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Paul Carelli Psychic Representation in Platos Phaedrus Abstract: The three parts of the soul in the Myth of the Chariot are most often understood to correspond to the three parts of the soul in the Republic, with the charioteer representing the rational part of the soul, the white horse the spirited part and the black horse the appetites. Such an interpretation, how- ever, is at odds both with the suggestion at the end of the Republic that the soul is a unity when it is free of the body and with the creation of the human soul in the Timaeus, where the soul receives its spirited and appetitive parts only after embodiment. Further, this interpretation causes problems with the elements of the Myth of the Chariot itself. In this paper I argue that it is better to understand the elements in the Phaedrus myth as representing divisions within rational soul. Keywords: Plato, Phaedrus, soul DOI 10.1515/apeiron-2014-0018 Introduction At least since the time of Plutarch 1 it has been a commonplace that the soul represented by the Myth of the Chariot in Platos Phaedrus is the tri-partite soul of the Republic, with the charioteer standing for reason, the white horse for the spirited part of the soul, and the black horse for the appetites. This interpreta- tion has had, and still has, wide enough currency to justify considering it the standard view. Interpreters who hold that the dialogues show a development in Platos philosophy often consider the Myth of the Chariot under this interpreta- tion to herald a necessary and revolutionary step in Platos understanding of the soul. 2 There are two aspects to this supposed revolution: the division of the apeiron 2015; 48(1): 76 98 Paul Carelli: University of North Florida Philosophy & Religious Studies, 1 UNF Drive, Jacksonville, Florida 32233, United States, E-Mail: [email protected] 1 Plutarch, Platonic Questions IX.1. 2 None of the positions I argue for in this paper depend on a developmental view and I take an agnostic stance on the matter of Platonic chronology in general. I reference here Platos development simply because this is often a background assumption of those holding a revolu- Brought to you by | University of Michigan Authenticated Download Date | 5/20/15 1:31 AM

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  • Paul Carelli

    Psychic Representation in Platos Phaedrus

    Abstract: The three parts of the soul in the Myth of the Chariot are most oftenunderstood to correspond to the three parts of the soul in the Republic, withthe charioteer representing the rational part of the soul, the white horse thespirited part and the black horse the appetites. Such an interpretation, how-ever, is at odds both with the suggestion at the end of the Republic that thesoul is a unity when it is free of the body and with the creation of the humansoul in the Timaeus, where the soul receives its spirited and appetitive partsonly after embodiment. Further, this interpretation causes problems with theelements of the Myth of the Chariot itself. In this paper I argue that it is betterto understand the elements in the Phaedrus myth as representing divisionswithin rational soul.

    Keywords: Plato, Phaedrus, soul

    DOI 10.1515/apeiron-2014-0018

    Introduction

    At least since the time of Plutarch1 it has been a commonplace that the soulrepresented by the Myth of the Chariot in Platos Phaedrus is the tri-partite soulof the Republic, with the charioteer standing for reason, the white horse for thespirited part of the soul, and the black horse for the appetites. This interpreta-tion has had, and still has, wide enough currency to justify considering it thestandard view. Interpreters who hold that the dialogues show a development inPlatos philosophy often consider the Myth of the Chariot under this interpreta-tion to herald a necessary and revolutionary step in Platos understanding ofthe soul.2 There are two aspects to this supposed revolution: the division of the

    apeiron 2015; 48(1): 7698

    Paul Carelli: University of North Florida Philosophy & Religious Studies, 1 UNF Drive,Jacksonville, Florida 32233, United States, E-Mail: [email protected]

    1 Plutarch, Platonic Questions IX.1.2 None of the positions I argue for in this paper depend on a developmental view and I takean agnostic stance on the matter of Platonic chronology in general. I reference here Platosdevelopment simply because this is often a background assumption of those holding a revolu-

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  • immortal, disincarnate soul into parts and the identification of those parts asthe appetites and passions. That the disincarnate soul is partitioned at all ap-pears to run counter to dialogues such as the Phaedo where the soul, both withand without the body, seems to be characterized as a simple unity, and RepublicX where Socrates suggests that the immortal soul may lack parts when it is se-parated from the body. On the other hand, the immortal soul is explicitly parti-tioned in the Timaeus, but there the psychic constituents the circle of thesame and the circle of the different are wholly intellective in nature, with theappetites and passions explicitly relegated to mortal soul. Given the generalconsensus among developmentalists that the Timaeus comes later than thePhaedrus in terms of chronology,3 however, understanding the horses as repre-sentations of the passions and the appetites presents an interpretive problemfor those who view this as a necessary step in Platos development since theappetites and passions are not part of the immortal soul in the later dialogue.

    For interpreters of Plato who see doctrinal consistency across the dialogues,the standard view may not cause specifically chronological concerns, but it willoffer a stumbling block to any unified view of Platos philosophy. The soul inthe so-called Socratic dialogues lacks any irrational motivational forces, as isapparent in Socrates claim that no one desires the bad and that any apparentdesire for the bad is ultimately due to ignorance, not irrational forces such aspleasure or fear. The Phaedo offers little interpretive problem for the unitarian,since there the passions and appetites are explicitly associated with the body,not the soul. In Book IV of the Republic Socrates identifies a spirited and anappetitive part of the soul, but then in Book X claims the soul displays suchpsychic variety as a result of its association with the body, making a unifiedview between this and earlier dialogues a possibility. Similarly, since the Ti-maeus characterizes the passions and appetites as parts of mortal soul whichare separate from the rational, immortal soul and which are needed for thesouls embodiment, it also lends itself to some kind of doctrinal reconciliationwith the Socratic position. The Phaedrus under the standard view, however,

    tionary view of the Phaedrus. For example, Nussbaum argues that the non-intellectual elementsare necessary both as sources for motivational energy and as guides towards understanding(1986 214 ff). Similarly, Bett holds that the appetites and passions in the immortal soul play anindispensable role in explaining how the soul transverses the heavens and periodically con-templates the forms, and are no longer things that need to be transcended in order to reach theideal state (1999 443). Both authors characterize these as improvements over an earlier view.3 Owen (1953) attempted to overthrown the traditional view that the Timaeus is late, but wasrebutted by Cherniss (1957). Though the matter is not settled, most now hold that the Timaeusis late. See, Zeyl (2000 xvixx).

