Protection of Civilians andPolitical Strategies

MAY 2018

Introduction

The 2015 UN High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO)stressed two major themes that Secretary-General António Guterres continuesto focus on: first, the primacy of politics in peacekeeping, which he raised inhis September 2017 remarks at the Security Council open debate onpeacekeeping; and second, the core obligation of peacekeepers and the entireUN to protect civilians, a continuous theme of his tenure.1

Yet protecting civilians and pursuing political strategies, the defining tasksof modern peacekeeping, have frequently been in tension. Critics argue thatpeace operations in the last two decades have too often been tools of lastresort, deployed to conflicts with no viable political process and serving asstop-gap measures rather than strategic steps toward a political solution. Thisis particularly evident in missions whose mandate to protect has been priori-tized in the absence of a clear political vision to address the conflict. Forexample, in South Sudan, Darfur, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo,the mission’s political role may seem elusive, while its protection goals canappear as an operational imperative and a clear priority. As a consequence,POC may capture most of the attention and resources, sometimes at theexpense of the political effectiveness of the mission.2

It should be noted that “the primacy of politics” and “political strategies” areterms that are not particularly well explored. Policymakers and practitionersfrequently use the term “political” to mean “strategic” or in reference to the“big picture” (as opposed to “technical” or in reference to the detail ofprograms); focused on high-level engagement (rather than to the “local” workof civil affairs sections in peace operations or civil society); or interest-drivenrather than principle-driven (when compared to humanitarian work, forexample). The Department of Peacekeeping Operations is currently workingto better clarify the idea and importance of political strategies writ large, andthis paper does not seek to preempt that work. It does, however, accept thatwhile the idea of a “political strategy” is contested, it remains a real andimportant component of mission work that is repeatedly contrasted with theprotection of civilians mandate.

IPI Protection of Civilians Project

In 2018, the International PeaceInstitute (IPI) created a dedicatedproject on the protection of civilians(POC). While protection of civilianshas become an essential paradigmfor UN peace operations, imple -menting protection mandates onthe ground—as well as linking themto political processes and exitstrategies—is increasingly challeng -ing. Through research, convening,and outreach activities, the POCproject aims to support peaceoperations strengthen their protec-tion work with solid political strate-gies, clearer roles and responsibili-ties within missions, outcome-drivenand tailored approaches, andenhanced accountability. It seeks toinform policy development andpractice, and support the UNSecretariat’s efforts to enhance thedelivery of protection of civiliansmandates by peace operations.

This issue brief was drafted by RalphMamiya, former team leader of theProtection of Civilians Team in theUnited Nations Department ofPeacekeeping Operations and co-editor of Protection of Civilians(Oxford University Press, 2016). Histhanks go to Tara Lyle, Adam Day,and the IPI team for their veryhelpful comments on earlier draftsof this paper. The views expressed inthis publication represent those ofthe author and not necessarily thoseof the International Peace Institute.IPI welcomes consideration of awide range of perspectives in thepursuit of a well-informed debate oncritical policies and issues in interna-tional affairs.

IPI would like to thank the govern-ment of the Netherlands for makingthis publication possible.

1 Predating both the HIPPO and the secretary-general’s statements, the Policy on the Protection of Civilians fromthe Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS) has enshrinedprotection through political dialogue as the first of three tiers of protective action, along with physical protectionand the building of a protective environment.

2 See, for example, Richard Gowan, “The End of a Peacekeeping Era,” Global Peace Operations Review, April 4,2018, available at https://peaceoperationsreview.org/thematic-essays/the-end-of-a-peacekeeping-era .

