prospects for soviet naval access to mediterranean shore facilities (2 august 1976) declassified

8/11/2019 Prospects for Soviet Naval Access to Mediterranean Shore Facilities (2 August 1976) DECLASSIFIED

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DECLASSIFIED u ~ h o r i t y NN 023211

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Prq_pects

for

Soviet

Navaf: A.ccess

t

Mediterranean

Shore Facillties

Declassified and

Approved for Releaae

by Central Intelligence

Agency

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NIO li 76-035 .

2 August W76

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N TION L

SECURITY

INrORM TI

Unauthorized Disclosure Subiect to Cri al Sanctions

DISSEMINATION CONTROL

A

NOFORN

NOCONTRACT-

Foreign Nationals

o Contractors

or

PKOPiN

NFIBONLY

ORCON-

REL:.

; _ ~

Contractor

onsultants

Caution-Pr

pr_ietary lnformalion Involved

NFIB De rtments

Only

Dissemi tion and Extraction

of

Information

Co rolled by Originator

Thi nformalion

has been

Authorized for

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elease

to

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empt from

General D e c l a s s i f k a t i o n ~ e d u l e

. of E.O. 11652. exemption eategory:

. 58(1). (2). and 3)

Automoticallr. declassified on:

date m p ~ l e io determine

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PROSPECTS

FOR SOVIET

NAVAl

.ACCESS

TO .MEDITERRANEAN SHORE FACILITIES

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SECRET

PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET N V l ACCESS

TO MEDITERRANEAN SHORE FACILITIES

1

KEY JUDGMENTS

ND

IMPLICATIONS

FOR US POLICY

.

: The

Soviets strongly desire

to

compensate

for

their

loss

earlier

~ i s y e a ~ : ; ,

, :

' in Egypt of their only adequate Mediterranean facilities for:maJor. ..

naval rpairs and replenishment. However, with current limited-shore

access the Soviets will be able to maiiitain essentially the same

e v ~ l of :

nava.l-suiface operations and presence in the Mediterranean

that

__ .

had

supported in recent years. This will apply during crisis

periOds a5

_

well

as

for their normal low tempo of operations. Without

f u r t h e ~ ::

.

access to shore facilities,

it

will be more expensive, more

d i f f i ~ u l t to

manage, and harder on the crews, but it can be done. -

;.:;--

~ - D i e s e i st thmarl ies

on deployment to the Soviet

M e d i t e r r ~ e a ~

kadra come from the Northern Fleet, and have

mu h

more

need

of

shore access than do Soviet surface ships with their freedom to use

closer Black Sea home port facilities. Without suitable new shore


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DECLASSIFIED Authority NN 023211

SECRET

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DISCUSSION

I SOVIET NEEDS

1. The Soviet naval presence has

become

a

permanent feature of the Mediterranean since 1964.

Serving as a counter to Western naval forces, these

ships have played n role in most of the Mediterranean

area crises of recent years. Further, their very presence

has served ndtice .that the Sovi.et Union is a superpower

possessing in1portant interests in the region. This Fifth

Eskadra

2

ha,s:both a strategic defensive mssion

v i s - a - ~ i s

Western ballistic missile submarinesand carriers, and a

wider role the support of Soviet clients

and

the

symbolic .

and

actual promotion of Soviet ~ t a t e

interests.

The

Soviets are anxious to continue to

maintain the Fif th Eskadra's capabilities to perform its

roles and to soive problems connected with its

. support.

3

2. We expect that the Soviet.navy's presence in the

Mediterranean will be maintained, probably at

roughly the same levels as have existed over th e 'past

few years. Although the Soviet navy is self-sufficient in

its peace-time logistics practi

ces,

operating ships at sea

for extended periods without shore sup'port is expensive

in terms of operational efficiency. For this reaso l. as

well as for the potentiai use of any shore acceSs to

enhance their political presen and influence in the

area, the Soviets perceive naval access to. shore .

facilities as highly desirable. . ..

3.

The degree

of

Soviet' dependence to

Mediterranean shore facilities variesfof different kinds

-

of

forces: surface shiPs can o p ~ ~ a t ~ a l m o s f e o m p l e t ~ l y

independently of I9Cal sup{>9rt; . d i ~ e l u ~ m a r i n ~

1

The Fifth Eskadra is the fleet organization

of

Soviet forces

. I . .