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  • with its explicit attribution of spirit and appetite to the soul before it has beenembodied provides a recalcitrant impediment to unitarian interpretations.4

    So, for both the developmentalist and the unitarian, the standard view ofpsychic representation in the Phaedrus is problematic.5 In addition to these ex-ternal considerations, this view also causes problems internal to the dialogueitself. The standard view, however, has not gone unchallenged. In particular,Hermeias in the fifth, Herrmann in the nineteenth, and Robin in the twentiethcentury, all sought to interpret the Phaedrus not in terms of the tri-partitionedsoul of the Republic, but in terms of the division of the immortal soul in theTimaeus.6 Although I do not follow the details of these interpretations in thispaper, I think understanding the soul as presented in the Phaedrus in light ofthe Timaeus offers several advantages over the standard view. I hope to showthis by first indicating various problems that arise with the standard view andthen by demonstrating how understanding the soul described there as parallelto the rational soul of the Timaeus avoids these problems. Understood in thisway, the psychic representation in the Myth of the Chariot causes neither pro-blems of chronology nor problems of consistency, whether external or internalto the dialogue. Before turning directly to the Phaedrus and Timaeus, however, Iwant to prepare the ground a little first by looking at what other dialogues haveto say about the nature of the disincarnate soul. I do this to forestall a possibleobjection to my whole enterprise, which might run something like this: Otherdialogues, such as the Phaedo and Republic, very clearly posit a simple immor-tal soul lacking any parts whatsoever. The Phaedrus, then, is revolutionary atleast in its portrayal of the soul having parts when separated from the body;why not, then, think it is also revolutionary not only in attributing parts to thatsoul, but also in its characterization of those parts as appetites and passions? In

    4 For example, Rowe, defending a unitarian position, argues that the soul remains essentiallyrational for Plato throughout the dialogues, but that we always retain our horses (2007 141).If these horses represent passions and appetites and the human soul always has them then thedescription of the soul as essentially rational is misleading and seems to be in conflict with theintellectualist picture of the soul offered by Socrates in the earlier dialogues.5 It is, of course, possible to take a skeptical position on the prospect of establishing either aclear chronology or doctrinal agreement in the dialogues. Nails (1995), for instance, holds thatno consensus on the ordering of Platos dialogues has been or is likely to be reached, and thatthe best way to read the dialogues is not as presenting any coherent set of doctrines but asdocuments exhibiting double openendedness a refusal to consider as settled the status ofeither the conclusions or assumptions of philosophical arguments. The legitimacy of a skepticalposition, however, depends upon the inability to present a coherent account of Platos doc-trines; if such a coherent account can be given such skepticism loses its foundation.6 For a brief mention of these positions see Robinson (1995 1223).

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  • other words, if the particular psychological outlook that Plato puts on displayin the Phaedrus is so radically different in one respect from that found in theseother dialogues, it seems easier to countenance radical differences in other re-spects. Consistency on this point across the dialogues, on the other hand, wouldlend credence to the claim of further consistency.

    I

    The Phaedo seems to offer the toughest obstacle for showing a consistent viewon the partitioning of the soul, since the souls simplicity appears to be a majorpremise in one of the central arguments for the souls immortality. In the Affi-nity Argument (78b80b) Socrates establishes with Cebes two classes of things those things likely to be scattered and those things unlikely to be scattered and then shows that the soul belongs to the second class. Mortality is hereequated with the ability to be scattered, death being the dispersion of variousparts of what was previously whole. In order for something to become scattered,Socrates notes, it would have to have parts, so things that can be scattered arethings composed of parts, and things that cannot be scattered are things with-out parts. He then proposes that those things that are always the same andnever change are likely those without parts and the forms fit this description,whereas those things that always change, such as physical particulars, haveparts. It is important to note here that Socrates contrasts these two groups inthe strongest terms: the forms remain the same and never in any way admitany change at all ( , 78d) and particulars in relation to themselvesand each other never remain the same ( - , 78e).7 So in terms of change forms and particularsare complete opposites. Since particulars can be perceived through the sensesand forms cannot, Socrates labels the changing class of things visible and theunchanging class invisible. All that is left is to show is that soul has moreaffinity with the invisible class than it does with the visible. After a bit of quib-bling about the meaning of invisible Cebes agrees that the soul is invisible.Socrates does not stop his argument here, however, but goes on to investigatethe souls relationship to change. Presumably the reason for this move is thatno causal connection has been established between invisibility and immortality the forms have properly been labeled invisible, but it is because they are

    7 All translations are my own unless noted otherwise.

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  • changeless that they do not have parts, and it is because they do not have partsthat they cannot be scattered and so are immortal. So, Socrates needs to showthat the soul is akin to the changeless in order to allay fears of its mortality.

    The argument that Socrates makes concludes that the soul can be change-less, but not that the soul is always changeless. As already noted, the forms arecompletely changeless in every way, and particulars are constantly changing inevery way. Strictly speaking the soul belongs to neither of these classes, butinstead is that which is capable of either changing or not changing, dependingon the method of investigation it uses. When the soul investigates the alwayschanging particulars through the senses of the body it wanders around and isconfused and dizzy, as if intoxicated, insofar as it lays hold of such things(79c). On the other hand, when the soul investigates the unchanging forms itstops wandering and it remains the same in regard to those things, insofar as itlays hold of such things (79d). So, the soul is capable of both changing andremaining the same.8 Since being composite is associated with always chan-ging, and being non-composite is associated with never changing, the soul can-not be placed closer to either category without some further qualification. Thatqualification comes by making the distinction between what the soul does byitself and what it does through the body. When alone the soul investigates thechangeless forms and as long as it does so remains itself unchanged. This is thesouls natural state, whereas the investigations that it makes through the bodyare done in unison with something foreign to it, so the fact that the soulchanges is not attributable to its own nature. Thus, although the soul can bothchange and remain the same, it is part of its nature to do the later and it there-fore has more affinity to the changeless, invisible forms than to changing visibleparticulars.

    Now, for the purposes of this paper, it is unimportant whether or not thisargument establishes its conclusion. What does matter is the view of the soulthe argument represents. Even if it is granted that the soul is closer to the chan-geless forms than to particulars, it does not follow that the soul is without parts.All that has been claimed is that things that never tolerate any change what-ever are non-composites. The soul is something that does tolerate change. Ofcourse, the soul cannot be said to be composite based on what has come beforeeither, because the only things that have been claimed to be composite are par-ticulars that always change in every way, something clearly not true of the soulwhich is capable of remaining the same. It would seem, then, that since the

    8 Bostock observes that the affinity argument assigns the soul a chameleon-like character itsimply takes on the nature of whatever it is thinking of and is not much of a ground forsaying that it is more like what is unchanging than what is changeable (1986 119).