2 ISSUE BRIEF

This issue brief reviews the complementarity andtension between protection of civilians andpolitical strategies. It explores the important role ofthe Security Council in laying the strategic ground-work for the success of missions, and examineshow missions, at their level, can implement protec-tion of civilians mandates through a politicalstrategy. Rather than providing concreterecommendations on a topic that touches upon thespectrum of peace and security challenges, thisissue brief provides an overview of key questionsand areas for further research. It highlights inparticular the importance of clarifying strategicobjectives for missions, UN headquarters, and theSecurity Council to minimize the risk that theprotection of civilians mandate becomes military-driven rather than politically driven. It alsoemphasizes the need to link local conflict resolu-tion to national political strategies, engage with awider range of actors, and strengthen field offices. Each of the following sections raises issues thatdefy simple answers and are the daily work ofmission personnel, many with decades of experi-ence in politics and peacekeeping. They are also thefocus of numerous actors and processes, from theHuman Rights Up Front Initiative and the HumanRights Due Diligence Policy, to the work of highcommissioners and the secretary-general’s specialrepresentatives and advisers on thematic issues, tothe numerous humanitarian actors whose work isbeyond the scope of this paper.

Complementarity andTension

The HIPPO recommended that missions deploybased upon a political strategy, with their capacitiesand activities tailored to fulfilling that strategy. Atthe same time, it recognized that missions wouldcontinue to be mandated to protect civilians,arguing that the protection of civilians is a “coreobligation of the United Nations,” and madenumerous recommendations to strengthen theprotection mandate. The HIPPO was much lessclear, however, on the potential tension betweenthese two aspects of peace operations. There is anargument that the tension between protection of

civilians and political strategies is a non-issue: UNpolitical strategies, in seeking peace, naturallysupport the protection of civilians, and protectingcivilians is a key step in building a viable politicalprocess and a sustainable peace. However, tensions often arise in practice,resulting from at least three dynamics: the “ripe”moment for political dialogue versus the urgentneed for protection; the focus on elites in politicalprocesses versus the interests and voices of thewider civilian population; and the military as a toolto further a political strategy versus as the driver ofa political strategy.RIPE MOMENTS VERSUS IMMINENTTHREATS

Peacemaking theory emphasizes “ripe” or “ready”moments, when parties to a conflict recognize thebenefits of compromise, often due to a “mutuallyhurting stalemate.”3 In many low-tech civil wars inthe developing world, however, parties can supportprotracted conflicts through obtaining funds fromneighboring powers, accessing transnationalcriminal and global trading networks, and preyingon civilian communities. These ongoing conflicts,unripe for mediation, can have an immediate anddevastating impact on civilians, and it is to thesesituations that peacekeeping missions are oftenexpected to respond. The tension between protection of civilians andpolitics becomes more pronounced when politicalprocesses stall while violence against civilianscontinues. This dynamic, which is all too commonin modern peacekeeping contexts, is evident inSouth Sudan and Darfur, as well as in the CentralAfrican Republic where long-term statebuildinggoals do not address immediate protection threats. This tension is partly due to the framing of theprotection of civilians mandate in apolitical terms,as a humanitarian or categorical necessity ratherthan a strategic decision. This framing is evident inthe history of the protection of civilians mandate inpeacekeeping, which grew from the stark atrocitiescommitted in Rwanda and the Balkans.Humanitarians, upholding principles of neutralityand humanity, first championed this innovation inpeacekeeping, though many have taken a more

3 See, for example, I. William Zartman, “The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments,” Global Review of Ethnopolitics 1, no. 1 (September2001).

skeptical view as the protection mandate hasincreasingly become the public face of aninherently political endeavor.4 There are risks totreating protection as an apolitical mandate,however. When politics is removed from protec-tion, we may create overly simplified narratives; theperpetrators of attacks on civilians, for instance,may be attributed motivations of “ethnic hatred”that mask more complex motivations aroundpower and patronage.ELITES AND COMMUNITIES

Scholars are increasingly recognizing theimportant work of local conflict mediation bypeace operations personnel and its importance forprotecting civilians and creating politicalsolutions.5 Political strategies and the work of peaceoperations, however, have frequently focused onnational political processes and political or militaryelites. These leaders do not always represent localcommunities, however, and they do not alwayshave influence on the perpetrators of violenceagainst communities. Moreover, peace agreementssupported by international actors can increase therewards for rent-seeking military leaders. Thisoccurred during the interim period following theComprehensive Peace Agreement in SouthernSudan, which incentivized militias to createinstability, and in Darfur during the period of theDarfur Peace Agreement, which disincentivized thegovernment of Sudan from seeking a comprehen-sive solution to the Darfur rebellion.6

