psso journal (1)

University of California, Los Angeles

Political Science Student Organization

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Undergraduate Review

UCLA

Volume 16 ~ Spring 2016

Table of Contents

Contributors 3

In Bad Faith: China’s Words and Actions in the South China Sea by Adrienne Ou

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The Development of U.S.-Cuba Relations: A Bureaucratic Approach by Jesus R. Medina- Garcia

15

The Unstable Isotope: Why North Korea Went Nuclear by Taylor Anthony Freitas

25

Dusting off the Blue Helmets: Brazil’s Return to Peacekeeping Operations by Arthur Sanders Montandon

36

The Response of Foreign Regional Equity Indexes to U.S. Travel Alerts and Warnings by Casey Leonard

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Nuclear Weapons and Pakistani Identity by James Jordan

59

Private Military Firms: Security for Sale by Maria Sanchez

71

Consequences of Iraqi-De-Baathification by Cherish Marie Zinn

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The National Security Dilemma: Democrats v. Republicans by Tomas Arriaga

92

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Contributors

Lead Editors: Tomas Arriaga Rebeca Flores Mona Mosavi Cherish Zinn

Editorial Staff: Omar Corona Steve Jaramillo Alexis Lim Alex Rodriguez Estefani Rodriguez Maria Sanchez

We would like to include a special thank you to the following supporters:

• Professor Jeffrey Lewis- Political Science Department Chair

• Mr. James Bondurant & Ms. Kathy Escobedo-Department Undergraduate Advisors

• All of the Professors that have guided our students in their amazing achievements resulting in this journal.

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In Bad Faith: China’s Words and Actions in the South China Sea

by Adrienne Ou

Adrienne Ou is a fourth-year political science major concentrating in international relations and minoring in classics. When she is not trying to research, write, and publish more to kickstart her career as an academic, she can be found on campus as president of Pi Sigma Alpha and chairing and competing for Model United Nations.

I. Introduction One of the largest geopolitical concerns facing the nations of East Asia is the legal and historical debate regarding the South China Sea. Six nations lay claim to various parts of the enclosed waters: People’s Republic of China (PRC), Republic of China (ROC, henceforth referred to as Taiwan), Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei. China’s claim is the largest, encompassing four main archipelagic groups of islands: the Spratlys (Nansha), Paracels (Xisha), Pratas (Dongsha), and Macclesfield Bank (Zongsha), with the so-called “nine-dash line.” This has caused 1

much discontent with its rival claimants, leading to military skirmishes and a pending China-Philippines international arbitration under Annex VII of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). However, the corpus of research 2

has concluded that any multilateral arbitration willingly undertaken, most likely with the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), is unlikely given China’s “strategic ambiguity” towards the issue and the dearth of legal evidence that supports its claim. This paper seeks to illuminate the relation 3

between international law and the use of force in East Asian relations by evaluating the strength of China’s legal claim to the sea and comparing it to the tactics utilized in their attempt to establish control over the area. Through a careful examination of both treaty and customary law, I show that China’s legal claim over the area is weak, thereby leading to its salami-slicing tactics in the South China Sea. The first issue is that China has never fully explained the nature of its claims over the sea. As Dupuy and Dupuy note, China’s claims over the area went unexplained until 1998 when it passed its China’s Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Act. Such legislation contained the first mention of historic

rights as a basis for its claims. The only other legal clarification came in 2009 when it submitted a note verbale to the UN secretary-general claiming “indisputable sovereignty” over the islands in the South China Seas and “adjacent waters”. Blood-4

Patterson has noted that the lack of mention until 1998 can be rooted to the Marxist ideology that China touted until its opening, in which China first repudiated “bourgeois international law,” especially considering that the initial eleven-dash map was drawn by Kuomingtang (KMT) officials. The first problem is that China 5

has not continually espoused its claims. The second problem is that historic rights as a legal concept is ill defined. None of the three UNCLOS treaties address the concept, and the third, the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (LOS Convention), mentions it briefly without fully defining the regime. Since 6

explanation from the Chinese government is not forthcoming, Chinese legal scholars have attempted to fulfill the vacuum. Gao and Jia root their analysis in customary law, in which China has exercised continual and effective sovereignty over the area since the Ming dynasty in the fifteenth century. They argue that the sporadic explorations conducted by Zheng He, use of the Spratlys by Chinese fishermen for rest, and the 1951 San Francisco Treaty that forced Japan to renounce its imperial possessions created a legal precedent for a choate title based on historic rights. Hence, 7

there are two ways to interpret the nine-dash line. The first way is to use UNCLOS, in which treaty law is used to determine the maritime boundaries surrounding the islands once legal title of the Spratlys and Paracels have been finally determined. However, that way would require the dispute over island and maritime feature ownership to be decided prior to ITLOS arbitration. The second way is for a tribunal, probably the International Court of Justice (ICJ), to determine the status of the islands and the maritime boundaries using a regime of customary law.

II. Treaty Law Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) codifies the sources of international law. The three primary sources of international law are treaties, customary law, and general principles of law. Judicial decisions and qualified juridical writings are secondary sources of international law. 8

Under the first source of law, China’s claim can be determined under UNCLOS, a comprehensive treaty that China is a party to. It details the rights of states with regards to territorial and res communis waters. Coastal states have possession of waters

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extending from their coasts 12 nm outward. Aside from these territorial waters, additional economic and research rights are granted if a state has a contiguous zone, a continental shelf, or an exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The most relevant concept for China is the EEZ, as an EEZ surrounding a land territory can extend up to 200 nm outwards without a continental shelf, or 350 nm with a continental shelf. China’s claim can be interpreted to 9

mean that it claims all island features within the sea, and the EEZs generated extend to the parameters of the nine-dash line. However, the nature of its claims run into several legal problems. First, the 2009 note verbale does not utilize any of the language contained in UNCLOS. It references “relevant waters” and “adjacent waters,” which are terms not found in any of the UNCLOS treaties. This 10

makes aligning the note verbale with the UNCLOS regime difficult. Second, Article 121 of UNCLOS determines that not all maritime features are capable of generating a full 200 nm EEZ; only islands, which are capable of sustaining human habitation and economic life, can generate an EEZ. A maritime feature like the Scarborough Shoal can only generate a 12 nm territorial sea. This 11

has been supported by ICJ cases like the 2001 arbitration between Qatar and Bahrain, in which the ICJ noted that state practice has evolved to not permit low-tide elevations to be annexed to islands to further an EEZ. Such feature was furthered by the 2012 case between Nicaragua and Colombia, in which the ICJ firmly prohibited the extension of EEZs using low-tide elevations. 12

Given that several of these maritime features do not qualify as islands, the maritime boundaries of the nine-dash line are not in alignment with UNCLOS, and if China were to submit to ITLOS Annex VII ad hoc arbitration like the Philippines wants, it would have to severely modify its claim to bring it in line with the terms of the treaty. However, China need not rely on the UNCLOS regime under one condition: if it can use customary law to supplant the treaty.

III. Customary Law Customary law has evolved through the centuries as countries created ad hoc tribunals, and later, the ICJ, to deal with interstate matters. These creations have led to the creation of a corpus of law that evolves with and amends treaty law. However, in this case, customary law is only applicable if it predates UNCLOS or has served to clarify the treaty regime. The 13

foundation of the law of the seas is not friendly to China’s concept of a South China Seas that is undeniably theirs. The famous legal

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writer Hugo Grotius established the basis of freedom of the seas in the seventeenth century with the Mare Liberum, which eventually became the orthodox position of nations regarding law of the sea. It was originally meant to deal with Spanish and Portuguese conquests of the New World and the disagreements that subsequently ensued, so China did not partake in this as isolationist as it was at the time. However, exclusion does not 14

equate to applicability so the bounds of international law apply to all nations of this planet regardless of whether they agree or not.

Under a historic waters claim, all land and maritime boundary enclosed within the nine-dash line is Chinese territory. There are two main issues with China’s claim under this regime: the validity of the nine-dash map as evidence, and the nature of historic rights. The nine-dash line map cannot constitute legal evidence. In the 1986 border arbitration between Burkina Faso and Mali, the ICJ refuted cartographic title by saying that maps “constitute information which varies in accuracy from case to case … they cannot constitute a territorial title.” The only exception to 15

this case is if the map in question is attached to an official text, such as a treaty. Since the nine-dash map is a unilateral statement by China, this exception does not apply.

Buttressing this decision is the Kasikili/Sedudu judgment, in which the ICJ ruled that contradicting maps could not be used as legal evidence in the case. Given the variety of maps with differing information regarding the ownership of the South China Sea since the map was first drawn in December 1946, maps would have little evidentiary value in any ICJ tribunal. This is compounded by the fact that China added a tenth dash in October 2010 to include the southern half of Taiwan. Hence, It is hard to admit a map as 16

evidence of legal title or take the historic claim seriously if the government changes the extent of the title sixty years later. The Kasikili/Sedudu judgment also produced Judge Oda’s separate opinion, in which he ruled that a map used in support of a territorial claim must be made with “the clear indication of a government’s intention.” Since the Chinese government has yet 17

to issue an explanation of the legal reasoning behind the nine-dash map and scholars are divided on its meaning, it suffices to say that China has not fulfilled this criterion. Furthermore, the map is not impartial, which reduces its usability as evidence. The Beagle Channel Arbitration set the precedent by noting that partial maps should be used as exceptions, not norms. Given that the map originated with the ROC’s Land and Water Maps Inspection Committee, it is in no way impartial. On a more technical note, 18

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the map is also vague in its specifications: there is no way to calculate the exact area that China claims, nor any way to determine the coordinates that make up the edge of the nine-dash claim. In the landmark Island of Palmas case that set the rules of acquisition of island territory, the arbitrator Max Huber noted that a map’s admissibility rests on its technical quality and the impartial nature of its origins, which the Chinese map clearly lacks. 19

There is one last argument that China uses in regards to maps: acquiescence and estoppel. In the Temple of Prear Vihear case, Thailand was said to have acquiesced to Cambodian sovereignty over the historic temple over two factors. The first was that the Thai (then Siam) president visited the temple when the French flag flew over the temple in December 1906, when Cambodia was the French colony of Indo-China. Siam did not protest this action. The second was that France published a map showing Prear Vihear within its territory and Siam failed to protest those actions as well. The ICJ concluded that Thailand, by failure to protest these actions, had acquiesced to Cambodian sovereignty and thus was estopped from lodging a claim for Prear Vihear. 20

Chinese legal scholars use this case to argue that the other claimants had not protested the publication of the map in 1946 until 1998, when the map resurfaced in the public consciousness. However, it is difficult to protest an action that the Communist government failed to publicize due to its KMT origins, as discussed above. This is compounded with the fact that post-World War II East Asia was riffed with conflict as former colonies engaged in the struggle for independence from their European imperial powers and subsequently consumed with the process of building new nations. It is hard to presume that the would-be 21

successful revolutionaries would have the time to protest a map while simultaneously trying to fight another army before they even gained independence.

In addition, there are qualifications to the use of acquiescence to estop a state from lodging a claim. It is only accepted following a prolonged period of passivity without complaints as the state effectively controls and administers the territory. In the 2008 arbitration between Malaysia and Singapore, Malaysia argued that it had sovereignty over the Pedra Branca maritime features since its fishermen had used the islands since “time immemorial.” Similarities of the Malaysian claim to the Chinese claim notwithstanding, Singapore rebutted by stating that it had administered the islands since 1850, when Singapore’s

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colonial power, Great Britain, built a lighthouse on the island. The ICJ ruled that Singapore had acquired the islands by governance à titre de souverain. Although none of the maritime features have a 22

state effectively controlling them à titre de souverain, states have been quick to protest China’s actions since 1998. These complaints are not restricted to those made by rival claimants either; in 2009, Indonesia questioned the nine-dash map and the ability for rocks to generate EEZs. 23

The second aspect of relevant customary law is the concept of historic rights. As Zou explains, there is no definition of historic rights in any case or treaty. However, most scholars from both sides of the debate use Yehuda Z. Blum’s definition from the Encyclopaedia of Public International Law and define historic rights as: “the possession by a State, over certain land or maritime areas, of rights that would not normally accrue to it under the general rules of international law, such rights having been acquired by that State through a process of historic consolidation.” 24

Historic rights are not to be confused with historic waters. According to Bernard, a historic rights claim has three differences from a historic waters claim: 1) historic waters constitute a title of full sovereignty, whereas historic rights do not, 2) historic rights claims are not exclusive, and 3) historic rights claims are specific regarding the nature of the claim, i.e. a historic right to fishing activities or a historic right to the fishery resources in a certain area. This process of acquiring title over historic waters consists 25

of three parts: 1) the state must exercise authority over the area, 2) this authority must persist through time, and 3) other states must acquiesce to this claim. However, Bernard notes that any historic 26

claims cannot supersede the UNCLOS regime, as the ICJ has not set a precedent of supporting any historic rights arguments that compete with UNCLOS. Moreover, an EEZ does not surmount to a claim of territorial waters: “It is a specific legal regime whereby coastal States have sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the natural resources in the body of water and subsoil up to 200 nm from the shore and where other States have certain rights and freedoms as provided for in the LOS Convention.” In fact, the 27

ICJ has used the equidistance principle and the equity principle far more frequently in delimiting maritime boundaries, so much that equidistance has supplanted historic rights to become the norm. 28

He concludes that historic fishing rights that can affect the boundary of EEZs can be taken into consideration under limited conditions: 1) per the agreement of the state to whom the EEZ belongs, and, 2) if the equidistance principle results in catastrophic

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socioeconomic consequences for a community that depends on the fishery resources, known as the Gulf of Maine exception. Seeing 29

as China’s claim extends almost to the territorial seas of all its rival claimants, there is no question as to why the rival claimants have made claims of their own and why they vociferously protest. However, as Bernard also explains, neither EEZs nor historic rights claims are exclusive, so the resources of the South China Sea can be equitably shared given the involved parties’ willingness to create a joint development regime via multilateral cooperation and agreement.

It is clear that the “indisputable sovereignty” that China claims in its note verbale, amounts to nothing more than a non-exclusive historic rights regime—mostly with regards to fishing and other economic activity. Neither UNCLOS nor the corpus of customary law can support China’s claims, leading Frankx and Benatar to conclude: “Maintaining a unilateral claim over an extended period of time without due consideration for the rights of other interested parties is tantamount to imposing a fait accompli. This plainly flies in the face of international law, which prevents the strong states from claiming their ‘lion’s share’ to the detriment of their weaker neighbours.” At the 2010 ASEAN Regional 30

Forum, Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi plainly stated: “China is a big country and other countries are small countries and that is just a fact.” That attitude epitomizes China’s realist tactics in the 31

South China Seas in the wake of the weakness of its legal claims.

IV. The Weakness of Words China’s tactics are rooted in its geopolitical insecurity. As

Xue notes, China suffered many national humiliations during the nineteenth and twentieth century, most of which came from the sea. History aside, China also is a coastal state that has overlapping boundaries along its coast and within 400 nm of its coast, thereby creating a disadvantage under the UNCLOS regime. Returning to 32

the concept of EEZs and their potential ability for China to control the sea, they are not the justification for excluding innocent passage. Exclusive economic zones are just that. Coastal states do not have complete sovereignty over the area, just sovereign rights. As Odom notes, an EEZ is not “exclusive security zone or an exclusive military zone.” Also, as previously mentioned, freedom 33

of the sea is a cornerstone of maritime law, as Grotius’ treatise still stands. UNCLOS and customary law both reaffirm this right.

However, China would like to see this changed. The nine-dash line, according to China’s military actions over the area that it

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would like to control, marks the boundaries of China’s territorial waters. In 2001, a US Navy EP-3 plane and a PLA Navy F-8 fighter jet collided in the South China Sea. China declared it a violation of international law, despite the fact that the freedom of the seas allows for innocent passage by all ships and planes in non-territorial waters, including those of foreign militaries. March 34

2009 also bore witness to another incident in which five Chinese vessels surrounded the USNS Impeccable. The situation was so dangerous that it probably would have caused a collision were it not for the emergency maneuver by the Impeccable. After harassing the Impeccable, China again declared it a violation of international law. 35

The United States has not been alone in experiencing Chinese harassment. In the summer of 2011, a Chinese vessel cut the equipment of a commercial survey ship from Vietnam. To be 36

fair, China and Vietnam have a history of antagonism over the South China Seas and enclosed islands that include races for islands, occupation of maritime features, and maritime battles that are all excluded from the parameters of international law. In 1974, the Chinese took the Crescent group of the Paracels by force from South Vietnam. In 1990, a race for island and maritime feature occupation between China and Vietnam led to casualties in a battle over Johnson Reef. However, past wrongs do not make a right 37

and China did indeed violate freedom of passage in this instance. If China is seeking to establish a new norm, it is not doing

so well. China has conducted military operations in the EEZs of other nations, including those of Japan and the Philippines. They took place in the equivalent of where the 2001 EP-3 collision and 2009 Impeccable standoff took place in China’s waters. This is 38

less about international law than it is about China trying to project a sphere of influence over the region, albeit in a poor manner as its actions are unsanctioned by all principles of equity and undermine the entirety of international law.

V. Conclusion In the 1987 cult classic film Princess Bride, Inigo

Montoya tells Vizzini after he keeps using the word “inconceivable” repeatedly: “You keep using that word. I do not think it means what you think it means.” Likewise, China uses 39

“international law” without concern for its actual meaning. Its claims are ambiguously defined at best, outright lies at worst. The nine-dash line has barely any legal foundation to stand upon, whether it is treaty law or customary law. UNCLOS, the primary

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foundation of maritime law gives no standing to China’s “historic claims” giving “absolute sovereignty” over the South China Seas. Moreover, customary law, the corpus of law that is most closely related to the foundation of China’s claims, also fails to support the country’s claims. Moreover, the country claims its legal rights has been violated when other countries exercise their right of innocent passage through the South China Sea and China’s EEZ while simultaneously doing the same action to its neighbors. China clearly does not respect maritime law in many respects for the simple fact that it is disadvantaged by the present regime of international law. However, the fact remains that there are 195 states in the world not including Taiwan, most of who do fairly well in upholding international law. Should China continue walking down this path, it will find itself increasingly isolated in an age of global supply chains and multilateral discourse.

Robert Beckman. “The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Maritime 1

Disputes in the South China Sea,” The American Journal of International Law 107.1 (2013): 142-163. See page 153.

N. Elias Blood-Patterson. “Smoke on the Water: The Role of International 2

Agreements in the Philippine-Chinese Dispute Over the South China Sea,” New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 46.1207 (2014): 1207-1248. See page 1209.

Beckman. See page 156.3

Florian Dupuy and Pierre-Marie Dupuy. “A Legal Analysis of China’s Historic 4

Rights Claim in the South China Sea,” The American Journal of International Law 107.1 (2013): 124-141. See pages 129-130.

Blood-Patterson. See page 1224, note 65.5

Zou Keyuan. “Historic Rights and Joint Development.” Paper presented at the 6

International Conference on “Recent Development of the South China Sea Dispute and Prospects of Joint Development Regime,” Haikou, China, 6-7 December 2012. See page 2. Gao Zhiguo and Jia Bing Bing. “The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: 7

History, Status, and Implications,” The American Journal of International Law 107.1 (2013): 98-124. See pages 100-103. See also: Shen Jianming. “China’s Sovereignty Over the South China Sea Islands: A Historical Perspective,” Chinese Journal of International Law 1.1 (2002): 94-157.

Statute of the International Court of Justice, San Francisco, 26 June 1945. United 8

Nations.

Zou Keyuan. “The Chinese Traditional Maritime Boundary Line in the South 9

China Sea and its Legal Consequence for the Resolution of the Dispute over the Spratly Islands,” International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 14.1 (1999): 27-55. See page 47.

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Erik Frankx and Marco Benatar. “Dots and Lines in the South China Sea: 10

Insights from the Law of Map Evidence,” Asian Journal of International Law 2.1 (2012): 89-118. See page 107.

Ibid. See page 101.11

Beckman. See page 150. Also see Maritime Delimitation and Territorial 12

Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain, supra note 51; Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), 2012 ICJ Rep. 1, para. 140.

Blood-Patterson. See page 1211.13

Blood-Patterson. See pages 1212-1215.14

Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), 1986 ICJ Rep. 554 at 582, 15

para. 54. Frankx and Benatar. See pages 90-91 for origin of nine-dash map. See page 106 16

for ten-dash map change.

Kasikili/Sedudu Island, supra note 58, Separate Opinion of Judge Oda at 17

1133-1134, para. 40.

Frankx and Benatar. See page 106 for history of nine-dash map. See pages 18

107-108 for map neutrality. See also Beagle Channel Arbitration (Argentina v. Chile), Decision of 18 February 1977, 2006 XXI Reports of International Arbitral Awards 53 at 167, para. 142.


Summary of the Summary of the Judgment of 15 June 1962. International Court 20

of Justice. Temple of Prear Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), 1962 ICJ Reports 6 at 23.

Alice Lyman Miller and Richard Wich. “Decolonization, Nationalism, and 21

Revolution.” In Becoming Asia: Change and Continuity in Asian International Relations Since World War II, 82-102. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011.