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  • soul is capable of both changing and remaining the same, it would have to beboth composite and non-composite. Strictly speaking, of course, this is impossi-ble, but it may be possible for the soul to have some features that compositeshave that allow it to change and other features that non-composites have thatwould allow it to remain in the same state. That the soul has parts like those ofthe body, physical parts capable of complete dissolution, is certainly incompati-ble with what Socrates claims in the Affinity Argument, but so is the view thatthe soul is a simple unity lacking any differentiated parts whatsoever. Indeed,the final agreement between Socrates and Cebes is that it is natural for the soulto be absolutely indissoluble, or nearly so ( , 80b italicsmine).9 There is a real possibility, then, that the soul as represented in this ar-gument in some way has parts.10

    There is further evidence that Socrates conceives the soul as having parts.In his argument that the soul is not a harmony Socrates asks Simmias, Does itseem to you that a harmony, or any other composite (), can be in a stateother than the state of the elements from which it is composed ()?(92e93a). Here Socrates characterizes a harmony as a composite, somethingformed from elements. He goes on to gain Simmias agreement that souls donot admit of degrees; all souls are equally souls. So, if the soul is a harmony,then each soul must be equally harmonious. Excellence, however, is harmonyand wickedeness disharmony. On the assumption that souls are harmonies,then, it follows that all souls are completely excellent and no soul is wicked;but this is clearly false. Since the soul can be excellent or wicked, and thereforeeither harmonious or disharmonious, it follows that the soul cannot itself be aharmony. It also follows, however, that if souls are capable of harmony and if aharmony is type of composite as Socrates has characterized it, then the soulmust be composite. So, it seems the soul is not understood by Socrates to bewithout parts in the Phaedo.

    This last claim may seem at odds with the bigger picture of the soul offeredin the Phaedo because throughout the dialogue Socrates repeatedly associatesthe appetites and passions with the body, not the soul. For example, in his sec-ond refutation of the soul as a harmony Socrates seems to rely on the evidencethat the soul rules the appetites and passions, since there are countless exam-ples of the soul opposing the passions of the body (94c). Socrates point is

    9 Gallop points out the grammatical ambiguity of Socrates qualification: nearly so can referto the souls non-composite nature or to the relative strength of the argument to establish itsconclusion (1975 142). In either case, room is left open for the soul to have parts.10 I make no claim here of the mereological status of these parts. See Shields (2001) for anargument on the compatibility of conceptual parts with the simple soul.

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  • that if the soul opposes the affections of the body, say, in refraining from drink-ing when thirsty in the interest of health, it cannot be a harmony of those parts,since the parts composing a harmony cannot be in opposition to one another.But, if the appetites and passions are affections of the body, then the only otherpart that the soul may be composed of seems to be reason, so the soul really isa simple unity after all. Beyond involving Socrates in an apparent contradiction since his claims that harmony is a kind of composite, that excellence is aharmony, and that souls can be possess excellence requires that the soul haveparts this interpretation limits him to only being able to conceive of parts ofthe soul in the terms laid out in Book IV of the Republic; the possible candidatesfor parts of the soul must be those parts identified by Socrates in his conversa-tion with Glaucon and Adeimantus, and since two of these, the appetitive andspirited parts, are explicitly associated with the body in the Phaedo, the soulitself must be composed solely of the third, reasoning part.11 If, on the otherhand, we charitably grant that Socrates is not contradicting himself in such anobvious way, then from the arguments against the soul as a harmony the viewemerges that the disincarnate soul has parts and those parts are neither appeti-tive nor spirited in nature.

    Support for the simple soul view may seem to be found in the Republic,though not in Book IV where the soul is divided into parts, but rather in Book Xwhere this division is qualified in an important way. After arguing for the im-mortality of the soul, Socrates cautions Glaucon against thinking that the soulin its truest nature is the sort of thing full of variegated colors and dissimilari-ties discordant with itself (611a). As it turns out, the model of a tri-partitionedsoul that Socrates and his interlocutors have been working with through muchof the dialogue only reflects the way the soul appears while it is associated withthe body. That association has put the soul in a condition analogous to the seagod Glaucus, whose true nature is hidden by the corrupting influence of thesea. It is only once the soul has been lifted out of the sea of its incarnate statethat we would see its true nature, whether it was multiform () or uni-form () (612a). Whatever the true nature of the soul is, then, it wouldseem to be something other than the division into rational, spirited, and appeti-tive parts, since otherwise there would be no sense in Socrates offering this cor-rective to the psychic analysis already given. But it does not follow that the dis-

    11 Bostock, borrowing the parts of the soul identified in the Republic to fill in the lacunae inthe Phaedo, concludes that Plato does not yet have a clear view of what will become his matureunderstanding of the soul (1999 4234). As I hope to show below, borrowing from the Timaeusand the Phaedrus (properly understood) instead of the Republic shows this assessment to beunwarranted.

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  • incarnate soul cannot have parts at all, and the possibility that it is possessedof more than one part is one that is explicitly left open. Nor can the souls sim-plicity be inferred from the fact that the soul has been shown to be immortal.As in the Phaedo, so here, Socrates excludes not the possibility that the soulhas parts, but only that it has parts of a certain sort. In the shorter dialogue,Socrates claims that the soul could not be made of the sort of parts that requiresomething to always be in a state of change, as physical bodies are, since thesoul is capable of remaining the same. Here in the Republic, he holds that itisnt easy for something to be eternal which is both composed of many partsand not put together in the finest way, as the soul now appeared to us (611b).The soul when associated with the body appears as something composed ofmany parts that have not been put together in the finest way and so it wouldnot be easy for this soul to be immortal. Thus, it is likely that the disembodiedsoul either lacks parts altogether, or has parts that are put together in the finestway.

    Such well-joined parts may perhaps form a more natural unit or be capableof a higher degree of harmony than the parts of the embodied soul, but howeverthat may be, what seems certain is that these parts are not the parts alreadyidentified as the seat of the passions and appetites. This comes out most clearlyin Socrates proposed program for seeing the true nature of the soul by lookingto the souls love of wisdom. Each of the three parts of the embodied soul hadpreviously been given special objects of desire in the discussion of different psy-chic pleasures: the appetitive part is characterized as a lover of money or profit,the spirited part as a lover of honor or victory, and the rational part as philoso-phical or a lover of learning (581ab). Clearly, if we are to isolate the souls loveof wisdom as the marker of its true nature, what we are isolating is the rationalpart of the soul. Thus, it seems fair to take Socrates claim to be that the rationalpart of the soul represents its true nature. This rational soul, then, when sepa-rated from the body will be composed either of a single part, or of parts thatdiffer from one another less than do the parts of the embodied soul.

