property 452 reviewer-[vena verga] property midterms reviewer

Vena V. Verga

PROPERTY REVIEWERPROPERTY REVIEWER Midterms, First Semester, Ay 2005Midterms, First Semester, Ay 2005--20062006

Atty. E. RoblesAtty. E. Robles PROPERTYPROPERTY The right and interest which a man has in lands and chattels to the exclusion

of others The role and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the

external things of the world in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe

The right to possess, use, enjoy, and dispose of a thing The free use and enjoyment by a person of all his acquisitions, without any

control or diminution, save only by the law of the land It means the thing possessed but it may include the right to use and enjoy it It is a thing owned, that to which a person has or may have a legal title It is an aggregate of rights which are guaranteed and protected by the

government, and, in the ordinary sense, indicates the thing itself, rather than the rights attached to it

It embraces every species of valuable right and interest, including real and

personal property, easements, franchises, and hereditaments; it includes money, credits, a debt;

All things are not the subject of property; the sea, the air and the like cannot

be appropriated, every one may enjoy them, but he has no exclusive right in them. When things are fully our own, or when all others are excluded from meddling with them or from interfering about them, it is plain that no person besides the proprietor, who has the exclusive right, can have any claim either to use them, or to hinder him from disposing of them as he pleases: so that property, considered as an exclusive right to things, contains not only a right to use those things, but a right to dispose of them, either by exchanging them for other things, or by giving them away to any other person without any consideration, or even throwing them away

Property is also said to be, when it relates to goods and chattels, ABSOLUTE or QUALIFIED. Absolute property is that which is our own without any qualification whatever. Qualified property consists in the right which men have over wild animals which they have reduced to their own possession, and which are kept subject to their power; as a deer, a buffalo, and the like, which are his own while he has possession of them, but as soon as his possession is lost his property is gone, unless the animals go animo revertendi. But property in personal goods may be absolute or qualified without any relation to the nature of the subject-matter, but simply because more persons than one have an interest in it, or because the right of property is separated from the possession. A bailee of goods, though not the owner, has a qualified property in them; while the owner has the absolute property

Property is lost by the act of man by:

1. Alienation; but in order to do this, the owner must have a legal capacity to make a contract

2. Voluntary abandonment of the thing; but unless the abandonment be purely voluntary the title to the property is not lost; as if things be thrown into the sea to save the ship, the right is not lost. But even a voluntary abandonment does not deprive the former owner from taking possession of the thing abandoned at any time before another takes possession of it

Property is lost by operation of law by:

1. The forced sale, under a lawful process, of the property of a debtor to satisfy a judgment, sentence, or decree rendered against them, to compel him to fulfill his obligations

2. Confiscation, or sentence of a criminal court 3. Prescription 4. Civil death 5. Capture by a public enemy

Property is lost by the act of God It is proper to observe that, in some cases, the moment that the owner loses

his possession, he also loses his property or right in the thing; animals ferae naturae belong to the owner only while he retains the possession of

Property Midterms Reviewer with Senors Notes

Vena V. Verga August 2005

them. But, in general, the loss of possession does not impair the right of property, for the owner may recover it within a certain time allowed by law

referring to the historical development of the law relating to chattels, it is said

that possession is prima facie evidence of ownership. The man with the better right to possession has the property.

CODAL and NOTES:CODAL and NOTES: Art. 414. All things which are or may be the object of appropriation are considered either:

(1) Immovable or real property; or (2) Movable or personal property.

Why is it important to distinguish:

The government has a continuous effort to collect taxes against real properties

In the field of criminal law, the distinction is also important. Example: the definition of theft: Article 308, the taking of personal property. If you got real property, then the crime is not theft. Usurpation of property can take place only with respect to real property.

In procedure, actions concerning real property are brought to the RTC where the property or any part thereof lies. Actions involving personal property are brought in the court were the defendant or any of its defendants reside or may be found or where the plaintiffs reside at the election of the plaintiff.

In recovering properties: real property an action for forcible entry and unlawful

detainer. Personal property provisional remedy of replevin or manual

delivery of personal property. In prescription the determination of the prescriptive period depends on

whether the property is real or personal. Real properties has a longer period.

Generally, transactions involving real property must be recorded in the registry or property to affect third persons. This is not required with respect to personal property except in the case of chattel mortgage.

In contract, real properties must be in writing, Art. 1358, the necessary solemnities and forms must be observed.

Real properties: must be in writing and in a public instrument and registered so that it will be known to the whole world.

Art. 415. The following are immovable property:

(1) Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil;

(2) Trees, plants, and growing fruits, while they are attached to the land or form an integral part of an immovable;

(3) Everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the object;

(4) Statues, reliefs, paintings or other objects for use or ornamentation, placed in buildings or on lands by the owner of the immovable in such a manner that it reveals the intention to attach them permanently to the tenements;

(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works;

(6) Animal houses, pigeon-houses, beehives, fish ponds or breeding places of similar nature, in case their owner has placed them or preserves them with the intention to have them permanently attached to the land, and forming a permanent part of it; the animals in these places are included;

(7) Fertilizer actually used on a piece of land;

(8) Mines, quarries, and slag dumps, while the matter thereof forms part of the bed, and waters either running or stagnant;

(9) Docks and structures which, though floating, are intended by their nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a river, lake, or coast;

(10) Contracts for public works, and servitudes and other real rights over immovable property. (334a)

Note: 1. Those in paragraph 1 and 2 and immovable BY NATURE. 2. Those in paragraph 3 are immovable BY INCORPORATION 3. Those in paragraph 4-9 are immovable BY DESTINATION/INTENTION 4. those in paragraph 10 are immovable BY ANALOGY, classified by express

provision of law its regarded as limited to the immovable property. Art. 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.

1. Public dominion or property owned by the State (or its practical subdivision) in its public or sovereign capacity.

2. Private ownership or property owned by: (a) the state in its private capacity, and is known as patrimonial

property (b) private persons.

What distinguishes public domain from the rest?



Property of public domain is: 1. outside the commerce of man 2. cannot be a lawful object of a contract 3. cannot be a subject of debt 4. cannot be subject of attachment or sold at public auction 5. cannot be burdened with easement 6. cannot be registered.

Other properties of the state: Patrimonial property 1. Public dominion: land used by the state for public use 2. That which the state has in its private character: patrimonial property

more specifically: properties of the state owned by it in its private or proprietary capacity (e.g. cemeteries, slaughter houses).

Art. 423. The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities is divided into property for public use and patrimonial property. (ex. zoos, parks etc.). PUBLIC LAND VS. PRIVATE LAND PUBLIC LAND Public dominion; cannot be sold PATRIMONIAL LAND A part of public dominion but not public land;

can be sold DOCTRINES AND CASEDOCTRINES AND CASE DIGESTSDIGESTS::

SOULARD VS. US 7 L.Ed. 938 (1830)

Doctrine: Property as applied to lands, comprehends every species of title inchoate or complete. It is supposed to embrace those rights, which lie in contract; those, which are executory; as well as those which are executed. Facts: Titles to lands in Lousiana were incomplete when the state was transferred to the United States. The practice under the Old Spanish government was for the deputy governor to place individuals in possession of small tracts of lands and thereafter protect that possession without further proceeding. If there are any intrusions in these possessions, a complaint is filed to the supervising officers who adjudicated the disputes. These titles remained incomplete under the new colonial government. It was said that the new government lacked funds thus, it remunerated services rendered by the citizens with land instead of money. Appellants filed the complaints in order to try the validity of their claims to certain lands in Missouri, which they claimed to have been granted to them under the former Spanish government. The court, in resolving the present case defined property in lands as used in the Louisiana Treaty. Issue: What is property as defined in the Louisiana Treaty? Decision: The court was not able to form judgment. Nonetheless, it defined the term property as follows: Property as applied to lands, comprehends every species of title inchoate or complete. It is supposed to embrace those rights, which lie in contract; those, which are executory; as well as those which are executed.