Pedra Branca (Malaysia v. Singapore), 2008 ICJ Rep. 2, para. 37-38.22

Frankx and Benatar. See page 102.23

Yehuda Z. Blum. “Historic Rights.” In Encyclopaedia of Public International 24

Law, Installment 7, ed. Rudolf Bernhardt, 120. Amsterdam: North- Holland Publishing Company, 1984.

Leonardo Bernard. “The Effect of Historic Fishing Rights in Maritime 25

Boundaries Delimitation.” Presented at the Law of the Sea Institute, UC Berkeley-Korea Institute of Ocean Science and Technology Conference, Seoul, Republic of Korea, 21-24 May 2012. See pages 4-5.

UN Doc. A/CN.4/143, supra note 4, at 13.26

Bernard. See page 7.27


Ibid. See pages 18-19.29

Frankx and Benatar. See page 115.30

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“The dragon’s new teeth.” The Economist, 7 April 2012.31

Xue Guifang. “China and the Law of the Sea: An Update.” US Naval War 32

College International Law Studies 84.1 (2008): 97-110. See page 98.

Jonathan G. Odom. “A China in the Bull Shop? Comparing the Rhetoric of a 33

Rising China with the Reality of the International Law of the Sea,” Ocean and Coastal Law Journal 17.2 (2012): 201-251. See page 210.


Odom. See pages 229-230.35


Stein Tønnesson. “International Law in the South China Sea: Does it Drive or 37

Help Resolve International Conflict?” Presented at the Third International Workshop: “The South China Sea: Cooperation for Regional Security and Development,” Hanoi, Vietnam, 4-5 November 2011.

Odom. See page 231.38

The Princess Bride. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, 1987.: Lt. Com. 39

Robert T. Kline. “The Pen and the Sword: The People’s Republic of China’s Efforts to Redefine the Exclusive Economic Zone through Maritime Lawfare and Military Enforcement,” Military Law Journal 216 (2013): 122-169.

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Development of U.S.-Cuba Relations: A Bureaucratic Approach

By Jesus Roberto Medina-Garcia

Jesus Roberto Medina-Garcia is a 4th year undergraduate student at UCLA majoring in Political Science with a concentration in American Politics. He is a student research assistant at the UCLA School of Law Department of External Affairs, a law fellow for the UCLA School of Law - Law Fellows Program, a representative for California Common Cause and will be a J.D. Candidate beginning in Fall 2016. He hopes to one day work in criminal law and prosecution.

Introduction In a December 17, 2014 statement on Cuban policy changes, during which the normalization of U.S.-Cuba relations were formally declared, President Barack Obama announced that “America [has chosen] to cut loose the shackles of the past so as to reach for a better future…” If by America, Obama referred to a 1

collection of multiple actors with often conflicting interests rather than a single, unitary entity, then yes, America chose to remove the shackles of the tumultuous history of U.S.-Cuba relations. The traditional approach to international politics, as Allison and Halerin note, depends on the flawed assumption that events in international politics consist of the acts of rational unified national governments acting as a single, unitary actor. To address this 2

simplification, Allison and Halperin offer an alternative approach to explain, predict, and plan the behavior of governments engaged in international relations. Their approach, the Bureaucratic Politics Model, challenges the assumption that governments act as rational, unitary actors when engaged in international relations, and instead proposes that the actions of a government in international relations are the result of a constant bargaining process between individuals within a government. This study will apply the Bureaucratic 3

Model to explain the development of U.S. policies and America’s relationship with Cuba, beginning with the Cuban embargo and ending with Obama’s declaration of normalization of relations. By assessing the dynamics of changing bureaucratic politics throughout this period, I argue that within the context of international and domestic interests, Obama was successful in normalizing relations with Cuba as result of the gradual decentralization of executive power in foreign policy, the shifting

influence of actors in the bureaucracy, and the changing interests of existing actors.

Brief History of Containment and the Lead-up to the Cuban Embargo After a series of crises that increased the U.S. perception of an expansionist and communist Soviet Union, the U.S. implemented the policy of containment towards their global foe, aimed at stopping their territorial and ideological expansion. In response to the last of these crises, during which the Greek government was in threat of being overthrown by a communist guerrilla movement, President Harry Truman delivered the Truman Doctrine in 1947. In his doctrine, Truman declared that “It must be the policy of the U.S. to support free peoples to oppose attempted subjugations by armed minorities” and that “Greece was part of a struggle between the forces of freedom and totalitarianism.” The 4

aims of the containment policy were later elaborated through the Marshall Plan, which set the logistics for how European countries were to receive American aid. Although Truman’s rhetoric was 5

globalist and idealist, the Truman administration did not initially intend for the policy to apply in every part of the world, but rather only to those nations that were in the interest of the United States to protect. Nevertheless, the containment policy guided U.S.-6

Soviet relations throughout much of the Cold War. It was against this backdrop of anti-communist sentiment that U.S. relations with Cuba began to deteriorate. Prior to Fidel Castro’s socialist rule over Cuba, the U.S. was able to exert great influence in the island, since America controlled a vast portion of the Cuban sugar industry and former Cuban President Batista was aligned with U.S. interests. However, as the Castro-led insurgency 7

gained momentum, the U.S. decided to no longer support Batista and suspend arm shipments to his government, leading to his flee, which allowed Castro to take control of the island. Initially, the U.S. government, under the leadership of President Eisenhower, recognized the Castro regime. However, anti-Castro sentiment began to surface in Washington as Castro and his revolutionary government announced they would not hold elections, executed former officials of the Batista regime, and allowed the Communist Party to roam freely. In response to these external events, the 8

Bureaucratic model begins to take shape, as various actors, though few initially, began to influence U.S. policy towards the Castro regime. Bureaucratic politics, though not as present during

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Eisenhower’s tenure in contrast to Obama’s, in part led to the enactment of the trade embargo against Cuba.

Bureaucratic Politics in the Enactment of the Cuban Embargo The Bureaucratic Model can only partly explain the enactment of the Cuban Embargo primarily because the imperial presidency, a passive Congress, and a minimally influential public opinion gave Eisenhower greater control of foreign policy. Nevertheless, the model sheds light on the gradual increase of actors influencing U.S. foreign policy. The first notable actor in influencing U.S. policy towards Cuba in the days leading up to the embargo was former Vice President Richard Nixon. Nixon, who met with Castro in 1959 to discuss U.S.-Cuba relations, famously wrote that after concluding that the Cuban president was either naïve or strictly communist, “[He] became a leading advocate for efforts to overthrow Castro.” Nixon’s relationship with President 9

Eisenhower at the time was particularly noteworthy, considering that Eisenhower operated a “formalistic” advisory system, in which he made use of staff and delegation of authority. Under the 10

assumption that Nixon was a trusted aid and that he had an interest in serving the President, the advice he would give to Eisenhower reasonably affected the policy to be implemented towards Castro. Other actors would soon become involved. As Patrick Haney points out, Castro’s subsequent agrarian reforms brought U.S. property owners into the fold as their profits sharply declined. In 11

response, these new actors voiced their newly formed economic hardships to the Eisenhower administration. As new actors begin 12

to become affected by external events in international relations, we begin to see an enlargement of the bureaucracy affecting the course of U.S. foreign policy towards Cuba. A notable non-actor, or minimal at best, during the lead-up to the embargo was Congress. As Haley points out, the Eisenhower administration relied on the National Security Council for advice while bypassing the legislative branch. Although 13

Congress did pass a bill which proposed to eliminate aid to Cuba, Eisenhower was nevertheless already implementing policy prior to any word from Congress. Eisenhower, without congressional 14

approval, authorized the covert operations to arm rebels, the sabotage of Cuban sugar production, the prohibition to Cuban-based U.S. refineries from processing crude Soviet oil, the implementation of a quota on Cuban sugar, and finally, the imposition of the economic embargo with Cuba in October 19, 1960. Castro responded by nationalizing and confiscating U.S. 15

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oil refineries and expelling U.S. diplomats from the island, convincingly cutting any remaining ties with the U.S. 16

Since the Cuban American voting bloc which required appeasement had not yet immigrated from Cuba, public opinion kept limited influence during the Eisenhower era. Nevertheless, what is important here in relation to the bureaucratic model is that Eisenhower, though likely influenced by Nixon, U.S. business owners, and even some congressional action, was able to act largely as a unitary actor, as Congress was permissive, and public opinion was not as influential as we will see later in this analysis. This undue influence of the executive branch on foreign policy aimed at Cuba drastically changed over the next fifty years, as the executive branch began to become subject to congressional and public influence as a result of the changing dynamics of the actors involved as well as the changing goals of U.S. policy as the Cold War came to an end.

Changing Dynamics of Bureaucratic Politics A. The Rise of Congress and the Cuban American Bloc During the span of the enactment of the embargo in 1960 until the normalization of relations in 2014, dynamics in the bureaucracy involved in U.S. relations with Cuba changed drastically as to allow Obama to successfully normalize relations. In particular, the gradual decentralization of executive power in Cuban-directed foreign policy in concurrence with the increasing influence of a more aggressive Congress, a more organized Cuban-American interest group, and a more influential Cuban American voting bloc led to the emergence of an expanded bureaucracy that began to control U.S.-Cuban policy. In their influential book, The Cuban Embargo: The Domestic Politics of an American Foreign Policy, Patrick Haney and Walt Vanderbush argue that the executive branch lost power in Cuban-directed policy, especially after the 1980s, as Congress gained power through the codification of the embargo into congressionally approved law in the form of the 1996 Helms-Burton Bill. After the passage of the bill, the 17

embargo could only be repealed formally through another congressional vote, effectively ending the precedence of sole executive actions in relation to the embargo and thus, granting Congress a voice that could no longer be bypassed. In addition, Haley and Vanderbush specifically point to the 1980s as the beginning of a sharp decline in executive influence because under the Reagan administration, the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF), a Cuban-American interest group that is

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widely regarded as being sponsored by Reagan to shift Congressional and public attitudes toward a hardline U.S.-Cuba policy, began to emerge as a powerful and influential instrument in directing foreign policy. The Reagan administration’s 18

sponsorship of CANF led to an increasing autonomy and influence of the group, which ironically, led to dispersion of power from the executive to the Congress, as other bureaucratic actors, namely U.S. agribusiness groups and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, began to mobilize in their opposition to CANF ideology. This ongoing debate operated in the form of lobbying efforts in Congress, effectively giving Congress more power in U.S.-Cuba policy. While I agree with Haley’s and Vanderbush’s assessment that Congress became an increasingly influential actor and that the President became a decreasingly influential actor within the bureaucratic model, I part company in their assessment of Cuban American influence that remained as “secondary”. 19

Haley and Vanderbush limit the scope of influence of Cuban Americans in U.S.-Cuba policy as secondary by arguing that since the embargo was becoming fragmented and decentralized, CANF’s hardline pro-embargo lobbying efforts could not significantly change the direction of an increasingly loose embargo. It is precisely Haley’s and Vanderbush’s narrow scope in clustering Cuban American influence into CANF that leads to their flawed reasoning, and even within the clustering of Cuban American influence, Haley and Vanderbush overlook the effect that CANF and their respective PAC, Free Cuba, had after the 1980s. In Trevor Rubenzer’s analysis of Cuban American interests, a significant correlation is found between campaign contributions by Free Cuba and the voting behavior of members of the House of Representatives in embargo related matters, effectively discrediting the classification of Cuban Americans as secondary actors.

Rubenzer analyzes two sets of votes in relation to the Cuban embargo. The first set is the 2004 and 2005 Davis amendments, which proposed barring federal funding to enforce the newly implemented travel restrictions by the George W. Bush administration. The second set is the 2004 and 2005 Rangel-led attempts to completely end the embargo. In that one year span, Rubenzer compares the differing voting behaviors of members of Congress in relation to the increased contributions by special interest groups, including the pro-embargo Free Cuba PAC, the anti-embargo U.S. agribusiness interest groups, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Rubenzer finds that the Cuban American

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lobby, in concert with the Free Cuba PAC, has been much more successful in influencing members of Congress to change their votes. This is despite offering less contributions than the U.S. agribusiness interests and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce because they were more cohesive in their desired policies and were not as dispersed as the latter groups. Within the context of the 20

bureaucratic politics model, Rubenzer’s findings are of great significance to this study, as Rubenzer effectively proves, though in a limited fashion, that during the George W. Bush tenure, the Cuban American lobby was still a dominant force in U.S. foreign policy. Not only was foreign policy influence granted to Congress through the rise of CANF and the implementation of the Helms-Burton bill as Haley and Vanderbush argue, but it was also granted to the Cuban American lobby. In this regard, it is important to note that the organizational interest of CANF and the Free Cuba PAC was Castro’s removal from power, and as such, their attempts at influencing members of Congress were accordingly shaped. Now that we have established that the number of bureaucratic actors and their respective influences were increasing, the question remains as to what events led to a change in attitudes and influences sufficient enough to allow Obama to normalize relations with Cuba.

B. The Bureaucracy during Obama’s Tenure The younger generation of Cuban Americans in Florida, in correlation to the decreasing anti-Castro sentiment among the Cuban American voting bloc, spurred a chain reaction within the bureaucracy to the extent that it allowed Obama to normalize relations with Cuba. As the new generation of Cuban Americans, who do not hold the same hardline anti-Castro sentiment of their predecessors, reached the voting age, influences in U.S. foreign policy began to change. CANF could no longer lobby Congress as effectively as it once did since the general Cuban American sentiment was changing. In a recent poll, 51% of Cuban Americans agreed with Obama’s decision to normalize relations with Cuba, as opposed to 40% that opposed. While it may be the 21

case that the Cuban American community was following the President, a recent Gallup poll may indicate otherwise. In 1997, 81% of the American public’s opinion of Cuba was unfavorable, but in 2014, before the normalization of relations, only 57% viewed Cuba unfavorably. Attitudes both within the American 22

community at large and the Cuban American community were changing, and as a result, CANF’s influence began to decrease, and in concert, members of Congress were no longer persuaded to

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change their votes. Similarly, Obama, who was not risking a loss in votes in the swing state of Florida given that he could no longer make a presidential run, was able to afford to alienate the hardline Cuban American community, though diminished, whom still had very strong anti-Castro sentiments. Another important factor in the analysis of changing attitudes is the overall change in the U.S. policy objectives in relation to Cuba. In a “two-level” game analysis, William LeoGrande argues that international security concerns, or level 1 issues, dominated the former part of the Cuban embargo while domestic concerns, or level 2 issues, dominated the latter part of the embargo. LeoGrande notes that Cuba’s link to Moscow in the 23

midst of the Cold War influenced U.S. policy by keeping our national security at the core of U.S. policy. After the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union collapsed, however, Cuba no longer presented a national security threat, and therefore U.S. policy changed to the promotion of democracy in the totalitarian regime. LeoGrande’s analysis is useful in the application of the 24

bureaucratic politics model because it further explains why the executive branch became decentralized and shows how other bureaucratic actors began to become involved. As long as Cuba presented a threat to the U.S. national security, the President was going to remain at the forefront of policy as the commander-in-chief. When Cuba no longer presented a threat however, more actors became involved, including Congress and CANF. LeoGrande further explains how both Clinton and George W. Bush, candidates from different parties, embraced the hardline Cuban American Florida bloc in order to secure wins in the historically swing state of Florida. It is clear that after the Cold 25

War, the executive no longer enjoyed the autonomy Eisenhower once had in foreign policy, as domestic interests began to become influential.

Outlook of U.S.-Cuba Relations Post-Obama Though Obama effectively began the normalization of

relations with Cuba, in analyzing the outlook of U.S.-Cuba relations, it is important to note that the embargo against Cuba is in the hands of Congress. After reviewing the literature indicating that the number of bureaucratic actors have significantly increased since the Eisenhower era, it remains to be seen how the next president will be able to affect trade restrictions now codified into congressional law. The 2016 elections are particularly interesting in relation to U.S.-Cuba policy because there are two candidates of

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Cuban American descent. These candidates, Republicans Marco Rubio and Ted Cruz, are part of the anti-Castro generation, and as such, it would be likely that the embargo would remain in place if not tightened, if either of these candidates were to reach the Oval Office. In contrast, on the other side of the spectrum, self-proclaimed Democratic Socialist Bernie Sanders is the likely presidential candidate that would seek to continue Obama’s normalization of relations. Nevertheless, regardless of what candidate wins the November election, perhaps the determinant set of elections are the next midterm elections, which will determine whether Congress remains Republican or if it shifts to the left. In addition, it remains to be seen whether CANF can remain influential, or whether the younger generation of Cuban Americans can ultimately replace the pro-embargo interest group. Also noteworthy, but likely to remain a non-actor by function of their judicial nature, the U.S. Supreme Court is now likely to lean left after the death of the far-right Justice Antonin Scalia. In the unlikely case, but still worthy of a mention, that the Supreme Court gets a chance to deliver an opinion in regards to U.S.-Cuba relations, the embargo may cease to exist. Nevertheless, regardless of what bureaucratic actors join and leave the game, their interactions and changing attitudes in response to external and internal events will continue to determine the course of U.S. foreign policy towards Cuba for years to come.

Conclusion In sum, the development of U.S.-Cuba relations since the

enactment of the Cuban embargo in 1960 up until the normalization of relations in 2014 has been determined by the change in composition of bureaucratic actors within the U.S. government. During Eisenhower’s tenure, U.S. foreign policy against Cuba largely remained at the hands of an imperial presidency that bypassed a permissive Congress. During this time, a few bureaucratic actors remained, but over the years, particularly after the 1980s, the once imperial presidency began to lose control of foreign policy as power became distributed. Reagan’s sponsorship of CANF, in his efforts to persuade Congress and the public to take a harder line against the Castro regime, would backfire for future presidencies, as the autonomy and influence that CANF would develop would in turn transfer foreign policy influence to an increasingly aggressive Congress. After the passage of the Helms-Burton Bill, which effectively codified the Cuban embargo into congressional law, the power of Congress in foreign

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policy began to develop a strong foundation. In addition, as the waves of Cuban American immigrants to Florida increased, the influence of the Cuban American voting bloc began to influence presidential hopefuls in their foreign policy platforms, including Clinton and George W. Bush. After Obama secured reelection, however, attitudes within the Cuban American community towards the Castro regime began to change, as the more progressive, younger generation did not hold the same anti-Castro sentiment as their predecessors. Further, American public opinion in general had changed their attitudes towards the island, as indicated by Gallup polls. Lastly, the shifting aims of foreign policy within the context of the Cold War also affected the direction of U.S.-Cuban relations, as protection from the national threat of a communist Cuba was no longer needed.

The analysis of U.S.-Cuba relations within the model of bureaucratic politics sheds light not only on the outlook of future relations with Cuba, but also on the direction of U.S. foreign policy throughout the world. Although Cuba is no longer a critically important state in which to keep oversight, the same bureaucratic politics model applied in this analysis should be applied in the context of the Middle East, where the U.S. faces its strongest threat to national security in the form of ISIS and other terrorist organizations. In understanding foreign policy and in the effort to implement successful policy, it is critical for the public, Congress, and the President to realize that different actors have different interests and as such, efforts by a group to persuade another group to implement a certain policy must be critically evaluated to avoid intelligence failures resulting from biases. Regardless of what actors come and go, the bureaucratic model successfully helps to explain the development of foreign policy, whether directed at Cuba, China, Russia, and perhaps most importantly in the face of today’s largest national security threat, the Middle East.

Barack Obama, “Statement by the President on Cuba Policy Changes,” The White 1

House Office of the Press Secretary, December 17, 2014.

Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm 2

and Some Policy Implications,” World Politics, Vol. 24, Supplement: Theory and Policy in International Relations. (Spring, 1972).

Ibid., 43.3

Harry Truman, “Transcript of Truman Doctrine (1947),” www.ourdocuments.gov.4

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“The Marshall Plan,” The George C. Marshall Foundation.5

Deborah W. Larson, The Origins of Containment,” (Princeton: Princeton 6

University Press, 1985) Print.

Patrick J. Haney & Walt Vanderbush, The Cuban Embargo: The Domestic 7

Politics of an American Foreign Policy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005), Kindle Edition. Pp. 204 Ibid., pp. 2108

Ibid., pp. 2169

Deborah W. Larson, 01/14/2016 Lecture10

Patrick J. Haney & Walt Vanderbush, pp.21611

Ibid., pp. 21612

Ibid., pp. 22913

Ibid., pp. 225-22814

Ibid., pp. 23515

Ibid., pp. 23516

Ibid., pp. 119217

Ibid., pp. 64918

Ibid., pp. 643-65019

Trevor Rubenzer, “Campaign Contributions and U.S. Foreign Policy Outcomes: 20

An Analysis of Cuban American Interests,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 55, No. 1 (2011). Pp. 105-116.

“Special Session: Polling Results on Cuban Americans’ Viewpoint on the Cuba 21

Opportunity,” Bendixen & Amandi International, March 2015.

“Cuba,” Gallup, accessed February 15, 2016, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1630/22

Cuba.aspx William LeoGrande, “From Havana to Miami: U.S. Cuba Policy as a Two-Level 23

Game,” Journal of Intramerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Spring 1998), pp. 67-86.

