSION is imprescriptible.

7. GALLAR v HUSAIN

If the action is brought by the one who is in possession of the

land, the action is imprescriptible; otherwise, it could

prescribe.

FACTS: Husains in this case are the heirs of Teodoro Husain. Teodoro Husain sold the land under dispute for 30 pesos to Serapio Chichirita with the right to repurchase within 6 years. Teodoro transferred his right to his sister, Graciana Husain. Graciana paid the redemption price and later sold the land to Elias Gallar for a cattle. Possession of the land, together with the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title of Teodoro Husain, was delivered on the same occasion to Gallar, who since then has been in possession of the land. A couple of years after, Gallar filed this suit in the Court of Instance of Iloilo on October 10, 1960 to compel Hermenegilda and Bonifacio Husain, as heirs of Teodoro Husain, to execute a deed of conveyance in his favor so that he could get a transfer certificate of title. He also asked for damages. The Husains countered by saying that Graciana already paid the redemption price thus their father had already reacquired

ownership over the same. They also claim that the action of Elias has already PRESCRIBED. ISSUE: 1) W/N ownership was transferred to Gallar?

2) W/N the action has already prescribed? RULING: 1) YES, ownership has been transferred to Gallar. The right of repurchase may be exercised only by the vendor in whom the right is recognized by contract or by any person to whom the right may have been transferred. Graciana Husain must, therefore, be deemed to have acquired the land in her own right, subject only to Teodoro Husain's right of redemption. As the new owner she had a perfect right to dispose of the land as she in fact did when she exchanged it for a cattle with Gallar. 2) NO, the action is imprescriptible. This action is not for specific performance; all it seeks is to quiet title, to remove the cloud cast on appellee's ownership as a result of appellant's refusal to recognize the sale made by their predecessor. And, as plaintiff-appellee is in possession of the land, the action is imprescriptible. Appellant's argument that the action has prescribed would be correct if they were in possession as the action to quiet title would then be an action for recovery of real property which must be brought within the statutory period of limitation governing such actions.

8. VDA. DE AVILES v CA

An action to quiet title or to remove cloud may not be

brought for the purpose of settling a boundary dispute

FACTS:

Eduardo Aviles, the predecessor of the petitioners is the

bother of defendant Camilo. They inherited their lands from

their parents and have agreed to subdivide the same amongst

themselves. The area alloted (sic) to Eduardo Aviles is 16,111

square meters more or less, to Anastacio Aviles is 16,214

square meters more or less, while the area alloted to

defendant Camilo Aviles is 14,470 square meters more or less.

Defendants land composed of the riceland portion of his land

is 13,290 square meters, the fishpond portion is 500 square

meters and the residential portion is 680 square meters, or a

total of 14,470 square meters.

The Petitioners claim that they are the owners of the fish

pond which they claim is within their area. Defendant Camilo

Aviles asserted a color of title over the northern portion of

the property with an area of approximately 1,200 square

meters by constructing a bamboo fence (thereon) and moving

the earthen dikes, thereby molesting and disturbing the

peaceful possession of the plaintiffs over said portion.

Petitioners say that the fences were created to unduly

encroach to their property but the defendant said that he

merely reconstructed the same.


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Petitioners brought an action to quiet title but were denied

thus this case.

ISSUE: W/N Petitioners filed the right action

RULING:

No, Petitioners filed the wrong action. This is obviously a

boundary dispute and as such the action must fail.

Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title. An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon a title to real property or any interest therein.

Petitioners fail to point out any any instrument, record,

claim, encumbrance or proceeding that could been a cloud

to their title. In fact, both plaintiffs and defendant admitted

the existence of the agreement of partition dated June 8,

1957 and in accordance therewith, a fixed area was allotted

to them and that the only controversy is whether these lands

were properly measured.

A special civil action for quieting of title is not the proper

remedy for settling a boundary dispute, and that petitioners

should have instituted an ejectment suit instead. An action

for forcible entry, whenever warranted by the period

prescribed in Rule 70, or for recovery of possession de facto,

also within the prescribed period, may be availed of by the

petitioners, in which proceeding the boundary dispute may be

fully threshed out.

