property cases 12-01
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al. who is sought that inscription be decreed in their name of the parcels of land in this
plaza occupied by them, this court decided that neither the municipality nor the
objectors were entitled to inscription, for with respect to the objectors said plaza
belonged to the municipality of Cavite and with respect to the latter the said Plaza
Soledad was not transferable property of that municipality to be inscribed in its name,
because he intention of Act No. 1039 was that the said plaza and other places therein
enumerated should be kept open for public transit; herefore there can be no doubt that
the defendant has no right to continue to occupy the land of the municipality leased by
her, for it is an integral portion of Plaza Soledad, which if for public use and is reservedfor the common benefit.
According to article 344 of the Civil Code: "Property for public use in provinces and in
towns comprises the provincial and town roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and
public waters, the promenades, and public works of general service supported by said
towns or provinces."
The said Plaza Soledad being a promenade for public use, the municipal council of Cavite
could not in 1907 withdraw or exclude from public use a portion thereof in order to
lease it for the sole benefit of the defendant Hilaria Rojas. In leasing a portion of said
plaza or public place to the defendant for private use the plaintiff municipality exceeded
its authority in the exercise of its powers by executing a contract over a thing of which itcould not dispose, nor is it empowered so to do.
The Civil Code, articles 1271, prescribes that everything which is not outside he
commerce of man may be the object of a contract, and plazas and streets are outside of
this commerce, as was decided by the supreme court of Spain in its decision of February
12, 195, which says: "Communal things that cannot be soud because they are by their
very nature outside of commerce are those for public use, such as the plazas, streets,
common lands, rivers, fountains, etc."
Therefore, it must be concluded that the contract, Exhibit C, whereby he municipality of
Cavite leased to Hilaria Rojas a portion of the Plaza Soledad is null and void and of no
force or effect, because it is contrary to the law and the thing leased cannot be the
object of a contract. On the hyphotesis that the said lease is null and void in accordance
with the provisions of article 1303 of the Civil Code, the defendant must restore and
deliver possession of the land described in the complaint to the municipality of Cavite,
which in its turn must restore to the said defendant all the sums it may have received
from her in the nature of rentals just as soon as she restores the land improperly leased.
For the same reasons as have been set forth, and as said contract is null and void in its
origin, it can produce no effect and consequently the defendant is not entitled to claim
that the plaintiff municipality indemnity her for the damages she may suffer by the
removal of her house from the said land.
For all the foregoing reasons we must reverse the judgment appealed from and declare,
as we do declare, that the land occupied by Hilaria Rojas forms part of the public plaza
called Soledad, and as the lease of said parcel of land is null and void, we order the
defendant to vacate it and release the land in question within thirty days, leaving it
cleared as it was before hr occupation. There is no ground for the indemnity sought in
the nature of damages, but the municipality must in its t urn to the defendant therentals collected; without finding as to the costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. 146621 July 30, 2004
RENE P. VALIAO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION-FOURTH DIVISION (Cebu City), WEST NEGROS COLLEGE, respondents.
For review on certiorari is the Decision1dated August 22, 2000 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 55133, and its Resolution
2
dated November 22, 2000 denying themotion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari
filed by petitioner and affirmed the Resolution dated July 7, 1999 of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC)-Fourth Division in NLRC Case No. V-000134-98 (RAB Case
No. 06-01-10026-95), which sustained the Decision of Labor Arbiter Benjamin E. Pelaez,
directing private respondent West Negros College (WNC) to pay petitioner Rene P.
Valiaos salary during the period of his preventive suspension and attorneys fees, while
dismissing all other claims.
The facts, as culled from records, are as follows:
On February 5, 1990, petitioner Rene Valiao was appointed by private respondent West
Negros College (WNC) as Student Affairs Office (SAO) Director, with a starting salaryof P2,800 per month. On May 14, 1990, he was assigned as Acting Director, Alumni
Affairs Office.
On July 29, 1990, petitioner was transferred to a staff position and designated as
Records Chief at the Registrars Office but was again re-assigned as a typist on June 24,
1991.
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The latest re-assignment was due to his tardiness and absences, as reflected in the
summary of tardiness and absences report, which showed him to have been absent or
late for work from a minimum of seven (7) to a maximum of seventy-five (75) minutes
for the period March to October 31, 1991, and to have reported late almost every day
for the period November to December 1991.
Copies of his tardiness/absences reports were furnished petitioner, along with
memoranda requiring him to explain but his explanations were either unacceptable or
unsatisfactory. Subsequent reports also showed that he did not change his habitsresulting in tardiness and absences. He was even caught one time manipulating the
bundy clock, thus necessitating another memorandum to him asking him to explain his
dishonest actuations in accomplishing the daily attendance logbook and in using the
bundy clock.
On December 10, 1991, petitioner received a suspension order without pay for fifteen
(15) days effective January 1, 1992, because of dishonesty in reporting his actual
attendance. After serving the suspension, the petitioner reported back to office on
January 16, 1992.
On June 15, 1992, another adverse report on tardiness and absences from the Registrar
was made against the petitioner prompting WNC to send him another memorandum
with an attached tardiness and absences report, calling his attention on his tardine ss
and absences for the period February to April 1992.
On June 20, 1992, petitioner sent a letter of appeal and explained his side to the new
college president, Suzette Arbolario-Agustin, who gave petitioner another chance. The
petitioner was then appointed as Information Assistant effective immediately. However,
the petitioner did not immediately assume the post of Information Assistant prompting
the President of private respondent WNC to call his attention. When the petitioner
finally assumed his post, he was allowed a part-time teaching job in the same school to
augment his income.
Sometime in December 1992, WNC won a case against the officials of the union before
the NLRC. Petitioner was ordered to prepare a media blitz of this victory but the
petitioner did not comply with the order on the ground that such a press release would
only worsen the already aggravated situation and strained relations between WNC
management and the union officials.
When petitioner reported for work on the first day of January 1993, he was relieved
from his post and transferred to the College of Liberal Arts as Records Evaluator. Not for
long, the Dean of the Liberal Arts sent a letter to the Human Resources Manager
complaining about the petitioners poor performance and habitualabsenteeism, as
shown in the daily absence reports.
On January 18, 1993, petitioner was again absent from work without permission or
notice to his immediate superior. It turned out that he went to Bacolod City and on
January 28, 1993, the petitioner was one of those arrested during a raid in the house of
one "Toto Ruiz," a suspected drug pusher and was brought to the Bacolod Police Station
along with four (4) other suspects. Upon further search and investigation by theNarcotics Control Division, the petitioner was found possessing two (2) suspected
marijuana roaches (butts) which were placed inside his left shoe. The event was widely
publicized, focusing on petitioners position as an Economics teacher of WNC, and
considering further that one of his fellow suspects was a member of the Philippine
Army, who was caught with an unlicensed firearm, a tooter and other "shabu"
paraphernalia. The petitioner and other suspects were then charged with violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425, as amended).
Petitioner was asked to explain within 24 hours why he should not be terminated as a
result of the raid and the charges against him for violation of Rep. Act No. 6425 as
amended. Petitioner allegedly was not able to answer immediately since he was in jail
and received said memorandum only on January 30, 1993, although his wife had earlierreceived the memorandum on January 28, 1993.
On January 29, 1993, the petitioner was dismissed for failure to answer said
memorandum.
On February 1, 1993, the petitioner wrote to the President of WNC explaining his side
and asking for due process. WNC cancelled its Notice of Termination dated January 29,
1993, and granted the petitioners request. The petit ioner was notified through a
memorandum about the grant of his request and that a hearing would be conducted. He
was then placed under preventive suspension and an investigation committee was
organized to conduct the probe. On March 6, 1993, a notice of hearing/investigation
was sent to the petitioner.