Ibid. 24

Ibid.25

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The Unstable Isotope: Why North Korea went Nuclear by Taylor Anthony Freitas

Taylor Freitas is a 3rd year undergraduate double majoring in Political Science, with a concentration in International Relations, and Russian Studies. He is a cadet in the Army ROTC program at UCLA, founding member of Scabbard and Blade Military Honor Society and former student leader at the University Catholic Center. He hopes to serve his country as a Military Intelligence Officer in the United States Army.

Introduction “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles,” Sun Tzu, The Art of War. If a country understands the motivations behind a rival state, they are better prepared to come up with a specific plan of action that yields greater success. In a world where states control nuclear power, only a minuscule margin of error exists when dealing with said nuclear power. Following this I ask, why did the rogue state of North Korea decide to acquire weapons of mass destruction? In order to determine the answer to this question and receive the insights it brings, the security, domestic, norms, and oppositional nationalist models of why states become nuclear powers will be applied to North Korean history.

History From 1950-1953, the Korean War greatly influenced the North’s fledgling regime. The war arose from the rising tensions between the communist north and democratic south over the 38th parallel. Neither side saw the other as legitimate, and major world powers aligned themselves based on ideology; the Soviet Union and China with the northern regime and the United States with the southern regime. The bloody conflict lasted for three years, officially resulting in an armistice and the observance of the 38th parallel border. Soon after, however, North Korea started their nuclear program. In 1956, a deal was made with the Soviet Union to start training North Korean scientists and engineers on the basics of a nuclear program. The beginning phase had now begun. Another treaty followed in 1959 that established the peaceful use of nuclear energy, but more importantly, it included a provision to build a nuclear research complex in Yongbyon, North Pyongan

Province. This came to fruition in the early 1960’s, with the construction completed by 1962. Specifically, a Soviet IRT-2000 nuclear research reactor was created and soon began the production of radioisotopes and the training of facility personnel. China held its first nuclear test in 1964, and shortly after, North Korean officials asked their ally for the secrets behind this powerful new technology. To the dismay of North Korea, China refused. From this point, relations between the two countries began to diminish and leader Kim II Sung of North Korea remained determined to acquire nuclear weapons even without the aid of their ally Mao Zedong. Other than early Soviet assistance, the North Korean nuclear program was maintained and developed largely independently.

As time passed, North Korea continued making progress towards attaining the bomb. Many developments such as factory expansion, beginning to understand the technique for plutonium extraction, and uranium mining facilities took place between the 1970’s and 80’s, catching global attention . Intriguingly, North 1

Korea signed the NPT in 1985, while in 1992 the Joint Declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was signed by both border states. The latter called for each side not to “test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons.” That same year North Korea also signed on to the IAEA, but on multiple occasions denied inspectors. This led to an appeal to the United Nations Security Council for a needed inspection, but upon hearing this, North Korea threatened to withdraw from the NPT. The United States then managed to arrange a deal, which resulted in the North remaining in the NPT in exchange for light water reactors, oil, and the assurance that the U.S. would not threaten or use its nuclear weapons against North Korea. Not long after, it was discovered that the regime bought centrifuge technology from a Pakistani scientist, which allowed them to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon. This was a clear violation of the previously signed treaties. Consequently, the U.S. responded by ending their shipment of oil, to which North Korea replied by reopening their nuclear power facilities and expelling all foreign inspectors.

After the turbulence of the 1990’s, North Korea completely withdrew from the NPT in 2003 and tested their first nuclear weapon in 2006. In the following years, the regime quickly broke and readily remade treaties regarding the abandonment of their nuclear program, but in spite of these, tested their second nuclear weapon in 2009 and third in 2013. A change in leadership

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resulted in less enthusiasm to entertain new agreements which stalled their nuclear program, and closed a route that had before been an option. This trend has continued into recent years and North Korea remains more belligerent than before, as they are closing in on acquiring a nuclear weapon that could reach mainland U.S.A. 2

Importance of Model Identification Once the specific reason behind North Korea’s decision to

go nuclear has been identified, policies can then be made to effectively end their nuclear regime. There are two ways to limit a nation’s nuclear aspirations: by targeting means of supply or the motivations behind their decision. Supply-Side policies consist of weakening the means of weapon production or necessary materials. Actions could include a freeze on parts required for centrifuges, reactors, or even the required elements themselves such as uranium. Nations can slow or even stop a country from going nuclear by minimizing or even halting the movement of these required materials. This method effectively stops a state from being nuclear for the time being, but at best, it is only a temporary solution. In order to eliminate the root of the issue, a nuclear aspiring nation must no longer want to acquire these weapons. Though not as easily understood as the previous method, persuading a country to stop pursuing their plans is a more effective long term goal, since the core dilemma would be solved. However, before this can even happen, the question of “why a state wants to go nuclear” must be established. This is where the use of models can be utilized. Theoretical in nature, these devices allow policymakers to identify and target a state’s reason for obtaining nuclear arms. Therefore, it is of utmost importance that the demand-side approach should be understood and utilized with a specific model to grant long term nuclear stability . 3

Security Model The first method that will be used to analyze why North

Korea chose to go nuclear will be the security model. This theory states that nations exist in an anarchic world where power, not rules, govern the actions of players. Most importantly, atomic armaments are what truly define strength in this system. Countries want to establish a clear defense from opponents by either allying with a state that has nuclear weapons or by creating their own. The nuclear umbrella afforded to ally states certainly aids friendly

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countries, but the main problem with this is that a state is never quite sure if their ally will defend them with a nuclear response if the need ever came. Since there are no rules in this system, it is foolish to expect another player to aid you if they aren’t getting much in return. Therefore, it would be wisest to build your own nuclear weapons and solely rely upon your own country. Additionally, George Shultz argues that in this system, “Proliferation begets proliferation.” What this means is that as one country acquires the nuclear weapon, states that have any security issues with this country will also develop a nuclear weapon in order to level the playing field. In a world where the most respected rule is a state’s own strength, allowing an enemy to have an atomic weapon which they can use against another country is unacceptable, and thus the cycle will continue . 4

Applying this model to North Korea yields fascinating results. Emerging from a war in which their opponent threatened the use of nuclear weapons, North Korea first relied on the nuclear umbrella of their ally, the Soviet Union, to shield them. In addition to President Truman’s moral reasoning, he also knew that the use of another American atomic bomb in Asia could escalate to something far worse now that there were multiple nuclear players. Because the war was only paused and not officially ended, North Korea remained on high alert. This prompted them to seek even greater security, which would only be afforded to them if they built their own atomic weapons. They received early assistance from the Soviets in building a reactor and in the training of key personnel, and even asked China for the shortcuts to unlocking the bomb . 5

North Korea’s constant policy fluctuations can be explained as a way for them to buy needed time to develop their nuclear weapons program in secret. Officials had to have known that they would be forbidden to acquire these weapons and that their international reputation would be severely damaged. Therefore, using duplicity to their advantage, the regime went along with non-proliferation when asked, but always continued along with their real objective, while regularly being caught breaking treaties. Also, a major turning point was when their ally the Soviet Union began its fall in the late 1980’s. Before this, security concerns had driven North Koreans to want the bomb, but now that their nuclear guardian would possibly no longer be able to provide the use of the Soviet nuclear umbrella, North Korea had to react fast. This feeling of powerlessness drove the regime to quicken the pace of nuclear production in secret. Today, the Democratic People’s Republic feels a greater sense of security afforded to them by their three

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nuclear weapons tests. Now that they have the potential for a nuclear attack they no longer see the need of playing around with the international community and signing treaties it does not intend to keep. North Korea now has a greater sense of national security thanks to these armaments, which has been their goal all along. Moreover, the United States was the main enemy that pushed the regime to wanting to acquire a nuclear weapon. This fits with the model as they now had a strong and clear enemy state on which to justify their need for atomic weapons. The U.S. also had a strong conventional fighting force and nuclear weapons. By creating their own militarized nuclear program, North Korea was able to negate the benefit afforded to the U.S. in terms of their quality and quantity of soldiers. Any country would now be extremely cautious to launch another land invasion on the north’s home territory. Additionally, obtaining nuclear weapons allowed for deterrence to come into play and effectively negated the power of American nukes for fear of mutually assured destruction (MAD). These examples further serve the security model as the armaments would now create greater order in the area through the use of strength. North Korea’s history of stubborn determination and repeated duplicity to get the bomb is best explained by their dire need to feel protected against their primary enemy across the ocean, the United States . 6

A demand-side measure the United States could take would be to somehow guarantee North Korea their security would not be at risk. Specifically, a policy could be drafted stating that in addition to not threatening North Korea with its own nuclear weapons, the United States would also limit its military drills with South Korea and even sign an actual peace treaty to officially end the war in exchange for the abandonment of the north’s nuclear program. This would be a an entirely realistic move the U.S. could take which would create more peace of mind for the northern regime and end their drive to become a nuclear weapons state. This would provide North Korea with the security it is searching for, while eliminating the threat of their nuclear weapons.

Domestic Model The domestic model offers the explanation that states are

encouraged or discouraged to become a nuclear power not by international relations, but from actors within a nation. Coalitions commonly existing of high ranking military officers, key science officials within an administration, and politicians themselves then decide to pursue a nuclear policy or not. Members of the

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bureaucracy are seen as much more active actors here and can have just as much influence in the procurement of nuclear weapons as politicians. Perhaps most importantly, Sagan defines these arms as “solutions looking for a problem.” A nuclear program isn’t formed as a reaction to a threat, but it is formed solely to fill some demand or fix an issue that may not seem directly related. Under this model, it is difficult to influence actors as they are working in the domestic sphere. However, the best way to target demand-side motivators would be to try and get key actors what they want in a way that would not include building a nuclear weapons program. Possible methods would be to tie in international aid programs with denuclearization procedures as well as simply having the international community provide pressure on a government by means of sanctions, which would damage the standing on domestic actors due to the damaged economy . 7

Looking at North Korea’s history through the lens of the domestic model places focus on the military elite. A highly militarized regime, North Korean defense ministers and military officers are key actors in their nation. With this power comes great influence. Since the nation is totalitarian in nature, they are not accountable to the people. Therefore, they are free to act with impunity and make decisions that best benefit their own prestige and standing in the nation. North Korean political leaders use the symbolism of the bomb as a way to promote the state ideology of strength, furthering their grasp over their people through means of propaganda. Video clips of missile launches are constantly shown and often misconstrued as footage of the current war against the U.S. and other enemies abroad. It can also be argued that North Korea was simply using their nuclear weapons program not as a means of a future offense, but as a way to bolster their domestic situation. Deals were made with foreign nations to provide valuable resources, means of production, and other aid simply by agreeing to put a halt on nuclear weapons production. This whole time North Korea could have simply been acting as a rogue state and actively pursuing a nuke solely to receive benefits from the international community, allowing them to build up their nation from the inside . 8

Utilizing the domestic model to provide a solution to demand-side reasons will require a more indirect approach. As a state only concerned with itself, the desires of other countries are not exactly a concern. However, when treaties and agreements are made that affect the state, things are changed. Keeping up

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international sanctions from the United Nations and other organizations will damage the economic well-being of the regime and could actually weaken them more than having a nuclear weapon would benefit them. On the other hand, aid in the form of food, money, and energy supplies upon signing and adhering to a non proliferation treaty such as the NPT would benefit the domestic situation by supplying the country with needed resources. At this point, a nuclear weapons program would no longer be necessary. Lastly, pressure must be put on the military community and political leaders who support being a nuclear state. This is the most difficult demand-side reason to attack because other than breaking international law or starting a war, there is no way to forcibly remove a state’s government. The best way to go about this is to continue with stringent sanctions, while offering generous aid to leaders of their nation. A simple cost-benefit analysis would indicate that the price of having nuclear arms outweighs the benefits of not having them. Over time domestic actors will be so far behind due to crippling international pressure, they will have to agree to end their nuclear program in order to catch up with the rest of the world.

Norms Model Similar to the prestige hypothesis, the norms model offers

another answer. Under this lens, states acquire nuclear weapons because they feel it is something their country should do based on either their own expectations or that of the international community. Each nation has a unique history and self opinion that determines how they act; their past influences and shapes their future. Moreover, significant emphasis is placed on understanding the role of what Sagan defines as “nuclear symbolism.” These weapons do more than simply fulfill a military function; they are also representative of the nation that owns them. National items such as flags and olympic teams are symbolic of a nation and are generally seen as a requirement to be taken seriously on the world stage. As opposed to these, nuclear weapons primarily serve to demonstrate a state’s power. Knowing this, the best way to tackle the demand-side factors would be to maintain and further expand the nuclear taboo to discourage nations from going nuclear, as this would set the precedent that nations do not need these weapons to be considered modern. Instead, the international community should promote the economic and scientific achievements as the new symbols of a state’s power, in place of nuclear weapons . 9

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North Korean history also makes a compelling argument in favor of the norms model. The regime heavily relied on its allies during the turmoil and aftermath of the Korean War. It was clear that they would not have made it alone. This likely damaged North Korea’s ego and would be a reason why they decided to construct a nuclear program. If they acquired an atomic bomb, there wouldn’t be any need to be under the Soviet or Chinese nuclear umbrella. They would be a modern state in this sense. This also explains why, even though Russia and China tried to talk the North into halting their weapons program, North Korea never fully complied . Additionally, building the bomb would be a vital 10

symbol of power that the regime wants to project both at home and abroad. Strength and control are the basis of the government. Their civilian population (with the help of propaganda) will feel secure and be proud that their government is developing ways to fight off the terrible foreign powers who threaten their way of life. The international community could not help affording North Korea more respect now that they are armed with a weapon of mass destruction. The history of the DPRK shows that the nation wanted to end the reliance on friendly states and become an acknowledged power of their own, while furthering their own power at home and abroad by the symbolism attached to owning a nuclear weapon . 11

The demand-side reasons for the norms model can most easily be eliminated by changing international perception of the bomb. The tradition of non-use, nuclear taboo, and treaties designed to limit the proliferation and testing of nuclear weapons all work to create a different view for states of what nuclear weapons represent. Since the North Korean government is primarily focused on obtaining these weapons to establish themselves as important and to demonstrate their power, policies must be drafted that can grant these same feelings in a way that does not allow them to have a nuclear armament. To be seen as a member of the international community, North Korea should be invited to join various worldwide organizations and have a voice there. North Korea will gain respect by simply participating with other countries on important issues instead of being the rogue state who causes trouble. While not likely in the near future, key positions in these same national organizations should replace nukes as a way to obtain symbolic power. North Korea will have their modern independent status and eventual recognition of power granted to them if they sign onto a treaty such as the NPT in exchange for the invitation to join international organizations.

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Oppositional Nationalist Model Lastly, the oppositional nationalist model will be applied.

A creation of Jacques E. C. Hymans, this theory states that countries are motivated to have WMDs out of a combination of strong domestic pride and a uniting fear of a common enemy. The linkage between these two emotions are what separates this lens from others such as the security model. Hymans argues that each feeling can exist independent of the other, but it is when both are present in a country, the situation becomes dangerous and states want to become nuclear. These nations present a problem because they are not thinking rationally when the decision is made to start a nuclear weapons program. Firm belief in their state’s abilities with the dread of a looming enemy are what prompts these countries to take action and do something about their perceived problem. This creates an even larger issue because it can lead to a nuclear arms race if multiple states adopt this mentality. To target the demand-side factors, the international community must maintain a strong coalition in favor of non proliferation treaties that would prevent a oppositional nationalist state from fearing a nuclear attack from an enemy and to prevent them from building one themselves . 12

The oppositional nationalist model helps make sense of North Korea’s actions in recent history. The emotions of fear and pride are easily identifiable; fear against the United States, and pride shared by the heads of the totalitarian regime. After a close stalemate in the Korean War, North Korea saw a superpower camped across their border. During the confrontation, they heavily relied on military troops and aid from nearby allies, the Soviet Union and China . But, there was no guarantee that these two 13

countries would be there with the same help in the future. Most importantly, this fear has always been present because at any moment war could break out again as there has never been an official peace treaty ending the conflict. The other necessary emotion is pride. To be a member of one of the elite classes of North Korea is a definite honor. High ranking military officials and administrators know they are almost revered because the massive amounts of propaganda spread throughout the country shows them as all important. Their own lies have emboldened the country's elite, and because of this they bring the emotion of pride to the table. The combination of these feelings along with the fact that their sworn enemy the United States has a nuclear weapon ignites the desire to also become a nuclear power . 14

In attempting to negate the demand-side motivators, the international community needs do one thing: find a way to

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negotiate and maintain a lasting peace between North Korea and the United States. Fear and pride are leading factors that drive nuclear action, therefore they are what need to be targeted. Pride is difficult to correct as it is illegal to replace the ruling elite of any country. However, fear is not as troublesome of problem. This emotion is brought out by the conflict between the U.S. and North Korea as there could realistically be a war over the smallest infraction, as seen by the multiple skirmishes at and around the demilitarized zone (DMZ) on the border. To nullify this sense of danger would effectively put an end to North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Numerous times throughout their shared recent history security guarantees were given, but these were not strong enough and they ended up falling short. A lasting peace treaty between the United States and North Korea that puts an end to this long, stale conflict, while also offering security guarantees in the near future, are necessary to stop North Korean nuclear proliferation.

Conclusion After applying the security, domestic, prestige, norms,

and oppositional nationalist models to North Korea’s specific history, it is clear that the security model fits best. From this, countries such as the United States may use this information to know their enemy, and thus can better plan ways to deal with North Korea either politically or militarily.

"Nuclear." NTI. N.p., n.d. Web. 6 Dec. 2015. <http://www.nti.org/country- 1

profiles/north-korea/nuclear/>.

"Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy." Arms 2

Control Association. N.p., 3 Feb. 2014. Web. 6 Dec. 2015.

Sagan, Scott D. "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in 3

Search of a Bomb." International Security 21.3 (1996-1997): 54-86. Ibid. 4




Control Association. N.p., 3 Feb. 2014. Web. 6 Dec. 2015. Sagan, Scott D. "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in 7

Search of a Bomb." International Security 21.3 (1996-1997): 54-86.



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Sagan, Scott D. "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in 9

Search of a Bomb." International Security 21.3 (1996-1997): 54-86.




Control Association. N.p., 3 Feb. 2014. Web. 6 Dec. 2015. Hymans, Jacques E. C. The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, 12

Emotions, and Foreign Policy. N.p.: Cambridge UP, 2006.




Control Association. N.p., 3 Feb. 2014. Web. 6 Dec. 2015.

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Dusting off the Blue Helmets: Brazil’s Return to Peacekeeping Operations

by Arthur Sanders Montandon

Arthur Sanders Montandon is a fourth year undergraduate, Political Science major with a concentration in International Relations. His interests include diplomacy and military history. Arthur is currently studying strategy and statecraft as a research assistant at the Wilson Center in Washington, D.C. and plans to pursue a career in foreign affairs.

I. Introduction From a country that did not contribute military troops to

the United Nations’ Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs) from 1968 to 1988, to having almost 1,700 uniformed personnel serving in nine UNPKOs, and holding leadership positions in UNPKOs in Haiti, Lebanon, and the Congo, Brazil’s presence in peacekeeping operations has turned from absent to prominent. The objective of this paper is to examine and explain the determinants of Brazilian participation in peacekeeping operations since its first UNPKO experience from 1957 to present.

This paper is organized into three sections. In the first section, I provide a summary of the Brazilian historical experience in peacekeeping operations from its first involvement in 1957 until today. In the following section, I make the case that Brazilian participation in UNPKOs is a product of the country’s long standing foreign policy’s quest for autonomy as well as for domestic political and economic stability at the time that the deployment was authorized. Finally, in the last section I present and summarize the result of my findings, and suggest new research topics in which the study of peacekeeping operations could greatly benefit from.

II. From the Sinai Peninsula to Port-au-Prince: The Brazilian Participation in UNPKOs A. UNEF I 1957-1967: Brazil’s first experience as a peacekeeper

The United Nations established its Emergency Force, or UNEF I, in November 1956 to respond to the Suez Crisis. It was the first time the UN deployed combat troops to one of its peacekeeping operations. The force was composed of troops from ten volunteering countries, and each country contributed a 600-

strong battalion. The Brazilian battalion, Batalhão Suez, arrived in Egypt in February 1957. The Brazilian contingent remained in Egypt until 1967, when UNEF I was dissolved due to the outbreak of the Six-Day War. Batalhão Suez was the first Brazilian combat unit to be deployed abroad since World War II, and it was the longest deployment of Brazilian troops to a foreign country until MINUSTAH. During UNEF I, Brazil had five different presidents; the first three were in office during the democratic period, and the last two under the military regime.

B. The Kubitschek Administration: The calm before the storm The United Nations established UNEF I during Juscelino

Kubitschek’s administration. Ruling from 1956 to 1960, he was the first civilian president of Brazil to serve his entire term since President Arthur Bernades in 1926. His presidency was a period of relative stability between two turbulent moments in Brazilian history. The previously elected president, Getúlio Vargas, pressured by the military to step down, killed himself in August 1954. Kubitschek’s successor, Jânio Quadros, faced with an obstructionist Congress, resigned in August 1961, a mere 8 months after assuming office, declaring that Brazil was ungovernable.