:_operations are significantly

c o m p l i c a ~ e < l

if aCcess to

local facilities is unavailable; arid deploymeiitof ~ d ~

based naval aircraft would r e q _ t ~ i r e aliriost .CQntlnual

uSe of local

a i r f i e l d s ~

The Soviets .have been able to

operating In Mediterranean. Prior to 19761ts

p r e s e n ~

averaged

11

major combatants, 13 submarines (of which

about

11

were

diesel

I . .

attad c submariries), lftd minor combatan ts

and

supply

ships

for a:

total of around

so

units. It

regularly

l.ridudes same

of

the navy's

most modem and effeCtive surface combatants, and Is under the

control of a

flag

offic:uusually embarlced on a maJor surface unit..

The &lcadra's normal operational activities lndude surveillance of

Western carrieD; ASW and occasional large exercises: Although a

large portion of the Mediterranean .deployment Is spent

at

anchorages or In port visits, the Soviets have exhibited the ability to

respond quickly to aises

and

to augment the Eslcadra with

additional surfaee ships, mostly from the Blade Sea Fteet.

1

Discussion of the objecttve which have led the Soviets o have

their navy operate in the Mediterranean and other distant areas lies

largely beyond the scope of this Memorandum. For fuller tcel -tment

the .reader Is referred to NlE 1 1 ~ 1 5 - 7 4 (Soviet Naval Polldes and

. I

Programs)

and

the forthcoming

NIE

11-10-76 (Soviet Military

Policy In the nir World).

i

.

a i n t a h t

their naval fortes in the.

e d l t e ~ e a n

~ t h

access to only a few shore faCilities. They

haye

'dorie

. this by

utilizing

afloat

SUpPQrt either lit port. lri

anchorages. This effort has lnvolved a

oondnuous

presence of tenders, repair ship$,

s ~ a l l food

anci stores

ships, naval oilers, merchant tankers under contract to

the navy, and a host of other support .auxiliaries.

4

We define

aooess

to naval facilities as the routine use of

another

country's airfields, sl\ore facilities, or sheltered anchorages within

territorial waters for repairs and substantial replenishment. Port

calls, which might

afsG

Indude minor replenishment (e.g., taking on

tresh water), neither meet. fufl Soviet needs nor Involve the same

magnitude of physical or political requirements.

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4. Inasmuch as a

key

role

of

the Fifth Eskadm.has to and from their B l ~ c k Sea h o r r i ~ .

been reaction to Middle Eastern crises,

t

s

n o t e w ~ r t h y any necessary submarine

that the ~ n p r e c e d e n t e d buildup : which

occ rred

' : ~

during the Octob:er War

of

1973 ~ not affected

by ...

5. Since Fifth Eskadra

limited logistics support nor was there

any

need to . majority-:--()erhaps ~ much as

: increase. t ~ i r utilization.

of

then. available E g y p t i ~ n .

t ~ m e at

a n ~ o r odn port i t s 1 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ t J ~ ~ : ~ i ~ i l ~ ~ ~

facilities. However, that time the Soviet were alSo

') iil -execches

their l o g i s t i c s ~

a

lucky; in that scheduled relief diesel s ~ b i n a r i n e s were . :are Somewhat less than would ntht ..nltriwo

already

enr9ute from the Northern Fleet. Both

t h ~ e

certain level ot

r e p l e n i s h m e o t ~ _ . i r i r u p t ~ n a n e e ,

.

and the d i ~ e l submarines they were scheduled to . minor repairs to combatants

c a ~ be . ~ C C ) m p l i s h e d in

relieve stayed on.station in tlie Mediterranean for

the

anchorage rather

than

in p o r t s ~ frequent Soviet; _

duration of the crisis. (Deployment f r o ~

the

Northern practice:

less

. used by other navie5.:

The

.primary. :

. Fleet requires two and one-half weeks for diesel anchorages used by the Soviets, even when access-to .

submarines

and about

ten days .. for

nuclear

Egyptian facilities was available, a ~ e l O c a . t ~ d in

:the

submarines.) Oil

was.

supplied by merchant

t a ~ k e r s A l b o ~ n

Basin, the Gulf of H a m m a ~ e t

. n e a ~

l t h e r ~ .

and by

nav -1

oilers operating out of Soviet Black Sea Island, east of Crete, and north

bf

o l l u r r i ~ Egypt (see .

ports. FurtHer, the evidence indicates that

many

Figure 1 . These anchorages a r ~

~ i t ~ a t e q - ~ e a r . t ~ e ,',,

merchant ta nkers which had p r e v i o ~ experience in principal operating areas of the Fifth Eskadra.

supporting fleet units were available.

and


9/18

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SECRH-

officers may have ;preferred to have the m e ~ s

available t6 support their own forces from their own

I .

resources rather . han come to rely on other sources

which might be denied

at

a crucial moment.