After the investigation attended by the petitioner and his counsel, with proceedings
duly recorded, the investigation committee recommended the dismissal of petitioner. A
notice of termination was then sent to petitioner informing him of his termination from
the service for serious misconduct and gross and habitual neglect of duty. The petitioner
received the notice on March 25, 1993, but did not file a grievance concerning the
notice of termination.
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On January 19, 1995, petitioner filed a Complaint against WNC for illegal suspension,
illegal dismissal, backwages, salary differential for salary increases and other benefits
granted after his dismissal as well as for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys
fees.
In its Answer, WNC alleged that petitioner was dismissed on charges of serious
misconduct, and gross and willful neglect of duty. WNC said his dismissal was effected
after due notice and prior hearing. It claimed also that since petitioner was terminated
for a valid cause after a due hearing, the lattersclaim for moral and exemplarydamages, and attorneys fees had no basis in fact and in law.
After due proceedings, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, the decretal portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered DIRECTING respondent
West Negros College to pay complainant Rene P. Valiao(a) P3,300.00 as salary for the
period of his preventive suspension, and (b) P330.00 as attorneys fees, or the total
amount of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED THIRTY PESOS (P3,630.00).
Further, all other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.3
The Labor Arbiter found no justifiable reason to place the petitioner under preventive
suspension as there was no serious or imminent threat to the life or property of his
employer or co-workers.
However, the Labor Arbiter found the dismissal of the petitioner from WNC to be valid
due to absenteeism and tardiness and after he was accorded the procedural due
process aspect of the law as reflected in the records showing that the petitioner was
formally investigated and given the opportunity to refute the alleged findings by the
management of WNC. The Labor Arbiter held that frequent absenteeism and tardinessof the petitioner constituted not only willful disobedience but also gross and habitual
neglect of duties, which are valid grounds for termination of employment. He stressed
that the petitioners frequent absences without proper leave of absence was not only
unfair to WNC and the petitioners co-employees but also set an undesirable example to
the employees under his supervision, considering that the petitioner was not a mere
rank-and-file employee but one who owed more than the usual fealty to the
organization.
On appeal to the NLRC, the latter affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter, sustained
the latters findings of facts, and made its own findings on the apprehension of the
petitioner for possession of prohibited drugs. The decretal portion of the decision reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED and the decision of the
Executive Labor Arbiter is AFFIRMED in its entirety.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorariunder Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals
but this was dismissed for lack of merit. The decretal portion of the decision reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the questioned Decision and Resolution dated December 11, 1998 and
July 7, 1999, respectively, of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.5
The Court of Appeals held that the petitioner was validly dismissed for serious
misconduct and gross habitual neglect of duties, which was aggravated by his arrest for
violation of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended [the January 28, 1993 incident] and that he
was afforded the twin requirements of notice and hearing and the opportunity to
defend himself by the investigating committee. The appellate court noted that WNC had
presented sufficient evidence to support petitioners termination from employment
after taking into consideration the totality of the infractions or the number of violations
committed by petitioner during the period of employment and stressed that it properly
exercised its management prerogative by observing due process. Finally, the Court of
Appeals ruled that the NLRC correctly denied the claim for damages and attorneys fees
for lack of evidentiary support.
Petitioner duly filed a Motion of Reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of
Appeals.
Hence, this petition alleging that:
A. THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE DISMISSAL OF PETITIONER WAS VALID, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THERE IS CLEAR
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AND BLATANT VIOLATION OF THE BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE HEREIN
PETITIONER BOTH SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.
B. THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IN (SIC) DISMISSING THE
RELIEFS FOR MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES.6
In our view, the only relevant issue for our resolution is whether or not the petitioner
was validly dismissed from employment on the ground of serious misconduct and gross
habitual neglect of duties, including habitual tardiness and absenteeism.
Petitioner claims that his outright dismissal from employment was not valid and too
harsh and that he was not dismissed from employment because of tardiness or
absences but because he was among those apprehended in a raid. Also, he was not
accorded due process because although his wife received the show causenotice, he did
not have the proper mind to reply as he was in jail and was psychologically disturbed.
Considering the submissions of the parties as well as the records before us, we find the
petition without merit. Petitioners dismissal from employment is valid and justified.
For an employees dismissal to be valid, (a) the dismissal must be for a valid cause and(b) the employee must be afforded due process.
7
Serious misconduct and habitual neglect of duties are among the just causes for
terminating an employee under the Labor Code of the Philippines. Gross negligence
connotes want of care in the performance of ones duties. Habitual neglect implies
repeated failure to perform ones duties for a period of time, depending upon the
circumstances.8The Labor Arbiters findings that petitioners habitual absenteeism and
tardiness constitute gross and habitual neglect of duties that justified his termination of
employment are sufficiently supported by evidence on record. Petitioners repeated
acts of absences without leave and his frequent tardiness reflect his indifferent attitude
to and lack of motivation in his work. More importantly, his repeated and habitual
infractions, committed despite several warnings, constitute gross misconductunexpected from an employee of petitioners stature. This Court has held that habitual
absenteeism without leave constitute gross negligence and is sufficient to justify
termination of an employee.9
However, petitioner claims that he was dismissed not for his tardiness or absences but
for his arrest as a suspected drug user. His claim, however, is merely speculative. We
find such contention devoid of basis. First, the decisions of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC,
and the Court of Appeals are indubitable. They show that indeed petitioner had incurred
numerous and repeated absences without any leave. Moreover, he was not punctual in
reporting for work. These unexplained absences and tardiness were reflected on the
summary reports submitted by WNC before the labor arbiter, but petitioner failed to
controvert said reports. Second, contrary to petitioners assertion, the NLRC did not
base its conclusions on the fact of the arrest of petitioner for violation of Rep. Act No.
6425 but on the totality of the number of infractions incurred by the petitioner during
the period of his employment in different positions he occupied at WNC. Thus:
In the case of petitioner Valiao, his services were terminated by private respondentafter having been found guilty of serious misconductand gross habitual neglect of
dutywhich was aggravated by the January 28, 1993 incident. In exercising such
management prerogative, due process was properly observed. Private respondent
presented sufficient evidence to support its act in terminating the services of
petitioner. Private respondent took into consideration the totality of the infractions or
the number of violations committed by petitioner during the period of employment.
Furthermore, it hardly needs reminding that, in view of petitioners position and
responsibilities, he must demonstrate a scrupulous regard for rules and policies befitting
those who would be role models for their young charges.10
Indeed, even without the arrest incident, WNC had more than enough basis for
terminating petitioner from employment. It bears stressing that petitioners absencesand tardiness were not isolated incidents but manifested a pattern of habituality. In one
case, we held that where the records clearly show that the employee has not only been
charged with the offense of highgrading but also has been warned 21 times for
absences without official leave, these repeated acts of misconduct and willful breach of
trust by an employee justify his dismissal and forfeiture of his right to security of
tenure.11
The totality of infractions or the number of violations committed during the
period of employment shall be considered in determining the penalty to be imposed
upon an erring employee. The offenses committed by him should not be taken singly
and separately but in their totality. Fitness for continued employment cannot be
compartmentalized into tight little cubicles of aspects of character, conduct, and ability
separate and independent of each other.12
Needless to say, so irresponsible an employee like petitioner does not deserve a place in
the workplace, and it is within the managements prerogative of WNC to terminate his
employment. Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of employees, it must also
protect the rights of an employer to exercise what are clearly management
prerogatives. As long as the companys exercise of those rights and prerogative is in
good faith to advance its interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing
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the rights of employees under the laws or valid agreements, such exercise will be
upheld.13
Still, petitioner claims that he was not afforded due process so that his dismissal from
employment should be declared invalid. This contention deserves scant consideration.