There are often attempts to incorporatecommunity voices into peace processes, but this israrely a straightforward matter.7 Reaching agree -ment, even in the “ripest” of moments, can be moredifficult with more voices at the table and civil

society voices are not always conducive to sustain-able peace. In the early stages of mediation of theSouth Sudanese civil war, for instance, most civilsociety representatives were highly partisan andeffectively aligned with one party or the other,making coordination more difficult and offeringlittle in terms of new perspectives.8

THE MILITARIZATION OF PROTECTIONAND POLITICS

A third challenge is the militarization of the protec-tion of civilians mandate and the tendency ofmilitarized protection to become divorced frompolitical goals. The recent UN report on“Improving the Security of United NationsPeacekeepers” (the “Cruz Report”) highlighted theimportance of military capabilities in moredangerous contexts and appears to have galvanizedproponents of more muscular peacekeeping.9 Inpractice, however, a heavy reliance on the militaryaspect of peacekeeping often draws focus awayfrom political solutions and may limit a mission’sroom for political maneuver. The missions in the Democratic Republic of theCongo (DRC), Mali, and the Central AfricanRepublic (CAR) illustrate the risk of highly milita-rized missions losing focus on political goals. TheUN Organization Stabilization Mission in theDRC’s (MONUSCO) focus on combating armedgroups in eastern Congo has left it with littlepolitical leverage to protect civilians as the countrybarrels toward its greatest political crisis in ageneration.10 In Mali, a combination of humanrights abuses by the government and the UNMultidimensional Integrated Stabilization Missionin Mali’s (MINUSMA) move toward supportingthe government in counter-terrorism operations

Protection of Civilians and Political Strategies 3

4 See and compare, for example, Statement of Under-Secretary-General Jan Egeland at the open debate of the UN Security Council on the protection of civilians inarmed conflict, December 9, 2005, available at https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/statement-usg-jan-egeland-open-meeting-un-sc-protection-civilians , and Victoria Metcalfe, “Protecting civilians? The interaction between international military and civilian actors,” Humanitarian Policy Group WorkingPaper, 2012, available at http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/7768.pdf .

5 See, for example, Severine Autesserre, “The Right Way to Build Peace in the Congo,” Foreign Affairs, April 6, 2017, available athttps://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/democratic-republic-congo/2017-04-06/right-way-build-peace-congo .

6 See Alex de Walle, The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa (Polity, 2015), chapters 5, 6, and the introduction. It should be noted that the negative impact of theseagreements were primarily the strategies employed by the respective governments, without direct international support.

7 See the World Bank-UN study, Pathways for Peace, for a more extensive discussion of inclusive peacebuilding: World Bank Group and the United Nations,Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict (2018).

8 In 2017, South Sudanese authorities initiated a national dialogue that seeks to broaden participation in discussions of conflict issues and broaden the scope ofissues addressed.

9 United Nations, “Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers,” December 2017, available at https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/improving-security-of-united-nations-peacekeepers-independent-report . See also Jean-Marie Guéhenno, “Peacekeepers Shouldn’t Always Be Peaceful,” Foreign Policy, April 19, 2018, availableat http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/19/peacekeepers-shouldnt-always-be-peaceful/ .

10 See Jason K. Stearns, “Can Force Be Useful in the Absence of a Political Strategy? Lessons from the UN Missions to the DR Congo,” Congo Research Group,December 2015, available at http://congoresearchgroup.org/essay-can-force-be-useful-in-the-absence-of-a-political-strategy/ .