9. OBLEA V. CA|ESTEBAN, 244 SCRA 101

FACTS: The lot in issue was originally registered in the names of Manuel Melencio, Pura Melencio, Wilfredo Wico and Mariabelle Wico. But was subsequently re-registered in the name of Ramon Melencio (son of deceased Manuel Melencio), Pura Melencio and the Wicos via a deed of sale. On 6 June 1958 subject lot was bought by private respondent Juan S. Esteban from Mauricio Ramos who claimed to have acquired the property from Ursula Melencio, the alleged administratrix of the estate of Manuel and Pura Melencio. Meanwhile, petitioner Romeo V. Oblea leased a building located on the subject lot from a certain Marius Esteban, an alleged son of private respondent Juan S. Esteban. Oblea eventually bought from Marius the lot on which the building

stood. As a consequence, on 4 July 1991 Juan Esteban filed an ejectment suit against petitioner Oblea. MTC decided for Juan Esteban and ordered Oblea to vacate and pay arrears. On appeal, RTC affirmed MTC. On 3 June 1993, the registered owners (Ramon Melencio, Pura Melencio and Wilfredo Wico and Mariabelle Wico) sold the disputed lot to petitioner Oblea. Afterwards, Oblea together with the registered owners filed before the RTC an action for quieting of title against Juan Esteban. They contended that the deeds of sale executed by Mauricio Ramos in favor of Juan Esteban and by Ursula Melencio in favor of Mauricio Ramos were a nullity. Meanwhile, the ejectment case was appealed thrice to the CA but all were denied. In the appeal to the SC, Oblea asserts that the subsequent sale to him by the registered owners is a supervening event that gave him a better right of possession and ownership. Hence the judgment of eviction can no longer be enforced. ISSUE: W/N a subsequent action to quiet title in the RTC divests the MTC of its jurisdiction over an ejectment case? HELD:

No.The sole issue in an action for unlawful detainer is

physical or material possession, i.e., possession de facto and

not possession de jure. The pendency of an action for

quieting of title before the RTC does not divest the MTC of its

jurisdiction to proceed with the ejectment case over the

same property. The subsequent acquisition of ownership by

petitioners is not a supervening event that will bar the

execution of the judgment in said unlawful detainer case, the

fact remaining that when judgment was rendered by the MTC

in the ejectment case, petitioner Oblea was a mere possessor

of the subject lot.

Similarly, the fact that petitioners instituted a separate action for quieting of title is not a valid reason for defeating the execution of the summary remedy of ejectment. On the contrary., it bolsters the conclusion that the eviction case did not deal with the issue of ownership which was precisely the subject matter of the action for quieting of title before the RTC. With the finality of the decision in the ejectment case, execution in favor of the prevailing party has become a matter of right; its implementation mandatory. It cannot be avoided. 10. GAPACAN V. OMIPET, 387 SCRA 383 FACTS: Paicat Gapacan is the primitive possessor of an unregistered land in Mt. Province, divided into 3 parcels of riceland and another planted to camote and declared by him for taxation purposes. He had two children Maria and Antonio. Antonio left for a long while to try his luck in the mines Benguet. Maria remained, took care of their father and eventually took over the cultivation of the land.

The pendency of an action to quiet title in the RTC does

not divest the MTC of its jurisdiction to execute a final

judgment in a prior ejectment case.

Issues of property rights can be determined in an action

to quiet title.


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Antonio Gapacan returned to and executed an Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property showing that the property had been transferred to him by his sister Maria Gapacan-Omipet (Omipet) making him in effect the legal owner of the property in question. Since then, Antonio Gapacans family (Gapacans) had been occupying and cultivating the property. Sometime in 1992, Omipet hired laborers to clear and cultivate portions of the disputed property. Gapacans prohibited them Gapacans and ordered the defendants to vacate the land and restore possession to plaintiffs. Omipet then filed an action to quiet title in RTC and that she be declared the lawful owner. RTC adjudged that Gapacans have right of possession over the land. On appeal CA, declared that the land is common property of both Omipet and Gapacans and ordered its partition. Both parties appealed. Gapacans alleged that CA cannot declare that the land is common property since it deviates from the cause of action in the trial court. Omipets appeal is mostly factual. ISSUE: W/N property rights can be decided in an action to quiet title? HELD: Yes. Art. 476 of the Civil Code provides that an action to quiet title may be brought when there exists a cloud on the title to a real property or any interest therein. In the case of Bautista v. Exconde, we held that the property owner whose property rights were being disturbed may ask a competent court for a proper determination of the respective rights of the party-claimants, not only to place things in their proper place, that is, to require the one who has no right to refrain from acts injurious to the peaceful enjoyment of the property not only of the rightful owner but also for the benefit of both with the view of dissipating any cloud of doubt over the property. It goes without saying therefore that the appellate court in resolving the present controversy is well within its authority to adjudicate on the respective rights of the parties, that is, to pass upon the ownership of the property; hence to declare the same as common property. As to Omipets appeal, SC merely affirmed the findings of the trial court that she did not present sufficient evidence to overcome Gapacans better right to possession. SC ultimately ruled that CA was correct in its determination that the land in dispute is common property and should be partitioned. 11. ROBLES v. CA

FACTS

Petitioners (all surnamed Robles) trace their ownership of a

parcel of land (9,985 sq m.) to Leon and Silvino, their

grandfather and father, respectively. Upon Silvinos death in

1942, said petitioners inherited the property and started

cultivation thereof. Hilario Robles, private respondent and

half-brother of the petitioners, was entrusted with the

payment of land taxes due on the property. In 1962, Hilario

caused both the cancellation of the tax declaration covering

the property and its transfer to Ballane (his father-in-law).