In this respect the relation of the inhabitants to their government is not changed. The new government takes the place of that which has passed away.

STEVENS VS. STATE 35 Am. Dec. 72

Doctrine: Property is defined as consisting in the free use, enjoyment and disposition by a person of all his acquisitions. Without control or diminution save only by the laws of the land. The right of every person to acquire, possess and protect property cannot be questioned. Facts: Plaintiffs were taxed one thousand dollars for keeping two billiard tables for a period of six months. They now question the validity of such enactment stating that the billiard table should be viewed as a property which under the law, every person has an indefeasible right of acquiring, possessing and protecting. The billiard table should have been taxed only according to its value. Issue: W/N the enactment prohibiting a person from making or keeping a billiard table without first paying tax for the privilege of keeping it is unconstitutional. Decision: Property is defined as consisting in the free use, enjoyment and disposition by a person of all his acquisitions. Without control or diminution save only by the laws of the land. The right of every person to acquire, possess and protect property cannot be questioned. However, the said property may only be taxed based on its proportionate value. The state is only allowed to regulate the use of property as far as they may be necessary to prevent the destruction or injury of the property of others or a detriment to the public morals or public good. The state may not prevent the plaintiffs from keeping the billiard table through imposing taxes. The right to keep any species of property cannot by the legislature be converted into and taxed as a privilege.

MAYO VS. CARRINGTON

2 Am. Dec. 580 (17910 Facts: Before Joseph Mayo died, he devised several schemes in his last will and testament whereby he said that he wanted to emancipate the slaves who served him during his lifetime. He instructed the executioner of his estate to endeavor to procure an act of emancipation from the legislature, but if the attempt failed due to fact that the law does not permit emancipation of slaves, he said that he wanted his slaves and ALL HIS PROPERTIES to go to his legatees. Paul Carington took administration of the testators estate and sold the personality (except for the slaves) and applied the proceeds towards payment of Josephs debts. The personal estate was exhausted by the debts. After which, the administrators hired the slaves and applied the profits to pay the unsatisfied creditors. Only after doing this did Carrington procured an act from the Legislative Assembly in order to emancipate the slaves. William Mayo, the heir at law of the testator questions the acts of Carrington saying that the whole device must be contingent upon the failure of the attempt to emancipate the slaves for if that did not succeed, the slaves as well as the estate



shall go to Josephs legatees. If it succeeded, no disposition should be made. Since the slaves were not emancipated, the undevised lands should all go William Mayo as heir at law of the testator. Key to this case is how the word property is used in the will of the testator. Issue: W/N the term property should only mean those things that were disposed. Decision: The word property in the will includes both real and personal. The word property comprehends everything that had not been disposed of. Generally speaking, it is applicable to land as to personalities. There was nothing in the will to confine it to personal estate. Including the slaves in the device did not have the effect of limiting it to personal property. It was a bequest of the residue of the property followed by an enumeration of personal articles. But the parts of the devise are kept separate and distinct, the slaves being mentioned first and the other property afterwards, Thus, leaving the word property unrestrained and to operate according to the usual sense of the term. Since the will provides that should the executioners fail to emancipate the slaves, said slave and ALL HIS PROPERTY would be given to certain relations. Therefore, the absolute disposition of all his properties was a correct move on the part of Carington.

WELLS FARGO VS. MAYOR AND ALDERMEN OF JERSEY CITY 207 Fed. 871 (1913)

Facts: In conducting its business, the plaintiff used a pier on the Jersey City side of the Hudson river, a terminal of the Erie railroad, as receiving and distributing point. At this terminal, it received not only the merchandise arriving on the trains but such as was collected in its metropolitan district, embracing city of New York. In making such collections and distributions, the plaintiff employed a large number of men, horses and wagons. Mob interference with the passage of such wagons and horses in the streets of Jersey City from October 26 to November 14, 1910 occasioned the business losses, which the jury verdict fixed at $43,000. Whether the business losses sustained by the plaintiff may be recovered would depend on the construction of the New jersey act entitled An act to prevent routs, riots and tumultuous assemblies Section 5 of such Ac provides that whenever any building or other real or personal property shall be destroyed or injured, in consequence of any mob or riot, the city in which the same shall occur, or if not in a city, then the county in which such property was situated shall be held liable to an action for the damages sustained by reason thereof. It is the contention of the plaintiff that it is the location of the mob violence and not the property destroyed or injured which is the deciding factor of the citys liability. Issue: W/N it is the place where the mob originated or operated and not the property destroyed which is the deciding factor of the citys liability. Decision: It is the property destroyed which is the deciding factor of the citys liability. However, such liability for destruction or injury of property by rioters should be limited to tangible properties. The word property as ordinarily used means the thing possessed, but it may include the right to use and enjoy it. The more comprehensive meaning is presumed to have been interceded by the use of such a word in a constitution. Property embraces business and as such has a situs, which ordinarily is at the place of the domicile of the owner, unless an

express statutory declaration or unmistakable implication fixes it at the place where the tangible property from the use of which it arises is situated.

MARABELLA VS. REYES

12 Phil 1 (1908) Doctrine: The delivery of title deeds of the property is equivalent in its effects to a delivery of the property itself.

WALKER VS. OLD COLONY AND NEWPORT RAILWAY COMPANY 4 Am. Rep 509 (1869)

Facts: Petitioner Walker owned half an acre of land with a house and other building, of which, around 1/15 was taken by the Railway company for construction of a railroad. Walker claimed for damages because of depreciation of his estate due to the proximity of the railroad to his estate and its incidental effects. Issue: W/N damages should be awarded W/N incidental effects may be a basis for damages Decision: The owner is entitled to compensation for the injury to the value of his whole lot as is occasioned by the appropriation of a part of it. One of the valuable incidents of the ownership of land is the right and power of exclusion. Compensation for the abridgement of this right should be included in the damages. However, incidental effects which are the natural and inevitable consequences of the exercise of the legislative franchise which cannot be made a ground for the recovery if damages as for a private injury.

EATON vs. BOSTON 12 Am. Rep. 147 (1871)

Facts: Boston Concord and Montreal Road built their road across plaintiffs farms. They already paid damages that were assessed thus said corporations were already released from all claim of damages on account of the construction of the road across said farms. However, as the corporation constructed their project road, they made a deep cut through a ridge of land which protected the meadow farms from freshets or a sudden rise in the level of stream or a flooding which was caused by heavy rains or the rapid melting of snow and ice. As a consequence, waters if the barriers frequently overflowed and carried sand, debris etc to plaintiffs land. Issue: W/N plaintiffs can still recover damages considering one has already been paid. Decision: Yes. Land is not property but the subject of property. The term property although commonly applied to a tract of land or chattel, may mean only the rights of the owner in relation to it. It denotes a right over a determinate thing. Property is the right of any person to possess, enjoy, and dispose of a thing. So partial, but substantial restriction of the right of the user, although it may not annihilate all of his rights, may as well be considered as taking of his



property. If the public can take part of a mans property without compensation, they can, by successive taking of the different parts, soon acquire the whole.