. Indicative of the Soviets' naval logistics philosophy

and practic has been their complicated effort to avoid

d e p e n d e n ~

on foreign .sources fuel oil. In the

Mediterranean some five to seven Soviet POL ships are

normally P,resent to provide fuel from their own

internal s o ~ r c e s to combatants and auxiliaries. In

general the: practice is for the merchant tankers to

refuel n a v a ~ oilers which

in

turn go from ship to ship

topping thetn off.

The

Soviets have held tenaciously to

this

a r r a n g ~ m e n t

in the Mediterranean and . any

change

w o ~ l d

require a major policy decision.

On

the

political level, the Soviets have to reconcile their naval

involvemeht in foreign countries with

their

c o n t r a d i c t o ~ desire to minimize the appearance of an

internationdl policy driven by naval expansionism.

I .

7. The e ~ p n d e d deployments of the Soviet navy

since the mid-1960s, however, have in fact been

a c c o m p a n i e ~

by

some m o d i f i c a ~ of past practices.

Since that time the Soviets have begun to seek rather

I .

limited (by Western standards) access to shore facilities

I

not only in the Mediterranean but also in the Indian

Ocean and btsewhere. Some of the port services which

are now use b Y the Soviet navy in the Mediterranean .

include routine . replenishment, minor

and

major

r e p a i . . s ~

and:crew r e s ~ . .Moreover, Soviet s ~ a n d a r d s of

control over

1

their military support have led them to

seek agreements with Httoral countries in.several ocean

areas atlow(ng them

to

establish facilities for their

exclusive use.

.1

Past

Ups

;and O o ~ n s

8. The S ~ ~ i e t S have, however, had mixed results in

their efforts obtain access ashore. Beginning in 1958

they based same 12. subma.nnes in the Albanian port of

I . . .

Vlore.

H o w ~ v e r

they had to pull out these units in

1961 with the break in Soviet-Albanian relations. In

the followirlg

yem

.the

SOviets

made a determined

effort to gaih access to Egyptian facilities,

but

despite

much importuning they were admitted only in the

wake of the jsix Day

War

of 1967 when the Egyptian

government ,was in no position to resist the strings

attached

t ?

1 Soviet offers of assistance. s indicated

below, t h e ~ e facilities in Egypt .were of great

conveniencej to the Soviets. When Egypt expelled

Soviet advisers in July 1972, however, Soviet naval

I .

support activities were curtailed.

By

early 1976 the

Soviets had been completely

~ x c l u d e d

from Egyptian

port facilities following

Sadat's abrogation of the 1971

Soviet-Egyptian Friendship Treaty.

NavaiNr

. . .

9. The most significant loss to the Soviet n ~ v y fro.m .

the 1972 ouster was the removal of their naval

a : ~ a t i o n

unit based in Egypt

at

three airfields. This . air

organization consisted of

ASW,

recom1aissanee,

and

missile- strike aircraft. The ASW and reconnaissance

aircraft conducted missions in t h ~ .

M ~ d i t ~ . : C a n e a n

against

US

and other units, and there is some evidence

that the strike aircraft were being prepared

fo

.r

operations over the Mediterranean whenSo viet use of .

Egyptian airfields was terminated. Soviet ocean.

surveillance in the Mediterranean is ~ u r r e n t l y

accomplished primarily by Soviet ship shadowing of

major Western ships, through high-frequency i r ~ c t i o n

finding (HFDF) and by satellite . reeoi:maisSance;

howev

er,

use of a Mediterranean airfield did

add

valuable flexibility and redundancy and regaining

access to such a facility probably remains

an

important

Soviet goal. Some agencies would al Q note that in a

c r i ~ i s with Syrian concurrence, the Soviets c ~ u l d also.

use the three electronic warfare :aircraft. they have

maintained in Syria since 1972

_

o

a$siSt

t h ~ i r

_

. . reconnaissance oPerations. Should the Sov.iets ~ h o o ~ e

to rotate the

K i e v - c l ~

ASW .carriers in f u t ~ t e regular

Mediterranean deployments, ~ h e y . ~ g u l d . _have

.

a

continual afloat naval air capability, .but they _would

. also want

at

least emergency airfield. acce 5 11,5hore.

soviet use of airfields of Mediterranean littoral

~ t s

f ~ r reconnaissance,.A.SW. and strike a i ~ ~ ~ t is

an:

even

more polltically sensitive issue .than ~ c c e s s to ship

repair facilities. Thus the Soviets are Jikely to .seek

- naval air access,

h o w ~ v e r

desirable; ' only after .any

improved ship ~ they might manage, f o ~ all

Mediterranean countries would

be

far less likely to

grant naval

air

aCcess

than ship facilities.