    So, despite initial appearances, there is a great deal of consistency betweenthe Phaedo and the Republic on the issue of the soul. Neither dialogue requiresthe disembodied soul to be without parts: the Republic allows such a soul tohave parts, and the Phaedo seems to require it. Further, the views of the soulpresented in each dialogue deny that whatever parts the disembodied soul mayhave correspond to parts identified with the appetites and passions: the Phaedoholding that these latter are actually affects of the body and the Republic thatthey should be considered parts of the soul only when it is associated with thebody. The Timaeus is also in broad agreement with these two dialogues in itspresentation of the soul. There, the partitioning of the discarnate soul is not

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  • merely a matter of possibility or implication, but two parts the circle of thesame and circle of the different are explicitly described in terms of their com-position, function and relationship with one another: the circle of the samebeing responsible for understanding and knowledge, the circle of the differentfor true opinions and conviction (37bc). Both of these parts, then, have ra-tional functions, and no hint of appetites or passions are present within thispre-incarnate soul. The soul that is responsible for the passions and appetites isdescribed as mortal, and only comes into play when the rational soul is embo-died (69cd).12 Thus, there is good reason to believe all three of these dialoguesare consistent in presenting or at least allowing that: 1) the disincarnate soulhas parts, and 2) the parts that make up the disincarnate soul are not spirited orappetitive in nature.

    When we turn to the Myth of the Chariot in the Phaedrus we see immedi-ately that it too represents the disincarnate soul as having parts, in this case inthe form of a charioteer and two horses. Where the representation of the soul inthe Phaedrus conflicts with the other three dialogues is in how it seems to char-acterize the two horses as the spirited and appetitive parts of the soul. The dif-ference is all the greater because the image of the soul in the Phaedrus is shownbefore it has had any contact with the body, so if the two horses do indeedrepresent the lower parts of the soul, there is no way to take them as the resultof contamination from the body. The passions and appetites on this view wouldhave to be integral parts of the human soul, thus making the Phaedrus an out-lier in an otherwise broadly consistent picture offered by the other dialoguesunder consideration. As I hope to show in what follows, however, this is notcase.

    II

    There are several prima facie reasons for understanding the description of thepre-embodied soul of the Phaedrus to be a close approximation of the descrip-tion of the tri-partitioned embodied soul of the Republic. In each instance thesoul is divided into three parts. In Book IX of the Republic these three parts arelikened to a human and two beasts (588ce), which seems to correspond nicely

    12 More precisely, passions and appetites only come into play when immortal souls are inbodies which have to negotiate an external world. The world soul is itself embodied, but doesnot require either passions or appetites since there is nothing outside of itself with which itneeds to deal.

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  • to the human charioteer and two horses of the Phaedrus myth. Further, the lionand mythological monster seem echoed in the white and black horse respec-tively. Under this interpretation the white horse represents the spirited part ofthe soul, just as the lion does; the black horse stands for the appetites so fit-tingly depicted by the multi-headed beast; while the human charioteer repre-sents reason. The relationships between the three parts in the chariot modelalso seem to mirror those found in the Republic. The charioteer as the guidingprinciple of the unit lends credence to understanding it as a representation ofreason. Certainly the appetitive part of the soul is the most disordered and inneed of reasons guidance, so that this part of the soul would be represented byan ill-trained horse of bad stock is fitting. When Socrates first divides the soulin Book IV he characterizes the spirited part of the soul as always siding withreason against the appetites, and the white horse certainly does this. In addi-tion, the chariot image also preserves an ambiguity in the Republic between atri-partitioned soul and a bi-partitioned soul.13 The three parts of the chariotmodel divide between the human and non-human just as the rational and irra-tional elements of the soul would be divided. So, the image of the soul as a pairof horses guided by a charioteer seems, by and large, to fit well with what issaid of the embodied soul of the Republic.

    Despite initial appearances, however, there is a fair deal of incongruity be-tween the two depictions of the soul. To begin with, the two animals in thechariot-image are much more similar to each other than are the lion and thebeast. In the Republic, the two are completely different creatures, and one is infact of mythological origin, as Socrates himself states (588c). In the Phaedrus,on the other hand, the two creatures are of the same species and only differ inthe stock they come from and their training. It is also important to note that thecharioteer and horses form a natural unit, whereas the human, lion, and mytho-logical beast do not form any sort of recognizable unit. Of course, this may sim-ply be a consequence of the different metaphors being used in each case, butthat Plato would use a metaphor in the Phaedrus that allows for a greater unitythan that allowed by the metaphor in the Republic should not be dismissed outof hand. In Book X of the Republic it is strongly suggested that the disembodiedsoul has greater unity than the embodied soul and the image of the charioteerand pair of horses serves to show that greater unity.

    Even if the image of charioteer and horses does attribute greater unity tothe pre-embodied soul than that found in the embodied soul, it does not followthat the horses do not represent the passions and appetites; it is still possible

    13 See, Penner (1971) for an argument that Plato subscribes to a bi-partite soul in the Republicdespite the argument in Book VI.

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  • that both are found in the pre-embodied soul but in a state that allows closerassociation with one another. If this were so, the effect the body has on the soulwould be the cause of the greater disunity among the parts, since when thebody is absent the parts form a more natural unit. This interpretation, however,seems to get things the wrong way around, at least in terms of the Myth of theChariot, since it is conflict in the soul during its route around the heavens thatcauses the fall into the body, not the body that causes the conflict in the soul.14

    According to Socrates in the Republic, the soul when freed from its associationwith the body should be in its more natural state and show more what it trulyis. Now merely being separate from the body may not in itself be enough toensure that the soul is in its natural state; the soul must also be freed from theresults of such an association. But in the Phaedrus the souls have not yet beenin bodies at all, so they cannot exhibit results of any association with the body.Embodiment is the result of psychic conflict, not the cause of it.

