Prospects for the Venezuelan

elections of 2012

José Antonio Gil Yepes

• The model of concentration of power

Content:

• What do the polls show?

• Analysis of 9 previous elections

• A statistical model of public opinion

• Scenarios 2012-2013

• What can the opposition and the government do?

The model of concentration of

power

Concentration

Of Power

Opposition

Students and Universities

Businessmen

Unionists

State

Enterprises Governors

and

Mayors

Media

Bolivarian

Armed

Force

Pro-Chavez

Proyecto Revolucionario : Reducción del Pluralismo

Government

Revolutionary project: Reduction of Pluralism

What do the polls show?

Historic of Presidential intention to vote

• If presidential elections were on next Sunday, who would you vote for?

Base:1.300

Relegitimation

of powers

Recall

Referendum Presidential

Elections Parliamentary

Elections

Ómnibus National Survey August 2011

Historical HChF management evaluation

• How do you evaluate the work of President HChF for the welfare of the country?

Base: 1.300

* The difference to 100% corresponds to the “Not know / no answer”

Presidential

elections Constitutional

Amendment

Referendum

Constitutional

amendment Parliamentary

Elections Relegitimation

of powers

Recall

Referendum Regional

elections

Parliamentary

elections

49%

Positive evaluation

average

2006

71,5%

2007

61,5%

2008

56,6%

2009

53,3%

2010

47,2%

2011

51,2%

Total average: 55,5%

Ómnibus National Survey August 2011

59,6%

Approval of management x intention to vote

Ómnibus de Datanalisis x election results (CNE)

Presidential

elections

Constitutional

Amendment

Referendum

Constitutional

amendment

Recall

Referendum

Relegitimation

of powers Parliamentary

Elections

59,9% 59,2%

66,3%

52,0% 53,8%

45,3%

55,8% 55,9%

69,7%

44,6%

53,9% 67,1%

r = + 0,963

Alternation of the Republic Presidency

Ómnibus National Survey August 2011

• Usted diría que el presidente Chávez debería….

Base: 1.300

En relación a la política nacional, ¿usted se considera….?

Base: 1.300

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

50%

55%

60%

feb

-03

ma

y-0

3n

ov-

03

dic

-03

feb

-04

ma

r-0

4m

ay-

04

jul-

04

Ago

I 04

Ag

o II

04

oct

-04

Nov

04

En

e 0

5M

ar 0

5A

br

05

Ma

y 0

5Ju

n 05

Jul 0

5S

ep

05

Oct

05

Dic

05

Fe

b 0

6M

ar 0

6A

br

06

Ma

y 0

6Ju

n 06

Jul 0

6A

go

06

Se

p 0

6N

ov

I 06

No

v II

06

Fe

b 0

7M

ar 0

7M

ay I

07M

ay

II 0

7ju

n-0

7ju

l-0

7se

p-0

7o

ct-0

7n

ov-

07

feb

-08

ab

r-0

8m

ay-

08

jun

-08

ag

o-0

8se

p-0

8o

ct-0

8n

ov-

08

Dic

I 0

8D

ic II

08

en

e-0

9fe

b-0

9fe

b II

-09

ma

r-0

9a

br-

09

Ma

y I-

09

jun

-09

jul-

09

sep

-09

oct

-09

no

v-0

9d

ic-0

9fe

b-1

0a

br-

10

ma

y-1

0ju

n-1

0a

go

-10

sep

-10

Sep

-10

IIn

ov-

10

dic

-10

feb

-11

ab

r-1

1m

ay-

11

De la Oposición/ Antichavista De Ninguno de los dos bandos Pro Gobierno/ Chavista No contesta

6,1%

31,5%

30,1%

32,4%

Ref.

Revocatorio

Elecciones

Presidenciales Ref. Reforma

Constitucional

Enmienda

Const.

Elecciones

parlamentarias

Inteligencia de Mercado y Toma de Decisiones

Evolution of party identification

Regarding national politics, could you tell me what movement or party do you consider yours?