Other Egyptian Conveniences

10. The AI Gabbari shipyard

at

Alexandria provided

major replenishment and repair services both routine

arid emergency to the Fifth Eskadra, particularly to

its diesel submarines, in conjunction with Soviet

support ships stationed in the harbor as a floating base.

The Soviets had constructed this yard where some 350-

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10/18


400 Soviet personnel worked on Soviet ships under the Mediterranean ~ i n c e they began nearly

control of a Soviet admiral. Untill972 the Soviets had submarine deployments there in H]64

. .

Exce:pHoru

managerial control of the shipyard; after .that" they

have .:.,

b ~ e n

Black Sea Fleet

~ u b m a

r i l l

apparently lost control of

and

even access to facilities . conducted Mediterranean patrols l > e f o r ~ ~ u ~ d

ashorC-except

for

_he graving

dockS a ~ d

perhaps

the ;. :

\ .overhauls in the Baltic.) :

: : : ; ~ ) . ( ?

: : _ . ~

; : : ~ : ; r ~ : : : ; l ~ t : r r ~ : ~ i ~ ~ ~ ~ : : n ~ ~ ~ : ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ _ . ia.use of Alexandria s u b ~ ~ ~ : ~ : i ~ ~ 1 ~ 7 : b ._....

_,,

.. c

.

to ~ 9 7 2 the Soviets had .been developing additional . . diesel submarines for major repair

a n ~

overhaul . ..

and more secure facilities

for

their own use further west therefore a significant expansion;

of

Soviet use

of

.

along the Egyptian coastiine

at

Mersa Matruh, .

but

the foreign

f a c i l i t ~ e s

Of the average

11

. iiesel .attack '.

Egyptian government also quashed these Soviet plans. submarines deployed, about three used .this

pOrt

at.any .

11.

Alexandria

was

also eonvenient in connection

with the important operating

r e q u i r e ~ e n t

.

for

fresh

water. The presence of at least one water tender in the

Mediterrar:tean suggests th.

at

Soviet naval combat

ants-espe

pially the .older

units-have

a restricted .

capacity distill their own water in adequate

quantities. Fresh water

is

also transferred to Soviet

combatants by oilers and by merchant tankers under .

naval chatter. When the Soviet navy had

aCcess

to

Alexandria, a water tender frequently operated from

this port

~ n d

resupplied naval units in :he eastern

Mediterranean. To date the Soviets have apparently

not found acceptable

s h o r ~

substitute and so have .

had

to

deploy water tenders from the Black Sea,

The Diesel Submarine Problem

:

:

i2. Logistical support

is

inuch more a problem

f n

Soviet diesei

submarines

in the Mediterranean .than for' .

surface s h t p ~ . Since the s u r f a ~ ships primarily_deploy.

.from the Black Sea .Fleet; major repair facilities

hi. .

.

home waters are more r ~ < ; I U y available. A d , d i t i 9 n a J i y ~ \ : : ::

crews of surface ~ h i p s do not h ~ v e to face the 5ame

habitability.problems as found on submarines;

sOViet

.

submarines

which

routinely deploy

to th e

.

Mediterranean, however, came from the Noitherr\ .

rather than, ~ l a c k

Sea

Fleet. In part the Soviets seem to

have chosen this arrangement became

of

provisioils

o f

the Montreux Convention; Article 12 states

that

submarines belonging to Black

Sea

powers riay exit_

the Turkish Straits only for overhaul outside the Black

.Sea, that Aotiee must be given to the Turkish .

government,

1

and that the submarines must transit on

the surface. No provision allows passage of submarineS

based elsewhere into the Black

Sea.

Transit through

the carefully monitored Straits inhibits flexibility

and

compromises security. For these reasons the Soviets

have chosen to deploy Northern.

F1eet

submarines to the

I

6

one ,time. Most work was .performed on submarines :

afl;at

in the harbor, but the yard's graving docks were

.