Ballane mortgaged the property and, for some reason, the tax

declaration thereon was subsequently named to Hilario. The

latter then mortgaged the property to private respondent

Rural Bank of Cardona. The mortgage was foreclosed and said

bank acquired by public bidding the property which was then

sold by it to the spouses Santos. Petitioners learned of the

mortgage only in 1987. Subsequently, the action was filed,

impleading also as parties-defendant the Director of Lands

and the District Land Officer sue to an issuance of a free

patent in favour of spouses Santos. Trial court ruled in favour

of petitioners, declaring null the patent, declaring the heirs

of Silvino absolute owners of the subject land. CA reversed on

the ground that petitioners no longer had title to the

property.

ISSUES

(1) whether petitioners have the appropriate title essential to an action for quieting of title (relevant issue) and whether title claimed by respondents is valid

(2) whether REM between Hilario and RBC is valid (3) whether issuance of free patent is valid

HELD

(1) Petitioners have valid title by virtue of their continued and open occupation and possession as owners of the subject property.

In this case, the cloud on petitioners title

emanate from the apparent validity of the free

patent issued and the tax declarations and other

evidence in favour of respondents ultimately leading

to the transfer of the property to spouses Santos.

WRT title of the spouses Santos, such is deemed

invalid/inoperative insofar as it is rooted in the title

and appropriation of Hilario. Hilario could not have

prejudiced the rights of his co-heirs as co-owners of

the real estate. He must have first repudiated the

ownership clearly and evidently. CA failed to

consider the irregularities in the transactions

involving the property. No instrument/deed of

conveyance was presented to show any transaction

between petitioners and Ballane or even Hilario.

(2) Mortgage was only valid insofar as Hilarios undivided interest is concerned there being co-ownership between the heirs. Court also delved into gross negligence which amounted to bad faith on part of bank by not exercising due diligence in verifying the ownership of the land considering such was unregistered.

Free patent was also not valid, the land in question having

been converted ipso jure to private land by virtue of the

adverse possession in the concept of owners since

It is essential to have a legal or equitable title to or

interest in the subject matter of the action for title

quieting; ICERP must be shown to be in fact invalid despite

apparent validity


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(3) 1916 by the petitioners. Issuance of patents covering private lands is out of the jurisdiction of the Director of Lands or Bureau of Lands.

Hence, the sale of the property in favour of the spouses

Santos WRT the share of Hiario was valid but the patent

issued was null.

12. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. V ALEJO

A cloud on a title is defined as a semblance of title which appears in some legal form but which is in fact unfounded. Where a title was previously held null and void already, an action to quiet title is not the proper remedy because the TCT (as basis of the right) is not, on its face or otherwise, valid in the first place.

FACTS: Spouses Raul and Cristina Acampado obtained loans from Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company in the amounts of 5k and 2k. As security for the payment, Spouses Acampados executed in favor of the bank a Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land registered in their names. Subsequently a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the TCT of the spouses was filed by Sy Tan Se in the RTC of Valenzuela. Despite being the mortgagee of the real property, the bank was not made a party to the said civil case(complaint for declaration of nullity of TCT.) They werent notified as well. The spouses defaulted in the payment of their loan and extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings were initiated. The bank submitted the highest and winning bid. A certificate of sale was issued in their favor. When they were about to get their TCT from the Register of Deeds, petitioner was informed of the existence of the decision in the aforementioned civil case (complaint for declaration of nullity of TCT) declaring the Spouses Acampadoss TCT null and void. The bank filed with the CA a petition for the annulment of the RTC Decision CA dismissed their petition and ruled that the bank should have filed a petition for relief from judgment or an action for quieting of title ISSUES:

1. w/n a petition for annulment of judgment is the proper remedy available to the bank 2. w/n the judgment of the trial court (declaring the

Spouses Acampados TCT null and void) should be declared null and void

HELD Both Yes 1. Petition for annulment of judgment was the proper remedy available to the bank. It precisely alleged that Sy Tan Se purposely concealed the case by excluding petitioner as a defendant to the civil case even if he was an indispensable party. This deprived the bank of its duly registered property right without due process of the law. The allegation of extrinsic fraud may be the basis for annulling a judgment.