The Court of Appeals held that "the records reveal that petitioner was afforded the twin
requirements of notice and hearing and was likewise given the opportunity to defend
himself before the investigating committee." We find no reason to set aside these
factual findings of the Court of Appeals as they are supported by evidence on record.Besides, we may not review the appellate courts findings of fact in an appeal
via certiorari,14
since as a rule, the Supreme Courts review is l imited to errors of law
allegedly committed by the appellate court.15
Judicial review of labor cases does not go
as far as to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence upon which the Labor Arbiter and
National Labor Relations Commission based their determinations.16
In this case, petitioner was asked to explain his several absences and tardiness on many
occasions. A notice to explain was sent to him regarding the arrest incident wherein he
was able to reply. An investigation committee was formed by WNC to investigate the
arrest incident and the absences and tardiness of petitioner. It must be emphasized that
proceedings of the committee were duly recorded, and petitioner actively participated
therein by answering the various questions interposed by the panel members. Finally, anotice of his termination was sent to petitioner, although he claims to have received it
late as he was in jail. It is an undeniable fact, however, that his wife had actually
received the notice in his house earlier, even before petitioners termination and this
matter was later communicated to him.
At any rate, petitioner was given enough opportunity to be heard, and his dismissal was
based on valid grounds. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side
or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A
formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential, as the due
process requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon isthe absolute lack of notice and hearing.
17
Finally, the Labor Arbiter found that petitioner is entitled to salary differentials for the
period of his preventive suspension, as there is no sufficient basis shown to justify his
preventive suspension. During the pendency of the investigation, the employer may
place the worker concerned under preventive suspension if his continued employment
poses a serious and imminent threat to life or property of the employer or of his co-
workers.18
But in this case, there is no indication that petitioner posed a serious threat
to the life and property of the employer or his co-employees. Neither was it shown that
he was in such a position to unduly influence the outcome of the investigation. Hence,
his preventive suspension could not be justified, and the payment of his salary
differentials is in order.
However, the award of attorneys fees to him cannot be sustained, in view of our
findings that petitioner was validly dismissed from employment. Said award lacks legal
basis and could not be granted properly in this case.
WHEREFORE,the assailed Decision dated August 22, 2000 and Resolution dated
November 22, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55133 are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that the award of attorneys fees is deleted. No pronouncement as to
costs.
G.R. No. L-66575 September 30, 1986
MANECLANG VS IAC
Petitioners Adriano Maneclang, et. al. filed before the then Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, Branch XI a complaint for quieting of title over a certain fishpond
located within the four [41 parcels of land belonging to them situated in Barrio
Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan, and the annulment of Resolutions Nos. 38 and 95
of the Municipal Council of Bugallon Pangasinan. The trial court dismissed the
complaint in a decision dated August 15, 1975 upon a finding that the body of water
traversing the titled properties of petitioners is a creek constituting a tributary of the
Agno River; therefore public in nature and not subject to private appropriation. The
lower court likewise held that Resolution No. 38, ordering an ocular inspection of the
Cayangan Creek situated between Barrios Salomague Sur and Salomague Norte, and
Resolution No. 95 authorizing public bidding for the lease of all municipal ferries and
fisheries, including the fishpond under consideration, were passed by respondents
herein as members of the Municipal Council of Bugallon, Pangasinan in the exercise
of their legislative powers.
Petitioners appealed said decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court, which
affirmed the same on April 29, 1983. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Acting on the petition, the Court required the respondents to comment thereon.
However, before respondents could do so, petitioners manifested that for lack of
interest on the part of respondent Alfredo Maza, the awardee in the public bidding
of the fishpond, the parties desire to amicably settle the case by submitting to the
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property of Miguel Fabie and brothers to point No. 12; thence N. 88 degrees 3 minutes
E., 45.35 meters along the northern boundary of the property belonging to Miguel Fabie
and brothers to point No. 13; thence S. 89 degrees 11 minutes E., 70.15 meters to a
stone monument to Miguel Fabie and brothers to point No. 14; thence S. 86 degrees 33
minutes E., 85.07 meters to a stone monument along the northern boundary of the
property of Miguel Fabie and brothers to point No. 15; thence N. 83 degrees 8 minutes
E., 14.49 meters along the northern boundary of the property owned by Miguel Fabie
and brothers to point no. 16; thence N. 47 degrees E., 158.35 meters along the
northwestern boundary of Miguel Fabie and brothers to point No. 17; thence N. 70degrees 22 minutes W., 40.74 meters along the southern boundary of the properties
owned by Charles M. Stone, Prudencio de Leon, and Asuncion Ventura (Looban) to point
No. 18; thence N. 83 degrees 22 minutes W., 7.38 meters along a stone fence and the
southern boundary of the properties belonging to Asuncion Ventura (Looban) and Petra
Garcia to point No. 19; thence S. 30 degrees 34 minutes W., 21.12 meters along a stone
fence and the western boundary of the property owned by Petra Carnero y Garcia to
point No. 20; thence S. 74 degrees 58 minutes W., 8.70 meters along the northern
boundary of the property of Evaristo Roxas and brothers to point No. 21; thence s. 22
degrees 4 minutes W., 34.75 meters along the eastern boundary of the property owned
by Evaristo Roxas and brothers to point 22; thence N. 68 degrees 47 minutes W., 26.40
meters along the southern boundary of the property belonging to Evaristo Roxas and
brothers to point No. 23; thence S. 68 degrees 47 minutes W., 85.61 meters along theeastern boundary of the properties owned by Silvestra Sarmiento and Evaristo Gonzalez
y Valdes to point No. 24; thence N. 84 degrees 58 minutes W., 12.85 meters to a stone
monument along the southern boundary of the property owned by Evaristo Gonzalez
Valdes to point No. 25; thence N. 79 degrees 37 minutes W., 11.10 meters along the
southern boundary of the property owned by Evaristo Gonzalez Valdes to point No. 0,
the point of the beginning. Containing 10,472.23 square meters of extension. Bearings
magnetic.
The said city alleged that it was the absolute owner of the said land; that said land was
assessed by the city of Manila in the sum of $1,780, United States currency; that there
existed no liens of whatever character against said land; that the land was unoccupied;
that the said city obtained title to the said land by reason of being the successor to allthe rights and actions of the old city of Manila (ayuntamiento de Manila), to which said
property formerly belonged.
To this petition of the petitioner, the Insular Government presented the following
opposition to the registration of said land:
The Solicitor-General, representing the Insular Government, appears before the court,
and states:
I. That the city of Manila, represented by its attorney, Modesto Reyes, requests that, in
compliance with the Land Registration Act, a parcel of land situated in Paco, a district of
this city, of which it claims to be the absolute owner, and the description of which is
specified in the petition be inscribed in its name.
II. That the land in question is the property of the Government of the United States
under the control of the Insular Government.
III. That by virtue thereof, the Solicitor-General opposes the inscription asked for, and
requests the court to deny the petition with the costs.
To this petition of the petitioner one Geronimo Morales also presented the following
opposition to the registration of a portion of the land described in the second paragraph
of said petition:
Now comes the undersigned before this court and says:
1. That the city of Manila, by its attorney, Modesto Reyes, has, in conformity with the
provisions of the Land Registration Act, applied for the registration of a certain parcel ofland located in the district of Paco, of this city, of which it alleges sole and absolute
ownership, and the description of which is included in the application.
2. That the plan and description of the said land as they appear in the petition are
incorrect, for there is included in the same a part of a building lot belonging to the
undersigned, and situated in the barrio of Rosario of said district, with an area of 84
meters more or less, as will be seen in the plan to be filed later.
3. Therefore, the undersigned files his opposition to the registration applied for, as far
as it has any bearing on the building lot of the undersigned which is included in the plan
and description of the applicant, and this honorable court is requested to deny the
application as far as it relates to the said building lot, with the costs against thepetitioner.