    A defender of the standard view might well be willing to make this conces-sion. After all, the fact that the lower parts of the soul are present before embo-diment is supposed to herald a change in Platos view, so this additional changecould be welcomed. But there are still more changes that would have to be ad-mitted if the standard view is correct, since the very natures of the appetitiveand spirited parts are different in important ways if these are the parts thehorses are supposed to represent. The appetites, for example, come off muchworse in the Phaedrus. In the Myth of the Chariot the black horse is completelybad, whereas the appetites in the Republic are a mixed bag. It is true that theadmittedly grotesque image of the multi-headed beast might lead one to thinkthat the appetites are nothing but bad, yet some of the many heads are de-scribed as coming from gentle animals, which would imply that at least someappetites would naturally follow reason. Now, since Socrates is here offering adescription of the soul while embodied, one could contend that the gentle ani-mal heads spoken of are a result of positive character traits developed in life;all but the most depraved person will have developed some good appetites dur-ing a lifetime. The appetitive part of the soul, however, is described as beingable to grow and change its heads on its own accord ( ), which implies that it can do this without the aidof reason or education (588c). So, by its very nature the appetitive part of thesoul in the Republic is not wholly bad and can therefore serve a positive role inthe soul, just as the artisans of the Kallipolis serve a positive role in the city.

    14 This underlines a general problem with understanding the horses to be appetites and pas-sions; as Robin points out, if the soul already has appetites and passions with it, then whatexactly is the fall (1908 162)?

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  • In contrast, the black horse of the Phaedrus is described as the opposite ofits beautiful and good counterpart (246b), and lacks any positive role to play inthe soul. Without the black horse, the souls of mortals would not fall, remainingin their circuits around the heavens. The fall from heaven has sometimes beeninterpreted in a positive light, as a move by Plato to rehabilitate the appetites,15

    but such an interpretation seems implausible when taken in the context of thewhole myth. Since the souls of mortals only fall because of the waywardness ofthe black horse, in order for the black horse to have some positive role somegood would have to come to the soul from its fall and return to heaven that itwould otherwise lack. But the only apparent change in the soul that goesthrough such a journey is undergone by the black horse itself. When the soul ofthe philosopher in love comes into contact within sight of the beloved, the char-ioteer and white horse already react properly, both filled with the belief thatseeking sexual union with the boy is wrong (254b); it is the black horse thatneeds to be humbled enough to follow the charioteers warnings (254e). So, itseems only the black horse is changed, becoming tamer as a result of the char-ioteers successful training. It may be tempting to think that the process of hav-ing to tame the black horse has somehow benefitted the charioteer; that per-haps the charioteer is better for having struggled against the lustful passion ofthe black horse. The result of the struggle, however, is for the charioteer andhorses to eventually find themselves back on the heavenly circuit, and there isno indication that their chances of a future fall have been lessened in the leastby the travails they suffered while embodied; there is no indication that thejourney below has placed them in a better position than they would have beenin had they not fallen.

    A similar reply could be made to the objection that according to Socratesthe black horse is the cause of the other parts of the soul being lead forward tothe boy; it is only after this that the charioteer, now close enough to see theboys face, remembers the real nature of Beauty, and so the black horse is theimmediate and even necessary cause of the recollection of what is beyond hea-ven.16 But again, since it is the black horse that was the cause of the fall awayfrom what is beyond heaven, there seems to be no net gain if now that samehorse is the catalyst for the return. The soul without a black horse will alwaysbe better off than the soul with one because there is nothing good about that

    15 See note 2.16 So argues Belfiore (2006 187194), following and expanding upon Ferrari (1987 185203).Both Belfiore and Ferrari deny an exact correspondence between the psychic capacities repre-sented in the chariot myth with the parts of the soul in Republic IV, but both argue that theblack horse has a legitimate, positive role to play in the soul.

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  • horse. Putting aside considerations of how the soul originally fell and focusingsolely on the encounter between the soul and the beloved does not place theblack horse is any better light. The charioteer and the white horse are describedas pulling back from the boy because they are angry at being forced to do some-thing dreadful and unlawful ( 254b), butit does not follow from this that either would lack the motivational force to ap-proach the boy in an inoffensive, lawful manner; an inoffensive, lawful ap-proach would be just as capable of leading to the eventual recollection ofBeauty that the charioteer experiences as that effected by the leaping forward ofthe black horse. The charioteer and white horse, then, are pulling back not fromthe sight of the beloved, but from the black horse. The black horse is somethingto be tamed and thereby overcome in order to bring about a good outcome, butit is not essential for such an outcome.

    The spirited part of the soul would also differ in the Phaedrus if the whitehorse is its representative. Socrates in the Republic does not characterize thespirited part of the soul as always obedient to reason, but instead says that itnever sides with the appetites against reason (440b). This leaves open the possi-bility that spirit may rebel against reason on its own. The passage from Homerthat Socrates quotes (441b) in order to illustrate that the spirited part of the soulis not identical with the calculating part is from the opening scene of Book XXof the Odyssey in which Odysseus successfully prevents his heart from makingjust such a rebellion; presumably he could have failed at this. Finally, in thehuman-lion-beast metaphor of Republic IX, Socrates claims that the person whopursues a life of injustice may have the human (rational) part of his souldragged to wherever either of the other two lead (589a) either the appetitesor passions may drag reason around like a slave. In the Phaedrus, however, thewhite horse is entirely good and always follows the orders of the charioteer(246b; 253d254a). If this is the case, then this part of the soul is indistinguish-able from reason in terms of its actions.17 As a representation of the spirited partof the soul from the Republic this signals a substantial change, but this changeis problematic beyond questions of consistency or development in Plato. On itsown, it seems implausible in the extreme that the part of the soul that naturallyconcerns itself with honor cannot go against reason. It certainly seems possiblethat a person could have all her appetites in order and yet seek honor beyondwhat a proper functioning reason would permit, as is the case with certain hon-or-lovers from the Republic. Honor-loving becomes an entirely rational enter-

    17 So Robinson (1995 117): Though in the Phaedrus lip-service is paid to tri-partition inpractice [the white horse] cannot be distinguished from the charioteer. Their desires and aimsare invariably one and the same

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  • prise, and this rational/irrational bifurcation then has reason and spirit on oneside with the appetites on the other, rather than grouping the passions and ap-petites together against reason, and this realigning is at the price not only ofdissonance with other dialogues, but also with common experience.