PRITCHARD vs. NORTON 27 L.Ed. 104 (1882)

Doctrine: A vested right of action is property in the same sense in which tangible things are property, and is equally protected against arbitrary interference. Whether it springs from contract or from the principles of common law, it is not competent for the legislature to take it away. A vested right to an existing defense is equally protected, saving only those which are based on informalities not affecting substantial right, which do not touch the substance of the contract and are not based on equity and justice. OWNERSHIPOWNERSHIP That independent right of a person to the exclusive enjoyment and control of

a thing including it disposition and recovery subject only to the restrictions established by law and the rights of others

Limitations upon the right of ownership

1. General limitations imposed by the State for its benefit such as the power of eminent domain, the police power, and the power of taxation

2. Specific limitations imposed y law, such as legal servitudes 3. Limitations imposed by the party transmitting the property either by

contract or by will 4. Limitation imposed by the owner himself such as voluntary servitudes,

mortgages, lease rights and pledges 5. Inherent limitations arising from conflict with other rights, such as those

caused by contiguity of property. the right by which a thing belongs to someone in particular, to the exclusion

of all others the entirety of the powers of use and disposal allowed by law. It implies that

there is some power of disposal; but the owner of a thing is not necessarily the person at a given time has the whole power of use and disposal. Ownership is broader than possession

CODAL and NOTES:CODAL and NOTES: Art. 427. Ownership may be exercised over things or rights Rights of a person over his property:

To enjoy the property To dispose of the property

To recover the property from any holder or possessor To exclude any person from the enjoyment an disposal of the property To enclose or fence his land or tenement To just compensation in case of eminent domain To construct any works or make any plantation or excavation on the

surface or subsurface or his land To the ownership of all or part of hidden treasures found in his property To the ownership of all accessions to his property.

Art. 428. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law.

The owner has also a right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover it.

Traditional attributes or elements of ownership: 1. The right to enjoy, which includes:

a. jus utendi, or the right to use; b. jus fruendi, or the right to enjoy the fruits; c. jus abutendi, or the right to consume the thing by its use,

2. The right to dispose (jus disponendi), or the right to alienate or destroy the property.

The right to vindicate (jus vindicandi) or the right of action available to the owner to recover the property against the holder or possessor. Remedies available to owners:

1. Replevin for movable properties under Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court that is available upon the concurrence of the following requisites:

a. affidavit of entitled ownership b. wrongful detainer of adverse party c. no seizure or attachment have been issued d. the actual market value of the property.

2. Remedies for immovables a. action for forcible entry (Rule 90) in case of use of force

without the consent of the owner b. an action for unlawful detainer -- in cases where the property

was unlawfully withheld after termination of contract; entry was lawful because there was a consent from the owner but since the property was withheld, there is unlawful detainer.

c. accion publiciana real action for recovery after a year of possession

d. accion reivindicatoria real action for recovery of ownership after 10 years.

Article 429: the owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonable necessary to repel an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.



Note: This is the Doctrine Of Self Help where the law has given a person a right to counter force with force. Requisites:

1. the force must be employed by the owner or lawful possessor of the property

2. there must be an actual or threatened physical invasion or usurpation of the property.

3. the invasion or usurpation must be unlawful and 4. the force employed must be reasonably necessary to repeal the invasion

or usurpation. Art. 432. The owner of a thing has no right to prohibit the interference of another with the same, if the interference is necessary to avert an imminent danger and the threatened damage, compared to the damage arising to the owner from the interference, is much greater. The owner may demand from the person benefited indemnity for the damage to him. Note: Difference between Article 429 and Article 432:

1. The law states that you can use force to repel a person from unlawfully possession your property. But once possession has been taken away from the owner, he can no longer use force; he must use lawful means to recover his property.

2. the law will never sanction force as a means of acquiring property. Force is only used in repelling a person. Lawful means must b used in recovering the property.

3. In using Article 432, there should e no malice, law allows the owner to protect his property and if necessary, he may destroy the property of others so long as the damage done is less than what should have been of not so for the acts (PRINCIPLE OF NECESSITY). Civil code allows compensation for property that was destroyed in order to prevent further damage.

Art. 433. Actual possession under claim of ownership raises disputable presumption of ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property. Note: since this is only a presumption, it is not conclusive and can still be challenged. The possessor can enjoy ownership until it has been proven that he is not the owner. The real owner cannot use for or violence to regain the property because no one is justified to take the law into his own hands. This presumption is not true with things that are personal where ownership is conclusively presumed. If the thing needs a title, mere possession does not establish ownership.

Art. 435. No person shall be deprived of his property except by competent authority and for public use and always upon payment of just compensation.

Should this requirement be not first complied with, the courts shall protect and, in a proper case, restore the owner in his possession. (349a)

Art. 436. When any property is condemned or seized by competent authority in the interest of health, safety or security, the owner thereof shall not be entitled to compensation, unless he can show that such condemnation or seizure is unjustified. OWNER More superior than possessor because

1. The owner reports to no one; possessor reports to the owner 2. Possession is effectively equivalent to ownership.

He who has dominion of a thing, real or personal, corporeal or incorporeal,

which he has a right to enjoy and do with as he pleases, even to spoil or destroy it, as far as the law permits, unless he be prevented by some agreement or covenant which restrains his right

Although there can be but one absolute owner of a thing, there may be a

qualified ownership of the same thing by many. Thus, a bailor has the general ownership of the thing bailed, the bailee has the special ownership. The right of the absolute owner is more extended than that of him who has only a qualified ownership: as, for example, the use of the thing. Thus, the absolute owner of an estate, that is, an owner in fee, may at the wood, demolish the buildings, build new ones, and dig wherever he may deem proper for minerals, stone, plaster and similar things, which would be considered waste and would not be allowed in a qualified owner of the estate, as a lessee or a tenant for life

The owner continues to have the same right although he performs no acts of

ownership or be disabled from performing them, and although another performs such acts without the knowledge or against the will of the owner. But the owner may lose his right in a thing if he permits it to remain in the possession of a third person for a sufficient time to enable the latter to acquire title to it by prescription or under the statute of limitations

CASES AND DOCTRINESCASES AND DOCTRINES PHILIPPINE CASESPHILIPPINE CASES TAYAG vs. YUSECO Facts: Joaquin Yuseco, an attorney leased the land of Maria Lim who was the latters client. To show her appreciation, Maria Lim offered to Joaquin and his wife to build a house in Hacienda San Lazaro so long as she (Maria) lives. Joaquin constructed a big house on the land thinking he had a righ to do so in view of the intended donation. Just before Maria died, she sold the land to her daughter Belen Tayag who in turn demanded from Yuseco either to remove his house or pay a rent. When Yuseco failed to pay, Tayag brought an action in the court.



Issues:

W/N there was an intended donation. W/N Yuseco should pay the rent. W/N Yuseco is a builder in good faith of the house W/N the case should prosper.

Decision:

1. No, there was no public instrument executed between Yuseco and Lim, thus the formalities of a donation was not complied with.

2. Yuseco should pay the rent from the time Lim sold the property to Tayag because insofar as Lim was concerned, the lease was gratuitous.

3. Yes, Yuseco was a builder in good faith since he though that the land was already his by donation.

4. Yes, for non-payment of rental, without prejudice to the determination of the right of each, particularly regarding the building.

REPUBLIC VS. LARA 50 OG 5778 (1954)

Facts: Lara owned a parcel of land, which the Japanese took over during the occupation and over which they built a concrete airstrip, runway and taxiway. After the war, the government decided to expropriate the lands. Issue: W/N the government should pay the improvements to the owner. Decision: No, because said improvements really belong to the republic, which as victor in the last war should be considered as the legitimate successor to the properties, owned by the Japanese in the Philippines. It is wrong to say that the Japanese army was a possessor in bad faith, and that therefore constructions by them belong to the owner of the land by industrial accession. This is because in the first place, the rule of Civil Code concerning industrial accession are not designed to regulate relations between private persons and a sovereign belligerent, nor intended to apply to construction made exclusively for prosecuting a war, when military necessity is temporarily paramount. In the second place, international law allows the temporary use by the enemy occupant of private land and buildings for all kinds of purposes demanded by necessities of war. The owner of the land expropriated by the government is entitled to recover legal interest on the amount awarded from the time the state takes possession of the land.

