GR. No. 48265 (Jan. 7, 1987)Director of Lands vs. CA and ISABEL ESTEVEZ DE TUANQUI

FactsDirector of Lands assailed the decision of CA in the Civil Case filed by Isabel Tuanqui against Diogenes Tuazon. The CA’s decision affirmed the decision of the CFI of Legazpi, Albay to which Tuanqui was declared as owner of Lot No. 109 of the Cadastral Survey of Legazpi and the defendant, Diogenes Tuazon, is ordered to re convey the lot embraced in Original Certificate of Title No. 40 plus damages and attorney’s fee.

Tuazon filed a complaint before the CFI of Albay an action to remove clouds over real property with damages and preliminary injunction. Tuazon’s contention is that the land in question was not formed by accretion but by the reclamation project of the government and the same was recently left dry due to the construction of the culvert for Legaspi drainage, consequently by the second parcel of land forms part of the public domain. That assuming without conceding that the second parcel of land is the private property of Tuanqui, her rights to recover ownership, thereof has prescribed as defendant and his predecessor-in-interests has occupied the land openly and adversely for more than ten years. On the other hand, the defendant in this case, the Director of Lands, through the Solicitor General, avers the fear that he will proceed in adjudicating the disputed parcel of public lands exist only in the imagination of Tuanqui who is not even certain that a public land application was filed for the land described in the complaint and therefore not a valid ground for the issuance of injunction, much less an ex-parte injunction. The CFI ruled in favor of Tuanqui.

Both petitioners Diogenes Tuazon and Director of Lands filed their separate motions for reconsideration which were denied by the appellate court. Hence, petitioners filed separate petitioners for review on appeal by way of certiorari resulting to a consolidated case herewith.

IssueWhether or not the CA erred in declaring that there was accretion and consequently in not declaring the same as public land subject to the disposition of the Director of Lands.

HeldNo. SC finds no reason to reverse the findings of facts or conclusions arrived at by the lower courts. In ruling that there was indeed accretion, the CA declares clearly that that Lot 109 was formed by the alluvial accumulation of deposit through the action of the current of the river. Therefore Article 457 of the Civil Code of the Philippines applies. Said article reads:

ART. 457. To the owners of land adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.

As between the plaintiff and the defendant, Diogenes Tuazon, the former has the right to Lot No. 109. There is enough evidence that the land in question was formed by accretion; thus it belongs to the riparian owner, pursuant to Art. 457 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Consequently, the Director of Lands has no jurisdiction over it and any conveyance made by him of any private land is null and void.

G.R. No. L-39248 May 7, 1976Republic vs. Heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille

FactsA parcel of land with a Torrens Title was adjoining a river that eventually dried up. The lot owner claimed Art. 457 that the dried-up river bed was his by accretion, so he drew up a subdivision plan that included the river bed. The plan was approved both by the Land Registration Commission and by the CFI, and two titles were issued, there being two parcels in the subdivision.

Hence, a complaint for Annulment of Certificate of Title was filed by the Republic of the Philippines (represented by the Director of Lands), with the Court of First Instance of Davao alleging that the land in question as formerly a portion of the Davao River which dried up by reason of the change of course of the said Davao River; hence a land belonging to the public domain and consequently prayed that the TCT’s of Heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille under the Torrens System be declared null and void. CFI gave its decision in favor of the Republic of the Phillippes and rendered its judgment to cancel the said TCT’s and directing the Register of Deeds of Davao to issue new certificates of title in lieu thereof after the portions consisting of 82,127 square meters, the land involved, shall have been segregated therefrom in accordance with law.

Not satisfied with the decision of the CFI, Heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille filed an appeal with CA contending that it erred in holding the approval of Subdivision Plan of no legal effect merely on ground of lack of notice to interested persons, and in ordering the cancellation of Certificates of Title. However, in its Resolution dated July 22, 1974, certified the case to this Court for consideration and final disposition.

IssueWhether or not the state can assail cancellation of the subsequent title over the river bed.

HeldYes. For to make the former river bed come under the Torrens System, the ordinary approval of a subdivision plan is not sufficient, there must be a judicial application for the registration of the land. This is so, for the increased area in question, which is not a registered land but formerly a river bed, is so big as to give allowance for a mere mistake in area of the original registration of the tracts of land of the defendant-appellant formerly belonging to and registered in the name of their grandfather, Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna. In order to bring this increase in area, which the parties admitted to have been a former river bed of the Davao River, under the operation and coverage of the Land Registration Law, Act 496, proceedings in registrations of land title should have been filed Instead of an ordinary approval of subdivision plan. Hence, with the foregoing requisites not having been complied with, the lower court committed no error in its appealed decision.