After the presentation of the petition on the part of the said petitioner, one of the
examiners of titles of the Court of Land Registration made an examination of the title
claimed by the petitioner and made the following report to the judge of the said court
of Land Registration.
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The examiner of titles of this judicial district, after going over the papers in the case of
the city, represented by its attorney, Modesto Reyes, states that:
1. The application filed by the city of Manila, is not accompanied by any document
relative to its alleged ownership, but sets forth that said city, as the successor in rights
and interest of the former ayuntamiento de Manila, is the owner of the land described
in the petition above referred to.
2. In the office of the register of deeds there is no record of any act or contract opposing
the claim of the applicant; nor does there appear, from the investigations held, any fact
contrary to those quoted in the application. The present limits of the land in question
may be held as correct.
3. The city of Manila, in order to acquire title to the land above mentioned, must show
the ownership which the former ayuntamiento had over said land.
OPINION.
Based on the above report, the undersigned is of the opinion that the title of the city of
Manila, represented by its attorney, Modesto Reyes, is defective and can not be
registered.
Manila, December 7, 1904.
AGUEDO VELARDE.
On the 14th of March, 1905, the cause was duly brought on for trial and during the trial
of said cause the petitioner attempted to establish by proof the following facts
First. That said land formerly belonged to the old city of Manila (ayuntamiento de
Manila) under the sovereignty of Spain.
Second. That the present city of Manila is at present the owner of said land by virtue of
being the successor of the old city of Manila.
Third. That the old city of Manila from the year 1894 until the change of sovereignty in
the Philippine Archipelago had rented said land, had received rents therefor, and in a
general way had administered the same.The respondent, the Central Government of the Philippine Islands, presented no proof
whatever in opposition to the claim of the petitioner, relying the fact that the petitioner
was not entitled to have said land registered, for the following reasons:
First. That the land in question was public land, belonging to the Central Government;
that the same had never been granted to any person or corporation or municipality by
the Spanish Government.
Second. That the city of Manila, neither the present nor the old city, was the owner of
said land.
On the 15th day of February, 1906, the judge of the said court filed h is decision by which
he denied the registration of the land claimed by the said Geronimo Morales and
granted the registration of the rest of said described property in favor of the said city.
Against this order allowing the registration of said tract of land the respondent duly
excepted and gave notice of his intention to appeal.
The Attorney-General, representing the respondent in this court, made the following
assignment of error:
There is nothing in the record which justifies the conclusion of the judgment of the court
below, to the effect that the land in question is owned by the city of Manila.The only proof presented during the trial by the petitioner which tended in any way to
support its claim was that in the year 1894 and thereafter the old city of Manila
(ayuntamiento de Manila) rented said land and received the rent therefor, and that the
present city of Manila succeeded to the rights of said old city. No proof was offered by
the plaintiff, documentary or other, to show in any way by what right said old city
exercised this right of control over said property.
We are of the opinion, and so hold, that the mere renting of property and receiving the
rent therefor can not, of themselves, in the absence of other proof, support a claim of
ownership of such property.
It has been argued that every pueblo organized by the Spanish Government in its insular
possessions has had granted to it, as a matter of course, certain lands for public
purposes, such as public commons, pasture lands, etc. Our attention has not been calledto any law or royal decree in which this contention is supported and we have searched
in vain to find such a provision. Upon the contrary we have found a royal decree of the
day of showing that the people of the pueblo of Dilao (now the barrio of Paco in
which this very land is located) had petitioned for a grant of acomunal, etc., and which
was denied.
One of the earliest provisions of law relating to the rights of pueblos in the insular
possessions of the Spanish Government is that de las reducciones, y pueblos de
indios (settlements and pueblos of natives) of December 1, 1573, as amended by that of
the 10th of October, 1618, found in Law VIII, Title III of Book VI of the Recopilacion de las
Leyes de Indias, and which it as follows:
The sites whereon the pueblos and settlements are to be bui lt must have water
facilities, lands, forests, entrances and exits, lands for cultivation, andan exido(common, public land) one league long, wherein the natives may keep their
cattle, without mingling them with those owned by Spaniards.
This provision of law seems to have been amplified in article 53 of the Ordinances of
Good Government, dated February 26, 1768, and extended to the pueblos of the
Philippine Islands by proclamation on the 11th day of September, 1801. This article
clearly indicates that these lands should be designated by the Spanish Government for
the use and benefit de las reducciones, y pueblos de los indios. Said article 53 is in part
as follows:
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It is held to be comunal (common public) the territory of the settlements and pueblos
inhabited by natives, to which, from the time of their foundation or organization, the
necessary lands were alloted in conformity with Law VII, Title III, Book VI of
the Recopilacion de las Leyes de Indias, etc.
This article 53 clearly indicates the following:
First. That the King continued to be the absolute owner of said lands;
Second. That the pueblos were only given the mere usufruct of the same;
Third. That the King might at any time annul such grant; and
Fourth. That a designation, of the particular land so granted, was a necessaryprerequisite for the holding of the same for the purposes indicated, by the said pueblo.
(SeeAutos Acordados , Vol. I, pp. 29, 48.)
As a further confirmation of the fact that the pueblos of the Philippine Islands did not
have, as a matter of right, a comunal, etc., unless the same had been expressly granted,
we find the following provision in the royal decree of February 28, 1883, which is as
follows:
On the recommendation of the minister for the colonies, and in conformity with the
opinion submitted by the council of the state, sitting in banc, I hereby decree the
following:
ARTICLE 1. The legua comunalfor the Philippine Islands, under the provisions of Law
VIII, Title III, Book VI, of theRecopilacion de Indias, as far as the pueblos already
established and those which may be established thereafter are concerned, shall be of anarea of 20,000 feet, equivalent to a league of 20 degrees, without regard to the
geometrical figure resulting from the topography of the locality, or to conditions relating
to property rights over the land itself or over land adjoining the same.
ART. 2. The pueblos not having said land alloted to them may apply and obtain the same
by means of the corresponding proceedings.
ART. 3. When the conditions so require, the pueblos may institute proceedings to obtain
an extension of said comunalland, in order that the latter may be in keeping with the
number of inhabitants, the number of heads of each pueblo. Given at the palace, on
February 28, 1883.
Following this royal decree we have the superior decreto of the 1st of August, 1883,
relating to the legua comunal, with the following provisions:
Legua comunal. In order to comply with and carry out the provisions of the royaldecree of February 28 of the current year, published in the Gaceta de Manilaon June 28
last, and relating to the legua comunal, on the recommendation of the direccion general
de administracion civil, I hereby order that the following regulations be observed:
1. The provincial chiefs shall take special care to inform the gobernadorcillos of the
towns under their control of the decree relating to the legua comunal, making them
understand that the superficial extension to be occupied by the same is that
corresponding to a square, the sides of which measure 20,000 feet, equivalent to a
square league, (de veinte al drado), and that the land should be uncultivated or untilled.
2. The towns not having said portion of land assigned may apply for the same to this
central government through the chief of the province or district, inclosing with the
petition a report of theprincipalia, stating the said circumstance and as many particulars
as may exist in their archives regarding the matter.
3. The said documents shall be forwarded to the direccion general de administracion
civil, through the provincial chief, and the said office, upon the information from the
bureau of forestry, shall recommend to me what it may deem proper.
4. After the "legua comunal" has been granted by this Government, the bureau of
forestry shall proceed to the setting up of the boundary marks of the same, executing acertificate of the land, which, after being signed by the officer conducting the
proceedings and by theprincipaliaof the town, will be submitted for my approval
through the direccion general de administracion civil.
5. For the legua comunaluncultivated land will be selected, whenever possible, which
may be in proper condition for the pasture of cattle and cultivation of building timber
and the necessary industries to meet the requirements of the inhabitants.