MIRANDA vs. FADULLON 51 OG 5778

Facts: In the year 1939, one Lucio Tio was the owner of a parcel of land at the Banilad Estate in Cebu. Lucio executed a power of attorney in favor of Esteban Fadullon. Such was annotated at the back of the transfer certificate title. On the same date, the deed of mortgage in favor of the Cebu Mutual Building and Loan Association was also annotated on the same certificate of title. In 1946, on the strength of said power of attorney, Fadullon sold the property to spouses Dionisio and Clemencia Segarra with right to repurchase within 30 days. Fadullon failed to

repurchased. 10 days after the expiration of the period, Segarras filed a petition for the consolidation of their ownership and registered said petition with the register of deeds. Lucio filed a complaint with the CFI asking it to annul the sale. It turned out that the Segarras introduced improvements in the property. They are now contending that they were possessors in good faith of the lot in question and that they introduced improvements also in good faith thus, if the plaintiff would not pay the amount of the improvements which was pegged at Php 5,3000.00, they should be allowed to buy the land. Issue: W/N the possessor were in good faith. Decision: The spouses were in bad faith for they very well knew of the encumbrance in the TCT. They should have at least inquired as to the authority of Fadullon to sell the property. They did not even require Fadullon to show his power of attorney. This together with the fact that there was a very short period of time for repurchase are indications that there might be collusion between the Segerras and Fadullon. A builder in good faith my no be required to pay rentals. He has a right to retain the land on which he has built in good faith until he is reimbursed the expenses incurred by him. Possibly, he might be required to pay rental only when the owner of the land choose not to appropriate the improvement and required the builder in good faith to pay the land. But in case the builder is unwilling or unable to buy the land, the landowner decides to leave things as they are and assumes the relation of lessor and lessee, then they might go to court to fix the amount of the rental if they cannot agree on it. The very fact that the courts sentenced the defendants to pay rentals is an indication, even proof that they were considered possessors and builders in bad faith, or at least that they were not possessors and builders in good faith.

SAN DIEGO VS. MONTESA G.R. L-177985 29 September 1962

Facts: Complainant Jose, Maria and Urbano de la Cruz filed a complaint to recover their land plus damages against Gil and Rufina San Diego. The said land was sold by the mother of the complainants to the San Diegos. The lower court held that the parcel of land belonged to the plaintiffs through hereditary succession and that the defendants built a house on said land in good faith. The court however voided the sale on the ground that that the mother had no right to the land. However, it upheld the defense of the defendants as builder in good faith. It ordered the San Diegos vacate the land while the complainants were ordered to pay Php 3,500 within 30 days after the decision becomes final. Issue: W/N the decision of the court that the San Diegos should vacate the land is valid. Decision: the right of retention granted to possessor in good faith by Article 546 of the civil code, which is applicable to builder in good faith (Article 448) is merely a security for their right to be indemnified for the improvements made on the land. Hence they are not bound to pay the rent during the period of retention. Although normally the landowner has the option to either appropriate the



improvement or to sell the land to the possessor in good faith, this option is no longer open to the landowners in the present case, because the judgment in question, which limits them to the first alternative, is already final. US CASESUS CASES

TURNER VS. CROSS 18 S.W. 578

Doctrine: The owner is said to be the one who has dominion of a thing, real or personal, corporeal or incorporeal, which he has aright to enjoy and to do with as he pleases, even to spoil or destroy it. so far as the law permits unless he be prevented by some agreement or covenant which restrains his rights. Both words convey the idea of property in the thing is right of the person who is said to be the proprietor or owner.

FLEMMING vs. SHERWOOD 139 N.W. 101

Doctrine: The owner of the thing is said to be one who has a dominion over a thing real or personal. Corporeal or incorporeal, which he has a right to enjoy and to do as he pleases, even to spoil or destroy it as far as the law permit.

JHOHSON VS. CROOKSHANKS 29 Pac. 78

Doctrine: In an action to recover the possession of real property, the plaintiff must have legal estate in the property, which it is sought to be recovered, and a present right of possession thereof and this complaint must tender an issue as to title. The word owner is a person who has dominion over a thing, which he may use as he pleases except a restrained by aw or by an agreement. ACCESSIONACCESSION ACCESSIO Modes of acquiring things:

Accession continua (original mode) the right pertaining to the owner of a thing over everything which is incorporated or attached thereto either naturally or artificially.

Accession discreta (derivative mode) right pertaining to the owner of a thing over everything which is produced thereby

An increase or addition; that which lies next to a thing, and is supplementary

and necessary to the principal thing; that which arises or is produced from the principal thing

A manner of acquiring the property in a thing which becomes united with that which a person already possesses

In the Roman Law, accessio is of six kinds:

1. that which assigns to the owner of a thing its products, as the fruit of trees, the young of animals

2. that which makes a man the owner of a thing which is made of anothers property, upon payment of the value of the material taken

3. that which gives the owner of law new land formed by gradual deposit

4. that which gives the owner of a thing the property in what is added to it by way of adoring or completing it

5. that which gives islands formed in a stream to the owner of the adjacent lands on either side

6. that which gives a person the property in things added to his own so that they cannot be separated without damage

CODAL and NOTESCODAL and NOTES: Art. 440. The ownership of property gives the right by accession to everything which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially. the right to all which ones own property produces, whether that property be

movable or immovable, and the right to that which is united to it by accessory, either naturally or artificially

Art. 441. To the owner belongs: (1) The natural fruits; (2) The industrial fruits; (3) The civil fruits. Note: Applying this provision and the principle of partus sequitur ventrem, the offspring belongs to the owner of the demale. Every building is an accession to the ground upon which it stands. The owner

of the land is the owner of the building (General Rule). Exception to this rule: Owner of the land upon which a building is constructed shall no be considered as the principle. Thus the owner of the building shall be the owner of the land. If a man hath raised a building upon his own ground with the material of

another, or if a man shall have built with his own materials upon the ground of another, in either case, the edifice becomes the property of him to whom the ground belongs. And the owner of the ground, if liable at all is only liable to the owner of the materials for the value of them

When the fruits of the property will not belong to the owner

(exception to the rule that the owner of thing the natural, industrial and civil fruits provided in Article 441):

1. A possessor of a property in good faith may claim the fruits of such property;

2. A usufructuary is entitled to the fruits of the property held in usufruct;



3. If the thing is in the possession of an antichretic creditor in which case such creditor is entitled to the fruits with the obligation of applying them to the interest and principal.

4. If the thing is leased, in which case, the lessee is entitled to the fruits of the thing, although such lessee must pay the owner rentals which are in the nature of civil fruits.

Basic principles or characteristics that underlie accession continua:

1. That to the owner of a thing belongs the extension or increase of such thing

2. Accessory follows the principal. 3. The nature of the incorporation is in such a way that separation

would injure or destroy either or both of the properties incorporated

4. No punitive liability shall be suffered by the person who acts in good faith; the person who acts in bad faith is punished by, among others, requiring him to pay damages

Spanish Civil Code

1. If the materials of one person are united by labor to the materials of another, so as to form a single article, the property in the joint product is, in the absence of any agreement, in the owner of the principal part of the materials by accession

2. Where, by agreement, an article is manufactured for another, the property in the article, while making and when finished, vests in him who furnished the whole or the principal part of the materials; and the maker, if he did not furnish the same, has simply a lien upon the article for his pay

American Courts

1. The increase of an animal, as a general thing, belongs to the owner of the dam or mother

2. If, by the labor of one man, the property of another has been converted into a thing of different species, so that its identity is destroyed, the original owner can only recover the value of the property in its unconverted state, and the article itself will belong to the person who wrought the conversion, if he wrought it believing the material to be his own.