4 ISSUE BRIEF

risk undermining the legitimacy of the mission andthe UN as trusted political actors.11 The CentralAfrican Republic continues to be roiled by violenceand intercommunal clashes despite a number ofmilitary successes achieved by the UNMultidimensional Integrated Stabilization Missionin the CAR (MINUSCA), putting the sustainabilityof such an approach into question. The use of force is necessary in peacekeeping butbecomes problematic when the military machinedrives the political strategy. While this is a dangerin any type of military operation, it is particularlyso when protecting civilians is a key part of amission’s political strategy. The seemingly endlesslist of threats to civilians in conflict-affectedcountries can lead to open-ended goals and a riskthat missions attempt to substitute their forces forthose of the host government. “Protection ofcivilians” can also come to be used to describe thegoals of military campaigns against non-statearmed groups, another potentially open-endedtask. There is no simple way to keep a mission’smilitary operations driven by its political strategy,particularly when the political process is stalled butmilitary tasks must continue. Vague mandates,poor communication between military and civilianpersonnel, and the significant logistical andbudgetary footprint of the military all add to thechallenge. The military planning chain, however, iswell within the UN Secretariat’s control. Themilitary “tail” will only wag the political “dog” ifcommunication between civilian political leader-ship and a mission’s military component is weak oravoids difficult issues, or when mission leadershipand UN headquarters fail to coalesce around apolitical strategy.SECURITY COUNCIL LANGUAGE ANDSECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

A mission’s political strategy begins with itsSecurity Council mandate. As lamented by many

commentators, these mandates are not alwaysstrategic documents.12 They frequently provide themission with numerous discrete tasks rather than aset of clear and achievable goals or a defined rolewithin a larger political plan. Too often, newiterations of a mission’s mandate are focused onoperational and even tactical directives. Protectionof civilians mandates are a clear example of this: thecouncil often calls for specific military measures(e.g., “robust patrols”) while leaving missions withlittle strategic sense of what the council seeksthrough the protection mandate. One of the HIPPO’s proposed solutions to thischallenge was to sequence mandates—“fewerpriorities, fewer tasks and better sequencing [oftasks].”13 As noted above, however, protectingcivilians and finding the ripe moment for politicalengagement cannot necessarily be sequenced, andrecent missions (as well as non-UN militaryoperations in Afghanistan and Iraq) have provedthat it is difficult to lay down the stages of stabiliza-tion in neat progression. Yet this idea doesrecognize that the mission’s political strategybegins in the Security Council—that the councilshould have a plan—and, consequently, that itshould ensure that the underlying conditions forthe mission’s success exist or are within reach.14Security Council members, particularly thepermanent members, are some of the most influen-tial member states in fragile and post-conflictcountries, with significant resources to bring aboutthose conditions. They can shape the economicspace through bilateral or multilateral trade deals,sanctions, or development assistance (includingloans from the World Bank or InternationalMonetary Fund); the political space through high-level diplomacy; and a mission’s capacity,including its resources and capabilities, as well asits political role. These external conditions beyondthe remit of the UN are vital to a mission’s success.Mission mandates should thus be tailored to andsequenced based on whether these conditions exist

11 John Karlsrud, “Towards UN Counter-Terrorism Operations?,” Third World Quarterly 38, no. 6 (2017).12 See, for example, UN News, “Unrealistic demands on peacekeeping costing lives and credibility–Guterres,” March 28, 2018, available at

news.un.org/en/story/2018/03/1006181 ; Adam Day, “To Build Consent in Peacekeeping Operations, Turn Mandates Upside Down,” United Nations University,February 1, 2017, available at ourworld.unu.edu/en/to-build-consent-in-peace-operations-turn-mandates-upside-down ; and Jean-Marie Guehenno, “Fog ofPeace: UN Peacekeeping Needs to Focus More on Political Strategy and Less on Troops,” Global Review of Peace Operations, October 1, 2015, available at https://peaceoperationsreview.org/interviews/fog-of-peace-un-peacekeeping-needs-to-focus-more-on-political-strategy-and-less-on-troops .

13 UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: Politics,Partnership, and People, UN Doc. A/70/95–S/2015/446, June 17, 2015.