6. In order to increase the said communal land, when the requirements of the towns
may demand, it will be necessary to institute new proceedings, which will be annexed to
a statement signed by theprincipalia, showing the number of the inhabitants of the
town, the kind and number of the extension of the lands which, bearing in mind the
local conditions, they may deem necessary to meet the requirements of the former and
nourishment for the latter.7. These statements will be forwarded to the direccion general by the chief of the
province, together with his opinion, in which he will state whether or not he considers
the petition to be unreasonable.
8. The offices under the department of finance will furnish the direccion general de
administracion with the necessary documents for verifying the truth of the declarations
made by theprincipalias of the towns, regarding the number of the inhabitants and
heads of cattle.
9. The direccion general de administracion civil, with the report of the bureau of forestry
and, should it be deemed necessary, of the board of agriculture, shall recommend to me
the extension to be finally marked for the legua comunal.
10. After the area of the land has been determined by this general government, the
bureau of forestry shall proceed with the appointment and the setting of marks of thenew communal land, a certificate being executed in the same form as previously stated.
11. The expenses arising from the proceedings, as well as those arising from the setting
up of boundary marks of the legua comunaland its final establishment, must be paid by
the town to which the concession has been granted. (Gazette No. 42, August 11.)
By the royal decree of the 23rd of December, 1870, it was made necessary by
monuments or otherwise to mark the division lines of the different pueblos of the
Philippine Islands. (Gaceta de Madrid, February 24.)
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By the royal order of the 17th of January, 1885, it was provided that, when a pueblo
should show to the Government of the Philippine Islands that its legua comunalwas
insufficient, it might, upon petition, have such lines increased. (Gaceta de Madrid,
March 15, 1885.)
The royal decree of the 19th of May, 1893, relating to the municipal government
(Gaceta de Madrid, May 22, 1893) contains no provisions with reference to the granting
to pueblos of the legua comunal, etc.
The question of the right of pueblos in the insular possessions of the Spanish
Government to public lands has come before the Supreme Court of the United Statesseveral times in its relation to pueblos in the territory acquired by the United States
from the King of Spain.
In the case of Grisar vs. McDowell (6 Wallace, 363, 373) Justice Field in discussing this
question said:
These laws provided for the assignment to the pueblos, for their use and the use of their
inhabitants, of land not exceeding in extent 4 square leagues. Such assignment was to
be made by the public authorities of the Government upon the original establishment of
the pueblo, or afterwards upon the petition of its officers or inhabitants; and the land to
be measured off in a square or prolonged form, according to the nature and condition of
the country. All lands within the general limits stated, which had previously become
private property or were required for public purposes, were reserved and excepted
from the assignment.Until the lands were thus definitely assigned and measured off, the right or claim of the
pueblo was an imperfect one. It was a right which the Government might refuse to
recognize at all, or might recognize in a qualified form; it might be burdened with
conditions, and it might be restricted to less limits than the 4 square leagues, which was
the usual quantity assigned.
In the case of United States vs. Santa Fe (165 U. S., 707), in which this same question
was involved, Justice White of the Supreme Court of the United States said:
It can not be doubted that under the law of Spain it was necessary that the proper
authorities should particularly designate the land to be acquired by towns or pueblos
before a vested right or title to the use thereof could arise.
Elizondo, in his work entitled Practica Universal Forense(vol. 5, p. 226), makes the
following statement relating to the question presented here:There is nothing whatever designated by law as belonging to towns, other than that
which by royal privilege, custom, or contract between man and man is granted to them,
so that although there be assigned to the towns at the time of their
constitution territorioor pertinencias, which may be common to all the residents,
without each one having the right to use them separately, it is a prerogative reserved to
the sovereigns to divided the terminos of the provinces and towns, assigning to these
the use and enjoyment, but the domain remaining in the sovereigns themselves.
Chief Justice Fuller, speaking for the court in the case of United States vs. Sandoval and
in the case of Morton vs. United States (167 U.S., 278, 297), said:
"Under the laws of the Indies, lands not actually allotted to setters remained the
property of the King, to be disposed of by him or by those on whom he might confer
that power. As Mr. Hall says (Chap. VII, 122): "The fee of the lands embraced within
the limits of pueblos continued to remain in the sovereign, and never in the pueblo as a
corporate body."
The petitioner herein not having presented proof showing that the land in question had
been granted to it by the former sovereign in these Islands, and not having shown that itwas entitled to said lands by virtue of some law of the present sovereign of these
Islands, the Court of Land Registration was not empowered to grant the registration of
said lands in favor of said petitioner. The judgment, therefore, of the lower court is
hereby reversed. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-15829 December 4, 1967
ROMAN R. SANTOS vs HON. FLORENCIO MORENO
THE APPEAL
The Honorable Secretary of Public Works & Communications appeals from the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring of private ownership certain creekssituated in barrio San Esteban, Macabebe, Pampanga.
The Zobel family of Spain formerly owned vast track of marshland in the municipality of
Macabebe, Pampanga province. Called Hacienda San Esteban, it was administered and
managed by the Ayala y Cia. From the year 1860 to about the year 1924 Ayala y Cia.,
devoted the hacienda to the planting and cultivation of nipa palms from which it
gathered nipa sap or "tuba." It operated a distillery plant in barrio San Esteban to turn
nipa tuba into potable alcohol which was in turn manufactured into liquor.
Accessibility through the nipa palms deep into the hacienda posed as a problem. Ayala y
Cia., therefore dug canals leading towards the hacienda's interior where most of them
interlinked with each other. The canals facilitated the gathering of tuba and the
guarding and patrolling of the hacienda by security guards called "arundines." By the
gradual process of erosion these canals acquired the characteristics and dimensions of
rivers.
In 1924 Ayala y Cia shifted from the business of alcohol production to bangus culture. It
converted Hacienda San Esteban from a forest of nipa groves to a web of fishponds. To
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do so, it cut down the nipa palm, constructed dikes and closed the canals criss -crossing
the hacienda.
Sometime in 1925 or 1926 Ayala y Cia., sold a portion of Hacienda San Esteban to
Roman Santos who also transformed the swamp land into a fishpond. In so doing, he
closed and built dikes across Sapang Malauling Maragul, Quiorang Silab,
Pepangebunan, Bulacus, Nigui and Nasi.
The closing of the man-made canals in Hacienda San Esteban drew complaints fromresidents of the surrounding communities. Claiming that the closing of the canals
caused floods during the rainy season, and that it deprived them of their means of
transportation and fishing grounds, said residents demanded re-opening of those
canals. Subsequently, Mayor Lazaro Yambao of Macabebe, accompanied by policemen
and some residents went to Hacienda San Esteban and opened the closure dikes at
Sapang Malauling Maragul Nigui and Quiorang Silab. Whereupon, Roman Santos filed
Civil Case No. 4488 in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga which preliminarily
enjoined Mayor Yambao and others from demolishing the dikes across the canals. The
municipal officials of Macabebe countered by filing a complaint (docketed as Civil Case
No. 4527) in the same court. The Pampanga Court of First Instance rendered judgment
in both cases against Roman Santos who immediately elevated the case to the Supreme
Court.
In the meantime, the Secretary of Commerce and Communications1conducted his own
investigation and found that the aforementioned six streams closed by Roman Santos
were natural, floatable and navigable and were utilized by the public for transportation
since time immemorial. He consequently ordered Roman Santos on November 3, 1930
to demolish the dikes across said six streams. However, on May 8, 1931 the said official
revoked his decision of November 3, 1930 and declared the streams in question
privately owned because they were artificially constructed. Subsequently, upon
authority granted under Act 3982 the Secretary of Commerce and Communications
entered into a contract with Roman Santos whereby the former recognized the private
ownership of Sapang Malauling Maragul, Quiorang Silab, Pepangebunan, Bulacus,
Nigui and Nasi and the latter turned over for public use two artificial canals and boundhimself to maintain them in navigable state. The Provincial Board of Pampanga and the
municipal councils of Macabebe and Masantol objected to the contract. However, the
Secretary of Justice, in his opinion dated March 6, 1934, upheld its legality. Roman
Santos withdraw his appeals in the Supreme Court.