3. If there be a mere change of form or value, which does not destroy the identity of the materials, the original owner may still reclaim them or recover their value as thus improved

4. If the change has been wrought by a willful trespasser, or by one who knew that the materials were not his own; in such case, however radical the change may have been, the owner may reclaim them, or recover their value in their new shape

ADJUNCTION the attachment or union permanently of a thing belonging to one person to

that belonging to another. This union can be caused by INCLUSION, as if one mans diamond be set in anothers ring; by SOLDERING, as if ones guard be soldered or anothers sword; by SEWING, as by employing the silk

of one to make the coat of another; by CONSTRUCTION, as by building on anothers land; by WRITING, as when one writes on anothers parchment; or by PAINTING, as when one paints a picture on anothers canvass

in these cases, as a general rule, the accessory follows the principal; hence

those things which are attached to the things of another become the property of the latter. The only exception which the civilians made was in the case of a picture, which, although an accession, drew to itself the canvas, on account of the importance which was attached to it

APPURTENANCES things belonging to another thing as principal, and which pass as incident to

the principal thing the thing appurtenant must be of an inferior nature to the thing to which it is

appurtenant to constitute an appurtenance, there must exist a propriety of relation

between the principal or dominant subject and the accessory or adjunct, which is to be ascertained by considering whether they so agree in nature or quality as to be capable of union without incongruity

thus, if a house and land be conveyed, everything passes which is necessary

to the full enjoyment thereof and which is in use as incident or appurtenant thereto

appurtenance of a ship include whatever is on board a ship for the objects of

the voyage and adventure in which she is engaged, belonging to her owner the word appurtenances in a deed will not usually pass any corporeal real

property, but only incorporeal easements or rights and privileges OUTLINE OF ACCESSION INDUSTRIALOUTLINE OF ACCESSION INDUSTRIAL A owner of the land B Builder, planter or sower C owner of materials Art. 447. The owner of the land who makes thereon, personally or through another, plantings, constructions or works with the materials of another, shall pay their value; and, if he acted in bad faith, he shall also be obliged to the reparation of damages. The owner of the materials shall have the right to remove them only in case he can do so without injury to the work constructed, or without the plantings, constructions or works being destroyed. However, if the landowner acted in bad faith, the owner of the materials may remove them in any event, with a right to be indemnified for damages. RULES:



1. ABC are all in good faith AB has a right of appropriation C has (1) a right of reimbursement and (2) limited right of removal. 2. AB are in good faith; C is in good faith AB has no right C has: (1) right of reimbursement plus damages and (2) absolute

right of removal plus damages.

Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. RULES:

1. If ABC are in good faith A has (1) right of appropriation and (2) right to demand price of land or

rent BC has (1) right of reimbursement or necessary and useful expenses and

(2) right of retention if A elects first option 2. A is passive while B is in good faith A can appropriate but should reimburse necessary/useful expenses

to possessor in good faith and good faith B can remove ornaments provided that there is no injury.

A can oblige B to pay price of the land or rent but B cannot be obliged when land is considerably higher than building, etc. He shall pay rent instead when owner does not appropriate (indemnity)

3. A is passive while B is in bad faith A need not pay (there is no unjust enrichment for such applies only

to quasi contractu) 4. The only by which B can get his materials for value is when A and B

are in bad faith 5. If both A and C are in good faith, only B in bad faith, Article 455 shall

apply

Art. 455. If the materials, plants or seeds belong to a third person who has not acted in bad faith, the owner of the land shall answer subsidiarily for their value and only in the event that the one who made use of them has no property with which to pay.

This provision shall not apply if the owner makes use of the right granted by article 450. If the owner of the materials, plants or seeds has been paid by the builder, planter or sower, the latter may demand from the landowner the value of the materials and labor.

RULE: 1. A in good or bad faith; B in good faith or bad faith; C in good faith.

(a) determine rights of A and B (b) then C can hold B primarily liable and A subsidiarily liable

except under Art. 450. 2. A in good or bad faith; B in good faith or bad faith; C in bad faith.

(a) Determine rights of A and B (b) Apply 449-452 to C since B shall be considered agent of C.

Note: Art. 448 is not applicable in the following instances:

1. In cases of co-ownership since in co-ownership, ownership is vested in two or more persons. It is revolting to reprive a co-owner of his property.

2. In cases of usufruct 3. In cases of lease 4. In case a person who owns a house and lot sells only the lot but not

the house 5. In relations between private persons and sovereign belligerent 6. Constructions made exclusively for prosecuting a war, when military

necessity is temporarily paramount 7. When the parties concerned (landowner builder, etc), agree on

terms and conditions not contemplated by the said article, it not being mandatory

An action to quiet title of real property not in the possession of another does not prescribe. If the real property is in the possession of another, it may be acquired by acquisitive prescription

Art. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity.

Art. 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad faith may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in order to replace things in their former condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower the proper rent.

Rules: 1. A is passive and B is in bad faith A may (1) demand demolition/removal so that there is restoration at

the expense of B or (2) compel payment of price of kind from B (builder and planter), rent from B (sower).

A entitled to damages from B 2. A is bad faith; B is good faith, 447 will apply.

Art. 451. In the cases of the two preceding articles, the landowner is entitled to damages from the builder, planter or sower.

Art. 452. The builder, planter or sower in bad faith is entitled to reimbursement for the necessary expenses of preservation of the land.



Rules:

1. A is in good faith; BC is in bad faith A has (1) right of appropriation plus damages, (b) right to demand

removal or demolition plus damages, (3) right to demand price of land or rent plus damages

B and C have no right except reimbursement of necessary expenses for preservation of the land.

Art. 453. If there was bad faith, not only on the part of the person who built, planted or sowed on the land of another, but also on the part of the owner of such land, the rights of one and the other shall be the same as though both had acted in good faith.

It is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the landowner whenever the act was done with his knowledge and without opposition on his part. Rule: A, B and C are in Bad Faith, Article 448 will apply.

Art. 454. When the landowner acted in bad faith and the builder, planter or sower proceeded in good faith, the provisions of article 447 shall apply. (n)

Rule: A in bad faith; BC in good faith, Art. 447 will apply. ALLUVION that increase of the earth on a bank of a river, or on the shore of the sea, by

the force of the water, or by a current or by waves, or by its recession in a navigable lake, which is so gradual that no one can judge how much is added at each moment of time. Conversely, where land is submerged by the gradual advance of the sea, the sovereign acquires the title to the part thereby covered and it ceases to belong to the former owner

Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. Note: This being regarded as the equivalent for the loss he may sustain from the encroachment of the waters upon his land AVULSION Accretion which takes place whenever the current of a river, creek, torrent or

lake segregates from an estate on its bank a known portion of land and trans it to another estate.

Art. 459. Whenever the current of a river, creek or torrent segregates from an estate on its bank a known portion of land and transfers it to another estate, the owner of the land to which the segregated portion belonged retains the ownership of it, provided that he removes the same within two years.