14 This paper recognizes that “the Security Council” is not a cohesive body with a single “plan”. It also recognizes that mission mandates, though the product ofcompromise, are also frequently the product of a single pen holder.

or council members are committed to establishingthem. The protection of civilians is often viewed as abreakthrough in mandate language. The firstprotection of civilians mandate in 1999 was the firsttime the council authorized the use of force todefend local people rather than to defendpeacekeepers or specific locations, and thesecretary-general’s aide memoire on the protectionof civilians (first released in 2002 and regularlyupdated) collects past and potential councillanguage to address protection issues.15 This focuson the council’s written word, however, at bestobscures and at worst confuses the real value ofcouncil mandates. As recent conflicts from SouthSudan to Syria have shown, the council’s requests,demands, and appeals for peace and protectionregularly go unheeded. The source of this “protec-tion gap” is not the language the council uses but itslack of commitment to shaping the economic andpolitical space to influence relevant actors. Forexample, an array of international actors initiallycoordinated pressure and incentives to ensure thepeaceful secession of South Sudan, leading many toassess the work of the UN Mission in Sudan(UNMIS), as custodian of the north-south peaceprocess, to be successful. Civil war broke out inSouth Sudan two and a half years after UNMIStransitioned to UNMISS, however, and the lattermission has been judged as overly focused onprotection to the exclusion of political progress.Yet the degree of international investment insupporting conditions for success in the firstconflict, including high-level mediation but alsoincluding an array of promises of sanctions reliefand financial aid to make the agreement palatable(these were not always delivered over time butimportant nonetheless), was not matched in thesecond.16

From this perspective, council mandates bestcontribute to the protection of civilians when theyare the culmination of the collective—or leastconvergent—will of at least key council members,including permanent members. It should also benoted that the participation or assent of regional

powers or organizations, whether or not they haveformal representation on the council, is increas-ingly important. Analysis of and advocacy for theprotection of civilians in peacekeeping, however,often focuses on the language of council mandates,with the economic, political, and resource implica-tions given secondary attention.16

Implementing Protection ofCivilians Mandates throughPolitical Dialogue

While protection is far more than a matter ofmartial vigor, peace operations have a large role toplay in successfully protecting civilians. They facetwo particular challenges at the level of fieldoperations: (1) ensuring that implementation ofprotection of civilians mandates is driven by apolitical strategy; and (2) enabling missionpersonnel to undertake the political dialoguerequired for protection.POLITICAL STRATEGIES IN MANDATEIMPLEMENTATION

Three years after the HIPPO report, it is now awell-established principle that implementation ofall mission mandates should be driven by a politicalstrategy. What this means in practice, particularlywith regard to protection of civilians mandates, ismore difficult to articulate.17 On the one hand, thelink between protection of civilians and a mission’sstrategy can be relatively clear: it is a basic goal ofpeacekeeping (even in the most traditionalmissions) to enhance stability and reduce conflict,and progress toward these goals naturally leads togreater protection. In many mission contexts,however, the level of violence is so high that“traditional” or “passive” measures still result inlarge numbers of civilian deaths. Similarly,supporting and building the capacity of govern-ments is a basic goal that naturally coincides withgreater protection, yet such projects progressslowly, often with backsliding and civilian deathsalong the way. There is generally no single document that

Protection of Civilians and Political Strategies 5

15 See UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Aide Memoire for the Consideration of Issues Pertaining to the Protection of Civilians in ArmedConflict, 2016, available at www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/Aide%20Memoire%202016%20II_0.pdf .

16 See and compare, De Walle, supra note 6.17 Part of this challenge lies in linking a mission’s political strategy to the strategic direction provided by the Security Council. As noted above, the latter is often

vague, incomplete, or incoherent, and missions are often left to fill in important blanks on their own.

6 ISSUE BRIEF

contains the political strategy for a peaceoperation.18 The mission concept and mission plan,defined in the planning guidance for peaceoperations, are key strategic documents thatestablish priorities, mission phases andbenchmarks, and key contextual factors. Mostmissions also have protection of civilians strategiesthat identify specific threats and articulate themission’s particular approach to protection. Themission’s political strategy should be reflected in allthese documents. This section looks at a set ofissues essential to consider in developing thestrategic approach that informs mission planning.Clarifying Objectives