Kubitscheck’s solution to soothe the military was to allocate more funds to the armed forces. Kubitschek 1

administration’s motto, “fifty years in five,” illustrated the president’s bold plan to rapidly promote the economic development of Brazil. In order to foster industrialization, he invited multinational automobile companies to install factories in the country. In regards to foreign policy, Kubitschek devised the Pan-American Operation to promote Latin American development. Under Kubitschek, the Brazilian economy grew an 23

average of 8.3% a year for the length of his administration. 4

Despite Kubitschek’s accomplishments, his presidential term was particularly plagued by accusations of corruption and misuse of public currency, especially regarding the construction of the new capital city, Brasília. Jânio Quadros won the 1960 presidential elections by promising to fight corruption. The Quadros administration, and more dramatically the subsequent Goular administration, witnessed a sharp decline in economic growth and an increased polarization between supporters of leftists Quadros and Goulart and an opposition that started to openly call for a military overthrow of the president. Despite the military coup d’état of 1964, the Brazilian commitment to UNEF I, established

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during the stable Kubitschek government, remained undaunted, with 600 men deployed throughout the duration of the mission.

C. IAPF 1965-1966: Brazil’s Last Peacekeeping Operation until 1989

President Castello Branco, the first president of the military regime, would be the last president to greenlight the deployment of Brazilian troops to a peacekeeping operation until the return of democracy. Following the American military intervention in the Dominican Republic in April 1965, Branco authorized the deployment of a contingent Brazilian force to join the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF). The IAPF was a multilateral peacekeeping operation established by the Organization of American States from May 1965 to September 1966 with the mission to restore order in the Dominican Republic. The Force was composed of 22,000 American troops, 1,130 Brazilian troops, and a number of troops and police officers from other American countries.

Brazilian generals commanded the IAPF from May 1965 until IAPF was dissolved in September 1966. At the same time, 5

Brazilian generals commanded the UNEF I from January 1964 to August 1964, and from January 1965 to January 1966. By 1966, with over 1,700 Brazilian troops deployed overseas and Brazilian generals commanding multinational peacekeeping operations in the Caribbean and the Middle East, Brazilian participation in peacekeeping operations seemed to have gained momentum. However, after the last contingent of UNEF I Brazilian troops left Egypt in 1967, Brazilian participation in peacekeeping operations was abruptly interrupted for twenty years.

D. The Castello Branco Years: Transition from Democracy to Dictatorship

Castello Branco’s administration was a transitional period between the overthrown democracy and the most repressive years of the military regime. When the military overthrew Goulart, the coup’s supporters believed that the military would be in power for just a short period of time and then new elections would be held.

Castello Branco originally intended to step down from office in January 1966, when Goulart’s presidential term would have ended. Under the pretense of preserving democracy, Castello Branco kept direct presidential elections scheduled for October 1965 and allowed most Brazilian political parties to remain active

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during the early stages of his government. Thus, on 18 May 1965 the Commission of Justice of the Chamber of Deputies was able to approve the legislative decree proposal PDC 225/1965, 16 votes in favor and 12 against, authorizing the deployment of Brazilian troops to IAPF. However, the direct elections of governors in 6

October 1965, where the opposition successfully elected governors in important states, changed Castello Branco’s plans. Under pressure from hard-liners in the military demanding control over the government, Castello Branco cancelled the direct presidential elections, extended his term until 1967, and abolished the existing parties. The framework for the repressive years, or anos de chumbo, was set.

E. 1968: AI-5, Repression, and Isolation Castello Branco was succeeded by General Arthur da

Costa e Silva in March 1967. The Costa e Silva administration was the beginning of a Brazilian relative isolation from the international community. Influenced by an outlook of foreign affairs that viewed international institutions as meant to “freeze the world power structure,” the Brazilian government became less 7

active in the UN. After its two-year term at the UN Security Council (UNSC) ended in 1968, Brazil would not assume a non-permanent seat in the Council again until 1988. In 1977, Brazil also left the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. 8

On the domestic front, the military government turned the focus of Brazil’s security apparatus on its perceived internal threats. By 1968, it became clear to Brazilians that the 1964 military intervention would not be as short lived as they had previously expected it. Opponents of the regime became more vocal and organized protests. With the purpose of restoring order, the Brazilian military suppressed left-wing guerrilla movements and political opponents of the regime. In December 1968, Costa e Silva issued the infamous Institutional Act Number 5 (Portuguese: AI-5), severely restricting individual rights and granting the president extra-constitutional powers. His first act under AI-5 was to close Congress until October 1969. Simultaneously, many congressmen who opposed the military were persecuted and stripped of their political rights by the regime.

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F. 1985-2002: Return of Democracy and Peacekeeping Operations

In 1978, Congress, under the Geisel administration’s policy of gradual political transition towards democracy, passed a constitutional amendment that ended AI-5. In 1985, Brazil’s first civilian president in twenty-one years, José Sarney, assumed office, officially marking the end of military rule in the country. In October 1988, Congress promulgated a new Brazilian constitution.

In December 1988, President Sarney authorized the deployment of eight Brazilian military observers to a UNPKO in Angola. This peacekeeping deployment, the first since 1967, began a renewed theme of Brazilian participation in UNPKOs throughout the 1990s. During President Fernando Collor, President Itamar Franco, and President Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s administrations, the Brazilian peacekeeping experience was characterized by the deployment of small contingents, usually around a few dozen first-care providers, military observers and election monitors to countries in Africa, Asia, and Central America. Alongside medical units and observers, relatively larger contingents of combat troops were assigned to missions in Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa, such as a 170-strong infantry company to Mozambique from June to December 1994, and an 800-strong infantry battalion to Angola from August 1995 to July 1997.

G. The New Millennium: Consolidation of Brazilian democracy and of Brazil as a peacekeeper

The trend of deploying small contingents for a short period of time, which prevailed during the 1990s, changed under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. In May 2004, the Brazilian government authorized the deployment of troops to a UNPKO in Haiti, MINUSTAH. Since then, a contingent averaging 1,300 Brazilian troops has been present in Haiti, with almost 30,000 Brazilian military men and women having served in the Caribbean country over the past twelve years. Since 2011, alongside the command of MINUSTAH, Brazil leads the Maritime Task Force of the UN peacekeeping mission in Lebanon, and since 2013, a Brazilian general has been the force commander of the UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the largest United Nations peacekeeping operation in the number of personnel.

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By the time the Brazilian government authorized the deployment of troops to MINUSTAH in 2004, Brazil had successfully transitioned from authoritarianism to democratization. In 2002, Lula, the most prominent leader of the left-wing Workers’ Party, was elected. The election of an opposition party’s candidate and the first transition of power from a directly elected president to another since the end of military rule showed the robustness of the Brazilian democracy. The military had inherited a significant amount of political power when it stepped down in the 1980s, but 9

it peacefully came under civilian rule with the reorganization of the former three military ministries into a single, civilian-headed Ministry of Defense in 1999. The Brazilian economy had also fully recovered from the debt crisis of the 1980s. Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s Plano Real controlled inflation, and in 2004 Brazil’s GDP grew 5.7%. With political and economic stability at home, 10

Brazil could turn its attention abroad.

III. Autonomy and Stability: The Determinants of Brazilian Peacekeeping Participation During Brazil’s largest participations in peacekeeping operations, two variables were constant: the Brazilian foreign policy quest for autonomy, and political and economic stability at home. When both were moderately present, for instance in the period of transition from democracy to authoritarianism under Castello Branco, or from authoritarianism to democracy under Cardoso, the deployment of significant contingents of combat troops was temporarily authorized. When both variables were strongly present, the government authorized deployment for a longer period of time. Once participation to a peacekeeping operation was authorized by the Brazilian Congress and the troops were deployed, the Brazilian commitment to the operation became immune to changes in the political and economic stability at home. The constant number of troops deployed to UNEF I and MINUSTAH, 600 and 1,300 respectively, despite domestic political and economic crises, are a testament to this.

A. Foreign policy and the quest for autonomy Brazilian foreign policy is best characterized by its continuous quest for national autonomy. As Celso Lafer notes, in response to Brazil having settled all of its border disputes in the 19th century, Brazilian nationalism is not expressed with an

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external look aiming for expansionism, but with an internal perspective seeking development. However, in order to develop, 11

Brazil must have an autonomous voice in the international system to protect its national interests from external interference. In 1959, Horácio Lafer, Kubitschek’s minister of external relations, defined autonomy as “the zeal to preserve the freedom to interpret the country’s reality and to find Brazilian solutions to Brazilian problems”. 12

Multilateralism and active presence in international organizations have been Brazil’s traditional tools to pursue autonomy. Recognizing the asymmetric distribution of power in 13

the international system, Brazil sides with weaker countries when it emphasizes the importance of national sovereignty and the legal equality of states. But seeing itself as an emerging power, Brazil believes that it should play a pivotal role in the concert of nations. In 1908, Brazilian diplomat Joaquim Nabuco stated that “Brazil has always been conscious of its size and has been governed by a prophetic sentiment with regard to its future.” In 1971, the 14

Brazilian ambassador to the US, Araújo Castro, declared that “no country escapes its destiny and, fortunately or unfortunately, Brazil is condemned to greatness.” Brazil’s presence in international 15

fora, and its ambitions to ascend to the UN Security Council as a permanent member, is thus motivated by its pursuit of autonomy through participation in the decision making of international action, as well as the fulfillment of its identity as a great power.

Brazil’s approaches to achieving autonomy have changed over the years. Vigevani and Cepaluni identified three paths through which Brazil has pursued autonomy. They are autonomy 16

through distance, autonomy through participation, and autonomy through diversification. The first path, consisting of seeking an independent and non-aligned foreign policy, prevailed from the 1930s until the late 1980s. Although not all administrations were consistent with this policy, and Brazil at times strengthened its ties with the US, the repressive years of the military regime were the pinnacle of the pursuit of autonomy through distance. Brazilian inconformity with the international regime is reflected in their refusal to ratify the Non-Nuclear Proliferation Treaty in 1968 and Geisel’s Responsible Pragmatism. This approach to foreign policy was also consistent with the economic development policy at the time, import substitution industrialization, with its focus on independent industrial development secluded from foreign interference. The second approach to autonomy, which had already been advocated by Rio Branco and Joaquim Nabuco at the turn of

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the last century, was retaken during Brazil’s return to democracy. It promoted a more expressive Brazilian participation in the international community, arguing that by taking an active part in international organizations, Brazil could better influence the creation of regimes and norms in line with its national interests. This reinsertion of Brazil in the international arena was characterized by Brazil’s return to the UNSC as an elected member in 1988, Brazilian participation in peacekeeping operations, and the opening of the Brazilian economy through the adoption of neoliberal economic policies. Finally, the current quest for autonomy through diversification, adopted since the Lula administration, is not a departure from autonomy through participation, but a different take on such. Whereas autonomy through participation promoted closer interaction with traditional partners and institutions such as the US, Europe, and the UN, autonomy through diversification endorses additional interaction and cooperation with actors in South America, Africa, and Asia as a means to counterbalance the asymmetric distribution of power. Brazil’s role in the UN became more vigorous, by matching its increasing international profile due to its wider range of international relations.

B. Domestic stability The second variable is political and economic stability at

home. Both the Kubitschek and Lula administrations were periods of remarkable stability and optimism. Before his term began, Kubitschek still experienced some political instability, caused by the death of Getúlio Vargas. Nonetheless relations between the new president and the main opposition party, the National Democratic Union, improved during his administration, and political stability was reached. Kubitschek’s initiatives to promote investments in infrastructure and to foster the automobile industry had a positive impact on the economy, leading to its growth during his administration.

Similarly, Lula experienced moderate economic instability before he was sworn into office. The possibility that the elected leftist president would adopt radical economic policies and undo the economic reforms of past administrations concerned foreign investors. However, as their fears did not materialize, as investment in the country shortly resumed. The commodity boom of the early 2000s also greatly benefitted Brazil’s economy, causing the Brazilian economy to grow significantly throughout the first few years of the millennium. After a decade-long process

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of solidifying the bases of the Brazilian economic and political life, Lula’s election and the successful transition of power from Cardoso to Lula testified the strength and stability of the country’s democracy.

While domestic instability led the military to focus its attention on internal threats to social order, political stability and economic growth allowed Kubitschek and Lula to focus on external factors. President Kubitschek sought to strengthen Brazil’s ties with the US in order to stimulate the economy. Lula pursued new trade partners and new multilateral initiatives, as well as strengthened Brazil’s lobbing efforts for a permanent seat in the UNSC.

The strength and stability of Brazilian democratic institutions such as their Congress was also fundamental in the process to determine if troops would be deployed to peacekeeping operations. As international organizations whose members utilize legal equality, free discussion, and votes to determine formulation and application of international rules, the acceptance by authoritarian regimes of directives from international organizations such as the UN indirectly imply their recognition of the legitimacy of the democratic process. Therefore, considering the constraints imposed by the military on the Brazilian Congress’ autonomy, the decision of the Brazilian government to abstain from actively participating in the United Nations during the military regime is a reflection of its weak democratic institutions.

The level of civilian control over the military is also important in the process of authorizing peacekeeping operations. Kubitschek, having secured military support through his Minister of War and by funding the military, was able to commit Brazilian troops to UNEF I. Likewise, as the Brazilian military fully came under civilian control with the establishment of the Ministry of Defense in 1999, Lula could authorize the deployment of troops to Haiti with support of Congress without having to haggle with the military. In 1965 and in the early 1990s, when the military had a stronger independent voice, the government had to negotiate with them. Under Castello Branco, as the opposition managed to elect governors to important states in 1965, the president had to appease the hard-liners in the military who were demanding more restrictive policies, and thus he was unable to adopt the reforms he intended. In 1991, as Brazil was transitioning to democracy and the military still held some power, a conflict of interest arose around a UN request of Brazilian troops to a UNPKO in Namibia. Although the Ministry of External Relations was favorable to the

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deployment, the army opposed it, and Brazil ultimately refused to send troops. 17

IV. Conclusion The resurgence of Brazil as a major contributor to UNPKOs since 2004 can be explained as a result of the interplay between Brazil’s long standing quest for autonomy through participation, and most recently diversification, and the country’s political and economic stability since transitioning from authoritarianism to democracy. Participation in peacekeeping operations and other joint military operations for pacific ends, such as training with friendly nations, is seen by Brazil as a means to further establish the country as a major player in the international community. Moreover, the 1996 National Defense Plan (Portuguese: PDN) defines “the projection of Brazil in the concert of nations and its greater integration into the international decision-making process” as one of the goals of Brazil’s defense apparatus. In order to pursue this ambitious foreign policy 18

project, a stable domestic environment is necessary. As MINUSTAH comes to an end, with the conclusion of

operations announced to take place in 2016 and Brazil having reduced its uniformed personnel in the country to 850 troops at the end of 2015, it will be interesting to observe what directions current and future administrations will take in regards to Brazilian participation in UNPKOs. With 30,000 troops of the three branches of the military having served in Haiti after twelve consecutive years, and with participation in peacekeeping operations institutionalized in Brazil’s 2008 Estratégia de Defesa Nacional, the effects of the MINUSTAH experience on Brazilian military doctrine and identity is also an important topic that deserves more attention.

Although it was beyond the scope of this paper to conduct an empirical research on the determinants of Brazilian participation in peacekeeping operations, I believe this paper provides a good initial framework to those intended to do so. Finally, the study of peacekeeping operations and civil-military relations would certainly benefit from an in-depth comparison between Brazil and its Southern Cone’s neighbors’ motivations to provide troops to UNPKOs, both before and after their military regimes, and the effects of such deployments on the military and the government.

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Rex A. Hudson, and Library of Congress Federal Research Division. 1998. 1

Brazil: A Country Study. Federal Research Division, Library of Congress.

Celso Lafer. “Brazilian International Identity and Foreign Policy: Past, Present, 2

and Future.” Daedalus 129(2) (2000), 225.

Alexandra de Mello Silva. “A Política Externa de JK: A Operação Pan- 3

Americana.” (Masters diss., Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1992) http:// bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace/handle/10438/6597 (May 31, 2015). Hudson, Rex A., and Library of Congress Federal Research Division. 1998. 4

Brazil: A Country Study. Federal Research Division, Library of Congress.

Terry M. Mays. Historical Dictionary of Multinational Peacekeeping. (Laham: 5

Scarecrow Press, 2010), 137-138.

Gustavo da Frota Simões 2010. “Turbulência Política Interna e Política Externa 6

Durante o Governo Castello Branco (1964-1967).” (Masters diss., Universidade de Brasília, 2010), 62. Fernando Cavalcante. “Rendering Peacekeeping Instrumental? The Brazilian 7

Approach to United Nations Peacekeeping during the Lula Da Silva Years (2003-2010).” Revista Brasileira de Política International 53(2) (2010): 148.

Cavalcante, Fernando. 2010. “Rendering Peacekeeping Instrumental? The 8

Brazilian Approach to United Nations Peacekeeping during the Lula Da Silva Years (2003-2010).” Revista Brasileira de Política International 53(2): 142–59.

Wendy Hunter. “Politicians against Soldiers: Contesting the Military in 9

Postauthorization Brazil.” Comparative Politics 27(4) (1995): 425. The World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2016. GDP Growth (Annual 10

%).

Lafer, Celso. 2000. “Brazilian International Identity and Foreign Policy: Past, 11

Present, and Future.” Daedalus 129(2): 207–38.

Ibid. 223.12

Maria Regina Soares de Lima, and Mônica Hirst. “Brazil as an Intermediate State 13

and Regional Power: Action, Choice and Responsibilities.” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 82(1) (2006): 25.

Lafer, Celso. 2000. “Brazilian International Identity and Foreign Policy: Past, 14

Present, and Future.” Daedalus 129(2): 207–38.

Ferolla, Sérgio Xavier. 2006. “Conceito de soberania e interesse nacional.” Idéias 15

em Destaque (21). Tullo Vigevani, and Gabriel Cepaluni. 2007. “Lula’s Foreign Policy and the 16

Quest for Autonomy through Diversification.” Third World Quarterly 28(7) (2007).

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Arturo C. Sotomayor Velázquez. “Why Some States Participate in UN Peace 17

Missions While Others Do Not: An Analysis of Civil-Military Relations and Its Effects on Latin America’s Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations.” Security Studies 19(1) (2010): 186-187.

Fernando Cavalcante. “Rendering Peacekeeping Instrumental? The Brazilian 18

Approach to United Nations Peacekeeping during the Lula Da Silva Years (2003-2010).” Revista Brasileira de Política International 53(2) (2010): 149.

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The Response of Foreign Regional Equity Indexes to U.S. Travel Alerts and Warnings

by Casey Leonard

Casey Leonard is a third year undergraduate double majoring in Geography and Political Science, with a concentration in Comparative Politics. He is the manager of UCLA Radio News, host of UCLA Radio show "Talk Therapy," and hopes to one day work in the field of broadcast journalism covering Latin American affairs.

1. Introduction There is a significant body of research examining how financial markets respond to public information. Moreover, many studies specifically examine the relationship between financial markets and government announcements, which represent one specific category of public information. Indeed, because government announcements oftentimes contain significant implications for a country’s economic activity, they influence investor behavior and catalyze a strong, immediate response within domestic and global financial markets. For instance, many 1

studies have documented the strong correlation between Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announcements and performance trends within global financial markets. This finding is unsurprising: FOMC announcements explicitly signal a future change in U.S. monetary policy, influencing foreign economic fundamentals and thus global financial markets. Additionally, 2

prior studies have demonstrated that financial markets incorporate news very rapidly, suggesting that government announcements would exert a significant market effect at short time horizons. 345

This paper is an empirical analysis of the relationship between stock market performance and U.S. Department of State (DoS) Travel Alerts and Warnings, which represent one specific 6

category of government announcement. My analysis focuses specifically on regional stock market performance in the market for equities, which I analyze using the proxy measure of daily price returns from several S&P regional equity indexes: S&P Asia Pacific BMI, S&P East Africa, S&P Latin America BMI, S&P Pan Arab Composite, S&P Southern Africa ex-South Africa, S&P North Africa, and S&P West Africa. I analyze stock performance 7

at short time horizons, comparing daily price returns on the day of the Travel Alert of Warning’s announcement relative to the prior

day’s price returns and the mean of the prior five days’ price returns. By systematically comparing market data on regional equity index price returns for a sample of 43 Travel Alerts and Warnings, this paper seeks to accomplish two objectives: First, measure and analyze the stock market’s immediate response to Travel Alerts and Travel Warnings at the aggregate scale of world regions. Second, gain some insight into the stock market’s response.

1.1 Contents Section 2 provides a comprehensive overview of the different data sets that were used in this paper. Here, I present the different proxy measures of stock market performance and national economic development that inform my analysis, providing context and source information for this data. Section 3 contains a precise description of my methods, laying out the sequence of steps that this paper employs to analyze the data presented in the Section 2. Here, I hope to provide absolute transparency into my research methods and the resulting findings. Section 4 features an analysis of my research, wherein I address my paper’s two main objectives: to record regional stock markets’ immediate response to Travel Alerts and Warnings, and to explain the markets’ observed response. Based on a careful analysis of the data, this paper finds no evidence that Travel Warnings and Alerts exert any significant or consistent impact on regional stock market performance at short time horizons. Section 5 presents a conclusion and a discussion of my findings’ implications. In this section, I also address several limiting factors that may potentially undermine my findings’ strength. This includes conspicuously lacking public records of historical Travel Alerts and Warnings, as well as possible problems with the broad, “world- region” scale and narrow time horizon applied in this analysis.