Art. 458. The owners of estates adjoining ponds or lagoons do not acquire the land left dry by the natural decrease of the waters, or lose that inundated by them in extraordinary floods.

alluvion differs from avulsion in that the latter is sudden and perceptible CASES AND DOCTRINESCASES AND DOCTRINES

BERNARDO VS. BATACLAN 66 Phil. 590

Issue: W/N the indemnity should be paid by a vendee who brought a land from the owner who alienated said land after improvements were made. Doctrine: Although the obligation to pay the required indemnity may be directed by the builder, planter, or sower against the transferee, ultimately, the obligation must be borne by the party who has profited from the accession. The reason for this is that in purchases of land and the improvements thereon, the purchaser may have already paid the vendor the value of the improvements and it would be unjust to make him pay again to the builder, planter and sower. Consequently, it the purchaser had already paid to the vendor the value of the improvement, the latter must pay the required indemnity, if not, the former must be the one who shall pay.

MENDOZA vs. DE GUZMAN 52 Phil 164

Issue: W/N the owner of the land is entitled with the natural, industrial and civil fruits during a period of retention. Doctrine: The natural industrial and civil fruits pertain to the owner of the land and not to the builder, planter or sower. The reason is obvious. Only a possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits of the property as provided in Articles 544 and 545. In the case at bar, the builder, sower and planter is no longer in good faith; he is already aware of the fact that he is in possession of said property improperly or wrongfully. CO-OWNERSHIP.

SAN DIEGO vs. MONTEZA 6 SCRA 207

Issue: W/N builder, planter or sower be compelled to pay rentals.



Doctrine: The period of retention, the builder, planter or sower cannot be compelled to pay rentals. It is evident that the right of retention is a security for the payment of the required indemnity. To require him to pay rentals during such period would result in the impairment of said security.

FILIPINAS COLLEGES INC. VS, TIMBANG 106 Phil 247

Issue: W/N the owner automatically becomes the owner of the improvements if the builder in good faith fails to pay after the former compelled latter by virtue of Art. 448. W/N there is remedy left to the owner in case he does not automatically become the owner of the land. Doctrine: Under Article 448 and 546 of the Civil Code, the owner of the land has the right to choose between appropriating the building by reimbursing the builder the value thereof or compelling the builder to pay for his land. Even this second right cannot be exercised if the value of the land s considerable more than that of the building. In addition to the right of the builder to be paid the value of his improvement, Article 546 gives him the corollary right of retention of the property until he is indemnified by the owner of the land. There is nothing in the language of these articles which would justify the conclusion that upon failure of the builder to pay the value of the land, when such is demanded by the landowner, the latter becomes the automatically the owner of the improvement. The Code is silent however on the other remedies available to the owner. In Miranda vs. Fadullan, the court said that the parties may decided to leave things as they are and assume the relation of lessor and lessee, and should they disagree as to the amount of rental, them they can g to the court to have the amount fixed. Likewise, in Ignacio vs. Hilario, the SC ruled that the owner if the land is entitled to have the improvement removed when after having chosen to sell his land the builder in good faith fails to pay for the same. In Bernardo vs. Bataclan, the SC approved the sale of the land and improvement in a public auction, applying the proceeds thereof first to the payment of the value of the land and the excess, if any to be delivered to the owner of the house in payment thereof.

GRANA and TORALBA vs. CA 109 Phil 260

Facts: The petitioner brought an action for recovery of a lot after the private respondents unknowingly built a portion of their house on a lot owned by the petitioner. The trial court, after trial ordered the former to vacate the land and to pay a monthly rental of Php 10.00 from the filing of the complaint. Issue: W/N the order of the court is correct. Decision: The respondents are in good faith, consequently under, Article 448 of the Civil Code, the petitioners have the choice of either appropriating the portion of the house of respondents which is on their land upon payment of the proper indemnity, or selling to the respondent that part of the land on which the

improvements stands. The second option is more practical however, the parties must come into agreement as to the condition of the lease and should they fail to do so, the court shall fix the same (Article 448). Thus, the order for rental payment is erroneous. A builder in good faith has a right to retain the land on which he has built in good faith until he is reimbursed the expenses incurred by him.

BAKER vs. MERSCH 45 NW 685

Doctrine: The doctrine of accession of property applies where one has willfully, as a trespasser, taken the property of another, and altered it, in substance or form, by his own labor. Where however, the appropriation was through a mistake of fact, and labor has been expended upon it which converts it into something very different from the original article, and greatly increases its value, and the value of the original is very insignificant in comparison with the new product, the title of the property in its converted form will pass to the person who has thus expended labor; the original owner to recover the value of the original article. Art. 466. Whenever two movable things belonging to different owners are, without bad faith, united in such a way that they form a single object, the owner of the principal thing acquires the accessory, indemnifying the former owner thereof for its value.

MERRIT VS. JOHNSON 5 AM Dec (1811)

Doctrine: The principle of law when the materials of another are united to material of mine, by my labor or by labor of another and mine are the principal materials, and those of the other are only accessory, I acquire the right of property in the whole by right of accession. The accessory follows the principal and not the other way around.

FOSTER vs. WARNER 14 NW 673

Doctrine: Whatever he might have had against Farmer as a consequence of his wrongful intermixture or confusion of the shingles, in case there was any, to seize and hold the required quantity out of the common mass, he had no such right against the plaintiffs, who according to this record were innocent purchasers from Farmer because it was due to the defendants trust in farmer that he was enabled to deal with them as he did and obtain money as through he was the sole and absolute proprietor of the property.

Art. 470. Whenever the owner of the accessory thing has made the incorporation in bad faith, he shall lose the thing incorporated and shall have the obligation to indemnify the owner of the principal thing for the damages he may have suffered.



If the one who has acted in bad faith is the owner of the principal thing, the owner of the accessory thing shall have a right to choose between the former paying him its value or that the thing belonging to him be separated, even though for this purpose it be necessary to destroy the principal thing; and in both cases, furthermore, there shall be indemnity for damages.

WILLIARD vs. RICE 45 AM DEC 226

Doctrine: A mortgagor entrusted with the possession of goods has the duty to keep them separately and preserve the mortgagors property. His intermixing them purposely or through want of proper care, was a violation of his duty, and is unlawful. As his own could not be distinguished, he could take none of the mixed parcel without taking the plaintiffs which he had no right to do; and as against his consignees, the plaintiff must hold the whole. QUIETING OF TITLEQUIETING OF TITLE The best way to quiet a title is through a good title An action may be brought to remove the clout or to quiet a title provided the

following requisites are present: 1. The plaintiff must have a legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the real

property which is the subject matter of the action (Article 477, CC) 2. There must be cloud on the title (Article 476) 3. Such cloud must be due to some instrument, record, claim, encumbrance

or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable and is prejudicial to the plaintiffs title

4. The plaintiff must return to the defendant all benefits he may have received from the latter, or reimburse him for expenses that may have redounded to the plaintiffs benefit.

WATERCODEWATERCODE Underlying Principles of the Water Code

All waters belong to the state. Such cannot be subject to acquisitive prescription The state may allow the use or development of waters by administrative

concession The utilization, exploitation, development, conversion and protection of water

resources shall be subject to the control and regulation of the government through the National Water resource council

Preference in the use and development of waters shall consider current usages and be responsive to the changing needs of the country (Article 3, PD 1067, Watercode)

Definition of Water in the Watercode Water refers to water under the ground, water above the ground, water in the atmosphere, and the water of the sea within the territorial jurisdiction (Art 4, PD 1067, Watercode)