Challenging questions about how to apply politicalstrategies to the protection mandate frequentlyarise in contexts where there is no clear politicalprocess. In such cases, clarifying the mission’soverall political goal is essential, if not always easy.In contexts like South Sudan with a halting politicalprocess and widespread violence, protection is thepriority yet seems to leave the mission in a billion-dollar holding pattern. Legitimate questions ariseover how the protection of civilians mandate can orshould be framed in political-strategic terms. Manyof those making policies for peace and stabilityoperations, whether in the UN or organizationssuch as NATO, have long recognized thatprotecting civilians can build a mission’s credibilityand better enable it to achieve its strategicobjectives. It is less clear, however, that simplyprotecting civilians can or should constitute astrategic objective. In addressing this question, it bears recalling thatSecurity Council mandates are products ofcompromise, and the strategic direction theyprovide is often opaque. While unfortunate, thismay be a reality of great-power politics to whichpeacekeeping must become accustomed. Thebenefit of broad mandates, however, is that theyprovide the secretary-general and the missionsignificant discretion to chart the best pathforward. If missions are pushed to prioritize“protection of civilians” with no other clearpolitical goal, that term is broad enough to capturea range of political goals. This does not makecharting the political path easy (it is certainly

challenging in South Sudan), but protectionmandates should not restrict clear politicalthinking. The Security Council and mission leadershipteams have repeatedly prioritized the protection ofcivilians mandate. While this is admirable andimportant, it also risks leading to (or being used tojustify) a heavily militarized approach. The militaryis a hugely important aspect of peacekeeping, ofcourse, but good military planning begins with aclear political direction. If this direction is lacking,as may be the case when there is no clearly articu-lated political strategy document, military plannersmay be left to fill the crucial gaps. Even in cases like DRC, where the neutralizationof armed groups is considered a core aspect of theprotection of civilians mandate, all stakeholders areclear that a military approach alone will not addressthe protection concerns of the affected communi-ties. However, it is widely recognized that use offorce is but one tool in the protection kit, andshould be used in a complementary fashion withother activities. A strategy that shows how forcewill contribute to protection goals is thus crucial.Clarity of goals, articulated in a sound politicalstrategy, is therefore important, particularly inpolitically polarized or counterterrorism contexts.Working with the Host Government

A foundational principle of peacekeeping is thatmissions deploy with the consent of the hostgovernment. This is also a guiding principle of theDepartment of Peacekeeping Operations’ (DPKO)policy that the primary responsibility to protect lieswith the host government. According to this policy,peacekeepers should only act when the governmentis unwilling or unable to protect civilians andshould support the government’s protection effortsthrough capacity building and logistical or othersupport. However, these well-established andsimply stated principles mask a more complexreality. Host-nation consent is generally a legalconstruct established (and sometimes cajoled) bythe Security Council. As the experiences of manyrecent missions show, a host state’s consent to apeace operation does not necessarily mean it willcooperate with mission activities, and it may even

18 As noted in the introduction, this is currently a work stream within DPKO to better flesh out the concept of political strategies and the primacy of politics inpeacekeeping. This section captures only current practice.

actively obstruct them. This non-cooperation canserve as leverage for the host government in itsdealings with the mission, the Security Council,and the international community. The mission inDarfur has long faced this challenge, and UNMISShas faced it in recent years as well. Challenges to host-government cooperation mayarise for many reasons, but a mission’s implemen-tation of its protection of civilians mandate is acommon one. For governments that present threatsto their population, as does the government ofSudan through support for militias in Darfur, forexample, a mission dedicated to protecting civiliansis something to keep at arm’s length, if not obstructoutright. The UN Human Rights Due DiligencePolicy provides an important framework forworking with and supporting governments whilemaintaining human rights standards andprotecting civilians. In many contexts, however, the narrative iscomplex. Most governments in fragile and post-conflict states face pockets of armed actors, whetherorganized groups or community-based militias,that they must co-opt, marginalize, or defeat. Thiscan be seen as a “political marketplace” where rulersbargain for the loyalty of factions through a twenty-first-century form of patronage politics.19 Whenpeace operations act militarily to protect civilians,they become significant actors in this politicalmarketplace, capable of supporting a ruler (andtherefore reducing his costs) or complicating aruler’s bargaining (and increasing his costs). This perspective is crucial for peacekeepingbecause of the risk of unintended consequences ofthe mission’s activities. In the DRC, for example,the MONUSCO Force Intervention Brigade’ssuccessful operations against the M-23 militiasupported the government’s interests. While thebrigade has subsequently turned its attention to anumber of other militias that represented threats tocivilians in eastern DRC, many of these have morecomplex relations with the government in Kinshasaand with local communities, and progress has beenhalting. Understanding local dynamics and howmission approaches to armed groups can produceripple effects is important.