2. Data Description2.1 State Department Travel Warnings and Travel Alerts The U.S. Department of State periodically issues “Travel Alerts” and “Travel Warnings” in order to deter American travelers from visiting specific foreign countries or world region that are perceived to be dangerous or unstable. Whereas “Travel Alerts” are issued to notify U.S. travelers about specific, short-term events that might jeopardize their safety (i.e. “an election season,” a “health alert,” or “evidence of an elevated risk of terrorist

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attacks”), “Travel Warnings” are issued to signal that a country’s general conditions present a serious and on-going safety risk (including but not limited to “unstable government, civil war, ongoing intense crime or violence, or frequent terrorist attacks”). Travel Alerts are removed once the short-term event in question concludes, but Travel Warnings remain in place indefinitely until they are lifted by the DoS. Additionally, Travel Warnings may occasionally be renewed and updated. I obtained all data on Travel Alerts and Warnings from the DoS Consular Affairs’ website, where the DoS publishes an official list of recent Travel Alerts and Warnings. At the time of my research, this source listed 43 Travel Alerts and Warnings issued from March 2014 through March 2015.

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Table 1A provides a chronological list of these 43 Alerts or Warnings, which I additionally grouped into four distinct categories depending on the main reason for the perceived risk. These categories are “Terrorism/Crime/Violence,” “Natural Disaster,” “Status of Government,” and “Civil War.” First, “Terrorism/Crime/Violence” broadly encompasses all cases wherein non-state actors have undermined a country’s security conditions through pervasive terrorist, criminal, or violent activity. Second, “Natural Disaster” includes cases principally concerned with some catastrophic natural event, including infectious disease. Third, “Status of Government” includes all cases wherein state actors pose a serious threat to U.S. citizens, or where a foreign government’s status is unclear. For instance, Burkina Faso received a Travel Alert after President Compaore resigned and left the country without a clear leader. Fourth, “Civil War” includes instances wherein state and non-state actors are engaged in a violent, internal struggle for power. Here, twenty-nine Travel Alerts or Warnings were issued because of “Terrorism/Crime/Violence,” four because of “Natural Disaster,” five because of “Status of Government,” and another five because of “Civil War.” Table 1A also indicates whether each Travel Alert or Warning makes explicit reference to either an upcoming election or conditions that may seriously impair U.S. citizens’ mobility. Note that the latter category includes cases wherein a state’s transportation infrastructure is highly underdeveloped (e.g. Haiti) or severely electoral period, whereas twenty-four reference “Closed Borders.”

2.2 Profile of the Targeted Countries The 43 Travel Warnings and Alerts analyzed here affected 41 countries in total; Nigeria and Burundi each received two Warnings or Alerts. Table 1B lists these 41 countries alongside several important measures of their national economies. First, countries are listed alphabetically by “Region,” which broadly denotes the relative world area containing each country. These regions were self-selected in order to accurately represent the 41 observed countries and provide a sense of the relative spatial distribution of Travel Alerts and Warnings. As Table B displays, 22 countries are listed in the “Africa” region, six in the “Americas” region, four in the “Asia Pacific” region, and nine in the “Middle East” region.

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Second, the category “S&P Regional Stock Index” indicates the S&P equity index that I assigned each country to represent stock market performance in that country’s world region. Altogether, I gathered data from seven distinct S&P equity indexes to represent the distinct geographical regions affected by Travel Alerts and Warnings: Here, four countries are listed under the “S&P Asia Pacific BMI” index, seven under “S&P East Africa,” six under “S&P Latin America BMI,” four under “S&P North Africa,” nine under “S&P Pan Arab Composite Index,” one under “S&P Southern Africa ex-South Africa,” and ten under “S&P West Africa.” Third, I indicate each country’s GDP (Official Exchange Rate) and leading national stock exchange, two measures selected to provide a broad window into the 41 countries’ level of economic development. The data on GDP was accessed from the C.I.A.’s World Factbook, which defines GDP (OER) as 8

“the home-currency-denominated annual GDP figure divided by the bilateral average US exchange rate with that country in that year.” This measure of GDP accurately captures a country’s real

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purchasing power within the international market and thus provides a useful comparative tool. 9

Also included here are the names of each country’s national stock exchange, an institution that foundationally supports a national stock market by facilitating the trading of stocks, bonds, and other securities. Note that “Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières SA (BRVM)” (listed for Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger) is a regional stock exchange serving West Africa; I included it here alongside national stock exchanges because the BRVM is a well-developed financial institution that serves a small, specific geographic region. Importantly, countries without a national stock exchange can suffer from seriously underdeveloped financial infrastructure. Here, 14 countries (34% total) do not possess a national stock exchange.

2.3 Regional Equity Market Data As stated previously, I collected data on daily price returns from seven S&P regional equity indexes, proxy measures for stock market performance in the world regions affected by Travel Alerts and Warnings. Here, I selected the market for equities in order to provide the broadest possible window into stock market performance; similarly, I chose to analyze market data on a regional scale in order to capture some measure of market performance for countries without a national stock index (see Table 1B). To this end, I selected the most regionally specific S&P indexes available to represent the targeted world regions, while also attempting to hold scale constant within the different regional indexes.

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Table IC lists the seven regional equity indexes used here, and also includes the S&P Global BMI (Broad Market Index) for reference. The S&P Global BMI is “a comprehensive, rules-based index measuring global stock market performance” that provides a useful standard of comparison for the seven regional indexes. All market data presented represents price returns in U.S. dollars; this standard measure of return captures only the portfolio’s capital appreciation, ignoring the income generated by the assets in the portfolio in the form of interest and dividends. All the data displayed in Table IC was accessed through S&P’s website under each equity index’s “Factsheet” tab. All eight indexes are capitalization-weighted float-adjusted indexes, meaning that they adjust the market capitalization-based weights to reflect only those shares that are publicly available for trading. This weighting method thus provides an accurate window into effective trading opportunities within the stock market. Additionally, the “number of constituents” refers to the total number of individual stocks or companies compiling each index; similarly, the “mean total market cap” provides the average market cap for companies within each index. Here, “market cap” simply refers to the market value of a company's outstanding shares (stock price multiplied by the total number of outstanding shares), and thus the mean market cap usefully indicates average firm size within each regional index. The category “Annualized 3 Year Risk (Standard Deviation)” provides an annualized measure of actual historical volatility, or the extent to which an index’s total returns varied from the mean over the past three years. S&P provides this measure for every index as an indicator of risk; this figure specifically represents the annualized (converted to reflect the yearly rate) standard deviation of total returns using monthly values over a three-year period. The “leading sector” and “percentage of index held by leading sector” categories provide further insight into the nature of the indexes’ constituent companies. Here, “sector” refers to a broad cluster of stocks in similar industries (e.g. consumer staples, materials, energy); thus, an index largely dominated by a single sector represents a less diverse portfolio of economic activity. Importantly, an equity index dominated by a single sector may be more volatile because risk is not diversified across different types of economic activity.

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3. Methodology In this section, I will explain the precise sequence of steps taken in order to analyze the data presented in Section 2 in search of a possible correlation between DoS Travel Alerts and Warnings and regional stock market performance. Again, I am looking for a market reaction at short time horizons, which I define as the day of the announcement. My assumption here is that foreign markets are able to rapidly incorporate news about Travel Alerts or Warnings, a claim that is substantiated by the significant body of research showing that stock markets rapidly absorb new public information. For the purposes of this paper, I refer to the day 1011

that the Travel Alert or Travel Warning was announced as “event day.” However, because African, Asian Pacific, and Middle Eastern markets are likely to be closed when the SoD announces Travel Alerts or Warnings, I treat the day after the SoD issues a Travel Warning or Alert as “event day” for these regions. To begin, I compared all “event day” daily price returns to the prior day’s price returns, calculating the daily change. Here, I hope to capture the immediate effect that a Travel Alert or Warning might exert on regional stock performance; if an effect were indeed present at this scale and time horizon, I would expect to see a consistent negative trend in price returns from prior to event day. Next, I compared all “event day” price return to the mean price return of the five-day period preceding the “event day”; I intend for this figure to represent a broader measure of recent market performance against which to compare “event day” returns. Again, if a market reaction was present, I would expect to see a consistent negative trend in price returns from the five-day average to event day. Moreover, in order to mitigate the possibility that the fluctuations in regional stock performance that I observe here simply mirror larger fluctuations in the global equity market, I cross-reference my market data from the regional indexes with the “S&P Global BMI,” an equity index that I use as a proxy measure of global stock market performance. For each Travel Alert or Warning, I compare the daily change from prior-to-event-day price returns in the regional index to the daily change in the S&P Global BMI over the same period; if my data reveals a strong positive correlation between daily changes in the regional indexes and this global equity index, it would suggest that these regional indexes predominately reflect larger trends in the global market.

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One major drawback of the S&P equity indexes used here is that they do not trade on weekends, making price return figures unavailable for Saturdays and Sundays. Thus, if a Travel Alert or Warning was issued on a weekend, I compared Friday’s daily price returns to Monday’s. Similarly, if a Travel Alert or Warning was issued on a Monday, I use the prior Friday’s daily price returns to calculate the change from prior to event day. When calculating the five-day pre- event mean price return, I took the average of all weekday price returns within the five-day window preceding the event; unfortunately, this means that the five-day mean numbers displayed here are calculated using different amounts of baseline price returns depending on when the Alert or Warning was issued.

4. Results Here, I found little evidence that any strong correlation exists between DoS Travel Alerts and Warnings and same-day regional stock market performance. On average, the affected S&P

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regional equity index experienced an insignificant $0.825 decrease in daily price returns the day of the Travel Alert or Warning’s announcement relative to the prior day. Indeed, daily price returns fell only in 23 of the 43 observed cases, remaining unchanged or increasing in the other 20. Thus, the apparent lack of any strong correlation between the two observed variables (Travel Alerts/Warnings and daily price returns) suggests that these Department of State announcements exert no appreciable market reaction in the targeted world region at short time horizons. Table ID presents all price returns data used here and displays each column’s numerical mean at the bottom of the table. Additionally, I present the averages for the seven regional index in Table IE and the averages for each category of Alert/Warning in Table IF (The latter table only contains the averages for daily change and change from the five day pre-event mean).

5. Conclusion This paper found no apparent correlation between Travel Alerts and Warnings on the one hand and regional stock market performance on the other. The lack of a consistent trend within the 43 analyzed sample cases suggests that there is no same-day market reaction at the regional market level. There are many reasons why this might be the case: perhaps these Alerts and Warnings do not affect investor behavior because they are mostly issued in countries that are highly prone to violence and instability; thus, a DoS Travel Alert or Warning is unlikely to represent “new news” for the investor. Moreover, these DoS announcements are

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typically announced in response to an ongoing, countrywide problem – suggesting again that these Alerts and Warnings would not represent new information for the investor. A second explanation for the lack of a consistent relationship concerns the geographic and temporal scale of my analysis. Indeed, a Travel Alert or Warning can reasonably be assumed to most powerfully affect the single targeted country’s stock market, but this effect may be lost at the aggregate scale of world regions. This is especially true if the targeted countries have underdeveloped capital markets and thus control an insignificant share of their regional index. Moreover, it is possible that a market reaction is present but does not manifest in the time window analyzed here; perhaps a study analyzing the five-day post-event average daily price returns would yield different results. Moving forward, there are many alternative analytic approaches available to the researcher attempting to broaden this paper’s findings.

Mitchell, Mark L., and J. Harold Mulherin. "The impact of public information on 1

the stock market." The Journal of Finance 49.3 (1994): 923-950.

Wongswan, Jon. "The response of global equity indexes to US 2

monetary policy announcements.” Journal of International Money and Finance 28.2 (2009): 344-365.

Bernanke, Ben S., and Kenneth N. Kuttner. "What explains the stock market's 3

reaction to Federal Reserve policy?” The Journal of Finance 60.3 (2005): 1221-1257. Mitchell, Mark L., and J. Harold Mulherin. "The impact of public information 4

on the stock market." The Journal of Finance 49.3 (1994): 923-950.

Ibid.5

“Alerts and Warnings.” U.S. Passports & International Travel. U.S. Department 6

of State, 2015. Web. 27 May 2015. S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC. S&P Dow Jones Indices. McGraw Hill Financial, 7

2015. Web. 27 May 2015.

The World Factbook 2014-15. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 8

2014.

Ibid.9

Wongswan, Jon. "The response of global equity indexes to US 10

monetary policy announcements.” Journal of International Money and Finance 28.2 (2009): 344-365.

Ibid.11

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Nuclear Weapons and Pakistani Identity by James Jordan

James Jordan is a third year undergraduate majoring in Political Science, concentrating in International Relations, and minoring in Classical Civilizations. He is the student representative for the Bruin Intercollegiate Studies Institute, and a Legislative Aide with the USAC Office of the External Vice-President. He hopes one day to work in foreign policy in either diplomacy or nuclear policy.

I. Introduction When considering the formulation of policy with Pakistan, one fundamental factor that is often overlooked is the consideration of the Pakistani identity, or how they see themselves on the world stage. As inhabitants of a nation that was born from conflict and exploitation, the people of Pakistan view their nation as a haven for thought, where they, as a cultural group, came together to weather the storm of Partition following the British withdrawal from the Colonial Empire. Through the development of the Pakistani state and later clashes with its neighbors, few central themes stay consistent within the narrative of the state. Pakistan’s view, placing its nation verses the world at large, is seemingly pervasive throughout government action and policy. Understanding this creates a guideline which can then be used to interpret the reasoning behind developing nuclear weapons against the wishes of the international community, and at the cost of regional stability. In this paper, I will trace the development of the personal identity of the state of Pakistan, and explore how this identity influenced the tensions between Pakistan and its rivals- regional and global- and how it influenced the circumstances that led to the development of the Pakistani nuclear project. The final section of the paper will address concerns about the stability of the nuclear program, and why Pakistan seems to ferment risks of nuclear terrorism.

II. Rise of “Pakistan” a. British Colonial Empire and Partition The founding of Pakistan by the Muslim League was the result of rising tensions between Muslims and Hindus living under the British Colonial Empire. The Muslim League gained power by playing off of the fear of Muslim communities, who believed

themselves separated from the Hindu majority population. Both Hindu and Muslim communities withdrew from each other, becoming less inclined to accept others who did not share their culture, religion, or customs. The Muslim League exploited this 1

action to convince the Muslim Indians that they needed to independently create a new nation. The withdrawal of the populations into themselves led to an increase in nationalistic fervor, which gained strength through religious tensions. 2

Religious tensions provided the impetus for division, as both sides manipulated discriminative attacks to rally their 3

followers and increase their power over the populations they represented. The British Colonial Empire exercised noncommittal 4

power over the region, and made half-hearted efforts to prevent or repair this religious dissonance. This distance was magnified by Partition, where the Colonial government withdrew before the new nations were ready to begin the resettlement process. Violence erupted as large, culturally different populations began moving to “their” nation. The violence in Pakistan was used to reinforce the 5

reality that Pakistan was a nation for the Muslim Indians, where they were the majority and held the power. The violence cemented India as the eternal enemy of Pakistan, as the differences were too great and prevented chances of future cooperation. This nationalistic outcome created the identity of Pakistan, where the citizens see themselves as standing against a local tyranny that will overstep its bounds, and it is their role to stand up against this.

b. An Inherited Instability Pakistani relations with the nation of Afghanistan, with whom it shares a border (the Durand Line) to the west of the nation, are traditionally unstable. The history between these two nations goes back to the British Colonial Empire, when the Afghan kingdoms fought and were defeated by the British, who pushed them back through the Khyber Pass and finalized the border in 1847. Relations with Afghanistan have been sour since the 6

inception of the Pakistani nation, as Afghanistan refused to recognize the border between the two nations, an act that continues today. The main issue between these nations is the status of the Pashtun tribesmen who live in both nations and were not consulted during the development of Pakistan. Afghanistan supports the Pashto people, and refuses to cooperate, while they are neglected by the primarily Punjabi Pakistani government. The situation revolves around the status of the Taliban operating in the semi-autonomous Pashto states, as well as the intervention of Western

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powers in the negotiations between Pashto leaders and the Islamabad government. This insecurity combined with the continuing uncertainty of the situation, helps to explain the view held by Pakistan, who believes it is not secure when interacting with its neighbors and is always under threat. The dissonance between the Pakistani ideology of tribal populations and that of Afghanistan lies in the violence that spread during Partition. In Punjab, the tribal bonds between the local people had not spared them the chaotic interactions that happened elsewhere during the period. This reinforced the belief that the 7

national identity of Pakistan was more important than smaller tribal, or communal, identities. As this runs counter to the tight knit and border-porous tribal identities of the Pashto tribesmen, the Islamabad government is unable to adapt and views the Pashto region with another “lens.” This difference was further exacerbated with the rise of the Taliban, an Islamist organization that relies on the support of tribal people for protection and supplies. As Pakistan moved into the previously semi-autonomous territory to root out the Taliban, they came into conflict with the tribal emphasis of the local population, distinct from the nationalistic “Pakistan First” mindset in which they were accustomed to confronting.

c. India and the Two Wars The deep impact of the successive wars with India cannot be understated for the Pakistani identity. Starting with the assaults on the border provinces of Jammu and Kashmir in 1965, and continuing through the War of Bangladesh Independence in 1971, military conflict with their Indian neighbors has thoroughly infiltrated the self-image of the Pakistani people and leadership. In the 1965 conflict, Pakistan embarked on an assault against the Indian-controlled province of Kashmir, hoping to unite the Muslims in the province and galvanize a domestic resistance to the eventual Indian response. The international community condemned the attack, and India rallied a response that pushed the Pakistanis out of Kashmir and to the plains surrounding Lahore, in the capital of Pakistani Punjab. This attack, and the repulsion of 8

the armed forces of a state which prides itself on its identity as the strong anti-Indian haven for Muslims, served to harm the image of Pakistan. It revealed that it was not on par with their perpetual enemy, creating fear that India had outdistanced them in technology and military advancement. It also proved that they could not count on the unconditional support of the Muslims who

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had stayed in India, nor could they catalyze the population in dominantly Muslim Kashmir to rise in their favor against their enemies; they were not seen as the unifying religious authority that they believed they would be seen as. These realizations proved shocking to the foundation of the Pakistani identity, influencing their insufficiency and the insecurity of their ability to defend themselves; they began to feel weak. Only six years later, the Bangladesh War for Independence, which later became the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, was another conflict that left the nation of Pakistan reeling from their unexpected defeat. When the eastern section of the country revolted after not receiving their guaranteed representation, Pakistan resorted to brutal measures in their effort to keep the province aligned. After refugees fled across the border into India 9

to escape the carnage, India declared that they supported the rebel movement and would appeal to the international community in an effort to de-legitimize the attacks by Pakistan. In response to this, 10

Pakistan preemptively struck several military installations along the Indian border, leaving them with an advantage in the upcoming battle. As India recovered and mobilized, they eventually pushed back the Pakistani offensive and secured the surrender of the forces operating in East Pakistan. Adding to the damage of the war, it is estimated that Pakistan lost “half its navy, one-fourth its air force, and one-third of its army” in the onslaught of the Indian counter-attack. With the failure of the Pakistani army in fighting the Indian army, as well as the secession of the eastern section of the nation, the Pakistanis were left in weaker straits than after the previous war in 1965. This weakness propelled the fear of India in the eyes of the Pakistani people, who were afraid that they could easily be overrun and defeated if India decided to push their offensive. Alongside the personal failure of their armies to fight effectively in the war, Pakistan was also let down by their allies abroad. Despite the hopes of the Pakistani leadership, China did not open another front along their border with India, which would have spread the Indian forces thin, weakening their effectiveness in operations in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Kashmir. As indicated by the lack of involvement, China saw the war as something to be avoided, but did support Pakistan and threatened to come to their aid if there was deep penetration by the Indian forces. This 11

letdown by the closest ally of Pakistan assisted the development of the view that they were alone in the world; any action they would take would have to be self-serving in its most basic form before

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the wants and needs of other nations could be taken into account. As Pakistan developed and became nuclearized, they kept to this policy, disregarding the conventions and history of the nuclear movement as arbitrary when placed alongside the need for security and strength in Pakistan.

d. The Cold War and Soviet Afghanistan While the Cold War divided the world between the

bipolar support systems of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, the Southeast Asia region remained mostly unaligned. Pakistan, however, was a close U.S ally, and remained so as a balance in the region to possible Soviet expansion into the Middle East or Southeast Asia. This role was put to the test when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in the 1980s, when Pakistan became the staging ground for the Mujahideen groups that moved in to oppose them after the fall of the Afghani government. 12

This role brought the tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan back to the front of policy for the Islamabad leadership, as they now had to ally with the Pashtun tribes that had given them trouble during the consolidation of power in the 40s. Serving as 13

the proxy for international powers to fight during this period would have chafed at the Pakistani self-image and damaged the integrity of the leadership. The re-inflation of tensions between the Afghan and Pakistani governments would have increased the concern regarding the security of the nation which was recently on the receiving end of almost complete military evisceration, resulting in the deposition of the democratically-elected government in favor of a military dictatorship. Directly challenging the Soviet Union also increased tensions with India, which had signed a friendship pact with the USSR prior to the nuclear detonations in 1974. As this was a nation that had proven it could withstand direct and pre-emptive assaults for the Pakistani military, the leadership of Pakistan must have been wary as the stakes increased during the Cold War. Due to their strategic placement in the Middle East- Southeast Asia area, as well as their alliance to both the U.S. and People’s Republic of China, Pakistan was instrumental in the process of rapprochement between the two nations, which helped to balance the scales in Cold War tensions by bringing a wedge between the USSR and PRC.