With respect to the portion of Hacienda San Esteban still owned by the Zobel family, the
municipal authorities of Macabebe filed in 1930 an administrative complaint, in the
Bureau of Public Works praying for the opening of the dikes and dams across certain
streams in Hacienda San Esteban. Whereupon, the district engineer of Pampanga and a
representative of the Bureau of Public Works conducted investigations. In the
meantime, the Attorney General, upon a query from the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications, rendered an opinion dated October 11, 1930 sustaining the latter's
power to declare streams as publicly owned under Sec. 4 of Act 2152, as amended by
Act 3208.
On September 29, 1930 the investigator of the Bureau of Public Works, Eliseo Panopio,submitted his report recommending the removal of the dikes and dams in question. And
on the basis of said report, the Secretary of Commerce and Communications rendered
his decision on November 3, 1930 ordering Ayala y Cia., to demolish the dikes and dams
across the streams named therein situated in Hacienda San Esteban. Ayala y Cia., moved
for reconsideration, questioning the power of the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications to order the demolition of said dikes.
Days before the Secretary of Commerce and Communications rendered his
aforementioned decision, Ayala y Cia., thru counsel, made representations with the
Director of Public Works for a compromise agreement. In its letter dated October 11,
1930, Ayala y Cia., offered to admit public ownership of the following creeks:
Antipolo, Batasan Teracan, Biuas or Batasan, Capiz, Carbon, Cutut, Dalayap,
Enrique, Iba, Inaun, Margarita, Malauli or Budbud, Matalaba Palapat, Palipit
Maisao, Panlovenas, Panquitan, Quinapati, Quiorang, Bubong or Malauli
Malati, Salop, Sinubli and Vitas.
provided the rest of the streams were declared private. Acting on said offer, the
Director of Public Works instructed the surveyor in his office, Eliseo Panopio, to proceed
to Pampanga and conduct another investigation.
On January 23, 1931 Panopio submitted his report to the Director of Public Works
recommending that some streams enumerated therein be declared public and some
private on the ground that they were originally dug by the hacienda owners. The private
streams were:
Agape, Atlong, Cruz, Balanga, Batasan, Batasan Matlaue, Balibago, Baliti, Bato,
Buengco Malati, Bungalin, Bungo Malati, Bungo Maragui, Buta-buta,
Camastiles, Catlu, Cauayan or Biabas, Cela, Dampalit, Danlimpu, Dilinquente,
Fabian, Laguzan, Lalap Maburac, Mabutol, Macabacle, Maragul or Macanduli,
Macabacle or Mababo, Maisac, Malande, Malati, Magasawa, Maniup, Manulit,
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Mapanlao, Maisac, Maragul Mariablus Malate, Masamaral, Mitulid, Nasi, Nigui
or Bulacus, Palipit, Maragul, Pangebonan, Paumbong, Pasco or Culali, Pilapil,
Pinac Malati, Pinac, Maragul or Macabacle, Quiorang Silab or Malauli Maragul,
Raymundo, Salamin, Salop Maisac, Salop Maragul, Sermon and Sinca or
Mabulog.
He therefore recommended revocation of the decision already mentioned above, dated
November 3, 1930 of the Secretary of Commerce and Communications ordering the
demolition of the dikes closing Malauling Maragul, Quiorang, Silab, Pepangebonan,Nigui, Bulacus, Nasi, and Pinac. On February 13, 1931 the Director of Public Works
concurred in Panopio's report and forwarded the same the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications.
On February 25, 1935 the municipality of Macabebe and the Zobel family executed an
agreement whereby they recognized the nature of the streams mentioned in Panopio's
report as public or private, depending on the findings in said report. This agreement was
approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications on February 27, 1935
and confirmed the next day by the municipal council of Macabebe under Resolution No.
36.
A few months later, that is, on June 12, 1935, the then Secretary of Justice issued anopinion holding that the contract executed by the Zobel family and the municipality of
Macabebe has no validity for two reasons, namely, (1) the streams although originally
dug by Ayala y Cia., lost their private nature by prescription inasmuch as the public was
allowed to use them for navigation and fishing, citing Mercado vs. Municipality of
Macabebe, 59 Phil. 592; and (2) at the time the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications approved the said contract, he had no more power so to do, because
such power under Sec. 2 of Act 2152 was revoked by the amending Act 4175 which took
effect on December 7, 1934.
Despite the above ruling of the Secretary of Justice, the streams in question remained
closed.
In 1939 administrative investigations were again conducted by various agencies of the
Executive branch of our government culminating in an order of President Manuel
Quezon immediately before the national elections in 1941 requiring the opening of
Sapang Macanduling, Maragul Macabacle, Balbaro and Cansusu. Said streams were
again closed in 1942 allegedly upon order of President Quezon.
THE CASE
Roman Santos acquired in 1940 from the Zobel family a larger portion of Hacienda San
Esteban wherein are located 25 streams which were closed by Ayala y Cia., and are now
the subject matter in the instant controversy.
Eighteen years later, that is in 1958, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 20562following
a congressional inquiry which was kindled by a speech delivered by Senator Rogelio de
la Rosa in the Senate. On August 15, 1958 Senator de la Rosa requested in writing the
Secretary of Public Works and communications to proceed in pursuance of Republic Act
No. 2056 against fishpond owners in the province of Pampanga who have closed riversand appropriated them as fishponds without color of title. On the same day, Benigno
Musni and other residents in the vicinity of Hacienda San Esteban petitioned the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications to open the following streams:
Balbaro, Batasan Matua, Bunga, Cansusu, Macabacle, Macanduling, Maragul,
Mariablus, Malate, Matalabang, Maisac, Nigui, Quiorang Silab, Sapang
Maragul and Sepung Bato.
Thereupon, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications instructed Julian C.
Cargullo to conduct an investigation on the above named streams.
On October 20, 1958 Musni and his co-petitioners amended their petition to include
other streams. The amended petition therefore covered the following streams:
Balbaro, Balili, Banawa, Batasan Matua Bato, Bengco, Bunga, Buta-buta,
Camastiles, Cansusu, Cela, Don Timpo, Mabalanga, Mabutol, Macabacle,
Macabacle qng. Iba, Macanduling, Maragul, Malauli, Magasawa, Mariablus
Malate Masamaral, Matalabang Maisa, Mariablus,3Nigui, Pita, Quiorang,
Silab, Sapang Maragul, Sepung Bato, Sinag and Tumbong.
On March 2, 4, 10, 30 and 31, and April 1, 1959, the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications rendered his decisions ordering the opening and restoration of the
channel of all the streams in controversy except Sapang Malauling, Maragul, Quiorang,Silab, Nigui Pepangebonan, Nasi and Bulacus, within 30 days on the ground that said
streams belong to the public domain.
On April 29, 1959, that is, after receipt of the Secretary's decision dated March 4, 1959,
Roman Santos filed a motion with the Court of First Instance of Man for junction against
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications and Julian C. Cargullo. As prayed for
preliminary injunction was granted on May 8, 1959. The Secretary of Public Work and
Communications answered and alleged as defense that venue was improperly laid; that
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Roman Santos failed to exhaust administrative remedies; that the contract between
Ayala y Cia., and the Municipality of Macabebe is null and void; and, that Section 39 of
Act 496 excludes public streams from the operation of the Torrens System.