::

also utilized for more e ~ t e n s i v e repilirs la.Sting 'for

several months. Further, submarine crews eould get .:.

away from the confined and uncomfortable quarters .

found on these diesel boats. Now Soviet submannes

can only

male

limited

use

of repair facilities in Syrian .

arid

Yugoslav

ports. . .

..

14 .

Having been expelled from Alexandria, the

Soviets must make alternate arrangements to maintain

the previous level of submarine operations and

presence in the

Mediterranean;

A t

a minimum the Soviets will probably seek to .,

maintain their previous level of d i e s ~ l a ~ t a c k . , : .

submarine operation,s. They .


11/18


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~ ~ i l l l l i l l i i l l l l l i l l

l 1 l i l i

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t i i { U ; ; : y ; : ; j : : J

JJ

tib

UH.:.: : : __ ~ : : ~ L ~ i i l i l l i t i i l i i i M i l l i l l l ~ i l i i l l l i l l l l i l l l l i i l l l i

...

-5ECRET

he

: most preferable alternative for the Soviets .

would be success in orie or more of their efforts to

a c q ~ i r e

additio' .,B:

.shore facilities, as major repair

of diesel submarines at sea is impossible, and even

l e s s e ~ support is far from easy.

I .

Curreht

SOviet

Port

Access

15. cu:rrent access by Soviet n a v ~ l units . o shore

based facilities (other than as part of official port visits)

is e s s e n t i ~ l l y limited to

Syria

and, for repair facilities

only,

Yugoslavia.

Syrian port facilities in both Tartus

and Latakia, d ~ p i t e improvements, are limited.

Neither of these

two

crowded harbors can be used on

the same scale as Alexandria since they lack graving

docks

and

other. requisite facilities. There has been,

however, near continuous presence

of

a support ship

in one ori the other Syrian ports since the 1973 war,

providing

1

services to visiting Soviet diesel submarines

and m i n ~ w e e p e r s In addition, most of the Soviet

support ships which were until recently stationed in

Alexandria :).re now stationed in Tartus. Replenish

ment of

\ ~ a t e r and

prov'isions is probably available to

the Soviets calling in Syria; however, there are

currently

bo

indications that Soviet naval units obtain

fuel oil id Syrian ports. There is evidence

that

the

Soviets h ~ v e been pressuring the .Syrians, thus far

unsuceess(uUy, for some additional access.

.

.

1 . . .

16. T h ~ S ~ v i e ~ have long . been interested in

Yugoslavia s facilities on the Adriatic,

but

Tito' s

g o v e r n m e ~ t has so far strictly limited Soviet ~ c c e s s .

Nevertheless, by late 1973 the Soviets .were granted

limited . ~ and . began to send unamled naval

auxiliaries 'to_ Yugoslav shipyards for overhaul.

10,

April

1974

Y u g o

l a v

mari.time law was revised' to permit the

repair .of

i

oreign combatants and _uxiliaries in

. Yugoslav ports. The provisions of the law are strict,

however, limiting the number of ships to two of the

same nati9n under repair at any one time in

any

one

port. Foreign c o m b a t a n ~ can be repaired only

in

a

Yugosla:v

n'ttlitary shipyard; currently,

Tivat

is

the only

Yugoslav port so designated. Furthermore, work must

be done exclusively by Yugoslav personnel, using

I .

Yugoslav material

and

repairs

and

must

be

completed

within six fuonths. Munitions and armaments must be

unloaded ~ n d placed in the care of Yugoslav military

authorities, and only one third of the foreign crew is

allowed tolstay

on

board. The law also specifically

prohibits foreign installations or fuel depots on

Yugoslav t ~ r r i t o r y . Finally, a size limitation of 4,000

tons for warshiPs

and lO,QOO

tons for auxiliaries is ' : : ~ '

imposed. The Soviets apparently h ~ ~ e accepted aiL: ':\

these restrictions.

They

delivered a large

1 2 , ( ) ( ) ( ) . t o ~


12/18


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~ G R i i l

they would prefer to avoid . a busy commercial

e n ~ r e p o t

19. More ptoblematical is the

political

aspect of the

.Soviets'

problkm-the

likelihood

of

various littoral

countries allowing Soviet shore access, and what l c i ~ d ..

under what conditions. For the near teim, we believe

that Soviet. prospects for increased access

to

Mediterraneart shore facilities for substantial repairs

and regular replenishment are dim, except in the case

of Yugoslavia, where they are marginally better but

still p r o b l e m a ~ i c a l . Over the longer teim, major

political variables in countries all around the littoral

could dramatibally affect Soviet p r ~ p e c t s In the

meantime the : o ~ i e t s are likely to plug -away

at

insinuating themseJves

and

their Mediterranean ships

into more modest port arrangements with the more

. promising pote:ntial hosts.