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III. Nuclear Development a. Global Policy Effects

When India tested their nuclear device in the Smiling Buddha test of 1974, it caused immense fear and suspicion within the Pakistani government. While Pakistan seemed unprepared for this revelation, it had begun its response two years before in the post-war period. This response was the development and acceleration its own nuclear program, and an increase in the ability to begin internal development of nuclear weapons from peaceful energy reactors. As this became known, nations withdrew their 14

support by reneging on deals to provide fissile material for their power plants- France and Canada backed out of agreements to construct heavy water plants in the 1970s- leading to a fork in the road for the Pakistani government. On one hand, Pakistan wanted 15

to continue to receive material from these nations, giving them an incentive to hide their program from the international community. On the other hand, the reaction to suspicions of development would have shown them that there was little support for their entry into the nuclear weapon nations, so they would have to develop their nuclear material independently and self- sufficiently. As a nation that sees itself as fiercely independent, Pakistan felt it best to choose both The development of nuclear weaponry is seen as the sign of advanced nations, where the technological advancements have created an atmosphere where bombs can be independently created by the scientists produced by the country. As objects of prestige, such weapons can help rally people in times of crisis, including after a war that proved a catastrophic loss for a formerly proud nation. Z.A Bhutto saw nuclear weapons in this light, as after the 1965 war with India he declared, “Even if we have to eat grass, we will have [the] nuclear bomb. We have no other choice. ” Bhutto’s 16

views followed him through his period as Foreign Minister, and prompted his request for the change of focus in the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, and head scientist Munir Ahmad Khan. The seriousness with which the leader of Pakistan held proliferation bled into the population, and created a sense of urgency that led to widespread support for development as a Pakistan with nuclear weapons is a nation that is better able to defend itself and prevent exploitation from other nations. While nominally unsupported due to the suspension of the Atoms for Peace program after it was revealed that the fissile material had been militarized in India’s Smiling Buddha weapon, Pakistan possibly received foreign aid. Intra-embassy cables show that

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Pakistan was suspected of receiving assistance from China, and some restrictions were lifted by the U.S for Pakistan’s support against the U.S.S.R. Pakistan’s nuclear program, while assisted 1718

by outside powers who wanted to interfere in the balance of power in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, was cut loose and proceeded to develop independently.

b. Nuclear Weapons and the Islamic Bomb The successful test of the Chagai implosion type nuclear device in response to the Indian Pokhran tests in 1998 demonstrated the undeniable fact that Pakistan had joined the nuclear weapons club through unofficial means. The weapons 19

served to mark Pakistan’s ability as an independent power in the region, unable to be overpowered by India or coerced by the Western nations. In an effort to justify the bomb to the world, and keep their good standing with the NPT groups, Pakistan made two compelling claims about the origins of the bomb: it was independently thought up and processed with no outside help or provision, and that it was a countermeasure to the religious imbalance currently shown by the bomb. These claims were part of the culture of Pakistan—fiercely independent and encompassing—so they could keep maximum deniability and gather large bases of support. The process of keeping good standing while developing the bomb was complicated for the Pakistani government, as their core cadre of scientists had mostly found work in the international non-proliferation community before returning to assist in development. This led to concerns that Pakistan had fudged their claims of individual development and that their scientists had brought designs over with them. Pakistan countered that it was just experience that was applicable in a later job. Keeping in good 20

faith with the international community was important because it helped decrease Pakistani security concerns over their unstable region. Good faith also prevented the leveling of sanctions, which could have damaged the country’s development and changed the opinion of the people concerning their government. The accusation of religious imbalance was an appeal to the other primarily Muslim nations for support. The Pakistani nuclear bomb has been referred to specifically as the “Islamic bomb,” which is a move away from the Pakistani central identity towards a more encompassing identity that gave them connections with other Muslim nations, as opposed to the Western nations who had turned their back on Pakistan during development, and

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condemned them when the news of the bomb was released. The Pakistani government appealed to the cultural base of the people to connect them to the foundational cultures of other nations to muster support and backing for their development, showing that they did not need the support or approval of the western powers, and that they had the allies and technology to go toe-to-toe with India. IV. Nuclear Policy The issue within Pakistan is recognition, versus action, on the world stage. Pakistan’s policy of loose usage has caused consternation among the other nuclear powers, as they are viewed as not taking the weapons’ damage and history seriously. Their policy of threatening first strike usage against their nuclear neighbor is a constant source of international agitation. Their support of extremist groups through their intelligence service (ISI) and their loose command structure combine to form a completely untrustworthy situation, which Pakistan has not worked to rectify. These actions are not the result of new measures undertaken to align Pakistan with other Islamic nations, nor are they simply overzealous threats against India to prevent attack by conventional or nuclear weaponry; they are calculated through the viewpoint of Pakistani history, and used to prevent their being taken advantage of again by powerful nations.

a. Escalation One of the more concerning aspects of the Pakistani nuclear policy is their threat of escalated retaliation concerning any conflict with India. Perhaps most easily to trace, this policy stems from the overwhelming fear felt by Pakistan concerning their much larger neighbor. This policy, while a deterrence masterpiece, has prevented Pakistan from engaging in developmental talks with India in the past, as the Indian government boycotted meetings while this extremely hostile policy was in place. This policy promises that Pakistan will be the nation that introduces nuclear weapons into any engagement that begins with India, whether justified or not. On two occasions (2000 and 2008), this has directly prevented India from responding to domestic terrorist attacks, as the groups were believed to have camps and training centers in Pakistan, but the threat of Pakistani retaliation from any attack on its soil with nuclear capabilities stopped India in it

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tracks, reducing its effectiveness in retaliation and limiting its future options. 21

This loose escalation plan has had significant effects on the regional politics of Southeast Asia. The danger of nuclear assault has prompted the Indian military to implement its “Cold Start” policy, where armored units are placed on the border and ready to assault Pakistan on a moment’s notice. The results of 22

this policy are to take the power of escalation out of the hands of the civilian government and cause an escalation that would push Pakistan to the brink of nuclear usage. The Cold Start policy is the deterring response by India, and is used to tie Pakistan’s hands and see if they really will escalate under any circumstances. The unpredictable group, however, is China. China is historically close with Pakistan, and has floated the idea that it would intervene on their behalf if war were to spark; however, how would they respond to another power, even their ally, escalating a conflict to the point of nuclear war in their home region? With their recent efforts to consolidate power in the South China Sea, China would not react kindly to another nation attempting to gain power in the Southeast Asian region. Pakistan’s usage policy stems from its insecurity about its place in the modern world. As one of the last nations to develop the nuclear bomb by slipping through the gaps of the NPT, Pakistan was not well received by the other nuclear weapons nations, and was actively induced to rescind its development, or deactivate all weapons and ship out any active material. This had a cascading effect because it played into the already fragile perception of other nations. Additionally, this failure to accept Pakistan as an equal nation when it developed nuclear weapons damaged their self-image, and, as a result, they have seen no reason to cooperate effectively with other nations.

b. The Role of ISI The Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) is Pakistan’s version of the Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Intelligence, as it operates in both foreign and domestic environments. They regularly investigate threats to the nation, and are in charge of intelligence gathering and shared information. In addition due to Pakistan’s loose nuclear structure, they also have access to nuclear weapons. This agency is widely seen as radical sponsors of terrorism, especially against India. With the lead intelligence agency, a powerful aspect of the Pakistani military, seen as radicalized by the West and compromised by the rest of the

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Middle East, Pakistan is placed in a precarious political system. They are isolated from other nations, despite their proclamations of an “Islamic Bomb” and the thought that nuclear weapons would grant legitimization and respect to the nation. The strategy of the ISI has its foundation in Pakistani identity translated into the globalized world. Their covert support for terrorist organizations is what their belief would call for- how else could they ensure Pakistani security unless they were striking against Pakistan’s enemies in any way possible, no matter how unsavory? ISI has used this strategy since the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, when they funneled arms to the Mujahedeen to aid their resistance, and continued in the Kargil War when they snuck operatives into Kashmir in order to attempt to incite the Muslim population. They have experience funneling support for 23

clandestine groups who either directly support their same aims, or at the least stand against their natural enemies. The danger of ISI is that they protect a nation that easily sees itself isolated when dealing with other nations, and has adopted a centrist, Pakistan first-and-foremost ideal to prevent damage from happening again. ISI uses its power, including theoretical control of decentralized nuclear bombs, to keep any situation they are involved in going in the favor of Pakistan.

c. Policy Recommendation The root of foreign policy within Pakistan is how their self image should be addressed by others who will interact with them. Pakistan began as a nation where a minority of people could escape to hold their own land, where they would not be subjected to the marginalization that occurred under the rule of the British Colonial Empire. After the creation of this independent nation, there were clashes with neighbors in an effort to stress the legitimacy of the new Pakistani identity in which everyone should subscribe. After the combat losses to India, this self-image took a hit that left the government of Pakistan reeling; the solution was to restore pride while also reassuring the people that the nation could remain secure through the power of their own armed forces. Thus the country’s nuclear weapons project was put into development. The bomb was a symbol for the people to rally behind, reminding them that Pakistan was created of violence and was able to be in the same category of the most advanced nations in the world. However, this expectation took a blow when the Western nations refused to recognize Pakistan after the initial announcement, instead condemning them for proliferating and attempting to

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influence them to redirect their advancement. Pakistan has held firm, and continues to advance development of its forces as a deterrent against India and other nations who may attempt to influence it. The nuclear bomb is the embodiment of the pride that the Pakistanis have in their country, as it reminds people that the West is not the only power; other nations can join the nuclear club and be on a near equal footing with them.

Gilmartin, David. 1998. “Partition, Pakistan, and South Asian History: In Search 1

of a Narrative”. The Journal of Asian Studies 57 (4). 1075.

Ibid.2

Kumar, Girja. "R.Rasul and Its Aftermath." In Books on Trial: Fundamentalism 3

and Censorship in India. Har- Anand Publications, 1997. Gilmartin, David. 1998. “Partition, Pakistan, and South Asian History: In Search 4

of a Narrative”. The Journal of Asian Studies 57 (4). 1075.

Ibid. 1089.5

Harrison, Selig S. "The Fault Line Between Pashtuns and Punjabis in 6

Pakistan." The Washington Post, May 11, 2009. Gilmartin, David. 1998. “Partition, Pakistan, and South Asian History: In Search 7

of a Narrative”. The Journal of Asian Studies 57 (4). [Cambridge University Press, Association for Asian Studies]: 1068–95.

"India's Foreign Relations." In South Asia in World Politics, edited by Devin 8

Hagerty. Lanham, Maryland: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2005.

Khan, Feroz. Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb. Palo Alto, 9

California: Stanford University Press, 2012. "India's Foreign Relations." In South Asia in World Politics, edited by Devin 10


Ibid. 27.11

Yoshida, Osamu. "Nuclear Development in South Asia." In Nuclear 12

Disarmament in the 21st Century, edited by Wade Huntly, Kazumi Mizumoto, and Mitsuru Kurosawa. Hiroshima: Hiroshima Peace Institute, 2004.




California: Stanford University Press, 2012.

"Chronology of Pakistan's Nuclear Development." Center for Nonproliferation 15

Studies. Sublette, Carey. "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program." Nuclear Weapons 16

Archive. January 2, 2002.

"Pakistani Nuclear History." International History Declassified.17

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Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Article 1 and 218


California: Stanford University Press, 2012.

Ibid. 105.20

Narang, Vipin. "Pakistan's Nuclear Posture: Implications for South Asian 21

Stability." Belfer Center for International Relations. 2010.

Ibid.22



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Private Military Firms: Providers of National Security by Maria Sanchez

Maria Sanchez is a fourth year undergraduate double majoring in Political Science, with a concentration in International Relations, and Global Studies, and minoring in Public Affairs. She is Publicity Director for the Political Science Student Organization and is currently writing a senior thesis on violent non-state actors and their impact on development and security. She plans on attending law school beginning fall 2017.

Introduction War is an unavoidable aspect of the current anarchic

global system. However, the nature of warfare has changed much throughout history. We currently are part of an increasingly globalized world where privatization is seen as key and the military industry is no exception. The growth of the privatized military industry has been enormous since the end of the Cold War; the industry currently includes several hundred companies and annual global revenues surpassing $100 billion US dollars. 1

Private military firms (PMFs), defined as profit-driven organizations that provide a wide range of military services, have established themselves as significant actors in conflicts across the globe.

These firms have the capability to completely alter the global security system as they join the modern battlefield, however, as much as they may serve to strengthen states’ coercive powers, they too can weaken it. Moreover, as profit driven corporations in the open market, their services can be acquired by anyone with adequate financial means. This then creates a challenge to states’ legitimate power on coercion that the Weberian model emphasizes as a unique quality of nation-states, as non-state actors can now gain access to military power. This paper will examine issues of accountability in regards to private military firms operating in the international system. Specific incidents involving firms will be used as examples to show the need for improvements within this international realm. Their rise in addition to the lack of accountability makes the issue of the commodification of security more pressing. Is national security something that can truly be provided best by the free market?

Rise of Private Military Industry The rise in the market for privatized military has been a remarkable element of the post-Cold War era. While most individuals are unaware private military firms exist, these organizations continue to possess increasing prominent roles in warfare. As stated by P.W. Singer there are three significant elements that led to the rise in the industry: the end of the Cold War, changes in the nature of warfare, and the rise in privatization as a global norm. As a result, this industry is very representative 2

of the security environment that has come about in the twenty-first century. The end of the Cold War brought immense changes in global dynamics. Then superpowers were no longer strong enough to ensure global order. As a result there has been an increase in ethnic and internal conflicts, while at the same time violent non-state actors began to emerge. These issues increased insecurity 3

and opened an avenue for private military firms to grow, as a market for their services was created. Furthermore, due to the reduction in militaries in the post Cold War era, various uniquely-qualified individuals became available for hire. Hence, the end of the Cold War ignited a significant rise in the supply and demand for PMFs. Secondly, the nature of war has changed drastically due to a rise in new technologies. As war has become increasingly technological, larger support networks have become necessary to operate sophisticated military systems. Private military firms are 4

able to fill these needs. Although less individuals are directly involved in combat, more are needed to fuel modern operations. Lastly, as globalization has spread, so has the idea of privatization. It has increasingly grown in appeal, being seen as a more efficient and effective way of providing services. Therefore, many nation-states have turned to the market to fill their security needs. These governments try to privatize any affairs that they believe can be handled outside the government. While the 5

aggregation of these three developments opened the market for the rise in the private military industry, but what does that mean for global security?

The Commodification of Security National security has generally been thought of as a

public good, and although non-excludable and non-rivalrous, it has been able to thrive in the private market in recent decades.

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However, just because the industry has thrived, does not mean security has been improved. After all, this is a business, and these corporations they are seeking profits and, as a result, benefit from the threats of insecurity. This is why accountability is imperative with the rise of private military firms.

The idea of security as a commodity is paradoxical. Firms, as previously stated, are concerned with profits and benefit when there is an increased sense of threat. Therefore, they are able to gain greater contracts when there is an immediate threat in which they can act against. However, with the best forms of security being prevention and deterrence, this goal of decreased 6

does not serve in the best interest of defense firms. For this reason, security is generally thought of as a public good provided by nation-states to their people. Defense firms are use, however, as states too think economically and therefore, view the market as a cheaper more efficient way to provide such goods. As a result, states are relying more on the private market for the provision of security. As a result, and because of the nature of warfare and its detrimental implications on human lives, the accountability of both private military firms and those who hire them becomes integral to maintaining a secure global system.

International Laws and PMFs International law has failed to keep up with the rapid rise of the private military industry and their increasing importance in global conflicts. These firms are now a significant component of large operations in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan. As of 2007, four billion dollars was being spent annually on private security contractors in Iraq compared to just one billion annually in 2003. These firms are making large sums of money and playing 7

powerful positions in global affairs, yet international laws have not been able to encompass them. As a result, PMFs are able to escape accountability, therefore creating further complications in international conflicts.

International law has long banned mercenaries in international warfare. In addition, many countries explicitly prohibit their citizens from enlisting in foreign armies. There have 8

been two particular documents that restricted mercenary activities Protocol 1 of the Geneva Convention of 1949 and the UN Mercenary Convention. Protocol 1 doesn’t allow mercenaries to 9

be considered prisoners of war. However the bigger implications for private military firms under this document is the definition of mercenaries. Their definition excludes “military trainers, advisors,

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and support staff” which encompasses the majority of activities that PMF’s fulfill. The UN Mercenary Convention tried to extend 10

the definition of mercenaries, but still failed to encompass PMFs because they tend to integrate their soldiers into client’s military forces. As a result PMF’s activities have largely been able to 11

operate out of the scope of international law. International law has allowed for this “jurisdictional gap”

because of the presumption that states are the only legitimate actors in warfare and as such they alone monopolize the use of force. However, in recent decades, this has clearly not been the 12

case. Although PMFs perform many of the same tasks which national militaries typically are charged with, international law has not modernized towards this idea. The frims' private, corporatized structure is something that has largely been able to elude international enforcement. This could become a larger issue for international security if contractors begin working to serve the interest of non-state actors, who themselves also do not have any accountability in the global sphere.

United States use of Private Military Firms The United States is the leading military power in the world and the largest employer of private military contractors. Between 1994 and 2002, the U.S. Department of Defense entered over 3,000 contracts with U.S. based firms, with a total estimated value of more than $300 billion US dollars. Additionally, the 13

United States has employed private military firms to supplement every major post-Cold War military operation the country has been part of; PMFs now provide the United States military with 14

logistical support for nearly every military deployment. Beyond that, these firms have even been charged with training the American military leaders of the future, and have taken over the operation of Reserve Officer Training Corps, better known as ROTC programs in over 200 universities across the country. 15

Clearly, the United States the leading force behind the continuous market for private military contractors. Although the accelerated use of private military firms took flight primarily after the end of the Cold War, its rise, at least in the United States, may have began earlier. In 1966, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) institutionalized a system that allowed private companies to compete with the armed forces for the provision of military services and products. The OMB 16

essentially encouraged a competition between the public and private spheres for the provision of national security. However, the

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OMB did make clear that there were some “inherently governmental” jobs that should not be outsourced to the private sector because they were “intimately related to the public interest.” While the private military industry didn’t begin its’ 17

ascend into lucrative wealth until decades later, its foundation was set.

Issues of Accountability These firms have been able to attain rapid and immense power, and now play a role in conflicts all over the world. Williams states, “traditionally, a nation’s criminal jurisdiction usually ended at its borders, and crimes were ordinarily proscribed, tried and punished in accordance with the law of the place where they occurred.” Now however, PMFs blur state accountability 18

and therefore undermine the “basic principles of international law.” States are no longer accountable for these private military contractors, however, international law also has no jurisdiction. 19

The “jurisdictional gap” creates this lack of accountability by contractors of a country operating overseas. U.S. contractors’ in countless instances have been able to work in this gap when operating abroad. They are not under the criminal jurisdiction of the United States but at the same time are not held criminally accountable by another sovereign state, and thus become able to operate essentially without much accountability. At the height of 20

U.S. involvement in both Iraq and Afghanistan, it is estimated that there were about 340,000 American civilian employees operating in these countries without any sort of criminal accountability. 21

These private military contractors, although operating under nation-states, were not bound by the same rules as national militaries, and therefore compromised overall accountability and security. An example of this lack of accountability and its correlating increase in the likelihood of human rights abuses was seen in Sierra Leone. The state government hired the South African private military firm Executive Outcomes (EO) to help control a rebellion within the state. EO quickly took control over all offensive operations on behalf of the government. However, when EO commanders were asked how to distinguish between rebels and civilians, they supposedly ordered pilots to “just kill everybody.” This is one of many brutal illustrations of how this 22

lack of accountability makes private military contractors dangerous for global security.