    It may be possible to provide a reading of Socrates second speech in thePhaedrus that would soften these differences between the tri-partitioned soul ofthe Republic and the Myth of the Chariot by appealing to the imprecise natureof myth in general or by altering how literally metaphors are taken one couldperhaps temper the obedience of the white horse or the rebelliousness of theblack horse to bring them more in line with the spirit and appetites. Such aninterpretive move, however, is not without its own dangers to the standardview. In the myth both divine and human souls are described, and the souls ofthe gods are also represented as consisting of a charioteer and two horses,though for them both horses are beautiful and good; it is due to the goodnessof both divine horses that the gods do not go through the wing shedding tur-moil that causes the souls of mortals to descend into physical bodies. Now ithas seemed problematic to some that the souls of the gods are portrayed withhonor-seeking parts of the soul at all, especially since the main role of the spir-ited part of the soul in the Republic is to help control the appetites, which thesouls of the gods entirely lack.18 This would be less of an interpretive puzzle if therole and nature of the white horses in the Phaedrus were very different from theRepublic. The problem, then, in loosening the details of the myth to bring thedescription of the white horse more in line with the spirited part of the soul asdescribed in the Republic is that the closer this description comes to the falliblespirited part of the soul, the more inappropriate such a part becomes for the soul ofa god; and the more perfected and purified this part is made to make it moreworthy of the gods, themore it loses its resemblance to the spirited part of the soul.

    There are, then, several reasons to question the standard view that the threeparts of the pre-embodied soul in the Phaedrus represent the three parts of theembodied soul of the Republic. Despite some similarities in the two accounts the number of members, the image of a human leading beasts there are sig-nificant discrepancies, such as the natural unity of parts in the chariot model,the radical degree of the rebelliousness of the black horse and the complete

    18 Guthrie (1975 423) suggests a looser interpretation, given that Plato is here writing in mytho-logical terms, which would not read the good horses of the gods as representing the spiritedpart of the soul, but rather the whole of the divine chariot team as representing nous. Theinterpretation I give in this paper has the advantage of explaining the roles of the horses forboth mortal and divine souls, retaining the relevant distinctions in both without violating themyth itself.

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  • obedience of the white horse. There is some evidence for the standard view,however, that I have so far left unmentioned: the way the parts of the soul aredescribed once it has been embodied. When Socrates relates how the lover iscaptured by the beloved he describes the white horse as a lover of honor alongwith moderation and modesty (253d). Honor is the special object of the spiritedpart of the soul in the Republic, so this would seem to be strong evidence thatthe white horse is meant to represent spirit in the human soul. The black horse,in turn, is described as trying to make the other parts of the soul approach theboy and propose the pleasures of sex (254a). Since sex (along with food anddrink) is the usual example given of what the appetitive part of the soul seeks,it is natural to understand the black horse as representing the appetites. Thereare certainly problems with this interpretation self-control is mentioned as theexcellence displayed by the white horse, the common excellence of the soul,and no mention is made of courage, the specific excellence of the spirited partof the soul yet the description of this encounter seems to conform to the broadoutline of what one would expect given the description of the parts of the soulin the Republic. Given this conformity between the two accounts it may seemthat the standard view is the most sensible, if imperfect, interpretation of theparts of the soul as described in the Phaedrus. As I will attempt to show in whatfollows, however, a better interpretation is possible.

    III

    The previous section outlined several problems arising from the identification ofthe parts of the soul in the Phaedrus with those in the Republic. For someoneunfamiliar with the tradition that stands behind the standard view, such pro-blems might be expected, since the latter dialogue describes parts of the soulthat result from its association with the body, whereas the former describes asoul prior to any contact with the body. As has already been pointed out,whether or not the disincarnate soul has parts remains undetermined in the Re-public, but in the Timaeus not only is the disincarnate soul represented as hav-ing parts, those parts the circle of the same and the circle of the different aredescribed in some detail.19 Rather than asking, then, if the partitioned pre-em-

    19 One could argue that the world soul described in the Timaeus is embodied, since the worldbody is described first, but Timaeus makes clear that the order of his exposition is the oppositeof the order of the creation of body and soul (34bc), so the world soul is created first and thenembodied.

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  • bodied soul of the Phaedrus is the same as or close to the partitioned embodiedsoul of the Republic, I want to ask whether it is better to take the partitionedpre-embodied soul of the Phaedrus to represent the same parts as the parti-tioned pre-embodied soul of the Timaeus. Beyond the initial plausibility thatsince each dialogue describes a partitioned pre-embodied soul there might beimportant similarities between them, putting the question this way already hintsat some advantages a well-supported affirmative answer to this question wouldhave. If the horses turn out not to represent the passions and appetites thenneither the hyper-obedience of the white horse nor the thorough corruption ofthe black horse are interpretative stumbling blocks, nor is any explanationneeded as to why the gods would have a spirited part of the soul, or why anydisincarnate soul would need appetites or passions.

    In order to demonstrate the compatibility of the accounts of the soul in eachof these dialogues, it will be helpful to indicate the function of the respectivepsychic parts in the Myth of the Chariot. The first thing to notice is that func-tionally the soul is bifurcated it is the role of the charioteer to lead the teamof horses and the role of the horses to be led. Despite the very different naturesof the two horses they are both supposed to do the same thing, namely, followthe commands of the charioteer. The black horse fulfills its function very poorly,but it does not have a function different from that of the white horse. Thereshould be no initial objection to the connection between the Phaedrus and theTimaeus, then, based solely on the fact that the disincarnate soul has threeparts in the former and only two in the latter.20

    Giving and obeying commands is a rather thin description of the functionof the parts of the disincarnate soul, however, and more needs to be said aboutwhat purposes the charioteer and horses respectively serve. It is tempting tounderstand the horses as functioning to lift the charioteer aloft, allowing him torise to the ridge of heaven where he can then gaze upon the forms. This is con-sonant with the view that the appetites and passions are introduced in the Phae-drus as necessary motivational forces in the soul. There are, however, at leasttwo problems with such a view. The first involves the mechanics of the myth,namely that the whole soul is winged, not just the horses. The initial mention ofthe simile is usually translated something like the following: Let us then likenthe soul to the natural union of a team of winged horses and their charioteer

    20 Hermeias argues for a connection between the ingredients that go into constructing the twocircles of the soul in the Timaeus and the soul in the Phaedrus, with Being corresponding withthe charioteer, the Same with the white horse, and the Different with the black horse (Commen-tary on the Phaedrus 126). Since the functions of the two horses are not distinct I do see this asa fruitful parallel to pursue.