G.R. No. L-30829 August 28, 1929THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE

FactsThe plaintiff assailed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, rendering the registration by the defendant of a parcel of land which borders the Laguna de Bay. The plaintiff claimed that the parcels of land in question are part of the bed of Laguna Lake and, therefore, belong to the public domain. According to the evidence, the waters of Laguna de Bay receded from the land in question but during rainy season, the land was flooded by its water. Inasmuch as under the Civil Code, the owners of the tenements bordering on ponds or lagoons do not acquire the land left dry by the natural decrease of the waters, then it is of primary importance to determine whether the body of water called the Laguna de Bay is naturally and legally a lake or a lagoon.

IssueWhether or not the land in question belonged to the public domain.

HeldNo. Laguna de Bay is a body of water formed in depressions of the earth; it contains fresh water coming from rivers and brooks or springs, and is connected with Manila Bay by the Pasig River. According to the definition just quoted, Laguna de Bay is a lake. Inasmuch as, according to article 407 of the Civil Code, lakes and their beds belong to the public domain, and inasmuch as, according to article 74 of the Law of Waters, the bed of lake is the ground covered by its waters at their highest ordinary depth; whereas the waters of Laguna de Bay at their highest depth reach no farther than the northeastern boundary of the two parcels of land in question, said parcels are outside said bed and, consequently, do not belong to the public domain. Also, based on the legal provision applicable to the case is that contained in article 77 and 84 of the aforesaid Law of Waters, which reads:

ART. 77. Lands accidentally inundated by the waters of lakes, or by creeks, rivers, and other streams, shall continue to be the property of their respective owners.

ART 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers, and lakes, by accessions or sediments from the waters thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.

Even if, therefore, the parcel of land in litigation were considered as accretions gradually deposited by accessions or sediments from the waters of Laguna de Bay, it would still, according to the legal provision just quoted, belong to the claimant Colegio de San Jose as owner of the lands bordering on said Laguna de Bay.

G.R. No. 105902. February 9, 2000Severino Baricuatro, Jr. vs. CA, et al.

FactsSeverino appealed to the decision of CA affirming the decision of RTC in Cebu for quieting of title. Severino, bought 2 lands from Galeos. He, however, was unable to pay the full amount to Galeos. At the time the original action for quieting of title was filed in the trial court, the titles to the said lots remained in the name of Galeos. Galeos sold the entire subdivision including the 2 lands purchased by Severino to Amores and have it registered under his name. Consequently, Amores sold the subdivision to Nemenio. Thus, a complaint for quieting of title was filed by the respondent spouses Nemenio against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. Prior to the sale, however, petitioner was informed through a letter by Amores about the impending sale of the two (2) lots but the former failed to respond. The respondent spouses Nemenio caused the transfer of the titles to the said lots and the issuance of tax declarations in their names. Thereafter, the respondent spouses Nemenio demanded from petitioner to vacate the said lots but the latter refused to do so. RTC rendered its judgment in favor of Nemenio as the owners of the disputed lands.

On appeal to the respondent court, Severino assailed the findings of the trial court that Galeos and Amores validly acquired ownership of the two (2) lots and registered the same in good faith, and that respondent spouses Nemenio are purchasers in good faith. However, the CA finds no merit of his contention thus affirming the decision of the RTC.

Here comes now the present case.

IssueWhether or not the CA erred in including Amores validly acquired ownership of the two (2) lots and that he is in good faith when he registered the disputed lands in the registry of property.

HeldYes. Petitioner emphatically contends that respondent Amores, the second buyer, cannot be categorized as a purchaser in good faith, arguing on the basis of the letter which the latter sent to the petitioner, reminding the petitioner of his overdue account and warning him that if he could not come up with the proper solution, it would be his last chance before respondent Amores does other remedies before the law

Article 1544 of the Civil Code provides:

"ART. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.

Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property. Under article 1544, the ownership of an immovable property shall belong to the purchaser who in good faith registers it first in the registry of property.

For Amores to successfully invoke the protection provided by article 1544 of the Civil Code, he must possess good faith from the time of acquisition of the property until the registration of the deed of conveyance covering the same.