Unlikely

Prospects

20.

An

otherwise

disparate

collection of

Mediterranean :countries is unlikely

in

the near term to

be actively wooed by the Soviets for their shore

facilities. Port calls by Soviet combata,nts to France

and l t ~ l y , for example, appear .to be motivated m ~ r e

by

broader political

.

objectives-the

USSR's

demonstration

pf

its legitimacy as a M ~ i t e r r a n e a n

power, weakening NATO, and improving s t a t e - t q ~

:

. .state

e ~ a t i o r l s - : - - - ~ h a E

a ~ y r ~ o n a b l e e x p e c t S . t i ~ h o

- securing access to naval facilities in those countries.

Increased Communist Party influence, OC evenfor'mal

participation, in the government of Italy

is ~ n l i k e l y

for .

the foreSeeable , future to change this situation. The

party would presumably want to_avoid the sart of

political-military f ~ t v o r to the USSR _ that" would

validate NATO:govemments' concerns and stimulate

a sharply negative reactio_. . .

21. Greece or Turkey present equally unlikely short-.

tenit possibilitieS for Soviet navalaccess. Any SoViet

effort to acquire (acUities in , one

~ o u l d

greatly

complicate r e l ~ t i o n s with the other, of course.

Moreover, the Soviets appear to be playing for much

higher stakes tpan naval facilities in both these

countries-namely, enticing them out of the Western

camp into

at

least the nonaligned Third World. Any

premature attempt to obtain naval access to facilities

_n Greece or Turkey, and the unwanted attention it

would surely d'raw, might very well be counter

productive to this larger objective. In the case

of

Turkey, other Soviet military

p r i o r i t i e s - r ~ r

transit through the Turkish Straits

and

. utaLrv-related

overflights through T,urkish air s ~ l c e . . . . . . , : e > u t r a n

access. 8oth Greece

and

Turkey c o n t a i ~

c o n s t a e l r a c , t e < i ' . i i ' ~

anti-foreign b ~ sentiment in general. t o r ~ l r ~ r J > : < ~ ~ ~

have

expresSed

concern in NATO .

naval presence in the Mediterranean,; .

hiLdic: tiin9.:

both would probably

be

~ e l u c t a n t

pc;.,rriiV

..

--

...

(.;

.

more than periodic Soviet naval ~ i s i t s s u c h a { t h ~ s e

France and Italy. . . . '

22. There are three ports in

Cypnis-Larnaca,

.

Limassol: and Famagusta; only the last deep water .. ;

.

port. The island ~ a s no graving docks pr bther major .

shipyard facilities. This unpromising physical base, . .

plus the continuing uncertainty

over.

the .political

future of Cyprus, make it unlikely that the

USSR

sees :

any

hope for significant naval facilities there .

Moreover, the

USSR

would be reluctant to set in

motion naval access gambits which might risk direct

:

Soviet involvement in the event of renewed .conflict.

Additionally, Greece and Turkey would probably be

no more willing to accept Soviet access to C)pdot ports

than

to

their own, and even Makarios

~ o u l d

be

unwiliing to contemplate such action.

23. In three other Mediterranean countries-:-Spairi;

Alb{lnia, and Lebarion Soviet naval ~ s

by

.

c o r n b ~ t a n t "ships is a . remote (>ossibility for- the. . .

. foreSeeable future. lri order to transform

any

:

f t h e s e

: . < : ~

:

~ u n t r i e s into vial>le . high

~ o r i t y

. ~ o s p e ~ t S

:: '

: :

drastic ~ o m e s t i c

l;lnd

regional politieal s h . i f t s w , o u l ~

?( ...,\

.

: .

required.

.-:

. . .

..

.


13/18

.

....

. .


' ,

.

EGRET

Some Soviet Effort

I

I

25.

Morocco s

location

:.

in

the

far western

Meditertanean probably reduces its t t r a c t i o n .

at

least

for use by .the Mediterranean Eskadra as presently

. deployed; .to Soviet naval planpers .

The

two major

ports M o r O c c o ~ s Mediterranean coastline, Ceuta

and M ~ l i l l a , are enclaves - m ~ e r Spanish control.