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  • ( , 246a).21 Theadjective translated as winged (), however, can be taken eitherwith team of horses () or with team of horses and their charioteer( ). A translation that preserves the ambiguity of the Greekwould be something closer to: Let us then liken the soul to the natural unionof a winged pair of horses and charioteer. That the charioteer himself haswings along with the horses is, then, in accord with a grammatically permissi-ble understanding of this initial description. This reading is supported by thedescriptions of the soul Socrates offers throughout the Myth of the Chariot heconsistently refers to the soul itself, not just the horses, as winged, and whendescribing the regrowth of the souls feathers explicitly states that this regrowthhappens under every part of the soul for long ago the whole soul waswinged ( : , 251b).So, according to the mechanics of the myth, the horses do not have the specificfunction of lifting the soul up; this is something the soul as a whole accom-plishes.

    The second problem for the view that the horses represent needed motiva-tional force for the soul is that such a view imports an anachronistic under-standing of reason into Platos thought. Supposing that the charioteer repre-sents reason, the appetites and passions represented by the horses would beneeded to provide motivation only if reason itself lacked motivation, but un-derstanding reason in this way attributes a Humean sort of view of rationalityto Socrates account. For Hume (and others) reason merely calculates themeans to a given end, but it does not itself choose that end, this latter func-tion belonging to the passions. But in Plato reason always has a desire for thegood (though in the Phaedrus, as in other dialogues, the beautiful plays surro-gate for the good). For example, when the charioteer looks on the beautifulboy with whom he is in love, he himself experiences the goading of desirewithout the aid of either of the horses (253e). The horses themselves also feeldesire in the presence of beauty, but this desire adds nothing positive to theexperience of the charioteer the white horse is obedient and so merely dupli-cates the charioteers desire and the desire the black horse manifests actuallyneeds to be opposed in order for the charioteer to fulfill his own. So it wouldseem that desiderative motivation is not what the horses provide to the chario-teer.

    If, then, it is not the function of the horses to lift the charioteer up to theheavens, it is difficult to see what purpose they could serve. It seems this diffi-

    21 This is Nehamas and Woodruffs translation as found in Cooper 1997.

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  • culty is due, at least in part, to the assumption that there is a stark and funda-mental difference between the charioteer and the horses, which in turn is a con-sequence of viewing the Phaedrus as a work making a revolutionary revision toPlatonic psychology. Since reason is already represented in the Republic as ahuman being, so the story would go, and since reason is the true soul, i.e. thesoul that survives death, then the myth in the Phaedrus seems to be addingsomething distinct to reason, since the human being is now joined by a pair ofhorses. These horses, then, must serve some purpose that previously the humanbeing was unable to perform alone; their addition would be frivolous otherwise.Whereas previously Plato thought that immortal soul was entirely rational, helater realized that spirited and appetitive psychic aspects were essential and soadded these to his representation of the immortal soul. If these assumptions areset aside, however, and rather than viewing the Myth of the Chariot as offeringa revision of the view in the Republic, we instead view it as offering a moreelaborate description of what is only hinted at there, then a different pictureemerges. The other dialogues discussed in this paper all agree that the disincar-nate soul is the rational soul and all either require or allow this rational soul tohave parts. So, since the charioteer and horses stand for the disincarnate soul,it seems reasonable to take the charioteer and horses together as representingthat rational soul. The question then becomes why represent the rational soulas a winged charioteer and a team of winged horses and what different rationalfunctions, if any, these different parts represent.

    Shortly after introducing the soul simile, Socrates states that All soul takescare of everything lacking soul, and transverses all of heaven (246b). He hadalready identified soul as a self-mover that is the spring and source of motionin every other thing that moves (245c). Representing the soul, then, as a char-ioteer and horses seems fit the soul would have to traverse a vast area inorder to look after everything that moves and chariots are just to sorts of thingsthat are used to transverse vast areas. In addition to the souls horizontal move-ment is a vertical movement upwards, made possible because the charioteerand horses are winged. This vertical movement, however, is not unrelated tothe horizontal scope of the souls rule, but the latter depends upon the former,since being in perfect condition and winged it travels through the air and ad-ministers the entire universe (246bc). It is only when the soul sheds its wingsthat it settles down taking on an earthly body. In the myth, then, it is theattainment of altitude that allows the soul to rule over the whole universe and aloss of altitude that narrows the souls rule, ultimately limiting that rule to thescope of a single body. But what is it about this altitude that allows or enablesto the soul to have dominion over everything? The details of Socrates descrip-tion of what the soul experiences at the top of heaven are not always consis-

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  • tent,22 but at least three points seem clear. First, at the topmost part of heaventhe charioteer, and only the charioteer, can look upon the stock of true knowl-edge (247c). Second, this true knowledge is knowledge of what really iswhat it is and is contrasted with the knowledge that comes to be, and be-comes somehow different as it is with the different things that we now call real(247de). Third, the wings of the whole soul are somehow nourished by thistrue knowledge (247e; 248bc).

    The object of all true knowledge is evidently the forms. The phrase trueknowledge is a redundancy in English, but the point Socrates is trying to makeis clear enough: There is a difference between what people consider to beknowledge and what actually counts as knowledge. What is often consideredknowledge, the knowledge that is close to change, seems to describe what iscalled opinion in other dialogues, and even here, the souls that fail to see thereality above heaven are said to go away and feed on opinion (248b). If, then,knowledge is only possible concerning what is above heaven (the forms), andconcerning what is below heaven only opinion is possible, then knowledge andopinion have separate domains. Since only the charioteer is able to see theforms above the ridge of heaven, knowledge is the specific function of the char-ioteer. The horses, on the other hand, are unable to attain knowledge and arelimited to opinion.

    This fits well with the horizontal and vertical aspects of the souls move-ments. The chariot is able to cover a large area in part because of the horseswhose specific function seems to be to range over the whole of the physicalworld. This physical world, what in the Republic is called the intermediate be-tween that which is not and that which purely is (479d), serves as the objectof the power of opinion. The horses, then, represent the souls power to opine,the power that regards the physical world and how things in that world seem.In order to have an all-encompassing perspective on this world that takes every-thing into account, however, the chariot also needs to fly high. It is able to dothis because of its wings, which are nourished by a vision of what is, somethingonly the charioteer can achieve. So, the charioteer represents the souls powerto know what is, the power that looks to the highest reality, the forms.

    The functions of these parts of the disincarnate soul of the Phaedrus corre-spond to the functions of the parts of the disincarnate soul of the Timaeus. AfterTimaeus has described the composition of the world soul as the circle of the

    22 For example, the whole soul is said to be winged, and the sights beyond heaven are whatnourishes these wings, yet the horses are said to be given nectar and ambrosia when stabledafter their flight, and the best part of the soul the human charioteer is said to feed on grassin the pasture where truth stands (247e248c).