Wherefore, SC had reversed the decision of CA declaring the petitioner SEVERINO BARICUATRO, JR. as the rightful owner of the disputed lots and ordering him to pay respondent Constantino M. Galeos the unpaid balance for the 2 lands.

G.R. No. 74470 March 8, 1989NATIONAL GRAINS AUTHORITY vs IAC

FactsThis is a petition for review of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court reversing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City.

Spouses Paulino Vivas and Engracia Lizards are owners of a parcel of land situated in Laguna. They sold the property in favor of private repondents Melencio Magcamit and Nena Cosico, and Amelita Magcamit. They constituted an evidenced by "Kasulatan Ng Bilihang Mabiling Muli." Wherein they agreed that the Certificate of Title will be issued to them upon payment of the balance of P40, 000.00. They the private respondents took possession of the said property.

Later on, an Original Certificate of Title covering the property in question was issued to and in the name of the spouses Vivas and Lizardo without the knowledge of the private respondents and they have executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Irenea Ramirez authorizing the latter to mortgage the property with the petitioner, National Grains Authority (NGA). The mortgaged was foreclosed and that the highest bidder is the NGA. Consequently, NGA asked the private respondents to vacate the property but they refused.

The private respondents then filed a complaint before the CFI of Laguna and San Pablo City and prayed that they be declared as owner of the said property. However, CFI ruled in favor of NGA declaring defendant National Grains Authority the lawful owner of the property in question by virtue of its indefeasible title to the same.

The private respondents interposed an appeal from the decision of the trial court to the Intermediate Appellate Court. IAC ruled in favor of the private respondents by reversing and setting aside the decision of the trial court and declaring then as the lawful owner of the property.

Hence, the petition for NGA is brought up in this case.

IssueWhether or not NGA has the better right over the disputed land.

HeldYes. NGA has the better right over the disputed land. It is thus evident that respondents' right over the property was barred by res judicata when the decree of registration was issued to spouses Vivas and Lizards. It does not matter that they may have had some right even the right of ownership, BEFORE the grant of the Torrens Title.

The real purpose of the Torrens System is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any question as to its legality. Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the mirador su casa, to avoid the possibility of losing his land. An indirect or collateral attack on a Torrens Title is not allowed. The only exception to this rule is where a person obtains a certificate of title to a land belonging to another and he has full knowledge of the rights of the true owner. He is then considered as guilty of fraud and he may be compelled to transfer the land to the defrauded owner so long as the property has not passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.

G.R. No. L-48268 October 30, 1978HEIRS OF SEGUNDO UBERAS vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL

FactsThe plaintiff assailed the decision of the CFI in dismissing the complaint filed by heirs of Segundo Uberas against Soledad Rapiz, and the children of Pedro Uberas on the ground of prescription and contending that the action is imprescriptible because it is one for partition and to quiet title to the property in question, declaring the declaration of heirship and deed of sale executed by defendants to be null and void ab initio.

The plaintiffs are the children and successors in interest of Segundo Uberas and Albino Uberas, while the defendants are the surviving spouse, Soledad Rapiz, and the children of Pedro Uberas, as well as Alejandra Uberas who is impleaded as an unwilling co-plaintiff. Segundo, Albino, Francisca, Pedro and Alejandra, all surnamed Uberas, the first four (4) already deceased, are legitimate children of the spouses Juan Uberas and Dominga Mendoza who originally own the land in question. Through fraudulent acts and malicious scheme, the land was transferred under the name of the surviving spouse, Soledad Rapiz, and the children of Pedro Uberas, and later claimed sole ownership and possession of the entire property.

As already indicated, respondent court in its questioned order, dismissed the complaint on the ground that it was barred by prescription "as more than ten (10) years had elapsed counted from the registration of the extrajudicial declaration of heirship and the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title solely in the names of Pedro Uberas and Alejandra Uberas. The complaint was raised November 3, 1977 while the title was transferred to Soledad Rapiz and her children December 2, 1966.

Reconsideration of the dismissal order having been denied by respondent court, petitioners filed the present petition for review.

IssueWhether or not the action for quieting of title for the said property is imprescriptible.

HeldYes, the action for quieting of title for the said property is imprescriptible. That an action to quiet title to property in the possession of plaintiff is imprescriptible and that where there are material facts to be inquired into and resolved on the basis of evidence adduced by the parties which will determine the legal precepts to be applied, as in this case, the complaining party should be given full opportunity to prove his case is fully applicable here according to Faja vs. Court of Appeals.