Article 58 of the Watercode already superceded article 461: Article 461. River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners whose lands are occupied by the new course in proportion to the area lost. However, the owners of the lands adjoining the old bed shall have the right to acquire the same by paying the value thereof, which value shall not exceed the value of the area occupied by the new bed. Article 58. (Watercode) When a river or stream suddenly changes its course to traverse private lands, the owners or the affected lands may not compel the government to restore the river to its former bed; nor can they restrain the government from taking steps to revert the river or stream to its former course. The owners of the lands thus affected are not entitled to compensation for any damage sustained thereby. However, the former owners of the new bed shall be the owners of the abandoned bed proportion to the area lost by each. The owners of the affected lands may undertake to return the river or stream to its old bed at their own expense; provided that a permit therefore s secured from the Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and Communication and work pertaining thereto are commenced within two years from the changes in the course of the river or stream. The following provisions has a counterpart on the water code: Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters Watercode version (Article 51) The banks or rovers and streams and the shore of the seas and lakes throughout their entire length and within a zone of three meters in urban areas and 20 meters in agricultural areas and 40 meters in forest areas, along their margins, are subject to the easement of public us in the interest of recreation, navigation, flotage, fishing and salvage. No person shall be allowed to stay in this zone longer than what is necessary for recreation, navigation, flotage, fishing or salvage or to build structures of any kind. Art. 502. The following are of public dominion:

(1) Rivers and their natural beds;

(2) Continuous or intermittent waters of springs and brooks running in their natural beds and the beds themselves;

(3) Waters rising continuously or intermittently on lands of public dominion;

(4) Lakes and lagoons formed by Nature on public lands, and their beds;



(5) Rain waters running through ravines or sand beds, which are also of public dominion;

(6) Subterranean waters on public lands;

(7) Waters found within the zone of operation of public works, even if constructed by a contractor;

(8) Waters rising continuously or intermittently on lands belonging to private persons, to the State, to a province, or to a city or a municipality from the moment they leave such lands;

(9) The waste waters of fountains, sewers and public establishments.

Watercode version (Article 5) The following belong to the state:

1. Rivers and their natural beds; 2. Continuous or intermittent waters of springs and brooks

running in their natural beds and the bed themselves; 3. Natural lakes and lagoons; 4. All other categories of surface waters such as water flowing

over lands, water form rainfall whether natural or artificial, and water from agriculture runoff, seepage and drainage

5. Atmospheric water 6. Subterranean or ground water; and 7. Sea water

GENERAL RULE: No person including the government instrumentalities or government owned or controlled corporation shall appropriate water without a water right, which shall be evidence by a document known as a water permit. However, any person may appropriate or use natural bodies of water without securing a water permit.

Logs floating in the river may be legal provided they are not placed there permanently (there is a need for permit if the logs are to be placed in the river permanently) Article 60 of the watercode provides that the rafting of logs and other objects on rivers and lakes which are floatable may be controlled or prohibited during designated season of the year with due regard to the needs of irrigation and domestic water supply and other uses of water. COCO--OWNERSHIPOWNERSHIP How co-ownership created:

by contracts

by law as in conjugal partnership by will by chance as in confusion or commotion

Requisites of co-ownership:

1. plurality of subjects 2. unity of object (absence of division) 3. proportionate shares of such subjects

Kinds of co-ownership:

1. ordinary (where right of partition exists) 2. compulsory (no right of partition; e.g. party wall)

Art. 490. Whenever the different stories of a house belong to different owners, if the titles of ownership do not specify the terms under which they should contribute to the necessary expenses and there exists no agreement on the subject, the following rules shall be observed:

(1) The main and party walls, the roof and the other things used in common, shall be preserved at the expense of all the owners in proportion to the value of the story belonging to each;

(2) Each owner shall bear the cost of maintaining the floor of his story; the floor of the entrance, front door, common yard and sanitary works common to all, shall be maintained at the expense of all the owners pro rata;

(3) The stairs from the entrance to the first story shall be maintained at the expense of all the owners pro rata, with the exception of the owner of the ground floor; the stairs from the first to the second story shall be preserved at the expense of all, except the owner of the ground floor and the owner of the first story; and so on successively.

Note: a party wall cannot be divided while two parties remain co-owners of said wall. The only solution is to buy said party wall, and destroy it. You may not destroy a party wall unless its yours.

3. legal (created by law) 4. contractual (created by contract) 5. universal (over universal things; e.g. co-heirs in inheritance) 6. singular or particular (over a particular or specific thing) 7. incidental (exists independent of the will of the parties)

Characteristics of co-ownership:

the co-owners share in the property, although definite in amount or size, is not physically and actually identified, it being merely an ideal;

a co-owners share is absolutely owned by him and he may dispose of it as he pleases



in regard to the use, enjoyment and preservation of the property, the co-owners observe mutual respect

Ordinary partnership distinguished from co-ownership: DISTINCTION CO-OWNERSHIP PARTNERSHIP As to creation Created by law, contract,

succession, fortuitous event

Created by the agreement of parties/contract

As to personality

No juridical personality There is a juridical personality distinct from the partners.

Duration There is limitation No limitation upon duration of partnership

Power of the members

No power to represent the co-ownership unless there is an agreement to that effect

Partners has the power to represent the partners, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary

Disposition of shares

A co-owner may ordinarily sell to a third person his interest in the co-ownership without the consent of the other co-owners which in turn would make a buyer a co-owner

Transfer of shares to a third person do not make that person a partner automatically unless agreed upon by the partners

Division of profits

Division of benefits is fixed by law

Division of profits and losses may be subject to agreement of the parties

Effect of death Death of a co-owner does not dissolve the co-ownership

Death of a partner dissolves the partnership

Joint tenancy and co-ownership distinguished:

1. Disability (like minority) in joint tenancy inures to the benefit of the others which is not true in co-ownership

2. In case of death of a joint tenant, the survivor is subrogated to the rights of the decedent which is not true in co-ownership where the death of a co-owner transfers his share to his heirs

3. A joint tenant may transfer or dispose of his share only with the consent of the others, but no such consent is required in co-ownership.

Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the charges, shall be proportional to their respective interests. Any stipulation in a contract to the contrary shall be void.

The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proved.

Art. 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in common, provided he does so in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it according to their rights. The purpose of the co-ownership may be changed by agreement, express or implied. The law does not specify the nature of consent to alternative in a property owned

in common. It may be made expressly or impliedly If a co-owner makes an unauthorized alteration, the other co-owners may demand

that the alteration be removed at the expense of the guilty co-owner Distinguish act of administration (resolution of majority)

vs. Act of alienation (consent of all) In co-ownership, each co-owner is owner of the whole, and over the whole he

exercises rights of dominion, but at the same time he is owner of a part which is truly abstract, because until division is effected such part is not physically determined

Each co-owner has the right to sell, assign or dispose of hi share or part unless

personal rights are involved and, therefore, he may lose said rights to others, as by prescription thereof by a co-owner

A co-owner may, irrevocably, dispose of his right to the undivided share he is

entitled to, subject only to the outcome of final partition, insofar as all the co-owners are concerned. Each co-owner, or his successor, is entitled to his lawful share only

It is elemental that until a partition is made, among the co-owners, no one of

them can claim any particular portion of an undivided property as exclusively his own

The remedy of a co-owner who desires that his share be adjudicated to him in

severalty is by an action for partition (does not prescribe and may be passed to the heir)

Benefits derived from property owned in common are divided in proportion to co-

owners interests; if it (property) suffers diminution, they shall have to share, too, the charges in accordance with their interests

A co-owner cannot legally dispose of a specific portion of the property owned in

common without the consent and approval of the other co-owners, his right being only to sell and convey his undivided share

Shares of co-owners are equal in the absence of stipulation Generally, co-heir cannot acquire community property be prescription. Art 494. No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.