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  • same and the circle of the different he describes how the Demiurge fashionedthe visible world inside of the soul, with the soul covering the corporeal allaround on the outside (36e). Since the circle of the different has been assignedthe inner movement of the soul while outer movement is assigned to the circleof the same, the former regards what is within the sphere of the soul the visi-ble corporeal world; while the latter regards what is outside the sphere of thesoul the invisible forms. The soul is subsequently able to give two differenttypes of account depending on what it comes into contact with:

    . . . whenever it happens that [the account] concerns something perceptible and the cir-cle of the different, going straight, proclaims it to the whole of its soul, firm and trueopinions and beliefs come about; and again, whenever [the account] concerns somethingintelligible and the circle of the same, being well-rounded, declares it, necessarily under-standing and knowledge result. (37bc)

    So, just as the charioteer looks beyond the ridge of heaven at the forms, thecircle of the same turns beyond the corporeal and comes in contact with theforms; and just as the horses range all over heavens above the corporeal worldbelow, the circle of the different turns within and comes in contact with theperceptible. In both cases the soul remains unified. When the circle of the dif-ferent forms an opinion its proclamation is described as happening throughoutthe whole soul and it seems reasonable to take the proclamations of the circleof the same to also be made to the whole soul. Likewise, the charioteer andhorses all travel together.

    There is still a disparity in the number of parts of each soul, however, thatneeds to be addressed. The disincarnate soul is divided into two parts in theTimaeus and into three parts in the Phaedrus. Although the natural divide be-tween the human charioteer on one side and the horses on the other mitigatessomewhat this disparity, it does not explain why there needs to be two horses,especially two horses of such different character as those found in mortal souls.The answer, I suggest, lies in the connection between the psychic function thehorses are meant to represent and the nature of the domain this function is setover, which also finds a parallel in the Timaeus. The circle of the same is theonly part of the soul that the Demiurge permitted to be undivided ()whereas the circle of the different he divided () in six places producingseven parts (36d). The undivided nature of the circle of the same corresponds tothe indivisibility of the objects about which that part of the soul produces un-derstanding and knowledge, namely the intelligible forms. The divided natureof the circle of the different, on the other hand, corresponds to the divisiblenature of the perceptible objects about which that part of the soul producesopinions. Although the horses are not seven in number, the fact that the part of

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  • the soul they represent is divided and in contrast to the unity of the other partmatches well what is found in the Timaeus. In the case of the souls of the gods,then, it is not that the two horses have functions separate from one another each horse attending to a separate aspect of perceptible objects, for example but instead it is their very plurality which corresponds to the multifaceted, scat-tered nature of things that come to be. This recalls the point made above aboutthe relationship between objects and the powers of the soul found in the Phae-do. Since the soul is able to investigate both changing and composite percepti-ble objects and unchanging, non-composite reality, it must in some sense bechangeable and composite, while in another sense changeless and not compo-site. Of course, since the disincarnate soul has parts it is composite taken as awhole, but one of these parts of the soul is itself composite and characterizedby its diversity of number, while the other is in itself non-composite and charac-terized by its singularity.

    This parallel between divisibility and unity among the doxastic and noeticparts of the soul in both dialogues explains why there are multiple horses andworks well with the souls of gods, but it does not explain why the horses ofhuman souls are so different from one another. Under the standard view thedifferent horses of the human soul represent different psychic desires one ap-petitive, one spirited and so their difference, though in degree problematic forthe reasons given above, is understandable. If the horses, as a pair, represent asingle doxastic power of the soul, then why is there such a stark difference intheir character? And if this difference is in some way necessary for the doxasticfunction in human souls, then why are the horses of the gods identical to oneanother?

    It is important to note that the difference between divine and human soulin the Phaedrus is not limited to the fact that human souls have a black horse,since the crippling of souls and the breaking of wings is explicitly tied to thebadness of the charioteers ( , 248b).Thus, the difference between the images of divine and mortal soul is not limitedto the black horse of the human soul, but is instead manifest by a certain defi-ciency in both halves of what I am characterizing as the bifurcated rational soul the unruliness of one of the horses and the incompetence of the charioteer.Human soul, then, when compared to the divine, falls short both in the imper-fection of its ability to form true opinions about the perceptible world, as wellas the imperfection of its ability to know the forms. It will be fruitful, therefore,to look in the Timaeus for something corresponding to the imperfection of theentire soul as presented in the Phaedrus. The disparity between the rational ca-pacities of the human and the divine is a theme found throughout Plato and theTimaeus is no exception. When the demiurge turns to make the souls of mortal

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  • beings, he proceeds to put in his mixing bowl the leftovers from before, mixingthem in somewhat the same way, though these were no longer pure and uni-form, but were a second and third grade of purity (41d). Human souls are com-posed of the same sorts of ingredients as both the world soul and the souls ofthe gods, and are mixed in the same sort of way, but the quality of those ingre-dients is impure. So too, the human soul in the Phaedrus is an impure versionof divine soul. The souls of the gods represent ideals in which beliefs about thecorporeal world are always in harmony with knowledge of the forms for thegods things always seem to be the way they are. In mortal soul, the black horserepresents not a function of the soul separate from that represented by thewhite horse, but the same function performed poorly; that tendency in humansto form false opinions about the world they inhabit, opinions that are in conflictwith the way things are. It is this tendency along with our inability to clearlyunderstand the forms that is represented by the unruliness of one of the horsesand the relative incompetency of the charioteer.

    Conclusion

    Given the problems with the standard view of psychic representation in thePhaedrus, such a view should be abandoned and instead the charioteer andhorses should be taken to represent the parts of the rational, disembodied soul.More than solving several problems internal to the dialogue, this interpretationoffers a more consistent picture of the soul across several dialogues. This is agreater level of consistency than is often granted Plato, but absent strong evi-dence to the contrary, consistency should carry more weight than contradic-tion.

    Acknowledgements: I would like to thank my colleagues Bryan Bannon, AaronCreller, Erinn Gilson, Jon Matheson, and Sarah Mattice for many helpful com-ments and questions, George Rudebusch for several useful suggestions, an anon-ymous reader at Apeiron for identifying weak spots in need of shoring up, andAlison Bruey for her constant support. I would like to especially thank my disser-tation director, David Bradshaw, who was the catalyst for my initial investigationinto the representation of the soul in the Phaedrus. Any weaknesses in the viewpresented here are, of course, attributable to me alone.

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