Casablanca ori

the

Atlantic has better facilities

including a graving dock of some 150 meters (490.

feet). Rabat" may

have

agreed in 1975 to allow

the

Soviets more freedom in using its ports in exchange for

expanded militar)' assistance. But; even before the

USSR's

u p p o r t

for Algeria over Morocco in the

Spanish 'Sahara dispute cast a pall over Soviet

Moroccan

relations, Morocco

tended

to regard

I . .

Western naval visits .more favorably than Soviet port

calls. And since the Sahara crisis Morocco's attitude

toward us navy has become even more favorable.

While this favor could certainly deteriorate, Moroccan

caution

i(l

dealing with the Soviets will probably be

more lasting. And, in the near term, the Soviets will

probably not press for naval access there.

26.

Ma fta

offers an excellent location for central

Mediterranean naval

operations, and Valetta s

extensive :facilities include five graving dockS-'-the

larges t 292 meters (962 feet) l o n g ~ a n d well trained,

.experienCed personnel. Prime Minister

Mintoff

s

w_llingness to discomfit Western. p(,wers is also

celebrated,

but M a l t a ~

overall (>olitical relations with

the USSI(\have. been too poor to offer much present

hope .for Soviet naval access there. Indeed,

Malta

now

has better relations with the PRC t h ~ m the USSR Any

future

a t t ~ ~ p t s by

Mintoff to exploftJears.in: the West

of Soviet naval access to Malta \ ~ o u l d complicate his

desire to . figure prominently . in the nonaligned

movement\

and

would alienate Libya. Malta s entry

into the nonaligned group in 1973 was . apparently

conditioned on a promise that no foreign military

presence would

be

allowed

aftet

the British lease

expired in ' 1979.

The

1979 expiration

of

.

the

b.ase

agreement ;awkwardly (for Mintoff) coincides with a

triennial nieeting of the.nonaligned conference. Any

continued : foreign military presence (Western or

Soviet) in his country would also discredit Mintoffs

attempt to set himself up as the spokesman for the.

Mediterranean world in any expanded follow-on

European security conference. Nevertheless, the

Soviets will

1

presumably be alert to any signs of further

shifts in ~ i n t o f f s foreign priorities

that

they might

exploit for even conditional naval access.

M e a n w h l l ~

they may play on Mintoffs nonaligned pretensions to '.

argue for greater equality of treatment vis-a-vis British /:)

and other Western ships.

The

economiccoiiseq"uences .:.

. of British

w i t h d r a w a ~

particularly if sufficient

Ubyan

' :

financial aid is not forthcoming, may also: o f f e r

. . . .

. Moscow some leverage. A Soviet promise

of

regular:

1

:

dockyard revenues, perhaps. initially associated

with

'

service for noncombatants,

could

prove attrac-

tive-particularly as Western ships . will probably

continue to use

the

facilities, allowins Mintoff to

argue the case of impartiality. Malta is one of $everal

Mediterranean countries that might in some

circumstances choose to develop the Yug95lav model

of port access that is strictly regulated but available to

both Soviet

and

Western ships.

Some Active

Effort

27. Algeria is rather well endowed with port .and

related facilities:

: of some ei

ght ~ q u i p p

major commercial

ports, seven (Annaba, Arzew, Bejaia, Ghazaouet,

Mostagnem, Skikda, and

Oran)

have faidy

. extensive anchorages and berthing facilities ~ u t

lack shipyards for major rei?air work. , A i g i ~ r s has

one of the largest ports. the A f r i ~ n ~ n t i n e r i t

with

t ~ o

shipyards, the larger.having

two

graving

docks and extensive related q u i p m e n t .

-Mers-el-Kebir, once a French

n a . ~ l

base but now

i n ~ c t i v e , has a d ~ e p and .well protected harbor.

Although it now possesse

no

major repair

facilities, M e ~ - e l - K e b i r ' , in ciQ.mbinaHon With the

excellent commercial faciiities at nearby

oran,

has the potential for a majot western Mediter-.

ranean complex.

. .

28. Although the Algerian government has for

many

years permitted periodic port calls by Soviet ships

at

Algiers . and Annaba for showing the flag and

replenishment,

it

has steadfastly

~ b u f f e d ,

all

Soviet

attempts to obtain any access to Mers-el-Kebir and to

repair facilities at Algiers. There

have

been no

indications of any shift in Algeria's position.