Also, respondent court manifestly failed to take into account the averments of petitioners' complaint that they "and defendants are co-owners and possessors of the property" and that "the malicious and illegal acts committed by defendants were known to the plaintiffs only during this year 1977, after Soledad Rapiz and her children were already claiming full ownership and possession of the whole of the property," thus, the period for prescription would only have commenced in 1977 and prescription could not lie.

Wherefore, the respondent court's order of dismissal is set aside and the case is remanded to respondent court for trial and determination on the merits.

G.R. No. L-20954 May 24, 1967ELIAS GALLAR vs. HERMENEGILDA HUSAIN

FactsThis is an appeal directly from the Court of First Instance of Iloilo.

A hectare of rice land owned by Teodoro Husain was sold to Serapio Chichirita for P30, reserving for himself the right to repurchase it within six years. Teodoro Husain did not redeem the land, although shortly after the execution of the deed of sale. Chichirita, transferred his right to Graciana Husain, in what purports to be a resale of the land. Graciana Husain subsequently transferred her rights to the land to appellee Elias Gallar in exchange for one cow. A deed of sale was constituted for this one. The possession of the land, together with the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title of Teodoro Husain, was delivered on the same occasion to appellee who since then has been in possession of the land.

Appellee asked the Cadastral Court for the issuance to him of a transfer certificate of title but the court dismissed his petition for lack of jurisdiction. He, therefore, filed this suit in the Court of Instance of Iloilo to compel Hermenegilda and Bonifacio Husain, as heirs of Teodoro Husain, to execute a deed of conveyance in his favor so that he could get a transfer certificate of title. CFI ordered the appellants to execute a deed of conveyance of the land in favor of the appellee on the authority of our ruling in Sapto v. Fabiana.

From this judgment, Bonifacio Husain brought this appeal to this Court.

IssueWhether or not Gallar has the right over the questioned property to which he may seek re-conveyance thereof.

HeldYes. When Teodoro Husain failed to redeem the land within the stipulated period, its ownership became consolidated in the appellee. True the successive sales are in a private instrument, but they are valid just the same. By the delivery of possession of the land, the sale was consummated and title was transferred to the appellee. Indeed, this action is not for specific performance; all it seeks is to quiet title, to remove the cloud cast on appellee's ownership as a result of appellant's refusal to recognize the sale made by their predecessor. And, as plaintiff-appellee is in possession of the land, the action is imprescriptible. Appellant's argument that the action has prescribed would be correct if they were in possession as the action to quiet title would then be an action for recovery of real property which must be brought within the statutory period of limitation governing such actions.

Still it is argued that no action can be brought on the basis of the deed of sale with a right of repurchase because the land in question was redeemed a few days after it had been sold. While it is indeed true that the first note written on the reverse side of the deed of sale speaks of the "redemption" of the land, there is no evidence to show that the vendee, Graciana Husain, was acting in behalf of her brother Teodoro Husain, in the exercise the latter's right of redemption. Graciana Husain must, therefore, be deemed to have acquired the land in her own right, subject only to Teodoro Husain's right of redemption. As the new owner she had a perfect right to dispose of the land as she in fact did when she exchanged it for a cattle with the appellee.

G.R. No. L-37135 December 28, 1973SIMEON A. LEE vs CA

FactsThe petitioners bought a property from the respondent Alberto Tabar Tabada, one of the heirs of the late Andres tabar. However, the heirs preferred to receive the properties pro-indiviso. The three heirs executed an extra-judicial partition of the estate. Alberto Tabar Tabada, allegedly in connicance and collusion with the spouses Dolores R. Saldana, executed a deed of sale in favor of the said spouses of all the properties he was supposed to receive as his share from the estate of Andres Tabar. Thus the petitioners filed for the annulment of the deed of sale executed by respondent Alberto Tabar Tabada in favor of the spouses Dolores R. Saldana before the CFI of Cebu. The parties in this case are required to reopen the Intestate Estate of Andres Tabar. This case dated January 22, 1957, the Cebu court of first instance issued its Order to Archive Case dated September 18, 1972 as the final disposition of which will depend on what the Intestate Estate Court in would finally determine.

The petitioner questioned the decision of the CA upholding the CFI Cebu court's order archiving petitioners' pending action before it to quiet title and ordering the parties instead to reopen the long closed intestate proceeding of the deceased Andres Tabar. It is obvious from the undisputed facts as stated in respondent appellate court's decision that the proceedings for the intestate estate of the deceased Andres Tabar have long been closed since 1957 with the payment of all taxes and debts and with the distribution of the net remainder of the estate pro indiviso among the three heirs thereof, namely respondent Alberto Tabar Tabada, Valentina Tabar Causancia and Esteban Tabar.