On April 29 and June 12, 1969, Roman Santos received the decision of the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications dated March 10 and March 30, March 31, and April
1, 1959. Consequently, on June 24, 1959 he asked the court to cite in contempt
Secretary Florendo Moreno, Undersecretary M.D. Bautista and Julian Cargullo for
issuing and serving upon him the said decisions despite the existence of the preliminaryinjunction. The Solicitor General opposed the motion alleging that the decisions in
question had long been issued when the petition for injunction was filed, that they were
received after preliminary injunction issued because they were transmitted through the
District Engineer of Pampanga to Roman Santos; that their issuance was for Roman
Santos' information and guidance; and, that the motion did not allege that respondents
took steps to enforce the decision. Acting upon said motion, on July 17, 1959, the trial
court considered unsatisfactory the explanation of the Solicitor General but ruled that
Secretary Florencio Moreno, Undersecretary M.D. Bautista and Julian Cargullo acted in
good faith. Hence, they were merely "admonished to desist from any and further action
in this case, observe the preliminary injunction issued by this Court, with the stern
warning, however, that a repetition of the acts complained of shall be dealt with
severely."
On July 18, 1959 the trial court declared all the streams under litigation private, and
rendered the following judgment:
The Writ of preliminary injunction restraining the respondent Secretary of
Public Works & Communications from enforcing the decisions of March 2 And
4, 1959 and all other similar decisions is hereby made permanent.
The Secretary of Public Works and Communication and Julian Cargullo appealed to this
Court from the order of July 17, 1959 issued in connection with Roman Santos' motion
for contempt and from the decision of the lower court on the merits of the case.
ISSUES
The issues are: (1) Did Roman Santos exhaust administrative remedies? (2) Was venue
properly laid? (3) Did the lower court err in conducting a trial de novo of the case and in
admitting evidence not presented during the administrative proceeding? (4) Do the
streams involved in this case belong to the publ ic domain or to the owner of Hacienda
San Esteban according to law and the evidence submitted to the Department of Public
Works and Communications?
DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES
1. Respondents maintain that Roman Santos resorted to the courts without first
exhausting administrative remedies available to him, namely, (a) motion for
reconsideration of the decisions of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications;
and, (b) appeal to the President of the Philippines.
Whether a litigant, in exhausting available administrative remedies, need move for the
reconsideration of an administrative decision before he can turn to the courts for relief,
would largely depend upon the pertinent law,4the rules of procedure and the usual
practice followed in a particular office.5
Republic Act No. 2056 does not require the filing of a motion for reconsideration as a
condition precedent to judicial relief. From the context of the law, the intention of the
legislators to forego a motion for reconsideration manifests itself
clearly.1awphil.netRepublic Act No. 2056 underscores the urgency and summary nature
of the proceedings authorized thereunder. Thus in Section 2 thereof the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications under pain of criminal liability is duty bound to
terminate the proceedings and render his decision within a period not exceeding 90
days from the filing of the complaint. Under the same section, the party respondent
concerned is given not than 30 days within which to comply with the decision of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, otherwise the removal of the dams
would be done by the Government at the expense of said party. Congress has precisely
provided for a speedy and a most expeditious proceeding for the removal of illegal
obstructions to rivers and on the basis of such a provision it would be preposterous to
conclude that it had in mind to require a party to file a motion for reconsideration an
additional proceeding which would certainly lengthen the time towards the final
settlement of existing controversies. The logical conclusion is that Congress intended
the decision of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications to be final and
executory subject to a timely review by the courts without going through formal andtime consuming preliminaries.
Moreover, the issues raised during the administrative proceedings of this case are the
same ones submitted to court for resolution. No new matter was introduced during the
proceeding in the court below which the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
had no opportunity to correct under his authority.
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Furthermore, Roman Santos assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 2056 and
the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications to order the
demolition of dams across rivers or streams. Those questions are not within the
competence of said Secretary to decide upon a motion for reconsideration.itc-alfThey
are purely legal questions, not administrative in nature, and should properly be aired
before a competent court as was rightly done by petitioner Roman Santos .
At any rate, there is no showing in the records of this case that the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications adopted rule of procedure in investigations authorizedunder Republic Act No. 2056 which require a party litigant to file a motion for the
reconsideration of the Secretary's decision before he can appeal to the courts. Roman
Santos however stated in his brief that the practice is not to entertain motions for
reconsideration for the reason that Republic Act No. 2056 does not expressly or
impliedly allow the Secretary to grant the same. Roman Santos' statement is supported
by Opinion No. 61, Series of 1959, dated April 14, 1959 of the Secretary of Justice.
As to the failure of Roman Santos to appeal from the decision of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications to the President of the Philippines, suffice it to state that
such appeal could be dispensed with because said Secretary is the alter ego of the
President.itc-alfThe actions of the former are presumed to have the implied sanction of
the latter.6
2. It is contended that if this case were considered as an ordinary civil action, venue was
improperly laid when the same was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila for
the reason that the case affects the title of a real property. In fine, the proposition is
that since the controversy dwells on the ownership of or title to the streams located in
Hacienda San Esteban, the case is real action which, pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule 5 of the
Rules of Court should have been filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga.
The mere fact that the resolution of the controversy in this case would wholly rest on
the ownership of the streams involved herein would not necessarily classify it as a real
action. The purpose of this suit is to review the decision of the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications to enjoin him from enforcing them and to prevent him frommaking and issuing similar decisions concerning the stream in Hacienda San Esteban.
The acts of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications are the object of the
litigation, that is, petitioner Roman Santos seeks to control them, hence, the suit ought
to be filed in the Court of First Instance whose territorial jurisdiction encompasses the
place where the respondent Secretary is found or is holding office. For the rule is that
outside its territorial limits, the court has no power to enforce its order.7
Section 3 of Rule 5 of the Rules of Court does not apply to determine venue of this
action. Applicable is Sec. 1 the same rule, which states:
Sec. 1. General rule. Civil actions in Courts of First Instance may be
commenced and tried where the defendant any of the defendants residents or
may be found or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the
election of the plaintiff.
Accordingly, the Petition for injunction who correctly filed in the Court of First Instanceof Manila. Respondents Secretary of Public Works and Communications and Julian
Cargullo are found and hold office in the City of Manila.
3. The lower court tried this case de novo. Against this procedure respondents objected
and maintained that the action, although captioned as an injunction is really a petition
for certiorarito review the decision of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications. Therefore they now contend that the court should have confined itself
to reviewing the decisions of the respondent Secretary of Public Works and
Communications only on the basis of the evidence presented in the administrative
proceedings. On the other hand, Roman Santos now, submits that the action is a
proceeding independent and distinct from the administrative investigation; that,
accordingly, the lower court correctly acted in trying the case anew and renderingjudgment upon evidence adduced during the trial.
Whether the action instituted in the Court of First Instance be for mandamus, injunction
or certiorariis not very material. In reviewing the decision of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, the Court of First Instance shall confine its inquiry to the
evidence presented during, the administrative proceedings. Evidence not presented
therein shall not be admitted, and considered by the trial court. As aptly by this Court
speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, in a similar case:
The findings of the Secretary can not be enervated by new evidence not laid
before him, for that would be tantamount to holding a new investigation, and
to substitute for the discretion and judgment of the Secretary the discretion
and judgment of the court, to whom the statute had not entrusted the case. It
is immaterial that the present action should be one for prohibition or injunction
and not one for certiorari; in either event the case must be resolved upon the
evidence submitted to the Secretary, since a judicial review of executive
decisions does not import a trial de novo, but only an ascertainment of whether
the "executive findings are not in violation of the Constitution or of the laws,
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and are free from fraud or imposition, and whether they find reasonable
support in the evidence. . . .8
The case at bar, no matter what the parties call it, is in reality a review of several
administrative decisions of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. Being
so, it was error for the lower court to conduct a trial de novo. Accordingly, for purposes
of this review, only the evidence presented and admitted in the administrative
investigation will be considered in our determination of whether on the basis thereof
the decisions of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications were correct.