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Nevertheless, states can play a major role in creating accountability for private military firms. When international law is not being effective in limiting these firms, their host states, and those states using their services, should compensate with the necessary policies. It is said, “the international community’s fear of mercenaries’ lies in that they are wholly independent from any constraints built into the nation-state system.” Although they do 23

not fall upon the mercenary definition, private military firms create the same concerns. There are currently sixty-one active PMFs coming from only eleven host countries. This makes the idea of domestic 24

regulations much more feasible in creating accountability, than the currently deficient approach of international laws. Currently, only the United States and South Africa have laws explicitly regulating the activities of private military firms. In the United specifically, 25

the Arms Export Control Act regulates the export of both arms and military service. Additionally, the State Department requires that any PMF providing “strategic, training, or maintenance advice to foreign forces” register with them to obtain a license. Similarly, South Africa insists that there be state licensing of PMFs. If the 26

remaining nine host states are able to create similar systems of licensing, it will increase incentives for firms to act responsibly in order to maintain respectability in the market. Additionally, it should be considered that states limit a firms’ accountability as a result of the their employment to handle the states’ security needs abroad. Gul notes that private military contractors are dangerous “precisely because they allow states to bypass mechanism for state responsibility.” A state’s executive 27

may not be as bound to adhere to collective action within the country when they can just hire a private military firm. There is less need for popular support in a democracy when privately contracted soldiers can go out to fight instead of members of the state military. Regardless of any forms of restrictions, either national or internationally, PMFs are still bound to push boundaries become involved in negative encounters, as the market plays a larger influence in their industry than rule of law. The nature of warfare 28

is messy and these firms have incentives to win wars by any means necessary as they compete for the top contracts in the market. Blackwater has largely been known as the largest contractor of the United States government. In 2007 when the United States was spending four billion dollars annually on private contractors in Iraq, Blackwater was receiving 80% of these

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contracts. On September 17, 2007 17 Iraqi civilians were killed 29

by employees of Blackwater in what is known as the Nisour Square massacre in Baghdad. As a result of the controversy that 30

followed, the company rebranded itself as Xe and continued to gain large contracts. This further illustrates how these companies can bypass accountability in the global sphere.

Conclusion The rapid rise of the private military industry has created significant implications for global security. Private military firms are part of a multi-billion dollar industry which profits from the threat of insecurity on both a national and global scale. The international law isn't prepared for the new role that private military firms are playing. The United States, although in a better position, also appears unable or unwilling to provide the proper restraints. As a result issues of accountability have been a prominent topic of conversation as the industry continues to soar on the open market. Private military firms, with lax rules of accountability, present a danger not only to those directly involved in wars, but also to civilians in countries where they operate. Once hired, these firms act as agents for their clients but, are much more difficult to oversee and control. Consequently, these billion dollar corporations are challenging states’ legitimate power of coercion. Nonetheless, the downfall of private military firms does not seem eminent, as they have created a strong niche in the market for national security and are now seen as an integral part of many nations’ security operations. Security, something previously deemed a public good has become commodified. Whether one sees it for the better or worse, private military firms seem to be here to stay. Thus, the most immediate thing that can be done to limit the negative impact of PMFs on human lives is increase their accountability.

Singer, P. W. "War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and 1

International Law." Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 42.521 (2004): 522-49. Web. 2 June 2015.

Singer, P. W. "Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry 2

and Its Ramifications for International Security." International Security 26.3 (2002): 186-220. Web. 10 May 2015.

Ibid. 193.3

Ibid. 195.4

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Ibid. 197.5

Lee. Lecture Week 8, “Security: Collective Good or Commodity” 18 May 2015.6

Dunning, Rebecca. "Heroes or Mercenaries? Blackwater, Private Security 7

Companies, and the U.S. Military." The Kenan Institute for Ethics (n.d.): 2 June 2015. Stinnett, Nathaniel. "Regulating the Privatization of War." Boston College 8

International & Comparative Law Review 28.211 (2005): 211-23. Web. 22 May 2015.

Ibid.9

Ibid.10

Ibid.11

Stinnett, Nathaniel. "Regulating the Privatization of War." Boston College 12


Singer, P. W. "War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms 13

and International Law." Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 42.521 (2004): 522-49. Web. 2 June 2015.



Singer, P. W. "War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms 15

and International Law." Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 42.521 (2004): 522-49. Web. 2 June 2015.


Companies, and the U.S. Military." The Kenan Institute for Ethics (n.d.): 2 June 2015.

Ibid. 4.17

Williams, Alan F. "The Case for Overseas Article III Courts: The Blackwater 18

Effect and Criminal Accountability in the Age of Privatization." University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 44.1 (2011): 45-82. Web. 2 June 2015.

Gul, Saad. "The Secretary Will Deny All Knowledge of Your Actions." Lewis and 19

Clark Law Review 10.2 (2006): 287-320. Web. 22 May 2015. Williams, Alan F. "The Case for Overseas Article III Courts: The Blackwater 20


Ibid. 47.21



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Clark Law Review 10.2 (2006): 287-320. Web. 22 May 2015.



Ibid. 219.25

Ibid. 220.26


Clark Law Review 10.2 (2006): 287-320. Web. 22 May 2015.

Singer, P. W. "War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and 28

International Law." Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 42.521 (2004): 522-49. Web. 2 June 2015.


Companies, and the U.S. Military." The Kenan Institute for Ethics (n.d.): 2 June 2015.

Williams, Alan F. "The Case for Overseas Article III Courts: The Blackwater 30


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Consequences of Iraqi-De-Baathification by Cherish Marie Zinn

Cherish Zinn is a fourth year undergraduate double majoring in Political Science, with a concentration in International Relations, and Middle Eastern Studies. She is the Vice President of the Political Science Student Organization, founder of Bruin Intercollegiate Studies Institute, and will begin a MA in Statecraft and National Security Affairs at the Institute of World Politics in Fall 2016.

Introduction While the 2003 US invasion of Iraq led to the fall of abusive dictator Saddam Hussein and his Baathist party, it also contributed to the formation of a power vacuum in the weakened nation. Hussein’s ousting brought the Iraqi people a chance for political freedom while also ending a stable, established regime. This Baathist government was replaced by a series of US led reconstruction efforts ending with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), chaired by Ambassador Paul L. Bremer, who ran the interim organization from 21 April, 2003 to 28 June 2004. Decisions made by Bremer and other top policymakers of the Bush administration, paired with the new liberation of the Iraqi people, led to greater sectarian violence which ultimately proved catastrophic for the future of Iraq. This paper aims to outline the consequences of the Coalition Provisional Authority Orders 1 and 2, including the De-Baathification of the Iraqi political and military institutions, in hopes of explaining the emergence of the power vacuum in the nation which worked against US reconstruction efforts.

The Coalition Provisional Authority The Coalition Provisional Authority was the second interim US government in Iraq after the defeat and fall of the authoritarian regime of Saddam Hussein. Administrator of the organization, Ambassador Paul L. Bremer, was then presidential convoy to Iraq and a long time Department of State employee who served as a foreign service officer in various countries. While Bremer had incomparable experience as a diplomat and businessman, many argued against his placement within the CPA since he had limited experience in the Middle East.

The CPA had three main goals that Ambassador Bremer wished to accomplish before initiating the ultimate goal of handing the Iraqi government back to the Iraqi people. First, the security situation of the nation would have to be improved in order to develop stability on which to rebuild the Iraqi society. Even though official combat operations ended before the creation of the CPA, a growing insurgency intensified violence in Iraq, often targeting US forces. Second, Bremer needed to repair or rebuild the nation’s infrastructure, including the government’s ministries. In addition to the security issue that came as a result of the lack of order and law, widespread looting, which took place throughout Baghdad shortly after the fall of Saddam, left many government ministries and other forms of infrastructure, such as the oil refineries and power grid, destroyed. Third, Bremer and his team needed to organize a representative body which, it was thought, would lead the country’s push towards establishing a new constitution and running elections for the first time. As stated above, no power existed within the Iraqi political system that could begin to counter Saddam’s Sunni Baathists. As a result, there were limited sources in which to pull new leadership from for the nation. Therefore, Bremer and his team had to travel throughout the various ethnic and religious regions in the country recruiting respected individuals who would eventually form an inclusive governing council until the nation was in a state to hold secure, honest elections.

CPA Order 1 Less then a month after the establishment of his organization, Bremer released the first of what would end up as a hundred documents aiming to reconstruct war battered Iraq. Coalition Provisional Authority Order 1 is known as the “De-Baathification of Iraqi Society,” and succeeded to eliminate “Senior Party Members” from any position of civil service. It also banned them from future service in the private sector. The order defined “Senior Party Members” as those who were identified with the top four levels of the former Baathist party, more specifically group, section, branch, and regional command leaders. Additionally, the top three tiers of management of “national government ministry, affiliated corporations and other government institutions” would be intently interviewed for ties to the Baath 1

Party, including lower member and active member tiers. Those labeled as a security risk would be removed from government employment. There is no clause in the order, however, that bans

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the fourth and fifth levels of Baath membership from future employment in government institutions. There exists many reasons for Bremer to issue such an order. First, the disestablishment of any ties between the former regime and the newly sprouting Iraqi institutions would limit the possibility for Saddam’s Baathists to regain power and influence in the nation. As the insurgency in Iraq began surfacing, this distancing would also provide greater security for the new Iraqi government. Bremer also explained his intentions to be a response to the brutality of Saddam’s former regime. The order is quoted to recognize the “large scale human rights abuses and deprivations” and note the “threat” and “intimidation” that the Iraqi citizens 2

encountered at the hands of the Baathists.

CPA Order 2 The second order issued by Paul Bremer’s organization was the CPA Order 2 or the “Dissolution of Entities.” While this order was issued to dissolve all defense, intelligence, and related organizations within the Iraqi government, its primary implication was its inclusive termination of the Iraqi military, which included the Republican Guard, Navy, and Air Force. All chain of 3

command, rank, title, or status which once resulted from the Iraqi military was also canceled. In addition, Bremer added any member of the military holding the rank of Colonel or above in the former regime to his past classification of “Senior Party Member,” unless they were able to prove to the CPA otherwise. Finally, the order stated that all of the property once owned by these organizations was now under the authority of the Administrator, Paul Bremer himself. Ambassador Bremer’s reasons to issue this order were aligned closely to those of the first order. Primarily, he feared that possible military loyalties to Saddam’s regime would threaten his efforts to reconstruct the nation. Furthermore, the Iraqi people would never begin the transition towards governmental trust if the same people who conducted themselves with brutality towards Iraqi citizens kept their positions after the fall of Saddam’s regime.

Political Consequences 2003-2006 The CPA Order 1 purged the Iraqi government of anyone who identified as or was tied to the upper levels of the Baath party. Therefore, all senior political, military, and civil leaders within Iraq’s exclusive society were removed from employment, leaving

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the entire top tier of Iraqi society vacant. Additionally, as CIA station chief in Baghdad, Charlie Sidell explained to Bremer: “[Y]ou will have between 30,000 and 50,000 Baathists go underground by sundown; the number is closer to 50 than to 30.” 4As a result of being the only existing political party during Saddam’s reign, the Baath party, although a minority, became a sizable group within Iraqi society. Therefore, the De-Baathification order isolated many employees, forcing them into unemployment. This provided the US with their first of many Iraqi subpopulations that would become disenfranchised from the Iraqi reconstruction efforts. Bremer’s first CPA order also did little to help improve Iraq’s already failing infrastructure. Many of the governmental leaders who were removed through the De-Baathification order came from head offices of each of Iraq’s ministries. Consequently, the Iraqi government largely stalled after the order, causing all government funding, revenue, and services to halt. This combined with a great influx of looting in the streets of Baghdad which had the effect of destroying many ministry buildings and structures, ultimately made Iraqi reconstruction even more difficult. In additional to the looting of the ministries, much of the Iraq’s power grid and oil infrastructure were also targeted by those looking for quick profit. This provided an even worse situation for the CPA, leaving the organization to reconstruct a war-torn, fractious nation with no governmental foundation or means of revenue. Alongside its effects on Iraqi infrastructure, CPA Order 1 also forced an overall reorganization of the Iraqi political system. While this was a primary objective of the order, it’s ability to demolish all of Iraq’s political institutional memory was greatly underestimated. As mentioned, the Baath party was the only significant party that was legal in the country under Saddam, therefore many political opposition leaders were forced into exile during Saddam’s rule. This left no opposition within Iraq who could restore order after the Baathist collapse, allowing the formation of an early power vacuum in the nation. Moreover, this vacuum could not be filled by immediate elections since no political foundation remained in the country. Bremer described the political condition of Iraq during this time stating that, “Thirty years of tyranny had gravely distorted civil administration, jurisprudence, and any semblance of representing governance. Elections and the rule of law had been a rude charade.” If Bremer 5

was going to succeed in the formation of a democratic Iraq, he would have to build an entirely new political groundwork,

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including reintroducing political parties into the nation and leading the efforts for the Iraqis to write a new constitution.

Iraqi Governing Council Bremer’s strategy in forming a new Iraqi government began by recruiting the former politicians, who were exiled abroad under Saddam, to return to Iraq. This movement was ignited by what Bremer nicknamed the “Council of Exile,” a group of seven former Iraqi political leaders who would provide the foundation for a new Iraqi democracy. Bremer’s goal was to add to this group until it was representative of Iraqi society, containing a proportionate number of Sunni, Shia, Kurds, men, and women, and then transfer authority from the CPA to this Iraqi Governing Council (IGC). Once the group contained a representative number of around thirty members, Bremer planned to, “officially name the enlarged body the ‘interim administration’ and then quickly give it ministerial power.” It was important to Bremer and other senior 6

US government officials to put the Iraqi government into the hands of the Iraqi people as soon as a stable enough body existed to maintain control. This would provide the entire political process with greater legitimacy in the eyes of Iraqi citizens. While the sprouting IGC clearly needed US assistance, the CPA understood that prolonged, intense US influence in Iraqi governing affairs would lead to increased anti-Coalition sentiments. This was echoed in a conversation between IGC member Dr. Ahmad Chalabi and Ambassador Bremer, where Dr. Chalabi explains how any potential slowing of a political transition to the IGC would not be a good “signal” to the Iraqi people. Bremer followed by declaring, “the president has been very clear. We will stay in Iraq until the job is done but not a day longer.” Dr. Chalabi followed, “I know he [President Bush] said that. But by going slowly, you give the impression to some people that America wants to stay in Iraq.” This exchange between the current and a 7

future leader of Iraq reveals misunderstandings of both the political processes occurring and desired outcome. First, Dr. Chalabi, as well as the entirety of the IGC underestimated the process of reconstruction, and the necessity of a complete inclusive political body. The basic principles of democracy are new to these emerging national leaders, leading them to undervalue the importance of time in the transition of power. This time would allow the Iraqi society to develop balanced political parties, notable candidates, and a generally informed electorate, all of which took a significant span of time to blossom. Additionally,

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this dialogue between these leaders hinted at inconstancies relating to the overall end state of the CPA. As an experienced American politician, Bremer was well informed of the complexities of democratic governments and developed his actions aiming towards a stable Iraqi democracy. Even though Dr. Chalabi (a Shia Muslim) supported Bremer’s promotion of democracy, he focused a greater bulk of his efforts towards establishing Shia dominance in the evolving political system. No matter how cooperative Dr. Chalabi was towards Bremer’s plans, it would take a great deal of work on Bremer’s part to help the Shia leaders of Iraq to begin mending the sectarian-fueled mistrust of their Sunni counterparts, which they developed under Saddam’s rule. This glimpse of mistrust between Shia and Sunni leaders of the IGC stood as the first hint at the political “tug of war” that developed within the post invasion Iraqi government. This political stalemate within the IGC continued until and beyond 13 July 2003 when the CPA officially rolled over authority of the Iraqi state to a twenty-five person, ethno-religiously proportionate Iraqi Governing Council.

Military Consequences 2003-2006 While the CPA was initiating the full implementation of De-Ba’athification, Paul Bremer was simultaneously combatting a decreasing security situation in the nation. This increase in violence rapidly developed into an insurgency in Iraq, as US military leaders and policy makers made numerous small decisions which, when combined, worked to segregate portions of Iraqi society. Upon the US invasion of Iraq, the Iraqi forces simply deserted, which allowed for quick combat operations. However, this “self demobilization” was in part due to deals the CPA’s predecessor made to moderate Iraqi officers; if their men resisted confrontations with Coalition forces, they would be recalled into the new Iraqi army. This promise, however, was not carried through to the CPA’s administration. Bremer believed, like the Baathist party, Saddam’s Army was one of the former dictator’s “instrument of repression” and therefore held the nation back from reconstruction. On the flip side of the argument, Franklin C. Miller, member of Bush’s National Security Council during the time of the invasion, explained the fear others had in regards to Bremer’s plan. He recalls, “It was recommended to maintain the regular Iraqi army as an institution, as we believed it would be dangerous to put 300,000 men on the street with guns, without jobs.” As 8

feared by some within the Bush administration, the CPA Order 2 !85

created a 400,000 man influx of newly unemployed and mostly uneducated, yet armed, men onto the already insecure Iraqi streets. These former soldiers were angry with the US’s unfulfilled promises and were desperate to locate some form of income to support their families. As a result, these men, who held no loyalty to the US and often very limited loyalties to their national government, simply followed financial opportunities regardless of if they supported or opposed Coalition causes. In addition to unanswered promises, the US did not provide adequate resources to fill the security gap that existed between the end of combat operations and the formation of new Iraqi forces. In Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War, a book written by the National Defense University’s Institute for National Security Studies, coeditors Dr. Joseph J. Collins and Dr. Richard D. Hooker, explain, “Because there were not enough forces to occupy the entirety of Iraqi population centers, these ‘Former Regime Elements’ had time and space to recover and organize their forces for a campaign against the coalition.” Baath 9

Party loyalists were able to take advantage of the inadequate number of troops who were stationed in country by mobilizing disgruntled “Former Regime Elements” against US forces. These hostile forces eventually spread thought Iraq, succeeding in creating an even worse security situation. In order to combat Iraq’s declining environment, Paul Bremer needed to quickly begin the long process of creating a new military. In August 2003 Bremer issued the 22nd order of the CPA, the Creation of a New Iraqi Army. When he did this, the true effect of Order 2 became clear. The 22nd order begins by recalling the Army’s dissolution and acknowledging the need to establish an armed body as a new institution. The order then describes the basic framework of the military, from code of conduct and purpose, to rank structure and personal requirements. The inclusion of these 10

rudimentary principles show how immature the organization was, and how much time and resources it would take to form the military into an effective institution. Continuing, Order 22 also establishes the new Iraqi Military as a volunteer service with a twenty-six month minimum term of office. The volunteer, and extremely short nature of these military enlistments will later prove to be a hindrance in formatting an institutional memory for the new army, as training had to stay limited and soldier turnover rates proved to be high.

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Insurgency By early 2004, the incomplete approach towards the defense of Iraqi society, stemming from the initial effects of the CPA’s second order, allowed the disgruntled citizens and the expelled Baathist members to join together and refocus their efforts against Coalition forces. The first battle of Fallujah in Spring 2004 marked the initial heights of the insurgency within the country. Known as the city of mosques, Fallujah provided a home for the two most intense battles of the Iraq War. As a large suburb forty-three miles west of Baghdad, Fallujah lays in Iraqi’s, Al-Anbar province and provided a safe haven to former Baathists during the war. Fallujah provides an useful case study regarding Iraqi insurgency as its population is comprised of 95% Sunni Muslims, many of whom turned towards violence as Coalition and Shia leaders rose in Saddam’s shadow. The first battle in the city was sparked by an insurgent ambush that targeted a group of four Blackwater USA military contractors, where insurgents murdered the contractors, and hung their burned bodies from a bridge in the city. The Sunnis in Fallujah were directly effected by Bremer’s order as interpreted by former CPA Military Strategist, Colonel Thomas X. Hammes: “Now you have a couple hundred thousand people who are armed, cause they took their weapons home with them, who know how to use the weapons, who have no future and have a reason to be angry at you.” While Hammes’s analysis 11

stands true for the entire country, it proved to be exaggerated in Fallujah as the quantity of both hostile personnel and hidden weapon caches located in the city soared above that of the rest of the nation.

Sunni Awakening To combat this now overwhelming insurgency, General David Petraeus rallied for Sunni support, hoping moderate Sunni tribal leaders in Al-Anbar could be paid to provide resistance against their extremist counterparts. Petraeus, “placed ‘local security bargains’, deals between neighborhood militias and the US military, at the center of consolidating and expanding the security gains made my the US military operations.” This 12

concept, called the Sunni Awakening, began in the Al-Anbar province and was met with much skepticism by the international community. Many thought it counterintuitive to arm the same Muslim sect that were the least predictable in their ties to the insurgency. However, as we have already concluded, many of the

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low-end hostile fighters were more in line with a chance for income then any ideology. Therefore, Petraeus’s attempts in allying with moderate Sunni tribesmen both worked to keep moderate Sunnis engaged outside of the insurgency, and assisted to begin bridging the fracture between the Iraqi populations. If the principles of the Sunni Awakening proved effective, moderate Sunni and Shia Muslims would unite towards a common cause: defeating the insurgency. In fact, this concept worked. With help from an increased US presence in the country, these Sunni tribesmen assisted in forming an Iraq with the lowest rates of violence in years. This, paired with the first Iraq elections in January 2005 and May 2006, began to pave the way towards a blossoming Iraqi democracy.