However, there are instances when a co-owner can acquire through prescription the share of another but the requirements are strict. There must be open and hostile repudiation of ownership. Possessor held by a co-owner is generally not adverse against his co-owners Co-owners are not privies inter se as to property owned in common (see 14 Am

Jur, p.169) Facts of the Am Jur case: There were four siblings, A, B, C and D. A filed an action against D for annulment of sale of properties. He won. B and C cannot benefit from the case for they are merely fence sitters. Since co-owners are not privies inter se, B and C must file their own cases in order to benefit from the judgment. Art. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. Co-owners are not privies for if there is benefit t one, it does not necessarily

mean that it shall also redound to other co-owners. Rule on privities: Under the rules on agency, when an agency does a thing,

the principal will necessarily be bound. It is clear from the judgment in the case at car that the such judgment

rendered in a suit affecting the common property, brought by only one of the co-owners is not binding upon the associates nor can be invoked by the,/ Thus, where a suit set a side a decedents deed conveying all his property to a single son is brought only by one of the disinherited children, such judgment declaring the deed to be void cannot be availed of in a subsequent partition proceeding by any of the others.

Co-owner may redeem community property sold under pacto de retro by another

co-owner See Oclarit vs. Oclarit (CA - G.R. No. 16066-R, 11-17-58), where adverse

possession of community property by co-owner was proven Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned. One cannot be compelled to remain as co-owner Co-owner with bigger share has preferential right of pre-emption (see Robel vs.

Robel, CA G.R. No. 20934-R, Sept. 27,1958) CASES and DOCTRINESCASES and DOCTRINES

PARDELL VS. BARTOLOME 23 Phil 450

Facts: A house was co-owned by the sister (A) and the husband (B) of the other sister (C). The upper floor was used as a dwelling and the lower was available for rent by stores. B used one of the rooms in the upper floor and another room in the lower flower as an office.

Issue: W/N the co-owner sister A can demand rent from B and C. Decision: (1) No rent for the upper floor can be demanded for the C is merely exercising her right as co-owner without prejudicing A who, had she wanted, could have also lived in another room of said floor, and who therefore could not have been prejudiced. (2) Half rental may be demanded for the use of the lower floor. Rent could be asked because others could have rented the same, but only half should be given since B was a co-owner. TREESTREES Part of the real estate while growing and before they are recovered from the

freehold; but as soon as they are cut down, they are personal property trees belong to the owner of the land where they grow. When the roots grow into

the adjoining land, the owner of such land may lawfully claim a right to hold the tree in common with the owner of the land where it was planted; but if the branches only overshadow the adjoining land, and the roots do not enter it, the tree wholly belongs to the owner of the estate where the roots grow. When the tree grows directly on the boundary line, so that the line passes through it, it is the property of both owners, whether it be marked as a boundary or not

the owner of trees in a highway is held to have the right of action for the necessary trimming of them for the installation of an electric lighting system for the municipality

where the branches of a tree growing upon the land of one person overhang that of his neighbor, one may, without notice, cut off so much of a tree as overhangs his land, if he can do so without going upon the land of the owner, and such owner cannot acquire, either by prescription or the statute of limitations, the right to overhang his neighbors land; and where a tree stands on the dividing line between adjoining lots, either owner may cut off branches or roots extending over his own land.

the owner of land on which a partially decayed tree is permitted to stand in such position that by falling it would damage the house of another, is liable for damages caused by its falling after he has been notified that it was dangerous

WATERSWATERS water when reduced to possession is property, and it may be bought and sold and

have a market value; but it must be in actual possession, subject to control and management. When stored in an artificial appliance or water-course, it is personal property

the most essential element of an appropriation of water is application to a beneficial use



a riparian owner may construct a dam. It is not per se an improper structure as to lower owners. But a dam may not be constructed of such a height that it will back the water upon the lands of others

the doctrine of the CIVIL LAW is that the owner of the upper or dominant estate has a natural easement or servitude in the lower or servient one, to discharge all waters falling or accumulating upon his land, which is higher, upon the land of the servient owner, as in a state of nature; and that such natural flow or passage of the water cannot be interrupted or prevented by the servient owner to the detriment or injury of the estate of the dominant or any proprietor

the doctrine of the COMMON LAW is that there exists no such natural easement or servitude in favor of the superior or higher ground or fields as to mere surface water, or such as falls or accumulates by rain or the melting of snow, and that the proprietor of the inferior or lower tenement or estate may, if he choose, lawfully obstruct or hinder the natural flow of such water thereon, and in so doing may turn the same back upon or over the lands of other proprietors, without liability for injuries ensuing from such obstruction or diversion

water is a movable, wandering thing, and must of necessity continue common by the law of nature

no one has any property in the water itself, except in that particular portion which he might have abstracted from the stream and of which he had the possession

flowing water is publici juris, not in the sense that it is bonum vacans, to which the first occupant may acquire an exclusive right, but that it is public and common in this sense only, that none can have any property in the water itself, except in the particular portion which he may choose to abstract from the stream and take into his possession, and that during the time of his possession only. But each proprietor of the adjacent land has the right to the usufruct of the stream which flows through it.

US VS. INV CO

156 Fed. 123 Doctrine: The US as the owner of the lands, though having appropriated them or reserved them already has the right to the continued flow of the waters of such stream so fast as may be necessary for the beneficial use of the government property, and the Blackfeet Indian reservation is in a sense government property. Though Conrad, the respondent, could rightfully divert water from the streams and the construction of the dam. the right of the riparian owner in the water is usufructuary, and consists not so

much in the fluid itself as in its uses. The law does not recognize a riparian property right in the corpus of the water; the riparian proprietor does not own the water. He has the right only to enjoy the advantage of a responsible use of the stream as it flows through the land, subject to a like right belonging to all other riparian proprietors

SIDEWALKSSIDEWALKS that part of a public street or highway designed for the use of pedestrians

generally the sidewalk is included with the gutters and roadway in the general term street

it is the duty of a municipal corporation to keep the sidewalk, as well as the roadbed of the street, in repair

a municipal corporation which permits a walk to be used for public travel is liable for an injury wrongfully caused by an obstruction thereon, no matter how the walk came into existence

a property owner who negligently maintains a pipe from the roof of a building so as to discharge water upon the sidewalk, will be liable for injury to pedestrians caused thereby

depressions in a sidewalk, into which water flows from adjoining property, may constitute a defect, for injury by which the municipality may be liable

even if the city were negligent, a person injured by a defective sidewalk cannot recover unless he show himself in the exercise of due care and if the accident occurred by reason of the plaintiffs being intoxicated, he cannot recover

where the sidewalk is manifestly dangerous, it is the duty of the pedestrian to walk on the roadway, and he cannot recover for an injury which his own observation, prudently exercised, ought to have enabled him to avoid

the temporary obstruction of a street or sidewalk for the purpose of loading or unloading vehicles may be justified on the ground of necessity

during building operations, materials may be placed in the street one injured by defective conditions of the street who has no knowledge of the

defect, cannot be charged with contributory negligence POSSESSIONPOSSESSION The detention or enjoyment of a thing which a man holds by himself, or by

another who keeps or exercises it in his name (Louisiana American Jurisprudence);

It expresses the closest relation that can exist between a corporeal thing and the

person who possesses it, implying an actual, physical contact, as by sitting or standing upon a thing

Actual possession exists where the thing is in the immediate occupancy of the

party. Actual possession must be coupled with intent to possess. Constructive possession is that which exists in contemplation or eyes of law,

without actual personal occupation It is the occupation of anything with the intention of exercising the rights of

ownership in respect to it Natural possession implies mere physical contact with a thing, apart from all

attempted exercise of rights with respect to it. The lower degree of control was known to the later civilians as detentio

In order to complete a possession, two things are required: that there be an

occupation, apprehension, or taking; that the taking be with an intent to possess (anmus possidendi): hence, persons have no legal wills, as children

property 452 reviewer-[vena verga] property midterms reviewer

Documents

right of property

absolute property property

qualified property

subject of property

personal property

exclusive right

species of valuable

external things