Reconsideration having been denied by the appellate Court, petitioners filed the present petition for review by Certiorari.

IssueWhether or not it is proper to archive an action to quiet title (between parties each of whom claims to have purchased the same properties from an heir) to certain properties involved in said probate proceedings.

HeldNo, it would not be proper to do the archiving simply because probate proceedings are begun in court. After all, probate proceedings do not delve into the ownership of the properties involved. Indeed, probate courts have no jurisdiction to determine with finality, conflicts of ownership. Such conflicts must be litigated in a separate action, except where a party merely prays for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of any particular property, in which case the probate court may pass upon provisionally the question of inclusion or exclusion, but without prejudice to its final determination in an appropriate action.

SC reversed the decision of the CA. The questioned order of the Cebu court of first instance to archive is set aside and said court is directed to proceed with the hearing and determination of the said action to quiet title on its merits.

G.R. No. 108547. February 3, 1997VDA. DE CABRERA vs. CA

FactsThe petitioner assailed the decision of CA in reversing the decision of CFI and ordered defendant Vda. de Cabrera to vacate the portion of a lot in question and surrender the possession thereof to Orais.

The lot in question was originally owned by Daniel Teokemian, Albertana Teokemian and Felicidad Teokemian then later sold to Orais without signature of Felicidad. Another deed of sale was executed by Felicidad for the same lot in favor of the petitioner Vda. De Cabrera. Thereafter Vda. De Cabrera and he husband immediately took possession on the said lot.

Before the RTC of Davao Oriental, an action for Quieting of Title to Real Property was raised by defendant Vda. de Cabrera against Orais. RTC ruled in favor of the defendant Vda. de Cabrera to execute a re-conveyance within thirty (30) days after this decision on the portion of a lot in question actually and physically possessed and occupied by the defendant plus damages.

Orais filed an appeal to CA. CA reversed the decision of CFI based on the fact that even as the appellate court observed that the registration made by the plaintiffs was fraudulent insofar as it involved the one-third interest of Felicidad Teokemian, which was not included in the sale executed by them and Albertana and Daniel Teokemian, it nevertheless upheld its effects, on the justification that the defendants action for re-conveyance based on an implied trust had already been barred by prescription.

Hence, Vda. De Cabrera are now before the Court as Petitioners for Review on Certiorari.

IssueWhether or not CA erred in ruling that the private respondents complaint filed for quieting of title which actually is one for recovery of ownership and possession and is not barred by laches

Held

Yes. An action for re-conveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in 10 years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property. But this rule applies only when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property, since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is an actual possession of the property, as the defendants are in the instant case, the right to seek re-conveyance, which, in effect, seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe. Also, even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. This is because the sale or other disposition affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the things owned in common. No prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner or co-heir so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.

Thus, The decision of CA is set aside and the decision of CFI is reinstated.

G.R. NO. 168222 : April 18, 2006Rumarate vs. Hernandez

FactsSpouses Rumarate filed an action for re-conveyance of real property and quieting of title against the Heirs of Spouses Hernandez. Rumarate averred that Santiago Guerrero orally bequeathed his rights over a lot to him in 1929. Thereafter, took possession of the land, built a house and planted on it. A quitclaim was also executed by Santiago in their favor in 1960.

In 1970, Rumarate discovered that Spouses Hernandez were able to obtain a title over the disputed lot but he did not file a case immediately. The respondent Heirs of Hernandez claimed that Santiago sold the lot to them in 1964 but were not able to take possession of the land.

IssueWhether or not Rumarate is entitled for the re-conveyance and quieting of title of the disputed land.

HeldYes. Rumarate is entitled for the re-conveyance and quieting of title of the disputed land. This is because, Rumarate’s open, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession and occupation of the disputed land for more than 30 years vested them the title over the lot.

The action for quieting of title is aimed to determine the respective rights of the parties and to prevent future disturbances thereon. It is merely a confirmation proceeding and is imprescriptible.

The requisites for an action for quieting of title are satisfied in this case;

1. The plaintiff has legal or equitable title to or interest in the subject property.2. The deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding casts on cloud on his title even if it appears to be

valid or legally efficient but was really invalid.