Ómnibus National Survey July 2011

47,3%

29,1%

18,2%

37,8%

Ómnibus National Survey August 2011

Base: 1.300

35,5%

From the following options, which would you vote for?

However, better opportunities have

been lost :

- Recall referendum 2007

- Constitutional amendment 2009

If a referendum for people to decide whether to approve or not the proposed constitutional amendment that would allow the President

to run for president candidate indefinitely were next Sunday, how would you vote: for or against the amendment?

Constitutional amendment

Base:1.300

December 2008: from 6th to16th December 2008

January 2009: from 13th to 18th January 2009

January II 2009: from 22nd to 30th January 2009

Results CNE: 15th February

National survey; 1.300 households; sampling error 2.71%; From 6th to 11th August 2004

To leave Survey on August 44,1%

CNE: 41,96%

To stay Survey on August 55,9%

CNE: 58,04%

Evolution of the intention to vote in the Presidential Recall Referendum

SÍ

NO

(Those who expressed their opinion are enrolled in the Permanent Electoral Register and currently have

laminated identity card)

* PER estimated for August 2004: 13.9 million voters.

* If a referendum for Venezuelan people to decide whether or not HChF should continue to be President, how would you vote, in favor or against he stays as President?

Analysis of 9 previous elections :

Key factors to explain the success

or failure of the government or the

opposition.

Aim towards

the sectors

Strategy and

message to the people

Leadership

Resources

Articulation: Identification

Party

Election Results

Explanatory model of the governing party election results

The multivariate statistical model

of public opinion

Applicable to…

- Governing party

- Opposition

The model applied to the case of

the governing party:

Explanation of election results

Aim towards the

sectors

Strategy and

message to the people

Leadership

Resources

Party Identification

Election Results

R2 = 0.895

0.5

72

R2 = 0.613

R2 = 0.860

0.8

31

R2 = 0.690

Explanatory model of the governing party election results

Total effects of each variable on the model of the governing

party election results

- 0,4

- 0,2

0

0,2

0,4

0,6

0,8

AIM MESSAGE

LEADERSHIP RESOURCES ARTICULATION

Effect of government’s

Resources

Pro-Chavez

Attraction Factor

% Of total 18 years and

older population linked to

Hugo Chavez for different

motivators

% Of pro-Chavez self-defined

population linked to President

Chavez for different motivators.

These percentages are calculated

on the average of 30% of "Pro-

Chavez" self-defined people on the

total voters

Axiomatic-

Ideological

3% 10%

Emotional-

Charisma

6% 20%

Utilities-Client 21% 70%

Management Evaluation of President Chavez and Real Liquidity

Relationship

Base: 1.300

0

5,000,000

10,000,000

15,000,000

20,000,000

25,000,000

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

80.0%

90.0%

100.0%

Feb

19

99

Feb

20

00

May

20

00

Feb

20

01

Jul 2

00

1

Feb

20

02

Jun

20

02

No

v 2

00

2

May

20

03

Sep

20

03

Dic

20

03

Mar

20

04

Jul 2

00

4

Oct

20

04

Ene

20

05

Ab

r 2

00

5

Jun

20

05

Sep

20

05

Dic

20

05

Mar

20

06

May

20

06

Jul 2

00

6

Sep

20

06

Feb

20

07

May

20

07

Jul 2

00

7

Oct

20

07

Feb

20

08

May

20

08

Ago

20

08

Oct

20

08

Dic

20

08

Feb

20

09

*

Ab

r 2

00

9 *

Jun

20

09

Sep

20

09

*

No

v 2

00

9 *

Feb

20

10

May

20

10

*

Ago

20

10

No

v 2

01

0 *

Mar

20

11

Aprobación de gestion (positiva) Liquidez Monetaria real (miles de Bs. De 1997)