Nouri al-Maliki On 20 May 2006, Nouri al-Maliki was democratically elected as Prime Minister of Iraq. He was a Shia Muslim of the formerly illegal Islamic Dawa Party, who lived abroad in exile during the Hussein regime. Maliki came to office with little experience and connection to the current state of Iraqi society, due to his 24 year exile in Iran, and therefore required much mentorship from a trusting US President George W. Bush. While US officials were optimistic towards the new leader, hoping he would assist the US push towards a democratic Iraq, Maliki quickly pulled away from his initial democratic tendencies and grasped power with an increasingly authoritarian nature. As the US began to give Maliki increased independence in order to begin to turn the government over to the Iraqi people, he started to act on fear of challenge, grasping power with a rigid approach. Toby Dodge described Maliki’s actions as, “[F]aced with a fractured political elite consumed with infighting and self-enrichment, Maliki placed the Malikiyoun (his crony followers) at the center of a network of influence.” Fear of rebellion led Maliki 13

to undo all the work of the CPA. His reinstitution of sectarian favoritism into the Iraqi “representative” government caused the invalidation of the organization, essentially causing the history of the IGC to be proven pointless. Even though Shia Muslims fill the authoritarian seat this time, the general lack of equality and compromise between the Islamic sects caused a repeat decline in political freedom and confidence that paralleled to Saddam’s Baathist regime.

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Not only did Maliki lead Iraqi’s political matters with crony leaders, he also altered the US built military in favor of Shia dominance. In an interview for PBS, The Gamble author Thomas Ricks stated, “Maliki gets rid of a lot of well trained commanders in the Iraqi army and replaces them with political loyalists. Its as if he's more worried about a coup then he is in having an effective military.” Maliki, once again afraid of challenge, traded 14

experience for guaranteed loyalty. This isolated angry Sunni commanders as well as many Sunni followers, leading to additional fuel for the insurgency. These actions also began the eventual conversion of the Sunni Awakening tribesman from friend to foe, as the tribesman greatly resented their declining political status. The rise and fall of a Nouri al-Maliki would not have been likely outside of the political and military vacuums created by the CPA orders. While President Bush did trust Maliki, Bush and the rest of the US government did not have many viable non-Baathist options to head the new Iraqi government after the first CPA order.

Civil War The combined actions by the Sunni Awakening tribesmen and Prime Minister Maliki paved the way for deepened sectarian rifts within Iraq, a majority of such Iraq has still failed to mend. The Sunni-dominated insurgency in Iraq progressively transformed into a nationwide civil war as anti-Coalition violence turned overwhelmingly sectarian, leading to a cycle of attack and retaliation between the Sunni and Shia populations. On 22 February 2006 the Al-Askari Mosque in Samarra was bombed and destroyed by what many believe to be a symbolic, religion based attack against Shia Muslims. This event is described by some as the final event that provided the catalyst for the beginning of the outright civil war within Iraq, a concept further examined by Dr. Collins, “In February 2006, Iraq exploded in sectarian violence after the bombing of the Shiite al-Askari mosque in Samarra … Shiite militias went on the warpath after the bombing, and al Qaeda exploited the alienation of the Sunni from the Shia-dominated Iraqi government under Nouri al-Maliki.” Since the 15

2003 invasion, but with extreme emphasis after the destruction of Al-Askari, Iraqi society became a battlefield of exploited opportunity. This terrorist exploitation of the sectarian disorder of Iraqi political and security structure created the foundation for the failing of the Iraqi state. Dodge adds, “[The] Iraqi state lost the

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ability to control its own borders, which has left Baghdad vulnerable to extended covert and overt interference from its neighbors.” This national collapse led to an immense power 16

vacuum which kept Iraq from securing its borders when neighboring Syria spiraled into its own internal conflict, spilling terrorist leaders across the border. Baathists and the Islamic State While the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) has never been limited to the borders of Iraq, no matter how porous, longterm ties to De-Baathification and forced demilitarization helped provide resources and leadership for the group. This convergence between former Baathist leaders and current members of ISIS is examined by Truls Hallberg Tonnessen in an article titled, “Heirs of Zarqawi or Saddam? The Relationship Between al-Qaida in Iraq and the Islamic State.” Tonnessen begins by explaining, “the top leadership of ISIS seems to have been populated by former Iraqi officers who were removed from their positions when the Iraqi army was disbanded in 2003.” This 17

analysis directly correlates to CPA Order 2. As noted, the Sunni leaders of Saddam’s regime became isolated from the state and were pushed into radicalization, ultimately aligning themselves with the extreme ideology of ISIS. Furthermore, Maliki’s authoritarian surge worked to push away Sunni leaders, forcing them to unite with other outside radicals until all remotely related terror networks unified their efforts against the Iraqi state.

Conclusion Even though combat operations in Iraq at the beginning of the US invasion were relatively painless, the CPA’s following reconstruction efforts proved overwhelmingly more complex. In the name of security, Paul Bremer demolished the Baath Party and military institution, however, this led to an extreme influx of disenfranchised citizens onto Iraqi streets. Additionally, rivalries within the IGC limited the organizations overall effectiveness. Democratic hope, however, did manage to emerge during the early days of 2006, but was short lived once Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and General Petraeus’s Sunni Awakening backfired, ultimately increasing the extent of sectarian violence. This violence quickly spiraled into a full blown civil war, spreading to a regional conflict with the addition of the Syrian conflicts. Circumstances continued to decline, allowing the ever present CPA created power vacuum in Iraq to expand rapidly, allowing now

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isolated former Baathist members to align with emerging terrorist networks. These groups grew until ISIS claimed a global caliphate in the Summer of 2014. The events which followed the US invasion of Iraq stand as an omnipresent reminder that, while intentions may prove sincere, a nation’s indecision toward full intellectual and material commitment to a conflict can lead to vacuums of power strong enough to inhale entire nations.

Coalition Provisional Authority. Order 1: De-Ba’athification of Iraqi 1

Society. 2003.

Ibid.2

Coalition Provisional Authority. Order 2: Dissolution of Entities with Annex A. 3

2003. Rudd, Gordon W. Reconstructing Iraq: Regime Change, Jay Garner, and the 4

ORHA Story. Lawrence: U of Kansas, 2011. Print. 313.

Bremer, L. Paul., and Malcolm McConnell. My Year in Iraq. New York: 5

Threshold Editions, 2006. Print. 79.

Ibid.6

Ibid. 89.7

Franklin C. Miller as interviewed in: Frontline: Losing Iraq. Documentary. 8

Directed by Michael Kirk. PBS, 2014. 16:10.

Richard D. Hooker and Joseph J. Collins. Lessons Encountered: Learning from 9

the Long War NDU Press, 2015. 96. Coalition Provisional Authority. Order 22: Creation of a New Iraqi Army. 2003.10

Colonel Thomas X. Hammes as interviewed in: Frontline: Losing Iraq. 11

Documentary. Directed by Michael Kirk. PBS, 2014. 16:52.

Dodge, Toby. Iraq: From War to a New Authoritarianism. London: International 12

Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012. Print. 95. Ibid.13

Thomas Ricks as interviewed in: Frontline: Losing Iraq. Documentary. Directed 14

by Michael Kirk. PBS, 2014. 1:06:40.

Richard D. Hooker and Joseph J. Collins. Lessons Encountered: Learning from 15

the Long War NDU Press, 2015. 68. Dodge, Toby. Iraq: From War to a New Authoritarianism. London: International 16

Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012. Print. 208.

Truls Hallberg Tonnessen. "Heirs of Zarqawi Or Saddam? The Relationship 17

between Al-Qaida in Iraq and the Islamic State.” Perspectives on Terrorism 9, no. 4 (2015).

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The National Security Dilemma: Democrats v. Republicans

by Tomas Arriaga

Tomas Arriaga is a third year undergraduate majoring in Political Science, with a concentration in American Politics, and a minor in Public Affairs. He is the President of the Political Science Student Organization and an UCLA Law School: Law Fellow. He hopes to enter the legal field and practice business law and public interest law.

Introduction “Democrats are good for the economy and Republicans

are good for national security.” That is how the saying goes anyways. It has been uncovered through past research that laissez-faire policies had far less benefits than expected, meaning the economy soars better under Democratic Presidents. Accordingly 1

with the drastic effects of the Great Recession, a majority of Americans have also come to understand that Democrats are better for the economy. Due to this, the first part of the saying need not be analyzed in this paper; instead the second part must be researched. It seems reasonable that Republicans would be better for national security because many Republicans would choose national security over civil-liberties and rights any day, but could not Democrats, as the “protectors” of Civil liberties and rights, do the same if they had to? Democratic presidents have done this in the past and it could be assumed they will continue chose national security over Civil liberties and rights. Thus, there is still no definitive answer as to which party is better in national security since throughout our history Presidents of both parties have succeeded and failed in issues dealing with foreign policy and national security.

A national security crisis arises no matter which party is in the Oval Office. In this situation partisanship is mostly put to the side, as it should be, and presidents act to protect and serve the whole country. This reality leads me to believe pressure from a national security crisis is enough to make any president, regardless of partisanship, rise up and fulfill their role as Head of State, Head of Government, and Commander-in-Chief. With this underlying assumption in hand, I believe saying that one party, Republicans, is better than the other when it comes to issues of national security was created and circulated by the media bias. Due to this, I

hypothesize the source of the media, either conservative or liberal, leads to more support of one party over the other. For example, foreign policy coverage in a liberal source, like MSNBC, would give Democratic presidents more support, while alternate coverage in a conservative source, like FOX News, would lead to more opposition towards Democratic presidents and vise versa. With this in mind I believe the data will demonstrate a good amount of people believe a president from the opposing party would not do a better job at handling the crisis. My relatively straightforward hypotheses are summarized in the following section:

H1 – Liberal Media: Coverage from left-leaning sources, in my case MSNBC, would lead to more support for Democratic presidents. H2 – Conservative Media: Coverage from right-leaning sources, FOX News in this case, would lead to more opposition for Democratic Presidents. H3 – National Security: Even with this bias people would generally not believe a president from the other party would do an immensely better job at handling the crisis.

Method To test these hypotheses I conducted an experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk, which is a service that pays participants to answer surveys. Unfortunately, my research revolves only around President Obama and his foreign policy because he is currently in office. However, if I had more time I would conduct the same experiment when a Republican President returns to office. The exact procedures of the experiment were as follows. First, participants where split into 3 groups and shown a news excerpt, related to President Obama and his foreign policy towards the Middle East. Each group received the exact same excerpt with the only difference being each group was told the news excerpts came from different sources or were not given a source. Figure 1 demonstrates Group A was told their excerpt came from MSNBC, Group B was told their excerpt came from FOX News, and Group C were not given a source, as such acts as my control. I originally planned to have a sample size of 100 (N=100) with Group A and B having a sample size of 35 and Group C of 30, but, due to the lack of time and money my sample size ended up being 85 (N=85). Group A has a sample size of 28 (n=28), Group B has 32 (n=32), and Group C has 25 (n=25). It is important to note the true source of the news excerpt came from BBC News. I chose to use BBC

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News as the news excerpt instead of using another source or creating my own because according to a Pew Research Study it is among the most trusted than distrusted sources by both conservatives and liberals alike. Accordingly, I chose the fairest 2

article I could find that primarily is informatory and shows both sides of the argument. An example of the instructions and news excerpt from Group C is shown below: Thank you for participating in our survey. Please read the following short news excerpt [added from MSNBC or FOX News for other two groups] and then answer the questions that follow.

Republicans and now some Democrats have criticized Mr Obama's plans, seizing on his earlier statements that the militants had been "contained". "We are going to continue the strategy that has the best chance of working," he told reporters in Turkey on Monday. However, he said the US would intensify its efforts against the militants. At times sounding frustrated, Mr Obama pushed back against those who say the US is not doing enough to stop IS. "This is not a traditional military opponent. We can retake territory and as long as we keep our troops there we can hold it. But that does not solve the underlying problem of eliminating the dynamics that are producing these kinds of violent, extremist groups," Mr. Obama said. Mr. Obama said most of differences among his political opponents on how to fight IS is about tone not tactics… Although most Republicans have opposed Mr Obama's IS policies, some fellow Democrats are breaking ranks to criticize the president. "[IS] is not contained. [IS] is expanding," said Democratic Senator Dianne Feinstein of California.

Figure 1

Group A: (n=28)

Told source of news coverage

was from MSNBC.

Group B: (n=32)

Told source of news coverage was from FOX

News.

Group C (No Treatment): (n=25)

Source of news coverage not given.

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After reading the news excerpt, respondents were asked to answer questions related to their approval of Obama’s foreign policy and partisanship the best they could with the given answers. It is important to note that participants were not allowed to “cop out” in choosing a middle answer such as: “Don’t Know”, “Unsure”, or “Independent”. These options were not included because if they were some participants would more than likely choose them, effectively altering the results. By removing the option it forces the individual to decide close to what they would really decide in real life. Additionally, I made it possible so respondents would not be able to return to the previous page and made them answer each question in order to move on so they could be forced to answer. In doing so, this process did not allow respondents to change their answers once they discovered what I was trying to get from them. For example, in leaving the question dealing with partisanship at the end they were given the option of not constraining their answers to fit answers closely related to their Party. Accordingly, if they were given this question first one can assume respondents would then tailor their future answers to match their Party affiliation. Below are the questions and answers respondents were given:

Question 1: Do you favor or oppose President Obama’s foreign policy towards ISIS?

(Favor), (Oppose) Question 2: Do you believe a Republican president would

have a better foreign policy? (Very unlikely), (Somewhat unlikely),

(Somewhat likely), (Very likely) Question 3: Generally speaking, do you consider yourself

more of a Republican or Democrat? (Strong Republican), (Republican), (Lean Republican), (Lean Democrat), (Democrat), (Strong Democrat)

Since my answers were non-numerical, I gave each answer a numerical value starting from 1. For example, for the third question the answers given values are as follows: (Strong Republican=1), (Republican=2), (Lean Republican=3) …and so on to make (Strong Democrat=6). In creating these questions I figured people would act according to Albert Gunther’s findings that people make inferences about the climate of opinion based on their

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reading of the news, especially the perceived slant of that news. 3

This experiment also calls to attention framing effects and how they impact people’s reaction because my experiment uses framing effects through the given sources. The results of this experiment could support the hostile media effect or, as I hypothesized, support the idea that issue partisans tend to have a “bias against bias,” whereby they perceive less bias in opinionated news that are closer to their beliefs with which they are already predisposed to agree with. Surprisingly, the results of my experiment did not 4

support my first two hypotheses and instead supports the hostile media effect.

Results As mentioned the results did not support my original two hypotheses and instead tends to support the opposite effect. This might be due to the lack of time and resources needed to extend the experiment or because of my small sample size. My results found a majority in Group A that received a liberal source, MSNBC, tended to oppose President Obama’s foreign policy. My first hypothesis that coverage from a left-leaning source would lead to more support for Obama was not supported. Instead, only 42.86% of respondents were in favor of Obama’s foreign policy after reading a news source from a liberal media outlet, such as MSNBC. While a good amount, 57.14%, of respondents did not believe Obama was doing a good job when it came to the nation’s national security after reading the “liberal” piece. The average of this data set was 1.57 showing that the results were indeed closer to 2, which meant a respondent was opposed to Obama’s foreign policy. Of those who responded to survey 60.71% were in the “lean Democrat” to “strong Democrat” spectrum. This means 39.29% of respondents where some form of Republican. Overall, “lean Democrat” was the largest party affiliation in this group with 50% of respondents claiming it. The average partisanship answer is right in-between “lean Republican” and “lean Democrat” at 3.5. Surprisingly, overall 58.82% of Democrats in all opposed Obama’s foreign policy. Of those who “opposed” Obama’s foreign policy 56.25% were some form of Democrat, while only 41.66% of those who “favored” Obama’s foreign policy were on the Republican side. This result could either show that more Democrats are turning hawkish and believe Obama is too weak when it comes to foreign policy or it could be the opposite in that Democrats are becoming more pacifist and disagree with the use of using air attacks and training rebels. This result should be studied more in

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depth by other research to find which outcome it likely is. Whatever the answer may be it is clear from this group that respondents tended to ignore and refute the news excerpt because they believed it came from a “biased” source in MSNBC. Accordingly, my second hypothesis that coverage from FOX News would lead to more opposition for Democratic Presidents was also not supported by my results. Instead, my results from Group B showed 56.25% of respondent’s “favored” Obama’s foreign policy, while 43.75% “opposed” it. The average of this data was 1.44 showing that the results were indeed closer to 1, which meant a respondent “favored” his foreign policy. Of those who responded to the survey 81.25% were in the “lean Democrat” to “strong Democrat” spectrum. This meant 18.75% of respondents were some form of Republican. This result clearly does not represent the nation’s population as a whole, and instead could be the result of a random sample or maybe due to the use of more liberals using Amazon Mechanical Turk. Overall, “lean Democrat” again was the largest party affiliation in this group with 53.13% of respondents claiming it. Again of those who opposed Obama’s foreign policy the number of those on the Democrat side was high at 64.39%, but this time this group only consisted of 37.5% of all Democrats. Here, the average partisanship for respondents was “lean Democrat” with it being 4.06. However, 80% of Republican-siders opposed Obama’s foreign policy, while only 20% favored it. This result is interesting because it could demonstrate that of those Republican leaners who received their excerpt from FOX News all but one believed the article was posing the argument against Obama. As Stefano DellaVigna found this Fox News effect could be a temporary learning effect for rational voters, or a permanent effect for non-rational voters who were subject to this type of persuasion. It would be interesting to discover which one of these 5

possibilities it could be by having a follow up experiment with these respondents. This result could also have the possibility of signifying that Republican voters tend to accept material from like-minded sources compared to Democrats. If the sample size and study was extended and this result stayed the same it also has the possibility of supporting my second hypothesis. Group C, my control group, had the closest results out of all three groups possibly due to the fact respondents in this group were not primed to act in one way. Thus, they acted as they would have regularly. This supports James Druckman’s findings that framing effects can be quite sensitive to slight contextual changes, in this case being just the addition of a “source”. The actual 6

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figures were 44% in “favor” of Obama’s foreign policy and 56% “opposed” to it. Interestingly enough the percentage in favor is nearly identical to Gallup’s most recent approval rating for President Obama, which is at 46%. Overall, this group tended to 7

align itself with their partisanship, in that 58% of Democratic-siders voted in favor while 87% of Republican-siders voted against. This could be the result of polarization but it is noteworthy that again a good amount of Democrat-siders voted in the opposition, with the percentage of Democrats in the opposition at 50%. Again, this could be the result of having a small sample size or it could have implications that support Republicans being more polarized than their liberal counterparts. Although my first two hypotheses were not supported by my findings, my final hypothesis found support in my results. H3 states people would generally not believe a president from the other party would do an immensely better job at handling the crisis. Each group had a good amount of respondent who did not believe a President from the opposite party would handle the situation better. Group A tended to have the closest results with 57.15% of respondents believing that a Republican president would be “very unlikely” and “somewhat unlikely” in doing a better job in keeping our national security safe. Accordingly, it was the only group that had the greatest support in “somewhat unlikely”, at 39.29%, over “very unlikely”. The overall average for this group was at 2.43 meaning “somewhat unlikely”. For Group C the option “very unlikely” had the highest support at 36% and combined with “somewhat unlikely” the doubters made up 60%. Here, the average was 2.2 again siding fairly with “somewhat unlikely.” Group B had the greatest impact in supporting my hypothesis with 81.25% of respondents being doubters. 46.88% of those believe it is “very unlikely” that a Republican president would do a better job when it comes to foreign policy/national security. As a result, the average for this group was smaller than the others at 1.81 siding the closest to “very unlikely” compared to the others. Thus, it appears these results support my third hypothesis or at the very least could signify that indeed Democrats are just as good in national security as they are with the economy.

Discussion As expected a respondent’s own group identification proved to be the strongest predictor because they usually tended to vote along party lines. Accordingly, respondents also tended to 8

view political coverage as biased even though the excerpts were !98

the same and devoted equal time to both sides of the debate. In 9

doing so, respondents acted against my hypothesis and as such lead us to question Rodger Giner-Sorolla’s findings that respondents tend to selectively categorize specific items in a direction favorable to their attitude. In my experiment, a majority 10

of respondents refuted a source that would be closer to their views, with the exception of Republican leaner’s in Group B. This behavior instead tends to support the hostile media effect and Kevin Acreneaux’s findings that news that counters your beliefs is more likely to induce hostile media perceptions than news closer to your attitudes. In this case, most respondents refuted the 11

source they were given because they believed the source’s argument was biased in that a majority opposed Obama’s stance after reading “MSNBC”, while a majority supported him after reading “FOX News”. This might be so because a majority of Amazon Mechanical Turk users are probably the most aware about politics, since they spend their time and care enough to answer political polls. Due to this, they usually already come with their minds made and wont let new information, or a news source, change it. This supports John Zaller’s findings that the most aware remain unchanged and refute new information because they are already too critically inclined to accept a new message. Overall, I 12

come to conclude that my first two hypotheses were not supported because respondents believed the articles had some sort of bias and as such refuted it completely. Due to this, more research is needed in the hostile media effect and as to the effects of media bias in general. Ultimately, solutions must be uncovered as to eliminate or curtail bias. Accordingly, this experiment should be recreated and expanded to include a greater sample size and use more and better resources because the major drawback to this experiment was indeed the lack of time and resources. As stated before another interesting finding in my research was that a decent proportion of Democrat-siders gave their support to the opposition in each group. Due to this phenomenon new research is needed as to uncover why this occurred and if a possible answer could be that divisions are starting to form in the Democratic Party as the Republican Party.

Deirtrick, Bob, & Goldfarb, Lew. Bulls Bears and the Ballot Box Wallet. 1

(Charleston: Advantage Media Group, 2012).

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