Managing Expectations

It is imperative but challenging to manage expecta-tions of missions, whether they are expectations ofthe international community, the host government,or vulnerable segments of the civilian population. Itis a well-worn truism that missions cannot protecteveryone in their areas of operations. Memberstates routinely acknowledge this, yet time andagain there are unrealistically high expectations ofpeacekeepers’ ability to protect. Part of this can beattributed to a lack of trust in the willingness andability of peacekeepers, particularly the uniformedcomponent, to protect civilians when called upon. While this impression is likely only half true atbest, its impact on the expectations of a mission—and therefore on how to define a mission’s successand failure—is real. As with improving the UN’simage in handling cases of sexual exploitation andabuse committed by peacekeepers, missions andUN headquarters need to examine ways of buildingtrust and managing expectations. Clear and consis-tent messaging on the protection of civilians is animportant and effective way to do this. Given therange of audiences for such messages, this is not asimple task of improving talking points. Suchmessaging would need to be based on a clearmission plan that embodies a political strategy andprotection goals.PROTECTION THROUGH POLITICALDIALOGUE

The HIPPO encouraged missions to focus on“unarmed protection” strategies—the first tier of“protection through dialogue and engagement”under the Department of Peacekeeping Operationsand Department of Field Support’s policy on theprotection of civilians. If recent budgetary trendscontinue, with peacekeeping missions providedwith fewer troops yet continuing to work in violentcontexts with expansive mandates, unarmedprotection will become ever more important.20Currently, civilians in field offices regularly playimportant roles in gathering and analyzinginformation, conducting human rights investiga-tions, and liaising with and building the capacity oflocal authorities. While this work needs tocontinue, missions also need to look at new ways of

Protection of Civilians and Political Strategies 7

19 See de Waal, The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa.20 On the case of MONUSCO, see Katharina P. Coleman, “The Dynamics of Peacekeeping Budget Cuts: The Case of MONUSCO,” IPI Global Observatory, July 10,

2017, available at https://theglobalobservatory.org/2017/07/monusco-drc-peacekeeping-budget-cuts .

leveraging their civilian personnel to influence thebehavior of armed actors. There are many cases of civilian missionpersonnel successfully engaging with armed actorsto prevent conflict and mitigate threats to civilians.Some of these are specific to individuals andsituations, such as MINUSMA’s head of office inTimbuktu riding out to meet an armed groupapproaching the town (the Coordination desmouvements de l’Azawad), engaging it in dialogue,and convincing it to turn back. In other cases,institutional approaches have been taken, such asMONUSCO’s section dedicated to disarmament,demobilization, repatriation, reintegration, andresettlement, which actively sought to convincemembers of armed group to leave their militias.Most recently, MINUSCA has embarked on astrategic initiative to negotiate local peaceagreements with the numerous armed groupsoperating in the Central African Republic. Strengthening this civilian-led work will requirethree elements: linking local conflict resolutionefforts to the mission’s political strategy;maintaining political space for dialogue with allrelevant actors; and empowering heads of fieldoffice and investing in civilian personnel.Linking Local Conflict Resolution toPolitical Strategies

To effectively influence actors who pose a threat tocivilians, missions need to link local conflict resolu-tion efforts and dialogue to their larger politicalstrategy. Too often, missions restrict politicalengagement to the capital and government officialswith ministerial titles. The real power structures ofmany fragile and post-conflict countries are notalways transparent, however, and local conflictsfrequently have direct or indirect ties to nationalpolitical or military actors. Understanding these power structures isessential. But while policymakers often prescribebetter information gathering and analysis as apanacea for what ails peacekeeping, a huge amountof knowledge is already present in national andinternational staff. What is often missing isfashioning this information into coherent plansthat address both the mission’s overall strategy andlocal concerns.