Correlation Coefficients

1.- Whole period 0,217

2.- August 2001 - Currently 0,411

3.- June 2000 - Nov 2006 0,795

4.- Feb 2007 - April 2011 0,601

Effect of Party Identification

Party identification by the parties of e/o collective

Politically self-defined e/o collective

Missiones RRP Parliamentary

elections Presidential

elections

Regional

elections

Constitutional

amendment

Constitutional

amendment

referendum

Parliamentary

elections

Correlation Coefficients: 0.416 Positive Moderate (Both articulations get modified at the same time)

Calculation Formula : Party leanings (by political segment)/ Political self-definition

average: 59,3% average: 82,9%

The model applied to the case of

the opposition:

Explanation of election results

-0.4

76

R2= 0,270

R2= 0,268 R2= 0.677

Aim

Message/ Strategy

Party Articulation

Leadership

Resources

Negative Situation

Results

Explanatory model of the opposition’s electoral results

- 0,8000

- 0,6000

- 0,4000

- 0,2000

0,0000

0,2000

0,4000

0,6000

0,8000

Aim Message / Strategy

Articulation Resources Leadership Negative

Situation

Total effect on the results

19,6%

24,2%

12,3%

29,7%

7,6%6,5%

24,1%

22,1%

10,0%

28,3%

7,9% 7,6%

26,7%

20,8%

12,1%

26,7%

4,4%

9,4%

31,3%

29,0%

7,6%

20,0%

5,0%

7,1%

30,1%

27,3%

7,3%

25,3%

3,6%

6,4%

35,8%

22,5%

7,1%

23,2%

3,2%

8,3%

22,9% 23,5%

2,5%

34,6%

16,5%

24,9%

27,2%

5,4%

30,4%

4,5%

7,7%

Oposición Oficialismo Independientes Es muy temprano para pensar en eso No voy a votar No contesta

Pensando en las próximas elecciones para diputados a la Asamblea Nacional, ¿Por cuales candidatos votaría? Base: 1.300

No

vie

mb

re

No

vie

mb

re

No

vie

mb

re

No

vie

mb

re

No

v

No

v

Feb

rero

Feb

rero

Feb

rero

Feb

rero

Feb

rero

Feb

rero

Mar

zo

Mar

zo

Mar

zo

Mar

zo

Mar

Mar

zo

Ab

ril

Ab

ril

Ab

ril

Ab

ril

Ab

ril

Jun

io

Jun

io

Jun

io

Jun

io

Jun

Jun

io

Ab

ril

Ago

sto

Ago

sto

Ago

sto

Ago

sto

Ago

sto

Ago

sto

II

Ago

sto

II

Ago

sto

II

Ago

sto

II

Sep

tie

mb

re

Sep

tie

mb

re

Sep

t

Sep

tie

mb

re

Sep

t

Sep

tie

mb

re

Thinking about the upcoming elections for deputies to the National Assembly, which candidates do you vote for?

Opposition Governing party Independents It's so early to think about it I will not vote No answer

How do you think that political parties can strengthen or restore its image before the public opinion?

April 2010

Consolidate internally

Renew internally / democratize

Be more proactive

Not know

No answer

Nothing can be done to restore his image

Other

Scenarios 2012-2013

Major uncertainties about the

governing party:

Aim treatment

toward sectors

Message strategy toward

population

Major uncertainties about the

opposition:

Aim One or more

candidates

Message Level of

organization

of the Opposition

Organization level to be handled by the

opposition in the electoral process:

. Dismantled

. Based on the parties

. Pluralist

DISMANTLED OPPOSITION

CDU IS ARTICULATED AS PARTY

EXTENDED CDU: IN FAVOR OF DEMOCRATIC

PLURALISM

MO

DER

ATE

R

EVO

LUTI

ON

D

EEP

R

EVO

LUTI

ON

The lost opportunity for the Opposition: The Great Bet of the Governing Party

David wins … The Opposition tends to win

Chavez Tends to lose

Scenarios 2011-2013

David against Goliath ... Both can win

Goliath wins… Chavez Tends to win

DISMANTLED OPPOSITION CDU IS ARTICULATED AS PARTY

EXTENDED CDU: IN FAVOR OF DEMOCRATIC PLURALISM

REV

OLU

CIÓ

N

MO

DER

AD

A

REV

OLU

CIÓ

N

PR

OFU

ND

A

Chavez won and, if lost, he did not quit 1) Radicalization deepens 2) If he loses, but not quit, the concentration of power will be even greater because it breaks the constitutional line.

