providing proofs of past data possession in cloud forensics
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Providing Proofs of Past Data Possession in Cloud Forensics Shams Zawoad, Ragib HasanSECuRE and Trustworthy computing (SECRET) LabUniversity of Alabama at Birmingham
04/08/2023
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Problem Statement : A Motivating Story
Bob
Investigator
XYZ Corporation
Cloud VM/Storage
Did Bob have this file?
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What is Digital Forensics and Cloud Forensics?
Identificatio
n
Incident Identificatio
nEvidence
Identification
Collection
Organization
Examination
Analysis
Presentation
• Applying digital forensics procedures in cloud.
• A subset of Network forensics [Ruan et al.]
Digital Forensics
Cloud Forensics
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Cloud Forensics vs Traditional Digital Forensics
• Physical access to computing resources
• No need to depend on third party
• Single user system
• Tools are available
• No physical access
• Need to depend on CSP
• Multi-tenant system
• No proven available tool
Traditional Cloud
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What is Past Data Possession?
If a file ‘F’ was possessed by a user ‘U’, then Past Data Possession states that
U possessed F at a given past time
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Why Is It Challenging to Provide the Past Data Possession?
Reduced Control over Clouds
Multi-tenancyChain of Custody
Presentation
NetworkServers
OSData
Application
Access Control
NetworkServers
OSData
Application
Access Control
NetworkServers
OSData
Application
Access Control
SaaS PaaS IaaSCustomers have controlCustomers do not have control
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In the Threat Model, Bob, Investigator, and the Cloud can be Malicious
User can delete records or present fake records
Investigator can plant invalid evidence
CSP can provide false past data possession or deny hosting any evidence
Every body can collude with each other
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Hence, The Possible Attacks can be:
Denial of possession
False presenceEvidence contamination
Repudiation by CSPRepudiation by User
Privacy Violation
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What Can be the Solution?
Proposing Proof of Past Data Possession (PPDP)
• PPDP attests that a User U possessed a File F at a given past time.
• An Auditor can use PPDP to check the Past Data Possession.
• File can be deleted but PPDP can still preserve the proof of data possession.
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PPDP Provides:
I1: Adversaries cannot remove any evidence.I2: Adversaries cannot plant any invalid evidence.I3: Adversaries cannot change any existing evidence.
I4: CSP cannot deny hosting any evidence.I5: CSP cannot repudiate any previously published proof.
Integrity
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PPDP Provides:
Confidentiality
C1: From the proof adversaries cannot recover the original file.
C2: From the proof adversaries cannot learn about the version history of file.
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Components of PPDP
File
Proof of File
P
Accumulator
Signed Accumulator,
PPDP
• Private, stored in Cloud
• Private, Stored in Cloud
• Private, Stored in Cloud
• Public, Available through RSS
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Proof of Past Data Possession (PPDP)
User
Proof Storage
CSP
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Bloom Filter as an AccumulatorA probabilistic data structure to check whether an element is a member of a set or not. • Stores the membership information in a bit
array • Space efficient representation.• Performance of element insertion and
membership checking is good.• False positive probability is not zero.
Is used in Google Chrome to maintain Black-list of malicious URLs.
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Verification of Past Data PossessionPPDPu = <H(DSu),
SPkc(DSu)>
Document
Exists?No
Accepts
Yes
Rejects
Bit positions
Signature Valid?
NoReject
sYes
DSu
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Investigator/ Auditor can query in two ways:
How to Identify the Generation Time of Evidence?
• A time range of evidence generation.
• Exact date of evidence generation.
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Security Analysis w.r.t. Collusion Model
CUI
¬CUI
C¬UI
CU¬I
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Security Analysis w.r.t. Collusion Model
C¬U ¬ I
¬CU ¬ I
¬C¬UI
¬C¬U¬I
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Security Analysis
Non repudiation by CSP : Proof is signedPreservation of user’s privacy: One-way HashingNon repudiation by User: Advanced version of PPDP, each evidence is signed
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Proof-of-Concept Implementation
FTP Server on Amazon EC2 Micro Instance.
Client Machine: Intel Core-i5-24305 CPU @ 2.40 GHz processor and 8GB RAM.
Bloom filter : 0.01 % False Positive Probability for 1000 elements.
RSA (1024 bit) and SHA 1 (160 bit)
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Evaluation of Our Prototype% Overhead associated with time needed to insert the PPDP
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Evaluation of Our PrototypeAverage time required to find true negative match
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Evaluation of Our PrototypeAverage time required to find a true positive match
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Applications of PPDP
CSP can preserve the proof without storing the data itself.
Storage overhead for CSP but can earn money by Forensic-as-service.
Make the Cloud more Auditable which in turn makesCloud more Regulatory Compliant.
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Conclusion
Future work : Implement the scheme in private cloud, later collaborate with a commercial CSP.
• Introduced the notion of a Proof of Past Data Possession (PPDP) in the context of digital forensics.
• Proposed an efficient and secured cryptographic scheme for creating a PPDP.
• Evaluated the proposed PPDP scheme using a commercial cloud vendor.
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Thank YouQ & A
04/08/2023