Maintaining Political Space for Dialoguewith All Relevant Actors

Engaging with the right actors is essential topolitical dialogue. Where protection is concerned,these actors may be armed groups whom thegovernment or international community do notview favorably, such as groups labeled terrorist, oron sensitive issues that the mission is not explicitlymandated to investigate, such as illicit criminalnetworks or corrupt practices. Missions mustmaintain their political space to engage with thesegroups and understand these issues, just ashumanitarian actors do for their own purposes.While cutting off dialogue can be an importantpolitical statement in some cases, engaging witharmed actors on the margins of peace processes canbe an important step in preventing conflict andlinking local efforts to national strategies. Suchengagement carries risks, however, and requiresstrong and capable field teams.Empowering Heads of Field Offices andInvesting in Civilian Personnel

Strengthening the link between national and localstrategies should not be a top-down affair, but eachshould inform the other. Mission field officesshould not engage in political dialogue that has nobearing on the mission’s direction or overallstrategy, but the mission headquarters also needs tolisten to the political advice of its field offices informulating strategic priorities. This requires trusted and empowered heads offield office who mission leadership will listen to asconfidants and who have the ability to proactivelyengage in dialogue when necessary. Protectingcivilians under imminent threat may requireengaging in political dialogue with little notice.Heads of field offices should be able to take theinitiative to engage in sensitive discussions withconfidence and decisiveness. Empowered field offices require greater invest-ment in civilian personnel. These personnel needopportunities to improve the qualities needed toengage in political dialogue, including politicaljudgment, leadership, and decision making, and tostrengthen specific skills in mediation, negotiation,and community liaison. Currently, this learningoccurs almost exclusively on the job, but it should

8 ISSUE BRIEF

be supplemented with training, including scenario-based training, and opportunities for structuredcareer progress. Where training is not feasible,recruiting heads of office with clear leadershipexperience is essential.

Conclusion

While political realities may prevent trueconsensus on important issues in the SecurityCouncil, it is still possible to build creativecoalitions in support of more meaningful commit-ments than strong mandate language and smallchanges to troop ceilings. However, this willrequire member states, and particularly councilmembers, to treat the protection of civilians asmore than a noble and aspirational ideal but aconcretely achievable goal, and to pursue it accord-ingly. At the mission level, political strategies shouldseek to accomplish the admittedly challenging tasksof establishing clear strategic goals; working withhost governments to serve the long-term interests

of their country while also meeting short-termprotection needs; and managing expectationsthrough messaging backed by credible steps toimprove performance. The work of unarmed actorsin missions can also be strengthened by linkinglocal-level conflict resolution efforts to missions’national-level strategies, engaging with all relevantactors, strengthening field offices, and investing incivilian personnel. Whether in South Sudan or Syria, violenceagainst civilians has rarely been more apparent,and the role of the United Nations in alleviatinghuman suffering in conflict zones has never beenmore important. To address this reality, the UN’speace and security architecture needs to embracethe primacy of politics, from the halls of worldcapitals to the dirt roads of remote field sites.Becoming a more effective political actor in protec-tion crises will require wrestling with the tensionsoutlined in this paper and building on the goodwork being done in peacekeeping and specialpolitical missions.

Protection of Civilians and Political Strategies 9

The INTERNATIONAL PEACE INSTITUTE (IPI) is an independent,

international not-for-profit think tank dedicated to managing risk and

building resilience to promote peace, security, and sustainable

development. To achieve its purpose, IPI employs a mix of policy

research, strategic analysis, publishing, and convening. With staff

from around the world and a broad range of academic fields, IPI has

offices facing United Nations headquarters in New York and offices in

Vienna and Manama.

777 United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017-3521, USA

TEL +1-212-687-4300 FAX +1-212-983-8246

Freyung 3, 1010 Vienna, Austria

TEL +43-1-533-8881 FAX +43-1-533-8881-11

52-52 Harbour House, Bahrain Financial Harbour

P.O. Box 1467, Manama, Bahrain

www.ipinst.org