Chavez loses Articulated opposition can: • force him to quit • receive military support • receive civil society support • prevail and govern Political side-changing

The CDU as based on the party can come to power but it will be difficult to govern because they would not have built the necessary cross-sector linkages in order to negotiate the pressures got in a new government and to resist the onslaught of Chavez in opposition. The new opposition would represent the majority in NA

Scenarios 2013

Chávez won 1) A new radicalization is probable

because …. 2) Dismantling of the opposition is

not an obstacle.

Both can win or lose The opposition can govern because its extended articulation grants a basis of power and government-sectors communication channels that facilitate negotiations. If Chavez governs the EXTENDED CDU represents an obstacle to his eventual radicalization.

What can the governing party do?

Accept other pro-Chavez leaders as presidential candidates

Consolidate the PSUV as an autonomous entity

Review the concept of Revolution to a pluralist

modernizing Socialism vs. Radicalism

Recognition of pro-government leaders Nacional

• And which of the following PSUV leaders would you prefer that President Chavez give the opportunity?

None

Not know Filtering by respondents "yes" to "Do you think

President Chavez should provide the opportunity

for another leader of the PSUV to ran for

president in the 2012 elections?

24,2%

20,7%

17,8% 44,9%

6,7%

4,3%

4,1%

3,7%

3,7%

3,7%

* No values were plotted <3,5% Ómnibus National Survey August 2011

Base: 517

What can the Opposition do?

• Expand its organization to make it plural

• Consolidate around a leader who goes to

the people and sectors

•Look for integration and avoid retaliation

Expanded CDU Coordinating Committee

Representatives of democratic government

Students and Universities

Democratic Pro-Chavez

trend Businessmen

Unionists Bolivarian Armed Force

Governors and Mayors

Media State Enterprises

With whom?

¿ How do you evaluate the work of the following sectors for the welfare of the country? (Top three boxes)

April 2011

Base: 1.300

Who are they and

what characterizes

these leaders?

Presidential opposition candidate for 2012 (spontaneous) Opposition

Base: 380

• Who do you think should be the opposition candidate ahead of presidential elections in 2012?

Not know

35,5%

12,4%

12,6%

12,1%

4,5%

7,1%

2,6%

1,6%

1,6%

* No values were plotted <1,5% Ómnibus National Survey August 2011

¡ Thank you very much!

Effect of the President’s illness

on the prospects for 2012

Two pathways for disease management of Hugo Chavez

Authoritarian

pathway

Democratic

pathway President HChF

Disease

Secrecy

Surgery in Cuba

Nobody is in charge of the Presidency

Rumors about HChF successors and conflicts between them

PSUV leaders call for unity

President returns with euphoria-connected

with the people--

Accurate information

Surgery in Venezuela or in a more advanced country on health issues

Vicepresident Jaua is responsible for Presidency

The laws and the party hierarchy define the possible succession

The unit would be strengthened by the institutions of the PSUV and the movement of Jaua in charge of the Presidency

The President returns with moderation-connected with

everybody-

Two pathways for disease management of Hugo Chavez

Authoritarian

pathway

Democratic

pathway

Insist on HChF as candidate

Deepens concentration of power

Reaffirm that there is no Chavez trend without Chavez

High risk of losing the 2012 election

Institutional decline of the movement and before public opinion

Accept other PSUV leaders

Following a modern European style socialism

Institutionalize the movement

Legitimize the movement, win or lose in 2012

Long-term prospects for a left Chavez trend become modern, European, Brazilian or Chilean style

Continuation …

President HChF

Disease

Risk of Chavez trend coup renewal Competition with center-left and center-right movements