Petition for relief (what the CA recommended) was not available to the bank since it was never a party to the civil case. An action for quieting of the title was also not available to the bank. An action for quieting of title is filed only when there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein. A cloud on a title is defined as a semblance of title which appears in some legal form but which is in fact unfounded. The subject judgment cannot be considered as a cloud on petitioners title or interest over the real property covered by TCT, which does not even have a semblance of being a title. It would not be proper to consider the subject judgment as a cloud that would warrant the filing of an action to quiet title because to do so would require the court hearing the action to modife or interfere with the judgment of another co-equal court. Well-entrenched in our jurisdiction is the doctrine that our court has no power to do so, as that action may lead to confusion and seriously hinder the administration of justice. Clearly, an action for quieting of title is not an appropriate remedy in this case. Bank cant also intervene to a case that he has no knowledge of. 2. The judgment of the trial court should also be declared null and void because the bank, which is an indispensable party, was not impleaded in the civil case. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actuations of the court null and void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. 13. BENITO vs. SAQUITAN-RUIZ

FACTS:

Petitioners Horacio and Felisa Benito, originally, bought the

land from Francisco Morales and instituted ejectment

proceedings against all of the other squatters in the land.

Respondent, Agapita Saquitan-Ruiz bought a portion of the

land from petitioner on a promise to contribute Php 6000 for

the ejectment proceedings which will serve as the

consideration for the sale. On 17 April 1979, a Deed of

Absolute Sale was issued in favor of respondent, however, he

failed to pay his obligation of Php 6000. Thus, the petitioner

never caused the issuance of the certificate of title despite

demands of the respondent for such issuance. Instead,

petitioner subdivided the lot where respondents land was

located into five while the latter continued to possess such

land. Petitioners, then borrowed Php75,000 from a certain

Basilia Dela Cruz, who later sued them for collection. For

failure to pay the borrowed money, a writ of execution was

issued by the RTC and the disputed petitioners land was sold

to Dela Cruz at a public auction, in which the latter was the

highest bidder. On 25 March 1996, the assailed Certificate of

Title was issued to Dela Cruz but it was only on 27 May 1999

If a person claiming to be the owner of a wrongfully registered parcel of land is in actual possession, then his right to seek reconveyance does not prescribea.


8

that the Certificate of Final Deed of Sale was issued. On 1

April 1999, respondent filed the case for specific performance

with declaration of nullity of titles and damages.

ISSUE/S:Whether or not petitioners action to quiet title had

already prescribed?

RULING: No.

The respondent is in possession of the disputed property. If a

person claiming to be the owner of a wrongfully registered

parcel of land is in actual possession, the right to seek

reconveyance does not prescribe. A petition for the quieting

of title, although essentially an action for reconveyance,

should not be dismissed on the ground of prescription, if it is

alleged that the plaintiff is in possession of the property.

Furthermore, the action was seasonably filed since Dela

Cruzs right to its conveyance and possession was subject to

the 12-month redemption perion provided under section 33 of

rule 39 of the Rules of court. In this case, only a month had

passed.

14. NAKPIL & SONS v CA

FACTS:

Private respondents Philippine Bar Association (PBA) a non-

profit organization formed under the corporation law decided

to put up a building in Intramuros, Manila. Hired to plan the

specifications of the building were Juan Nakpil & Sons, while

United Construction was hired to construct it. The proposal

was approved by the Board of Directors and signed by the

President, Ramon Ozaeta. The building was completed in

1966.

In 1968, there was an unusually strong earthquake which

caused the building heavy damage, which led the building to

tilt forward, leading the tenants to vacate the premises.

United Construction took remedial measures to sustain the

building.

PBA filed a suit for damages against United Construction, but

United Construction subsequently filed a suit against Nakpil

and Sons, alleging defects in the plans and specifications.

Technical Issues in the case were referred to Mr. Hizon, as a

court appointed Commissioner. PBA moved for the demolition

of the building, but was opposed. PBA eventually paid for the

demolition after the building suffered more damages in 1970

due to previous earthquakes. The Commissioner found that

there were deviations in the specifications and plans, as well

as defects in the construction of the building.

ISSUE: Whether or not an act of God (fortuitous event)

exempts from liability parties who would otherwise be due to

negligence?

HELD:

Art. 1723 dictates that the engineer/architect and contractor

are liable for damages should the building collapse within 15

years from completion.

Art. 1174 of the NCC, however, states that no person shall be

responsible for events, which could not be foreseen. But to

be exempt from liability due to an act of God, the ff must

occur:

1) cause of breach must be independent of the will of the debtor

2) event must be unforeseeable or unavoidable 3) event must be such that it would render it impossible

for the debtor to fulfill the obligation 4) debtor must be free from any participation or

aggravation of the industry to the creditor.

In the case at bar, although the damage was ultimately

caused by the earthquake which was an act of God, the

defects in the construction, as well as the deviations in the

specifications and plans aggravated the damage, and lessened

the preventive measures that the building would otherwise

have had.

To be exempt from liability due to an act of God, the

engineer/architect/contractor must not have been

negligent in the construction of the building.

property 452 reviewer-digests p6

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