StUI,

the

physical attractiveness of Algerian facilities; combined

with the USSR's large political inves tment in that

country, will probably motivate the Soviets to some

level of continued effort. Should the Soviets at some

future time move toward expanded naval activity in

the western Mediterranean, the attraction of Algeria's

9

&ECAH


14/18

.


SECRET

excellent facilities would obviously increase. M o s c o w

status as Algeria's principal arms supplier gives the

USSR potential leverage.

The unhappy

Soviet

experience

with

Egypt,

h o w ~ v e r

has

probably

made

the USSR more conscious

of

the hazards

of

(although

not

necessarily wisedn)

manipulatingan

anns

supply

,

relationship

. Moreover, the USSR's reliance

on

Algerian overflight rights

an d

. landing privilege$ to

. support its southwes t African interests provides Algeria

with

signifidnt

bargaining power o( its own. A

deterioration in

the

Algerian-Moroccan situation

might provide. Moscow with some opportunities to

press its case

by

exploiting Algeria's probable desire for

greater military and political support. But even

in

this

case,

barring

an

Algerian debacle of unlikely

proportions there seems little prospect that Moscow

would gain t ~ e kind of access it wants to Algiers or

Mers-el- Kebir.

29.

Libya doc: not have

developed port facilities or

natural harbors. The three principal ports, Benghazi,

Tripoli, and Tbbruk. lack shipyards

and

other facilities

of the sort available in Egypt. Benghazi and Tripoli

do

have shipyards with limited facilities, and Tripoli

. apparently has recently acquired a floating drydock.

For relatively low levels

of

usage, various

other Libyan

s i t ~ offet p o ~ s i p i l i t i e s b u

it

would still be necessary t

e o n ~ t n i d

facilities neai-ly from scratch. along

the

lines

of

the Soviets' endeavors in Berbera: Somalia,

oi:

as

they

stl -rted

t() do

at Mersa Ml -truh. .

30.

The

Soviet-

Libyan

courtship . of

the

last two

years has not flourished in the naval access area.

Despite some reports from_ time.

to time

[

J of

impending access, there

have

been no visits

by

Soviet

nayal combatants

Libya since

the

September

1969

revolution.

Other

evidence indicates that

Libya is

still resisting SOviet

overtUres fot some degree of navaraccess. Nevertheless,

in the

long terrii

Libya is

probably destined to remain

attractive to

the

Soviet navy.

In

the last two

years

,

Moscow has

substantially

increased its

involvement

in

Libya's military development. Along . with large

quantities of Soviet

armor

, aircraft,

and other land-

based

equipment

Libya is to acquire naval ships.

Soviet training

of Libyan

naval personnel,

the

probable growth

of

substantial requirements for Soviet

technical/training support to maintain Li_bya's Soviet

supplied ships, .

and

assistance in developing

port

facilities, all

may

provide Soviet personnel

with

greater

opportunities for influence in Libya. We think it

highly probable that M o s c o ~ . .u;;irig

~ h o s e

nattue

' .was clearly in its

i>wri

~ ~ t i o n a l

i ~ t ~ r e s t ~ < "

'".

::

And Sy{ia.

. cO(ltinues to r e j e ~ t .Soviet reque5ts

f4?r

.: .

increased ~ s . i:\


15/18


16/18

...

I


. I . . . . . 6ECRI T

opportunities.: While the eventuality of severe strains any deterioration of

the

Yugosla

. I

in Yugoslav cohesion would favor possible augmented Belgrade deal with the Soviets

a:t c r ~ o a t i a r t . . ~ J c o e : n s ~ ~ : ~

....... . ,...

.

Soviet

l e v e r ~ g e ,

this. might not pertain

on

the naval orderly transfer of power and

s t r i ~ t a

d h l e n ~ n < : e J : i f ~ f i t . o s . : : , , , . , , . , . , ,

acceSs issue. 1The Croatian Republic contains most of policies of nonalignment 'buld . : 'u ' '

the attractive port real estate, and Croatians might be Moscow no better off in

naval_

. . _

..

_-...-.-

more rather ~ h n less resistant to Soviet port access in present.

i

I

val

Repai r

acil i t ies

and

Rai l Links

I

International boundary

Re

1

public boundary

....._ - AJtonomous area boundal)'

N ~ t i o n a l capital

Railroad

I

I

12

SECRET

. Figure 2


17/18

I

I

I

I

I

l


BL NK P GE


18/18

~ D E C L S S I F I E D

Authority

NN

023211

,

.. .: ~ :

eeret

:

prospects for soviet naval access to mediterranean shore facilities (2 august 1976) declassified

Documents