4. We come to the question whether the streams involved in this case belong to the
public domain or to the owner of Hacienda San Esteban. If said streams are public, then
Republic Act 2056 applies, if private, then the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications cannot order demolition of the dikes and dams across them pursuant
to his authority granted by said law.
First, we come to the question of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 2056. The
lower court held Republic Act No. 2056 constitutional but ruled that it was applied by
respondents unconstitutionally. That is, it held that Roman Santos was being deprived of
his property without due process of law, for the dikes of his fishponds were ordered
demolished through an administrative, instead of a judicial, proceeding. This conclusionand rationalization of the lower court amount in effect to declaring the law
unconstitutional, stated inversely. Note that the law provides for an expeditious
administrative process to determine whether or not a dam or dike should be declare a
public nuisance and ordered demolished. And to say that such an administrative
process, when put to operation, is unconstitutional is tantamount to saying that the law
itself violates the Constitution. In Lovina vs. Moreno,supra, We held said law
constitutional. We see no reason here to hold otherwise.
Discussing now the applicability of Republic Act 2056, the same applies to two types of
bodies of water, namely (1)public navigable rivers, streams, coastal waters, or
waterways and (b) areas declared as communal fishing grounds, as provided for in
Section 1 thereof:
Sec. 1. . . . the construction or building of dams, dikes or any other works which
encroaches into any public navigable river, stream, coastal waters and any
other navigable public waters or waterways as well as the construction or
building of dams, dikes or any other works in areas declared as communal
fishing grounds, shall be ordered removed as public nuisances or as prohibited
constructions as herein provided: . . .
We are not concerned with communal fishing grounds because the streams here
involved have not been so declared, but with public navigable streams. The question
therefore is: Are the streams in Hacienda San Esteban which are mentioned in the
petition of Benigno Musni and others, public and navigable?
Respondents contend that said streams are public on the following grounds:
(1) Hacienda San Esteban was formerly a marshland and being so, it is not susceptible to
appropriation. It therefore belongs to the State. Respondents rely on Montano vs.Insular Government, 12 Phil. 572.
(2) The streams in question are natural streams. They are tributaries of publ ic streams.
Cited are the cases ofSamson vs. Dionisio, et al., 11 Phil. 538 and Bautista vs. Alarcon, 23
Phil. 636.
(3) The streams have for their source public rivers, therefore they cannot be classified as
canals.
(4) Assuming the streams were artificially made by Ayala y Cia., said titleholder lost
ownership over them by prescription when it allowed the public to use them for
navigation for a long time. Respondents cite Mercado vs. Municipal President of
Macabebe, 59 Phil. 592.
(5) Assuming the streams in question are not mentioned as public in the certificates of
title held by Ayala y Cia., over Hacienda San Esteban, still they cannot be considered as
privately owned for Section 39 of Act 496 expressly excepts public streams from private
ownership.
(6) The Panopio Report, which found the streams in question of private ownership was
nullified by the Secretary of Justice in his opinion dated June 12, 1935.1awphil.netAnd,
the contract between Ayala y Cia., and the Secretary of Commerce and Communications
agreeing on the ownership of the streams in question is ultra vires.
The doctrine in Montano vs. Insular Government, supra, that a marshland which is
inundated by the rise of the tides belongs to the State and is not susceptible to
appropriation by occupation has no application here inasmuch as in said case the
land subject matter of the litigation was not yet titled and precisely Isabelo Montano
sought title thereon on the strength of ten years' occupation pursuant to paragraph 6,
section 54 of Act 926 of the Philippine Commission. Whereas, the subject matter in this
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case Hacienda San Esteban is titled land and private ownership thereof by Ayala y
Cia., has been recognized by the King of Spain and later by the Philippine Government
when the same was registered under Act 496.
Respondents further cite Bautista vs. Alarcon, 23 Phil. 631, where the plaintiff sought
injunction against the defendants who allegedly constructed a dam across a public canal
which conveyed water from the Obando River to fishponds belonging to several
persons. The canal was situated within a public land. In sustaining the injunction granted
by the Court of First Instance, this Court said:
No private persons has right to usurp possession of a watercourse, branch of a
river, or lake of the public domain and use, unless it shall have been proved that
he constructed the same within in property of his exclusive ownership , and such
usurpation constitutes a violation of the legal provisions which explicity exclude
such waterways from the exclusive use or possession of a private party.
(Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in the above-cited case, a private person may take possession of a
watercourse if he constructed the same within his property.itc-alfThis puts Us into
inquiry whether the streams in question are natural or artificial. In so doing, We shall
examine only the evidence presented before the Department of Public Works and
Communications and disregard that which was presented for the first time before the
lower court, following our ruling in Lovina vs. Moreno, supra.
(1) Sapang Macanduling Maragul or Macanduli is presently enclosed in Fishpond No. 12
of Roman Santos. Its banks cannot anymore be seen but some traces of them could be
noted by a row of isolated nipa palms. Its water is subject to the rise and fall of the tides
coming from Guagua and Antipolo Rivers and it is navigable by light watercrafts. Its inlet
is Antipolo River; another dike at its outlet along the Palapat River.9It is closed by four
dikes: One dike at its inlet along the Antipolo River; another dike at its cutlet along the
Palatpat River; and, two dikes in between. Then exist channel at the Palapat River where
the fishpond gate lies has been filled up with dredge spoils from the Pampanga River
Control Project.
(2) Sapang Macabacle is found in Fishpond No. 13. Its banks are still evident. This
stream is about 30 meters wide, two meters deep and one and one-half to two
kilometers long. Its source is Rio Cansusu. Like Macanduli, its channel is obstructed by
four dikes. One of them was constructed by the engineers of the Pampanga River
Control Project.
(3) Sapang Balbaro which is found in Fishpond No. 13, runs from Canal Enrique near Rio
Cansusu to Sapang Macabacle, a distance of about one-half kilometer. It is passable by
banca. The closures of this stream consist of two dikes located at each ends on Canal
Enrique and Sapang Macabacle.
(4) Sapang Cansusu is a continuation of the Cansusu River. The Cansusu River opens at
the Guagua River and allegedly ends at the Palanas River in front of Barrio San Esteban.
At a point near the mouth of Sapang Balbaro, the owners of Hacienda San Esteban built
a canal leading straight to one end of Barrio San Esteban. They called th is canal "CanalEnrique." And at the point where Canal Enrique joins Cansusu they built a dike across
Cansusu, thus closing this very portion of the river which extends up to Palanas River
where they built another closure dike. This closed portion, called "Sapang Cansusu," is
now part of Fishpond No. 1.
Sapang Cansusu is half a kilometer long and navigable by banca.
Appellant's witnesses, Beligno Musni, 41, Macario Quiambao, 96, Roman Manansala, 55
and Castor Quiambao, 76, all residents of Barrio San Esteban, testified that prior to their
closure, Sapang Macaduli, Macabacle, Balbaro and Cansusu were used as passageway
and as fishing grounds; that people transported through them tuba,10
wood
and sasa,11and that the tuba was brought to the distillery in Barrio San Esteban.Macario Quiambao testified also that said four streams "were created by God for the
town people"; and that if any digging was done it was only to deepen the shallow parts
to make passage easier. According to witness Anastacio Quiambao said streams were
navigable, even Yangco's ship "Cababayan" could pass through. Simplicio Quiambao, 36,
and Marcelino Ocampo, 55, stated on direct examination that before closure of the
above named four streams, people from the surrounding towns of Guagua, Bacolor,
Macabebe, Masantol and Sexmoan fished and navigated in them.
Against the aforementioned, testimonial evidence Roman Santos presented the
testimony of Nicanor Donarber, 80, Mariano Guinto, 71, and his own. Donarber, who
started working as an arundin12
testified that Ayala y Cia., dug Sapang Macanduli,
Balbaro